IS AUTOMATION GETTING TOO FAR AHEAD OF PILOT CAPABILITIES?

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               IS AUTOMATION GETTING TOO FAR AHEAD OF PILOT
                              CAPABILITIES?
           “We cannot afford pilots and the technology failing together! If we only look at the
           pilots - the human factor - then we are ignoring other important factors, we have to
           look at how they work together." (US Airways Capt. Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger
Des Barker (Flight Test Society of South Africa)
Media Melodrama
         Despite a media ‘feeding frenzy’ following the Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 Max 8 (10 March
2019) and the Lion Air Boeing 737 Max 8 (29 October 2018), there were subtle differences between the
two accidents. The Lion Air Boeing was unserviceable and should not have been airborne, while the
Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 Max 8 was fully serviceable. The failures, however, may have some
common basis and questions are once again being asked whether automation has overtaken pilot’s
handling capabilities.
         As early as 2011, following a spate of ‘automation accidents’, in typical melodramatic fashion, the
media, through Yahoo News, had a ‘full go’, without a proper understanding of the issues and in an article
published by The Associated Press1, the question was posed: “Are Airline Pilots Forgetting How to Fly”?
         The article started with: “As planes become ever more reliant on automation to navigate crowded
skies, safety officials worry there will be more deadly accidents traced to pilots who have lost their hands-
on instincts in the air. Hundreds of people have died over the past five years in ‘loss of control’ accidents
in which planes stalled during flight or got into unusual positions that pilots could not correct. In some
cases, pilots made the wrong split-second decisions, with catastrophic results, for example, steering the
plane's nose skyward into a stall instead of down to regain stable flight”.
FAA Concerns
        Is there any substance to the media concerns? Spurred on in part by federal regulations that
require greater reliance on computerised flying, the airline industry is suffering from "automation
addiction", said Rory Kay, an airline captain and co-chairman of a Federal Aviation Administration
committee on pilot training. "We're seeing a new breed of accident with these state-of-the art planes."
Pilots use automated systems to fly airliners for all but about three minutes of a flight: the takeoff and
landing. Most of the time pilots are programming navigation directions into computers rather than using
their hands-on controls to fly the plane. They have few opportunities to maintain their skills by flying
manually, Kay's advisory committee warns.
        The article continued: “Fatal airline accidents have decreased dramatically in the U.S. over the
past decade. However, The Associated Press interviewed pilots, industry officials and aviation safety
experts who expressed concern about the implications of decreased opportunities for manual flight, and
reviewed more than a dozen loss-of-control accidents around the world. Airlines and regulators
discourage or even prohibit pilots from turning off the autopilot and flying planes themselves, the
committee said. Safety experts say they're seeing cases in which pilots who are suddenly confronted
with a loss of computerized flight controls don't appear to know how to respond immediately, or they
make errors — sometimes fatally so.”
Problem Definition
         A recent FAA study found serious flaws in pilot training for handling automation and suggested
that flight crew have never been properly trained for operating highly automated aircraft, and that for
many of the problems they have to deal with, there are no checklists, leaving the pilots to manage using
ingenuity and airmanship.
         Inadequate crew knowledge of automated systems was a factor in more than 40% of accidents
and 30% of serious incidents between 2001 and 2009. Presenting progress in her research, FAA human
factors specialist, Dr Kathy Abbott catalogued the evidence of disharmony between crews and their highly

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    AP IMPACT: Automation in The Air Dulls Pilot Skill by JOAN LOWY, Associated Press (AP), August 20, 2011

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automated aircraft. Among the recurring handling problems pilots demonstrated, included lack of
recognition of autopilot/auto-throttle disconnect; lack of monitoring and failure to maintain energy/speed;
incorrect upset recovery and inappropriate control inputs. Abbot delivered the judgement: "Failure
assessment is difficult, failure recovery is difficult, and the failure modes were not anticipated by the
designers."
          The FAA study also found that pilots sometimes "abdicate too much responsibility to automated
systems". Because these systems are so integrated in today's planes, one malfunctioning piece of
equipment, or a single bad computer instruction can suddenly cascade into a series of other failures,
unnerving pilots who have been trained to rely on the equipment. The study examined 46 accidents and
major incidents, 734 voluntary reports by
pilots and others as well as data from more
than 9 000 flights and found that in more
than 60% of accidents, and 30% of major
incidents, pilots had trouble manually flying
the plane or made mistakes with automated
flight controls.
          The question that begs asking is,
however: “Is there anyone out there in the
aviation community, the pilots, aircraft
design engineers, test pilots, line pilots and
civil aviation regulators, who has noticed the
irony of aviation’s technological advances
over the last 116 years of powered flight?”
          The problem stems from the fact
that smart avionics, smart aerodynamics
and smart flight control systems have made        The fad among modern pilots is to have as much
modern aircraft a lot easier to fly and           ‘technology’ as possible; reduces pilot error and reduces
consequently pilot workload has decreased         workload. However, failure of the ‘technology’ could
significantly to the extent that the ‘pilot out   result in a major loss of situational awareness. (Marc
of the loop’ philosophy increasingly poses a      Ulm, Airliners.Net)
threat to piloting skills decay and situational
awareness.
Engineering Innovation
          It is no secret that engineers seized upon the fickleness of pilot judgement to deliberately design
‘pilot error’ out of the cockpit. The universally accepted 72% of accidents attributed to MAN, spurred
engineers on to introduce automation technology into the cockpit to ameliorate pilot handling and
judgement inadequacies. A real and relevant question: “Is automation error going to be the new human
factors contribution to accident statistics?”
          There is no doubt that innovative engineering and technological advances HAVE increased
aviation efficiency and safety at a higher rate than any of the other sciences, but HOW we are actually
directing the benefits and the training of this technology gain, should be a concern to all. Regulators
have, over the years, exercised their mandate in directing safety conventions in accordance with their
existing knowledge and experience. But, with aviation worldwide facing a revolution in technological
affairs, it would appear that the influence thereof is beyond the scope of current aviation community’s
comprehension.
          One could say that engineers have led pilots to a place where a trust in technology has
overwhelmed a faith in the ability of the pilots to recover from a ‘bad situation’ and to a certain extent, the
pilots themselves are complicit in this situation; the luxury of automation is turning pilots into ‘better
informed’ passengers with inadequate physical cues to handle emergency situations in some cases.
          Very little seems to be made of the fact that engineers have not yet succeeded in designing zero
defect equipment and their backup of quadruple redundancies, statistically reducing failure to better than
10-9, have not lived up to expectations in the real world.

