North Korea: A Month in Review - An analytic look at the main developments of the November 1 and November 30 period - NK News
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North Korea: A Month in Review An analytic look at the main developments of the November 1 and November 30 period By NK Pro Staff Analysts
North Korea: A Month in Review & What’s Ahead
An analytic look at the main developments of the November 1 and November 30 period
By NK Pro Staff Analysts
NK Pro has conducted an in-depth analytic review of news on the peninsula for the period between November
1 and November 30.
In addition to an Executive Summary providing top-line findings, the following review includes detailed analysis
on a wide range of other specialist focus areas.
Furthermore, it also includes a look ahead at the six events likely to create news in December.
Please send any feedback about this feature to chad.ocarroll@nknews.org
Published by Korea Risk Group, the world’s premier resource for analysis, research
tools and data on North Korea (www.korearisk.com)
Contents PLACEHOLDER
PLACEHOLDER:
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
04 Executive Summary
Military: U.S.-ROK postponed air drills, though DPRK still conducts two
08
air force drills, live-fire drills, and one missile test
Foreign Relations: North Korea demands U.S. drop “hostile policy,”
11
DPRK warns foreign diplomats against social media posts
Inter-Korean: South Korea repatriates two North Koreans accused of
14
murder, Kim Jong Un rejects Busan summit invitation
Leadership: Kim Jong Un’s activities become decidedly military-
17
focused
Human Security / Human Rights: Typhoon displaced over 6,000 North
20 Koreans, recent security measures in Pyongyang draw concern,
Seoul abstains from human rights resolution co-sponsorship
WMD: North Korea launches two short-range projectiles, DPRK nuclear
23
activities a “clear violation” UNSC resolution: IAEA
Economy: China, Russia sign new cross border agreements with the
26 DPRK, construction at China-North Korea economic zone
appears to restart
Sanctions: Singapore jailed two businessmen, U.S. makes arrest over
30
sanctions violations, new Lexus spotted with Kim Jong Un
33 DPRK State Media: New and Notable
35 The Month Ahead: What to expect
3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A group of women laugh together in Pyongyang | Picture: NK Pro
MILITARY: U.S.-ROK POSTPONED AIR DRILLS, THOUGH DPRK STILL CONDUCTS TWO
AIR FORCE DRILLS, LIVE-FIRE DRILLS, AND ONE MISSILE TEST
Section by Caroline Kearney and Oliver Hotham
Early November saw the U.S. and South Korea announce that they had decided to postpone a planned series of
joint air combat drills, purportedly in an effort to facilitate diplomacy with North Korea, stalled since failed talks
in Stockholm the previous month. Pyongyang had in the run up to those exercises -- intended as a scaled-down
replacement for the previous annual Vigilant Ace drill -- warned that it could retaliate should they go ahead.
But despite the cancellation and the apparent gesture of goodwill, North Korea in November turned up the dials
in one of its most military-focused months this year. In mid-November, leader Kim Jong Un was reported to have
overseen two air force drills by the country’s Korean People’s Army (KPA), at which he was said to have praised
the army’s preparedness and urged them to become an “invincible” force. Later in the month, the DPRK stepped-
up provocative military actions, engaging in a round of live-fire drills on an island near the inter-Korean border.
Both the timing and the location of the exercise were likely intended to send a message to Seoul: taking place
within previously-agreed-to buffer zone, it was later revealed to have been conducted on the 9th anniversary of
Pyongyang’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. South Korea lodged a formal complaint.
RISK: While North Korea at the end of the month suggested it had conducted its final test of the MLRS, other
output from state media hinted that the country will likely continue provocative military actions in the run up to
Kim Jong Un’s previous state end of the year deadline. An outbreak of military tensions on the peninsula comes
with obvious risks in and of itself, increasingly the likelihood of accidental skirmishes, but it also further narrows
the chances of successful outcomes for diplomacy between the U.S., North Korea and South Korea, raising the
risk of a major outbreak in tensions in the new year.
4
Executive Summary
FOREIGN RELATIONS: NORTH KOREA DEMANDS U.S. DROP “HOSTILE POLICY,” DPRK
WARNS FOREIGN DIPLOMATS AGAINST SOCIAL MEDIA POSTS
Section by Caroline Kearney and Oliver Hotham
North Korea’s message to the U.S. during the month of November was clear: small-scale agreements are not
possible and talks will only resume if its “hostile policy” against the DPRK is lifted. But what has not been made
clear -- at least publicly -- is Pyongyang’s current definition of American hostile policy.
In a run of statements by top officials, including a spokesman for the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),
chief nuclear negotiator Kim Myong Gil, and MFA advisor Kim Kye Gwan, North Korea stressed that while it
remains open to dialogue with the U.S., it seeks a concrete proposal from Washington before negotiations can
go ahead. They have also sought to underline the country’s looming deadline for talks with the U.S. to produce
results.
The month drew to a close with Stephen Biegun’s confirmation hearing for his promotion to Deputy Secretary of
State. Biegun took the opportunity to announce that the “window is still open” for a U.S. - North Korea agreement,
and that his pending promotion would raise the priority level of DPRK negotiations.
RISK: Heading into the final month of the year, prospects for a renewal of dialogue between the U.S. and North
Korea appear increasingly slim. With elections in the U.S. and South Korea looming and North Korea stepping-
up provocative actions, absent any last-minute agreement between Washington and Pyongyang, a return to the
tensions appears highly likely in the year.
INTER-KOREAN: SOUTH KOREA REPATRIATES TWO NORTH KOREANS ACCUSED OF
MURDER, KIM JONG UN REJECTS BUSAN SUMMIT INVITATION
Section by Caroline Kearney and Rachel Minyoung Lee
In November, South Korea repatriated two North Koreans accused of murder, though legality and human rights
concerns have arisen in response. The DPRK rejected an invitation for Kim Jong Un to attend a ROK - ASEAN
summit, politely on the surface, but all the while divulging Seoul’s behind-the-scenes communications with
Pyongyang urging Kim to send a special envoy to Busan if he cannot attend himself. Pyongyang also disclosed
that it had sent Seoul an “ultimatum” to immediately remove ROK assets at Mt. Kumgang Tourist Region or the
North will “unilaterally demolish” the facilities.
