International and local/diaspora actors in the Syria response - A diverging set of systems?
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HPG Working Paper
International and
local/diaspora actors
in the Syria response
A diverging set of systems?
Eva Svoboda and Sara Pantuliano
March 2015
HPG
Humanitarian
Policy GroupAbout the authors Eva Svoboda is a Research Fellow with the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Sara Pantuliano is the Director of HPG. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank all those who gave their time in interviews, shared contacts or material and offered comments on the study. In particular, the authors would like to thank Rola Hallam from Hand in Hand for Syria, who gave valuable advice and provided contacts in local/Syrian groups. Thanks also go to the wider Syrian diaspora community. Humanitarian Policy Group Overseas Development Institute 203 Blackfriars Road London SE1 8NJ United Kingdom Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300 Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399 E-mail: hpgadmin@odi.org Website: http://www.odi.org/hpg ISBN: 978 1 909464 91 9 © Overseas Development Institute, 2015 Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce materials from this publication but, as copyright holders, ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. This and other HPG Reports are available from www.odi.org.uk/hpg.
Contents
Executive summary iii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Scope and methodology 2
2 The ‘formal’ humanitarian system 5
2.1 Access 5
2.2 Protection 6
3 Humanitarian response: the Syrian perspective 9
3.1 Typology of local groups 9
3.2 Access 12
3.3 Protection 13
4 A diverging set of systems? 15
4.1 Principles 15
4.2 Partnerships 16
4.3 Procedures, programmes and policies 17
4.4 Coordination mechanisms 18
4.5 Funding 19
4.6 The impact of counter-terrorism legislation 19
5 Conclusion 21
References 23
iii International and local/diaspora actors in the Syria response: a diverging set of systems?
Executive summary
The conflict in Syria – coming amid a slew of large- or traditional humanitarian sector of the UN, the
scale emergencies in the Central African Republic and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
South Sudan, alongside the Ebola crisis in West Africa and international NGOs. This is a diverse category,
– has posed particular challenges for humanitarian comprising professional bodies (often medical groups)
response in its scale and complexity. Five years since that existed prior to the conflict, charities, networks
the first demonstrations against the government of anti-government and community activists, diaspora
prospects for an end to the fighting seem as elusive organisations, coordination networks and fighting
as ever. As the Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie groups that also provide relief. These groups have
Amos, put it in December 2014: ‘In many parts of almost inadvertently filled the gap left by the limited
Syria the level of violence has worsened, with civilians international presence, providing both assistance and
continuing to pay heavily with loss of life, serious protection – even if the majority of these groups neither
injuries, psychological trauma, ongoing and recurring see themselves as protection actors nor use the term.
displacement and massive damage to property and
infrastructure’.1 At the end of 2014 the UN launched According to the Office for the Coordination of
its largest appeal yet, asking for $8.4 billion to cover Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), around 600 to 700
not only urgent humanitarian needs, but also funding ‘local’ groups have been created since the start of
for development projects. Securing that funding will the conflict. Much of their work is not necessarily
be difficult: in 2014 the UN received only half of the captured by any coordination mechanism within the
amount it had requested from donors, and there is little formal humanitarian sector, and yet they are playing
to suggest that this latest appeal will fare much better. a vital role in responding to needs that would only be
met inadequately or not all. Challenges in accessing
The formal humanitarian system has struggled with populations in need by the formal humanitarian
issues of access and protection in a conflict marked system have made partnerships an essential tool
by widespread and deliberate disregard for civilians. in the Syria response. However, the conflict has
Violations include unlawful killings, arbitrary arrest confirmed what others have shown before: that the
and detention, hostage-taking, sexual and gender-based formal humanitarian sector finds it extremely difficult
violence and sieges. While the responsibility to protect to establish genuine, inclusive partnerships.2 Instead,
civilians rests primarily with the warring parties, the local/diaspora groups are often seen as mere service
belligerents’ only aim seems to be to win the war providers, rather than genuine counterparts. Making
at any cost. Although humanitarian organisations genuine partnerships work will require flexibility
have a responsibility to remind the parties of their and adaptability from traditional donors and
obligations and address the consequences of violations, international aid agencies. This does not mean doing
information on protection is difficult to obtain and is away with all procedures and standards, but rather
neither centralised nor sufficiently analysed. Protection adapting them as far as possible to the realities on
agencies are geographically separated and dispersed the ground.
in different countries, and communication and
coordination between them is weak. There is an assumption that the challenges faced by
the formal humanitarian system are fundamentally
The lack of physical presence of international different from those faced by local/diaspora groups.
aid agencies has shone a spotlight onto what is Yet access, insecurity, funding and the effects of
commonly called the ‘local response’: groups and counter-terrorism legislation are issues that all aid
organisations that do not belong to the formal agencies are grappling with. Focusing on differences
rather than recognising similarities encourages the
1 See https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/15%20
December%202014%20USG%20SecCo%20statement%20 2 See https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/WHS%20
on%20Syria.pdf. Concept%20Note.pdf.
iiibelief that local and international aid agencies cannot time to explore how forces can be combined, while work together, and discourages them from exploring also recognising that there will be instances where how they could. As needs in Syria far outweigh international aid agencies and local/diaspora groups what each individual organisation can do, it is will operate separately. iv International and local/diaspora actors in the Syria response: a diverging set of systems?
1 Introduction
The conflict in Syria entered its fifth year early in Syrians are in need of humanitarian assistance, 7.6m
2015, and there is no end in sight. As the conflict are internally displaced and over 3m have fled to
has dragged on it has become more widespread neighbouring countries.4 By mid-2014, three years
and complex. What started as a popular uprising in into the war, the death toll had reached 191,000.5 In
2011 has rapidly developed into a civil war between its 2015 Strategic Response Plan for Syria, the United
the government in Damascus and a constellation of Nations estimated that it would need $2.9 billion to
proliferating armed groups, including Syrian armed cover humanitarian needs (UN, 2014e). As in other
forces, so-called moderates, Islamists and Kurds. conflicts, children have been particularly hard-hit.
