Ending Tyranny in Iraq - Fernando R. Tesón* - Carnegie Council for Ethics in ...
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Ethics F International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005).
All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or utilized in any form
without the written permission of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs.
Ending Tyranny in Iraq
Fernando R. Tesón*
s it did at least three times during the the war can be justified as part of the war on
A twentieth century, the United States
(this time joined by its most reliable
ally, the United Kingdom, and a few others)
terror. The legal arguments against the war
have focused largely on self-defense and en-
forcement matters, in particular: whether
has once again deposed a brutal tyrant. The the justifications given by the Coalition were
long and cruel rule of Saddam Hussein came genuine, given the fact that no weapons of
to a close in 2003 after a short war. Operation mass destruction were discovered in Iraq;
“Iraqi Freedom” had four phases: military whether the war could be justified as enforc-
deployment and preparation; initial attack; ement of prior Security Council resolutions;
capture of Baghdad and overthrow of the whether preventive self-defense is admissi-
regime; and reconstruction and peacekeep- ble under international law; whether the war
ing. In every phase except the last, the Anglo- against Iraq can be justified as part of a reac-
American alliance (the Coalition) had tion against the attacks of September 11,
remarkable success.1 The first three phases— 2001; whether the Iraq war has severely
that is, the international war proper—lasted undermined the system of the UN Charter;
from March 19, 2003 until April 14, 2003. and whether the law of self-defense should
These were followed by a period of military be radically changed in the light of the new
occupation, the return of sovereignty to realities that the international community
Iraq, and, finally, an unprecedented demo- has to face.3 These criticisms have arisen
cratic election in the country—all of it amid
virulent insurgent violence.2 *
I am grateful to Eric Posner and the participants at the
The war in Iraq has reignited the passion- University of Chicago International Law Colloquium
ate humanitarian intervention debate. Pres- for their useful comments. Thanks also to Dean Don
Weidner of Florida State College of Law for granting me
ident George W. Bush surprised many relief from my teaching obligations in the spring of 2005.
1
observers in his second inaugural address See Marc Kusnetz et al., Operation Iraqi Freedom
when he promised to oppose tyranny and (Kansas City, Mo.: Andrews McMeel, 2003), p. xii. This
is the account of the war by NBC News.
oppression, and this in a world not always 2
In addition to the NBC News account, a useful source
willing or ready to join in that fight. Human- is M. L. Sifry and C. Cerf, eds., The Iraqi War Reader:
itarian intervention is again on the forefront History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Touchstone,
2003).
of world politics. 3
A survey of these arguments can be found in Dominic
Many have criticized the war, in all parts McGoldrick, From “9-11” to the “Iraq War 2003”: Inter-
of the world. Much of the criticism challen- national Law in an Age of Complexity (Oxford: Hart,
ges the twin assumptions made by Coalition 2004); Karine Bannelier et al., eds., L’intervention en Irak
et le droit international (Paris: Pedone, 2004); and in
leaders: that the United States had to neu- “Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict,” Amer-
tralize the dangers posed by Iraq, and that ican Journal of International Law 97 (July 2003), p. 553.
1001-020_Teson.qxd 7/6/05 9:56 AM Page 2
against the background of a growing distrust the case in Kosovo).5 I do, however, outline a
of American power and the anxieties created version of the doctrine of humanitarian
by new threats to peace and liberty. intervention that I defend more fully else-
In this essay I respond to a different criti- where. I then respond to claims 2, 3, and 4. I
cism of the war: that it cannot be justified as will examine the criticisms that humanitarian
humanitarian intervention. I will not, there- intervention principles cannot justify the war
fore, address self-defense or other possible in Iraq because it was not really humanitar-
justifications of the war unrelated to the ian, and the criticism that the war did not
abject human rights record of the deposed meet other requirements for legitimate
Iraqi regime. I argue that the war was morally humanitarian intervention. I conclude that,
justified as humanitarian intervention. In whatever its value as a defensive reaction
substantiating this claim, I will, for the most against terrorism, the war was indeed justified
part, set aside legal and political questions as a humanitarian intervention.