RISK: Seoul’s repatriation of the two North Koreans accused of killing their crew members could have been part of
the Moon administration’s effort to find common ground with Pyongyang amid the stalemate in bilateral relations.
Yet, the DPRK has either ignored or responded negatively to the South’s engagement attempts, most recently
Seoul’s offers to resolve the Mt. Kumgang tourist zone issue through dialogue, and Seoul’s invitation to Kim Jong
Un to attend the ROK-ASEAN summit.
North Korea’s seemingly polite but firm rejection of the invitation to the Busan summit, which also purposefully
embarrassed the Moon administration by divulging behind-the-scenes communications, and its positive refusal
to engage in dialogue with Seoul over Mt. Kumgang point to unfavorable prospects for an improvement in inter-
Korean relations. KCNA readouts of these two issues indicate that Kim Jong Un has clearly decided he cannot
rely on South Korea for a breakthrough in U.S.-DPRK relations or for the resumption of inter-Korean economic
projects, and therefore he has nothing to gain from improved ties with Seoul for now.
LEADERSHIP: KIM JONG UN’S ACTIVITIES BECOME DECIDEDLY MILITARY-FOCUSED
Section by Rachel Minyoung Lee
Kim Jong Un made seven appearances in November, one fewer than his eight public activities in the previous
month and almost half of his 13 appearances in November 2018. All of Kim’s appearances occurred in the second
half of November.
In a noticeable shift from his economic-focused appearances the month before, the leader’s activities in November
were concentrated in the military. Kim made two visits to economic installations, one a fishery station run by the
5 5
Executive Summary
Korean People’s Army (KPA) and the other the hot springs resort construction project in Yangdok County, South
Phyongan Province. Kim’s visit to the hot springs resort marked his second in less than one month.
RISK: The spate of Kim’s military appearances in November is consistent with North Korea’s hardening line on
the U.S. since the Stockholm talks. North Korea’s decision to report on Kim Jong Un’s guidance of a snipers’
parachute drill the day after Esper postponed the U.S.-South Korea joint aerial exercises signaled that the North
would forge ahead with its plan, one that likely is militaristic, not diplomatic. North Korea’s latest test-fire of
multiple rocket launchers on November 28 seems to be a testament to that position. State media continues to
acknowledge economic difficulties, and thus the economy will likely remain Pyongyang’s top priority in the New
Year. That said, various signals from state media also indicate that North Korea’s “new path” in 2020 will be
militaristic, possibly resembling 2017. North Korea in 2020 will likely seek to achieve economic development while
continuing to develop and test new weapons, given the lack of diplomatic progress with the U.S.
HUMAN SECURITY / HUMAN RIGHTS: TYPHOON DISPLACED OVER 6,000 NORTH
KOREANS, RECENT SECURITY MEASURES IN PYONGYANG DRAW CONCERN, SEOUL
ABSTAINS FROM HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTION CO-SPONSORSHIP
Section by Caroline Kearney and Rachel Minyoung Lee
In November, a Red Cross report said over 6,000 North Korean citizens were displaced during Typhoon Lingling
which hit the country in September. Secondly, NK Pro highlighted increasing and concerning security measures
recently observed in Pyongyang. Finally, Seoul decided not to co-sponsor an annual UN resolution condemning
the human rights situation in North Korea.
RISK: Perhaps the most concerning development during the month of November arises out of NK Pro analysis
highlighting recently heightened security measures in Pyongyang. These are likely reactive measures to a number
of recent incidents including video footage of Kim Jong Un unguarded at a train station en route to Hanoi in
February, international scrutiny of DPRK-related sanctions violations, and the leadership’s inability to fulfill
promises of economic reprieve through improved U.S. - North Korea relations. In a nutshell, the actions could
point to concern within the leadership of the negative impacts on its authority if it does not crack down on the flow
of information. Ongoing observation will be needed to monitor public reaction and to determine if North Korean
state security can keep up with global technology advancements and spread of information. Stricter regulations
on information leaving the country will also make sanctions evasions monitoring more difficult for the UN Panel
of Experts as well as member states. Meanwhile, South Korea’s decision not to co-sponsor the UN resolution on
the human rights situation in North Korea is yet another example of the Moon administration overlooking illicit
behavior by the regime in order to provide latitude for inter-Korean dialogue.
WMD: NORTH KOREA LAUNCHES TWO SHORT-RANGE PROJECTILES, DPRK NUCLEAR
ACTIVITIES A “CLEAR VIOLATION” UNSC RESOLUTION: IAEA
Section by Caroline Kearney and Oliver Hotham
The final week of November saw the DPRK launch two short-range missiles, in what represented its
thirteenth test this year. The IAEA also said that North Korea’s ongoing nuclear activities clearly violated
UNSC resolutions and remain a cause for serious concern. This year Pyongyang responded to the report,
saying it “categorically rejected” it. Meanwhile, CSIS assessed satellite imagery showing movement
of specialized railcars at the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility to be significant, though 38 North classified
movement at the facility as “minor.”
ECONOMY: CHINA, RUSSIA SIGN NEW CROSS BORDER AGREEMENTS WITH THE DPRK,
CONSTRUCTION AT CHINA-NORTH KOREA ECONOMIC ZONE APPEARS TO RESTART
Section by Caroline Kearney and Oliver Hotham
In November, Russia and a Chinese province launched new cross border economic agreements with the
DPRK and construction at a joint Chinese-North Korean economic zone also appears to have restarted.
Pyongyang also held another new food expo with predominantly Chinese attendance, and held their
first domestic cosmetics exhibition. There has been a significant increase in the price of pork over the
past two months, likely the outcome of African swine fever. A small slight uptick in gas prices was also
observable, but it returned to a steady rate by mid November.
6 6
Executive Summary
SANCTIONS: SINGAPORE JAILED TWO BUSINESSMEN, U.S. MAKES ARREST OVER
SANCTIONS VIOLATIONS, NEW LEXUS SPOTTED WITH KIM JONG UN
Section by Caroline Kearney and Oliver Hotham
During the month of November, Singapore handed jail sentences to two businessmen and the U.S. arrested
a blockchain researcher for violating sanctions against North Korea. Meanwhile, Nepal announced that it
already repatriated 33 DPRK citizens ahead of the UN Security Council’s (UNSC) December 22 deadline.
