BACKGROUND GUIDE - Beymun 2021
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1 BACKGROUND GUIDE
2
Crisis Security Council
Chair: Hussein Kazem
Assistant Chair: Mark Nourallah
Crisis Staffer: Elissa Hassan
Committee Administrator:
Ahmad Najia
3
Table of Contents:
Table of Contents: 3
Letter from the Secretary General 5
Letter from the Chair 6
BEYMUN 2021 – Fifth Edition 7
Committee Overview 8
I. History 8
II. Membership 8
A. Permanent Members 8
B. Non-Permanent Members 8
III. Functions, Powers, Mandate 9
IV. References: 9
Rules of Procedure 10
I. Committee Rules 10
A. Voting and the ‘Veto’ 10
B. Debate Procedures 10
II. Crisis Committee 10
B. Crisis Notes 10
Topic: The Situation in Ethiopia 12
I. Introduction 12
A. Background 12
B. The Political System in Ethiopia 13
1. The Ethno-Federalist System 13
II. History 13
A. Ethiopian Civil War (1973) 13
1. The Derg Regime 13
a. The Ethiopian Red Terror 14
2. Rise of Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) (1989) 14
B. Fall of the USSR and the End of the Derg Regime (1991) 15
C. The Border War with Eritrea (1998-2000) 16
III. The Tigray War 17
A. The 2015 Elections 17
1. The Election Results 17
2. The Protest 17
B. The Resignation of Hailemariam Desalegn in 2018 18
4
1. The OOP and ADP Alliance and the Election of Abiy Ahmed 18
2. The New Prosperity Party 18
3. Abiy Ahmad Criticizes the TPLF 18
C. The Tigray Regional Elections 19
1. The Results of the Election 19
2. Abiy Declares the Tigray Government as Illegitimate 19
3. Abiy’s Reaction and “the Declaration of War” 19
D. The November 4th Attack 20
E. The Violence, Civilian Casualties, and Ethnic Massacres 20
F. The Supposed Involvement of Eritrea and Somalia 20
IV. The Humanitarian Crisis and the Regional Consequences 21
A. The Refusal of International Mediation 21
B. The Ethiopian Refugee Crisis 21
1. The Effects on Sudan 21
2. The Humanitarian Aid 22
C. The Regional Consequences and the Potential Ethnic Cleansing of the Tigrayans 24
1. The War Spilling over into Sudan and Eritrea 24
2. The Fear of Ethnic Cleansing 24
V. The Role of the International Community 25
VI. The Situation at the start of the Conference: 26
VII. Questions to Consider 27
VIII. References 28
List of figures:
Figure 1: What is the Security Council? | United Nations Security Council
8
Figure 2: Tigray crisis: Why there are fears of civil war in Ethiopia - BBC News
12
Figure 3: CHART COMPARING PEI-4.0 BY COUNTRY AND REGION
18
5 Letter from the Secretary General Dear Sir or Madam, I am pleased to announce the official return of the Beirut International Model United Nations Conference, making this our 6th official debut, and commencement of our long road to BEYMUN 2021. With more exciting and intellectual surprises on the way, it is our absolute pleasure to invite your institution and students to join us at one of the most exceptional, cultural, and educational experiences in the Middle East. As we face one of the world’s most challenging times, the entire BEYMUN 2021 team has made it a primary focus to empower and give back to the communities that have lost so much hope and spirit. Ones that have found themselves struggling to regain their drive, passion, and resilience to become the future change makers of our planet. With a pandemic on the loose, international instability, and each and every individual’s lives being lived on a day to day basis, we took it upon ourselves to not only create a successful conference, but an outlet for brilliant minds to regain their spirit and remember how important their voices are. Thus, our theme for the BEYMUN 2021 conference is “Focusing Inwards, Channeling Outward, Steering Forward.” We truly believe in the importance of reevaluating and revisiting our current circumstances, politically, socially, and economically, and using our accumulated knowledge to change the way our world is, and foster a better future for us all. This is the mentality and environment we hope to harvest within this year’s conference, one filled with hope and motivation for a better tomorrow. We look forward to welcoming you with open arms on our journey to an empowered and intellectual 3-day experience! Sincerly, Annabelle Ghanem Secretary General of Beirut International Model United Nations 2021
6 Letter from the Chair Dear Delegates, Welcome to the 2021 Beirut International Model United Nations (BEYMUN)! We are pleased to welcome you to the Crisis Security Council (CSC) Committee. My name is Hussein Kazem, and I will be serving as Chair of the CSC Committee. I am a fourth year Electrical and Electronics Engineering student at the Lebanese University. Alongside me in this committee will be Mark Nourallah, acting as Assistant Chair, Elissa Hassan, as the Crisis Staffer, and Ahmad Najia, as Administrator. My journey in MUN began in high school. I wasn’t always the most outgoing person but I found a passion for public speaking and conflict resolution. With 6 years of experience, I have attended and chaired numerous conferences hosted in Lebanon. My love and passion for MUN grew as time passed by, and I participated in the previous edition of BEYMUN as an assistant chair. This year, the theme of our conference is “Focusing Inward, Challenging Outward, Steering Forward.” I highly encourage all of you to reflect upon this theme since action is critical amidst the present time. The topic chosen this year for CSC, “The Situation in Ethiopia,” is highly interesting, engaging, and relevant to the conference’s theme and to our present-day situation. With arising conflicts across the African Region, the lack of international attention and media coverage, preventing an all-out war between countries in the region is crucial. Moreover, the refugee crisis that may arise, the ethnic conflict going on, and the potential for ethnic cleansing is a huge threat that needs to be responded to at all costs. Certainly, the 21 st century is characterized by issues that have maintained an extensive impact on the global community. Thus, it is the duty of each one of us to work and seek a better future. The purpose of this background guide is to introduce you to the topic of this committee. However, this background guide is not intended to replace your own individual research. I advise you to explore in depth the policies of your Member State and go above and beyond in your research to have a thorough understanding of the topic. Should you have any questions regarding the committee itself or its topics, please do not hesitate to contact me at unsc.beymun@gmail.com. I look forward to a heated debate and seeing you in the conference! Sincerely, Hussein Kazem Crisis Security Council Chair BEYMUN 2021
7
BEYMUN 2021 – Fifth Edition
BEYMUN Crisis UNSC will welcome delegates all around the world and from different
backgrounds to discuss, analyze, and resolve what has the potential to be one of the largest
conflicts in the African Continent. The United Nations Security Council will be tackling on the
following topic during the conference
● Topic: The situation in Ethiopia
While the scope of the topics may seem focused on the internal conflict in one country, the
UNSC will focus on attempting to restore order to the entire horn of Africa region as the
conflict escalates very quickly and the potential for an all our war for the water of the Nile is
becoming more and more of a reality by the day.
