Maritime Airpower for Australia, Submarines in Britain's Defence - MOW NOT TO DEFEND
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MOW N O T TO D E F E N D T H E I N N E R ARC JULY - SEPTEMBER 2000 VOLUME 62 N O . 3 www.n*up*cejieuu/-nivyleig Maritime Airpower for Australia, Part 2 Submarines in Britain's Defence
D I V I 2 A 4 THE NAVY I I k N.i\> I
FKDKRAL C O U N C I L
ol \iMt;ili:i
Volume 62 No. 3 Patron in Chief: His Excellency. The Governor General
President: Graham M Hams. RFD.
Vice-Presidents: RADM A J Robctts,*i. AO. DSC. RAN (Rid): John Binl.
Contents C D R E H J . P Adams. AM. RAN (Rid) CAPT H.A J o v p h v AM. RAN (Rid)
Acting Hon. Secretary: Ray Coctwy. PO Box 309. Ml Wavtrlcy. Vic 3149.
HOW NOT T O D E F E N D T H E INNER A R C Telephone: (03)9888 1977. Fax: (03)9888 10X3
By Dr John Reeve Page 3 N E W S O U T H WALKS DIVISION
Patron: I lis Excellency. The Governor of New South Wiles.
T B M D A N D T H E RAN President: R dney. NSW 1013
By Mark Schweikerl Page 7
Telephone: (02)9132 2144. Fax: (02)9132 8383.
S U B M A R I N E S IN BRITAIN'S D E F E N C E M I S S I O N V ICTORIAN DIVISION
Patron: His Excellency. The Govemi* of Victoria.
By Dr Lee Willel Page 20
President: J M Wilkirts. RFD - .
M A R I T I M E A I R P O W E R F O R A U S T R A L I A , PAR I 2 Hon. Secretary: Gavan Bum. PO Box 1303. Box Hill Vic 3128
Telephone: 9927. PO Box 1303 Box Hill VIC 3128
Q U E E N S L A N D DIVISION
Patron: His Excelkucy. The Gov err* r of Queensland
gome m w k m Kovy's From ihe C r o w ' s Nesl Page 2 President: I M Eraser. OAM.
Hon. Secretary : Adnan B«rwvk. PO Box 402. Roma Street Bnshane. Qkl 4003
tend From O u r readers Page 2
Telephone: (07)3263 1319
Burt'i nly m Flash Traffic Page 12 State Branches:
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Mkgrfmsia*
in m m N i proviui
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Product Review
ftnji Ml
Ihn'i »ly an do League Policy Statement Page 32
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irffahm.
Bundaherg: I Lohse. PO Box 5141. Bundahcig West. Qld-1670
T h e o p i n i o n s o r a s s e r t i o n s e x p r e s s e d in THE NAVY a r e t h o s e or Telephone: (07)4151 2210.
Southport: IV Fix*. PO Box 9 4 6 S . w t l ^ » t Qkl 4215. T d c p h n c : (07) 5532 2447
the a u t h o r s a n d not necessarily those of Ihe F e d e r a l C o u n c i l of t h e
S O U T H AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
N a v y L e a g u e of Australia, t h e E d i t o r of THE NAVY, the R A N
Patron: His Excelkucy. The G o v e r n * t>t South Australia.
o r the D e p a r t m e n t of Defence. T h e K d i t o r welcomes c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , {'resident: Alan Pteskett R I D . 15 Sleeps Hill Drixe. Pamrama SA 5n Secretary. Admiral Michael W. Hudson. AC. RAN (Rid)
Navy League of Australia. N S W Division Vice Admiral David Ixach. AC CBE. LVO. RAN (Rid)
I -achlari Payne. C E O Australian .Shipowners' A w viation
G P O Box 1719. Vice Admiral Sir Richard I\vk. KBE. CB. DSC. RAN (Rid)
John Strang. Chairman Strang Interna!*wul Ply Lid
Advertising enquiries to:
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Corporate Members
Telephone: ( 0 3 ) 9 6 4 5 0411
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D e a d l i n e f o r next e d i t i o n 5 A u g u s t , 2(MM)
Strang International Pty Ltd
1' . - T -.--a! - U— : 46
T H E NAVY VOL. ft2 NO. 3
Whot the "White Paper will say about the SAN s plans to replace the DDCs is still somewhat up in the air. Here the recently decommissioned
HO&ART prepares for seo. (Brian Morrison, Warships and Marine Corps Museum Int)I K< > M IIII ( ROW s \ l M
Many of the editorials and articles that I have written in the acknowledged by NATO command was that military power
past have warned about the growing anti-surface ship cannot be exercised in isolation from other services. The
community within Defence. This offensive has now taken Serbs were quite willing and able to ride out the air
on allies. A growing number of articles in the mainstream campaign but were not so keen about the threat of NATO
print media are supporting the anti-surface community by ground forces and the sea blockade being undertaken.
making sensational, unsubstantiated and subjective claims One of the reasons for the Serb's confidence was the
about surface ship vulnerability and cost whilst peddling way NATO air power was so easily fooled by Serb decoys
the barrow of air power. The claims made by these articles, and camouflage, simple to do when air power won't risk
whilst being false and lacking insight, have unfortunately going below I5.()00ft. It wasn't until the KLA (Kosovo
created their own inertia, or to put it another way. 'one dog Liberation Army), realising NATO was unable to target
barks at something, the rest bark at him". Serb ground forces, deliberately engaged the Serbs to draw
The only saving grace is that none of the writers, who them out for waiting A-10 tank buster aircraft.
side with air power at the expense of sea power, are 'Operation Allied Force' was not the first war won by
recognised by defence media specialists or academics as air power alone. No war can be won by the application of
having any military substance or relevance. a single pressure point on a single front. Unfortunately.
The problem though, is that many of our politicians Australia's air power lobby cannot see our future security
tend to place an over reliance on Australia's media for for the clouds and are in danger of giving themselves a
defence information. An example of which was seen during pyrrhic victory.
a recent SLC (Senate Legislative Committee) hearing in The growing debate over air power versus sea power
May. The Chief of Navyuse of sea control it was a particularly dangerous position. of three factors: the leapfrogging strategy, the submarine
The withdrawal from Guadalcanal in 1943 thus war cn shipping, and US carrier air power."" In maritime
precipitated the collapse of the outer perimeter. The strategic terms, he was concluding that Japan lost its
Japanese strategic problem became not knowing when and perimeter and the war because it lost control and use of the
where the Allies would use the sea to strike next. Seeing sea. Yamamoto knew that the sea must be utilised fully if
their defence in territorial as opposed to maritime terms Japan were to establish a credible defence or a negotiable
meant in effect that the Japanese took their sea position. He knew that the region is oceanic in scale and
communications - and hence logistics and reinforcements that the sea makes it indivisible: that within this
- for granted. The Allied submarine campaign inside and environment maritime strategy is necessarily offensive (at
beyond the defensive perimeter devastated Japan's sea least in the sense of achieving initiative, mobility, and
transport in the most successful blockade in naval history. reach), otherwise sea control will be lost; that the land-sea
This blockade, like the amphibious power projection which interface of Southeast Asia cannot be defended without that
defeated the perimeter, depended upon sea control and was control; that Australia is a natural springboard into this
T h e J a p a n e s e cruiser M I K l ' M A heavily d a m a g e d during t h e Battle o f Midway
a war-winning weapon. George Baer, one of the world's interface (hence his desire to take Australia before Y a m a m o t o realised that sea control w a s the vital e l e m e n t of a w a r in t h e Pacific.