NK Pro also discovered that a new Lexus has been accompanying Kim Jong Un and that Orascom
financed LED displays on Pyongyang’s Ryugyong Hotel. Also, a Hong-Kong owned, DPRK-flagged vessel;
made a ship-to-ship transfer in November while another known DPRK vessel may have may have sunk
the previous month.
7 7
MILITARY: U.S.-ROK POSTPONED AIR DRILLS, THOUGH DPRK STILL
CONDUCTS TWO AIR FORCE DRILLS, LIVE-FIRE DRILLS, AND ONE
MISSILE TEST
Section by Caroline Kearney and Oliver Hotham
DPRK leader Kim Jong Un poses with members of the KPA Air and Anti-Air Force during November’s sharpshooter training | Picture: Rodong Sinmun
November saw the U.S. and South Korea decided to postpone planned downscaled joint air drills, in a move
reportedly intended to facilitate diplomacy with North Korea. Despite this, the DPRK conducted live firing drills on
an island near South Korea on the anniversary of the bombardment of Yeonpyeong island, two rounds of air force
training exercises, and ended the month with a test of a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS).
U.S. and South Korea postponed downscaled Vigilant Ace air drills
At the beginning of the month, the U.S. and ROK were planning to hold a downscaled version of the annual joint
Vigilant Ace air combat drills set to take place in December, according to South Korean defense minister Jeong
Kyeong-doo on November 4. But the next day a statement by the DPRK’s “roving” ambassador Kwon Jong
Gun said his country’s patience with U.S. - ROK joint military drills was “nearing [its] limitations.” Once again
on November 13, a spokesperson for North Korea’s State Affairs Commission — the highest-level state organ
in the DPRK government — said talks were on the verge of breakdown and that time was running out for an
agreement to be reached. The next day, North Korea held the first round of its air training exercises.
The U.S. and South Korea then decided to postpone the drills. U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, speaking
alongside his South Korean counterpart Jeong Kyeong-doo, said the purpose of the decision was to “contribute
to an environment conducive to diplomacy and the advancement of peace.”
North Korea conducts firing drills on island near South Korea, Seoul launches
formal protest
On November 23, the ninth anniversary of North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, the DPRK conducted
live firing drills near the inter-Korean maritime border on Changrin island. DPRK leader Kim Jong Un visited the
units that day, ordering the military to ensure full preparedness by conducting a “real war-like drill” at a “higher
degree of intensity. ”
8
Military: U.S.-ROK postponed air drills, though DPRK still conducts two air force drills, live-fire drills, and one missile test
In response, South Korea lodged a formal protest to the North by telephone and letter, Ministry of National
Defense (MND) spokesperson Choi Hyun-soo said on November 25. The Ministry also confirmed that the South
Korean military had detected signs of the North’s live-fire exercises on two days prior but had not released the
news until the 25th. The ROK spokesperson said the announcement was not made two days earlier because
Seoul was considering the timing of the announcement and the military was still analysing the drills. Choi
denied claims that the ministry had attempted to delay or conceal release of the news.
Two days later, South Korea fired warning shots toward a North Korean vessel that had violated the inter-Korean
maritime border. It appeared to be a merchant boat that crossed the border due to poor weather conditions and
engine problems, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a statement on the 27th.
Kim Jong Un attends two rounds of air force training exercises
DPRK leader Kim Jong Un and top officials from the Central Committee of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea
(WPK) attended two sets of training drills by North Korea’s Air and Anti-Aircraft Force of the Korean People’s
Army (KPA) between November 15 and 17, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported. Kim Jong Un
and other officials first attended a flight contest conducted on November 15, state media reported the next day.
The exercise highlighted the corps’ “invincible might” and involved pilots conducting “bombing flight and firing
flight under the command of the formation flight,” the article said.
Kim Jong Un then guided a round of training exercises by the air force’s sharpshooters, KCNA reported on
November 18, presumably occurring on one of the two previous days. The DPRK leader expressed “great
satisfaction” over the drills, saying it was important to hold such exercises at a moments’ notice to improve the
preparedness of the units for war. The article was released hours after the U.S. and South Korea announcement
postponement of the downscaled Vigilant Ace air drills. Observers say the drills were in part responses to the
planned U.S.-ROK military drills, though the DPRK held similar drills in April 2019, June 2017, December 2016,
and May 2014.
9 9
MILITARY: WHY IT MATTERS
Government
November saw the DPRK significantly step up Industrial Complex. As the end of year deadline quickly
conventional military activities, specifically targeting approaches, mounting tensions could easily transform
South Korea. The DPRK’s decision to hold live-fire into greater provocations in 2020 -- including a
drills both near the maritime border with South Korea potential return to long-range missile launches and
and on the anniversary of the shelling of Yeonpyeong perhaps nuclear tests. Events in November will force
island are clear provocations towards Seoul. The both U.S. and South Korea to prepare for an array
actions speak to Pyongyang’s growing frustration of military provocations from Pyongyang. Further,
over a lack of progress towards its key foreing policy this could create a particularly-challenging domestic
goals: the lifting of international economic sanctions political situation for the Moon Jae-in administration,
and security guarantees. And while the majority of which has so far been able to downplay or reinterpret
these concessions must be granted by the U.S., the Pyongyang’s provocations, insisting that inter-Korean
DPRK holds South Korea responsible for misleading dialogue could resume at any moment. An increase in
them -- even if innocently -- prior to Hanoi and since military provocations will make this tactic very difficult
failing to convince the Trump administration to to justify.
reopen Mt. Kumgang Tourist Resort or the Kaesong
Business
Pyongyang’s decision to conduct live-fire drills on some opportunities for military equipment providers
the anniversary of Yeonpyeong island touches a to Seoul. More broadly, however, the potential for
particularly sore spot for Seoul. This could motivate growing tensions on the peninsula and the increasing
South Korea to both become more generous in risk of a return to the “Fire and Fury” of 2017 does not
military cost-sharing talks with the U.S. and to bode well for businesses focused on the North Korea
increase its military spending, which could create issue.
