NATIONAL EBOLA RECOVERY STRATEGY FOR SIERRA LEONE - GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE 2015-2017
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NATIONAL EBOLA RECOVERY
STRATEGY FOR SIERRA LEONE
2015–2017
GOVERNMENT
OF
SIERRA LEONE
National Ebola Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone acronyms A4P Agenda for Prosperity CSO civil society organization DISECS District Security Committees ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EVD Ebola virus disease GDP gross domestic product IMF International Monetary Fund MDG Millennium Development Goal MW megawatt(s) NGO non-governmental organization PROSECS Provincial Security Committees UNDP United Nations Development Programme WASH water, sanitation and hygiene Government of Sierra Leone July 2015
3
contents
Foreword 5
Executive Summary 6
1. Introduction 11
1.1. Background 11
1.2 Strategy Preparation Process 13
1.3 Structure of the Strategy Document 14
2. Economic Impact of the Ebola Crisis 14
2.1 Impact on Economic Sectors 14
Agriculture 14
Mining and Construction 15
Manufacturing 15
Transport and Tourism 16
Energy 17
Roads Infrastructure 18
2.2. Impact on Macroeconomic Aggregates 18
Inflation and Exchange Rate 18
Balance of Payments 18
Public Finances 19
Public Debt 20
Financial Sector 20
Medium-term Macroeconomic Outlook and Challenges 22
3. Social Impact of the Disease 24
3.1 Health Services 24
3.2 Education 26
3.3 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 26
3.4 Gender, Women and Children 27
3.5 The Elderly and Disabled 27
3.6 Labour and Employment 27
3.7 Implication for Social Protection 28
4. Impact on Governance, Security and the Justice System 30
5. Lessons Learned from the Ebola Epidemic 31
6. The Recovery Strategy 32
6.1 General Objectives of the Recovery Strategy 32
6.2 Principles Guiding the Post-Ebola Recovery Strategy 33
6.3 Strategic Assumptions 35
7. Immediate Recovery Strategies 35National Ebola Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone
7.1 Getting to and Maintaining Zero Infections 35
7.2 Managing and Mitigating Immediate Ebola Impact in the Social Sector 36
Health Care Services 36
Water and Sanitation 36
Education 37
Gender, Children, Social Protection 37
Labour and Youth Employment 38
7.3 Restoring Economic Growth and Output 38
Strategies to Recover Agriculture 38
Strategies to Recover Fisheries 39
Strategies to Recover Tourism and Air Transport 39
Strategies to Recover Trade and Private Sector Development 39
Strategies to Recover Road Development 39
Strategies to Recover Energy Services 40
Strategies to Restore Mining Operations 40
Strategies to Increase Domestic Revenue Mobilization 40
Strategies to Recover Financial Services 40
7.4 Strategies to Strengthen Governance, Justice and Security 40
8. Building National Systems for Resilience and Sustainable Development 41
8.1 Building a Resilient Health System 41
8.2 Community Development, Trust in Public Institutions and Peacebuilding 42
8.3 Establishment of Integrated National Security and Disaster Risk Management System 42
8.4 Strengthening Implementation of Public Sector Reforms 42
8.5 Strengthening Aid Effectiveness through the New Deal and Mutual Accountability Principles 42
8.6 The Role of the Private Sector and Trust 42
8.7 Dealing with Inequalities, Especially Gender-based 43
8.8 Regional Opportunities 43
8.9 Strengthening Economic and Financial Policy Management 43
9. Preconditions Underpinning Immediate Recovery Efforts 44
10. Risk Management 45
11. Transition Arrangements 45
12. Financing and Implementation 46
Annex 1 50
Annex 2 51
Annex 3 535 foreword Message from the President Sierra Leone as we all know was a leading United Nations example of post-conflict recovery. This was evidenced by the closure of the UN peace mission in March 2014. As a show of resilience, we contributed troops towards peace-keeping in Africa; we became one of the fastest growing economies in the world; growth rates in real GDP stood at 15.2 percent in 2012, and 20.1 percent in 2013; and poverty dropped from 70 percent in 2003 to 52 percent before the Ebola Virus Disease struck in May 2014. These gains have been largely reversed by the Ebola outbreak, compounded by two related shocks: coincidental drop of global price of the country’s leading export commodity, iron ore; and two of the major mining companies – the African Minerals and the London Mining – suspended operations due to financial distress. The twin crisis constrained our progress and drive to achieving our collective Vision 2035 of middle income country and drastically reducing poverty. We believe all is not lost. While the disease has caused unspeakable carnage, we are encouraged that it has equally presented us with invaluable opportunities and lessons to learn. We are left to accept that our country was still fragile and that more reform efforts are needed in building public institutions. We have worked on recovery today because we have seen light at the end of the tunnel in the fight against the disease; an outcome of concerted efforts of Government, the public, and the international community. Our recovery strategy is planned for implementation within a period of 24 months, spanning July 2015 to June 2017, with the first six to nine months focusing on 1) restoring basic access to health- care; 2) getting kids back to school; 3) social protection; and 4) restoring growth through the private sector and agriculture. I am very hopeful that, with the lessons learned from this epidemic and sustained commitment from my Government and our Development Partners, this recovery programme shall heal affected communities and institutions, and build a foundation for a more resilient Sierra Leone that is better prepared to face future shocks and epidemics. We hope to quickly recover from the epidemic and reengage the Agenda for Prosperity. Let me take this opportunity to thank our Development Partners, our communities and front-line doctors and nurses, some of whom laid down their lives for God and Country. H.E. Dr. Ernest Bai Koroma President of the Republic of Sierra Leone
National Ebola Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone
executive summary
A. Background Context The gross domestic product (GDP) growth
rate for 2014 is estimated at 7 percent, and 1
Sierra Leone is one of three countries in the percent excluding iron ore, compared to the
Mano River Union to suffer from the worst 11.3 percent projection at the beginning of
recorded Ebola outbreak since the disease was the year. For 2015, the economy is projected
first diagnosed in 1976 in the Democratic to contract by 23.5 percent, and by 1 percent
Republic of Congo. The socio-economic excluding iron ore. Inflation rates increased
impact of the disease has been devastating. modestly over the second half of 2014, while
To date more than 8,000 infection cases and the monthly average exchange rate depreciated
more than 3,000 deaths have been recorded. by around 13.5 percent, and the trade balance