Although no exact figures are available, it is likely that According to a report published by the Overseas
there are around 10–12 major groups, with a number Development Institute (ODI) in September 2014, ‘four
of smaller sub-groups (HPG interviews). The Islamic years into the Syrian crisis, over half a million Syrian
Front Coalition, for example, comprises seven Islamist refugee children are out of school – and the numbers
groups. Other groups operating outside the Coalition are rising. The education crisis is fuelling an epidemic
include the Yarmouk Martyrs’ Brigade and the Ahfad of child labour and early marriage’ (Watkins and
al-Rasoul Brigade, as well as Kurdish groups fighting Zyck, 2014).
predominantly in the Kurdish area of Syria.3 Making
an already complex situation even murkier are Iranian- Despite growing humanitarian needs access for
trained militias loyal to the government but separate humanitarian agencies has been hampered by conflict
from the Syrian army, Hizbollah and the National and bureaucratic obstacles. The lack of physical
Defence Force, a loyalist reserve force. The fragmentation presence of international aid agencies has shone a
within the opposition and the appearance of Islamist spotlight onto what is commonly called the ‘local
groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and more recently response’: groups and organisations that do not
Islamic State (IS, formerly known as the Islamic State belong to the formal or traditional humanitarian
in Iraq and Syria or ISIS) has thrown the country into sector of the UN, the Red Cross/Red Cresent
further disarray, as well as triggering airstrikes by the Movement and international NGOs.
United States and others. Although the government has
wrested some areas back from the opposition, IS has These groups have almost inadvertently filled the gap
substantially gained in strength and territory and now left by the limited international presence, providing
controls one-third of Syria, as well as large areas of Iraq. both assistance and protection. International
organisations with a protection focus have struggled
The conflict has also spilt over into Lebanon, adding to respond to the enormous scale of needs, and
a further layer of complexity to a situation that the attempts to promote respect for international
International Crisis Group has called a ‘metastasising humanitarian and human rights law have largely
conflict’ (ICG, 2013). Meanwhile, the flight of millions failed. In their stead, Syrian and diaspora groups
of Syrians has created a massive and complex refugee have engaged in a wide variety of work with a
crisis in neighbouring countries. Lebanon in particular distinct protective function, even if the majority of
is struggling as the influx puts a severe strain on a these groups neither see themselves as protection
country dealing with its own political upheavals and actors nor use the term. It is clear that needs far
historical grievances against Syria. outweigh what the formal humanitarian system
or local/diaspora groups can address individually:
The civilian population has borne the brunt of the both need to work together, but the challenge lies
violence: OCHA estimates that over 12 million in how to do this. Most local/diaspora groups were
4 See http://syria.unocha.org.
3 For a more detailed breakdown, see http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syria-the-epicenter- 5 See http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/SY/
of-future-jihad HRDAGUpdatedReportAug2014.pdf.
1set up only at the start of the conflict, and are to
some extent unknown entities in the eyes of the 1.1 Scope and methodology
established humanitarian system. Questions have
been raised about their effectiveness and efficiency, This HPG Working Paper on the crisis in Syria is
their adherence to professional standards commonly part of a two-year research project entitled
accepted in the sector and whether they are neutral, ‘Approaches and Innovations Reshaping the
independent and impartial. While these are important Humanitarian Landscape: Opportunities and
questions they also obscure the fact that international Challenges for Protection Work’. The first
NGOs do not always consider themselves neutral, publication from the project (Svoboda, 2014) looked
and many donors have been vocal about who they at the challenges involved in providing effective
support in this conflict. It also ignores the fate of protection. During this initial research it quickly
principled humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan, became clear that diaspora/local Syrian groups played
Iraq and elsewhere. a key role in the response in a context where access
for international actors is severely circumscribed.
Although partnerships have eventually been formed, Consequently, the paper provides a typology of
many are not partnerships in any genuine sense. the wide range of actors gathered under the ‘local/
Local/diaspora groups are often seen as mere diaspora’ label, outlines their evolution and growth,
service providers, rather than genuine counterparts. sets out their key activities and explores the nature
Local groups find the bureaucracy around funding and extent of their interaction with the ‘formal’
cumbersome and unwieldy, staffing requirements humanitarian system.
impossible to meet, accountability arrangements
unequal and registration processes confusing. While protection remains at the heart of the project,
Cultural and linguistic differences have hampered the paper also looks at the challenges diaspora/
mutual understanding and meaningful coordination. local groups face more broadly, for example when
Figure 1: A growing crisis
Number of people People in need Internally displaced people Refugees
25,000,000
20,000,000
15,000,000
10,000,000
5,000,000
JUN SEPT DEC APR DEC JUN OCT
2012 2013 2014
2 International and local/diaspora actors in the Syria response: a diverging set of systems?engaging with the ‘formal’ humanitarian sector. Damascus and providing relief from there were not
The study was conducted jointly with the UK-based interviewed due to time and security constraints.