T h e battle signified a shift in sea control to the allied forces. J a p a n never tried t o
regain sea control and a d o p t e d a perimeter d e f e n c e mentality with devastating most distinguished naval-strategic writers, has observed: MacArthur and the Australian command - similarly aware T h i s w a s d e m o n s t r a t e d with a m a s s i v e s u r p r i s e attack o n t h e U S ' s ability t o
- seized the opportunity to go forward); and that Australia e x e r c i s e sea c o n t r o l throughout the A s i a - P a c i f i c , its s h i p s in Pearl Harbor.
consequences. There was no systematic effort until too late to protect
within these zones the sea lanes over which the vital is dependent upon its sea communications (hence his desire
This progressively left the Japanese floundering in a carriers PRINCETON and SARATOGA.) Whether or not
cargo ships passed, to meet and match the American to cut them off). Yamamoto's defeats and death left
manner which has critical lessons for any Australian this is taken as an argument for Australian carrier
submarines, to mount a guerre de course, or. after Japanese Pacific strategy to the continentally-minded
defensive concept based on comparable ideas. This is not procurement today, it is certainly part of a case for control
Midway, to make another try for offensive sea control. Army, who saw the perimeter as a fortified extension of of the maritime environment and for an air warfare
to suggest that current Australian planning necessarily their war on the Asian mainland. This is a lesson against
Each of these omissions was an astonishing strategic capability within it.
makes the mistakes made by the Japanese. It is. however, any tendency to superimpose ideas of continental defence
lapse... Pinning all their hopes on the battles expected It was sea control which allowed power projection in
to suggest that a concept for defending the inner arc must upon the different circumstances of the maritime
under their strategy of zone defence. Japan's leaders the inner arc in the Pacific War. This is demonstrated by the
pay attention to controlling the sea or risk failure. For environment.
left exposed all other dimensions of the country's fact that MacArthur's reconquest of New Guinea was a
Australia's recent mission within the arc in Timor, the
maritime position, failing in every other way to protect All military operations in the area of the inner arc must strategic mirror image of the Japanese taking of Southeast
deterrent effect of naval cover for the task force - based
the empire's vital access to the sea... The offensive be conceived of within the context of true maritime Asia - employing amphibious landings supplied by
upon sea control - was a given, and Major-General
strategy of the United Slates exposed the weakness of strategy. There can be no battlespace dominance involving merchant shipping while covered by naval and air forces.
Cosgrove has staled publicly how essential it was. calling
Japan's perimeter defence. Static island fortresses, the arc without sea control. During the Pacific War the (MacArthur. a remarkably maritime-minded general, had
this a "blindingly obvious lesson" in the value of sea
even with air bases, did not constitute an impenetrable fighting around Guadalcanal. New Guinea, the Philippines, as a major grievance the fact that he was short of shipping).
power.' 4 " As the Japanese learnt to their cost, how much
palisade unless a Navy held local command of the sea. and the Central Pacific was inextricably linked to the issue In this littoral warfare, sea control gave cover against
more relevant is this lesson to high intensity operations in
That command Japan never attained. Its Navy simply of who controlled the local seas and used them. Defence of enemy naval forces and gunfire support for landings.
which sea control may be contested, and in which our
lacked the force and range. The United States, with its the inner arc against Japan did not succeed until the Coral MacArthur's land-based air operations (like Nimitz's)
national interests may be threatened more seriously?
dual advance and very flexible Naval strategy, kept the Sea and Midway battles afforded the Allies sea control." 4 ' relied on sea power for forward base acquisition and
The Japanese Pacific offensive was a classic case of supply. Above all. sea control gave the initiative and the
initiative. It dispersed its fleet into task forces that kept MacArthur and Nimitz. could then take the offensive.
starting a war without knowing how to end it. Japanese choice of when and where to strike. This distracted the
the enemy off balance. The Americans could assault, or Operations within the arc were very much influenced by its
strategy was short-term, and plagued by lack of inter- enemy, enhanced the element of surprise, and allowed
simply bypass and isolate, the Japanese barrier's geography of isolated locations and rugged terrain. These
service co-operation and understanding. In 1941 the strongpoints to be bypassed and Allied lives to be saved.
strongpoints. attacking as they chose and wearing the created difficulties for land transport and air basing.
Japanese Army was preoccupied with the Asian mainland The initiative granted by sea control also gave options at
empire down... The Americans used time and space as Operational mobility and logistics were greatly facilitated
and its war in China, where forty-four of its fifty-five the wider strategic level. The central Pacific advance
the Japanese could not.'"" by use of the sea in littoral areas (as recently in Timor).
divisions were deployed. It saw Southeast Asia as a covered the flank of the Allied front moving up through
Arrived at by default, the perimeter concept tended to Having lost sea control the Japanese were vulnerable in
territorial resource basket to be seized and held. The Army Southeast Asia. Later the U.S. command could consider
compound defeat with defeat, as withdrawal was the only this situation. Sea power was a requirement to drive an
assumed that the Navy would conduct a defensive war in taking either the Philippines or Formosa.
option in the face of penetration and out-manoeuvre. In invader out of his lodgement in the inner arc. clearly
the Pacific. Ultimately the Army saw itself as fighting the
war it is the winners who usually fail to learn the lessons evident at Guadalcanal in 1942-43. Air cover, both land Sea communications, and the ability to interdict them
Sov iet Union. There was thus a lack of forward planning
and to think outside the established frame. We should listen and carrier-based, was utilised in successful operations by blockade, were and are critical in the area of the inner
for the Pacific, especially on the part of the Army who were
to the losers in the last major war to be fought in the within the arc and for power projection beyond it. (Darwin arc as in the entire Asia-Pacific region. Without sea control,
politically dominant. There was a working assumption that
maritime environment of the Asia-Pacific. Tojo told was bombed partly by aircraft based on Nagumo's four which enables their protection or attack, operations to take
Japan should reach a negotiated settlement with the Allies
MacArthur that the Allies defeated Japan by a combination carriers. The Allied attack on Rabaul in 1943 involved the or defend the arc are not strategically feasible. No army
who would respect the Pacific conquests. This fallacious can reach the arc in force to occupy or defend it. or be
assumption undermined efforts to analyse the problem of sustained and reinforced, save by sea. This was as true
defence. The concept of an outer perimeter - which during the Pacific War as it has been in the case of Timor.
represented a failure to create a general maritime strategy Japanese sea control in early 1942 meant that the
- emerged during 1942. with the Army's dominance at southward advance could not be stopped. Once the
Imperial General HQ. its winning of the political battle Japanese were lodged in the arc. the Allies required a
against the Navy's view of a wider Pacific war. the defeats build-up and deployment of resources to take it. both of
at Coral Sea and Midway which led to loss of sea control, which occurred by sea. Above all. the future sea denial
and that at Guadalcanal which led to progressive rolling operation which could be required to defend Australia
back of the defensive perimeter. The death of Japan's naval would only succeed as a dimension of sea control. This is
commander Yamamoto in 1943 ended the likelihood of one of the most salutary deductions from the Pacific War
wider strategic use of the maritime environment by the for Australian defence thinking. In a sense it was proven
Navy. The reactive concept of the defence of a territorial twice, by the Japanese in 1941-42 and by the Allies from
perimeter was thus established, creating the opportunity for 1942 onwards. Frank Uhlig. a leading U.S. naval
Allied exploitation. commentator, writes of the Japanese conquest of Southeast
Without sea control such reactive defence meant lack of Asia in terms which should sound alarm bells for
Australian strategic policy:
manoeuvre, vulnerability and lack of options, despite the
M a j o r G e n e r a l Peter C o s g r o v e returning f r o m a visit t o the F F G H M A S
possession of land-based air power. The perimeter was The defenses: American. British and Dutch, were...
