Ireland: Begins 2020 in best shape since early 2000s - January 2020 Second straight budget surplus in 2019 - NTMA
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Ireland: Begins 2020 in best shape since early 2000s Second straight budget surplus in 2019 January 2020
Index Page 3: Summary Page 8: Macro Page 23: Fiscal & NTMA funding Page 38: Brexit Page 46: Long-term fundamentals Page 57: Property Page 63: Other Data Page 72: Annex (GDP distortions explainer) 2
Domestic economy growing: averaging 4%+ since 2014 Dramatic drop in Employment (000s) well True growth healthy unemployment rate above 2008 peak 30% 18.0 200 25% 16.0 16.0 100 20% 14.0 0 15% 12.0 10% -100 10.0 5% -200 0% 8.0 -300 -5% 6.0 -10% -400 4.0 4.8 2008 2011 2014 2017 -15% 2.0 Non-Construction Employment Construction Employment 0.0 GDP Underlying* 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019 Total Employment vs 2008 peak * Underlying series is modified final domestic demand (excludes inventories) 4
Ireland is improving its debt sustainability year-by-year Two years of budget Ireland is improving its debt Debt headed below 100% of surplus (€bn) dynamics by the month national income 10 180% Debt-to-GNI* 160% 5 (100% 2019f, from 166% peak) 140% 0 120% -5 Debt-to-GG Revenue 100% (243% 2019f, from 353%) -10 80% -15 60% Average interest rate 40% -20 (2.3% 2019f, from 5.1%) 20% -25 0% 2019f 1998 1995 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019f 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 Debt-to-GDP^ GG Balance Primary Balance (59% 2019f, from 120%) Ireland (GNI*) Ireland (GDP) ^ due to GDP distortions, Debt to GDP is not representative for Ireland, we suggest using other 5 measures listed.
Main risks are external and outside of Ireland’s control Brexit US Tax Deal is likely to be passed in UK Ireland is still a “high beta” bet on Corporation tax reform may parliament meaning the the US economy, impact Ireland's economic model immediate risk is gone. in particular its ICT sector. in the medium term. The catch for Ireland is that US is in the late stage of its The OECD BEPS II process is set to Britain reverts to WTO rules in the economic cycle, although interest be completed by end 2020 end and diverges from EU regs. rate cuts may extend its duration 6
Funding range of €10-14bn for 2020 – down from 2019 €10-14bn 10 years AA- Funding range is €10-14bn for One of the longest weighted Ireland has been upgrade to AA the coming year average maturities in Europe space by S&P Ireland has €20bn+ in outflows The NTMA used ECB QE to Ireland’s debt sustainability has in 2020, so the NTMA will run extend debt maturity, reduce been improving and Brexit risk down some of its cash buffer interest cost and repay the IMF has receded 7
Section 1: Macro Economy still healthy, but manufacturing has softened in line with global conditions
Labour market best illustrates Ireland’s growth story – Ireland is close to full employment Unemployment rate: down to 4.8% Employment growth consistently above 2%; in December 2019 from peak of 16% average net jobs increase of 15K a quarter 18.0 60 6.0% 16.0 40 4.0% 14.0 20 2.0% 12.0 0 0.0% -20 -2.0% 10.0 -40 -4.0% 8.0 -60 -6.0% 6.0 2.3m people -80 employed -8.0% 4.0 Ireland back to -100 -10.0% 2.0 unemployment levels 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 seen pre-crisis Total Employment (Quarterly net chg, 000s) 0.0 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Total Employment (Y-o-Y growth rate, RHS) Source: CSO 9
High-skill employment an important driver; though labour participation rate has been slow to recover High-skill employment has grown sharply Labour participation has not yet fully (index, 100 = end 2008) recovered as young stay in school 130 68% 67% 120 66% 110 65% 64% 100 63% 90 62% 61% 80 60% Rate inflated pre-crisis by 70 59% migrant construction workers 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 58% High Skill Other 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 Source: Eurostat; CSO 10 High sk0ill jobs include the ISCO08 defined groupings Managers, Professionals, Technicians and associate professionals
Wage growth evident in 2019 but uneven across sectors Wage growth a driver for increase in … but disparities remain across sectors compensation of employees… 12% 7% 70 10% 65 6% 60 8% 5% 55 6% 50 4% 45 4% 3% 40 2% 35 0% 2% 30 -2% 1% 25 20 -4% 0% 15 Arts & Rec Industry IT Fin, Insurance & RE Total Public admin Transport/Storage Wholesale/Retail Health Prof, science & tech Accom & Food Construction Education Admin & Support -6% -8% -10% Hours worked Hourly wage Employment Other Compensation 4Q average hourly earnings y-o-y Q2 2019 COE growth (y-o-y) 2019 Q3 average annual earnings (€000, RHS) Source: Eurostat, CSO 11
Despite being late cycle, inflation is low; Ireland’s Phillips Curve might be starting to bite Inflation (%) in Ireland similar to rest of euro At full employment, wage growth could area currently – Brexit ref. impact has gone become an issue if Brexit outcome is benign 4 12.0% 3 10.0% y = -0.7267x + 0.0943 Nominal COE growth per head 2 R² = 0.8 8.0% 1 6.0% 0 4.0% -1 2.0% -2 0.0% -3 Unemployment -2.0% reached 5% in -4 Q3 2019 -4.0% 2.0% 5.0% 8.0% 11.0% 14.0% 17.0% HICP Ireland HICP Euro Area Unemployment Rate Source: CSO, Eurostat Source: CSO, NTMA analysis; Non-Agriculture employment /wage data on yearly basis (1999-2018) 12
GDP distortions mean we need to look to other metrics; Irish recovery evident when looking at GNI* GNI* was €197bn in 2018; 7.3% higher than GNI* growth rate averaged 8% in 2013-2018 in 2017 (current prices or cash basis) (current prices or cash basis) 350 40% GNI* is 61% of 300 GDP 30% 250 20% 200 10% 150 0% 100 -10% 50 -20% 0 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 GDP GNI* GDP Growth GNI* Growth Source: CSO 13 Note: See annex for discussion on the GDP distortions from 2015 onwards
When looking for price-adjusted timely data, modified final domestic demand is the best measure In real terms underlying growth in Ireland MFDD measure driven by consumption; averaged 4.3% since 2014 investment slowed by Brexit uncertainty 15% 10.0% 10% 5.0% 5% 0.0% 0% -5.0% -5% -10.0% -10% -15% -15.0% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Modified Domestic Demand MFDD (MDD ex stocks) Investment Consumption Govt MFDD Source: CSO Note MDD measure used here includes private consumption, government consumption, building 14 investment, elements of machinery & equipment investment, elements of intangible asset investment. See annex for more detail.