and concentrate on the moral legitimacy of
the intervention.4 THE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
There are four claims that have been ad- DOCTRINE6
vanced by those who argue that the
war in Iraq cannot be justified as humanitar- I define humanitarian intervention as
ian intervention: proportionate help, including forcible
Claim 1: The war cannot be justified as help, provided by governments (individu-
humanitarian intervention because it is ally or in alliances) to individuals in
always prohibited to wage war for human another state who are victims of severe
rights; that is, the doctrine of humanitarian tyranny (denial of human rights by their
intervention is invalid. own government) or anarchy (denial of
Claim 2: The war cannot be justified as human rights by collapse of the social
humanitarian intervention because the Co- order). Humanitarian interventions are
alition leaders did not offer that justification guided by the following principles:
but different ones. They did not say that the
war was waged for humanitarian reasons. • a justifiable intervention must be aimed
Claim 3: The war cannot be justified as at ending tyranny or anarchy;
humanitarian intervention because Coalition • humanitarian interventions are gov-
leaders did not intend the humanitarian erned, like all wars, by the doctrine of
objective. They had a different intent: to sup- double effect (that is, the permissibility
press a security threat. of causing serious harm as a side effect of
Claim 4: The war cannot be justified as promoting some good end, coupled with
humanitarian intervention because the Coa-
lition did not comply with other requirements
4
established by the doctrine of humanitarian I believe that the war was legally justified as well. For a
full discussion of the legal aspects, see Fernando R.
intervention.
Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention, 3rd ed., revised and
I deal only briefly with the all-important updated (Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational, forthcoming
claim 1, the general justification of hu- 2005).
5
manitarian intervention. I will assume that I address this question fully in Téson, Humanitarian
Intervention.
sometimes it is justified to intervene militarily 6
This section is a very brief summary of Téson,
for humanitarian reasons (as was Humanitarian Intervention, ch. 5.
2 Fernando R. Tesón001-020_Teson.qxd 7/6/05 9:56 AM Page 3
an adequate theory of costs and benefits); THE QUESTION OF RIGHT INTENT:
• in general, only severe cases of anarchy INTENTION AND MOTIVE
or tyranny7 qualify for humanitarian
intervention; Many commentators have dismissed the
• the victims of tyranny or anarchy must possibility of treating the intervention as
welcome the intervention; and, humanitarian. Citing the shifting justifica-
• humanitarian intervention should pre- tions that President Bush and Prime Minis-
ferably receive the approval or support of ter Tony Blair gave before, during, and after
the community of democratic states. the war, they claim that the United States
was “really” trying to find weapons of mass
These principles should not be under- destruction (or “really” doing something
stood as strict necessary conditions for else), rather than trying to rescue the Iraqis
legitimacy. Rather, I suggest that they are from Hussein’s rule.10 This objection may
principles in Ronald Dworkin’s sense: if take the form described in claim 2—that
they apply, they incline our judgment Coalition leaders did not say they were
toward approval of the intervention.8 They intervening for humanitarian reasons—or
do not automatically determine legiti-
macy. Conversely, if the intervention does 7
I write “severe tyranny” to distinguish the standard
not satisfy any one principle, that is a rea-
from, on the one hand, “ongoing atrocities,” and, on
son for condemning it, but it does not the other hand, “ordinary tyranny.” The proposed
automatically render it wrong. For exam- standard is not as demanding as the former, nor so lax
ple, suppose a government contemplates as the latter. See discussion below.
8
See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cam-
intervening to stop genocide. Suppose fur- bridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 24–45.
9
ther that it deceives public opinion, or Supporters of humanitarian intervention have gen-
refuses to seek authorization (if authoriza- erally treated guiding principles as necessary condi-
tions for legitimacy, so that if one of the conditions is
tion is desirable or possible), or does not lacking the intervention would be illegitimate. See,
comply with the strictures of the doctrine e.g., Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitar-
of double effect. Those facts ought to ian Intervention in International Society (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 33–35; Interna-
incline our judgment against legitimacy,
tional Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
but they ought not be treated as decisive eignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: IDRC,
for that judgment. We must consider those 2001), pp. 31–37; and Stanley A. McChrystal, “Memo-
facts in light of the urgency of ending randum to the President: Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff,” in Alton Frye, ed., Humanitarian Interven-
tyranny in particular cases.9 tion: Crafting a Workable Doctrine (New York: Council
Here I do not attempt to defend this par- on Foreign Relations Press, 2000), pp. 61–70. The more
ticular version of the doctrine. Rather, I flexible approach in the text is better suited to
the complexities, similarities, and differences of vari-
wish to challenge the view expressed by ous situations.
