OBSERVATORY OF ILLICIT ECONOMIES IN WEST AFRICA
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ISSUE 4 | JUNE 2022
OBSERVATORY OF
ILLICIT ECONOMIES
IN WEST AFRICA
SUMMARY HIGHLIGHTS
1. Cattle rustling spikes in Mali amid increasing political 3. The strategic logic of kidnappings in Mali and
isolation: Mopti region emerges as epicentre. Burkina Faso.
On 18 June 2022, suspected members of the Islamic The international focus on the issue of kidnapping
State in the Greater Sahara killed at least 20 civilians and as a business in the Sahel has dropped dramatically,
seized cattle belonging to residents of Ebak village in in large part due to a reduction in the number of
Anchawadi commune, 35 kilometres north of Gao. Three Western nationals falling victim to it. However,
months earlier, on 19 March, residents of Niougoun, a the phenomenon has far from disappeared. On
village in Segou region in central Mali, lost more than 200 the contrary, the kidnapping industry in central
heads of cattle to suspected jihadists. These incidents Mali and northern Burkina Faso surged in 2021
are merely two examples of many recent cattle-rustling and this trend shows no signs of slowing in 2022,
incidents in central and northern Mali, an illicit activity that with most victims being locals caught in the battle
has continued to surge following a marked spike in 2021. between the numerous armed groups operating
Armed groups, including jihadists, are central players in in the region. Analysis of the targets of kidnapping
the lucrative cattle-rustling economy, exerting significant in central Mali and northern and eastern Burkina
control over the market in certain areas and exploiting Faso, two of the regions most affected, suggests
existing community vulnerabilities. The 2021 uptick in that although kidnapping for ransom is a primary
cattle rustling has occurred in parallel with Mali’s growing source of revenue for armed groups, abductions
political isolation and linked shifts in the country’s security operate primarily as a war instrument, wielded
tectonics. The restructuring of the political and security for purposes of intimidation, punishment and
landscape in Mali has seemingly led to a greater impunity recruitment, with profit often featuring only as a
for both non-state actors and state or state-affiliated secondary motivation.
actors linked to the cattle-rustling economy.
4. A surge in cybercrime in Oyo State, Nigeria, has
2. Banditry in northern Niger: geographic diffusion and triggered a spike in arrests and the involvement
multiplication of perpetrators. of anti-crime group Amotekun, but alternative
A bandit attack on 8 April 2022 that left two Nigerien responses are needed.
military officers dead illustrates two trends shaping armed In February 2022, a commander of Western
banditry dynamics in northern Niger since late 2021. The Nigeria Security Network, codenamed ‘Operation
first of these is the geographic diffusion of attacks, which Amotekun’, reported the group’s focus on cracking
have spread southwards from their original concentra- down on cybercriminals, known locally as ‘Yahoo
tion in remote areas close to the Libyan border. The April Boys’. The commander labelled Yahoo Boys a
attack occurred in a new hotspot – an area called Plaque ‘menace’ affecting the security of the south-
50, located just 300 kilometres north-east of Agadez. western states. This came amid an upsurge in
A second trend is the fragmentation of actors behind cybercrime in south-west Nigeria, despite
the attacks, with both Libyan and (particularly) Nigerien escalating arrests. Law enforcement has scaled up
criminal groups becoming increasingly prominent. These responses in Oyo State, and particularly the state
operate differently from Chadian armed groups, who are capital Ibadan, a cybercrime hub where Yahoo Boys
long-standing perpetrators of banditry in the swathes of are prominent. However, responses appear to be
Nigerien desert hugging the Libyan border. This expan- missing the mark. The inclusion of poorly regulated
sion in the constellation of armed groups preying on licit vigilante groups in responses to predominantly
and illicit activities in northern Niger presents a marked non-violent illicit markets risks escalating griev-
deterioration in the regional security situation. ances and instability, which Nigeria can ill afford.
ABOUT THIS ISSUE
The fourth issue of the Risk Bulletin of Illicit Economies Across areas of the Sahel and in Nigeria, kidnap for
in West Africa focuses primarily on the Sahel region, ransom operates as a prominent illicit economy that
an area suffering from high levels of violence, conflict multiplies harms to communities, and in some contexts
and instability. This issue leads with a story on the provides significant revenues to armed groups. The third
surge in cattle rustling since 2021; in Mopti region (cen- story of this issue examines how the dynamics surround-
tral Mali), the number of cattle stolen rose threefold, ing the kidnapping industry in Mali and Burkina Faso have
from an average annual figure of approximately 42 000 changed over the past five years, culminating in a surge of
to almost 130 000 in 2021. The 2021 uptick in cattle incidents in 2021 and 2022 that target first and foremost
rustling has occurred in parallel with Mali’s growing local populations. While previously kidnap for ransom
political isolation and linked shifts in the country’s has predominantly been assessed through the lens of
security tectonics. revenue flows to armed actors, this article explores how
it is used as a tool in armed-group governance.
Across the border in neighbouring Niger, recent attacks
illustrate two key trends shaping armed banditry The final article explores the involvement of self-defence
dynamics in northern Niger since late 2021, namely group Amotekun in responding to a surge in cybercrime
the geographic diffusion of bandit attacks and the in Nigeria’s Oyo State, in a clear case of mission creep.
fragmentation of the actors responsible for them. This Development responses are needed to complement
expansion in the constellation of armed groups preying already scaled up law enforcement responses – the
on licit and illicit activities in northern Niger presents a inclusion of poorly regulated vigilante groups in respons-
marked deterioration in the regional security situation. es to predominantly non-violent illicit markets risks
escalating grievances and instability, rendering responses
counterproductive.
1. Cattle rustling spikes in Mali amid increasing political isolation: Mopti region
emerges as epicentre.