Economy has been driven by multinational growth – in particular ICT; tech grew 26% in year to Sept 2019 Breakdown of the Irish economy by sector – Information and communication sector has Industry (pharma) and ICT are 40% of GVA expanded rapidly in recent years Other, 2.6% 30% 25% P Admin, 20% Educ & Industry, Health, 27.2% 15% Prof, Admin 11.4% 10% and Support , 11.6% 5% Financial, 0% Construction 8.0% + Real Estate, -5% 9.1% -10% Dist, trans, ICT, 17.1% hotels, rest., -15% 13.0% 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 ICT % of Economy (GVA adjusted for 2015 distortions) ICT Sector (GVA 4Q y-o-y) Source: CSO (2018) Note GVA figures adjusted for distortions in 2015. A depreciation charge was subtracted from 15 industry GVA in 2015 and onwards to take account of multinational effects.
Manufacturing is declining like elsewhere in the world; services are robust but growth has decelerated Manufacturing PMIs across the globe Ireland’s PMIs slipping much like rest of declined in 2019 globe – services above 50 however PMI PMI 70 Country Dec 2018 Dec 2019 65 EU 51.5 46.4 60 France 49.7 50.4 55 Germany 51.5 43.7 50 Italy 49.2 46.2 Japan 52.6 48.4 45 Spain 51.1 47.4 40 UK 54.3 47.5 35 US 53.8 52.4 30 World 51.4 50.1 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Services Manufacturing Composite 16 Source: Bloomberg
Consumer spending growth consistent around 3% Private consumption expanded by Ireland’s consuming faster than Euro Area 3.3% in 2018 – steady trend emerging peers 12% 115 12% 105 10% 9% 8% 95 6% 6% 85 3% 4% 75 2% 0% 65 0% -3% 55 -2% -4% -6% 45 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 -6% Consumption Growth (4Q Y-o-Y) 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 Consumption (€bns, RHS) Ireland Euro Area Source: CSO; Eurostat 17
Crucially the recovery was not driven by credit; debt reduction ended as recently as 2018 Lending for house purchase only edging Modified investment led solely by building & into positive territory construction; mach. & equipment is sluggish 40 50% 35 40% 30 30% 25 20 20% 15 10% 10 0% 5 -10% 0 -5 -20% -10 -30% -15 -40% 2013 2014 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 Credit advanced to Business (y-o-y) Investment Building & Construction Lending for house purchase (y-o-y) Investment ex B+C Source: CBI; CSO 18 Note: Credit to business series excludes financial intermediation and property related credit Note: Modified investment excludes impact of imports of intangible and aircraft leasing assets
Private debt levels remain elevated but Ireland has used recovery period to repair balance sheets Household debt ratio has decreased due to Legacy of crisis is on the Government deleveraging and increasing incomes balance sheet not the private sector’s 220 400% 200 350% 180 160 300% Economic growth has 140 250% allowed smooth private 120 sector deleveraging 200% 100 80 150% 60 100% 40 50% 20 0 0% Debt (€Bns) Disposable Income Debt-to-Income Public and Private Private debt (% of Public debt (% of (€Bns) Ratio (%) debt (% of GNI*) GNI*) GNI*) 2008 2013 2018 2003 2008 2013 2018 Source: CBI Source: CBI data, CSO Note: Private debt includes household and Irish-resident enterprises (ex. financial intermediation) 19 CBI quarterly financial accounts data used for household and CSO data for nominal government liabilities.
Savings rate around EU average – pointing towards households being more prudent Gross household saving rate lower than Interest burden down to well below 4% of peak but close to EU average disposable income from peak of 11% 16 14% 14 12% % of Disposable Income (4Q MA) % of disposable Income 12 10% 10 8% 6% 8 4% 6 2% 4 0% 2 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 0 Ireland EA-19 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Germany Spain Italy Netherlands Ireland EU-28 EA-19 UK Source: Eurostat, ONS, CSO ; CBI, Eurostat NTMA calculations 20 Note: Gross Savings as calculated by the CSO has tended to be a volatile series in the past, some caution is warranted when interpreting this data
External environment worst since 2012 for Ireland? Brexit deal would alleviate short term risks 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020f EA Monetary Less Accommodative Accommodative Accommodative Accommodative Accommodative Policy accommodative in Q4 US Monetary Accommodative Further Easy policy Accommodative Accommodative Easing Policy but tightening tightening continuing Stimulative due YC inversion, but Labour market US growth Stimulative Less stimulative Stimulative to fiscal package still growing strength Rising on Oil price Falling Falling Rising Falling Flat y-o-y tensions? Brexit risks Less favourable; UK growth Stimulative Growth slowing Growth slowing Brexit risks reduced for Brexit impact 2020 Euro Growth Stimulative Stimulative Stimulative Slowing growth Sluggish Unimpressive No change y-o-y Euro currency Very Helpful Helpful Headwind Neutral Neutral? v. £; weaker v $ 21
Export growth has rebounded in 2019; Ireland is living within its means Goods exports outside MNC-dominated Current account is distorted heavily by sectors rebounding (y-o-y change) MNEs: modified CA is consistent with GNI* 50% 20% 40% 15% 30% 10% 20% 10% 5% 0% 0% -10% -5% -20% 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 -10% Exports 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Chemical Products and Computer Services Current Account (% of GNI*) Exports ex. Chem & Comp Modified Current Account (% of GNI*) Source: CSO, NTMA calculations Nominal values, exports excludes contract manufacturing. Modified CA=CA less (IP Depreciation + Aircraft Leasing Depreciation + Redomiciled Incomes + R&D Services Exports) adding back (Imports of related to Leasing Aircraft + R&D related IP and services 22 Imports). Significant caution should be exercised when viewing Ireland’s current account data. MNC’s action distort metrics heavily.
Section 2: Fiscal & NTMA funding Ireland likely to have recorded second straight budget surplus in 2019
Funding range of €10-14bn for 2020 – down from 2019 €10-14bn 10 years AA- Funding range is €10-14bn for One of the longest weighted Ireland has been upgrade to AA the coming year average maturities in Europe space by S&P Ireland has €20bn+ in outflows The NTMA used ECB QE to Ireland’s debt sustainability has in 2020, so the NTMA will run extend debt maturity, reduce been improving and Brexit risk down some of its cash buffer interest cost and repay the IMF has receded 24
Maturity profile: IMF repayment and FRN buy-backs have reduced refinancing risk; Green diversifies investor base 20 18 16 14 12 10 Billions € 8 6 4 2 0 Bond (Fixed) EFSM EFSF Bond (Floating Rate) Green Other (incl. Bilateral) Source: NTMA Note: EFSM loans are subject to a 7-year extensions. It is not expected that Ireland will refinance any of its EFSM loans before 2027. As such we have placed the pre-2027 EFSM loan maturity dates in the 25 2027-30 range although these may be subject to change.