8
Committee Overview
Figure 1 What is the Security Council? | United Nations Security Council
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/what-security-council
I. History
The United Nation Security Council was established on October 24 th 1945 as a part of the 6
major organs of the United Nations. It was founded in an effort address the failings of the
League of Nations in maintaining world peace1.
II. Membership
According to chapter V, Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations, it shall consist of 15
members of the UN with 5 permanent members and 10 non-permanent members.
A. Permanent Members
The Republic of China, France, Russia, The United Kingdoms (UK) and The United States of
America (USA) make up the 5 permanent members also known as the P52. These 5 members
hold the power of the ‘veto’ which will be discussed in the rules of procedure part of this
background guide.
B. Non-Permanent Members
The ten non-permanent members of the security council are elected on terms of 2 years by
the United Nations General Assembly and are ineligible for immediate re-election. Each
member state shall only have one representative3.
The current 10 non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are: Estonia,
India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia and
Vietnam4.
1
The United Nations:
https://www.un.org/en/model-united-nations/security-council
2
The Charter of the United Nations:
https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/index.html
3
Ibid
4
The United Nations Security Council:
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members
9
III. Functions, Powers, Mandate
Under the United Nations Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Council
are: maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the principles and
purposes of the United Nations; investigating any dispute or situation which might lead to
international conflict; recommending ways of adjusting such disputes or the terms of
settlement; formulating strategies for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments;
determining the possibility of a threat to the peace or act of offense and to recommend what
action should be taken; calling on Members to apply economic sanctions and other none
violent measures to prevent or stop aggression, taking military action against an aggressor;
recommending the admission of new Members; exercising the trusteeship functions of the
United Nations in "strategic areas"; recommending to the General Assembly the appointment
of the Secretary-General and, together with the Assembly, electing the Judges of
the International Court of Justice5.
IV. References:
A. Security Council. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/model-united-
nations/security-council
B. Chapter v. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-
charter/chapter-v/index.html
C. Current members security council. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members
D. Functions and Powers Security Council. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/functions-and-powers
5
The United Nations Security Council:
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/functions-and-powers10
Rules of Procedure
I. Committee Rules
All the rules of procedure that apply in a regular MUN conference usually apply in this Crisis
Committee as well, with a few discrepancies.
A. Voting and the ‘Veto’
In the Security Council, the main final goal of the conference is to formulate a draft resolution
to be voted on and hopefully passed at the end of the conference just like any other
committee. Yet, seeing as this is a Crisis Security Council conference, you will be working in
high pressure situations where you will need to pass directives, which are actions to be taken
immediately by the members of the Security Council. They will also be voted on with a
maximum of one directive passing during each committee session.
In the Security Council a 'super majority' is required in order for a clause to pass. Therefore, a
clause or resolution needs 9 out of 15 votes in favor for it to pass. As it is well known, if any
P5 member state votes against the clause, it automatically fails6 due to the ‘Veto’. However,
it is possible to bypass a veto and take action with the directives using joint crisis notes at the
Dais’ discretion, which will be discussed in (II).
B. Debate Procedures
One of the major differences between the Security Council and other UN Committees is the
veto power of the P5 members. In an effort to make things more interesting, the following
will be applicable during the voting procedure:
Before a directive or the background guide gets vetoed, a P5 member state is encouraged to
raise ‘veto concerns.’ The Chairs will open the floor for veto concerns before a clause is
debated. When veto concerns are raised, the P5 member is required to give a speech detailing
their concerns and accepting points of information. Following that, the Chair will call for an
unmoderated caucus to allow further discussion and attempts to reach a compromise and
decide on a way in which the clause can be amended to become agreeable to the P5.
However, if a clause cannot be amended in order to satisfy all members of the P5 it may then
be vetoed and it will be up to the sponsors of the directive to work on a joint crisis note.
II. Crisis Committee
A. What is a Crisis Committee?
A crisis committee differs very little from any other MUN committee except that it is much
more fast paced and action packed. Your performance as a delegate is very much based on
your knowledge and your ability to think on your feet and make the right decisions in the heat
of the moment.
B. Crisis Notes
A crisis note is an action taken by you as the delegate representing a member of the Security
Council. The possibilities are endless with this tool, whether you want to impose sanctions on
a specific party in the conflict, send troops to the borders, send peace keeping forces, invade
the country and impose your form of peace and democracy or just fire off nukes into it (all
6
The Charter of the United Nations:
https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/index.html11 within reason of course). The crisis note must be addressed to the Chair and must contain the name of the delegation(s) and the actions they want to take within their powers and logical reasoning. Crisis notes will be taken into consideration by the Chairs and Crisis staffers of the committee and will be either passed or rejected, depending on the flow of the debate. Keep in mind that your notes must present a logical pattern, and tie together in your character’s Crisis Arc. Sending a note to the back room is like telling a story, and, therefore, all major actions require proper preparation and buildup.
12
Topic: The Situation in Ethiopia
Figure 2 Tigray crisis: Why there are fears of civil war in Ethiopia - BBC News
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54826875
I. Introduction
A. Background
On November 4th 2020, Tigrayan troops attacked a National Ethiopian military base in Tigray.