On 18 June 2022, suspected Islamic State in the Greater communities launch retaliatory attacks and counter
Sahara (ISGS) jihadists killed at least 20 civilians and seized attacks in Mali and in the border areas.’4
cattle belonging to residents of Ebak village in Anchawadi
commune.1 The gunmen arrived in Ebak, 35 kilometres Although cattle rustling is not a new phenomenon, since
north of Gao, on motorbikes. This attack was typical of 2017, armed-group involvement in the industry in central
the ISGS, which is known to operate in Mali’s Gao region.2 and northern Mali has vastly swollen the scale of the
market, and its associated profits. According to official
Three months earlier, on 19 March 2022, residents of figures, the volume of cattle rustled in Gao, Ménaka,
Niougoun, a village in Segou region in central Mali, lost Mopti and Timbuktu regions in Mali in 2021 was un-
more than 200 heads of cattle to suspected jihadists.3 precedented. In Mopti region (central Mali), the number
After several futile missions to recover the cattle, tradi- of cattle stolen rose threefold, from an average annual
tional hunters known as the Dozo, who provide security figure of approximately 42 000 to almost 130 000 in
in the area, instead unlawfully seized a handful of heads 2021.5 Community members and local officials inter-
of cattle from a neighbouring village. This episode viewed in Mopti, Gao, Ménaka and Timbuktu regions in
sparked a stand-off between the two communities and March and April 2022 confirmed that cattle rustling has
local police, with tensions rising as women and young since continued to escalate across the first half of 2022.6
people took to the streets to protest, demanding the
release of the stolen cattle. Yet, in parallel to this escalation, state responsiveness
in many parts of these regions has reportedly decreased
This incident in Segou is merely one of many currently over the past year.7 According to one community leader
fuelling tensions between different factions of commu- in Timbuktu region, while ‘jihadists go wherever they
nities, and with law enforcement, across central Mali and want on motorcycles, even in areas where bans on
also in the north of the country. According to one village motorbikes and vehicles remain in force,’8 local adminis-
chief in northern Mali’s Timbuktu region, ‘cattle rustling tration and security officials of the Malian government
is directly linked to the current armed conflict, as have increasingly moved to nearby urban areas, and
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 4 • JUNE 2022 2 WEST AFRICA REGION
are less likely to act on cases of cattle rustling reported cattle were reported stolen in 2021 – is the epicentre of
to them. Interviews with other community members in
9
cattle-rustling activity in the country, with Badiagara and
these regions confirmed these trends.10 Koro cercles particularly affected.15 According to official
figures, the number of rustled herds in Mopti in 2021
The involvement of armed groups in cattle rustling, and rose to more than those recorded in 2018, 2019 and
the confinement of many state officials to urban centres 2020 combined (see Figure 1).16
in these regions in central and northern Mali, appears to
have accelerated in the wake of the 2021 and 2022 Herds from Koro, Bandiagara and Bankass – the three
withdrawals of French and other European forces in cercles in Mopti region with the largest number of stolen
response to diplomatic and political fallout between cattle in 2021 – are transported to Burkina Faso and Niger
Mali and its key Western partners.11 via key transit nodes such as Sikasso, Bamako and Mopti, as
well as to Mauritania through Ouroali and Tenenkou.17
CATTLE RUSTLING IN MALI ESCALATES SINCE 2021
Previously limited and occurring sporadically, cattle rus- The 2021 uptick in cattle rustling has occurred in parallel
tling has grown into a major threat since the onset of the with Mali’s growing political isolation, and linked shifts in
Malian security crisis in 2012. According to the president the country’s security tectonics. In Mopti region, since
of Bamako district’s Regional Chamber of Agriculture, ‘it is December 2021, the Malian military has intensified joint
no longer simple theft, but looting of herds. They gather operations with the Wagner Group.18 At the same time,
hundreds or even thousands of cattle and sell them in the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
neighbouring countries.’ 12
Mali (MINUSMA) has reportedly experienced increased
access challenges.19 Concerns regarding human rights
While prior to the present security crisis cattle rustling violations by military officers in Mopti escalated in the
was largely considered a form of ‘ordinary banditry’, since second quarter of 2022.20 The February announcement of
2017 it has evolved into a highly organized form of crimi- the withdrawal of French troops from Malian territory, and
nality, involving a wide range of different actors, including the May announcement of Mali’s exit from the G5 Sahel,
bandits and armed groups with or without ideological including the joint force aimed at combating armed groups
orientation, including extremist groups.13 in the region, signal further political isolation.21 Although
MINUSMA’s mandate is expected to be renewed on 30
Cattle rustling reached new volumes in 2021 (with June, it is likely that the UN peacekeeping mission will
over 170 000 heads of cattle reported stolen) and has continue to face operational and security challenges, par-
reportedly continued to grow throughout the first half ticularly in Mopti region, in light of the increasing political
of 2022. The Mopti region – where over 125 000
14
isolation on the part of the Malian transitional authorities.
140 000
129 493
126 456
Youwarou 4 550
120 000 Tenenkou 5 545
Djenné 6 731
Mopti 7 986
100 000 Douentza 8 757
Number of cattle stolen
Bankass 10 755
80 000
Koro 20 020
Mopti region
60 000
40 000
Bandiagara 65 149
20 000
2018–2020 2021
FIGURE 1 Cumulative number of cattle stolen in Mopti region, Mali, 2018–2020 versus 2021.
SOURCE: Office of the Governor of Mopti Region, Report of the regional conference on cattle theft in the Mopti region, Ministry of
Territorial Administration and Decentralization, 7 December 2021
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 4 • JUNE 2022 3 WEST AFRICA REGION
THE CENTRAL ROLE OF ARMED GROUPS IN of the proceeds.27 This creates a cycle of vulnerability:
CATTLE RUSTLING a cattle owner in Timbuktu region noted, ‘any youth in
Armed groups in Burkina Faso and Mali, including jihadist Mali who saw their parents being robbed of herds by
groups, are central players in the lucrative cattle-rustling bandits, or lost their parents to bandits, jihadists or the
economy. Additional pivotal players include trans-
22
military, have become easy prey for bandits and jihadists
porters, who drive trucks long distances to major cities to recruit.’28
within Mali and across the borders; traders who coordi-
nate the sale of cattle at local and cross-border markets; In some areas of central Mali and northern Burkina Faso,
and state-embedded actors, including corrupt individuals extremist groups exert a significant degree of control
in the military, security forces, state administrators and over the cattle-rustling market, dictating prices and trad-
politicians, who protect or turn a blind eye to the trade ing mechanics. For instance, in 2020, local criminal-gang
(see Figure 2).23 leaders in northern Burkina Faso with direct links to
al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin
Armed groups operating in Mopti region target cattle (JNIM) rescheduled previously regular market days
while they are grazing in fields, being herded on so that they could sell stolen herds quickly on ad hoc
transhumance routes or transported in trucks along days to beat spot-check patrols by French troops and
key roads. In one instance, in Mopti region’s Djenné
24
spontaneous drone strikes by foreign forces.29
cercle in October 2021, herders who had moved their
cattle to pastures in nearby Méma Plains pasturelands 25 In return for protection, jihadists also impose herd taxes
were robbed of their herds by bandits as they sought on whole villages or larger areas under their control.
to return home. Herders who offered any resistance This policy is enforced through the seizure of cattle
were kidnapped and their families forced to give cattle from non-compliant villagers.30 For example, since 2021,
as ransom.26 In some cases, trucks transporting already Youwarou cercle in Mopti region has been under signifi-
stolen cattle are themselves the target of attacks. cant control of the Katibat Macina (a constituent group
of JNIM), which imposes zakat on the owners of herds.