The NTMA took advantage of QE to extend debt profile Various operations have extended the …Ireland (in years) now compares maturity of Government debt … favourably to other EU countries 20 12 € Billions 18 16 10 14 8 12 10 6 8 10.6 10.4 10.2 6 4 8.8 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.6 4 6.9 6.6 6.4 6.3 2 2 0 2026 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036-40 2041-45 2046-50 2051-53 0 Debt Prefunded Long-term Extensions since 2014 Govt Debt Securities - Weighted Maturity Debt Profile EA Govt Debt Securities - Avg. Weighted Maturity Source: NTMA; ECB *excludes programme loans. Ireland’s maturity including these 26 loans is still similar
Funding requirements will be met by mix of new issuance and rundown of cash €24 Two bonds mature in 2020, the first in April and Other: 3 the second in October. €20 UK Bilateral 2 Run-down of cash: 8 Four of the remaining five tranches of the UK bilateral loan mature in 2020. €16 Other: 1 Intra Govt. 1 Exchequer Borrowing Requirement could be ST paper: 1 €12 smaller than estimated if Brexit withdrawal Redemption agreement is ratified by UK. of Bonds: 17 €8 Existing cash balances will be run down to meet Bond Issuance: 12 part of the 2020 funding requirement. €4 EBR: 2 €- Funding Requirements (€bn) Sources of Funding (€bn) Notes: Short Term Paper (ST paper) = Net growth in marketable short-term debt (Treasury Bills and Commercial Paper). Intra Govt .funds = Expected growth in funding from domestic public sector sources. Other funding requirements includes general contingency provision e.g. for potential Floating Rate Note purchases. Other sources Includes other cash inflows and expected European Investment Bank loan drawdowns. Mid-point of €10bn-€14bn bond funding range is used for illustrative purposes. 27
ECB policy and NTMA’s funding strategy have lowered the State’s interest burden NTMA issued €69bn MLT debt since 2015; Interest costs forecasted pre-QE to be 14.1 yr. weighted maturity; avg. rate of 1.04% c.€10bn; will drop below €5bn by end 2019 6.0 18 10 € Billions 5.5 5.0 15 8 3.9 4.0 12 6 2.8 10Y 10Y 3.0 9 12Y 12Y 15Y 30Y 4 2.0 1.5 6 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.0 3 2 5Y 5Y 10Y 7Y 5Y 8Y 10Y 16Y 30Y 10Y 20Y 0.0 0 0 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020f 2020 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2021 Auction Syndication GG interest (€bns) SPU 2014 Estimates Weighted Average Yield % (LHS) 2019-2021 Latest Estimates Source: NTMA, CSO, Department of Finance 28 Only showing marketable MLT debt (auctions and syndications). Other issuance such as inflation linked bonds, private placement and amortising bonds occurred but not shown.
Diverse holders of Irish debt – sticky sources account for over 50% Ireland roughly split 80/20 on non-resident “Sticky” sources - official loans, Eurosystem, versus resident holdings (H1 ‘19) retail - make up over 50% of Irish debt 250 200 Other Debt (incl. IGBs - Official) Private Non 150 22% Resident 35% 100 50 10%, Resident 0 7%, Eurosystem Resident Other Debt (incl. Official) Retail 21% Eurosystem Short term Short term IGBs - Private Resident IGBs - Private Non Resident 4% Total Debt (€bns) Source: CSO, Eurostat, CBI, ECB, NTMA Analysis IGBs excludes those held by Eurosystem. Eurosystem holdings include SMP, PSPP and CBI holdings of FRNs. Figures do not include ANFA. Other debt Includes IMF, EFSF, EFSM, Bilateral as well as IBRC- 29 related liabilities. Retail includes State Savings and other currency and deposits. The CSO series has been altered to exclude the impact of IBRC on the data.
Investor base for Government bonds is wide and varied Investor breakdown: Country breakdown: Average over last 5 syndications Average over last 5 syndications 6.0% Other, 13.4% 10.2% Pensions/ Fund/Asset Insurance, 26.4% Manager, 14.2% 37.2% Banks/ Central 45.0% 6.9% Banks, 38.4% Ireland UK US and Canada Continental Europe Nordics Asia & Other Source: NTMA 30
Late cycle risks mixed for Ireland: yield curve sets recession clock ticking but central banks are now easing US yield curve has inverted (albeit only PSPP restarting + re-investment means ECB slightly so far): could be waiting a while yet will be active In IGBs in 2020 6% 40 3.5 € Billions 5% 35 3.0 4% 30 2.5 25 Reinvest- 3% ment 2.0 20 included 2% 1.5 15 1% 1.0 10 0% 5 0.5 -1% 0 0.0 Q1 2015 Q3 2015 Q1 2016 Q3 2016 Q1 2017 Q3 2017 Q1 2018 Q3 2018 Q1 2019 Q3 2019 Q1 2020f Q3 2020f -2% -3% 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 PSPP IGB purchases (RHS) US 10 year bond yield minus 3m Treasury bill yield Cumulative Purchases (LHS) Source: DataStream, ECB 31 *Shaded areas indicate recessionary periods in the US
Ireland recorded full budget surplus for first time in 11 years in 2018: another one likely for 2019 Gen. Govt. Balance in surplus but might Revenue surge has helped Ireland balance slip into deficit in case of no-deal Brexit the books since 2015 (€bn) 10% 100 € Billions 90 5% 80 70 0% 60 50 -5% 40 30 -10% 20 10 -15% Surplus is back 0 2019f 2021f 2007 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 due to CT windfall -20% GG Expenditure (ex-banking recap) GG Revenue GGB (% of GNI*) GGB ex. CT receipts (% of GNI*) GG Revenue 10yr rolling average Source: CSO; Department of Finance 32
Ireland has improved its debt dynamics: next step is to follow others and run a GGB surplus for many years In recent years Ireland has run primary 2019 GGB Deficit/Surplus (% of GDP) surpluses that reduced debt ratios forecasts; Ireland moving up the ranks 15.0% Cyprus Netherlands 10.0% Luxembourg Malta 5.0% Germany Bulgaria Ireland(GNI*) 0.0% Slovenia Denmark -5.0% Greece Sweden Austria -10.0% Lithuania Czech Rep -15.0% Croatia Estonia Finland -20.0% Portugal Surplus is back Slovakia -25.0% Latvia due to CT windfall EA ~ EU28 -30.0% Belgium -40% UK Poland Spain Italy France Primary Balance (% of GNI*) Romania Debt Stabilising PB (% of GNI*) -4 -2 0 2 4 Source: CSO; Department of Finance, EU Commission forecasts, NTMA calculation 33 Note: Debt Stabilising primary balance is the primary balance it is necessary to run in a year to keep the debt-to-GNI* ratio from rising given the average interest rate and growth in that year.