Medical personnel are among the victims, with deteriorated from US$362.3 million in 2013 to
at least 295 health care workers infected and US$6.8 million. The government’s fiscal deficit
221 dead, including 11 specialized physicians. doubled to 3.8 percent of GDP (compared
This is especially worrying, as these personnel with 2013), reflecting higher current spending
were already in short supply. The ratio of skilled and decline in revenues (both associated with
health personnel to population size has reduced EVD, although revenues were also impacted
from an already low level of 17.2 personnel by the decline in iron ore revenues late in the
per 10,000 people before the outbreak to the year). Despite the higher deficit, official interest
current record low of 3.4 per 10,000. The rates remained low, reflecting increased system
required minimum ratio is 25 per 10,000. Of liquidity from unsterilized foreign exchange
the cumulative deaths, 446 are children: 222 inflows associated with the Ebola efforts. The
girls and 220 boys. Orphans are estimated at fiscal position is expected to deteriorate sharply
8,345: 4,182 girls and 4,163 boys. Widows in 2015, reflecting full year effects from the
are estimated at 954 and widowers at 465. same pressures, and there is an increased risk
The epidemic has crowded out the effective re- of higher domestic financing costs raising debt
sponse to other diseases (including traditional sustainability risks. The country’s fragility has
killers such as malaria) in the national health been increased once again; the hopes embodied
care system; non-Ebola illnesses certainly will in its Agenda for Prosperity (2013–2018) and
have added to the death toll recorded during chances of achieving Vision 2035 have been
this period. Following substantial efforts by the badly undermined.
government, communities and international
agencies, the disease is trending downward,
with the number of new infections significantly B. Socio-economic Impact
decreasing in the past couple of months, but it
cannot be said to be contained until zero cases
are recorded. 1. Impact on Social Services
Economic growth rates have slumped since
Delivery
the onset of Ebola virus disease (EVD), which There has been a 23 percent decrease in health
followed very strong growth rates in 2012 and service delivery. About 78 teachers are reported
2013, of 15.2 and 20.1 percent respectively. to have died, and the educational institutions
The economy suffered a double shock from remain closed, with some school facilities used as
the Ebola outbreak and the simultaneous Ebola holding and treatment centres. This poses
sharp decline of iron ore prices that resulted a serious risk of pupils not returning to school
in both iron ore companies being placed un- after the disease has been controlled, and brings
der administration and a sharp curtailment a higher chance of increased teenage pregnancy.
of production and revenues to government.7
The epidemic has seen the disruption of the sequential steps: (i) getting to and maintain-
implementation of water and sanitation pro- ing zero cases, (ii) implementing immediate
jects. Expert personnel have fled the country recovery priorities, with a special focus on
following the outbreak, and public works restoring access to basic healthcare, reopening
generally have been put on hold in many parts and running of schools in a healthy environ-
of the country. This can also be said for projects ment, providing social protection support, and
in other social service sectors. revamping the private sector, including agricul-
ture activities; and (iii) transitioning back into
2. Growth, Employment and the Agenda for Prosperity plan.
Human Development
It is crucial to underscore that the Agenda
Revenue lost to the disease is estimated at for Prosperity (A4P) remains the defining
about Le350 billion (US$74 million). There document for the overall development of the
has been a significant disruption in agricultural country, despite the EVD setback, and is the
activities and a decline in agricultural output. main national anchor for dealing with the
The private sector has been severely affected, medium- to long-term challenges posed by the
with a 50 percent decline in formal employ- disease. Lessons learned from the outbreak re-
ment. Manufacturing has lost 60 percent of its inforce the need to recalibrate our development
employees, and a number of new investment trajectory and ensure a robust A4P and drive to
ventures have been postponed. Cross-border Vision 2035. It is also recognized that, given
trade has come to a standstill. Air transport scarce resources and a multitude of spending
remains handicapped, with only two carriers priorities, the recovery plans must be brought
providing flights, and sea transport has been back into the prescribed public financial man-
reduced. agement framework of the budget, forward es-
timates, and prescribed procurement processes
to ensure the necessary internal accountability,
3. Implications for Social
assessment of options, transparency, and value-
Protection for-money outcomes.
EVD has increased levels of poverty and vul-
The recovery strategy will rely on the New
nerability. The situation is dire especially for
Deal for Engagement in Fragile States as an
women, children and the youth. To date, 3,034
implementation guide. The New Deal, to
survivors have been registered, of which 750 are
which Sierra Leone is a signatory, is a guide for
females and 591 males. This has increased so-
fragile states to attain and sustain resilience. Its
cial spending pressures, while the government’s
emphasis on country ownership, strengthening
revenue position has been badly undermined.
institutions, capacity building, and the effective
use of government resources dovetail with the
objectives and highlights of the report.
C. Recovery Strategy
2. Preparation Process
1. Context and Objective of The Recovery Strategy preparation process
the Strategy has been highly participatory, and the process
continues to evolve. It draws input from the
The 24 month Recovery Strategy – spanning Ebola Recovery Working Group, which com-
July 2015 to June 2017 – will focus on three prises representatives from the government andNational Ebola Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone
development partners, including the private of communities; improving surveillance and
sector, non-governmental organizations and health management information; ensuring the
civil society. It also takes into account sector and thorough disinfection of all facilities used as
ministerial consultations; inputs from national holding and treatment centres; and providing
experts and international missions; the multi- for post-Ebola complications and challenges,
agency Ebola Recovery Assessment; and vari- especially those associated with Ebola survivors.
ous national and international socio-economic
impact studies. Comments were also received 3. Access to Water and
from Development Partners Committee meet-
Sanitation
ings and Cabinet consultations.