charity Hand in Hand for Syria. The research
involved a review of primary and secondary sources, The report uses ‘formal’ or ‘traditional’ to refer to
including UN documents, grey literature and UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement
academic publications. Fieldwork in Jordan, Turkey and international NGOs (INGOs). This label of
and Lebanon took place between January and August course does not do justice to the diversity within the
2014, complemented by additional phone/skype humanitarian sector. UN agencies, due to their origins
interviews with individuals based in the Middle East, and mandates, face different challenges from INGOs or
Europe and Australia. Interviewees included current the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
and former staff and volunteers of Syrian diaspora While the authors recognise this diversity, it is beyond
groups, associations and NGOs, staff of international the scope of this report to make reference to it and its
aid agencies and international non-governmental operational implications in any great detail. Similarly,
organisations, and current and former UN staff. the groups and organisations that make up what is
Interviews were also conducted with donors, commonly called the ‘local response’ are by no means
academics, independent consultants and Syrians monolithic, but rather a collection of groups with a
living abroad. For security reasons field research wide range of views, affiliations and agendas. This
was not carried out inside Syria itself. In order to report attempts to shed some light on this diversity.
allow for fuller discussions and for safety reasons the
names of interviewees have been withheld. The report uses the commonly agreed Inter-Agency
Standing Committee (IASC) definition for the term
The authors recognise that the perspective provided protection, namely:
in this report is partial as it focuses primarily on
organisations providing assistance from Turkey all activities aimed at obtaining full respect
(through cross-border operations). It does not deal for the rights of all individuals in accordance
with assistance provided to refugees in neighbouring with international law, including international
countries, although references to the specific humanitarian, human rights and refugee law,
circumstances in those contexts are made where regardless of their age, gender or social, ethnic,
appropriate. In addition, aid agencies based in national, religious or other background.
34 International and local/diaspora actors in the Syria response: a diverging set of systems?
2 The ‘formal’ humanitarian
system
When the demonstrations against Bashar al-Assad’s the border and from Damascus until the Syrian
government started early in 2011, most humanitarian government asked it to stop operating from Turkey in
organisations, some analysts and indeed many Syrians May 2014. Subsequently the agency decided to close
thought that the country would go the way of others its operations in Damascus.6
in the region: the government would fall quickly and
civil war would be avoided, even if no one expected
the uprising to be entirely bloodless. Few suspected 2.1 Access
that what had started with popular demonstrations
would escalate into full-scale war. Access issues have been a prominent feature of the
conflict from the beginning. According to the Syria
The international humanitarian system began its Integrated Needs Assessment (SINA), produced in
engagement in Syria in earnest in 2012 (Slim and December 2013: ‘Rampant insecurity and violence
Trombetta, 2014). While international NGOs such across affected areas pose a constant – though
as MSF, UN agencies (UNRWA, UNHCR) and the unpredictable – challenge to ensuring humanitarian
ICRC had been present in Syria prior to the start of access to affected people. Beyond insecurity and
the uprising against the Assad government, primarily violence, imposed movement restrictions and
in relation to Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, an the denial of humanitarian needs pose the most
agreement between the Syrian government and the significant access challenges’ (SINA, 2013). In
UN on access to populations in need was reached this context access has been understood largely as
only in May 2012, under which eight UN agencies access for international aid organisations, with a
and nine international NGOs were initially permitted principal focus on access across the Syrian border –
to provide humanitarian assistance from Damascus. to which the Syrian government remains staunchly
The number of accredited international NGOs opposed. This is not to say that calling for access
has gone up to 14 since then, though this marks a is unnecessary, but both the Syrian government
decline on the previous year (UN, 2014f). In 2014, and armed non-state actors have consistently and
4.8m people were provided with food assistance and intentionally hampered access by humanitarian
16m received medical aid and treatment; another organisations. Although there has been some progress
5.4m were given non-food items and 16m received on this issue, the process of obtaining visas is lengthy
improved access to safe drinking water (UN, 2014f). and by no means always successful, with visas often
Apart from providing food and restoring water denied to particular nationalities or job descriptions
supplies, the ICRC also assists Syrians to restore (in particular protection officers).Obtaining
contacts with family members separated due to the permission to conduct field trips is a cumbersome
conflict (ICRC, 2014). process requiring a multitude of authorisations.
Besieged areas have been particularly difficult to
From the start of the conflict there were two access, and many such areas regularly go without
distinct modalities of operating: across frontlines any assistance for months. Shifting frontlines, the
by organisations based in Damascus and across volatility and unpredictability of the conflict and
international borders without the consent of the fragmentation among belligerents make it difficult to
Syrian government by organisations based in Turkey, know who to negotiate access with, and whether any
and to a lesser degree Lebanon and Jordan. In rare agreements reached will be honoured.
cases international agencies have operated both from
Damascus and from outside the country. Mercy 6 See http://www.mercycorps.org.uk/articles/syria/closure-mercy-
Corps, for instance, provided assistance both across corps-humanitarian-aid-operations-damascus.
5Discussions of the legality of cross-border operations assistance, and the government in Damascus has
– an issue that affects the UN and its agencies more removed or reduced some of the obstacles in the way
than it does international NGOs – and calls to of aid provision across frontlines, arguably as a way
disregard state consent became louder as the conflict of demonstrating that cross-border operations – which
dragged on, and various legal interpretations of Syria opposes – are unnecessary, and most people
situations that would justify ignoring state consent can be reached from Damascus. Even so, aid agencies
were published.7 However, progress in the UN Security continue to face significant operational constraints.