10 10FOREIGN RELATIONS: NORTH KOREA DEMANDS U.S. DROP
“HOSTILE POLICY,” DPRK WARNS FOREIGN DIPLOMATS AGAINST
SOCIAL MEDIA POSTS
Section by Caroline Kearney and Oliver Hotham
Parade participants at the 70th anniversary of the founding the DPRK | Picture: NK Pro
North Korea explicitly stated throughout the month of November that negotiations with the U.S. will not resume
unless American hostile policy is removed. Meanwhile, the DPRK warned foreign diplomats living in Pyongyang
against posting sensitive photos on social media, and North Korea’s foreign ministry paid visits to Malaysia,
Cambodia and Laos during the month.
DPRK says no talks with the U.S. unless “hostile policy” lifted
North Korea’s message to the U.S. during the month of November was clear: small-scale agreements are not
possible and talks will only resume if its “hostile policy” against the DPRK is lifted. But what has not been made
clear -- at least publicly -- is Pyongyang’s current definition of American hostile policy.
== A spokesperson for North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on November 5 said the U.S.’s
Country Reports on Terrorism 2018 released on the first of the month was an example of the U.S.’
“hostile policy” and “narrowed” the likelihood that talks could resume.
== On the 14th, Kim Myong Gil, the North’s chief nuclear negotiator, rejected an apparent recent
invitation from U.S. negotiator Stephen Biegun to holds talks before the end of December. The DPRK
negotiator said that while the DPRK would meet the U.S. “at any place and any time” under the right
circumstances, the U.S. had failed to offer a proposal to withdraw its hostile policy, and his country
is not interested in recent offer to solely sign an end-of-war declaration or exchange liaison offices.
== On November 17, U.S. President Donald Trump attempted to motivate DPRK leader Kim Jong Un to return
to the negotiation table via Twitter, but MFA advisor Kim Gye Gwan swiftly rejected it the next day. Kim
said that sufficient progress had not been made and that the U.S. seemed to “buying time.” Both Kim Gye
Gwan and a State Affairs Commission spokesperson said the DPRK was not interested in providing the
U.S. President with more meaningless events that he can use to “brag about” to his domestic audience.
11Foreign Relations: North Korea demands U.S. drop “hostile policy,” DPRK warns foreign diplomats against social media posts
== On the 19th of the month Kim Yong Chol, a senior official in the DPRK’s Central Committee, again reiterated
the need for the U.S. to lift its hostile policy, looping in U.S. support for a human rights resolution in the
United Nations on November 14.
== The month drew to a close with Stephen Biegun’s confirmation hearing for his promotion to Deputy
Secretary of State. Biegun took the opportunity to announce that the “window is still open” for a U.S. - North
Korea agreement, and that his pending promotion would raise the priority level of DPRK negotiations.
North Korea warns foreign diplomats over social media photos
North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on November 13 issued a document to foreign diplomats and
humanitarian workers warning recipients not to publish media taken with “impure intentions” on Twitter and
Facebook. The MFA document said some foreign diplomats had violated North Korea’s “Formality Guidance
for the diplomatic corps presiding in the DPRK,” which lays out strict rules for envoys living in the country.
It reminded foreign diplomats of their duty to respect the country’s laws and regulations, as per the Vienna
Convention. Multiple embassies and diplomats maintain social media accounts from the DPRK, including
China, Indonesia, India, Mongolia, Pakistan, Sweden, Russia, and the UK. Many of the accounts have shared
photos and videos of major events in the country such as trade fairs, holidays, and a inter-Korean football game
held in Pyongyang in October, which was not televised and only open to a few foreign envoys and FIFA officials.
Malaysia to reopen embassy, North Korea visits three Southeast Asian nations
Malaysia will reopen its North Korean embassy in 2020, the country’s foreign minister Saifuddin Abdullah
said during a press conference on November 21 in Moscow. The embassy was partially closed following the
assassination Kim Jong Nam in a Kuala Lumpur airport in 2017. Saifuddin said a key reason for the reopening
was to “encourage” North Korean engagement with the U.S. and others. “We look at the Korean peninsula
seriously, we are very supportive of all efforts in trying to negotiate for peace, especially between DPRK and
ROK,” he added while standing alongside his Russian counterpart.
Meanwhile, a DPRK foreign ministry delegation made a two-week tour to Malaysia, Cambodia, and Laos from
November 10 - 23, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on Saturday. The Cambodian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) readout on November said foreign minister Prak Sokhonn was invited to visit Pyongyang,
the first by a foreign minister since 2012. An MFA spokesperson reportedly said that the country’s diplomatic
ties with North Korea remained strong but that its “trade relations were modest.” And the Laos MFA said the
two sides discussed political and international affairs as well as educational and cultural exchanges.
12 12FOREIGN RELATIONS: WHY IT MATTERS
Government
Kim Jong Un’s end of year deadline for the U.S. to to his domestic audience. These statements appear
make a “resolute decision” in negotiations is rapidly to suggest that Pyongyang is watching Trump as he
approaching. While DPRK official pronouncements in takes credit for DPRK-U.S. joint efforts since 2018 in
November have left the door open for dialogue with order to feed his re-election campaign, but feels that he
the U.S., Pyongyang’s definition of the U.S. “hostile is not compensating Pyongyang in kind. But the U.S.
policy” has gained importance, expanded in definition, cannot offer many more concessions as Washington,
and become more vague since working-level talks and the majority of the international community, do
collapsed early October. Based on Pyongyang’s latest not believe DPRK steps towards denuclearization to be
pronouncements, lifting U.S. “hostile policy” includes: sufficient. North Korea has proven that it is not willing
lifting sanctions, providing security assurances to budge until, at a minimum, it receives compensation
(including the complete cancelation of all U.S.-South for steps it has already taken, and possibly until all
Korea joint military drills), the establishment of a U.S. hostile policy is lifted. Further, it appears the
peace regime, and a halt to human rights “commotion,” DPRK may have sufficient economic support from
according to NK Pro analysis in November. In addition, Russia and China to lean on in the meantime. Under
North Korea has repeatedly asked to receive a “due these circumstances, the resumption of U.S. - DPRK
price” for the steps the country has already taken working-level negotiations before the deadline expires
towards denuclearization and confidence-building -- appear bleak.
including the accomplishments that Trump has touted
Business
The North Korean MFA’s Southeast Asia tour and the UN deadline for the repatriation of North
appeared aimed at increasing exchanges, possibly Korean workers is only weeks away, North Korea could
economic, with all three countries. All three countries be seeking new opportunities as well as guarantees
host DPRK embassies, Cambodia and Laos are the three countries will allow North Korean workers
home to Pyongyang restaurants, and Cambodia to remain in the country. However, both the owners of
hosts the jointly-owned Angkor Panorama Museum joint ventures in the countries and the governments
which benefits from large Chinese tourist groups. As themselves should be aware of the risks associated
it becomes apparent that the U.S. will not be lifting with becoming a key focus of the UN Panel of Experts
economic sanctions on the DPRK in the near future, or sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department.