This prompted the now Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed to send troops to the area
which is mostly governed by the Tigray People’s Liberation Party (TPLF) sparking the ongoing
conflict between the government and the party7. The conflict started off as an exchange of
attacks between the two sides until things started to escalate heavily when Tigrayan missiles
landed on Eritrea, the neighbor country bordering Ethiopia8 from the North in addition to
rising tensions on the borders with South Sudan9.
According to the UNHCR, more than 56,000 Ethiopian refugees have already fled the country
and have been moved to camps in South Sudan. Most refugees in the camps are desperate
for food, shelter, sanitation, clean water and most importantly healthcare10; making this not
only an armed conflict but also an emerging humanitarian crisis with tensions rising at the
borders and war spilling over into the South Sudan territories.
7
Washington Post:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/11/17/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-what-is-happening/
8
Ibid
9
Anadolu Agency :
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/sudan-accuses-ethiopia-of-escalation-amid-border-row/2151358
10
UN News:
https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/108142213
B. The Political System in Ethiopia
1. The Ethno-Federalist System
The Ethiopian Constitution came into full force on the 21st of August 1995 upon the
establishment of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1995. It introduced a federal
system of governance11. The goal of federalism was to maintain unity and peace among the
people. There are currently 9 member states in Ethiopia delimited on the bases of settlement
patterns, language, ethnicity and consent of the people concerned. The member states are:
the State of Tigray, the State of Afar, the State of Amhara, the State of Oromia, the State of
Somalia, the State of Benishangul/ Gumuz, the State of the Southern Nations, Nationalities
and Peoples, the State of the Gambella people, and the State of the Harari people 12. The
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia comprises the Federal Government and the State
Members according to article 50-1 of the Ethiopian constitution13. When it was introduced
and developed, social critics and intellectuals stated concerns about the negative
consequences of ethnic federalism in the Ethiopian context since this nation is an ancient
country having multi-cultural and multi-lingual societies that have been assimilated due to
thousands of years of continuous interaction, intermarriage, trade, migration, and other
social activities14. In Ethiopia, the politicization of ethnic identity has been a cause of many
conflicts, dubbed ‘ethnic’ conflicts, recorded ever since 1995 and many of which were
recorded by the UNHRC15.
II. History
A. Ethiopian Civil War (1973)
The Ethiopian Civil War occurred from 1974 to 1991 in the aftermath of the communist
Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia's coup d’état (the removal and seizure
of a government and its powers) against the last Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie in 1974.
The provisional government, nicknamed the Derg ("council"), established a military junta and
a communist state, but the Derg soon faced rebellions from anti-communist rebels, armed
separatist forces, the Eritrean independence movement, and rival communist factions.
1. The Derg Regime
During the 1950s, the Ethiopian Empire was entangled in political and financial turmoil due
to Emperor Haile Selassie's failure to improve Ethiopia's quality of life or to stop human rights
abuses by his government. Furthermore, there was control within the hands of respectability,
which rejected numerous of the Emperor's modernizing changes. The Empire survived a 1960
coup endeavor, but a famine outbreak in 1973 led to “dissents” which empowered the
military to subdue the Emperor on 12 September 1974. The military at that point shaped the
Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia, nicknamed the "Derg" ("council"), with
11
Ethiopian Government Portal:
http://www.ethiopia.gov.et/government-
structure?p_p_id=56_INSTANCE_Aa8zGn38nDVb&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=colu
mn-1&p_p_col_count=1&_56_INSTANCE_Aa8zGn38nDVb_page=2
12
Ibid
13
The Ethiopian Constitution: http://www.ethiopia.gov.et/-/--8
14
A Accord:
https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/ethnic-federalism-conflict-ethiopia/
15
Human rights watch:
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia1013_ForUpload_0.pdf14
Aman Andom serving as its first Chairman. Aman was a moderate who sought a bloodless
revolution. He moreover favored peace for the Eritrean War of Independence. The other
members of the Derg junta contradicted his claim to leadership over the rest of them, and
they started the primary circular of show trials and executions in November 1974. Aman
offered to the military to subdue the Derg, but junior junta member Mengistu Haile Mariam
came in-between this request and sent soldiers to capture Aman, causing his death in a
shootout. On 21 March 1975, the Derg nullified the Ethiopian government and supplanted it
with a Marxist-Leninist communist one-party state. On 27 August 1975, Haile Selassie passed
away in Derg custody at the Jubilee Palace in Addis Ababa, supposedly strangled to death.
The Derg at that point went on to nationalize most of the country's urban real-estate property
and industries.16
a. The Ethiopian Red Terror
In 1976, the Derg initiated the "Red Terror" against political dissidents and rebel movements
in Ethiopia, leaving between 50,000 and 750,000 people dead.” In addition, the government
also targeted the MEISON student movement in an attempt to consolidate its power,
unleashing the smaller "White Terror". On 3 February 1977, Mengistu became Chairman of
the Derg after having Tafari (Ethiopia's 225th and last emperor) executed for his alleged
EPRP sympathies, and he took a hardline stance against the regime's opponents. By August
1977, the EPRP and MEISON leadership was either dead or in hiding in the countryside, but
the collateral damage caused by the purges led to a boost in popular support for the rebel
groups17.”
2. Rise of Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) (1989)
The most powerful opposition movement in fighting against and challenging the Derg and the
dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam was the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), even
though they “had a modest and unimpressive beginning.” It was founded by a group of young
students from the Addis Ababa University (AAU)18.
The group fled from Addis Ababa to their home region of Tigray, which is deposited in the old
heartland of Ethiopia where the old Ethiopian empire and its center first were situated19.
They felt that they, as “Tigrayans”, had a notable privilege in forming the political scene of
the future in Ethiopia. The individuals of the TPLF respected their political views as Marxist,
but in reality their perspective were exceptionally from a Marxist point of view and “more
associated to that of the Chinese communists within the 1930s and a few of the Latin
American developments based on rural populations than that of urbanized intellectuals.” The
opposition movement dynamically picked up back from the Tigrayans and developed more
grounded20.