Gross Government debt likely close to 59% of GDP at end- 2019; 100% of GNI*; reality somewhere in between Ireland’s net debt position converging with Debt-to-GNI* ratio is high but has declined gross debt as EDP assets are run down quickly 140% 180% 120%120% 120% 111% 160% 104% 100% 33% 30% 140% 86% 32% 18% 77% 74% 120% 80% 68% 19% 64% 62% 11% 9% 59% 57% 56% 100% 60% 9% 9% 8% 25% 80% 90% 86% 40% 80% 87% 67% 66% 65% 59% 60% 55% 51% 20% 37% 40% 0% 20% 0% Net Debt/GDP Cash Balances/EDP assets 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019f GG Debt/GDP Debt to GNI* Debt to GDP Source: CSO; Department of Finance 34
It’s best to analyse Irish debt with broad range of metrics 2018 GG debt to GG revenue % GG interest to GG rev % GG debt to GDP % Greece 377.9% 6.3% 181.2% Italy 291.7% 7.6% 134.8% Portugal 284.1% 7.5% 122.2% Cyprus 256.5% 6.0% 100.6% Ireland 250.2% 5.7% 63.6% Spain 249.1% 5.9% 97.6% UK 219.3% 5.9% 85.9% Belgium 194.7% 3.9% 100.0% EA19 184.7% 3.7% 85.9% France 183.9% 2.9% 98.4% EU28 178.4% 3.8% 80.4% Slovenia 158.9% 3.9% 70.4% Austria 151.4% 3.1% 74.0% Germany 133.2% 1.9% 61.9% Netherlands 120.3% 1.9% 52.4% Source: Eurostat, Department of Finance 104% Debt to GNI* ratio in 2018 35
Corporation tax revenue keeps surprising positively, but each year the concentration risk increases Corporation tax receipts have more than Sectors with large MNC presence dominate doubled in four years the CT receipts 24.0% 12.0 100% 90% 20.0% 10.0 80% 70% 16.0% 8.0 60% 12.0% 6.0 50% 40% 8.0% 4.0 30% In 2018, 45% of CT paid 20% 4.0% by 10 companies 2.0 10% 0% 0.0% - 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019f 2009 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2011 2013 2015 2017 Manufacturing ICT Corporation Tax (€bns, RHS) Financial & insurance Admin & support services Corporation Tax (% of tax revenue) Wholesale & retail trade Other Source: Department of Finance, Revenue 36
S&P restores “AA” grade – for first time in a decade Date of Rating Long- Short- Outlook/ last € Billion 2016 2017 2018 Agency term term Trend change Currency and deposits Standard Nov (mainly retail debt) 21.3 21.6 21.6 AA- A-1+ Stable & Poor's 2019 Securities other than shares, exc. financial derivatives 124.2 130.7 134.2 Fitch Dec A+ F1+ Stable - Short-term (T-Bills, CP etc) Ratings 2017 2.4 2.9 3.1 - Long-term (MLT bonds) 121.8 127.8 131.1 Sept Moody's A2 P-1 Stable Loans 2017 55.2 49.0 50.3 - Short-term 0.7 0.5 0.6 R-1 March - Long-term DBRS A(high) Stable (official funding) 54.6 48.5 49.7 (middle) 2016 General Government Debt 200.7 201.3 205.9 EDP debt instrument assets Jan. 24.9 27.3 28.6 R&I A a-1 Stable 2017 Net Government debt 175.8 174.0 177.3 37 Source: NTMA, CSO
Section 3: Brexit “Hard Brexit” risk has de-escalated but cliff edges may keep appearing
Brexit deal solves many issues for Ireland but does not eliminate the risk of a hard Brexit Northern Ireland border issued solved if UK-EU Future trading relationship current deal is ratified by UK parliament unresolved • Northern Ireland will remain within the UK • After the withdrawal agreement is sorted we Customs Union but will abide by EU Customs enter the transition period, which is slated to Union rules – dual membership for NI. finish at the end of 2020. • No hard border on the island of Ireland – customs • The UK government has stated its intention to border will be in the Irish sea. Goods crossing seek a free-trade arrangement for the long term. from ROI to NI will not require checks but goods going to UK will. • This is a departure from Theresa May’s government position which kept all of the UK in • Complex arrangements will be necessary to the EU customs union and kept many regulations differentiate between goods going to NI and aligned. those travelling through NI to UK or vice versa. Customs checks at ports, VAT and tariff rebates • The upshot is that the trading relationship will be and alignment of regulations will be needed. more distant, making negotiations difficult. • All of this is backed by a complex consent • There is only one year to negotiate what normally mechanism, which allows Stormont to opt-out takes several years. Risk of hard Brexit if the under simple majority at certain times. transition period is not extended. 39
Negatives of hard Brexit outweigh positives in short-term, although opportunities may appear longer term Cons Pros Short term Short term • Major trade disruption from tariffs, customs • None, bar cheaper domestic food prices? checks and documentation (red tape) Long term • Regions suffer severe recession in agriculture and • Fiscal help from Europe is likely; selective temporary UK-focused manufacturing; tourism might suffer waiving of State Aid rules? • Confidence shock to business and households • FDI influx from UK, as multinationals avoid turmoil; UK’s reputation might be tarnished • Liquidity may dry up in property market Financial services (passporting lost by UK) Other multinationals - especially • Fiscal surplus will turn to deficit, challenging 3% IT and business services of GDP limit in worst case • Commercial property occupancy could rise; there Long term may also be an influx of well paid workers • Lower consumer spending thanks to higher • Gradual partial trade recovery inflation when tariffs dominate the FX benefit Irish companies may steal EU market share from British ones (and finally diversify) • Political economy cost (loss of ally in the EU) Import substitution (especially in food) 40
Whichever type of Brexit materialises, trade is likely to be negatively impacted % of Goods Services Total Irish/UK trade linkages will suffer following Brexit total (2018) (2018) (2018) The UK is the second largest single-country export destination for Ireland’s goods and Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. the largest for its services At the same time, Ireland imports c. 20% of US 27.9 18.5 11.6 25.4 18. 23.1 its goods from the UK. Ireland’s trade with the UK is labour intensive UK* 11.5 21.7 15.7 9.6 13.8 13.6 The UK might only account for 14% of Ireland’s total exports, but Ireland is more NI 1.6 1.6 n/a n/a n/a n/a dependent than that because those UK- reliant sectors are labour intensive EU-27 38.8 37.4 29.4 26.8 33.5 30.3 SMEs account for over 55% of Irish exports to the UK. They are likely to be more adversely affected China 3.9 5.9 2.6 1.5 3.1 3.0 than larger companies by the introduction of tariffs and barriers to trade Other 21.8 22.4 43.3 38.3 30.7 31.1 41 Source: CSO 2018 * UK data includes Northern Ireland NTMA calculations; Data does not include contract manufacturing