Armed-group tactics exploit existing community vul- Katibat Macina gunmen demand a bull calf for every 30
nerabilities. According to a herder in Timbuktu region, heads of cattle and a heifer calf for every 40 heads of
armed groups regularly engage groups of unemployed cattle. The jihadists sell the zakat cattle on the local mar-
youth, arm them, instruct them to carry out cattle- kets and pocket half of the proceeds, distributing the
rustling attacks on their behalf, and reap the majority other half to vulnerable members of the community.31
Cattle rustlers Intermediaries Buyers
Target herders on transhumance, Transport and sell stolen cattle Operate both domestically and
villages or trucks transporting cattle within Mali or across national internationally.
along highways, or seize cattle for borders.
illicit taxation. ■ Local and foreign wholesale
■ Middlemen: traders and cattle traders from Ghana,
■ Unemployed youth transporters directly linked Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Nigeria and
commissioned by jihadists to jihadists and self-defence Benin
■ Armed bandits and criminal groups ■ Butchers in Bamako,
gangs acting independently or ■ Corrupt politicians and local Ouagadougou and Niamey
having direct links with jihadists administrators providing direct
or self-defence groups or indirect political protection,
■ Jihadist or self-defence militia including the release of
gunmen who seize cattle for arrested cattle rustlers and
illicit taxation dealers in stolen cattle, among
others
■ Rogue security agents
FIGURE 2 Stolen-cattle supply chain involving local and foreign actors.
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 4 • JUNE 2022 4 WEST AFRICA REGION
Ta oudénit Bourem
Niger
Timbuktu
MAURITANIA Ber
Gao Mé na k a
Goundam T o mb o ucto u
Bassikounou Gossi Ga o
to Senegal
Ndaki N'Tillit Ménaka
MALI Hombori
Tessit
Nara Mo p ti
Fatoma
Déou Labbezanga
Ténenkou Mopti Bandiagara
Niono- Koro Boulikessi NIGER
Socoura
Samadougou Bankass
Koulikoro NIAMEY
Yolo
K ay es
Bouro S a he l
Ségou
Tominian T illa b é ri
BAMAKO
Ségou
BURKINA FASO
Nassougou
OUAGADOUGOU
er
Nig
E a st
Sika sso
Sikasso BENIN
GHANA TOGO
GUINEA
Main cross-border markets
Ouangolodougou Cattle-rustling hotspots
Key trafficking routes for stolen cattle (Mali)
CÔTE D’IVOIRE Key trafficking routes for stolen cattle (cross-border)
FIGURE 3 Cattle-rustling routes in the Liptako–Gourma area.
Cattle in Koriomé village on the banks of Niger River. Photo: Timbuktu Centre for Strategic Studies on the Sahel
SNAPSHOT: CATTLE-RUSTLING PROFITS REAPED BY ANSAR AL-ISLAM IN BURKINA FASO
Although the Mopti region is the epicentre of cattle-rustling activity in the Sahel, many other areas are severely
affected by this illicit economy. A significant proportion of cattle rustled in Mali is transported across the border
into neighbouring Burkina Faso, where major profits can be made through the sale of stolen livestock.
As in Mali, armed groups in Burkina Faso are intimately involved in the illicit economy. Between 2017 and 2021,
the Islamic State-linked Ansar al-Islam group sold millions of heads of cattle and other livestock across the coun-
try.32 Jihadist-linked traders receive between 80 and 100 heads of cattle each to sell at very low prices, ranging
from FCFA175 000 to FCFA200 000 per head. One Burkinabe livestock trader close to Ansar al-Islam said: ‘This
is really profitable for small-scale traders in the area, where the price of a cow varies between FCFA250 000 and
FCFA500 000. We make huge profits from the herds we buy from jihadists, even though we know it is illegal.’33
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 4 • JUNE 2022 5 WEST AFRICA REGION
Cattle rustling hotspots
Aguelhok ALGERIA
Armed group presence in cattle
rustling areas Taoudénit Kida l
ISGS
Dan Na Ambassagou Kidal
JNIM
Other armed groups
MALI Tabankort
Sangha
French military bases
Bourem Ga o
French military bases Ber Ména ka
Military bases handed back to Timbuktu
Tombouctou
the Malian armed forces Goundam Gao* Agazragane
Niafunké Gossi
Ménaka
MAURITANIA
Youwarou Ansongo
Douentza Tessit
Ségou Boni Anderamboukane
Konna Labbezanga
Kou likoro Mopti Gorom-Gorom
Kay es Mopti
Niono-Socoura Famaye
Bandiagara
Tillabéri NIGER
Koro
Dougabougou Soum Tilla béri
Bankass Dori
Bapho Bourzanga
Macina Djenné Sa hel NIAMEY
Farabougou r Ségou
ige
N Bla BURKINA FASO Dosso
BAMAKO Ea st Ni
ge
r
OUAGADOUGOU Fada N'Gourma
Tenkodogo
Sikasso Sikasso
Tiekorobougou
NIGERIA
Diombougou
BENIN
GUINEA GHANA
CÔTE D’IVOIRE TOGO
FIGURE 4 Cattle-rustling hotspots and the presence of armed groups and international forces.
NOTE: *French armed forces’ withdrawal from the military base in Gao is planned for the end of the summer.
The unprecedented 2021 surge in levels of cattle groups responsible for the overwhelming majority of
rustling, particularly in Mopti region, has, according to cattle-rustling incidents, Malian state forces and the
community members and livestock traders interviewed, international forces present in the country. The restruc-
been continuing unabated in the first half of 2022. turing of the political and security landscape in Mali has
The intensification of cattle-rustling activity in central seemingly led to greater impunity for both non-state
Mali and surrounding regions has occurred in parallel actors and state or state-affiliated actors linked to the
with shifting power dynamics between the armed cattle-rustling economy in central Mali.
2. Banditry in northern Niger: geographic diffusion and multiplication of
perpetrators.