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) founded the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1989. TPLF was at that time a Marxist-Leninist liberation
16
Britannica News
https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Socialist-Ethiopia-1974-91
17
Human Rights Watch:https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/Ethiopia919.pdf
18
The Ethiopian Quest for Democracy in a Dominant Party State
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/15606916.pdf
19
Ibid
20
Ibid15
movement who fought for the right of autonomy for the Tigray ethnic group. TPLF was
nevertheless not strong enough to fight the Derg and in order to create a powerful national
resistance movement it was established into an ‘umbrella’ movement. TPLF needed to
rebrand itself by making big adjustments in terms of political orientation, ideology and
mobilization in order to play a national role and to be able to defeat the Derg. The TPLF
needed to think about its future in the Ethiopian national politics and therefore broaden its
constituency and open its membership to different ethnicities, other than only the Tigray
ethnic group, in order to create a strong coalition movement of ethnic organizations to win
military victory over the Derg21.
The EPRDF became the strong political and military force that Ethiopia needed in finally
defeating the Derg with a military victory. In 1991, the EPRDF assumed power over the
country. The Ethiopian state and its political future and reconstruction were left in the hands
of the EPRDF. Thus, the era of military force in Ethiopia’s political history came to an end in
1991 with the military victory of the EPRDF. The majority of the Ethiopian people was relieved
that the war finally was over and wanted nothing more than peace22.
Parties who got to be a part of this ‘umbrella’ movement were the Amhara National
Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) and
the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front (SEPDF). SEDPF got to be a part of EPRDF
at an afterward stage than ANDM and OPDO since it was set up in 1994. SEDPH in this way
got to be the final part of the party. In addition to these parties, EPRDF gained a few
associated parties at an afterward stage. EPRDF was in this way a TPLF creation but had
developed into a much stronger force and was getting to be a identity of its own without
connection to the TPLF. It had all the potential to develop into a major political force – which
afterward got to be reality.
B. Fall of the USSR and the End of the Derg Regime (1991)
On 15-19 February 1989, the EPLF ( Eritrean People's Liberation Front) dealt a decisive defeat
to the Ethiopian army at Shire. The TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) also gained the
support of Ethiopia's suffering peasantry, clergy, and other opponents of the regime, evicting
the PDRE from Tigray by the end of 1989. In 1990, amid the Dissolution of the Soviet Union,
the USSR cut off aid to Mengistu's regime, forcing a desperate Mengistu to formally renounce
Marxism in favor of a mixed economy. This was not enough to quell popular discontent
against his regime, and, in May 1991, the EPRDF( Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Front) rebel coalition advanced on the capital of Addis Ababa from all sides.
Mengistu abandoned most of his fellow WPE (Workers' Party of Ethiopia) and Derg leaders
by fleeing to Zimbabwe that month (at the behest of the United Nations, seeking to avoid a
bloody last-stand battle in the capital), and EPRDF forces entered Addis Ababa on 4 June 1991.
The EPRDF transitional government disbanded the WPE, arrested almost all of the prominent
Derg officials, and began Ethiopia's transition towards being a federal state 23.
21
Ibid
22
The Ethiopian Quest for Democracy in a Dominant Party State
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/15606916.pdf
23
Human Rights Watch:
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/Ethiopia919.pdf16
C. The Border War with Eritrea (1998-2000)
On May 6-7, 1998, small-scale clashes occurred between the Eritrean military and Ethiopian
militia or police patrols in a remote area along the western part of the Eritrean-Ethiopian
boundary near a town called Badme. As the claims commission later found,it is clear from the
evidence that these incidents involved geographically limited clashes between small Eritrean
and Ethiopian patrols along a remote, unmarked, and disputed border. Such minor incidents
might well have gone unnoticed, but they were followed by much more serious action. On
the morning of May 12, Eritrean armed forces consisting of soldiers, tanks, and artillery
attacked the town of Badme, crossed through the Badme plain to higher ground in the east,
and attacked several other areas in Ethiopia’s Tahtay Adiabo Wereda, as well as places in the
neighboring Laelay Adiabo Wereda. The areas attacked on May 12, the claims commission
later found, “were all either within undisputed Ethiopian territory or within territory that was
peacefully administered by Ethiopia . . . Even amid the conflict, the Organization of
African Unity (OAU, the forerunner to the current African Union) Ministerial Committee
found that Badme and its environs were beneath Ethiopian administration earlier to May
1998 and consequently requested that Eritrea pull back its strengths from
the zone”. Without a doubt, even “Eritrea acknowledged the Badme region had
been persistently beneath Ethiopian authority for a significant period of time, both some
time recently and after autonomy in 1993,” but kept up that the
colonial settlements concluded between Italy and Ethiopia set up that Badme was portion of
Eritrea24.
On May 12, 2000, Ethiopia propelled a major hostile from the region of Badme, taken
after from there at Zalambessa on the central front. Ethiopian forces within
the west outmaneuvered and broke through the Eritrean lines and after that entered into
Eritrean domain, seizing a few Eritrean towns (Barentu, Bimbina, Bishuka, Mailem, Molki,
Shambuko, and Tokombia). From there, a few Ethiopian forces moved east in Eritrea toward
Mai Dima and Mendefera, others traveled west toward Alighidir, Gogne, Haykota, and
Teseney, whereas still others returned to Ethiopia. Of particular significance, Ethiopian
troops were inside striking remove of Adi Quala, which lay as it were approximately 100
kilometers by a great street from the Eritrean capital of Asmara. Ethiopian troops that come
to Teseney were locked in by Eritrean troops and retreated south back to Ethiopia through
Omhajer and Guluj, and after that over the Setit Stream. After being fortified,
those strengths returned to Eritrea and recovered Alighidir, Guluj, and Teseney on June 12-
1425.
24
The Eritrean-Ethiopian War (1998-2000)
https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2492&context=faculty_publications
25
ibid17
III. The Tigray War
A. The 2015 Elections
1. The Election Results
In May of 2015, general
parliamentary elections
were held in Ethiopia,
resulting in the EPRDF
winning 100% of the
seats26.