Agri-food and tourism most at risk from trade barriers Agriculture has not diversified from the UK Tourism numbers linked to FX moves 60% 30% 20% Agri. exports to UK 15% 50% 20% 10% 40% 10% 5% 30% 0% 0% All other goods 20% -5% exports to UK -10% -10% 10% -20% -15% 0% -30% -20% 2010 2013 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2016 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 % of Irish Agri Exports going to UK Euro/Sterling (y-o-y, Lagged 3Qs, RHS) % of Other Irish Goods Exports going to UK Visitors to IE from UK (y-o-y) 42 Source: CSO, Datastream Eikon
Fan chart of hard Brexit impact on Ireland – the most severe forecast puts Ireland into recession The hit from the baseline for various Impact on GNI* growth under various forecasts of a hard Brexit forecasts of hard Brexit 1% 10% 0% 5% -1% -2% 0% -3% -5% -4% -5% -10% -6% -15% -7% 2020 2022 Baseline DOF/ESRI GNI* (Deal Scenario) DOF/ESRI Central Bank BoE implied (disruptive) Central Bank BoE implied (disruptive) BoE implied (disorderly) BoE implied (disorderly) 43 Source: CSO, various forecasters – GNI* shown has been deflated to produce a real GNI* series
Hard Brexit impact estimates all show similar story – return to WTO rules would be negative for Ireland Forecast vs. no Brexit Short term Medium term Long term baseline (2 years) (5 years) (10-15 years) Department of Finance -2.4% -3.3% -5.0% (ESRI) -7.0% Copenhagen Economics -2.0 to 2.5% -4.5% (of which -4.9% is due to regulatory divergence) Central Bank of Ireland -4.0% - -6.0% Bank of England -5.0% -6.2% -6.2% “disruptive” (implied) Bank of England -6.3% -8.2% -8.2% “disorderly” (implied) UK Treasury range (implied) - - -5.0 to 7.2% 44 Source: ESRI, Copenhagen, Bank of England, UK treasury Implied uses the impact on UK GDP and an elasticity measure of 0.8 to calculate the impact on Irish Growth
Many financial institutions have already announced that they will expand or set up in Dublin after Brexit FDI: Ireland may benefit Companies that have indicated jobs to be moved to Ireland Ireland could be a beneficiary from displaced FDI. The chief areas of interest are Financial services Business services IT/ new media. Dublin is primarily competing with Frankfurt, Paris, Luxembourg and Amsterdam for financial services. Ireland’s FDI opportunity will depend on the outcome of post-exit trade negotiations. The UK (City of London) is almost certain to lose its EU passporting rights on exit, so there may be more opportunities in time. 45
Section 4: Long term fundamentals Ireland’s long run future looks bright thanks to its favourable demographics
Much rebalancing has taken place – Ireland’s structural growth drivers have reasserted Gross National Income* at current prices Ireland’s GNI* per capita hit 2007 levels and (1995=100) compares favourably to EA 320 45,000 300 "Celtic Tiger" Credit/Prop Bubble Recovery 1994-2001 erty Bubble Burst 40,000 280 260 35,000 240 220 30,000 200 25,000 180 160 20,000 140 15,000 120 100 10,000 80 5,000 60 40 - 20 0 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020f Ireland (GNI*) EA 19 (GDP) Germany (GDP) 47 Source: CSO, Eurostat
Ireland’s population profile healthier than the EU average Ireland’s population was 4.92m in 2019 – Ireland’s population will remain younger over 200,000 more than 2011 Census than most of its EA counterparts 2.0% Japan 1.8% % of population in age cohort Spain Italy 1.6% Portugal 1.4% Greece Germany 1.2% France Belgium 1.0% Finland 0.8% Canada Denmark 0.6% 25% of Ireland’s UK population aged 17 or Ireland 0.4% below versus 19% for EU China 0.2% Sweden USA 0.0% World
Favourable population characteristics underpin debt sustainability over longer term: next 10 years look healthy Percentage of population: Ireland’s has The consequence is that working-age relatively more young people and fewer old population expected to grow (2020-2029) 70% India US 60% Ireland Denmark 50% UK Spain 40% Belgium Netherlands 30% France Austria 20% EU Euro area 10% China Italy 0% Germany
Openness to immigration has been beneficial to Ireland Latest Census data show net migration Highly educated migrants moving to Ireland positive since 2015 – mirroring economy “Reverse Brain Drain” 150 3.0% 120 100 2.0% 90 60 50 1.0% 30 0 0.0% 0 -50 -1.0% -30 -100 -2.0% -60 1995 1987 1989 1991 1993 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 -90 Emigration (000s) Immigration (000s) -120 Net Migration (000s) Third level Other Education Net Migration Net Migration (% of Pop, RHS) 2009-2013 2015-2019 50 Source: CSO
Openness to trade is also central to Irish success – led by services exports; Brexit may hinder export-led growth Cumulative post-crisis total exports (4Q sum Ireland benefits from export to end-2008 = 100, current prices) diversification by destination 290 190.00 % of Goods Services Total 270 170.00 total (2018) (2018) (2018) 250 150.00 Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. 230 130.00 US 27.9 18.5 11.6 25.4 18. 23.1 210 110.00 190 90.00 UK* 11.5 21.7 15.7 9.6 13.8 13.6 170 70.00 150 50.00 NI 1.6 1.6 n/a n/a n/a n/a 130 30.00 EU-27 38.8 37.4 29.4 26.8 33.5 30.3 110 10.00 90 -10.00 China 3.9 5.9 2.6 1.5 3.1 3.0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Contract Manufacturing* Services Other 21.8 22.4 43.3 38.3 30.7 31.1 Goods ex. CM Exports Source: CSO, NTMA calculations , * Contract manufacturing proxy 51
Ireland is relatively competitive now; we need to avoid repeat of the mid-2000s Nominal Labour Cost Ratio – IE vs Euro Area Unemployment back towards 1999-2007 level, but wage growth lower 115 7.0% 6.0% 2019 110 forecast 5.0% 2019f 105 4.0% 3.0% 100 2.0% 95 Ireland still competitive 1.0% versus The Euro Area 0.0% 90 Unemployment Comp. of Emp. per 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 employee growth Annual Averages (1999-2007) Source: Eurostat, NTMA analysis *Ratio = IE Nom. Labour Source: CSO, Eurostat, NTMA calculations Costs/ EA Nom. Labour Costs 52
Ireland is a good place to live and do business Ireland is close to OECD norms socially Ireland scores well on metrics such as property rights and government efficiency 100 Ireland 95 UN Goal – Ireland Normalised OECD 90 Peace, Justice and Actual (world Average Strong institutions Figure leader = 85 100) 80 Overall - 87.5 75.8 75 Corruption Perception Index 70 73.0 79.4 73.5 (0-100) 65 Government Efficiency 4.8 74.8 52.8 60 (1-7) Homicides (per 100,000 55 1.1 97.8 96.1 people) 50 Prison population Gender Decent work Reduced Sustainable 80.0 87.8 74.6 (per 100,000 people) Equality and economic Inequalities Cities and growth Communities Property Rights (1-7) 6.1 94.8 73.1 Ireland (World leader = 100) OECD Average Population who feel safe 75.0 73.7 67.4 walking alone at night (%) Source: United Nations SDG project 53