many that even if (some version of ) the 10
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, “On American Excep-
humanitarian intervention doctrine is tionalism,” Stanford Law Review 55 (2003), pp. 1521–23;
Richard A. Falk, “What Future for the UN Charter Sys-
accepted, the intervention in Iraq cannot
tem of War Prevention?” American Journal of Interna-
be justified on humanitarian grounds tional Law 97 (2003), pp. 596–97; Michael Walzer,
either because it was not really humanitar- Arguing about War (New Haven: Yale University Press,
ian, or because even if it was (intended as) 2004), p. 149; Gareth Evans, “Humanity Did Not Jus-
tify This War,” Financial Times, May 15, 2003, p. 15; and
humanitarian, it did not meet other Jerome Slater, “Can the War with Iraq Be Justified?”
requirements of the doctrine. Buffalo News, February 16, 2003, p. H1.
ending tyranny in iraq 3001-020_Teson.qxd 7/6/05 9:56 AM Page 4
the form of claim 3—that they did not under the rationale it did not choose to
really intend the war to be humanitarian invoke. The justification is still valid, and if
but had other, nonhumanitarian, inten- it applies it may justify the act even if the
tions. These critics may or may not have government did not invoke it.11
been ready to approve of the intervention
had they been persuaded of its humanitar- Distinguishing Right Intent from
ian nature, but, at any rate, categorizing the Right Motive
intervention as humanitarian is a prelimi- But the question of right intent (as opposed
nary step even to starting to discuss the to right rhetoric) as part of the definition of
issue of justification. For these critics, the humanitarian intervention is important
fact that the United States is helping the and deserves close examination. Most writ-
Iraqis to build democratic institutions dur- ers agree that a necessary condition for the
ing reconstruction might be a good thing, justification of humanitarian intervention
but it is not enough to characterize the is that the interveners act out of humani-
intervention as humanitarian, and thus not tarian concerns, at least in part.12 If a gov-
enough to justify it retrospectively under ernment’s preeminent reasons or motives
the humanitarian intervention doctrine. are nonhumanitarian, the intervention will
They require one of the following things to not be humanitarian, and should not be
occur before or at the time of the invasion: evaluated under the doctrine of humani-
the intervener must say that he is acting for tarian intervention, even if the doctrine is
humanitarian reasons (claim 2); or, what- deemed valid. The use of force will be
ever he says, he must actually have a something else (self-defense, for example),
humanitarian intent (claim 3). and it should be judged accordingly.
These two versions of the objection can But what facts are we describing when
be joined into a single one: that the Coali- we say that a government has or doesn’t
tion lacked humanitarian intent. This is have right intention? To answer I intro-
because the first version, the performative duce, following John Stuart Mill, a distinc-
theory of justification (that what matters is
what governments say they are doing),
while popular with international lawyers, is 11
Contra Falk,“What Future for the UN Charter System
untenable. Simply put: governments, like of War Prevention?” pp. 596–97. Falk thinks that gov-
individuals, may lie about why they are ernments should not be allowed retroactively to invoke
humanitarian reasons once they have initially chosen
doing what they are doing, or they may be some other justification. But why? If the justification
mistaken about why they are doing what was available, why would the deficiencies in the rhetor-
they are doing and about which rule, if any, ical skills of politicians be dispositive? An analogy may
help. Suppose I rescue someone held hostage by a vil-
is available to justify their behavior. Words lain, and when asked to justify my action I say that I did
lack magical power, so whether the inter- it because I thought (unreasonably and mistakenly)
vention is humanitarian cannot depend on that the villain was threatening my life. My act of rescue
is still justified, even if I failed to invoke the right rea-
the government saying so. This view
sons, and even if the reason I invoked did not justify my
involves, in addition, a fallacy. Suppose a behavior.
12
government has two available justifications For a summary of this position, see Oliver Rams-
for a contemplated act. If it chooses to jus- botham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Interven-
tion in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization
tify its behavior under one of them, it does (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 43. See also ICISS,
not follow that the act cannot be justified The Responsibility to Protect, pp. 35–36.