On 8 April 2022, two members of the Nigerien military the geographic diffusion of attacks, which have spread
were killed in a bandit attack near Plaque 50, an area southwards from their original concentration in remote
close to the main road, 300 kilometres north-east of areas close to the Libyan border; and the fragmentation
Agadez.34 The group of off-duty military personnel of actors behind the attacks, with both Libyan and
were travelling to Agadez in a rented vehicle when they particularly Nigerien criminal groups becoming in-
were attacked by the armed bandits, who are likely to creasingly prominent. These groups operate differently
have mistaken them for civilians. 35
from Chadian armed groups, who are long-standing
perpetrators of banditry in the swathes of Nigerien
This incident highlights two trends shaping armed desert hugging the Libyan border.
banditry dynamics in northern Niger since late 2021:
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 4 • JUNE 2022 6 WEST AFRICA REGION
PHASES OF THE ARMED BANDITRY ECONOMY OF NORTHERN NIGER
2010
Sudan stops financing Chadian rebel groups after
agreement with Chadian government. 2011
First Libyan civil war starts.
2013
Discovery of gold in northern Chad
triggers gold rush. 2014
Second Libyan civil war commences, offering
mercenary work for Chadian armed groups.
2015
The Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) and Misrata hire
Chadian fighters from the Union des forces pour la 2016
démocratie et le développement as mercenaries. Niger criminalizes human smuggling and
implements crackdown.
2019 2019
LAAF launches Operation ‘Southern Purge’ in LAAF campaign on Tripoli begins, fuelling
southern Libya, which partly intends to remove demand for mercenaries.
‘Chadian bandits’ from the area.
May–June 2020
LAAF loss of strategic al-Wattiya airbase and the city of
Tarhuna to UN-recognized Government of National
Accord-aligned forces. October 2020
Government of National Accord in Tripoli and
Security incidents are reported to start increasing, the LAAF sign ceasefire agreement.
linked to growing involvement of Chadian armed groups
on goldfields and trans-Sahelian smuggling routes.
January 2021
12 Pakistani migrants en route to Libya are kidnapped
by Chadian Zaghawa fighters in northern Niger.
June 2021
The LAAF deploys additional security forces to the
September 2021 Fezzan and conducts security operations.
The LAAF attacks the Front pour l’alternance et la
concorde au Tchad rebel based in the Fezzan.
January 2022
Theft of 60 kilograms of gold from convoy en route
to Agadez.
March 2022
Convoy of expelled migrants attacked by two April 2022
separate bandit groups in Niger. Two Nigerien military officers killed in bandit attack
near Plaque 50, 300 kilometres north-east of Agadez.
May 2022
Clash between Nigerien National Guard and
traffickers near Seguedine.
2016–mid 2020: Armed banditry in northern Niger escalates.
Mid 2020–late 2021: Growing attacks by Chadian armed groups in extreme north of Niger.
Late 2021–present: Spate of attacks by Nigerien bandits closer to Agadez (in parallel to ongoing high level of attacks by
Chadian bandits further north).
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 4 • JUNE 2022 7 WEST AFRICA REGIONAlthough armed banditry is not a new phenomenon in campaign, Chadian fighters have been key actors
northern Niger, since 2016 it has grown as livelihood operating as mercenaries for both sides. As a relatively
options have declined. The criminalization of human inexpensive yet experienced and expendable source of
smuggling, which dealt a significant blow to local liveli- front-line fighters, Chadian mercenaries became valu-
hood options, is one factor behind the growing intensity able assets in the conflict. The 23 October 2020 cease-
of banditry.36 Another is the increased smuggling of fire agreement signed between the UN-recognized
high-value commodities – such as drugs and vehicles – Government of National Accord in Tripoli and the LAAF
through north and north-west Niger, which is also rich marked a de-escalation of conflict.
in gold, making banditry there more lucrative. 37
One of the key features of the ceasefire agreement
A further increase in banditry since July 2020 cor- was, in the words of the acting head of the UN mission
relates with the growing presence of former Chadian in Libya, ‘the immediate and unconditional withdrawal
mercenaries in southern Libya, as employment for of all foreign forces and mercenaries from the entirety
Chadian fighters as mercenaries in the Libyan war has of Libya’s territory’.38 While international attention
dwindled. Chadian mercenaries are particularly present focused predominantly on the departure of Russian-
at the Kouri Bougoudi goldfield, which straddles the and Turkish-backed Syrian mercenary forces – seen as
Chad–Libya border, from where they engage in preda- instrumental to achieving peace, given their support
tory activities across northern Niger. for opposing Libyan factions in the war – this decree
similarly applied to Chadian fighters.
The spate of attacks on convoys and groups near main
roads closer to Agadez since late 2021, and the grow- Although the agreement has not been fully imple-
ing prominence of Nigerien groups, marks a further mented, the demand for mercenaries has waned, and
evolution of the region’s armed banditry economy, and many Chadian mercenaries have been demobilized
further raises the protection risks faced by migrants and returned to bases in the desert south of Murzuq
transiting the region, most commonly through the and close to the Kouri Bougoudi goldfield.39 Faced
services of human-smuggling networks. with dwindling revenue from mercenary engagement,
Chadian fighters have consolidated their positions
Since the start of the second Libyan civil war in 2014, in Sahelian criminal economies, seeking to find new
and particularly following the 2019–2020 LAAF Tripoli revenue streams and solidify existing ones.40
FACT – Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad
(Front for change and concord in Chad)
The FACT is a political and military organization created by SG Mahamat Mahdi Ali in
March 2016 in Tanua, in the north of Chad. FACT is mostly composed of Daza Goran.
CCMSR – Conseil de commandement militaire pour le salut de la république
(Council of military command for the salvation of the republic)
Founded in 2016, the CCMSR currently operates in the border regions of northern Chad,
southern Libya, eastern Niger and western Sudan. The CCMSR recruit among Kreda
Goran (northern Chad) and Arabs.
UFDD – Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement
(Union of Forces for Democracy and Development)
The UFDD is the largest group of Chadian rebel forces opposed to former President
Idriss Déby. It was formed in October 2006 under the leadership of Mahamat Nouri.
The UFDD mostly consists of Goran Anakaza.
UFR – the Union des forces de la résistance
(Union of resistance forces)
The UFR is an alliance of eight Chadian rebel movements founded in December 2008 by
Timan Erdimi, nephew of former President Idriss Déby. The UFR is largely composed of
Bideyat Zaghawa (eastern Chad).
FIGURE 5 Prominent Chadian armed groups.