These include provision of emergency water,
The recovery strategy will rely on the New sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services to
Deal for Engagement in Fragile States as an Ebola care centres; disinfection of affected com-
implementation guide. The New Deal, to munities and monitoring of WASH services’
which Sierra Leone is a signatory, is a guide for functionality; restoration of water, sanitation
fragile states to attain and sustain resilience. Its and hygiene service delivery in health units and
emphasis on country ownership, strengthening schools; promotion of the retention of positive
institutions, capacity building, and the effective health and hygiene behaviour through com-
use of government resources dovetail with the munity engagement and ownership.
objectives and highlights of the report.
4. Getting Kids to School
D. Immediate Priorities Decontaminate educational institutions used
as holding and treatment centres; repair schools
to basic operational level; promote better
1. Eradication of the Disease health habits and access to water and sanita-
tion; train teachers on Ebola and psychosocial
Stepping up efforts to completely eradicate therapies; provide early Ebola detection devices
the disease to ensure effective socio-economic and isolation facilities; engage communities
recovery, through enhancing disease surveil- on child care; expand the school feeding pro-
lance and contact tracing; improving infection gramme; provide incentives for pupils to return
prevention and control; maintaining safe and to school; and support the most vulnerable
dignified burials; deepening community en- children, including those with disabilities and
gagement; increasing cross-border surveillance; girls, as well as Ebola survivors.
sustaining support for mental and psychologi-
cal services; and improving operational services. 5. Protection of the Most
Vulnerable
2. Restoring Health Services
Recovery assistance will be targeted at the most
These include a review of the national health vulnerable and affected individuals – Ebola
system, strengthening of health care facilities, survivors, orphans, widows and widowers – and
and ensuring compliance with infection protec- interim care centres and homes will be estab-
tion and control standards; leveraging existing lished. The reintegration of Ebola survivors and
foreign medical teams to address immediate related health workers, including burial teams,
health staff shortages; new recruitment/train- into their communities will be facilitated, and
ing of health personnel; restoring the trust livelihood support provided.9
6. Economic Sectoral Response short-term recovery programmes. The me-
dium- to long-term needs shall be integrated
and Prudent Macroeconomic
into the Agenda for Prosperity.
Policies
The total cost of implementing the strategy for
Provide support to the agricultural sector;
full recovery for a period of 24 months – span-
rebrand the country and improve its image
ning July 2015 to June 2017 – is estimated
through destigmatization campaigns to restore
at US$1.3 billion, with a financing gap of
tourism and attract private investment, as
US$896.2 million.
well as ensure the resumption of air and sea
transport operations; provide support to the
Implementation will focus on two broad strate-
energy sector; resume public infrastructure
gic components. Component One will focus on
programmes, including road works; improve
delivering four highly prioritized recovery areas
the implementation of revenue collection
in the first six to nine months: i) sustaining the
strategies; strengthen the implementation of
fight against the disease and restoring access to
financial services policies and maintain appro-
basic health services; ii) getting kids back to
priate monetary and debt policies to stabilize
school; iii) social protection; and iv) support-
the financial sector.
ing private sector recovery with special focus on
accessing finance and supporting agricultural
E. Subregional Dimension activities. These six-to-nine month initiatives
have a total cost of US$306.3 million, with a
This will focus on strengthening the provision
current financing gap of US$102.1 million,
of service delivery centres at border crossings to
taking into consideration existing government
stimulate cross-border trade and regional trade
and in-country donor resources towards the
and investment through the Growth Triangle
rapid results project. In Component Two, the
Framework; adopting a unified approach to
government will focus the 10 to 24 months
Ebola eradication and recovery; improving
on three areas to sustain the recovery process:
cross-border coordination on security, disease
i) water and sanitation; ii) private sector de-
control, and data sharing; deepening and
velopment; and (iii) providing energy services
broadening the scope of regional infrastructure
to support and sustain the recovery. Activities
projects (roads, transport and energy); and
not completed in the first 6 to 9 months under
ensuring a regional approach for image rebuild-
Component One will be carried forward into
ing, rebranding and destigmatization.
the 10-to-24 month period. And recovery areas
for which strategies have been identified in this
F. Budgeting and programme but not prioritized for funding here
Implementation Issues will be addressed within the normal national
budget.
and Risks
2. Existing Plan
1. Zero Infections and Full The recovery strategy will be implemented
Recovery within the existing budget and medium-term
expenditure frameworks, consistent with
The current focus of the government is on the Agenda for Prosperity plan, including
getting to and maintaining zero infections and these monitoring and evaluation arrange-
the delivery of quick wins and immediate and ments; development partners’ support will beNational Ebola Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone
coordinated to ensure that they operate within pressure on suppliers and the domestic finan-
the New Deal and the Mutual Accountability cial sector and resulting in higher government
Framework principles; and a subregional security yields and domestic debt sustainability
approach will be adopted, but with country- challenges. Further capital flight due to percep-
specific implementation through sector basket tions of an ailing banking sector could add to
funds. depreciation pressures on the currency, adding
to macroeconomic instability and thwarting
3. Risks the recovery efforts. To mitigate some of these
risks, the government will maintain the agreed
The strategy will be subjected to significant International Monetary Fund programme, per-
risks which, given the urgency of recovery formance criteria and structural benchmarks.