0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.1 Slovakia Slovenia Czech Rep Iceland Finland Denmark Norway Belgium more equal society Hungary Lower GINI score means Sweden Austria Poland Netherlands France Source: OECD Germany Switzerland Luxembourg Canada Ireland Estonia GINI Coefficient (Post Taxes and Transfers) Italy Australia Portugal Russia Greece Japan Spain Israel Latvia UK Korea Pre Taxes and Transfers Lithuania USA Income equality – Ireland’s very progressive system Turkey Chile Mexico Costa Rica means income equality is around OECD average after tax South Africa 54
Ireland reformed its corporate tax code to meet global standards; the 12.5% rate is fixed Government policy Ireland’s part in OECD (BEPS 1.0) corporate Ireland’s role in EU actions on corporate tax tax reform reform • Ireland has been a strong supporter of the BEPS • Ireland agreed two Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives process since inception. (ATADs) with its fellow EU Member States in 2016 and 2017. The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives • Removal of known tax avoidance structures such represent binding commitments to implement as the “Double Irish”, “the Single Malt” and three significant BEPS recommendations into Irish “stateless companies”. law as well as two additional anti-avoidance • Ireland is best in class on tax transparency and measures. exchange of information. Ireland is one of only 23 • Three out of five required components of the jurisdictions to have been found to be fully ATADs are now in effect as of 1st Jan 2019: compliant with new international best practice by Controlled-Foreign Company (CFC) rules, Exit Tax the Global Forum on Tax Transparency and and General Anti-Abuse Rules (GAAR). Exchange of Information. • Ireland continues to engage positively at both EU • Ireland introduced Country-by-Country Reporting and OECD level on tax issues. in 2015. The State also ratified the BEPS multilateral instrument in domestic legislation which will update the majority of Ireland’s tax treaties to be BEPS compliant. 55
OECD’s BEPS 2.0 process could impact the tax landscape globally – one to watch in 2020. Pillar One : proposal to re-allocate taxing Pillar Two: proposal for minimum global tax rights on non-routine profits • The OECD has proposed further corporate tax • Pillar Two - the basic idea is to introduce a reform - a BEPS 2.0. minimum tax rate with the aim of reducing incentives to shift profits. • BEPS 2.0 looks at two pillars. The first pillar focuses on proposals that would re-allocate taxing • Where income is not taxed to the minimum level, rights between jurisdictions where assets are held there would an “income inclusion rule” which and the markets where user/consumers are operates as a ‘top-up’ to achieve the minimum based. Non-routine profits could - to some - rate of tax. degree be taxed where customers reside. • The obvious questions arise: • Under such a proposal, a proportion of profits what is the appropriate minimum tax rate? would be re- allocated from small countries to who will get the ‘top-up’ payment? large countries. Such a proposal will reduce Is the minimum rate taxed at a global (firm) Ireland’s corporation tax base but it is impossible level or on a country-by-country basis? to predict the size of the impact. • These questions are as yet unanswered. If the • Nothing has been decided but proposals are minimum rate agreed is greater than the 12.5% currently in the public consultation phase. rate that Ireland levies, it would erode this country’s comparative advantage. 56
Section 5: Property Residential property prices have started to cool as supply comes online
House prices have plateaued over the last year House prices have stabilised 20% Office prices have diverged from retail and below their peak (100 in 2007) industrial (peak = 100) 120 120 100 100 80 80 60 60 40 40 20 20 0 0 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 National Excl. Dublin Dublin Retail Office Industrial Source: CSO; MSCI data 58
Housing supply still below demand; but price inflation has moderated as supply is catching up Housing Completions above 22,000 in 2018 New dwellings* make up 80% of housing but still low historically (000s) completions: some debate about the rest 100 30000 90 25000 80 70 20000 60 15000 50 40 10000 30 5000 20 10 0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019f 0 1970 1978 1986 1994 2002 2010 2018 New dwelling completion Unfinished Nationally Dublin ex. Dublin Reconnection Non-Domestic All connections Source: DoHPCLG, CSO, NTMA Calculations * Housing completions derived from electrical grid connection data for a property. Reconnections 59 of old houses or connections from “ghost estates” overstate the annual run rate of new building.
Demand has picked up since 2015; credit slowly increasing as cash buyers become less important Mortgage drawdowns rise from deep Non-mortgage transactions still important trough (000s) but closer to 40% of total 120 20 80.0% Thousands 18 70.0% 100 16 60.0% 14 80 12 50.0% 60 10 40.0% 8 30.0% 40 6 20.0% 4 20 2 10.0% 0 0 0.0% Q2 2015 Q4 2010 Q2 2011 Q4 2011 Q2 2012 Q4 2012 Q2 2013 Q4 2013 Q2 2014 Q4 2014 Q4 2015 Q2 2016 Q4 2016 Q2 2017 Q4 2017 Q2 2018 Q4 2018 Q2 2019 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Residential Investment Letting Mover purchaser Non-mortgage transactions Mortgage drawdowns for house purchase First Time Buyers Non-mortgage transactions % of total (RHS) Source: BPFI *4 quarter sum used Source: BPFI; Residential Property Price Register 60
Residential property prices have steadied in recent quarters; rents continue to increase Residential property prices have rebounded Rents are well above previous peak – out of strongly since 2012 but steadied in 18/19 line with prices 30% 180 160 Rents now well 20% above prices 140 10% 120 100 0% 80 -10% Prices were 60 above rents -20% 40 20 -30% 0 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 National (Y-o-Y %) Ex Dublin (Y-o-Y %) Dublin (Y-o-Y %) Rents (100 = 2005) Price Source: CSO; RTB 61
Irish house price valuation metrics continue to rise but remain below 2008 levels; most countries are expensive Deviation from average price-to-income ratio (Q1 2019, red dot represent Q1 2008) 60% 40% 20% 0% -20% SD BG NL NW OE DN LX FR ES IE PT EA UK FN BD GR IT Deviation from average price-to-rent ratio (Q1 2019, red dot represent Q1 2008) 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% -20% SD NW BG UK DN FR LX ES IE NL OE FN EA BD PT GR IT Source: OECD, NTMA Workings 62 Note: Measured as % over or under valuation relative to long term averages since 1980.