Council on forcing Damascus to allow free access for In September 2014, Valerie Amos, then Emergency
humanitarian organisations was slow. A Presidential Relief Coordinator, stated that ‘intense fighting and
Statement in October 2013 (UN, 2013) calling on all shifting conflict lines continue to make the delivery of
parties to allow unimpeded access to humanitarian aid difficult and dangerous. The parties to the conflict
organisations and condemning widespread violations continue to put obstacles in the way of the sustained
of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and access that humanitarian organizations require’.9
International Human Rights Law (IHRL) was
considered by diplomats and aid agencies as a major While the Security Council remains deadlocked
step, even though it was non-binding. To consider a on finding a political solution for Syria, the same
non-binding statement as an improvement was perhaps paralysis does not afflict UN mechanisms based in
illustrative of the low expectations many humanitarian Geneva, even if their work has not jolted those in
organisations and Syrians alike had of the Security power into action either. In August 2011 the Human
Council, which has been divided on Syria from the Rights Council passed Resolution S-17/1 establishing
outset.8 the Independent International Commission of Inquiry
on the Syrian Arab Republic (OHCHR, 2011). The
In February 2014 the Security Council itself remarked Commission has consistently documented violations
on the lack of progress following the Presidential perpetrated in Syria and has raised awareness of the
Statement (UN, 2014d), but it would take until plight of civilians and the need to hold perpetrators
July 2014 for the Council to authorise cross-border accountable. In its September 2014 statement, the
operations under Resolution 2165 (UN, 2014c). Chair of the Commission is very clear:
Resolution 2165 authorises UN agencies and their
implementing partners to provide assistance using We have charted the descent of the conflict
four designated border crossings (Bab al-Salam, Bab into the madness where it now resides. We
al-Hawa, Al Yarubiyah and Al-Ramtha). However, have implored the parties and influential states
unanimity within the Security Council was only to forge a peaceful settlement. We have asked
achieved by omitting any automatic sanctions or the Security Council to refer the situation in
consequences in the event the resolution’s provisions Syria to the International Criminal Court.
were not implemented by the belligerents. Modest But we have been faced with inaction. This
progress has been made since; Syrians who had inaction has allowed the warring parties to
previously been cut off from aid have received operate with impunity and nourished the
violence that has consumed Syria. Its most
recent beneficiary is ISIS.10
7 For an excellent discussion on the various legal interpretations,
see Naz Modirzadeh’s guest blog in Opinio Juris: http://opiniojuris.
2.2 Protection
org/2014/05/12/guest-post-strong-words-weak-arguments-
response-open-letter-un-humanitarian-access-syria-part-1.
8 Between October 2011 and July 2012 Russia and China
vetoed three UN Security Council resolutions aimed at holding There is widespread and deliberate disregard for
the Syrian government accountable for mass atrocity crimes. the obligations imposed by IHL and IHRL on
Since September 2013 the Security Council has passed four
those fighting in Syria. Those who bear primary
resolutions on Syria: Resolution 2118, regarding the destruction
of chemical weapons; Resolutions 2139 (February 2014) and responsibility to protect civilians are the least likely
2165 (July 2014), demanding increased humanitarian access
and, in the case of Resolution 2165, also authorising cross-
9 See http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48957#.
border access; and Resolution 2191 (December 2014), which
VEjcua1MvIU.
re-authorised 2165. On 22 May 2014 Russia and China vetoed
another resolution calling for Syria’s referral to the ICC. There 10 See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
have also been resolutions specifically related to JN and ISIS. aspx?NewsID=15039&LangID=E.
6 International and local/diaspora actors in the Syria response: a diverging set of systems?to do so, and violations are perpetrated equally by Lack of access also means that protection information
government forces/militias and rebel groups. Reports is difficult to obtain and verify, and what information
by the Independent International Commission of is available is neither centralised nor analysed among
Inquiry, the Office of the High Commissioner for those agencies working outside of Syria, as well as
Human Rights (OHCHR), Amnesty International among these agencies and organisations based in Syria.
and regular briefings to the Security Council by Field staff are not regularly debriefed and there is
the Emergency Relief Coordinator are testament to limited protection monitoring (HPG interviews). All
that. Violations include unlawful killings, arbitrary these activities require adequate resources in terms
arrest and unlawful detention, hostage-taking, sexual of protection skills and experience, but international
and gender-based violence and unlawful attacks protection actors struggle to recruit the necessary
and sieges. Mass, systematic violations of IHL and experts. Protection actors are geographically separated
IHRL have triggered widespread forced displacement between those inside Syria and others dispersed in
(internal as well as to Syria’s neighbours), the break- surrounding countries, and until recently communication
up of families and communities and the collapse of and coordination between them was weak. Security
social structures. concerns, lack of trust and disagreements over
modalities (cross-line versus cross-border) have further
Humanitarian agencies can do little to physically impeded collective analysis and the development of
protect civilians. Their mere presence can in some a strategic approach to Syria’s protection crisis. The
circumstances have a deterrent effect, but it would be absence of any coherent protection strategy has meant
unrealistic to expect this in a conflict on Syria’s scale. that humanitarian response has focused more on the
Even so, humanitarian agencies have a responsibility provision of material assistance, and there has been
to address the consequences of conflict and (a much insufficient emphasis and weight given to protection
more difficult task) to try to prevent violations from in cross-border operations.11 A similar problem was
taking place. From the beginning of the conflict lack evident in the closing phase of the conflict in Sri
of access and bureaucratic constraints have meant Lanka; indeed, one of the recommendations of the UN
that organisations with a protection focus, such as Secretary-General’s Report on Sri Lanka (the ‘Petrie
UNHCR, the ICRC and UNICEF, have struggled to Report’) was to ‘embed a United Nations human rights
respond to the enormous scale of needs. Attempts perspective into United Nations strategies’ to ensure that
by agencies aiming to undertake activities which protection is at the centre of every UN response. Syria
promote respect for IHL and IHRL have not been shows yet again that progress on this aspiration remains
successful – or have been successful only to a very dependent on political will within the Security Council.
limited degree – in a country where violations and
abuses are a matter of government policy, and where
11 UNHCR is present in Turkey in relation to refugees, and has
the unaccountable state apparatus has long relied on participated in cross-border assistance since the passage of
repressive practices. Resolution 2165 in July 2014.