efforts, will be hard to mitigate. Getting to
zero and maintaining zero could take longer 4. Principles Guiding the
than anticipated, which will either delay the
Recovery
recovery efforts or erode them. The shortage of
skilled administrators and analysts in the public Thus, the key principles guiding the recovery
sector could frustrate timely implementation process include building on the existing
due to the limited absorptive capacity of the response capacity in the fight against the
economy. Raised community expectations of disease; ensuring continued mobilization of
equitable aid disbursements, if not met, could communities; strengthening sector coordina-
lead to social unrest. There is a significant risk tion; ensuring an implementation recovery
that unfunded budget shortfalls could develop that is effective, efficient, and accountable; and
through the year, particularly if significant iron strengthening subregional coordination.
ore production fails to materialize, leading to11
1. Introduction mining, with the agricultural, construction and
services sectors showing strong performance.1
Macroeconomic stability had considerably
1.1 Background improved: single-digit inflation was recorded,
as well as low official interest rates and stable
Sierra Leone is among the West African coun-
exchange rates. The country was assessed as
tries worst affected by the Ebola virus disease.
having a low risk of debt distress. The country’s
The disease was detected in rural Guinea in
performance was encouraging not only on the
February 2014 and spread to Sierra Leone
growth front, but also in poverty reduction
in May 2014. Since then, more than 8,000
and human development. The national poverty
Sierra Leoneans have been infected, and more
headcount dropped from 70 percent in 2003 to
than 3,000 have died of the disease. While
52 percent before the Ebola outbreak, and the
the epidemic has killed many people, mostly
Human Development Index had shown signs
women and children, it is especially worrying
of improvement, increasing from 0.329 in 2005
that a good proportion of doctors, nurses and
to 0.374 in 2013, and ranking 183rd out of
other health personnel are among the fatalities.
187 in 2013.2 The strong growth performance
Children have been orphaned by the disease;
was accompanied by improved ratings on the
schools closed down from the beginning of
World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index,
the academic year in September 2014 until
as the country strove to emerge from a fragile
April 2015. Over two-thirds of those infected
post-conflict state. Notable progress had been
are in the economically active age group.
made in peace consolidation and strengthening
Furthermore, the epidemic has crowded out
of democratic governance and human rights.
effective response to other diseases in the
Considerable investment had been put into
national health care system, and, as a result,
public sector capacity to deliver effective and
non-Ebola-related illnesses have added to the
efficient public services with transparency and
suffering and the death toll.
accountability. These efforts all culminated in
the peaceful conclusion of the second and third
The disease has caused unprecedented social
post-conflict democratic elections of 2007 and
and humanitarian damage, accompanied by se-
2012, respectively.
vere economic consequences. It has remarkably
reduced the impressive gains made in economic
The EVD epidemic, along with the sharp
growth over the years, badly affecting farmers,
decline in commodity prices that has caused
traders, investors and a range of other economic
the country’s two iron ore mines to be placed
agents. Key economic activities – including
under administration, has reversed many of
agriculture, manufacturing, construction, trade
these achievements. The hopes embodied in
and commerce, transport, and tourism – have
the Agenda for Prosperity (the third generation
been disrupted, and this has significantly in-
poverty reduction strategy) and the country’s
creased the national unemployment rate.
Vision 2035 have been badly undermined. It
has wreaked untold havoc on the economic
Prior to the epidemic shock, the economy of
and social fabric of Sierra Leone, weakening the
Sierra Leone had recovered remarkably follow-
growth prospects of the economy and causing
ing the end of the civil war in 2002, and was
1 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development of
on a trajectory to sustainable development. Sierra Leone. Economic Bulletin 2013, Volume 19, Issue
The country recorded double-digit real GDP 2, p. 3.
2 Government of Sierra Leone, UNDP, World Bank, and
growth rates of 15.2 and 20.1 percent in 2012 African Development Bank. The Economic and Social
and 2013, respectively, driven largely by iron ore Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in Sierra Leone: Joint
Preliminary Assessment Report, p. 17.National Ebola Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone
a rapid reversal of the gains made in manag- outbreak, pointing towards the need to
ing macroeconomic stability and improving recalibrate our development trajectory and
human development. This has consequently ensure a robust A4P and drive to Vision
held back the government’s efforts at fighting 2035
unemployment, poverty and vulnerability. • Identifying missed opportunities and plan-
ning for their exploitation, particularly the
The country is confronted with numerous need to accelerate the implementation of
post-Ebola challenges that demand planning structural reforms, emphasizing applica-
and urgent action if the country is to (i) ensure tion of the rule of law (particularly the
the timely implementation of actions to ar- public finance management laws) and
rest further erosion of the development gains strengthening of regional cooperation,
obtained prior to the disease outbreak, (ii) especially within the Mano River Union
expedite socio-economic recovery and reduce States, on issues pertaining to health,
the suffering caused by the disease, and (iii) security, management of natural resources,
speedily chart a course to reclaim the path to and general subregional socio-economic
sustainable development that Sierra Leone had development
laid before the outbreak of the disease and the
demise of the iron ore sector. It should be emphasized that this strategy was
prepared when the disease was still infect-
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the ing and killing people, although it has been
Agenda for Prosperity growth path along which encouragingly trending downward decisively.
the country was moving, illustrating the socio- Therefore, given the unique crisis we are facing,
economic disruption caused by the shock of the which necessitates planning for recovery with
Ebola epidemic. The A4P remains the defining the continuity of EVD, and in order not to lose
document for the overall development of the sight of the risk of complacency in the fight
country despite this shock. The medium- to against the disease, we will integrate getting
long-term recovery programmes will be inte- to and maintaining zero infections within the
grated within the A4P, while we immediately recovery strategy.