G e n e r a l D o u g l a s M a c A r t h u r w a d e s a s h o r e in t h e Philippines. A surprisingly sea M E L B O U R N E d u r i n g t h e T i m o r crisis. G e n e r a l C o s g r o v e later d e s c r i b e d the
liable to penetration and outflanking like any defensive m i n d e d G e n e r a l h e o f t e n c o m p l a i n e d a b o u t not having e n o u g h ships. T h e value value o f sea p o w e r a s " b l i n d i n g l y o b v i o u s " . H o p e f u l l y it will c o n t i n u e to b e carried out by soldiers and shore-based aviation... and
line. But situated in the maritime environment and without o f sea c o n t r o l w a s pivotal in ' h i s r e t u r n ' " b l i n d i n g l y o b v i o u s " t o t h e a u t h o r s o f t h e n e w ' W h i t e ' Paper. ( R A N ) by submarines. Theirs was a dismal record of failure.'"
48 ||
V O L . 6 2 NO. 2 T H E NAVY T H E NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 2most to threaten this country after 1788. understood this
well. The inner arc as a concept lends to neglect the Indian
and Pacific Oceans and their intrinsic relevance to our
national security. Thus any credible threat implies a wide
strategic context.
Mahan did not live to see the Japanese defeat in (he
Pacific War. He did. however, write specifically of
Australia's need to view its defence in wide and maritime
terms: "by contemplating the whole, and recognising that
local safety is not always best found in local precaution"."'
The current concept of defending the inner arc can be
compared w ith the Japanese view of the same geography as
a Pacific perimeter. That view was shown to be defective in
A J a p a n e s e destroyer is seen sinking f r o m the p e r i s c o p e o f t h e s u b m a r i n e thai terms of strategic viability and scope, and we should take
delivered ihe laial blow Without a concerted m a r i t i m e strategv J a p a n w a s o p e n care to absorb the lesson. Defensive strategy involving a
t o exploitation hv s u b m a r i n e s as part of t h e Allied strategy of sea control form of the arc concept may well be viable, but it must be
formulated w ithin the context of a fully maritime strategy
U.S. submarines failed dramatically to halt the
into which sea control principles are built. This article is
Japanese advance. Twenty-nine submarines in Philippine
written in a co-operative spirit, and with respect for the
waters made virtually no impression on Japanese
qualities and complementary expertise of the various
amphibious assaults. The submarines retreated to Java,
elements of the Australian Defence Force. The
failed again, and retreated to Western Australia. We can
fundamental point about the Japanese defeat in the Pacific
compare the obstacle presented by the Royal Navy's
(beyond the question of whether the war could ever have
surface warships to invasion in 1940 - the reason for the
been considered feasible) is the fatal nature of lack of inter-
Luftwaffe's strategic mission to achieve command of the
service understanding.
air.'4" During the Allied counter-offensive in the Pacific, the
Bad strategy kills, and bad strategy brings defeat. The
U.S. submarine campaign - aided by sea control and A C h i n e s e M - 9 ballistic missile d u r i n g a parade in Beijing. In 1998 f o u r o f these missiles w e r e fired into the Taiwan Strait t o i n t i m i d a t e t h e T a i w a n e s e . T h e
islands and waters of our region are haunted by the ghosts
Japanese neglect of convoys and anti-submarine warfare - U S N cruiser U S S B U N K E R H I L L s u c c e s s f u l l y d e t e c t e d and t r a c k e d e a c h m i s s i l e prov iding valuable intelligence for f u t u r e T B M D systems.
of fallen empires and defeated forces - some of them our
was a powerful factor in the erosion of Japanese defences
own. and all of them were initially (but not of course fully)
and winning the war. This is not surprising. The classical By Mark Schweikert
defeated at sea. The conventional strategic wisdom which
maritime strategists Mahan and Corbett analysed centuries
sees the inner arc as a defensive barrier should pay more
of naval history, concluding that commerce war is not As the 21st century dawns the world consists of a volatile mixture of alarming trends and growing challenges. Amongst
attention to its maritime setting. Otherwise that
v iable strategically without control of the sea. these is a concern in the West of the increasing numbers i»nd effectiveness of Theatre Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) and the
conventional wisdom risks leaving a significant gap in
The arc concept risks becoming a victim of the fortress associated worldwide proliferation of Weapoas of Mass Destruction (WMD). As the RAN's proposed SKA 4000 destroyer
Australia's defences and being a danger to national
fallacy: ihe assumption that the strategic context can be will be Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) capable, and given TBM proliferation in our region, some information
security. The Defence White Paper debate is an opportunity
safely surrendered by default because one guards against on what the RAN may be able to acquire is warranted particularly leading up to the 'White' Paper.
to ponder the expensive lessons of the past and their
the one way the enemy will come. History is full of the
continuing relevance, for our geography has not changed.
victims of this approach, for it is a rare luxury to get (like The need for a T B M D capability in Australia and the RAN The rapid rate of TBM development and proliferation
Yamamoto) the war one expects. As well as the Japanese, Australia's Strategic / W i t v ( C a n b e r r a . 1997). p. 10
is compelling. Many regional neighbours either have, continued into 1999. In February. China deployed more
one thinks (in maritime terms) of Singapore in 1942 and of " " S e c for e x a m p l e M . E v a n s . The Role of the Army in a Maritime
Concept of Strategy. I .and W a r f a r e S t u d i e s C e n t r e . W o r k i n g Paper 101 make, sell or intend to acquire TBMs. T B M D is currently than 100 TBMs along its coastline adjacent to Taiwan. In
the Soviet Union attempting to deal with the U.S. Maritime April, both India and Pakistan launched extended range,
( C a n b e r r a . 1998). I a m indebted t o Dr E v a n s ' excellent work, especially outside the capability of the ADF. thus TBMs cannot be
Strategy in the 1980s. There may also be a conceptual his a d v o c a c y of joint a n d a m p h i b i o u s c o n c e p t s of o p e r a t i o n s . Ii is countered. Although many resigned themselves to this fact nuclear capable TBMs. Agni II and Ghauri-II respectively,
problem in planning to use manoeuvre in the littorals as a important however, mil l o see sea control and p o w e r p r o j e c t i o n a s distinct
during the Cold War when Soviet missiles threatened the with ranges in excess of 3.000 kms.