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Aviation Community Role
          Another prudent question. Do the aircraft manufacturers and regulators understand that pilot
training has not kept up with technological innovation? In fact, do the test pilots understand that the
engineering innovation and advances in automation that they have Released-to-Service, have out-paced
the existing training regimens? And training captains? Have they interrogated the impact and influence
of automation on their pilots’ abilities to deal with the complex permutation of automation idiosyncrasies?
Do ‘line pilots’ even bother to consider the impact of automation and modern systems on their handling
skills and situational awareness? It’s doubtful. What has in fact happened is that the aviation community
at large have just accepted automation as the progressive way forward as the key to solving human
shortcomings in dealing with judgement and psychomotor issues.
          However, very slowly, the pilot community worldwide is being alerted to the threat of automation;
several recent accident investigations have concluded that automation and its concomitant addiction
effects are more regularly being classified as a contributory factor to accident causal factors. In fact,
several airline training captains worldwide are beginning to voice their concerns at the lack of basic
situational awareness and ‘below par’ handling capabilities appearing in the cockpits. In several accident
cases, the causes could be traced back to the pilot’s inadequate ‘hands-on’ abilities or loss of situational
awareness operating the latest generation aircraft.
          Coupled to the adverse effects of innovative technologies on pilot’s handling skills, the
overemphasis on ‘paper licences’ by civil aviation authorities, without an equivalent focus on handling
skills and decision making, by the transfer of such knowledge from classroom to cockpit, has led many
‘old hands’ to question the future of manned aviation.
          The removal of stalling and spinning from the basic flying training syllabus as a mandatory basic
handling requirement has been debated for many years and is being accepted by civil aviation authorities
in many cases. Not their fault, but engineers, offering an improvement to aviation accident safety
statistics through stall and spin free handling qualities in their latest products, are in fact, indirectly,
producing handling-deficient pilots. The result: pilots with a lack of recognition of high angle of attack
characteristics and low confidence in handling aircraft at high angles of attack, and accidents that should
never have occurred.
Case Studies
          Without being judgemental, the loss of the Air France Flight 447 Airbus over the Atlantic in 2009,
saw, over a time span of four minutes, a series of twenty-four ACARS messages sent automatically,
indicating, amongst other speed measurement inconsistencies, the disconnection of the autopilot and the
airplane going into 'alternate law' flight control mode which happens when multiple failures of redundant
systems occur; 228 people died. The loss of major systems left the pilots with information overload; latest
draft versions of the accident investigation allude to the pilots’ losing situational awareness and lacking in
the ability and basics to fly ‘attitude and power’ in an effort to ‘keep the shiny side up’.
          The simple failure of a radio altimeter led to the delayed attempts at stall recovery of the Turkish
Airlines Boeing 737 Flight 951 in which the investigators' preliminary report confirmed that the pilots
allowed the automatic systems to decelerate the aircraft to a dangerously low speed as it approached
Schiphol Airport. Very late detection and pilot response at 450 feet agl; the pilots scrambled to accelerate
out of the stall before it crashed to the ground, killing the three flight deck crew and six others on board.
The radio altimeter had ‘informed the automatic flight system that the aircraft was 8 feet below the surface
when it was still nearly 2,000ft in the air which caused the auto-throttle to pull back the power to idle, as if
the plane were touching down.
          The Amsterdam incident was at least the fourth over a thirteen-month period in which pilot error
caused an airliner to stall and crash. The accident findings intensified the debate over the dangers of
pilots losing their basic flying skills as a result of relying on the sophisticated electronics that control
airliners through most of their flights. Boeing was prompted to issue an unusual world-wide alert covering
procedures that already should be second nature to aviators: "to carefully monitor primary flight
instruments during critical phases of flight" such as takeoffs and landings.
          There should be no intention to turn the issue into a ‘manual flying vs. automation flying’ or
‘Airbus vs. Boeing debate’. Collectively, we will have to capitalise on the tragic accidents which indicate a
need for more robust flying skills and level of technical understanding without leaving the old basics of
flying out of the technological surge in aircraft systems.