implement others to restore lost livelihoods
and address heightened levels of poverty and A two-year implementation period is planned
vulnerabilities due to the disease. for ending the disease and overcoming the
immediate post-Ebola challenges, from June
The Ebola Recovery Strategy will therefore 2015 to May 2017, while incorporating the
not replicate the A4P, but repair, strengthen medium- to long-term actions within the
and build on it with the following specific A4P. The success of this will depend on the
objectives: efficiency and effectiveness of programme
• Getting to and maintaining zero infections implementation, and calls for enhanced co-
• Focusing on implementing quick-wins/ ordination and application of basic principles
immediate actions for dealing with the of good governance and management. A joint
current epidemic shock government–development partners committee,
• Formulating and adopting strategies to with civil society participation, will be set up
prevent future health and other emergen- to provide guidance on the implementation,
cies of similar magnitude, as well as build- monitoring and evaluation of the immediate
ing a robust health care system recovery programme within the framework of
• Applying lessons learned from the the A4P.13
Figure 1: The Ebola Recovery Strategy, Agenda for Prosperity (2013–
2018, and Vision 2035
Vision 2035
Expected Actual
Development Development Path
Results Post-Ebola
Planned
Development
Path before
Ebola
Agenda for
Prosperity
(2013-2018) Ebola
Agenda for Begun Response &
Change
Recovery Curve
(2008-2012)
Completed
Actual Ebola Catastrophe
Development Struck, May 2014
Path up to
Outbreak of
Ebola
Time horizon
Figure 1: The Ebola Recovery Strategy, the Agenda for Prosperity (2013-
2018), and Vision 2035
1.2 Strategy Preparation (UNDP) studies on the economic and social
impact of Ebola on households in Sierra Leone;
Process a study on the impact of Ebola on business in
Sierra Leone; assessments by the International
The preparation of the Sierra Leone Ebola
Growth Centre; and the Ebola Recovery
Recovery Strategy draws from the various
Assessment done in January 2015 by the Multi-
analyses carried out on the economic and social
Agency Mission, comprising representatives
impact of the disease by the Government of
from the UN, the World Bank, the European
Sierra Leone and other stakeholders. These
Union, and the African Development Bank.
include assessments by the Ministry of Finance
and Economic Development; the ministry’s
The government and the development partners
various policy documents; strategic plans
established the Working Group on Ebola
submitted by government ministries, depart-
Recovery, co-chaired by the Ministry of Finance
ments and agencies for the 2015 financial year
and Economic Development, UNDP, and the
budget process and Medium Term Expenditure
World Bank. The working group comprised
Framework 2015–2017 driven by the epidem-
a wide range of stakeholders, including key
ic; ministerial discussions on the 2015 financial
government agencies, donors, UN agencies,
year budget and strategic priorities post-Ebola;
non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
sectoral recovery strategies; joint assessments
civil society organizations (CSOs), and the
by the government and development partners;
private sector. It organized several meetings
impact studies by the Work Bank, Statistics
and technical workshops to provide inputs to
Sierra Leone and International Poverty Action;
the preparation of this document, including
the United Nations Development Programme
the identification of immediate recovery needs.National Ebola Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone
Various other stakeholders, including interna-
tional missions and national experts, have also
2. Economic Impact
provided strategic inputs. of the Ebola Crisis
1.3 Structure of the 2.1 Impact on Economic
Strategy Document Sectors
A review of the socio-economic, governance and
justice system impact of the disease is presented Agriculture
in Sections 2, 3 and 4, while Section 5 presents
lessons learned from the disease. Sections 6 and EVD significantly reduced agricultural and
7 discuss the recovery priorities. Strategies to food production in Sierra Leone in the second
restore functionality in the national health care half of 2014 (this sector employs 70 percent
system and other social sectors have been out- of the labour force and contributes to 40–45
lined alongside actions to relaunch economic percent of the GDP). The epidemic started
activities to stimulate state revenue generation spreading from mid-2014 when crops were
and restore viable public investments. Actions being planted and expanded during the crop
to restore normal operations in the security and maintenance and critical harvesting period of
justice system have also been outlined. staple crops (rice, maize and cassava). Labour
shortage is the main factor that affected crop
Section 8 discusses opportunities the disease production in 2014, as the traditional work
has presented for building national systems for gangs were disbanded.
resilience and sustainable development, identi-
fying fault lines leading to the outbreak and the The total national crop production of 2.09
difficulty of containing it, and suggesting long million tons in 2014 was a decrease of about
strategies to overcome weaknesses identified. five percent from production levels in 2013.1
It stresses those actions that would continue Production of the main staple crop, rice, is
into the medium and long term and that will estimated to have declined by eight percent.
be incorporated into the Agenda for Prosperity. The relatively low level of impact at the na-
Sections 9 and 10 are devoted to discussing tional level reflects the onset of the disease in
the preconditions and risks underpinning the the second half of 2014 and masks relatively
implementation of the recovery programmes, high subnational production and food security
with 10 discussing management of the imple- impacts. For example, the decline in rice pro-
mentation risks. Section 11 discusses the tran- duction is estimated at 17 percent in Kailahun
sition arrangement, including management District. Cash crop performance was also af-
of a possible resurgence of the disease in the fected to the extent that, although production
recovery phase, and linking medium- to long- of crops like cocoa was estimated to be normal
term recovery to the A4P. Section 12 discusses in 2014, exports fell by 30 percent owing
programme cost details/financing issues and largely to a reduction in cross-border trade.
the implementation arrangement, including Women’s cooperatives in other rural districts
monitoring and evaluation. such as Koinadugu have witnessed a decline of
at least Le200 million (about US$42,000) in
revenue since the disease struck.2
1 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Food Security and
Food and Agriculture Organization. The Food Security
Situation in the Context of Ebola Outbreak in Sierra
Leone: A Rapid Assessment Report, September 2014.