4 Fernando R. Tesón001-020_Teson.qxd 7/6/05 9:57 AM Page 5
tion between intention and motive. 13 tion fulfills a double role: it allows us to
Intention covers the contemplated act, characterize the act, 16 to say that the act
what the agent wills to do. I see a person in belongs to a class of acts, such as acts of
distress, decide to rescue her, and do it.14 rescue; and it allows us, correspondingly,
The action was an act of rescue. I intended to praise or criticize the act under the
to rescue the person, I committed to doing moral principles that apply to that class of
it, and I did it. The way I understand it acts, acts of rescue.
here, intention covers the willed act and
the willed consequences of the act. (It is
controversial whether intention also cov- 13
See John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Roger
ers foreseen but not willed consequences Crisp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 65,
of the act.) Intention, then, implies not n. 2. Responding to a critic, Rev. Davies, Mill wrote:
“I submit, that he who saves another from drowning
only desire to do something but commit- in order to kill him by torture afterwards, does not
ment to doing it. This involves believing differ only in motive from him who does the same
that the act is under the agent’s control. If thing from duty or benevolence; the act itself is dif-
ferent. The rescue of the man is, in the case sup-
I intended to rescue someone but failed to posed, only the necessary first step of an act far more
do so, say because I didn’t put in enough atrocious than leaving him to drown would have
effort, or I was clumsy or otherwise mis- been. . . . The morality of the action depends entirely
upon the intention—that is, upon what the agent
taken in my choice of means, then you
wills to do. But the motive, that is, the feeling which
could say, perhaps, that mine was not an makes him will so to do, when it makes no difference
act of rescue. Certainly you could say that in the act, makes none in the morality: though it
my failed effort cannot be justified as an makes a great difference in our moral estimation of
the agent, especially if it indicates a good or a bad
act of rescue.15 The important point here habitual disposition—a bent of character from
is that there is a direct connection between which useful, or from which hurtful actions are
my willing something, my commitment to likely to arise.”
14
The discussion in the next two paragraphs owes to
doing it, and my doing it. Michael Ridge, “Mill’s Intentions and Motives,” Util-
By contrast, a motive is a further goal itas 14, no. 1 (2002), p. 54.
15
that one wishes to accomplish with the After this article was written, Terry Nardin kindly
sent me his “Introduction,” in Terry Nardin and
intended act. I rescued the person in dan-
Melissa Williams, eds., Humanitarian Intervention
ger, I intended to do it, so mine was an act (NOMOS: Yearbook of the American Society of Politi-
of rescue. But suppose I did it because I cal and Legal Philosophy, XLVII) (New York: New
wanted to appear as a hero in the local York University Press, forthcoming 2005), where he
makes a similar point (although not relying on Mill).
newspaper. I had an ulterior motive. This I do not take sides on the question whether the
motive is not part of the class of actions motive is best defined as a desire, a disposition, or a
called “acts of rescue”; only the intention feeling (as Mill prefers). It is enough for purposes of
my analysis that the agent does X, intending to do X,
is. It makes sense for you to say that my act thinking that X will enable him later to reach out-
of rescue was good (it saved a life), but come Y. Be that as it may, Nardin and I agree that “a
that I am not a particularly admirable per- humanitarian act is defined by its intention, not by its
motive” (“Introduction,” in Nardin and Williams,
son, since my motive was self-interested,
eds., Humanitarian Intervention).
not altruistic. A lasting contribution of 16
On the various definitions of action and its
Mill to the theory of action was to show relation with intent and causation, see George
that intention is more important than Wilson, “Action,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford, Calif.: Meta-
motive in evaluating action (as opposed to physics Research Lab, 2002); available at plato.
evaluating persons). The concept of inten- stanford.edu.
ending tyranny in iraq 5001-020_Teson.qxd 7/6/05 9:57 AM Page 6
Criminal law distinguishes intention to neutralize the threat posed by Iraq’s
from motive in a similar way.17 Criminal weapons of mass destruction,” the word
law tends to ignore motives in establishing “because” is ambiguous: it may mean inten-
criminal liability. Thus, a crime gives rise tion or it may mean motive. Once we dis-
to liability even if the agent had a good solve the ambiguity we can say that the
motive; and conversely, a noncriminal act is liberation of Iraq was motivated by the
not penalized just because the agent had a American desire to disarm Iraq, and, when it
bad motive. But motive is often relevant to turns out that the weapons are not there, we
those administering punishment: a bad are accordingly free to praise the act of inter-
motive may lead the judge to punish more vention while criticizing the government
severely, while a criminal with a good motive who intervened for erring or lying.
may receive leniency. This is exactly in line The distinction between intention and
with Mill’s distinction between judging motive in the theory of intervention paral-
actions and judging persons: the bad motive lels the one in criminal law, but they are not
of a criminal allows us to say that the person perfectly symmetrical. As we saw, criminal
is particularly evil or objectionable, but does law is concerned with bad actions, either
not itself affect the moral status of the act performed out of good motives (which may
(its criminality under the law). And a good be cause for leniency), or bad motives
motive may lead us to praise the criminal, (which may be cause for increased punish-
and perhaps be lenient with him, while still ment), and, of course, it has nothing to say
holding him responsible for the crime.