78 International and local/diaspora actors in the Syria response: a diverging set of systems?
3 Humanitarian response: the
Syrian perspective
International aid agencies’ lack of any significant 3.1 Typology of local groups
physical presence in Syria outside Damascus has
highlighted the role of what is commonly called The adjective ‘local’ covers a wide and diverse array
the ‘local response’. Any group or organisation not of actors, some of them not really ‘local’ at all, and
belonging to the formal or traditional humanitarian the distinction between local and diaspora groups is
sector (UN, ICRC, INGOs) is considered to be part not easily made. The category can denote professional
of the local response. Almost inadvertently, these bodies that existed before the outbreak of the war,
organisations have filled the void left by the absence such as medical associations now providing emergency
of an international presence, providing assistance as relief; charities; networks of anti-government and
well as protection, even if their definition of what community activists, which have morphed from
constitutes protection is rarely the one commonly protest movements into relief providers; diaspora
used by the traditional sector. Other groups focus on organisations; coordination networks; and fighting
documenting violations of IHL and IHRL in the hope groups engaged in aid delivery. The Syrian British
that these records will be needed to hold perpetrators Medical Society (SBMS), for example, was established
to account. These local/diaspora groups might have in 2007 by British medical professionals of Syrian
filled a gap inadvertently, but by no means easily: descent and focused initially on fostering academic
negotiating with non-state armed actors can be links, promoting standards among British-Syrian
challenging for local organisations just as it is for healthcare professionals and establishing contacts with
their international counterparts, and insecurity poses other associations (SBMS, 2007) before it became
just as much of a danger. active in providing medical training and relief in Syria.
Figure 2: Countries with active Syrian diaspora organisations
CANADA SWEDEN POLAND
SWITZERLAND GERMANY
AUSTRIA
TURKEY
BELGIUM
SYRIA LEBANON
UK
SPAIN
FRANCE
UAE
USA CROATIA
ROMANIA SAUDI ARABIA
CYPRUS JORDAN AUSTRALIA
Countries with active diaspora organisations
9Groups range in size from half a dozen volunteers Box 1: Hand in Hand for Syria
on a shoestring budget to organisations drawing on
hundreds of staff and volunteers. They work across
Hand in Hand for Syria is a UK-registered aid
the humanitarian spectrum, some through the direct
and development NGO. Founded soon after the
provision of assistance, others indirectly through
humanitarian crisis started in Syria, it delivers
counterparts on the ground in Syria, typically personal
humanitarian assistance to, and has projects in,
or family contacts; some have formal registered status
hard-to-reach areas inaccessible to many inter-
and their relationship with each other and with the
national aid agencies, such as Daraa, Homs
established humanitarian system varies enormously.
and Hama, working with Syrian and interna-
With a growing number of organisations being
tional partners. The organisation has offices in
established in reaction to the conflict, efforts have
the United Kingdom, Turkey and Syria. It has a
been made to join forces under umbrella organisations
six-strong management team with an additional
such as the Union of Syrian Medical Relief
15 operational staff working from Reyhanli
Organisations (Union des Organisations Syriennes de
in Turkey and around 190 field staff in Syria.
Secours Médicaux, or UOSSM), which was established
Hand in Hand works across a range of sectors,
in 2011 in Paris and has ten member organisations.12
including sanitation, water and hygiene, educa-
tion, emergency shelter, food security, liveli-
What started as individual initiatives to alleviate
hoods and healthcare. It has established five
some of the most pressing needs, primarily related to
hospitals in Northern Syria and supports over
medical care, organically grew into something much
25 medical centres.
more organised, structured and diverse in terms of
activities. Many of the diaspora groups in Europe and
elsewhere started with a sense that ‘something needed
to be done’. Getting together ‘around the kitchen Box 2: Syria Relief
table’ (HPG interviews), Syrians living abroad and
moved by the suffering of their compatriots collected Syria Relief was established shortly after the
funds among the Syrian diaspora, which were then Syrian conflict began. Founded by a group of
used to buy relief items and medicine. Many of those Syrian nationals living and working in the UK,
who got together were medical professionals who then it is now Britain’s largest Syria-focused charity.
decided to travel to Syria and provide their services It provides medical aid through field hospitals,
there. Interviewees described how their operations primary health centres, prosthetic limb clinics,
at the beginning were improvised and somewhat dental clinics and a maternity hospital. It also
amateurish; very few had previously been involved provides food assistance, runs schools, provides
in humanitarian work and so had to learn on the essential seasonal items such as winter clothing,
job. Initially there was no need to establish more blankets, heaters and fuel, generators and
formal structures and many activities were driven by solar-powered lamps, and repairs and operates
individuals. Many of those travelling to Syria did so clean water systems.
in their spare time and without any payment, while
continuing to hold down full-time jobs. Respondents
admitted that, certainly in the early days, most States, Europe, Turkey or the Gulf States operate
thought the conflict would be over quickly (HPG either independently or as implementing partners for
interviews). None expected it to last as long as it has. international NGOs. Like grassroots organisations
they tend to focus on opposition areas, and operate
According to OCHA (n.d.), between 600 and 700 through personal or tribal connections. Other diaspora
NGOs have been established since the conflict began groups act as links and intermediaries between local
in 2011, around a fifth of them active in Syria itself. Syrian organisations and networks and funding
Many are either unregistered or registered with the sources outside of the country, both individuals and
local authorities in opposition areas or in neighbouring donor governments (OCHA, n.d).
countries such as Turkey and Lebanon. Between 20
and 30 diaspora organisations registered in the United Although the vast majority of NGOs are extremely
young – according to OCHA barely a dozen were
12 See http://www.uossm.org/index.php/about-us/. active prior to 2011 – some diaspora groups in
10 International and local/diaspora actors in the Syria response: a diverging set of systems?particular have seen very rapid growth, both in Box 3: Local Coordination Committees
membership and in formal organisation: one group,
for example, emerged out of ‘haphazard initiatives
Local Coordination Committees (LCCs) play
by family networks’ and now has almost 900 staff
an important role inside opposition-held areas.