tool of barrier defence, however geographically deep one issues. Sea control is ihe pre-requisiie f o r joint o p e r a t i o n s a n d p o w e r
p r o j e c t i o n a s h o r e in a m a r i t i m e e n v i r o n m e n t . West a counter now exists. This is timely given world-wide There is a determined and deliberate pattern to procure
sees ihe inner arc as being. The essential strategic point
about amphibious power projection is of course that it is
T h e classic text is J . S . C o r h c t t . Some Principles of Maritime Strategy TBM proliferation with more than 30 nations possessing or develop longer range TBMs by countries whose political
11911, repr. e d . E . G r o v e . L o n d o n . 1988)
offensive, combining the mobility of Navies with the 1, v 1
TBMs and more than 25 having or developing nuclear, aims and activities arc potentially hostile to those of the
An a c c e s s i b l e study is C . S . G r a y . The Leverage of Sea Power. The
striking power of armies. This has been true from the fall Strategic Advantage of Navies in War (New York. I992»
chemical and biological weapons. West including Australia. When North Korea finally test
of Quebec in 1759 to the Falklands in 1982. In defence, W r i t t e n in July. 1902. q u o t e d in D . S l e v e n s (ed ). In Search of a
emergencies are frequently the work of an enemy strategy. Weapon Systems reports that the Taepo Dong 1 has a range To understand why TBMs are now the weapon of
Maritime Strategy. The Maritime Element in Australian Defence Planning
Moreover, if Australia's local security is threatened it will Since 1901 ( C a n b e r r a . 1997). p. 155
of approximately 2.000 kms. threatening all of Japan and choice for many nations one has only to witness a Western
be by a power possessing or contesting sea control as in US bases as far away as Okinawa. This test confirmed the military operation on TV. Whenever the West enter a
1941-42. The primary threat to Australia is not. therefore, ( * ) D r J o h n R e e v e is a S e n i o r Lecturer and O s b o r n e Fellow in Naval ease with which an impoverished nation with massive conflict they immediately establish complete air
History at T h e Australian D e f e n c e F o r c e A c a d e m y . H i s article is an
to its landward (as opposed to its maritime) territoriality, economic problems, including famine, could develop and superiority, usually via the USAF. Airpower is used to
a b r i d g e m e n t of a W o r k i n g Paper s o o n t o he published by the R A N ' s Sea
but lo its maritime communications. Yamamoto. who did Power Centre launch a long ranged TBM. displace the enemy's offensive and defensive capabilities.
VOL 62 NO. 3 T H E NAVY T H E NAVY VOL 62 NO. 3 7This not only denies the enemy the means to use its air In the first attempt to destroy a TBM target, a prototype
force for defence but also for attack. Consequently, the SM-2 Block IVA missile performed as expected. The
only way to counter US/Western air superiority and attack imaging IR seeker successfully performed target search,
the US and its allies is to go over their air superiority acquisition and missile hand-off. guiding the missile to a
umbrella. lethal intercept. Just before intercept, the IR seeker
TBMs provide an attractive counter to Western air imagery was sent by real time telemetry to ground stations
power as they are launched with no warning, have short showing a well defined image of the TBM target. Several
flight times (which limits response times), are impossible sensors fitted to the target to record warhead fragmentation
to kill without specialised equipment and their payloads reported lethal warhead impact with the TBM totally
can vary from HE (High Explosive) to chemical, destroyed.
biological, nuclear or submunitions. A TBM's range means To demonstrate the lethality of the Standard SM-2 Blk
that they can strike targets deep inside USAF defended IVA warhead design under simulated flight conditions, the
areas such as air bases where air superiority is vulnerable. USN conducted extensive warhead sled testing. In these
Ballistic missiles are also very cheap, plentiful and tests, a sled propelled the Blk IVA warhead toward replicas
becoming increasingly accurate. With the recent superficial of enemy TBM warheads and AAW targets. These tests
victory of airpower during 'Operation Allied Force' over T h e Indian A g n i - l l ballistic missile is believed to have a r a n g e o f m o r e than were as close to actual flight dynamic conditions as
Serbia many Western nations are falling into the trap of no 3 . 0 0 0 k m s and c a n be fitted with m a n y w a r h e a d t y p e s the I n d i a n ' s m a y wish T h e U S N A e g i s cruiser B U N K E R H I L L ( C G - 5 3 ) s u c c e s s f u l l y t r a c k e d a n d possible. Target designs included simulated nuclear
to employ. plotted the trajectory of f o u r M '< ballistic m i s s i l e s used by C h i n a in IWH. T h i s
longer considering sole air campaigns an option but a warheads, chemical. HE and submunitions. In the tests, the
m a p s l u m s the impact points o f t h e T B M s .
necessity. SM-2 warheads were detonated at a miss distance
reinforcement personnel. The study concluded that airbase
Part of the problem with the TBM not being seen as a was still able to. without any T B M D thought going into its predicted at the outer boundary of 90'/f of all successful
destruction could be achieved with as little as 30 TBMs. or
serious threat is the misconception that it is a high priced surveillance architecture, gain valuable intelligence on the intercepts. These conservative values were used to measure
for the price of four F/A-I8s, and with land and air based
complex weapon and thus not plentiful. However. Defence North Korean missile's flight. These and other detection the effectiveness of the warhead in 'worst case' and 'best
TBMD systems still languishing in design and testing, the
strategists should view the TBM as a simple round of and tracking events have provided valuable intelligence case* scenarios.
current level of naval T B M D provides the only real answer.
ammunition. In WW II Hitler fired over 4300 V2 TBMs data to system engineers and computer programmers, as During 1998 and 1999. six sled tests were conducted
whilst undergoing Allied strategic bombing and massive well as tracking experience for shipboard crews for further against nine TBM replica warheads and three AAW targets.
resource deficiencies. TBMs are also considered inaccurate
Desert Storm T B M D development. In each test, the warhead performed exactly as designed.
and thus militarily insignificant however, today. TBMs Desert Storm taught the West several important lessons Ail tests achieved kills of the TBM and AAW targets.
have GPS to aid in guidance and accuracy and are far less Chemical suhmunition casings were penetrated, rendering
indiscriminate than their V2 ancestors. The Russian SS-21
about the need for T B M D after Iraq demonstrated the ease The SM-2 Block IVA the chemicals ineffective.
that a belligerent could use them. Scud attacks on cities,
battlefield ballistic missile, recently used in Chechnya, is a despite being tactically unsuccessful, affected coalition Two naval T B M D weapon systems are currentlv under
good example of the modern TBM. Small, accurate, cheap, military strategy and constrained US options. However, at testing in the US. They are the Area Wide, using the SM-2
easy to move around and with very different warhead the Port of Jubayl a potential campaign 'show stopper' Blk IVA as a common AAW and T B M D missile, and Naval TBMD
types. Intelligence sources suggest that the SS-21 system event occurred. An Iraqi Scud fired at the port fell in to the Theatre Wide, using the newer SM-3 missile used In the era of 'The UN Operation' international strategy
and ammunition stocks were recently sold to North Korea sea adjacent to the dock, but had it hit a major catastrophe exclusively for T B M D outside the earth's atmosphere. has relied on force deployment from bases around the
via Syria. The North Koreans can be expected to reverse would have occurred. Unloaded on the dock were For the purposes of this article and its relationship to world. Airlift and sealift arc the precursors to these
engineer the guidance system for use in its designs making thousands of tonnes of 155mm and 203mm HE artillery the RAN and its AAW requirement we will concentrate on operations, but the ports and airfields through which forces
them 75c/f more accurate. shells, aircraft fuel and military vehicles. Tied up alongside the Area Wide system. The Standard SM-2 Blk IVA missile and reinforcements must arrive are known to the enemy
Improvements in warhead payload have also given the that dock was the LHA USS TAWARA. an army barge is the newest of the AAW Standard missiles produced. It and thus vulnerable to TBM attack. Currently, the only way
modern TBM a new lease on life. The US RAND loaded with ammunition, one bulk fuel carrier and three provides the capability for all round defence in a severe to provide protection for these debarkation points is from
Corporation recently published a study on modern TBM container ships. Although no damage was inflicted the electronic environment against aircraft and ASMs (even ships at sea. If these ports and airbases are made unusable,
effectiveness. It found that the use of submunitions in TBM potential for devastation woke many to the threat posed by with low radar cross-sections) from high altitudes down to bearing in mind that the enemy would want to restrict
warheads is a very effective way of neutralising airbases TBMs. sea-level and with a T B M D capability. military operations against them at every stage, then the
through attacks on parked aircraft, taxiways. runways, The Mark 125 warhead of earlier Standards is retained UN action cannot go ahead, giving the enemy victory.