This election was ranked
the lowest on the Harvard
perception of electoral
integrity dataset for that
year27.
The seeds for the situation
were sown years ago.
During the election in
2010, in which the EPRDF
won 99.6 percent of
parliamentary seats,
political space had been
very restricted: the
independent media had
been decimated, civil
society groups virtually
eliminated, and peaceful
public demonstrations
quelled, sometimes by
force28.
Figure 3. CHART COMPARING
PEI-4.0 BY COUNTRY AND
REGION
https://dash.harvard.edu/bits
tream/handle/1/27030113/T
he_Year_in_Elections_2015_p
ages.compressed.pdf?sequen
ce=1&isAllowed=y
26
The Guardian:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/22/ethiopias-ruling-party-win-clean-sweep-general-election
27
The Year in Elections 2015 Harvard Report:
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/27030113/The_Year_in_Elections_2015_pages.compressed.pdf?sequence=
1&isAllowed=y
28
Human rights watch:
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/23/dispatches-alarm-bells-ethiopias-100-election-victory18
In September 2015, protests swept through Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest region, expanding to
Amhara in 2016. Ethiopian security forces used live ammunition to disperse the protests,
many of them fully peaceful condemning the killing hundreds of protesters and arresting tens
of thousands29.
Following that, violent protests occurred all the way through till February of 2018 when the
then acting Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn submitted his resignation from his office in
the midst of political turmoil30.
B. The Resignation of Hailemariam Desalegn in 2018
1. The OOP and ADP Alliance and the Election of Abiy Ahmed
The resignation of Hailemariam Desalegn, who had been in power since 2012, was considered
to be unprecedented in Ethiopia31. His resignation came at a time where unrest and political
crises led to many losses of lives. The reason behind his resignation was also to be able to
participate in reforming Ethiopia. Abiy Ahmed is a former soldier, of half-Oromo and half-
Amhara ethnicity and is known as a reformer, responsible for multiple reforms such as
lowering corruption, appointing women in half the ministerial posts, promising fair and free
elections in 2020, and negotiating an end to the border conflict with Eritrea. As the first
Oromo Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed formed an alliance with political parties in Ethiopia.
Furthermore, the Prime Minister ended the state of war with Eritrea by coming to an
agreement to give up a disputed border territory, in order to normalize relations with the
long-time foe32.
2. The New Prosperity Party
Founded in 2019, the prosperity party was built as a successor to the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) by Prime Minister Abih Ahmed. The EPRDF was
formed by merging parties such as the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), the Oromo
Democratic Party (ODP) and the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement
(SEPDM). This merger then joined a couple movements and leagues who had similar visions
and plans for Ethiopia33. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, as the dominant party for over
27 years, refused to join the new party and were refusing to acknowledge its existence. The
Prosperity Party was now multi-ethnic which allowed them to move on from pro-ethnic
federalism and ethnic nationalists. Their plans were there to support individual rights of each
individual and to finally shape Ethiopia into a democracy.
3. Abiy Ahmad Criticizes the TPLF
On July 1st 2019, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmad vowed to fight anyone who threatens
Ethiopia’s sovereignty with a weapon and not with a pen. Member parties of the EPRDF
29
Human Rights Watch:
https://www.hrw.org/tag/ethiopian-protests/
30
BBC News:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43073285/
31
The Guardian:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/15/ethiopia-prime-minister-hailemariam-desalegn-resigns-after-mass-
protests
32
Ibid
33
Al Jazeera:
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/4/2/abiy-ahmed-sworn-in-as-ethiopias-prime-minister19
publicly accused the TPLF of supporting conflicts in the region34. The prime Minister has been
critical of the party by criticizing their integrity and calling them out for their involvement in
corruption.
C. The Tigray Regional Elections
1. The Results of the Election
As a show of defiance against Prime Minister Abiy, Ethiopia’s Tigray region, mainly composed
of supporters of the TPLF, held their own elections. The head of the regional electoral
commission claimed that the “turnout was over 97%”35 in a country where Tigray only
represents 5% of the Ethiopian population but whose history in politics depicts an incredible
amount of influence and wealth than any other region. Prime Minister Abiy called the
elections illegal and would not respond with force. Ethiopia had been expecting to hold
national and regional elections on August 29 2020, but due to the pandemic, had them
postponed. This was seen by the Tigray politicians as a scheme from the Prime Minister to
prolong his rule36, stating that, since no other party participated in the vote, the TPLF won
100% of the seats.
2. Abiy Declares the Tigray Government as Illegitimate
In response to the TPLF, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed held an emergency session on November
7th with parliament which declared the Tigray administration as illegal and went into a vote
to replace it37. The TPLF stated that “Mr Abiy is an illegitimate leader, because his mandate
ran out when he postponed elections.”38 In response, the UN has called for a ‘de-escalation
in the fighting.’39 Furthermore, military action has been taken by the Prime Minister in order
to contain any form of escalation by the TPLF and their attempts to legitimize their votes and
government.
3. Abiy’s Reaction and “the Declaration of War”
The Federal Government of Ethiopia then came to an agreement to cut off all forms of funding
to Tigray. This sparked anger and the TPLF then considered these actions as “tantamount to
a declaration of war,”40 especially since Tigray was due to receive a federal budget of around
10.4 billion Ethiopian birr which is equivalent to 261 million USD41. The Federal government
stated they would stop contact with Tigray’s leadership and, according to General Adem
Mohammed, that they would only communicate with lower-level government bodies in
Tigray.