2 Ibid. p. 23.15
Generally, about 47 percent of all agricultural ore resulted in both iron ore companies being
activities have been disrupted, resulting in the placed under administration in late 2014/early
likelihood of the agricultural sector’s contribu- 2015. While the administrators were able to
tion to GDP being negative compared with the structure a deal on the resumption of produc-
earlier (March 2014) projection of a positive tion from the smaller of the two mines, the
4.6 percent contribution to real GDP growth.3 larger one remains on hold. Meanwhile, iron
This has worsened the livelihoods of a consid- ore prices have continued to decline to multi-
erable proportion of farm families, currently year lows (by end March 2015), which does
estimated at 420,000 nationwide. Within not bode well for this subsector.
the non-farm household sector, 179,000
household heads are reported to have lost jobs If iron ore production levels cannot be re-
or employment since Ebola broke out. At an sumed in 2015, this will have a major adverse
average of six persons per household, according impact on government revenues, GDP, and
to the last national population census of 2004, the workforce and businesses connected to
the livelihoods of close to 2.3 million people the sector. Similarly, the decline in world oil
have been worsened by the disease. prices is likely to impact government revenues
adversely through the reduction of petroleum
Livestock trade dropped significantly, due license fees, although there will be some offset
mostly to the restriction of movement and from the extinguishment of implicit petroleum
limitation of transport services. Furthermore, consumer subsidies. Also, reports suggest that
many farmers depend on wild animals as a artisanal mining, especially gold and diamond
source of animal protein and income. The activities, almost ceased operations owing to
outbreak has affected this source of livelihood restrictions on movement of people.
following restrictive public messages on the
consumption of bush meat, reinforced by com- The construction industry was buoyant prior
munity by-laws. to the outbreak of Ebola, and had been crucial
to poverty reduction given its labour-intensive
Mining and Construction nature. It utilized unskilled labour intensively
during the implementation of public and pri-
Mining contributed around 27 percent of GDP vate investment programmes, particularly
in 2014 and has been dominated by the iron road and building construction. The disease
ore subsector over the last three to four years, has overturned this source of livelihood by
which alone contributed around 24 percent.4 creating a lull in construction activities. Several
Other mining operations include rutile, ilmen- road works and many other infrastructure
ite, bauxite, and diamonds. Ebola has had little construction projects have been suspended.
direct effect on mineral production in 2014, The construction industry is estimated to have
with the main companies generally achieving declined in real terms by 10 percent in 2014.
their planned production levels in that year.
However, the sharp decline in the price of iron Manufacturing
3 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Food Security;
Food and Agriculture Organization; World Food
The small but expanding manufacturing sector
Programme; and International Fund for Agricultural had been instrumental in boosting employ-
Development. Agriculture Sector Post-Ebola Virus Disease ment and poverty reduction prior to the EVD
Response Programme, December 2014.
4 Government of Sierra Leone, UNDP, World Bank, and outbreak. Besides its direct impact on employ-
African Development Bank. The Economic and Social ment, it has had an indirect impact through
Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in Sierra Leone: Joint
Preliminary Assessment Report, p. 31.
backward and forward linkages, bringingNational Ebola Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone
together small-scale business operators and rural Côte d’Ivoire lately), have suspended opera-
farmers with large businesses within supply and tions. Travel restrictions imposed by countries
value adding chains. Manufacturing enterprises around the world, including African states,
had consumed intermediate inputs from other compounded the frustration of the industry.
sectors in the production of beer, soft drinks, The disruption of air transport hampered cross-
paint, soap, cement, foam mattresses, and so border and regional trade and reduced the sup-
on, and the vast majority of street vendors ply of essential commodities, exerting upward
traded in products from the manufacturing pressure on prices. It also frustrated govern-
sector. The disease has seriously affected these ment efforts at fighting the disease, impeding
income avenues. Bars, night clubs, cinemas and needed humanitarian assistance from abroad,
related activities ceased trading in response to including essential medical supplies and staff.
Ebola measures, which, coupled with the lull in Lulls in sea transport additionally hampered
construction activities, resulted in a significant the movement of international traders, as the
drop in demand for locally manufactured prod- disease caused a growing general scare. Sea ves-
ucts. A leading manufacturing firm, the Sierra sels that maintained operations were run with
Leone Brewery, which manufactures alcoholic higher costs and insurance.
and non-alcoholic beverages, deferred its in-
vestment plan and significantly scaled down About 70 percent of business establishments
operations because of falling demand. This led attributed the “limited availability of raw ma-
to a loss of about 24,000 jobs related to the terials and resale difficulties” to the limited air
entertainment industry. The loss of market travel and quarantine policies, with 65 percent
for agro-industry inputs upstream rendered asserting that the disease caused an increase in
22,500 persons in agriculture unemployed; transportation costs. This contributed to busi-
they depended on these firms to purchase the ness reports showing significant decreases in
raw materials they produced. total sales.
Transport and Tourism The tourism and hospitality sector is highly
vulnerable to domestic shocks, and Ebola has
The recovery of domestic transport following devastated it. According to available data from
the end of the civil war had supported an the National Tourist Board, tourist arrivals
expanding economy, enhancing the develop- from abroad dropped by 46.1 percent in 2014
ment of supply and value chains through the compared to 2013. Foreign investors declined
strengthening of forward and backward link- by 46.9 percent. A total of 50 out of 70 hotels
ages, and hence the development of small-scale and 200 out 242 guest houses closed down
enterprises and survival of informal economic because of the fall in occupancy, while all night
operators. International transport had picked clubs totally ceased operations. This led to a 75
up impressively, supporting the revitalization percent fall in employment in the sector, from
of the tourism sector and private sector devel- 4,207 people pre-Ebola to 1,051 at the end of
opment. Now, all of these positive trends have 2014. Revenue generated in the sector declined
been reversed by the disease. from US$58.8 million in 2013 to US$31.8
million in 2014. Some hotels managed to oper-
Air transport has been particularly hit; since ate at a half-month workforce rate to cushion
August 2014, all airlines, with the exception the costs of operations.
of Air Maroc and Brussels Airlines (and Air17
Energy resulted in the plant being run beyond its
technical limits.