in the missile with a new fuzing system to meet a wider
airbase infrastructure and the inev itable tent city of surged Real World TBM Events range of relative target speeds for precise burst-point
A credible deterrent and warfighting capability
independent of foreign control and relatively free from
USN ships have often been in position to obtain real selection. A Raytheon IR seeker, which is covered by an reliance on overseas bases and support is only achievable
world TBM tracking data. During Desert Storm. AEGIS ejectablc faring, is also fitted to aid in accuracy and
ships in the north of the Persian Gulf were the first to detect provide a real time video data link to the launch ship for
and track Iraqi Scud missiles. missile identification purposes, an indication that the TBM
In March 1996 USS BUNKER HILL (CG-52) detected was destroyed and to replay on CNN as proof of
and tracked four Chinese M-9 missiles fired into the waters destruction. The IR seeker positions the warhead to impact
near Taiwan. BUNKER HILL successfully detected and the target or pass close enough to enable the warhead
tracked the missiles with an older variant of the SPY-1A fragments to be effective. The high closing velocities
radar with no external cueing, no developmental radar encountered in TBM engagements require precise fuze
improvements and a crew that was not specially trained for timing. To aid a Forward Looking Fuze (FLF) is fitted. The
the mission. The crews existing air defence skills translated FLF uses angle and angle-rate information from the IR
well to TBM tracking. seeker and range and range-rate information from a high
Tracking by AEGIS ships continued when USS frequency short-range radar incorporated in the SM-2
MITSCHER (DDG-57) tracked Syrian TBM development missile. These two sensors provide data to the FLF to
test flights in the eastern Mediterranean with near 'fire- compute warhead detonation time and positioning to place
control quality . the most fragments on the target. The new fuze will also
T h e highly e f f e c t i v e Russian SS-21 ' S c a r a b ' battlefield missile is a g o o d e x a m p l e
In August 1998. JDS MYOKO (DDG-175) tracked direct the blast energy of the warhead towards the side of
of the m o d e m ballistic missile. It is c h e a p , e a s y t o m o v e and very a c c u r a t e . It can the SM-2 the TBM will pass as direct hits at these speeds
he fitted with various w a r h e a d t y p e s i n c l u d i n g an anti-radar h o m i n g h e a d . North Korea's first Taepo Dong I missile as it flew over
T h e SS-21 is believed t o have m a d e it t o North Korea via S y r i a n . Japan. This launch was unexpected and sudden yet the ship will be rare.
T h e e f f e c t i v e ranges o f North K o r e a ' s ballistic m i s s i l e s .
x VOL 62 N O 3 T H E NAVY T H E NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 3 9MK 104 DTRM
History has shown lime and again that in the opening j u n g l e s and islands of Indonesia would be virtually
IR S e e k e r Warhead In Production
d a y s of a crisis, forward deployed naval forces bring a impossible given the 'Desert S t o r m ' experience.
I Two-Axis
Seekerhead
In Production
MK 72 Booster TVA
In P r o d u c t i o n
wide range of capabilities, now including T B M D . into
theatre in a few days. In the modern context that could also
mean just when the heaviest T B M attacks would be likely.
T h e R A N needs to develop a T B M D capability as
T B M s b e c o m e more attractive t o the West's adversaries.
North Korea. China. Iran and Syria are but a few countries
Naval forces with T B M D provide significant flexibility. of many who are capable of making and selling T B M s and
From a few stations in the Sea of Japan. USN T B M D tend not to be loo selective w h o they sell to. With advances
equipped surface ships can provide an effective T B M D in Western A E W & C and stealth aircraft the T B M is the
force covering most of the Republic of Korea ( R O K ) and only counter that many nations can hope to employ,
Japan. The beauty of ships is that they can be visible or militarily and economically.
unobtrusive, are self-sustaining and can c a m out other With the acquisition of an AAW destroyer the R A N can
traditional naval missions such as protection of air and sea be expected to use of Standard SM-2 Blk IVA. It m a k e s
Power Control and Telemetry lift, air intercept control, shore bombardment. A S W and sense to use the latest Standard available as this will be the
Guidance Section Steering Control Sectn
High Bandwidth Telemetry maritime interdiction, while simultaneously providing only Standard missile in production. The USN w ill use this
Advanced Guidance and Control In Production TBMD missile for s o m e time thus ensuring a 3 0 year logistics and
I IK- S t a n d a r d S M - WIK IV A built A A W / T B M D missile in p r o d u c t i o n . Il is currently ready f o r d e p l o y m e n t and s h o u l d e q u i p any R A N d e s t r o y e r supply pFlash Traffic Reporting on the progress of the
upgrade project RADM Briggs said
Sea Eagle ASM update its position relative to the
target before dropping back to sea-
HMAS WALLER and FARNCOMB. modification trials of engine mount withdrawn skimming height. The missile's
ESSM scores kill Collins submarine would be available for operations this stiffeners on one of DECHAINEUX's onboard flight-control computer
The UK has announced the early
The Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile upgrade on track year. three engines were successful in withdrawal of its locally developed allows it 10 vary the attack height, fly
(ESSM) has achieved a kill of a Later this year WALLER will take reducing vibration. air launched ASM. The air launched random manoeuvres during the final
BQM-34S Firebee target drone The upgrade of iwo Collins class part in RIMPAC - an exercise with They have now been filled to Sea Eagle ASM served ihe RAF and stages, fly over other targets or ships,
during its first guided flight test at submarines to increased operational and against the US Navy near Hawaii. COLLINS and will be finally fitted to RN for 15 years. The UK MoD ignore countermeasures or decoys
White Sands Missile Range. New capability was on track to meet its COLLINS will also travel to Hawaii the fast track submarines. believes that since the demise of the and attack from any required bearing.
Mexico. ESSM is under development December 2(MM) target. Head of the then on to testing 011 a US Navy range In 1999 COLLINS and Cold War. for which the weapon was A 5001b semi-armour-piercing
by Raytheon C o m p a n y ' s Missile Submarine Capability Team (SMCT). off Alaska. DECHAINEUX trialed various designed, strategic circumstances no warhead is used with a delayed action
Systems business unit lor the U.S. Rear Admiral Peter Briggs. said. He said by the en J of the year five measures in propeller and hull longer require such a weapon. impact fuze. The propulsion unit is
Na\y and the 13 member nations of DECHAINEUX and SHEEAN submarines will have been delivered changes and engine fixes which had reported lo have a low infra-red
the NATO Sea Sparrow Consortium, are currently being upgraded to make to Navy. The sixth. RANKIN, is been successful in improving signature and is smoke free. The
including Australia. them faster, quieter, more reliable and expected to be launched in November reliability and reducing the noise missile has a maximum range of
2000 and start sea trials in April 2001. signature. NO km.