and volunteers in Syria and the UK and an office
LCCs – each governorate council has several
in Turkey. Its work in Syria covers Idlib, Aleppo,
– emerged from neighbourhood gatherings
Deiraz-Zor, Homs and rural Damascus, and its
and served initially as information hubs for
activities range from medical assistance to water
protesters. With time their structure and areas
and sanitation, education, social programmes and
of engagement evolved, including the provi-
food assistance (HPG interviews). Another, set
sion of relief. The LCCs do not normally work
up in 2011 in the UK, now has offices in Turkey,
directly with international aid agencies, but with
three warehouses and teams in Syria delivering
their local partners. Many focus on providing
emergency assistance – predominantly medical aid
basic services such as electricity. Others focus
– across most of the country (HPG interviews). The
on agricultural projects, although crops are
organisation typifies how these groups have evolved
regularly destroyed during fighting. Some LCC
in size, structure and logistics. Initially storing relief
projects in the governorates are supported
goods and drugs in basements in houses in Syria, it
by the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU).
now keeps goods in warehouses in Turkey. Many
LCCs are also involved in the distribution of
organisations have over time gradually switched from
exam papers and the transport of teachers to
being run by volunteers working during their own
supervise exams so students can sit them while
spare time to paid staff.
schools are closed.
Several of the more established Syrian diaspora
groups have ‘matured’ into what can almost be
called ‘established’ organisations. This means that Box 4: The Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society
they can now assume a role similar to that played
by international aid agencies that work with smaller The Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society (SARC)
and less experienced Syrian actors, mentoring smaller is the largest humanitarian organisation in Syria.
and more recently created local groups inside Syria Founded in 1942 it was recognised by the ICRC
and providing them with advice and capacity- in 1946 as a national society. International
building. Some of these local groups in turn act as NGOs and donors have criticised the SARC for
implementing partners, though this is rare. its lack of neutrality and impartiality, though this
criticism is partly rooted in a misunderstanding
Charitable work has long played an important role of the SARC’s role and legal status. The SARC,
in Syria despite severe limitations on freedom of like every other National Red Cross/Red
expression and association. Although restrictions Crescent Society, is an auxiliary of the national
were eased in 2000 the government continues to authorities, a role that is generally enshrined
exert control over civil society organisations, notably in law. As such the SARC provides support to
through the Syria Trust, a collection of high-profile health and social services as well as disaster
organisations established by the president’s wife, Asma management when requested by the govern-
al-Assad (Kraft, 2000; Bosman, 2008). Faith-based ment. In the current conflict the SARC has been
organisations (Islamic and Christian) were also active providing relief and assistance as part of the
prior to the conflict, and unlike secular associations or national response, and has been delivering
organisations were generally exempt from having to assistance to all governorates, both govern-
register with the government. Many of their services ment- and rebel-held. Certain branches have
were provided out of mosques and churches. With in fact become increasingly autonomous from
their strong community support, a wide network headquarters in Damascus. By February 2015,
and the advantage of being monitored less closely 40 SARC volunteers had been killed, and many
by the government than Syrian NGOs, faith-based more subjected to arrest and harassment by the
organisations continue to play an important role in the government as well as attacks by various armed
provision of assistance in areas inaccessible to other groups opposing the government.
organisations.
11Several international faith-based organisations support
projects run by Syrian religious groups. For example, 3.2 Access
Cafod supports networks of the Catholic Church
in Syria providing medical aid and food parcels.13 Local associations and diaspora groups enjoy better
Similarly, the Mennonite Central Committee in the US access than international aid organisations, but
supports partners inside Syria, for example through reaching people in need is by no means easy, even for
cash allowances to needy families in Damascus. The them. Respondents explained that members of Syrian
contacts and networks used inside Syria are long NGOs are often from the same communities as armed
established and predated the start of the conflict. actors and are therefore in a privileged position to
negotiate access. Despite the negative public image
In December 2012 the Syrian National Coalition of armed groups in Syria, several allow humanitarian
established the Assistance Coordination Unit aid into areas they control (HPG interview). The
(ACU).14 The unit was set up to coordinate UN for example has acknowledged discussing the
increasing volumes of aid in rebel-held areas, and to delivery of aid with Jabhat al-Nusra. Armed groups
provide basic services and assist the LCCs in their with a particular connection to the population will
work. The ACU has had mixed reviews from aid tend to be more receptive to suggestions not to harm
agencies and donors, though some of the criticism their own community, for example by refraining from
it has received might be attributable to the high recruiting child soldiers and allowing aid distributions
expectations of foreign donors and aid agencies, who to go ahead. In contrast, armed groups with little
had hoped that a mechanism such as the ACU would or no connection to the population, i.e. groups
at least help alleviate some of the problems around predominantly made up of foreign fighters and groups
aid delivery. There have also been allegations of with a particularly radical agenda, are more likely to
mismanagement of funds. While the effectiveness and prevent or obstruct assistance.
impact of the ACU and its proximity to the Syrian
National Coalition might be questioned, its Polio Even when access is granted the journey from the
Task Force has been widely credited with raising border to communities in need is perilous and can
the alarm on the polio outbreak in Syria in 2013 take several days. As an example, one trip in early
(Svoboda, 2014). 2014 from the Turkish border to Homs (a distance
of around 300km) took 16 days, though it can
Lastly, armed groups and the government also provide often take longer due to the need to use tracks to
assistance, including food and medicine. Jabhat avoid checkpoints on main roads. Different stretches
al-Nusra was reportedly coordinating the distribution of the road might be controlled by different armed
of flour in Aleppo (SNAP, 2013). Controlling key groups, necessitating repeated negotiations. Nor
infrastructure such as electricity and water plants means are Syrians working with local NGOs and diaspora
that armed groups often manage the provision of groups necessarily safer than staff of international
services. The provision of assistance is not necessarily agencies. Respondents spoke of numerous
limited to the area the provider controls. Water supply colleagues killed, abducted, injured or detained.