Unreliable and limited energy services in
urban areas and the near absence of energy A number of energy projects that were in the
services in rural areas are major obstacles to an offing in the wake of the outbreak have suffered
adequate response to the Ebola crisis. Many severe implementation setbacks:
health centres are without light and a cold • Construction of 2.2 MW hydropower
chain for medicines. The lack of street lighting plants in Charlotte and Bankasoka
contributes to a worsening security situation. • Extension and rehabilitation of the low and
Structural deficiencies in service delivery sys- medium voltage distribution network in
tems were clearly exposed by EVD. Electricity Western Area (Islamic Development Bank
access and consumption in Sierra Leone are project), and extension and rehabilitation of
among the lowest in Africa. The country’s the distribution network in Freetown (Japan
limited and dilapidated power infrastructure International Cooperation Agency project)
(for generation, transmission and distribution) • Emergency grid works/Energy Access
is a major constraint to expanding electricity Project and energy sector Utility Reform
access in the country, which remains below 10 Project (World Bank)
percent. Public electricity services are limited • Moyamba hydropower project (UN
to selected areas, and sparse coverage and un- Industrial Development Organization)
reliable service exacerbate poverty. Electricity and Betmai hydropower plant project
tariffs remain among the highest in Africa, • The 128 MW thermal generation project
constraining energy consumption. Because for Western Area (Copperbelt Energy
of scarce supply and high costs, electricity Corporation) and electrification of 14
represents only 7 percent of the total energy district headquarter towns
consumption. • Solar street light project phases 1 and 2;
the Goma Hydropower Dam Extension
Improving energy services will not only be Project; and the Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia,
required for the containment of the crisis, but Sierra Leone and Guinea West African
also for the successful economic and social Power Pool Project to cover seven districts
recovery following reasonable ‘containment’. in Sierra Leone
The Ebola crisis impacts the energy sector in
various ways. Fiscal space for the financing of Furthermore, the installation of a new thermal
infrastructure services has further decreased as power plant (Copperbelt Energy Corporation
public funds were reallocated to the crisis and heavy fuel oil plant) was planned for 2016 to
as financing options evaporated. There were generate additional capacity, but this is unlikely
delays in the maintenance of thermal plants to materialize due to the effects of the Ebola
and implementation of energy projects as expa- crisis; as such, severe power outages between
triates were evacuated and external consultants March and July 2016 are projected. The crisis
could not visit Sierra Leone to provide needed has also led to the deferment of studies on
technical assistance. In particular, critical peri- long-term power generation options, which
odic maintenance was deferred, as contractors are necessary to minimize poor investment
did not visit the country during the epidemic, decisions in the future. Overall, an integrated
and this resulted in the deterioration of the approach in the energy sector must address
existing thermal plants at Kingtom and Black both short-term electricity supply needs in
Hall Road in Freetown. In addition, the need health facilities so that these have lighting, cold
to provide power throughout the outbreak chain, and other facilities, as well as support toNational Ebola Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone
improve broader electricity services to contrib- food inflation on a national basis over the sec-
ute to economic and social recovery following ond half of 2014. The national inflation rate,
reasonable ‘containment’. which had fallen from 8.2 percent at the end of
2013 to 6.4 percent at the end of April 2014,
Roads Infrastructure rose to 7.9 percent at the end of January 2015.
Road projects, including maintenance works, About 65 percent of business establishments
have been interrupted since the onset of the attributed the “limited availability of raw mate-
epidemic. Almost all activities in this sector rials and resale difficulties” to the rising level of
came to a standstill. International contractors general prices. The depreciation in the exchange
and consultants supporting operations left the rate contributed to the rise in inflation. The
country following the outbreak. Restrictions of exchange rate, which had been stable between
movement also affected the projects’ timelines. 2012 and the first half of 2014, depreciated by
Projects in the offing, with design works com- 13.5 percent in the second half of 2014 due
menced, were all postponed until the end of to foreign currency demand pressures arising
the epidemic. In turn, the poor road network from Ebola-related uncertainties and essential
that existed in most communities thwarted a imports (food, pharmaceutical and petroleum
more robust response to the disease. products), but also from the demise of iron ore
production and exports late in the year, a sharp
decline in foreign investment inflows, and
2.2. Impact on
maintenance of very low government security
Macroeconomic yields.
Aggregates
To meet the increased demand for foreign cur-
The combined effect of the disruptions to rency, the Bank of Sierra Leone increased its
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construc- weekly sales of forex from US$0.5 million in
tion, transport and tourism, and domestic June to US$3 million in October, and carried
and international trade on the GDP has been out five wholesale forex operations between
substantial. Economic growth is estimated to September and December 2014 amounting
have decelerated to 7 percent in 2014 from to US$30 million. Nevertheless, EVD-related
a pre-Ebola projected growth rate of 11.3 donor inflows, including IMF extended credit
percent. The non-iron ore economy grew by facility support, supported central bank foreign
1 percent compared to the earlier projected exchange reserves, which steadily increased
growth rate of 6 percent. The deceleration was over the second half of 2014 and into 2015.
magnified in the second half of 2014 given the With the demise of the iron ore sector and
strong growth rates up to mid-year prior to the large financing requirements for the post-EVD
EVD outbreak. recovery programme, continued donor inflows
will be required to support the currency over
Inflation and Exchange Rate 2015–2016.