34
The Africa Report:
https://www.theafricareport.com/14894/amidst-instability-ethiopias-abiy-wants-to-strengthen-the-ruling-alliance/
35
Reuters:
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ethiopia-politics/ethiopias-tigray-holds-regional-election-in-defiance-of-federal-
government-idUKKBN2602QU
36
Ibid
37
Ibid
38
BBC:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54853362
39
Ibid
40
Barrons:
https://www.barrons.com/news/ethiopian-lawmakers-vote-to-slash-funds-for-tigray-01602081006
41
Ibid20
D. The November 4th Attack
On November 4th, the TPLF attacked a Federal Army base, proceeded to target airports and
threaten Eritrea. The TPLF fired rockets at two airports in Ethiopia’s Amhara State that is
bordering Tigray. As a result Prime Minister Abiy mobilized federal troops and ordered a
military offensive against the TPLF especially in the regional capital of Mekelle claiming that
the military would try and not harm any civilians and asking them to disarm, stay home and
keep away from any military targets42. Furthermore the Prime Minister proceeded to block
all travel, internet and phones were in Tigray. The UN has warned of possible war crimes
especially if it came to attacking the regional capital of Tigray. The TPLF is mostly formed of
around a quarter of a million of battle-hardened soldiers which raises the risk of this
confrontation to turn into a guerilla conflict. Even with the attack on Merkelle, the TPLF’s
leader Debretsion Gebremichael said that the Tigray forces are “ready to die in [defense] of
our right to administer our region”.
E. The Violence, Civilian Casualties, and Ethnic Massacres
As warned by the UN this war can and will lead to even more humanitarian crises. The
mistreatment of Tigrayan people in other regions of Ethiopia and the reports of violence on
non-Tigrayan civilians being massacred in Tigray. Recent news uncovered that 600 non-
Tigrayan citizens were murdered by a small Tigrayan youth group in the town of Mai-Kadra43.
Many different massacres are occurring in different areas of Ethiopia due to the 2 million
people who had to be displaced due to the conflict 44. This war has deepened ethnic tensions
and has created an immense humanitarian crisis with over 4.5 million people, mostly from
Tigray, who are in dire need of assistance45. There are severe shortages of food, water and
medicine and many areas are considered to be unknown due to the fact that international aid
cannot reach many towns46.
F. The Supposed Involvement of Eritrea and Somalia
With fear that the conflict might spread to neighboring countries such as Eritrea whose
relationship to the Tigrayans is hostile, the Prime Minister stated that he would refuse any
form of external intervention to the conflict in order for this war not to spill to other countries.
Yet, the United States claims that intel shows that Eritrean troops have already entered
Ethiopia and are fighting against the TPLF.
Other neighboring countries such as Egypt and Sudan have started joint military exercises in
light of the current events47, especially after the TPLF fired missiles at the capital of Eritrea on
November 14th accusing them of intervening and also went on to accuse Somalia of providing
soldiers to the Federal Government of Ethiopia.
42
BBC:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55083098
43
Reuters:
https://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-conflict-massacre-idUSKBN2841SQ
44
The New Humanitarian: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2021/01/12/tigray-ethiopia-
humanitarian-needs-assessment-
incomplete#:~:text=Local%20authorities%20estimate%204.5%20million,who%20were%20already%20in%20need
45
Ibid
46
Ibid
47
Africa News:
https://www.africanews.com/2020/11/20/egypt-sudan-conduct-joint-military-drill21
IV. The Humanitarian Crisis and the Regional Consequences
A. The Refusal of International Mediation
On November 25th 2020, in an open statement, Abiy Ahmed shut down the idea of any
international intervention claiming that one must adhere to the ‘Principle of Non-Intervention
in Internal Affairs’ as stated in Article 2(7) of the charter of the United Nations until an official
request for assistance is submitted. This statement was released alongside military action
taken in response to the ‘act of treason’ committed by the TPLF where they attempted to
take control of the military depot of the Northern Command. As a response to the military
action, Abiy Ahmed claims that an ‘ethnically-driven massacre’ of the 600 Amharas and
Wolkiats civilians in the city of Mia Kadra was executed with the blessing of the TPLF; which
was an ‘unimaginable atrocious crime’ according to the Chief Commissioner of Ethiopian
Human Rights Commission Daniel Bekele in his report. As the allegations against the TPLF
begin to accumulate, the government’s position in pushing their law enforcement operations
to defend and protect the integrity of the country is strengthened - which falls in line with the
‘spirit and objectives of the African Charter on Democracy’ according to Abiy Ahmed. In an
attempt to diffuse such a volatile situation peacefully, Abiy Ahmed gave the TPLF a 72-hour
surrender period for the TPLF leadership. However, the TPLF leadership refused to surrender
and stated that they are capable of arming ‘each and every civilian’ and they are ‘ready to die’
as the military encircles the Tigray capital Mekelle with tanks ready to shell the city to force a
surrender while still ensuring the protection of the civilian population.48 As the State of
Ethiopia continues to reject any international intervention as they are ‘very much capable’ 49
of solving their internal affairs, the UN along with many of their allies have only been able to
raise concerns over the possible humanitarian issues that might arise. As the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, believes ‘such rhetoric will lead to further
violations of international humanitarian laws’ as the situation has been really difficult to
monitor from the outside with the communication lines being cut.50
B. The Ethiopian Refugee Crisis
1. The Effects on Sudan
With the already present 25-year-long territorial conflict around the southeast Ethiopian-
Sudanese border and as conflict and tension begin to rise in the city of Tigray between the
TPLF and the Ethiopian government, nowhere are the threats of instability more acute than
in neighboring Sudan. Two days after fighting began, Sudan announced a closure of portions
of its eastern border with Ethiopia, and reportedly began deploying more than 6,000 of its
own forces inside of the Gedraf state – which borders the city of Tigray. These border
measures have been met with an influx of over 56,000 refugees according to the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees reports, and they are expected to exponentially increase to
200,000 refugees if violence is not halted.51 At the peak of the conflict, the Sudanese
48
Al-Jazeera:
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/24/tigray-forces-ethiopia-mechanised-division-completely-destroyed
49
Bangkok Post:
https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/2025415/ethiopian-pm-rejects-interference-ahead-of-surrender-deadline
50
Foreign Policy:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/25/ethiopia-poised-to-attack-tigray-capital/
51
UN Refugee Agency:22
government has reported the crossing of over 4,000 refugees in a single day seeking asylum