13 13INTER-KOREAN: SOUTH KOREA REPATRIATES TWO NORTH KOREANS
ACCUSED OF MURDER, KIM JONG UN REJECTS BUSAN SUMMIT
INVITATION
Section by Caroline Kearney and Rachel Minyoung Lee
A hotel attendant in Mt. Kumgang Tourist Region | Picture: NK Pro
In November, South Korea repatriated two North Koreans accused of murder, though questions of legality and
human rights concerns have arisen in response. The DPRK rejected an invitation for Kim Jong Un to attend a ROK -
ASEAN summit, politely on the surface, but all the while divulging Seoul’s behind-the-scenes communications with
Pyongyang urging Kim to send a special envoy to Busan if he cannot attend himself. Pyongyang also disclosed
that it had sent Seoul an “ultimatum” to immediately remove ROK assets at Mt. Kumgang Tourist Region or the
North will “unilaterally demolish” the facilities.
South Korea repatriated two North Koreans accused of murder
South Korea’s military on November 2 intercepted two North Korean escapees from the East Sea (Sea of
Japan), but repatriated them five days later following accusations that they murdered 16 of their crew mates,
the country’s defense minister and Ministry of Unification (MOU) said. The MOU’s spokesperson Lee Sang-
min said that due to the severity of the crime, they were not covered under the nation’s defector law and
thus ineligible to defect. However, the deportation sparked debate about its legality and raised concerns from
human rights organizations. Two key points of contention were that only five days passed between the time the
vessel was intercepted and the two were deported, and that they were likely to be punished severely upon their
return to North Korea. The MOU, however, defended its stance, and on November 8 said that while the two men
expressed a desire to defect, it did not seem genuine and they may pose a safety risk in the country.
Kim Jong Un rejects invitation to attend ROK-ASEAN Summit in Busan
DPRK leader Kim Jong Un sent a formal rejection letter to notify President Moon Jae-in of his absence at
the ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit held in Busan from November 25 - 26, a Korean Central News
Agency (KCNA) commentary said on the 21st of the month. This follows months of anticipation from the Moon
administration that the North Korean leader’s attendance would break the impasse in inter-Korean relations.
The tone of the rejection in the KCNA commentary was seemingly polite -- a rare occurrence in Pyongyang’s
14Inter-Korean: South Korea repatriates two North Koreans accused of murder, Kim Jong Un rejects Busan summit invitation
attitude towards Seoul in recent months. It said that while the North understands Moon’s “distress and agony”
over the status of relations, the place and timing were not appropriate. Despite the polite tone, KCNA also
disclosed Seoul’s alleged behind-the-scenes communications to Pyongyang, urging Kim to send a special
envoy in his stead, if he cannot attend. This likely was intended to embarrass the Moon administration. KCNA
also did not forget to cite the reasons for why Kim could not find “a suitable reason” to accept the invitation.
Among the reasons listed, KCNA said Seoul continues to rely on the U.S. instead of the North to resolve inter-
Korean relations and the conservative voices in South Korea have become “zealous in their censure and attack
on the DPRK.” The article also went on to say that Kim Jong Un’s appearance in Busan would only give the
appearance that dialogue between the two leaders was ongoing, even though fundamental issues were not
being resolved.
Pyongyang sends Seoul “ultimatum” to remove ROK facilities at Mt. Kumgang
In November, South Korea continued efforts to resolve a dispute with North Korea over the potential
transformation of the Mt. Kumgang tourist resort - formerly a joint-run project – into an international tourist
complex. On October 25, Pyongyang rejected in-person meetings and requested that Seoul send written notice
of its schedule to remove ROK-constructed facilities at the resort. South Korea on November 5 then proposed
sending a joint inspection team of government officials and businesspeople to Mt. Kumgang to visit the site.
The proposal, however, was met with an “ultimatum” from Pyongyang, according to an unattributed Korean
Central News Agency (KCNA) article on November 11. KCNA said Pyongyang “repeatedly and clearly informed”
Seoul of its “firm intentions” regarding the site on October 29 and November 6. It added that the North will
“unilaterally demolish facilities on the assumption that the South Korean authorities” do not intend to remove
them based on their ongoing requests to discuss alternative solutions. The ROK’s MOU deputy spokesperson
said the government “will cope with the issue calmly in close consultation with business operators” invested in
the Mt. Kumgang tourism project and urged North Korea to respond to their request to resolve the issue.
15 15INTER-KOREAN: WHY IT MATTERS
Government
Seoul’s repatriation of the two North Koreans accused by divulging behind-the-scenes communications, and
of killing their crew members could have been part its positive refusal to engage in dialogue with Seoul
of the Moon administration’s effort to find common over Mt. Kumgang point to unfavorable prospects
ground with Pyongyang amid the stalemate in for an improvement in inter-Korean relations. KCNA
bilateral relations. Yet, the DPRK has either ignored readouts of these two issues indicate that Kim Jong
or responded negatively to the South’s engagement Un has clearly decided he cannot rely on South Korea
attempts, most recently Seoul’s offers to resolve the for a breakthrough in U.S.-DPRK relations or for the
Mt. Kumgang tourist zone issue through dialogue, and resumption of inter-Korean economic projects, and
Seoul’s invitation to Kim Jong Un to attend the ROK- therefore he has nothing to gain from improved ties
ASEAN summit. with Seoul for now.