All six submarines will be Modifications to the fin. casing
The helicopter-launched version
home ported at HMAS STIRLING and platform were now being fitted to
is in service with the Indian Navy for
Admiral Briggs said Navy was DECHAINEUX and SHEEAN.
use on Sea King helicopters and
working to progressively overcome Currently a new Electronic
Jaguar strike aircraft owned by the
the Collins class submarine's Support Measure (ESM) system is
Indian Air Force. It is believed thai
operational deficiencies, improve being delivered for DECHAINEUX
Sea Eagle missiles were also exported
their reliability and upgrade many of and SHEEAN. The system is a critical
lo Chile and Saudi Arabia.
the electronic and platform systems area of self defence enabling the
onboard. submarine to dctcci radar What the UK intends 10 do with
S2f>6 million was allocated from transmissions. The submarines' its Sea Eagle stocks is presently
the Defence budget and approved by communication and combat systems unknown.
the Federal Government in December will also be augmented this year.
last year to achieve the upgrade of Admiral Briggs said the fast track A n early m o d e l R N S e a Harrier l a u n c h e s a Sea E a g l e
a n t i - s h i p missile. Without Sea E a g l e ihe R N Harriers
IRAN tests new
D E C H A I N E U X and SHEEAN to program built on work approved by
increased operational capability. the Government in mid-199 4 ) which
a r e without an c l f c c t i v c long r a n g e a i m - s h i p missile.
ASMs
RADM Briggs said half of this had resulted in significant The Sea Eagle entered service in Iran has announced that it has tested
funding was being used to incorporate improvements to noise signature in 1985 as a long range fire and forget two new indigenous developed ASM.
new technology and to enhance the COLLINS. ASM. Production was completed in
\ n I . S S M leaving its test launch canister T h e E S S M will a m i t h e K \ V s I H i s and A n / a c s The first missile type is a
(Raytheon) operational performance of the COLLINS has also had its combat 1992. Il was launched from RN Sea reworked US RIM-66 Standard SM-I
submarines. He said the balance of system augmented and trials of this Harriers and RAF Tornado G R . I B s naval anti-aircraft missile delivered to
Ihe missile, dubbed Control Test less vulnerable to detection RADM the funding would be used to rectify equipment, together with additional which replaced the Buccaneer in this Iran in Ihe 1970s. T h e missile's
Vehicle-4A (CTV-4A). was launched Briggs said. shortcomings, many of which were testing of platform improvements, role. The decision also comes about
electronics have been digitised
Irom the IX-sert Ship launch complex RADM Briggs said three identified by the Mclntosh/Prescott will be carried out at sea in the from the recent UK Strategic Defence
allowing the use of a frequency agile
at White Sands Missile Range. After a submarines. HMAS COLLINS. report. coming month. Revjew recommendation to withdraw
receiver for semi-active command
series of controlled manoeuvres, the "We have also been encouraged by the G R . I B froi service as anti-
guidance, providing greater resistance
missile transitioned to guided flight the response to a number of initiatives shipping roles would now be in
to jamming with solid rocket fuel,
resulting in the tactical kill. Real time, to retain existing submariners and littoral waters as opposed lo open
warhead and powcrpacks now
visual, radar and telemetry data attract new personnel." he said. ocean operations of the Cold War.
being made locally. Although not
showed the missile maintaining "In September last year we began The availability and use of possessing the warhead effect of a
proper controlled and guided to implement our plan lo achieve an Harpoon in the RN surface fleet also
Harpoon or Exocct the main
flight with the flight trajectory effective personnel capability. This brought about the decision to retire
advantages of this missile is its size
comparing favourably with preflighl included an increase in submarine the missile early.
and supersonic speed, thus making it
predictions. service allowance, a financial bonus Sea Eagle uses incrtial guidance
difficult to counter.
ESSM is the next-generation Sea for two years' service, a three-watch for mid-course, followed by a J-band
Sparrow missile. Features include a system, stress management training (10 to 20 GHz) active pulse radar The second missile is a locally
larger diameter rocket motor, a tail and a dedicated trials crew to reduce terminal seeker w ith a range of 30kni. modified Chinese C - 8 0 2 . The
control section, thrust vector control family separation." he said. On launch, the missile accelerates to modification allows the missile to be
lor vertical launch capability and an "We have four submarines its Mach .85 cruise speed, descends to air launched and gives it a more
upgraded ordnance package. CTV-4A manned. We currently have 42 per cent sea-skimming height and then turns robust guidance system with, it is
was the first of fifteen planned flight of the final number of submariners on to the target bearing. When the believed, a data link back to the
tests scheduled for this year. The required. We will need to build the missile is approximately I Skills from launch aircraft.
NATO Sea Sparrow has been the numbers farther to ensure we have its target, the radar seeker switches on The presence of both new types of
primary surface-to-air ship self enough personnel to run the licet and and locks on to the enemy ship. On a ASMs will make naval operations in
defence missile system for USN and support infrastructure based on shore." long-range mission, the missile can. if the Gulf and in particular the Straits
member nations" ships for more than By Vic Jeffery . Navy Public Affairs required, climb when some 3()kms of Hormuz that much more
30 years. H M A S W A L L E R «mi ihe s u r f a c e in D a r w i n Harbour T h e u p g r a d e lor all si* s u b m a r i n e s is o n track. WA from its target and use its seeker to problematic.
27
26 V O L 62 N O . 13 T H E NAVY T H E NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 2Two more large complement of anti-ship It is not known if KIEV will be RSN commissions Landing Ships Logistic (LSL) SIR
missiles. She was launched in used as an aircraft carrier or as an PERCIVAL and SIR C.ERAINT in
Sovremennys for 1972 and withdrawn from service example to the Chinese for their two LSTs and plans 2003/2004.
China in 1994 carrier construction. However, the circumnavigation The new ships, expected to be at
The Russian paper reported that a carrier is very similar to what India least K).(KK) tonnes each, will be
Russia is selling two of its existing US-Chinese firm. Maritime has recently chosen which is to be The Republic of Singapore Navy much larger, more capable and
Sovremenny class DDGs to China. Suppliers, is understood to have extensively modified to take the MiG- (RSN) has commissioned two flexible than existing RFA LSLs and
This comes on the heels of the arri\ai signed a sale agreement with the 29K fighter. As the Chinese do not locally-built E N D U R A N C E class will provide a major increase in the
Russian Defence ministry. use the MiG they could opt for the LST (Landing Ship Tank). The capability of the RFA to support
SU-27K which is in Chinese airforce commissioning ceremony signified amphibious operations and other
What the Chinese paid for the
hands, which incidentally was that the two LSTs. RSS ENDURANCE military tasks such as peacekeeping
carrier is not known but the MINSK
thought to be for a carrier when and RSS RESOLUTION, the first of duties and disaster relief around the
and NOVOROSSIYSK, same class, T h e New U S M C A A A V T h e vehicle w o u l d serve the
initially purchased. a total of four, have attained world. Australian A r m y well f r o m the L P A s K A N I M B L A a n d
were sold lo South Korea as scrap lor
operational status. Singapore's The UK Strategic Defence
MANOORA. (USMC)
$US4.5m and $US4.3m respectively.
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister Review gave a clear commitment to
According to Kommersant. the Vehicle (AAAV). designed and built
Russian Defence ministry has said
Another FFG for for Defence. Dr Tony Tan officiated improved specialist amphibious by General Dynamics Land
at the commissioning ceremony at
that all military equipment had been Taiwan Tuas Naval Base.
shipping for the Joint Rapid Reaction Systems. The test ux)k place at the
stripped from KIEV. Forces, including the building of two Patuxent River Naval Air Station in
China has been keen to acquire The Taiwanese Government has The two LSTs are part of the new RFA landing ships. These vessels Maryland.
aircraft carriers for many years. decided to resurrect plans for an RSN's new-generation LSTs that will enable the UK to maintain its The AAAV is a new amphibious
Recent reports have stated that it will eighth Olivier Hazard Perry class replace the five ageing ex-US County leading position in amphibious APC for the USMC. It can self deploy
complete its first locally constructed FFG. The plan to build the eighth ship Class LSTs. They have greater lift capability within Europe and help across water and land with 17 fully
carrier in 2005 with construction was shelved in 1997 due to budgetary capacity and longer range but operate Europe field a stronger and more equipped Marines. It is armed with a
starting later this year. constraints. The Taiwanese FFGs with half the crew. With its enhanced coherent contribution to NATO. 40mm gun and can travel on the water
differ from those found in the RAN logistics transportation capabilities, The ships will offer flexibility for at more than 3()kts in Sea-State 3.