The distinction between intention and
motive is crucial to the debate on humani- 17
For a comprehensive treatment, see Martin R. Gard-
tarian intervention, yet has unfortunately ner, “The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role
been overlooked by critics of the war in Iraq. of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present,” Utah
Law Review (1993), pp. 635–750. A useful summary is
If a government wages war with the inten- Wayne R. LaFave, “Motive,” in Substantive Criminal
tion to rescue victims of tyranny and does in Law, 2nd ed. (Eagan, Minn.: West, 2005), section 5.3.
fact liberate those victims,18 then the inter- The question is complex, as motive sometimes bears on
the definition of the crime (think of hate speech
vention is humanitarian (and thus eligible
crimes). In these cases, however, we can perhaps say
under the doctrine), even if its motive is self- that criminal punishment aims at finding persons
interested or otherwise nonhumanitarian.19 blameworthy. The performance of an act is a necessary
This distinction is crucial, for if we fail to condition for that blameworthiness, as a liberal crimi-
nal law does not punish mere motive. (I am indebted to
make it, governments can never have altru- Marcelo Ferrante on this point.)
18
istic motives. They always have motives very Just overthrowing the tyrant does not amount to lib-
different from the intention of ending erating the victims. If I depose the dictator and then
impose my own tyranny, or hand the government to the
tyranny—and, moreover, that is the way it dictator’s henchmen, then I have not liberated the vic-
should be. Governments owe a fiduciary tims. The act of liberating victims of tyranny is a con-
duty to their citizens. They are bound to junction of deposing the tyrant plus certain acts
(facilitating the establishment of free institutions) and
advance their interests internationally, so it
omissions (avoiding acts that frustrate liberation). The
would be morally wrong for them to care difficulties of defining human action here are no
only about saving others. greater than those that arise in other contexts.
19
Public debate on intervention falls prey to I ignore here the issue of whether states can have
intentions or motives. I assume that any account of
a semantic ambiguity. In the sentence “The state intent and motivation is reducible to propositions
United States invaded Iraq because it wanted about individual intent and motivation.
6 Fernando R. Tesón001-020_Teson.qxd 7/6/05 9:57 AM Page 7
about morally neutral actions (that is, non- interested motives) sometimes nonetheless
criminalized conduct) performed out of bad do the right thing, and this is because we
motives. In contrast, the intervention that I intuitively see the distinction between inten-
consider here is a good action (liberating tion and motive. Even if (contrary to fact)
people) performed out of a bad or non- the United States’ motive in 1941 was to
altruistic motive (gaining power, or access to become a dominant superpower, it did the
oil, or suppressing a threat). The logic is the right thing in fighting the Axis. Or, to take an
same, however: just as we do not acquit example outside of war, even if the United
someone who did a bad deed just because he States’ motive in implementing the Marshall
had a good motive, so we do not condemn a Plan was to neutralize Soviet power, its
government who did a good deed just intent (to donate money toward the rebuild-
because he had a bad (or merely nonaltruis- ing of a ravaged Europe) was laudable, and
tic) motive. And the relevance of bad so was the act. Once we understand the dif-
motives for moral evaluation is the same in ference between intention and motive, the
both cases: just as we think better of a crim- criticism based on lack of right intention
inal who acted out of a good motive (a rob- (both of the humanitarian intervention
ber that wanted to feed his family, say) and doctrine and of the war in Iraq in particular)
we punish him more leniently, so we criti- loses much of its appeal.
cize the political leader who helps people in
need out of a desire to gain access to oil (a Evaluating Intentions
bad motive), or consider him less generous Intention (but not motive) is, then, relevant
(without necessarily criticizing him) if he to characterizing the action. Intention is a
helps people in need out of a desire to sup- definitional element of the action. But
press a threat (a nonaltruistic but not neces- intention, unlike motive, is also relevant, as
sarily bad motive). Yet the evaluation of the Mill said, in evaluating the action morally.