North Korea’s seemingly polite but firm rejection
of the invitation to the Busan summit, which also
purposefully embarrassed the Moon administration
Business
According to the ROK Unification Ministry, private Kumgang tourism, due to the ongoing international
South Korean companies have invested $320 sanctions and the lack of progress in DPRK-U.S.
million in the Mt. Kumgang tourism zone, and the nuclear negotiations.
government approximately $4.15 million, excluding
the approximately $47 million in building the separated North Korea’s goal of turning Mt. Kumgang into an
families reunion center. This excludes the rent and international tourist zone on its own seems to suggest
tourism fees South Korea paid the North. Realistically, that North Korea either has enough money now, or has
there is not much the South Korean government prospects for sufficient funding to execute the project
can do to resume tours, salvage the assets, or help without South Korea.
companies like Hyundai Asan, the top South Korean
investor in Mt. Kumgang, and Ananti, which has a
golf course in Mt. Kumgang, keep their share in Mt.
16 16LEADERSHIP: KIM JONG UN’S ACTIVITIES BECOME DECIDEDLY
MILITARY-FOCUSED
Section by Rachel Minyoung Lee
DPRK leader Kim Jong Un at the Changrin Islet defense unit | Picture: Rodong Sinmun
Kim Jong Un made seven appearances in November, one less than his eight public activities in the previous
month and almost half of his 13 appearances in November 2018. All of Kim’s appearances occurred in the second
half of November.
In a noticeable shift from his economic-focused appearances the month before, the leader’s activities in November
were concentrated in the military. Kim made two visits to economic installations, one a fishery station run by the
Korean People’s Army (KPA) and the other the hot springs resort construction project in Yangdok County, South
Phyongan Province. Kim’s visit to the hot springs resort marked his second in less than one month.
Resumption of flight contest coverage, rare snipers’ landing training
State media on November 16 reported that Kim had watched “KPA Air and Anti-Aircraft Force Flight Commanding
Members’ Combat Aviation Contest-2019.” North Korea media reported on this event every year since 2014
except for 2018. According to the media readout on the 2019 flight contest, Kim launched this event five years
ago and made it annual -- implying this contest was held in 2018 but state media did not report on it, almost
certainly due to its diplomatic overtures vis-a-vis the U.S. and South Korea. Moreover, North Korean media
on November 18 reported on the leader’s guidance of rare “KPA Air and Anti-Aircraft Force sniper subunits’
parachute training.” This report was notable for two reasons. First, this appears to be the first time state media
reported on snipers’ parachute training. In fact, state media rarely mention “snipers” and “parachute training,”
the party daily having been observed to mention the former only once in connection with military drills in
2016, and the latter in reference to “parachute training” conducted in 2013, 2014, and 2016. Second, timing-
wise, the parachute training report appeared the day after U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper announced
the postponement of U.S.-ROK joint military drills. The training may have been conducted before the Esper
announcement, but the North had the choice to not publish the story.
17Leadership: Kim Jong Un’s activities become decidedly military-focused
Bringing back the specter of Yeonpyeong shelling in 2010
State media on November 25 reported on Kim’s inspections of the Changrin Islet defense unit and a women’s
company under KPA Unit 5492 on unknown dates, his first KPA unit inspections since June 30, 2018. Both of
these units, neighboring South Korean islands, are located within the maritime buffer zone as stipulated by
the inter-Korean military accord signed in September 2018. Notably, Kim during his inspection of Changrin
Islet ordered soldiers to fire artillery, which according to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND)
constituted a violation of the military agreement. Moreover, according to the MND, the artillery firing occurred
on November 23, the ninth anniversary of North Korea’s shelling of South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island. The
timing of Kim’s visits to the two islands, and the artillery firing on November 23, almost certainly was carefully
calculated to remind South Korea and, to a certain extent the U.S., that a military provocation against South
Korea is not off the books.
Fourth test-fire of “super-large MRLs”
North Korean state media on November 29 reported on Kim’s “observance” of the “test-fire of super-large multiple
rocket launchers [MRLs]” -- the North’s fourth test-fire of this weapon system after August 24, September 10,
and October 31. It marked the first time since September 11 that state media reported on Kim’s presence at a
weapon test. Kim skipped out on the Pukguksong-3 SLBM test launch on October 2, and on the third test-fire
of the “super-large MRLs” on October 31. Kim’s presumed absence from these events was considered unusual
as the leader normally attends weapons tests. As of now, it is unclear whether Kim’s two absences in October
were exceptions, or if Kim’s selective participation in weapon tests will be the new norm. If it is the latter, Kim
may have attended the latest weapon test as a final check on the weapon.
18 18LEADERSHIP: WHY IT MATTERS
Government
The spate of Kim’s military appearances in November “until the U.S. takes actual steps to completely and
is consistent with North Korea’s hardening line on the irreversibly withdraw its hostile policy toward the DPRK
U.S. since the Stockholm talks. North Korea’s decision that threatens our national security and undermines
to report on Kim Jong Un’s guidance of snipers’ our people’s right of existence and development.”
parachute drill the day after Esper postponed the U.S.- The references to security and economic concerns
South Korea joint aerial exercises signaled that the were stronger in language compared to Pyongyang’s
North would forge ahead with its plan, one that likely is previous pronouncements and reflected the North’s
militaristic, not diplomatic. North Korea’s latest MRLs hardening line. North Korea in November issued
test-fire on November 28 seems to be a testament to multiple “press statements” in foreign policy-related
that position. officials’ names not only reiterating the Foreign
Ministry’s position, but also stating that the North
In the immediate wake of the Stockholm talks, the will need to be compensated for the diplomatic
North Korean Foreign Ministry proclaimed that it will achievements for which the U.S. president has taken
not engage in any more negotiations with the U.S. credit.
Business
Despite the uptick in Kim’s military activities, the various signals from state media also indicate that
economy remains North Korea’s top policy priority. North Korea’s “new path” in 2020 will be militaristic,
Moreover, while the North could continue to carry out not diplomatic, possibly resembling 2017. North
weapons tests until the end of the year, it likely will not Korea in 2020 will likely seek to achieve economic
renege on Kim’s ICBM and nuclear test moratorium development while continuing to develop and test new
before the year-end deadline is up on December 31. weapons, given the lack of diplomatic progress with
the U.S. During the 2013-2018 era of byungjin, parallel
State media continues to acknowledge economic development of the economy and nuclear programs,
difficulties, and thus the economy will likely remain Pyongyang justified its weapons development
Pyongyang’s top priority in the New Year. That said, and testing as a way to ensure stable economic
development.