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 4 • JUNE 2022 8 WEST AFRICA REGIONChadian actors have therefore become increasingly Groups move fluidly between transporting, protecting
involved in coordinating, providing protection for or and preying on licit and illicit convoys. On 21 May, a
attacking licit and illicit networks coordinating the member of the Nigerien National Guard on patrol near
transport, smuggling and trafficking of people, gold, Seguedine, a town in the middle of the Sahara Desert
vehicles, goods (including foodstuffs) and high-value in central eastern Niger, was killed while in a pursuit
drugs (such as cannabis resin and cocaine). The of suspected passeurs (smugglers), who are typically a
proceeds of such activities are significant. Chadian source of revenue for the guards.43 Instead, the quarry
fighters escorting drug traffickers through northern turned out to be well-armed traffickers, who retaliated
Niger, northern Chad and southern Libya can earn up in face of pursuit, shooting at the guards’
to around €5 000 per journey, while hijacking such vehicle and killing one. According to an actor familiar
convoys can earn up to six times that amount through with the incident, the group ‘were Tebu traffickers of
sale of the seized goods. 41
tramadol. They were not conducting a banditry opera-
tion at that time. But they could also turn to banditry on
Since mid-2020, as growing numbers of Chadian their next mission, after their trafficking operation.’44
former mercenaries turned to illicit markets for
revenue, attacks on licit and illicit networks in northern Nigerien and Chadian security forces have been
Niger and Chad have spiked. Victims typically identify
42
unable to contain their threat in the Chad–Libya–Niger
the armed groups responsible as Chadian, composed tri-border area,45 which has spurred the creation of
of members of the Zaghawa community from eastern local armed self-defence groups to protect the ability of
Chad. These Chadian groups leverage their substantial such pre-existing groups’ to participate in regional illicit
combat experience from fighting in Libya’s internal economies. For example, in April 2021, around 60 Tebu
conflicts, as well as ample hardware and vehicles passeurs created a ‘self-defence’ committee tasked with
acquired from the conflict, to operate across vast areas deterring bandit attacks in the tri-border area.46 While
between northern Chad, northern Niger and southern representatives of the committee reportedly tracked
Libya, and target well-armed criminal networks. ‘a sharp reduction in attacks in the area’ in the months
following the establishment of the self-defence com-
mittee, this decrease proved temporary, although the
committee continues to mobilize on an ad hoc basis.47
Union des forces de la résistance vehicles, undated. Photo: Social media
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 4 • JUNE 2022 9 WEST AFRICA REGIONWadi al Al Wahat 0 100 km
Shatii Brak al-Shati Jufra N
Sebha
Sebha
Awbari L i b y a n
Ghat
Wadi al Murzuq Tmassa
EGYPT
Hayaa D e s e r t
Jabba Oasis
Qatrun LIBYA
Gold mining area
Murzuq Kufra
Kufra
Gold site
S a h a r a D e s e r t
Butte/Mountain
Kouri Bougoudi Kilinje goldfield
ALGERIA Djado Ko Karama
goldfield
goldfield
Aouzou
Emi Emi
Tchibarakatene Braho Fezzane Wour
goldfield Bardai
Tibesti Miski
Agadez goldfield
Seguedine
NIGER
In Puits de
Guezzam l’Espoire Ounianga
Borkou Kebir
Ennedi-
Dirkou Est
Arlit
SUDAN
Bilma Ennedi-
Amziguer
Plaque 50 Faya- Ouest
Largeau
goldfield L'Arbre du
CHAD
Ténéré Fada
Tahoua
Agadez
Zinder Diffa
Official convoy route for growing Growing bandit attacks by Chadian armed groups, January 2022
bandit attacks since mid-2020 Theft of 60 kilograms of gold from convoy protected by
Drug smuggling routes Epicentre of growing banditry attacks, since late Nigerien military
Arms smuggling routes 2021, reportedly by Nigerien groups 21 May 2022
January 2021 Stand-off between Nigerien National Guard and
Car smuggling routes Tramadol traffickers
Kidnapping of 12 Pakistani migrants by Chadian Zaghawa
Human smuggling routes fighters
FIGURE 6 Areas of intensifying bandit attacks in northern Niger.
LATE 2021 TO PRESENT: GEOGRAPHIC A growing number of such attacks target human-
DIFFUSION AND ACTOR FRAGMENTATION smuggling convoys, presenting an escalating threat to
Since late 2021, GI-TOC monitoring has tracked a migrants transiting the region.48 On 4 March, a convoy
tangible increase in attacks by Nigerien criminal groups of circa 190 migrants expelled from Libya into Niger by
on the main roads connecting Agadez and Dirkou, Libya’s Desert Patrol Company was attacked twice by
particularly concentrated around Plaque 50, the site of armed bandits: first, by Chadian bandits, immediately
the April 2022 attack on Nigerien military officers. upon entering Nigerien territory; and second, by a dif-
ferent group of Nigerien nationals, far closer to Agadez,
These attacks are distinguishable from those typically in the Plaque 50 area.49 According to one migrant trav-
perpetrated by Chadian armed groups, who predomi- elling on the convoy, in the second attack: ‘The bandits
nantly operate in the vast desert areas in the extreme came on the road, some guys came on motorbikes and
north of Niger and Chad, and on remote routes rather robbed us; they did not kill anybody, but they carried
than close to main thoroughfares. Nigerien networks guns, and the robbers were from Agadez.’50
typically seek to steal fuel, vehicles and goods rather
than the high-value commodities transiting the far Bandits have also targeted convoys carrying gold
northern areas, which are typically the target of shipments from the Djado goldfields towards Agadez.
Chadian armed groups. It is likely that these local For example, in January 2022, 60 kilograms of gold
bandits lack the operational capacity and combat were stolen from a convoy protected by the National
experience of Chadian bandits. Guard.51
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 4 • JUNE 2022 10 WEST AFRICA REGIONStakeholders based in the region posit that an overall from mercenary work, they are likely to continue seek-
deterioration of economic opportunities is likely to be ing revenue from the criminal economy of the central
driving more actors to rely on banditry as an alternative Sahara.56 While the ‘national dialogue’ promised by
livelihood. Further, the impunity enjoyed by the vast the Transitional Military Council as a stepping stone
majority of attackers to date may have encouraged to elections raised hopes that some fighters would
additional actors to seek a share of banditry proceeds.52 be able to return home,57 its repeated postponement
has dashed these. On 2 May, authorities announced
According to several contacts, the bandits appear the indefinite postponement of the dialogue, originally
undeterred by the presence of military personnel, and intended to occur in December 2021, pointing to
regularly target vehicles travelling with the military a drawn-out period of political stalemate with few
convoy between Agadez and Dirkou. The Nigerien
53
concrete attempts to re-engage with current and
military is ill-equipped to respond to banditry, and has former rebels.