is an interesting case in point as the government Medical services and personnel have been a
continues to provide water to areas under rebel control. particular target; according to the World Health
There seems to be a certain degree of agreement that Organisation (WHO) the number of available health
supplies such as water and electricity should not be professionals in Syria is now a mere 45% of what
cut even where the reservoir or power plant is in an it was before the conflict started.15 Several diaspora
area controlled by one warring group, and the people organisations providing medical assistance have lost
receiving services are in an area under another group’s staff members. According to Physicians for Human
control. Rights, as of 31 December 2014 ‘599 medical
personnel had been killed since the conflict began,
including 195 doctors, 117 nurses, 114 medics, and
13 For example http://www.cafod.org.uk/News/Emergencies-news/ 56 pharmacists, among others. In 2014, a medical
Syria-Q-A.
worker was killed every other day on average’ (PHR,
14 The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition 2015). In 2014 WHO reported that, of 113 assessed
Forces, commonly known as the Syrian National Coalition, is a
coalition of opposition groups formed in November 2012 during
opposition meetings in Doha, Qatar. 15 See http://www.emro.who.int/countries/syr/index.html.
12 International and local/diaspora actors in the Syria response: a diverging set of systems?public hospitals only 45% were fully functioning, and psycho-social work, which in themselves have a
34% partially functioning and 21% not functioning protective benefit. Some Syrian organisations focus on
at all (WHO, 2014). addressing child labour by supporting families with
food or cash so that they do not need to send their
children out to work. Others support female-headed
3.3 Protection households with food, medical help and psycho-social
support in community centres. One international aid
Much like its English usage, the term protection in agency suggested that Syrian NGOs could make use of
Arabic (himaya) has a variety of meanings, though the media (radio in particular) to pass on protection
care for orphans and the elderly in particular has messages, though for reasons that are unclear this
a long tradition in Islam (Moussa, 2014). Most of communication tool has yet to be used. Some explained
the respondents from Syrian groups see themselves that they have moved away from providing material
neither as protection actors nor as doing protection support, which they said made sense at the beginning
work in the sense of the IASC definition (with which of the conflict, and have now switched to projects
most were unfamiliar). A minority of interviewees involving education and psycho-social support, in part
understood and used the term ‘protection’ in the same because of growing needs in these areas and because
way international agencies would, but these were providing material assistance is more costly (HPG
humanitarians who had previously worked for the UN interviews). This is an indication of the trade-offs aid
or international NGOs. However, when probed further agencies face – both international and local – when
it becomes clear that much of what these groups do deciding what assistance to provide, a decision that is as
can be considered protective. For some protection is much dictated by available funds as it is by needs.
clearly equivalent to physical security (HPG interview),
but most regarded protection as going beyond Generally, there is a good understanding of the legal
that, mentioning dignity and expressing the need to framework for protection among Syrian groups,
understand the link between violations of rights and and some have made it the focus of their work to
protection. Generally these organisations do what specifically document violations of IHL and IHRL.
could be considered ‘protection mainstreaming’,16 Human rights monitoring includes keeping track
rather than stand-alone protection activities. of those killed, tortured or detained, documenting
shelling in a particular area or training armed groups
So-called social programmes include support to families in IHL. Organisations documenting incidents,
with orphans, female-headed households and the casualties and the use of particular weapons such
elderly. This support is provided through education as barrel bombs use Arabic rather than English and
tend not to get the same exposure as organisations
publishing in English, such as the London-based
16 ‘Protection mainstreaming’ is generally understood to mean Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR). Even
incorporating into activities such as food distribution or water
and sanitation projects principles such as dignity and access
so, there is a strong conviction among Syrians activists
to services by all affected persons, and avoiding doing further that documenting violations now will help in bringing
harm with aid. perpetrators to justice once the conflict is over.
1314 International and local/diaspora actors in the Syria response: a diverging set of systems?
4 A diverging set of systems?
Although established only very recently, several of the Roundtable 1, 2012). During a roundtable discussion
organisations looked at in this study have with time as part of ODI’s Syria conflict analysis in August
adopted elements of the culture, principles, language 2012, for example, doubts were raised as to how the
and practices – including fundraising practices – of formal system could work through local networks,
the existing humanitarian system. One organisation, citing in particular their lack of adherence to
for instance, claims to deliver aid regardless of politics humanitarian principles (HPG Roundtable 2, 2012).
and religion, and is ‘humanitarian in the full sense of Some Syrian respondents acknowledged that there
the word’ (HPG interviews). In keeping with current were groups that had a political agenda or were clearly
aid thinking, the organisation states that it supports affiliated or aligned with a political/military actor. For
‘community empowerment’ and sustainability, and example, while some Syrian groups claim to focus on
its fundraising techniques are familiar from decades assistance to orphans a closer look reveals that these
of NGO campaigning in the West. Interviewees in are the orphans of ‘martyrs’ rather than orphans in
the study also spoke of the need for independence, general, thus assisting families who had fought for
neutrality and impartiality in aid provision, and the same political cause (HPG interviews). However,
claimed to refuse funds from politically or religiously most respondents from Syrian groups interviewed
motivated groups. emphasised that they strived for impartiality, even if
perhaps their actions were guided by solidarity more
Several of the larger organisations interviewed for than by neutrality. Some clearly distanced themselves
this study have developed links with established from the opposition, including the ACU, or refused
actors; some work with OCHA on aid planning, and funds from political or military groups. While personal
several members of the Syrian NGO Alliance (SNA), contacts facilitate access to certain communities,
a grouping of a dozen diaspora organisations, pressed respondents claim that the aid they provide benefits all
for a seat on the Humanitarian Liaison Group (see those in need.