A Sovremenny c l a s s D D G T w o are l o h e taken " u iDuring 1999. the A AAV prototype Los Angeles-class attack submarines Under the terms of the 1993 HMNZS Following her Gulf deployment in , India to receive more
successfully completed safety checks, or lo serve as a down payment on treaty, ballistic missile submarines 1996. WELLINGTON was further
crew familiarisation, thruster and converting several Ohio-class cannot be used for other missions WELLINGTON altered by replacing the old Seacat Bear
missile system with the Phalanx
water mobility testing, and land- strategic ballistic missile submarines unless the missile tubes are Decommissions CIWS and enlarging the hangar in
The Indian Navy has announced it has
speed performance requirements at to carry cruise missiles. significantly different from what is selected the Russian Tupolov Tu-142
Quaniico in Virginia. This issue is being debated within already fitted. Otherwise, the modified HMNZS WELLINGTON, well anticipation of the replacement naval 'Bear' for Maritime Patrol duties. The
"A prototype engine is 7 5 ^ the USN who must decide on where submarine would still count as part of known to many in the RAN. has helicopter. Tupolov beat the French Atlanlique
through ils l.(MX)-hour engine to allocate the money. However, the warhead totals under the treaty's decommissioned after 18 years and However, personnel training which happens to be used by India's
durability testing and another has because of arms control treaty provisions, even if there are no 352.000 nautical miles in RNZN demands were beginning to dominate neighbour and part time enemy
started the 400-hour standard NATO uncertainty, it seems more likely the ballistic missiles on that submarine. service. the Navy's day to day management. Pakistan.
testing." said John Wosina. Land USN will take the Los Angeles-class If the USN decides to go with the The Indian Navy will purchase six
Systems Vice President of Amphibious option. The USN have four SSN-688 SSBN conversion option now it could Tu-142 aircraft which will be
Operations. "The prototype vehicle is that will have to be decommissioned be forced to pay a huge cost increase equipped with (he British made Sea
scheduled lo continue water testing in 2002 if they don't refuel them. if arms control implications are not Eagle ASM (Anti-Ship Missile, see
through this summer in preparation The Ohio-class conversion at addressed before work starts. Rather earlier news item) and cost
for Early Operational Assessment present is considered risky. If changes than lose the opportunity to increase approximately SUS200 million.
testing later this year". to the existing Strategic Arms the SSN force structure, it is believed The Indian Navy already operate
Limitations Treaty II cannot be the USN is more likely to choose eight Tu-142 'Bear' for maritime
negotiated lo allow strategic missile refuelling. Nuclear refuelling of the patrol. This was considered a major
USN SSNs may get submarines to be converted to carry Los Angeles-class subs costs about factor in favour of the decision lo
cruise missiles, then the USN will be SUS200 to SUS250 million per boat.
new life forced to completely remove the If the decision is made to forgo
purchase the Russian aircraft which
have the ability to operate off the
Citing costs and the need for more missile compartment from each sub ballistic submarine conversion at this Western Australia coastline.
submarines, the USN is likely to and replace it with a different type. time, the issue is not dead. Navy The Indians also have plans to
earmark more than SUSI billion to This approach is viewed as very officials said, adding that converting equip the new aircraft with (he much
extend the life of Us SSNs rather than costly. It is estimated thai this special ihe four strategic submarines could feared SS-N-27 ASM.
convert four Ohio class SSBNs to missile compartment conversion still be carried out to boost the total
carry cruise missiles. would cost an extra SUS500 million number of attack submarines to 62.
The USN placed SUSI. I billion in per sub. taking the four-ship The USN believes thai this is still not H M N Z S W E L L I N G T O N d u r i n g h a p p i e r times. (John M o r t i m e r ) Navy League award
its 2001 budget request that would be conversion costs to about SUS 4.5 enough to handle all the missions the for HMAS
used either lo refuel four SSN-688 billion. sub force faces today. W E L L I N G T O N was acquired and in late 1997 the ship was
from the Royal Navy in 1981 having designated the Navy's training ADELAIDE
already served for 12 years as HMS frigate. The Navy League Community
BACCHANTE in RN Service. As a During 1998. incidentally. Service Award Shield for 1999 has
gun-armed Leander she was fully WELLINGTON conducted the last been won by HMAS ADELAIDE.
compatible with existing RNZN operational flight of a Wasp Commodore M.J. You I AM
frigates. She sailed for New Zealand helicopter. RAN(Retd). representing the Federal
in 1982 and went straight inio a Last year a decision was made lo President of the Navy League of
lengthy refit. Changes were made lo place her alongside at extended notice Australia, presented the award to the
bring her into line with RNZN following the announcements of a Ship's Commanding Officer. Captain
standards - such as the ASW mortar three frigate policy for the RNZN. W.M. Gately AM RAN. on Ihe flight-
which was removed and replaced None the less, the ship made one last deck of HMAS ADELAIDE berthed
with two triple ASW torpedo tubes. passage to the city of Wellington at Fleet Base East.
Most significantly though was her where her charter of the freedom of The Navy League of Australia
fuel capacity being doubled, setting the city was returned. Since then Community Service Award is
her apart from her contemporaries. WELLINGTON has served alongside presented annually to the HMA ship
Other changes were made included an in a training role and support role for or establishment that has made the
RCA digital fire control system and the fleet. most significant contribution to the
gunnery radar, anti-missile chaff
In his closing remarks at the civilian community during the
launchers, new ESM and an updated
decommissioning ceremony on 5 calendar year. The contribution need
surface search radar.
May. the RNZN Chief of Navy said not be made in Australia. It can be
In 1991 the ship again entered "Farewell WELLINGTON and thank made anywhere in the world and can
major refit with the installation of the you - for the happiness we have range from a rescue at sea. fighting
NAUTIS F action information system, shared: for the friendships made and bushfires or raising funds for charity.
and Ihe new LW-08 long range air Ihe frustration's endured: for the The Federal Council of the Navy
warning radar. Such equipment memories, and the sea-stories they League selects the winner of the
served her well for one of her most generate: and for bringing us safely award from nominations forwarded to
extensive deployments when in 1996. home. May I wish all that have served it by the various RAN commands.
W E L L I N G T O N was sent to the in her every success and remember,
The League's executive admit that
North Arabian Gulf, as New- whilst her people will soon leave the
it is not an easy decision to make as
Zealand's first contribution to the ship. Ihe ship will never leave her
ships and establishments vary greatly
UN-mandated sanctions against Iraq. people."