on occasion been said to avoid crossing paths with
heavily armed bandits.54 Nigerien’s lucrative banditry economy is swelling: new
players are attracted as alternative livelihoods become
IMPLICATIONS scarcer, while long-standing players face limited exit
Armed banditry is a growing threat across expanding prospects. Banditry erodes existing livelihoods, raising
areas of Niger, as alternative livelihoods dwindle and costs for both licit and illicit operators in the region, and
conflicts in the country’s neighbouring states have compounding existing economic strain. As Africa is buf-
cross-border implications. Although a long-standing feted by spiralling global inflation rates and economic
phenomenon in northern Niger, banditry has intensified woes look set to grow, banditry appears set to become
since late 2021, including between Agadez and Dirkou, an ever-greater problem in Niger.
south of the remote north-east already afflicted by
Chadian attacks.55 In northern Niger, according to a contact close to
the Seguedine ‘self-defence committee’: ‘The best
The poor reintegration prospects faced by members way to effectively fight against banditry activities is
of Chadian armed groups mean that they are likely to through collaboration between the civilian population
continue being prominent players in armed banditry. of the area with the Nigerien army, and that [the latter
The Chadian government has a poor track record carries out more official actions against bandits].’ Given
with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration the Nigerien army’s limited resources, particularly
processes, discouraging Chadian fighters from surren- considering the vast terrain under their mandate, such
dering to government forces. As the Libyan ceasefire steps appear distant. As the contact concluded, ‘this
holds and Chadian fighters face dwindling revenues phenomenon is far from over.’58
3. The strategic logic of kidnappings in Mali and Burkina Faso.
The international focus on the issue of kidnapping as operating across central Mali and other countries in
a business in the Sahel has dropped dramatically, in West Africa) and government sources, as soon as the
large part due to a reduction in the number of Western hunters heard gunshots, they began a search for the
nationals falling victim to it. However, the phenome-
59
women, leading the jihadists to abandon their kidnap
non has far from disappeared. The kidnapping industry attempt and flee.60 However, according to a source with
in central Mali and northern Burkina Faso continues local knowledge of the incident, the version of events
to swell, with most victims being locals caught in the relayed by the Dozo hunters was an attempt to conceal
crossfire between the numerous armed groups operat- a far less flattering truth.
ing in the region.
In reality, the jihadist group Jama’at Nasr al-Islam
On 5 May 2022, 31 women were kidnapped in Femaye wal Muslimin (JNIM) had kidnapped the women and
commune, Djenné cercle, in the central region of Mopti, released them several hours later. They ordered them
Mali. According to the Dozo hunters (traditional hunters to go to the nearby town of Djenné, 5 kilometres away,
often carrying out the role of community protectors, and stay there overnight before returning home.
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 4 • JUNE 2022 11 WEST AFRICA REGION120
Number of individuals 100
80
60
Est
40
Centre-Nord
Sahel
20 Boucle du Mouhoun
Cascades
Nord
Centre-Est
Hauts-Bassins
Sud-Ouest
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
FIGURE 7 Number of individuals kidnapped in Burkina Faso, per region, 2017–2022.
NOTE: 2022 data as of 26 May. Regions with no kidnapping incidents since 2017 are not included.
SOURCE: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
The women then returned to their village on 6 May. No while profit (by way of ransom) often appears a second-
violence was used, no sexual abuse took place and no ary driver.
money was stolen or requested as ransom. Instead, the
motive of this kidnapping was to humiliate the Dozo From the early 2000s until around 2012, kidnappings
hunters, illustrating to them and the whole community were located mostly in northern Mali, which is where the
their inability to protect their women.61 conflict originated. Westerners were an important – albeit
not exclusive – target, and their kidnapping represented
This incident, one among the daily reports of kidnap- the main source of revenue for al-Qaeda in the Islamic
pings in conflict-affected areas of Mali and Burkina Maghreb, so much so that it was called the industrie de
Faso, underscores the threat that kidnapping poses to l’enlèvement (kidnapping industry).62 As kidnappings of
communities caught in the crossfire between several Westerners sharply declined, largely due to the fact that
armed groups across swathes of both countries. The the number of potential victims became more limited as
incident also illustrates some key characteristics of the Westerners became more rare in the area, the targeting
kidnapping economy in central Mali and Burkina Faso: of locals became the central feature of the kidnapping
punishment of enemies, intimidation of communities industry in Mali. Around 97% of the targets of kidnap-
and recruitment appear to be prominent motivations, pings in Mali since 2012 have been local citizens.63
90
80
70
Number of individuals
60
50
40
30
Mopti
Gao
Segou
20 Tombouctou
Menaka
Sikasso
10 Koulikoro
Kidal
Kayes
Bamako
2012 2013 2014 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
FIGURE 8 Number of individuals kidnapped in Mali, per region, 2012–2022.
NOTE: 2022 data as of 26 May.
SOURCE: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 4 • JUNE 2022 12 WEST AFRICA REGION2017 2022
Taoudeni ALGERIA ALGERIA
Taoudeni
MAURITANIA MAURITANIA
Taoudénit
Taoudénit
Kidal Kidal
Attacks Attacks
Kidal
Kidnappings Kidal Kidnappings
MALI MALI
Gao Gao
Timbuktu Ber Bourem Ménaka Timbuktu Ber Bourem Ménaka
Tombouctou Gao Tombouctou Gao
Goundam Ménaka Goundam Ménaka
Gossi Gossi
Douentza Douentza
Sévaré Markoye NIGER Sévaré Mopti NIGER
Kayes
Mopti
Mopti Sahel Gorom-Gorom Kayes
Mopti Sahel Markoye
Koulikoro Gorom-Gorom
Titao Djibo Koulikoro Titao Djibo Dori
Kayes Djenné Dori NIAMEY Kayes Djenné NIAMEY
Ségou N CN N CN
Sebba Sebba
Ouahigouya Ouahigouya
Koulikoro Ségou Kongoussi Kaya Tougan Goursi
Koulikoro Ségou Ségou Kongoussi Kaya Tougan Goursi
BM BURKINA FASO BM BURKINA FASO
Bogandѐ Bogandѐ
Yako Yako
Toma Boulsa Toma Boulsa
BAMAKO
Nouna Boussé Gayéri Nouna Boussé Gayéri
PC BAMAKO OUAGADOUGOU PC
Dѐdougou Réo Dѐdougou Réo
Zorgo Zorgo
East East
Koupѐla Koupѐla
OUAGADOUGOU Diapaga
Koudougou Koudougou
Diapaga
Solenzo Solenzo
Kombissiri Kombissiri
Boromo Tenkodogo Boromo Tenkodogo
Sikasso Madjoari Sikasso
Manga Manga
GUINEA CW CS CW CS Madjoari
Houndé Sapouy Houndé Sapouy
GUINEA
Ouargaye Ouargaye
Sikasso U-B Dano
Pô
CE Pama
Sikasso U-B Dano
Pô
CE Pama
SW SW
Léo Léo
NIGERIA
NIGERIA
Orodara Diébougou Orodara Diébougou
Sindou
Banfora BENIN Sindou
Banfora BENIN
GHANA GHANA
Gaoua Gaoua
W W
TO
TO
Batié Batié
CÔTE D’IVOIRE CÔTE D’IVOIRE
GO
GO
Kpuéré Kpuéré
temp (for caption) 2017 temp (for caption) 2021
FIGURE 9 Violent incidents in Mali and Burkina Faso, 2017 versus 2022.