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Is the Threat Real?
           Is engineering is getting ahead of, and out of synch with the pilot’s abilities and regulator
knowledge? Could the advanced technologies instituted to ameliorate human shortcomings turn out to be
a bigger threat to safety than the human factor? Are test pilots the missing link that can close the
‘technology handling gap’ by introducing appropriate procedures and processes?
           Bill Voss, president of the Flight Safety Foundation, appears to think so: “The ability of pilots to
respond to the unexpected loss or malfunction of automated aircraft systems "is the big issue that we can
no longer hide from in aviation … We've been very slow to recognize the consequence of it and deal with
it. Airline training programs are focused on training pilots to fly with the automation, rather than without it.
Senior pilots, even if their manual flying skills are rusty, can at least draw on experience flying older
generations of less automated planes,” he said.
           Airlines are also seeing smaller incidents in which pilots waste precious time repeatedly trying to
restart the autopilot or fix other automated systems when what they should be doing is "grasping the
controls and flying the airplane", said Bob Coffman, another member of the FAA pilot training committee
                                                                  and an airline captain.         We need to
                                                                  encourage pilots to do that and not rely
                                                                  100% on the automation.
                                                                           Locally, the issue of ‘Automation
                                                                  Addiction’ was intensely deliberated and
                                                                  debated upon at the International
                                                                  Aerospace Seminar of South Africa held in
                                                                  Centurion at the end of September 2011,
                                                                  during which it was concluded that the rapid
                                                                  pace of engineering innovation held the
                                                                  potential for a regression in pilots’ handling
                                                                  skills and situational awareness. But there
                                                                  was no going back on technology; that
                                                                  would be impractical and unrealistic, given
                                                                  the significant contribution of technology to
                                                                  aviation safety.
                                                                           The threat, however, is real;
                                                                  automation is getting ahead of, and out of
                                                                  synch with the pilot’s abilities and regulator
                                                                  knowledge;        advanced        technologies
   An ‘Automation Dog’ - Full automation may only require
                                                                  instituted to ameliorate human deficiencies
   the services of a VLD = Very Large Dog instead of a co-
                                                                  could turn out to be a bigger threat to safety
   pilot: the task of the dog being to bite the pilot flying if
   the pilot should as much as touch anything. (Strange           than the human factor.
                                                                           The pertinent question was, how to
   New Products March 2006, Ear Protection for Flying
                                                                  deal with the challenges of integrating
   Dogs by Steve Johnson.
                                                                  human factors with automation. Certainly,
a compromise solution would require a more closely integrated effort between design engineers, test
pilots, line pilots and regulators to close the loop of understanding the impact of technological innovation
on the fickleness oh the human psyche.
The Way Forward?
         The biggest question is how we, as aviators, help the regulators and other decision makers that
ultimately create standard operating procedures, to understand the complexities of the challenge facing
aviation into the future. It is not unexpected that the highly successful course the industry has been on for
the past 25 years is in need of an adjusting to the ‘revolution in technological affairs’. That adjustment
needs to reconsider the human interface and ensure pilots have the tools which include robust enough
‘manual flight skills’ and technical understanding to resolve the occasional automation failure or
irregularity.
         In no way ca the need be overstated for the pilot to be completely confident: “I own this aircraft in
every dimension of its operation”. Without that confidence, the pilot is unable to bridge the gap between
fully automated flight and resolution of an ‘Automation Exception’.

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        From the regulator side, it would be required to ensure that training regimens adequately
addressed the human factors issues of skills regression and situational awareness. Cognitive saturation
and pilot workload following failures would have to be considered by the design engineers and test pilots;
by the same token, test pilots would likewise have to play a larger role in ensuring that the interface
between engineering and the line pilot is closing the understanding gap between both parties. Airlines,
charter companies and flying schools should acknowledge the extent of the challenge of integrating the
next generation pilots safely into highly automated cockpits through adequate training of pilots to cope
with automation.
        Finally, pilots of the automation generation (otherwise known as ‘pilots of the magenta line’) will
be required to more fully understand the matrix of failures possible from integrated systems; in fact, the
technical knowledge level of pilots would have to be increased to that approaching an engineer.
Automated systems are complex and without full understanding of the intricacies and multiple
permutations of complicated matrix systems, pilots would be at the mercy of automation following failures.
As Sully Sullenberger said: “If we only look at the pilots - the human factor - then we are ignoring other
important factors; we have to look at how they work together." (Acknowledgements: Captain Dennis J.
Landry, Air Line Pilots Association, ADO Group; Chairman Master MEL Committee)