T h e U S N S S N U S S K E Y W E S T R e f u e l l i n g f o u r S S N s will h e l p i h e U S N m e e t s its s u b m a r i n e patrol responsibilities. ( U S N l in size. Obviously establishments
I ft VOI.. ft2 N O . 3 T H E NAVY T H E NAVY V O L . ft2 N O . 3 17such as HMAS CERBERUS, with a
ships company of several thousand,
and particularly the fact (hat. although
they all had busy jobs on board, they
exploring issues relevant to the
acquisition of an effective Air Warfare
Observations
has more opportunities to qualify for were prepared to spend their spare capability for the ADF's surface fleet."
the award than a patrol boat with a time raising funds and helping these Mr Moore said that a decision on
D E F E N C E G O V E R N M E N T W I L L HAVE T O C H O O S E
crew of 20 or so. organisations when they could. The a naval Air Warfare capability would By Geoffrey Evans
The award was first presented in Ship's Company also kept close ties be made following the Defence
1981 to HMAS PENGUIN and since with the organisations by sending White' Paper, due for release later Looking at the defence scene in early May 2(KX) it appears Given convergence of the factors outlined above - with
then it has traversed the length and regular newsletters and updates. this year. to the writer that the present government will have to face defence debts exceeding income - it seems something will
breadth of the country a number of Commodore Youl said that "their A joint Defence and industry team up to some troublesome defence issues in the very near have to give: A reduced defence capability or more funds
times. The list of winners includes efforts were a credit to the Ship's has been established to determine the future. to meet the nation's security insurance policy? Not an easy
H M A S CONNAWARRA. Naval Company". most effective way to acquire the All the indications point to a defence force expected to decision for any Australian government.
Communications Station HAROLD E "The thousands of kilometres that capability for the ADF. perform too many tasks with inadequate resources. Both
HOLT. HMAS STIRLING. MM A the shield had travelled since it was "The Government recognises that financial and human. The tasks range from peacemaking and
peacekeeping missions in foreign lands to a defence force
Sea/Shore Postings
Cairns. H M \ s CERBERUS. HMAS first awarded demonstrates that an Anti-Air Warfare capability in the
expected to have the ability to deter anyone contemplating The April issue of the Defence Personnel Executive's
ALBATROSS and HMAS HARMAN. Australian sailors, wherever they surface fleet is an important
a challenge to Australia's national sovereignty. publication T H E KEY contains interesting information on
Until this year it had been might happen to be. contribute much consideration, it also is an expensive
The Defence Department's decreasing proportion of the the problems of achieving a reasonable balance between
presented to a ship on only 4 to the community which in turn one." Mr Moore said.
national financial cake is almost, if not quite, as well sea and shore time in the RAN at the present time.
occasions - HMAS C E S S N O C K reflects well on the communities "The Federal Government and the
known as widely reported cost overruns in some The aim of the sea to shore ratio is to provide 10 years
t twice i. HMAS B R I S H W I .md perception of the RAN" he added. Defence Department will continue to
acquisition programmes; the additional costs involved in service at sea in a 20-year career: Ideally the sea/shore ratio
HMAS ANZAC three years ago. work with industry lo investigate the
rectifying these deficiencies are however small compared would be:
HMAS ADELAIDE was a very question of the future of Australia's
worthy winner for 1999 given the
Kidds rejected, Again surface fleet, including Air Warfare
w ith the certain cost of replacing major items of naval, air • Warrant officer 1:2
force and army equipment many of which will become • Chief Petty officer 2:3
excellent work which the Ship's The Minister for Defence. John capable ships. obsolescent at about the same time - 'block obsolescence' • Petty officer I. I
Company had done in supporting the Moore, has announced that the "This will include consideration as it is know n in defence circles. Ships and aircraft do not • Leading Seaman 3:2
Colton w ard at the Adelaide Women's Defence Capability Committee of industry's future ability to support come cheaply. • Able Seaman 2:1
and Children's Hospital. St Ann's (DCC) has formally decided that the the A D F in the provision of its Efforts to avoid block obsolescence have been made by The ideal is rarely achieved for many reasons
Special School, and their support for US Navy Kidd Class destroyers will maritime capabilities." Mr Mixire said. defence planners for many years but governments tend to including:
the Naval Reserve Cadets of TS not be acquired by the ADF. Industry is already gearing up to procrastinate when faced with significant equipment • operational requirements.
ADELAIDE. The Ship's Company The DCC reached its decision on meet the capability requirement of the expenditure. Governments failing lo act in a timely way • career progression (promotion and training
had raised a considerable amount of the basis that, in the present RAN with many major shipbuilders can however, claim with some justification that the requirements).
funds for the hospital and the school. environment, they do not provide from around the world expressing community has other priorities in the relatively peaceful • known discharges.
Members of the Ship's Company had longer term value for money. interest. Whether any new ship on climate in which most Australians have lived, virtually
• billet requirements.
\ isited the hospital and the school and "The Kidds were only one option offer will be as capable, survivable since the Second World War.
• personal posting preferences.
spent time with the children. Children for Navy's long term Anti-Air and powerful as the Kidds is open to Human resources: Not surprisingly, personnel costs
If possible, six to eight months notice of postings is
from the school were also given an Warfare capability and they were debate. Hew many will be acquired is have for long formed the largest item of expenditure in
given to members but this can be affected by factors
exclusive tour of the guided missile closely examined." Mr Moore said. also unknown but if the decision is to defence budgets - only rarely falling below 5()9f. In recent
such as:
frigate. be based on the White' Paper's years particularly these costs have escalated and will
"'Although they will not be • changes to a sailor's medical category or to personal or
recommendations that number could continue to do so as pay scales based on rank are
Commodore Youl congratulated acquired, the examination of the Kidd family circumstances.
be quite low. increasingly discarded in favour of pay. for specific skills
the Ship's Company for their efforts option proved a useful exercise in • unexpected discharges.
(not so long ago only medical and dental officers received
salaries more closely aligned to their civilian colleagues). • personnel shortages etc.
A fall in uniformed and civilian members has not been At the present time an overall shortage of personnel in
matched by a corresponding fall in personnel expenditure the RAN. intensified in certain categories, has meant more
- in fact costs w ill almost certainly increase as the Services time at sea for some people: however, the need to have
strive to match wages and conditions prevailing in civil ships manned and operationally fit to go to sea makes this
employment in order to not only attract recruits but to inevitable.
retain serving members. (In the writer's experience sailors were not particularly
In addition to the need to meet increased equipment and adverse to seatime. in fact it was sometimes a relief to see
personnel costs, operational expenses have also grown Sydney Heads or some port with all its entanglements
especially since the East Timor venture: while some disappear over the hori/on)
peacemaking/keeping expenditure may be reimbursed by
the United Nations overall operational costs are unlikely to Coastwatch
decrease in the foreseeable future and are more likely to
rise as tensions in our region show few signs of easing. Coincidentally a decision to hold yet another inquiry into
The Howard Government appears to recognise the coastal surveillance arrangements was announced at the
approaching problems and one might assume it awaits with same time the April-June edition of THE NAVY in which
some trepidation the Defence White Paper it commissioned this column pleaded for no more inquiries, was published.
in 1999. which among other things will provide the current The latest inquiry - there have been at least ten since
strategic outlook. One does not have to be a foreign affairs 1971. the latest in 1999. an average of one every three
or defence expert to realise that we do not yet live in a years or less - is to be conducted by the Joint Committee
world in which nations have decided to dismantle their of Public Accounts and Audit.
armed forces, discard their armaments and henceforth live Members of the public were invited to express their
T h e Kidd class D D G U S S C H A N D L E R enters Sydney Harbour for the last time The Kidds were at o n e stage the most powerful destroyers in the world. (Brian happily alongside one another: indeed, one might reach a views on the performance of Coastwatch. submissions to
Morns*w. Warships and Marine Corps M u s e u m Inti quite different conclusion. be made by 2 June 2(XX).
IK VOL 62 N O 1 T H E NAVY VOI. 62 NO. 3You can also read