at UN Um Rakuba camp as it is approaching full capacity.52 . In addition to that, many
Ethiopian rockets have landed in Sudan during the conflict and on January 24 th, 2021 a military
camp in Sudan was struck by missiles coming from Ethiopia in Gedaref by an unknown
perpetrator during the same time as protests were held in Khartoum over the severe inflation
and lower living standards.53 With the camp approaching full capacity and the threat of heavy
artillery looming over the heads of the refugees, the UNHCR has taken the initiative to set up
new camps ‘136 kilometers from Gedaref’ at Tunaydbah which will be able to hold up to 5,000
more people. However, the UNHCR’s obstacles do not end there as the funding provided to
the camps are not sufficient enough, given that they only cover 37% of the financial
requirements to be able to provide adequate sanitation and water conditions for the refugees
admits probably the worst pandemic our generation has ever seen.54 Looking closely into the
conditions the refugees are living in it does not require a professional eye to realize it is only
a matter of time before a COVID-19 outbreak is set to happen, which not only threatens the
camps but the whole Sudanese population. With several confirmed cases identified on a
weekly basis and the lack of any isolation center, the already overcrowded camps present a
perfect environment for the coronavirus to spread easily which would cause an additional
humanitarian crisis that Sudan is not prepared to combat. With an already severe famine
present in Sudan, as a result of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia which blocks
large amounts of water from Sudan, the Sudanese government is struggling to feed its own
population and the refugees where they are being kept for days before any food is handed
out to them.55 Concurrent with these events, the Ethiopian government seems to lose its
patience as using diplomacy to solve the border issues seem to reach their limits and are
lingering towards a war with Sudan.56 This places the Sudanese government in a difficult
dilemma trying to solve a barrage of issues simultaneously reaping negative effects on them.
2. The Humanitarian Aid
The struggles of the Ethiopian refugees does not end as they cross the Ethiopian-Sudanese
border, with only $147 million dollars allocated to fund the UNHCR, the UN and humanitarian
communities in aims to assist Sudan, the financial budget has forced them to cut short on
many necessities.57 Where reports have emerged from Medecins Sans Frontieres describing
the struggles of the refugees and their family, as they are forced to stay for extended periods
of time without and food; and according to more reports in the event food is served there
https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2021/1/5ff4316c4/unhcr-relocates-first-ethiopian-refugees-new-site-
sudan.html#:~:text=Since%20early%20November%2C%20more%20than,have%20fled%20to%20neighbouring%20Sudan.&t
ext=Refugees%20are%20arriving%20with%20little,cent%20over%2060%20years%20old.
52
Relief Web:
https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/over-24000-ethiopian-refugees-cross-sudan
53
MSN News:
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/sudan-police-fire-teargas-at-protesters-over-worsening-economy/ar-
BB1d38wL?ocid=ob-fb-enus-1541512262291
54
UN News:
https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1081422
55
Médecins Sans Frontières:
https://www.msf.org/lack-food-shelter-sudan-add-worries-refugees-fleeing-ethiopia
56
Reuters :
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-ethiopia-idUSKBN29H228
57
UN News:
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/11/1078822#:~:text=The%20appeal%20for%20%24147%20million,over%20the%20nex
t%20six%20months.23 seems to be a shortage in the stock as not everyone is able to get a meal. 58 As the State of Ethiopia continues to further reject any international intervention, including humanitarian aid, thus putting roughly 4.5million people at risk of starvation. This decision has been argued to go against the African Union constitutive act in Article 4 section (h) these circumstances permit for the Union to intervene in a sovereign for humanitarian purposes.59 As mass starvation becomes imminent, the possibility of another great influx of refugees is no longer a question of ‘if’ but ‘when’. The international aid Sudan has been receiving is not sufficient enough to cover the first half year of its operations, which roughly costs $173.8million, in which a combined total of $5.2million has been given to Sudan from Germany, Norway, Switzerland, the UK and the United States of America and a contribution from Japan worth $800,000 on February the 1st.60 Along with 1million meals from the public campaign ‘ShareTheMeal’ app all in the hope of partially solving this humanitarian crisis under the supervision of the WFP.61 Not only has Sudan been suffering in providing basic services such as food and sanitation, but there has been also a great shortage in medical aid too. Where UNFPA representatives and Doctors without Borders have constantly raised the concerns of the shortage in equipment and the lack of adequate facilities to help out the refugees. It has been claimed that in some regions the water supplies are not functional and the power lines are cut, making the job of the organization ‘Doctors without Borders’ a lot more challenging.62 While other reports by the UNFPA have been claiming that the closest center of some essential services are about 40 minutes away, which has resulted in the death of a baby after nine months of pregnancy in one case.63 This is a direct result of the lack of funding provided to the refugees, as according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, Doctors and nurses have been forced to cut services after weeks without new supplies, running water and electricity. 64 Having also run out of surgical gloves and other PPE equipment, it is starting to pose a threat to the volunteers as the COVID-19 cases begin to rise between the refugees. The lack of funding along with shortages in COVID related equipment have made contact tracing and the establishment of ICU units near impossible with the current funding Sudan and other groups have been receiving and are crying for an increase in humanitarian aid before the situation gets out of control to the point of no return. 58 Relief Web: https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/ethiopian-refugees-hamdayet-sudan-everyone-hungry-everyone-tired 59 African Union: https://au.int/en/constitutive-act?qt-qt_documents_au=3 60 World Food Program: https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-sudan-calls-funding-support-refugees-ethiopia-thanks-japan 61 World Food Program: https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-sudan-calls-funding-support-refugees-ethiopia-thanks-japan 62 Doctors without Borders: https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/story/ethiopia-providing-medical-aid-people-affected- fighting-tigray 63 Relief Web: https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/ethiopian-refugees-sudan-dire-need-protection-reproductive-health-care 64 International Committee of The Red Cross: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/ethiopia-red-cross-sends-medicines-relief-supplies-mekelle-fortify-paralyzed-health- care-0
24
C. The Regional Consequences and the Potential Ethnic Cleansing of the Tigrayans