NOTE: 2022 data as of 26 May.
SOURCE: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
The kidnapping economy in Mali and Burkina Faso is the capacity to pay ransom. The Macina Liberation
swelling: in Mali, the number of individuals kidnapped
64
Front (Katibat Macina) in central Mali regularly abducts
rose eight-fold between 2017 and 2021, from 22 to civilians, including those with a social or religious status
184 (the majority of victims across this time period within the community; however, often no ransom
were abducted in the country’s central regions), while in request is received. Instead, after a couple of days or
Burkina Faso, kidnappings increased more than 30-fold, weeks, the body is found at the entrance of the village.69
from eight in 2017 to 258 in 2021. This trend shows 65
no signs of slowing in 2022 – kidnappings in Burkina In both countries, all parties to the conflict are known
Faso as of 26 May showed a 10% increase from the to resort to kidnapping, including state actors (see
same period in 2021. 66
Figure 10). The targets typically vary depending on the
primary motivation of the kidnap. In Mali and Burkina
The epicentres of the kidnapping economy broadly Faso, victim typologies suggest three forms of motiva-
overlap with the areas most affected by conflict in tion are most common.
the two countries. As the conflict has geographically
67
expanded – with Burkina Faso replacing Mali as the First, kidnappings are carried out to punish anyone
epicentre – so have the areas most heavily affected perceived as the ‘enemy’ because of their leadership
by kidnapping. position and ability to influence the community, or
because they represent the national authorities that
THE NEW STRATEGIC LOGIC OF KIDNAPPING IN armed groups are aiming to eliminate. These include
CENTRAL MALI AND BURKINA FASO? administrative authorities (such as mayors and local
Analysis of the targets of kidnapping in central Mali law enforcement) and traditional authorities (religious
and northern and eastern Burkina Faso, the regions leaders and village heads). Targeting these groups has
most affected by conflict and where kidnappings are a clear goal of further weakening central authorities
currently concentrated, suggests that abductions oper- and disrupting traditional norms to prevent pushbacks
ate primarily as a war instrument, wielded for purposes for their own model. In addition to authority figures,
of intimidation, punishment and recruitment, with profit however, anyone who is deemed to be a traitor or a
often featuring only as a secondary motivation. collaborator may also be targeted. For example, local
staff at NGOs operating in conflict hotspots in Mali
The majority of kidnapping victims are communities and Burkina Faso are arrested and abducted by armed
caught between various groups fighting to expand groups on a weekly basis.70 In such areas, according to
their reach, often along ethnic lines, especially in Mali’s an interviewee involved in the security of NGOs, ‘being
central regions. Many families of victims do not have
68
seen talking to the enemy is enough to be kidnapped.’71
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 4 • JUNE 2022 13 WEST AFRICA REGION300
Number of individuals 250
200
150
100
50
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Mali Burkina Faso
Al Qaeda affiliates Unidentified groups Self-defense militias Islamic State in the Greater Sahel Armed forces
FIGURE 10 Number of individuals kidnapped in Mali and Burkina Faso, per perpetrator, 2017–2022.
NOTE: 2022 data as of 26 May.
SOURCE: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
Secondly, and linked to the first typology of kidnappings, Djenné cercle, telling people that they had to contribute
abductions are used by armed groups as an instrument to the war effort.74
to terrorize and intimidate local populations to deter
anyone from opposing them, or from joining or even When one father refused to hand over his son, they
sympathizing with another group. The primary targets of killed one of his nephews. Upon the return of the
such kidnappings are the local population living in areas Katibat Macina militants several days later, the father
under the influence or control of armed groups. The 5 had little choice but to hand over one of his sons.75 In
May kidnapping of 31 women is a prime example of this, the same operation, the Katibat Macina also abducted
as the motivation was to intimidate the community living several people, including officials, who were accused of
under Dozo hunters’ ‘protection’. The JNIM has now having given names of their members to the security
threatened this protection, showing that they can reach forces before the operation.76
into territory typically under Dozo influence. Similarly,
kidnappings are leveraged as a form of enforcing gov- KIDNAPPINGS AS A MONEY-MAKING VENTURE?
ernance rules imposed by armed groups. For example, Although profit does not always appear to be the driving
in central Mali, there have been cases where the village force behind the kidnapping economy of central Mali
chief, or any other villager, refuses to pay the zakat on and Burkina Faso, armed groups do ask for ransom in
livestock or on their harvest and, as a regional expert many cases. For example, the Dogon militia Dan Na
said, ‘if you refuse, they will kidnap you and release you Ambassagou, the main self-defence militia in central
when money has been paid.’ 72
Mali, kidnapped six people in Bandiagara on 22 May
2022 and allegedly demanded ransom.77 Since 2017,
Thirdly, forced recruitment by armed groups from kidnapping for ransom has been an important source
local populations can also be understood as a form of revenue for the militia, alongside cattle theft and
of kidnapping (notwithstanding the fact that such protection rackets.78 The ransom paid for each individual
abductions can also constitute human trafficking). Local kidnapping is significantly lower than what armed groups
communities are asked to contribute to the war effort would receive for a Western national, but, according
and children are abducted to join the ranks of armed to an expert on local kidnappings, ‘the scale is very
groups. Following the Moura incident in late March, in different, so eventually that amounts to a substantial
which the Malian armed forces and ‘associated foreign sum.’79 Most sources report that ransom prices vary
soldiers’ allegedly executed an estimated 300 civilians from FCFA1 million to FCFA5 million and can go higher
in a purported counter-terrorism operation,73 Katibat for a high-level state representative or member of the
Macina went house by house in several villages of armed forces.