The closure of markets (lumas), internal travel Balance of Payments
restrictions, and the resultant difficulty in the
distribution of farm produce caused some price The improvement in the balance of payments
spikes. Data indicates price spikes for the staple in 2012–2013 continued into the first half of
food, rice, of up to 30 percent countrywide, 2014, reflecting both a strong iron ore–driven
although there was no discernable increase in increase in export receipts and a decline in19
imports (particularly of machinery and equip- • Secondly, government current spending
ment related to the iron ore construction increased, with public funds the first line of
phase). Hence, despite lower-than-projected resources for the Ebola response. In total,
capital inflows, at the end of June 2014, gross the government allocated US$27 million
official foreign international reserves increased (2.8 percent of expenditure) in 2014 to
to US$570 million (4 months of imports) from fund Ebola-related activities. It is notable
US$473 million (1.8 months of imports). that public servants have continued to be
paid throughout this period at the increased
The external trade balance deteriorated in rates announced in the 2015 budget. Areas
the second half of 2014 on account of lower where government spending has declined
iron ore export receipts and maintenance of a include domestically funded capital projects
relatively high level of imports, predominately (down by around 14 percent of the planned
due to EVD requirements. However, capital budget) and foreign-financed capital pro-
inflows increased significantly during the same jects (down by 40 percent of the budget)
period, mainly due to higher-than-anticipated as contractors and international technical
budget support and Ebola-driven foreign sup- assistance ceased work and left the country.
port, which resulted in some additional reserve
accumulation by the central bank. Scaled-up budget support from development
partners – including the African Development
Public Finances Bank, World Bank, European Union and
IMF – through the Extended Credit Facility
While there was some moderate fiscal slippage and access augmentation played a critical role
over the first half of 2014 due to some spend- in covering the financing gap. All outstand-
ing overruns and shortfalls in revenue and ing bills were cleared at the end of 2014, and
grants, resulting in an accumulation of unpaid advances from the central bank were reduced
bills totalling about 1 percent of non-iron ore substantially below prescribed limits. While
GDP, the onset of EVD greatly accelerated fis- these actions ensured that the budget was
cal pressures. By the end of 2014, tax revenues adequately financed for 2014, huge challenges
were down 1.5 percent of GDP and tax arrears were expected to emerge in 2015 and subse-
had mounted significantly. Fiscal expenditure quent years.
also declined by just over 1 percent of GDP,
but higher current outlays due to higher EVD- Over 2015, revenues are expected to remain
related expenditures and a higher wage bill weak, reflecting the economic slowdown
(mainly for subvented agencies) were offset (particularly in the iron ore sector, which is
by much lower capital expenditure. The total unrelated to the EVD crisis), lower commodity
fiscal impact in 2014 was estimated at US$130 prices and associated investment flows, and
million, which occurred through two channels: ongoing compliance challenges exacerbated
• Firstly, the slowdown in economic activity by EVD. In contrast, fiscal expenditure to
and weaker tax compliance adversely affected achieve and maintain zero infections and for
domestic revenue collection. Total revenue the post-Ebola recovery efforts and resumption
collected in 2014 was US$90 million below of the existing public investment programme is
the pre-Ebola projection. The deterioration significant. Accordingly, in line with ongoing
in international prices of iron ore also weak- IMF programmes and the commitments made
ened revenues at year end. In all, state revenue following the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
loss since the beginning of the outbreak is debt forgiveness process, the government
estimated at Le350 billion (US$74 million). remains committed to limiting debt financingNational Ebola Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone
and maintaining fiscal sustainability, despite The situation was also compounded by difficul-
the EVD spending requirements and the col- ties experienced by the two state banks in rec-
lapse of the iron ore sector. onciling a large percentage of non-performing
loans. With additional foreign borrowing and
Under the IMF programme formalized in April downward pressure on the currency, a key
2015, the fiscal deficit in 2015 is projected to challenge ahead is the ability of the state to
decline to 3.6 percent of GDP from 3.8 percent service external debt due in 2015, 2016 and
in 2014. Estimates of external financing and 2017, which is estimated at US$36.4 mil-
contributions to the Ebola response amount to lion, US$42.1 million and US$49.8 million
US$381 million, while domestic financing is respectively, excluding debt owed to the IMF.
set at around US$90 million. Should resump- The IMF has provided debt relief support
tion of iron ore exports from the larger iron ore towards the recovery effort through the New
mine fail to occur from mid-2015 and if zero Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust
EVD infection rates is not achieved by the sec- Fund. But greater efforts are required to secure
ond quarter of 2015, then the fiscal deficit and additional debt relief from other creditors,
its financing requirements could widen further. since the IMF’s exposure is only 14.7 percent
of current debt stock. A further challenge could
Public Debt materialize if the financing gap is unable to
be covered by foreign inflows and substantial
Total public debt is estimated at US$1.49 bil- recourse to the domestic financial system is
lion, of which US$1.1 billion is external. Debt warranted. If domestic liquidity were to tighten
management policies and strategies since the and non-bank financial institutions were to
end of the civil war have been underpinned by a continue to withdraw from the market in
robust macroeconomic framework manifested government securities, any substantial increase
in recent years in declining inflation rates, a in domestic financing could result in sharply
stable exchange rate, declining government higher treasury bill yields, which will place
security yields, and rising foreign exchange even greater strains on the budget, particularly
reserve cover. Debt sustainability analyses in 2016.
consistently concluded that Sierra Leone’s risk
of debt distress remains moderate. Financial Sector
However, the current Ebola epidemic, which In recent years, the government embarked
has impacted negatively on key macroeco- on the establishment of community banks
nomic indicators, poses additional challenges and financial services associations to improve
to maintaining debt sustainability. The drop in access to finance for farmers and small-scale
domestic revenue and increase in expenditure enterprises, especially in rural areas. Ebola has
induced by the Ebola outbreak in the first seriously affected financial intermediation in
couple of months resulted in a widening of the rural areas. Some bank branches in epicentres
financing gap. Part of this gap was covered by temporarily suspended operations, and this
increased borrowing from the domestic bank- affected trade. Some banks reported that cash
ing sector. The situation was compounded by withdrawals were high at the onset of the crisis,
the sharp decline in securities held by non-bank as depositors sought to convert local currency
financial institutions, in part the result of the into dollars, which also contributed to the de-
success in achieving lower government security preciation of the exchange rate and consequent
yields resulting from high system liquidity. inflationary pressures. Some community banks
and financial services associations that providedYou can also read