19 19HUMAN SECURITY / HUMAN RIGHTS: TYPHOON DISPLACED OVER 6,000
NORTH KOREANS, RECENT SECURITY MEASURES IN PYONGYANG DRAW
CONCERN, SEOUL ABSTAINS FROM HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTION
CO-SPONSORSHIP
Section by Caroline Kearney and Rachel Minyoung Lee
A man shows off his crop at a rice cooperative farm | Picture: NK Pro
In November, a Red Cross report said over 6,000 North Korean citizens were displaced during Typhoon Lingling
which hit the country in September. Secondly, NK Pro highlighted increasing and concerning security measures
recently observed in Pyongyang. Finally, Seoul decided not to co-sponsor an annual UN resolution condemning
the human rights situation in North Korea.
Typhoon Lingling displaced over 6,000 people in the DPRK: Switzerland, India
provide aid to DPRK, Danish NGO receives sanction exemption
Typhoon Lingling displaced 6,362 North Korean people, primarily on the country’s east coast, the DPRK
Red Cross Society (RCS) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
reported in an update on November 28. Strong winds and flooding caused by the September 7 storm resulted
in damaging 1,774 households and 75,226 hectares of farmland, according to the report.
Switzerland and India have recently contributed funds for humanitarian assistance in North Korea, according
to reports released this month. India contributed $1 million through the World Food Programme last month,
according to Yonhap News on November 5. Switzerland is making a contribution of $70,000 through its
domestic cooperation and development agency, Yonhap reported on the 21st of the month. Switzerland is the
DPRK’s second largest donor, according to the UN financial tracking service, which listed the Swiss nation’s
2019 contributions at $8 million. South Korea is listed as the largest donor, though its contributions have yet
to reach the North.
The UN Sanctions Committee on November 6 granted the Danish aid NGO Mission East a sanctions exemption
to bring agricultural machinery into the DPRK to support a food security project.
20Human Security / Human Rights: Typhoon displaced over 6,000 North Koreans, recent security measures in Pyongyang draw concern,
Seoul abstains from human rights resolution co-sponsorship
Increased security measures in Pyongyang invite concern
A series of new or recently reinstated security measures in Pyongyang suggest that the government may be
raising domestic state security and information control to its strictest levels since Kim Jong Un came to power.
NK Pro analysis on November 21 pointed to seven sets of new and concerning security measures witnessed in
the country during 2018 and 2019.
Increased security and surveillance efforts include the installation of window blocks and bars in apartments
and hotel rooms in central Pyongyang during 2019, a significant expansion of CCTV and surveillance software
in 2018 and 2019, and an uptick in the number of ‘wanted’ signs in centrally located Pyongyang locations.
Meanwhile, the arrest of Alek Sigley, social media guidelines for diplomats, and restrictions on foreigners
departing North Korea with DPRK-purchased phones all seem aimed at preventing information from leaving
the country. Since Hanoi, DPRK embassies in London and New York have significantly decreased the frequency
of meetings held with foreigners -- likely a restriction aimed at preventing diplomatic leaks. While the rationale
behind these measures cannot be determined for certain, observers have suggested it is a reaction to a
combination of perceived security lapses, leaks, and diplomatic issues.
UN committee adopts human rights resolution, Seoul abstains from co-sponsorship
A committee of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on November 14 adopted a resolution on the
situation of human rights in the DPRK, which is expected to pass the UNGA next month. A version of the
resolution is adopted annually, condemning human rights abuses in North Korea and calling on the government
to take action. Notably, this was the first time since 2008 that South Korea opted out of co-sponsorship on the
resolution. The ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release on November 15 stating the government
chose not to co-sponsor the bill due to the “comprehensive consideration of the overall circumstances, such as
the current situation on the Korean Peninsula.” Meanwhile, the DPRK Foreign Ministry on November 17 issued
a “spokesperson’s press statement” -- a relatively strong reaction to this annual human rights bill -- calling it a
“politically motivated reckless provocation” brought about by the U.S. and other “hostile forces.”
21 21HUMAN SECURITY / HUMAN RIGHTS: WHY IT MATTERS
Government
Perhaps the most concerning development during determine if North Korean state security can keep
the month of November arises out of NK Pro analysis up with global technology advancements and spread
highlighting recently heightened security measures of information. Stricter regulations on information
in Pyongyang. These are likely reactive measures to leaving the country will also make sanctions evasions
a number of recent incidents including video footage monitoring more difficult for the UN Panel of Experts
of Kim Jong Un unguarded at a train station en route as well as member states.
to Hanoi in February, international scrutiny of DPRK-
related sanctions violations, and the leadership’s Meanwhile, South Korea’s decision not to co-sponsor
inability to fulfill promises of economic reprieve through the UN resolution on the human rights situation in
improved U.S. - North Korea relations. In a nutshell, the North Korea is yet another example of the Moon
actions could point to concern within the leadership of administration overlooking illicit behavior by the
the negative impacts on its authority if it does not crack regime in order to provide latitude for inter-Korean
down on the flow of information. Ongoing observation dialogue.
will be needed to monitor public reaction and to
Business
The increase in surveillance equipment in North Korea its economic foothold in North Korea in the event
provides business opportunities primarily for Chinese that UN sanctions are lifted and further licit trade is
providers such as Hikvision. The past several months allowed.
have seen Chinese firms become more active in the
DPRK through increased participation in trade fairs The month of November also provides niche business
and high-level exchanges. China’s goals are likely opportunities for those providing humanitarian goods
twofold. Firstly, as North Korea refrains from nuclear through the funds provided by Switzerland and India
tests, China is open to rewarding the country with and those providing agricultural equipment to Mission
economic benefits. Secondly, China is likely solidifying East.