below). According to one of the founders of the SNA,
the Alliance ‘has great potential to encourage group Respondents from the ‘formal’ system explain that
work within the Syrian community and give us a it is difficult to know immediately which Syrian
voice and a presence as a collective amongst the big organisations have humanitarian motivations and
actors’ (HPG interviews). At the same time, however, which do not. Most Syrian diaspora groups and
most respondents from Syrian diaspora groups and NGOs were created in the first phases of the conflict
NGOs admitted that they felt there were important and so had no previous history when the international
differences, as well as similarities, in the way humanitarian response began. Determining what
international and Syrian humanitarian organisations motivates a particular group is a valid question
work, the language they use and the way they when determining which partner to work with, but
function. Some clearly do not want to ‘belong’ to the criticising Syrian groups for a lack of neutrality and
formal system, while others feel that, despite efforts to impartiality is both simplistic and unhelpful. It is
adapt, they are still seen as outsiders. simplistic because the formal humanitarian system
– made up as it is of a variety of organisations
(UN agencies, international NGOs, the Red Cross/
4.1 Principles Red Crescent) with differing mandates – is itself
not immune from the same criticism. Numerous
Syrian NGOs, not unlike local actors in other examples from other contexts show that international
contexts, are at times seen by the formal system as humanitarian agencies struggle profoundly with
lacking in neutrality, impartiality and independence, the question of principled humanitarian action.16
and some networks originating in diaspora
groups have been regarded as ‘amalgamated with 17 See for example Donini (2011); Collinson, Elhawary and
the opposition, regardless of their stance’ (HPG Muggah (2010); Gordon (2010).
15Afghanistan is one such example, where the neutrality agency or Western donor) and recipient communities
of traditional humanitarian actors has come under can have several links. Generally it is assumed that an
close scrutiny. In Syria, many donor governments international aid agency ‘sub-contracts’ a Syrian NGO
financing aid have at the same time been very vocal in cases where it is unable to reach communities itself.
in declaring their support for ‘moderate’ opposition Syrian NGOs or diaspora groups are also increasingly
groups and insisting that Assad must go. They are using other local groups as ‘implementing partners’,
also participating in air strikes against Islamic State. including on protection activities, though this is still rare.
Given that humanitarian aid is acting as a substitute
for sorely lacking political action to end the war, One interviewee from a Syrian organisation called
from the start questions of humanitarian access have the word ‘partnerships’ a misnomer ‘because these
been thrown in with wider political issues, conflating are not real partnerships’; another complained
objectives that, in a truly principled approach to that they were ‘more words than action’ (HPG
assistance, should remain separate.18 interviews). Respondents complained that training
and capacity-building were being neglected, the
Criticism of Syrian groups has also been unhelpful bureaucracy around funding was cumbersome and
because it has hampered constructive discussion unwieldy, staffing requirements were impossible to
between these groups and international humanitarian meet, accountability arrangements were unequal,
actors and donors, not only on highly relevant registration processes were confusing and cultural
questions such as neutrality, impartiality and and linguistic differences (and, for one interviewee,
independence, but also on finding pragmatic ways to snobbery and condescension) impeded mutual
work together to provide effective assistance. In any understanding. The UN and international NGOs
conflict there is a risk that belligerents will divert aid were ‘working too slowly, doing too little and
and that aid agencies will inadvertently contribute generally inflexible’ (HPG interviews). ‘Capacity-
to strengthening armed groups. Throughout the building’ often meant holding a workshop with
history of humanitarian action aid agencies have had little depth or usefulness for highly educated
to grapple with these difficult ethical, operational Syrians. Many respondents acknowledged that they
and legal dilemmas (Jackson and Davey, 2014). lacked capabilities in strategic planning and the
Notwithstanding the difficulties. aid agencies, donors management skills to run ever-larger organisations
and Syrian groups need to discuss these issues or write complex funding proposals, but these
and assess the associated risks if they are to work much-needed skills were not or only inadequately
effectively together as partners. taught. In addition, by 2013 many better-educated
Syrians had fled or been detained, leaving poorly-
educated local activists to submit complex funding
4.2 Partnerships proposals (Slim and Trombetta, 2014). For their part,
international aid agencies found that, when they
Like the term ‘local’, ‘partnership’ has become a key did invest in teaching skills in smaller organisations,
element of the humanitarian lexicon in recent years, such as proposal writing, once trained the staff
though in many cases what agencies call ‘partnerships’ would often be offered better-paying jobs with other
are in fact little more than contractual arrangements organisations.
with service providers, rather than a full partnership
of equals in which risk and reward is shared. Syria Unsurprisingly, there is a certain hierarchy among
appears to be no exception despite the context, which local actors, in that staff who speak English and
makes working with or through Syrian organisations have connections outside Syria stand a better chance
a necessity as issues of access and insecurity effectively of attracting funding or projects with international
make it very difficult if not at times impossible for agencies than local, less well-connected groups.
‘traditional’ humanitarian players to operate on the Language was mentioned as a significant obstacle to
ground. The chain between the initial funder/provider better engagement between international and Syrian
of assistance (usually an international NGO/UN groups, both in terms of the language used – English
predominantly – and the jargon that is so ingrained in
the ‘formal’ humanitarian system. Most meetings are
18 See, for instance, http://www.irinnews.org/report/96336/
analysis-donors-not-walking-the-talk-on-humanitarian-aid-to- conducted in English, and while that is not a problem
syria. for many Syrians it does exclude those who speak
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