Section 6: Other data Ireland’s banks now among strongest in Europe – complete reverse of late 2000s
Ireland has legacy banking-related assets – equity in banks and expected NAMA surplus • Banks continue to be profitable: income, cost and balance sheet metrics are much improved. • Interest rates on mortgages and to SMEs are still high compared to EU thanks to legacy issues and the slow judicial process in accessing collateral. • An IPO of AIB stock (28.8%) occurred in June 2017. This returned c. €3.4bn to the Irish Exchequer to be used for debt reduction. Further disposal of banking assets will depend on market conditions. All three pillar banks are profitable Net Interest Margin Profit before Tax 3.0% 1.4 2.5% 1.2 1 2.0% 0.8 1.5% 0.6 1.0% 0.4 0.5% 0.2 0.0% 0 AIB BOI PTSB AIB BOI PTSB 2017 2018 2019H1 2017 2018 2019H1 64 Source: Annual reports of banks - BOI, AIB, PTSB Profit measures are before exceptional items (2019H1 annualised)
Domestic bank cost base reduced over time Cost income ratios improve dramatically… … and IE banks* below EU average 90% 150% 144% 80% 70% 123% 125% 60% 50% 100% 40% 88% 30% 69% 20% 75% 65% 10% 54% 0% 50% LV SK ES PL DK GR PT NL HU SI GB FI IS IE IT EU AT LU BE FR CY DE Staffing (000s) halved post crisis 25% 30 0% 26 20 AIB BOI PTSB 2012 2013 2014 2015 16 10 2016 2017 2018 2019 H1 10 10 5 2 0 Source: Annual reports of Irish domestic banks AIB BOI PTSB 2008 2019H1 Source: Annual reports of Irish domestic banks, EBA 65 * EBA data includes three domestic banks as well as Ulster Bank, DEPFA & Citibank.
Capital ratios strengthened as banks were slimmed down and consolidated Loan-to-deposit ratios have fallen CET 1 capital ratios (Jun 2019) significantly as loan books were slashed 25% 200 180 160 20% 140 120 15% 100 80 10% 20.3% 60 16.8% 17.3% 40 14.9% 13.6% 14.4% 20 5% - Loan-to- Loans (€bn) Loan-to- Loans (€bn) 0% Deposit % Deposit % CET1 % (Transitional) CET1 % (Fully Loaded) AIB BOI AIB BOI PTSB Dec-10 Dec-18 Source: Published bank accounts Source: Published bank accounts Note: “Transitional” refers to the transitional Basel III required for CET1 ratios 66 “Fully loaded” refers to the actual Basel III basis for CET1 ratios.
Pillar banks sold non-performing loans during 2018, as asset quality continues to improve All 3 Pillar banks (€bn) Dec-17 Dec-18 Non-performing exposures % of total loans1 (loss provision % of NPE) Total Loans 162.4 158.2 Dec-17 Dec-18 Book (€bn) Non-performing Exposures 22.0 12.7 BOI Irish Residential Mortgages 11.0(24) 9.5(21) 23.7 UK Residential Mortgages 1.9(14) 2.3(15) 21.7 (NPE as % of Total) 13.5% 8.0% Irish SMEs 15.4(46) 11.2(49) 7.6 Provisions 7.3 4.4 UK SMEs 8.6(42) 6.1(53) 1.6 (Provisions as % of book) 4.4% 2.8% Corporate 3.0(69) 2.6(60) 10.3 CRE - Investment 17.9(43) 10.7(44) 7.7 (Provisions as % of Impaired) 33.2% 34.6% CRE - Land/Development 39.4(55) 14.0(54) 0.6 Consumer Loans 2.1(98) 2.1(140) 5.1 8.3(36) 6.3(35) 78.4 Loan Asset Mix (3 banks Dec 18) Corporate/ Mortgage AIB Residential Mortgages 14 10.1 (20) 32.3 SME SMEs/Corporate 11 5.2 (36) 19.6 25% CRE 33 18.0 (29) 7.9 Consumer Loans 18 11.1 (50) 3.1 16 9.6 62.9 Consumer 5% 60% PTSB Residential Mortgages 21.7(44) 8.8(39) 12.4 Buy-to-let Mortgages 21.8(64) 12.9(113) 4.0 10% Commercial 30.3(104) 33.3(76) 0.2 CRE Consumer Loans 15.4(92) 7.5(112) 0.3 21.7(50) 10.0(64) 16.9 Source: Published bank accounts 1 Non-performing exposures include impaired loans, loans past due greater than 90 days but not 67 impaired, and Forborne Collateral Realisations
Irish residential mortgage arrears are still improving; but there are legal bottlenecks to normalisation Mortgage arrears (90+ days) Repossessions** 20% 12.0 PDH Arrears 3500 6.0% 18% 10.0 (by thousands) 16% 8.0 3000 5.0% 14% 6.0 4.0 2500 12% 4.0% 10% 2.0 0.0 2000 8% 3.0% -2.0 6% 1500 -4.0 4% 2.0% -6.0 1000 2% -8.0 0% 1313131313131313131 1.0% 3412341234123412341234123412341234123412 500 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 0 0.0% PDH + BTL (by balance) Over 90 days 90-180 days 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 181-360 days 361-720 days PDH + BTL (by number) PDH BTL % of MA90+ (RHS) >720 days Total change Source: CBI • Non-bank entities now hold 13 per cent of all PDH mortgage accounts outstanding; 11 per cent are held by regulated retail credit firms, with the remaining 2 per cent held by unregulated loan owners. Credit Servicing Firms hold 22 per cent of all PDH mortgages in arrears over 720 days * Over 40% of those cases in arrears > 720 days are also in arrears greater than five years. 68 ** Four quarter sum of repossessions. Includes voluntary/abandoned dwellings as well as court ordered repossessions
NAMA has repaid its senior debt of over €30bn; likely to deliver surplus of around €4bn – half of which in 2020 • NAMA’s operating performance is strong Acquired 12,000 loans (over 60,000 saleable property units) related to €74bn par of loans of 780 debtors for €32bn NAMA continues to generate net profit after impairment charges. • It has repaid 100% of €30.2bn of original senior debt NAMA exceeded its senior debt redemption targets well ahead of schedule. It remains on course, subject to market conditions, to redeem its small amount of subordinated debt by 2020. • NAMA could deliver a surplus for Irish taxpayers of about €4bn, according to its management team - if current market conditions remain favourable. The surplus is already factored into the budgetary arithmetic. NAMA plans to return €2bn of the €4bn to the Exchequer in 2020. • NAMA initiative to develop up to 20,000 housing units by 2020 – subject to commercial viability. Progress has been strong so far: 11,700 units were completed in 2014 – 2019; Another 1,900 are under construction or have had funding approved; A further 4,500 have planning permission granted. More NAMA information available on www.nama.ie 69
The European Commission’s ruling on Apple’s tax affairs does not change the NTMA’s funding plans • The EC has ruled that Ireland illegally provided State aid of up to €13bn, plus interest to Apple. This figure is based on the tax foregone as a result of a historic provision in Ireland’s tax code. This was closed on December 31st 2014. • This case has nothing to do with Ireland’s corporate tax rate. In its press release the EC stated: “This decision does not call into question Ireland’s general tax system or its corporate tax rate”. • Apple is appealing the ruling, as is the Irish Government. This process could be lengthy. Pending the outcome of the appeal, Apple has paid approximately €13bn plus EU interest (c. €2bn) into an escrow fund. • Bank of New York Mellon has been selected for the provision of escrow agency and custodian services to hold and administer the fund. • Amundi, BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Limited and Goldman Sachs Asset Management International have been selected for the provision of investment management services for the fund. • As the funds will be held in escrow pending the outcome of the appeal, the NTMA has made no allowance for these funds. 70