1. The War Spilling over into Sudan and Eritrea
Even with most of the conflict being resolved, the potential for hostilities spilling over,
especially into Sudan, are still very high especially with the potential problems and famines
that the Renaissance Dam can cause. Speculations say that the interference and preparations
by Sudan and Egypt are in order to take advantage of the situation to tackle the dam being
built that could also lead to a water war. The Ethiopian government has already claimed that
Sudan has been taking advantage of the ongoing catastrophe in the Tigray war, where the
Sudanese army has been regaining control of most of the land it has accused Ethiopians of
encroaching with clashes between the two armies being instigated in certain areas.65
Resulting in the looting of the Ethiopian farmers' harvest leaving the people without food to
eat according to Abiy Ahmed. Sudan has also been hit by shells near its border around the city
of Gedaref from Ethiopian soils, but the perpetrator remains unknown as of now. On the other
hand, Eritrea has already shown its support to the Ethiopian government by becoming heavily
involved in the conflict according to US intelligence as they have been reportedly sending
troops to support the Ethiopian Government in their conflict; however, this has results in a in
the bombing an airport in the outskirts of the Eritrean capital, Asmara.66 Which was followed
by a statement from the President of the TPLF, Debrestion Gebremicheal, that as long as
troops are here fighting any legitimate military target will potentially be fired at.67 This has
resulted in the further destabilization of the Sudanese-Ethiopian-Eritrean border. Even
though Egypt is not geographically near Ethiopia, the effects and the outcome of this conflict
is of great importance towards the GERD dispute, some specialists even alarmed towards a
possible proxy war ignited by Egypt.68 As the longer the conflict goes on the weaker the
Ethiopian government will be while negotiating a deal with Ethiopia, as Ethiopia has been
trying to keep the dispute at the African Union level where it has a better chance of getting
their requests met. Publicly, as it stands now, Egypt has not had any role in any military action
taken in the Ethiopian region and have refrained from publicly talking about any military
action; however, it has been recently discovered that as of the February the 21 st Egypt has
recently acquired German submarines, French troop carries and Russian helicopter
gunships.69 The stance Egypt has taken remains to be known in the public eye, but the rest of
the nations seem to have sided with the Ethiopian Government to aid it resolve its conflict
before it continues to spill across the borders.
2. The Fear of Ethnic Cleansing
With the conflict currently unfolding, new issues have risen regarding ethnic differences in
many regions. Non Tigrayan natives and Tigrayan natives are facing violence and murders
between each other. In Tigray over 500 non Tigrayans were massacred in school yards on
November 9th that were in ‘no way involved in the ongoing military offensive’ according to
65
Arab News:
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1783361/middle-east
66
Power Technology:
https://www.power-technology.com/comment/tigray-conflict-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/
67
Al-Jazeera:
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/15/rockets-fired-from-ethiopias-tigray-region-hit-eritrean-capital
68
Power Technology:
https://www.power-technology.com/comment/tigray-conflict-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/
69
National News: https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/africa/egypt-s-el-sisi-holds-military-meeting-amid-tension-
with-ethiopia-1.98767125 the Director of Amnesty International’s East and Southern Africa.70 Meanwhile, the Ethiopian government has called in some ‘high-ranking officials’ that were of Tigrayan descent to ‘hand over all government property and firearms’ and others were detained and treated like ‘prisoners of war’ while a conviction of any crimes committed is yet to be confirmed.71 Such actions are believed to be solely driven due to their ethnicity. Additionally, the Humans Right Watch reported that the Ethiopian federal forces have been carrying out indiscriminate shelling of urban areas in the Tigray region, which has resulted in the death of 83 civilians in November 2020. Areas which included homes, schools and hospitals.72 Similar patterns have been seen all around the city of Tigray where artillery has been believed to be aimed at populated areas instead of military targets. Such military action has been called against by the UN high commissioner for Human rights on November the 24 th before it commenced, after Abiy Ahmed used language such as ‘no mercy’ if the Tigray people do not leave their areas away from the TPLF.73 The ongoing alleged genocide has caused Mr Debretsion to call for help and release public statements on a TPLF Facebook page commenting on the horrific acts that the Ethiopian federal forces have been committing alleging that widespread murder, rape and torture have been committed to the Tigray population. 74 When the Ethiopian government was questioned about such accusations, they one ‘could not speak to the delusions of a criminal clique’s Facebook page’ denying any act of genocide or violations of the laws of war.75 V. The Role of the International Community The international community has remained very silent during the entirety of the conflict but, with tensions rising in the region, something has to be done to prevent further escalation. Numerous agencies and Nations have urged the Ethiopian government to ensure the safety of the civilians and minimize any civilian casualties in an attempt to steer it away from a genocide. The US State Department has already commented on the military interference of the Eritrean troops and has ordered their immediate withdrawal from the Ethiopian region despite continuous denial from both nations of their involvement in the issue, stating that there have been multiple reports of human rights violations from both parties. Additionally, the UN Human Right Chief, Ms. Bachelet, released more reports supporting the statements of the US State Departmnet’s reports of the human rights violations being committed by all parties involved. Therefore, the UN Human Rights Cheif has called for unhindered humanitarian access to the whole of Tigray to help aid and protect civilians as a result.76 Various other nations have seemed to have great interest in this war, such as China and UAE: due to the strategic location of the Horn of Africa the dominating power in the region will be 70 Amnesty : https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/ethiopia-investigation-confirms-scores-civilians-killed-tigray-state-massacre 71 BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55043373 72 Human’s Right Watch: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/11/ethiopia-unlawful-shelling-tigray-urban-areas 73 AP News: https://apnews.com/article/africa-ethiopia-international-law-kenya-95ab65c5942bff98e68826f93d74920f 74 BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55877939 75 BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55877939 76 UN News: https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1080622
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