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 4 • JUNE 2022 14 WEST AFRICA REGIONIt is clear that individuals known to have a degree the family, like one daughter.’83 On 12 May 2022, for
of wealth are also being targeted; this appears to be example, the daughter of an important businessman in
particularly prominent in cases where kidnappings are Gao was abducted and subsequently released following
linked to other illicit economies, such as cattle rustling, a ransom payment.
a prominent illicit market in central Mali, as explored in
the first article of this issue.80 One regional expert noted While the kidnapping of foreign nationals generally has
that ‘in areas where there is a lot of cattle rustling, there a limited impact on local stakeholders and communities,
are also a lot of kidnappings, and the two dynamics rein- the kidnapping of local residents multiplies the harms
force each other.’ When armed groups steal the cattle,
81
experienced by communities. Kidnapping for ransom
they often kidnap the herder or the owner of the cattle, continues to be a source of some funding for jihadist
because they know that ‘the owner of the cattle, or his groups; however, perhaps even more important in the
family, has money and will pay extra to get him back.’82 context of the security crisis in the region is the role that
the illicit economy plays in damaging local communities,
In the main cities of northern Mali, and especially in and constituting a tool in armed-group governance.
Gao, the dynamics are slightly different, with profit
more clearly a shaping motivation. The contrast The kidnapping of individuals with strategic leadership
underscores the differences in the nature of the roles heavily undermines both local and national
kidnapping industry between central Mali, currently the security institutions, as figures that are traditionally or
epicentre of conflict, and northern Mali, where violence administratively responsible for maintaining social, reli-
is currently lower. In Gao, and other major urban hubs gious and legal norms are directly targeted. Moreover,
in the north of Mali, so-called ‘bandits’ are strategic it also drives bottom-up grievances towards the state,
in their targets – they typically abduct businessmen as the communities that suffer from violence (in the
(opérateurs économiques), hotel managers and members form of threats, abduction and murder) perpetrated
of rich families, as well as high-level officials and their by all sides of conflict parties do not feel protected by
family members. Armed groups target a family that the national authorities. This, in turn, allows for greater
they know has money and pay bandits (known as entrenchment of both non-state armed groups and
petites mains – small hands) to observe and gather organized criminal groups in the region, further eroding
intelligence on their whereabouts and their habits. the already weak local governance.84 To compound the
According to an aid worker with knowledge of incidents issue, data on the phenomenon is scarce, inhibiting a
in Gao, ‘if they can get the head of the family, they will. fuller grasp of the scale of the problem for the purpose
Otherwise, they will try to take another member of of informing policy responses.
4. A surge in cybercrime in Oyo State, Nigeria, has triggered a spike in arrests and the
involvement of anti-crime group Amotekun, but alternative responses are needed.
In February 2022, the Chairman of Nigeria’s Council south-west. Yet incorporating poorly regulated vigilan-
of Amotekun Commanders in the South West, the tes into responding to illicit markets with tenuous links
state-created regional anti-crime outfit, announced to violence and instability may be counter-productive,
the group’s focus on tackling cybercriminals, popularly escalating rather than mitigating the consequences of
known as ‘Yahoo Boys’. The commander linked Yahoo these criminal economies.
Boys to a spate of ‘ritual killings’, labelled by the press
as an ‘emerging insecurity menace in the South West’.85 The Amotekun commander lamented the ‘upsurge
in the involvement of young people in fraudulent
Amotekun’s increased focus on Yahoo Boys appears to activities’,87 an increase confirmed by law-enforcement
fall outside of the group’s central mandate of fighting officials interviewed by the GI-TOC in Oyo State.
violent crimes (such as kidnapping), particularly in rural According to the Zonal Head of Nigeria’s antigraft
areas.86 This may be linked to emphasis by domestic agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
press on the connections between so-called Yahoo (EFCC), Oyo State has the highest rate of cybercrime in
Plus, the allegedly more violent iteration of Yahoo the south-west region.88
Boys that emerged in 2020, and ritual violence in the
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 4 • JUNE 2022 15 WEST AFRICA REGIONNumber of convictions
100 200 300 400 500 600
Lagos 481
Ibadan 324
Port Harcourt 230
Enugu 173
EFCC zonal command
Benin 170
Uyo 142
EFCC Headquarters 140
Ilorin 137
Kano 121
Abuja 94
Kaduna 64
Gombe 58
Sokoto 38
Maiduguri 26
Makurdi 22
FIGURE 11 Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission convictions, 2021.
NOTE: The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is a Nigerian law enforcement agency that investigates financial
crimes. Although the 2021 data does not include a breakdown of convictions by crime type, the vast majority of the EFCC’s past
convictions have been cyber-related.
SOURCE: Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, via https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/504409-efcc-secured-
2220-convictions-in-2021-spokesperson.html.
The surge in cybercriminal activity is claiming a DRIVERS OF THE CYBERCRIME SURGE IN OYO
growing proportion of law-enforcement resources in STATE
Nigeria; of the 978 convictions recorded by the EFCC The upsurge in cybercrime in Oyo State reflects regional
in 2021, 80% were related to cybercrime, 89 many and international trends. According to the general
occurring in the south-west. EFCC officers confirmed
90
manager of IBM’s Africa Growth Markets, cybercrime in
a further uptick in counter-cybercrime operations in Nigeria and other parts of the globe was at an all-time
Oyo state in 2022. 91
high in the second quarter of 2022.94
Yet the surge in arrests appears to be having limited The COVID-19 pandemic is one factor behind the
impact on the growth of the market. One resident of major increase in cybercrime across Nigeria since early
Ibadan, the capital of Oyo State, lamented the spike in 2020.95 The drive to remote work in the context of the
cybercrime, attributing it ‘to the stifling of the economy pandemic, and the increased vulnerability of corporate
and the high rate of unemployment and the recession, networks accessed from home, contributed to a sharp
[meaning] a lot of ambitious youths have seen cyber- increase in cyber-attacks.96
crime as a form of escape.’92
An EFCC officer working in Ibadan noted that cyber-
While the growth of cybercrime in the face of criminals used ‘unemployment benefits and relief
law-enforcement action appears to have encouraged grants’ introduced to alleviate the impacts of COVID-19
Amotekun to include cybercrime within its priority as avenues for phishing and hacking ‘unsuspecting
areas, this appears to be a case of gradually expanding victims’.97
objectives. Overlapping mandates risk fuelling compe-
tition with yet more police forces, which may deepen
federal agency mistrust, and create rivalry between
security providers, thus hampering anti-crime efforts.93
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