agent (and this is my main point) is irrele- This is relevant for humanitarian interven-
vant for the moral evaluation of the tion. A government that topples a repressive
(intended and performed) act. regime with the intent of imposing its own
Many reject the doctrine of humanitarian repression, or to otherwise exploit or subju-
intervention because they believe that inter- gate the people, does not perform a human-
veners invariably have nonhumanitarian itarian intervention. That is why I have
motives. They usually advance cynical inter- doubts about Vietnam’s 1979 intervention in
pretations of the intentions of the interven- Cambodia, for example, an event that some
ers and are thus able to find the “real” authors (notably Nicholas Wheeler) charac-
reasons (selfish power politics, for example) terize as humanitarian intervention.20 Viet-
behind any action. But since governments nam toppled the murderous Pol Pot regime
always have some self-interested motive, it is only to impose its own harsh dictatorship.
always possible to reinterpret any action, no Lawful interveners need not be saints, but
matter how apparently good or altruistic, as for an act to count as humanitarian inter-
ill-motivated. These kinds of cynical claims vention we should require at least the intent
are unfalsifiable: interveners always have bad to liberate the victims of severe tyranny.
motives, so no intervention is ever humani-
tarian. But this is wrong. We intuitively feel
20
that governments (which usually have self- See Wheeler, Saving Strangers, pp. 78–110.
ending tyranny in iraq 7001-020_Teson.qxd 7/6/05 9:57 AM Page 8
It may be objected that, on my own Still, what the intervener does is the best
account, intent is superfluous, because the evidence of its intention. There are of course
only important factor, once we discard many examples of aggressive state behavior
motive, is the humanitarian outcome. This cloaked in sanctimonious humanitarian
view may be reinforced by recalling that the language. Yet all political institutions,
source of the intention/motive distinction, including international law, should enable
John Stuart Mill, was a utilitarian, so for human flourishing and protect freedom,
him, arguably, outcomes were paramount. autonomy, and dignity. Therefore, we
This view is certainly possible, and indeed should look at whether the intervention has
the humanitarian outcome (people getting furthered those goals, rescued the victims of
rid of the tyrant) is central in my account. I tyranny, and restored justice and human
think the concept of intent, however, ought rights. The humanitarian outcome should
to be retained. Consider the example of the be a central factor in evaluating the inten-
Falkland Islands war. There the United tion of the intervention. As I indicated,
Kingdom defeated the tyrannical Argentine politicians, even in democratic states, will
military regime and recovered possession of never have pure humanitarian motives,
the islands. As a result of this defeat, because they have a fiduciary duty to their
Argentina’s illegitimate leaders were so citizens, and because they have other selfish
humiliated that the only thing for them to personal motives, such as incumbency. It
do was to relinquish power to civilians. follows that in order to judge the legitimacy
Democracy then ensued in Argentina. Yet of intervention we must look at the situation
while many people would regard the British as a whole. Two important indicators of
action as justified (on grounds of self- legitimacy are whether the intervener used
defense, for example), they would not call means consistent with the humanitarian
the British action humanitarian, and prop- purpose, and whether it helped the country
erly so. While the restoration of democracy to build free democratic institutions in the
and human rights in Argentina was a reconstruction stage.
humanitarian outcome, neither the motive The requirement of right intent as part of
nor the intention of Prime Minister Margaret the justification of war has an old and ven-
Thatcher included freeing the Argentines. erable history as part of the just war tradi-
The liberation of Argentina was a relatively tion. St. Thomas Aquinas writes: “Those
remote consequence of the war. In contrast, who wage war should have a righteous
in Iraq the Coalition intended to depose intent: that is, they should intend either to
Hussein, as a means to something else (dis- promote a good cause or avert an evil.” Even
arming Iraq, or neutralizing the enemies of if the government has a just cause (for
the United States, or democratizing the example, removing tyranny), “that war may
region; see below). In addition, insisting on be rendered unlawful by a wicked intent.”21
right intent is necessary to devise a workable The Millian distinction I advance, however,
operational definition of humanitarian differs from the distinction between just
intervention in international law and ethics; cause and right intent proposed by just war
otherwise actions could not be judged when
they are contemplated, since we would have
to wait for all the consequences of the action 21
R. W. Dyson, ed., Aquinas: Political Writings (New
to unfold. York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 241.