22 22WMD: NORTH KOREA LAUNCHES TWO SHORT-RANGE PROJECTILES,
DPRK NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES A “CLEAR VIOLATION” UNSC
RESOLUTION: IAEA
Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll
North Korean launch of two projectiles from a Multiple Launch Rocket System on November 28 | Picture: Rodong Sinmun
The final week of November saw the DPRK launch two short-range missiles, in what represented its thirteenth
test this year. The IAEA also said that North Korea’s ongoing nuclear activities clearly violated UNSC resolutions
and remain a cause for serious concern. This year Pyongyang responded to the report, saying it “categorically
rejected” it. Meanwhile, CSIS assessed satellite imagery showing movement of specialized railcars at the
Yongbyon Nuclear Facility to be significant, though 38 North classified movement at the facility as “minor.”
North Korea launched two short-range projectiles
North Korea launched two short-range projectiles on November 28 from what was believed to be a large-caliber
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said the same day. The
projectiles were launched from or nearby Ryonpo in Hamgyong Province and in the direction of the East Sea.
The two projectiles traveled at a 380km trajectory at an approximate apogee of 97km and were launched within
30-second intervals, the JCS confirmed. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) confirmed a launch from a
“super-large MLRS” the following day, saying it represented a final examination of the weapon’s capabilities and
that it took place in the presence of leader Kim Jong Un. The Rodong Sinmun, in turn, said the country would
develop “even more state-of-the-art arms and equipment of our style for realizing the party’s strategic plan,
and equipping the People’s Army with them as soon as possible.” The test event marked the DPRK’s thirteenth
projectile launch this year and its fourth test of the MLRS system. It also followed test-fire artillery drills by
North Korea’s military near the inter-Korean maritime border five days prior.
In a notable article, the Choson Sinbo, a Tokyo-based newspaper with editorial ties to Pyongyang, on November
13 referenced the range of the MLRS in relation to the U.S. military base’s relocation to Pyeongtaek. The article,
written by managing editor Kim Ji Yong, claimed the purpose of the relocation was to “escape from the People’s
Army’s artillery,” but at only 70 km south of Seoul, it remains “within the firing range of the MLRS.”
23WMD: North Korea launches two short-range projectiles, DPRK nuclear activities a “clear violation” UNSC resolution: IAEA
Research institutes note movement at Yongbyon, CSIS finds movement significant
Specialized railcars have recently been spotted at different locations throughout the Yongbyon Nuclear
Facility, according to satellite imagery from November 1 and 9 and analyzed by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS). The movement is noteworthy as the type of railcars have previously been involved
in the movement of radioactive material, CSIS said. On November 1, the imagery showed one railcar at a track
near the Radiochemistry Laboratory and the other three near the Uranium Enrichment Plant and reported
Isotope and Tritium Production Facility. While November 9 imagery showed all four railcars relocated to a
track near the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Facility. CSIS said it is difficult to determine whether the movement
is the result of a “carefully calibrated political maneuver by North Korea, the actual movement of radioactive
materials or a combination of both.”
Meanwhile, 38 North also released a report on November 27 stating that low level activity at the site had been
observed in satellite imagery in October and November. It noted the presence of railcars at the site, but did not
provide detailed analysis of their purpose, apparently giving less weight to their presence than the CSIS report.
And in a separate report, 38 North on November 18 released analysis covering 17 years of housing developments
in Yongbyon City, the town which supports the nearby nuclear facility. Satellite imagery showed that additional
personnel housing is being built and old facilities are not being demolished. This indicates that the number of
personnel at the nuclear facility has or will be increasing, according to 38 North.
IAEA says North Korea’s nuclear program remains a serious concern
The DPRK’s ongoing nuclear activities - witnessed through satellite imagery - are a “clear violation” of UN
Security Council resolutions and “remain a cause for serious concern,” the acting director general of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) told a UN General Assembly (UNGA) meeting on November 11.
The agency’s acting leader said that even though North Korea’s actions are “regrettable,” it remains on stand-
by to verify North Korea’s nuclear program if a political agreement is reached. While the statement is similar
to previous years’ statements, that same day, the DPRK Ambassador to the UN Kim Song responded directly
to the statement during the UNGA meeting saying that his country “categorically rejects” the report. Kim’s
statement also criticized the agency for being biased towards forces hostile to the DPRK, presumably the
U.S. He added that Pyongyang’s self-imposed moratoria on nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile
launches for more than 20 months demonstrates their “good will and tolerance” on the nuclear issue.
24 24WMD: WHY IT MATTERS
Government
North Korea’s projectile launches and subsequent administration will want to take into account as it
reporting in state media during the month of mulls over potential concessions in an effort to restart
November have direct implications for the U.S. and working-level negotiations with the DPRK.
ROK governments as the two attempt to restart
dialogue with the country. The last sentence in North Korea has stepped-up WMD activities over the
Rodong Sinmun’s Korean-language pronouncement past several months and, coupled with Pyongyang’s
on November 29 stating that the country’s national statement on November 19 that it is not interested
defense scientists are anxious to continue developing in talks with the U.S. until its hostile policy has been
weapons in compliance with the party’s strategic line withdrawn, they signal that the DPRK leadership is
implies that the ballistic missile program will likely more likely to shift to a militaristic path instead of a
continue apace. Further, the MLRS system test-firing diplomatic one. This makes a resumption of U.S.-
on the 28th of the month decreased projectile interval DPRK talks before Kim Jong Un’s year end deadline
time to 30 seconds, a notable improvement from unlikely unless the U.S. makes North Korea an offer to
the 17-minute interval demonstrated during the first remove its hostile policy - though the DPRK’s definition
test-firing of the system on August 24. The country’s of “U.S. hostile policy” has been both broad and vague
program continues to advance, which the Trump since the breakdown of talks in Stockholm.
Business
North Korea’s WMD-related activity in November and One niche business opportunity remains for military
recent months signal ongoing testing well into 2020. equipment providers to Seoul and Washington. In
As a result, prospects for U.S.-DPRK negotiations to 2019, North Korea has primary focused on enhancing
resume or make substantial progress are slim. This its short-range weapons capabilities and conducting
bodes poorly for businesses awaiting opportunities military provocations near the inter-Korean border.
with North Korea as a result of economic sanctions Should Pyongyang step-up provocative actions in
relief or that benefit from minimal tensions on the 2020, the U.S. and South Korea may feel a pressing
peninsula. Such opportunities may even be on hold need to beef up missile defense systems on the
until after the next U.S. President takes office. peninsula.
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