Government’s NDP outlines green projects; aim to cut CO2 emissions by at least 80% by 2050 1 in 5 euros in the National Development Plan (NDP) to be spent on green projects Sustainable Transition to a Management Low carbon Sustainable and Climate Total:€23 Mobility of Water and billion (13% Environmental Resilient €8.6 billion Resources Society of GNI*) €6.8 billion €7.6 billion Further details are available at ntma.ie Source: National Development Plan 71 2018-2027
Annex Explanatory charts about the distortions to Ireland’s National Accounts
Distortions to GDP/GNP make them sub-optimal indicators of economic performance Substantial activity from multinationals Reclassification of several companies and distorts the national accounts “onshoring” of IP led to step change in GDP 30% 350 25% c.35% increase in 300 nominal GDP in 2015 20% 250 15% 10% 200 5% 150 0% -5% 100 -10% 50 0 Change in Inventories External Channel 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Modified Domestic Demand GDP Nominal GDP (€bns) Nominal GNP (€bns) Source: CSO; Department of Finance 73
The change in capital stock resulted in large increase in net exports – mostly through contract manufacturing (CM) 240 The capital stock expanded in 2015 by c. €300bn or c. 220 40%. This is due to: 200 Contract 180 manufacturing Re-domiciling/inversions of several multinational proxy* companies 160 140 The “onshoring” of IP assets into Ireland by 120 multinationals 100 The movement of aircraft leasing assets in Ireland. 80 60 Goods produced by the additional capital were mainly 40 exported. Complicating matters, the goods were 20 produced through “contract manufacturing”. 0 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 CM occurs where a company in Ireland engages another National accounts exports Trade data exports abroad to manufacture products on its behalf. Crucially, the foreign contract manufacturer supplies a manufacturing service to the Irish entity but the overseas contractor never takes ownership of the product. When the product is sold abroad, a change of economic ownership takes place between Ireland and the country where the product is sold. This export is recorded in Ireland’s statistics even though it was never produced in Ireland. Little or no employment in Ireland results from this contract manufacturing. Source: CSO 74
Investment distorted by multinationals importing intellectual property (IP) into Ireland Investment (4Q sum, €bns) • Investment is above the pre-crisis level due to 140 MNCs importing intangibles into Ireland. 120 100 • Ireland has become an ICT hub in recent years 80 with this investment impacting the real economy. 60 40 • However the recent sharp increase in intangibles investment overstates Ireland’s position and 20 should be discounted accordingly. 0 2006 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Building Investment Other Investment Distortions Modified GFCF Total GFCF Source: CSO, 75
GNI* is a better measure of underlying economic activity than GDP/GNP; best as a level rather than a growth metric National Account – 2015 2016 2017 2018 • GDP headline numbers do not reflect the “true” Current Prices growth of Ireland’s income due to MNCs. (€, y-o-y growth rates) Gross Domestic Product 262.8bn 271.7bn 297.1bn 324.0bn • Reasons for 2015-18 MNC distortions: (GDP) (34.9%) (3.4%) (9.4%) (9.4%) Re-domiciling/inversions of several minus Net Factor Income multinational companies from rest of the world The “onshoring” of IP assets into Ireland = Gross National Product 200.8bn 220.6bn 234.9bn 253.1bn by multinationals (GNP) (22.9%) (9.9%) (6.5%) (7.7%) The movement of aircraft leasing assets add EU subsidies minus 1.2bn 1.0bn 1.1bn 1.1bn in Ireland. EU taxes = Gross National Income 202.0bn 221.6bn 236.0bn 254.2bn • By modifying GNI to take account of these factors, (GNI) (22.9%) (9.7%) (6.5%) (7.7%) GNI* gives us a better understanding of the minus retained earnings -4.7bn -5.8bn -4.5bn -5.0bn underlying economy. of re-domiciled firms minus depreciation on -30.1bn -35.3bn -42.5bn -46.3bn foreign owned IP assets minus depreciation on -4.6bn -4.9bn -5.1bn -5.4bn aircraft leasing = GNI* 162.7bn 175.6bn 184.0bn 197.5bn (9.4%) (8.0%) (4.7%) (7.3%) Source: CSO 76
Modified Domestic Demand (MDD) – which ignores exports - is best cyclical indicator 15% GNI* is useful but not timely. MDD and MFDD are released on a quarterly and real basis. 10% MDD ignores the net exports channel. It also omits aircraft leasing and IP imports from investment. 5% The measure includes: Private and government consumption Building investment 0% Some machinery & equipment investment Some intangible asset investment -5% Value of physical changes in stock. This last piece is impacted by MNCs and is quite volatile. -10% MDD has Ireland growing negatively in Q1 2019 mainly due to volatility in stocks. -15% When stocks are excluded, (i.e. using Modified Final 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Domestic Demand) real underlying growth was 2.6% Modified Domestic Demand MFDD (MDD ex stocks) in Q3 2019. Since 2014, annual growth has averaged 4.3% when looking at MFDD. Source: CSO, four quarter sum growth rate used to strip out substantial quarterly volatility. 77 Note MDD includes inventories. Large inventories in Q4 2016 added a further degree of volatility into MDD data.
Disclaimer The information in this presentation is issued by the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) for informational purposes. The contents of the presentation do not constitute investment advice and should not be read as such. The presentation does not constitute and is not an invitation or offer to buy or sell securities. The NTMA makes no warranty, express or implied, nor assumes any liability or responsibility for the accuracy, correctness, completeness, availability, fitness for purpose or use of any information that is available in this presentation nor represents that its use would not infringe other proprietary rights. The information contained in this presentation speaks only as of the particular date or dates included in the accompanying slides. The NTMA undertakes no obligation to, and disclaims any duty to, update any of the information provided. Nothing contained in this presentation is, or may be relied on as a promise or representation (past or future) of the Irish State or the NTMA. The contents of this presentation should not be construed as legal, business or tax advice. 78
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