8 Fernando R. Tesón001-020_Teson.qxd 7/6/05 9:57 AM Page 9
theorists. For them, right intent seems we need to look at all the facts. Suppose that
equivalent to Mill’s motive. The following I deposed a tyrant, called free elections, and
formulation of the requirement of the just helped to install a democratic government
war conception of right intent is typical: “In that respects human rights—all of which I
war, not only the cause and the goals must be need, let us assume, to capture the tyrant’s
just, but also our motive for responding to wealth. I think it is plausible to say that my
the cause and taking up the goals.”22 This act of liberating the country was objectively
definition suggests that under just war doc- justified. My act intended to redress the
trine both intent and motive (in Mill’s wrong (as part of my plan to steal the
sense) must be humanitarian or at least tyrant’s wealth), and did it. I ended tyranny.
morally acceptable. Perhaps Millian intent My motives were such, however, that you
(aiming to do something and doing it) is can justifiably criticize me, or penalize me in
included in the notion of just cause. appropriate ways, or take steps to return the
This view is too demanding. It puts too stolen wealth to the people from whom the
much stock in the agent’s subjective state dictator initially stole it. All of this is com-
and, in doing so, disallows many actions that patible with saying that the overthrow of the
are objectively justified under any plausible tyrant was justified. Still, there is one quali-
moral theory. Take this obvious case: a polit- fication: both Mill and Aquinas agree that if
ical leader decides to stop genocide in a the intent is “wicked” (Aquinas) or “atro-
neighboring country (or, even less contro- cious” (Mill), as when the “liberator”
versially, to defend that country against intends to visit equal or harsher treatment
aggression) because he thinks that is the way on the “liberated,” the act cannot be consid-
to win reelection. If we require right motive ered justified—the intervention cannot be
and not merely right intent, that war would defined as humanitarian.
be unjust. Instead, I argue that we might dis-
approve of the leader’s motives and still WHY THE INTERVENTION IN IRAQ
judge the action itself to be just. WAS JUSTIFIED: NARROW AND
Someone may retort that, in fact, we do GRAND STRATEGIES
often make moral judgments based on the
agent’s motives, so it is false to claim that Because critics of the war in Iraq fail to dis-
they are morally irrelevant. Thus, for exam- tinguish between intention and motive, they
ple, the reply goes, deposing a tyrant simply hastily dismiss the Coalition’s operation as a
to steal his wealth is morally wrong. But this candidate for humanitarian intervention.
misses the distinction between judging Yet once we draw that distinction we can
actions and judging persons. The word plausibly defend the intervention in Iraq on
“wrong” in the sentence “deposing a tyrant humanitarian grounds. The Coalition in-
to steal his wealth is wrong” is ambiguous. It tended to topple Hussein, committed to
suggests that the action of deposing the doing it, did it, and moreover, committed
tyrant was wrong because the motive was itself to helping Iraqis reconstruct their rav-
bad. But it is more plausible, I think, to say
that the sentence confusedly conveys our
moral disapproval of the agent, not the 22
Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith, “Humanitarian Inter-
action. In order to judge whether the action vention and Just War,” Mershon International Studies
(deposing the tyrant) was morally wrong, Review 42 (1998), p. 286.
ending tyranny in iraq 9001-020_Teson.qxd 7/6/05 9:57 AM Page 10
aged society on the basis of a liberal consti- preeminently interested in suppressing secu-
tution, human rights, democracy, and creat- rity threats, and that the humanitarian
ing the conditions for economic recovery. If motives, if any, were secondary. But this
the intention was to depose Hussein and assumption is wrong. In reading the materials
thus end tyranny, then the fact that the on the war, one is struck by the fact that, what-
United States had an ulterior motive may be ever else was going on, the war against Iraq had
a reason to lower our “moral estimation” of an unmistakable humanitarian component.
the United States’ government, as Mill says. Liberating Iraq was always part of the motiva-
Maybe it was a reason not to vote for George tion for the invasion. The public debate made
W. Bush. But it was definitely not a reason to clear that, other things being equal, the fact
conclude that the intervention itself “was that the target of military action was such a
not really” humanitarian, so that we are now notorious tyrant was a reason in favor of the
precluded from evaluating the war under war. Removing tyranny is not always a suffi-
humanitarian intervention principles. We cient reason for war, but it certainly inclines us
have to separate our reasons for judging toward intervention. The removal of Hussein
actions from our reasons for judging agents. was central in the minds of political leaders
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that throughout the whole exercise. It is true, as
President Bush and Prime Minister Blair did critics have pointed out, that Bush and Blair
not really care about human rights in Iraq. were slow in embracing the humanitarian
Critics of the war have claimed that their rationale for the war. But they did so, before,
failure initially to invoke the doctrine of during, and after the war.26 During recon-
humanitarian intervention means that the struction, the emphasis on human rights
intervention was unprincipled, since the and democracy intensified, and culminated
Coalition offered humanitarian reasons
only after it failed to find weapons of mass 23
See Falk, “What Future for the UN Charter System of
destruction.23 But the fact that the leaders War Prevention?” p. 597.
who decree the intervention are unprinci- 24
Someone may insist that the way justifications enter
pled is independent of whether the act is jus- the public domain have a bearing on the correctness of
intervention. I am not persuaded by this objection
tified.24 If the Coalition leaders were
because, in my view, typical public deliberation suffers
unprincipled (say they were merely trying to from serious pathologies that undermine its epistemic
find after-the-fact reasons that would vindi- credentials. See Guido Pincione and Fernando R. Tesón,
cate them in the eyes of the public), then Deliberation, Democracy, and Rationality (New York:
Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
that is a reason to criticize them and eventu- 25
See Michael Ignatieff, “Why Are We in Iraq? (And
ally make them pay the political price for Liberia? And Afghanistan?),” New York Times Magazine,
erring or deceiving. But it is not a reason to September 7, 2003, pp. 38ff.
26
See, e.g., George W. Bush,“State of the Union,” January
refuse to even consider whether the inter- 28, 2003; available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/
vention was justified on humanitarian releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html#; his statements to the
grounds. It is bizarre to oppose the inter- press on the eve of the attack, “Threats and Responses:
Excerpts from Joint News Conference ‘Tomorrow is a
vention in Iraq when it had the intent of
Moment of Truth,’” New York Times, March 17, 2003, p.
deposing a horrific tyrant and did so, merely A13; George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation,” March 19,
because the men leading the intervention had 2003; available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
motives unrelated to the act of liberation.25 2003/03/20030319-17.html; and for Prime Minister Blair,
see, e.g., 149 Cong. Rec. H7059, H7060 (July 17, 2003)
So far I have conceded, for the sake of argu- (address by the Right Honorable Tony Blair, Prime Min-
ment, that the Anglo-American leaders were ister of the United Kingdom).
10 Fernando R. Tesón001-020_Teson.qxd 7/6/05 9:57 AM Page 11
with the Coalition’s organizing elections in the regime). This is the grand plan that
Iraq and the president’s second inaugural apparently underlies American strategy after
address on January 20, 2005. the September 11, 2001, attacks, and can be
From these facts it is possible to detect not summarized in one sentence: Defeating the
one but two related yet distinct humanitar- enemies of the United States requires pro-
ian rationales for the war in Iraq. The first moting liberal reforms in the Middle East
can be described as the narrow humanitarian and, indeed, the entire world. Removing the
justification. This I categorize, in accordance regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq is part of
with the discussion above, as the intention to that strategy. The strategy also includes the
depose Hussein and the act of doing so. This successful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian
intention fits with the view of humanitarian conflict, as well as promoting liberal reforms
intervention I proposed above: a war to res- in other Arab countries, both friend (such as
cue victims of tyranny. There is no question Egypt and Saudi Arabia), and foe (such as
that the Coalition intended to do exactly this. Libya and Syria). With respect to the war in
It aimed to do it, it committed itself to doing Iraq, the grand strategy is part of the moti-
it, and it did it. The removal of Hussein vation, not the intent, but it is no less
brought, in addition, prospects of freedom humanitarian. This grand strategy is
and democracy to the Iraqis. This direct humanitarian in a broad sense, because it
intention was shown by numerous state- involves fighting tyranny by peaceful and
ments and actions by Coalition leaders, and (where required) military means. The
it included the willingness to surrender Hus- intended act was to liberate the Iraqis; the
sein for trial on charges of crimes against motivation was to enhance the security of
humanity. On January 30, 2005, eight million the United States by promoting liberal
Iraqis voted freely in a successful election. reforms in the Middle East and elsewhere.29
Even before these recent developments, there President Bush clearly articulated the
were signs (concealed behind the under- grand strategy in his second inaugural
standable emphasis of the media on insur- address.30 There he announced that it was
gent violence) that good things were “the policy of the United States to seek and
happening in Iraq.27 If things go well, the support the growth of democratic move-
country will have, for the first time in its his- ments and institutions in every nation and
tory, a liberal constitution that will hopefully culture, with the ultimate goal of ending
guarantee human rights and the rule of law.
Most well-motivated observers have wel-
27
comed these developments, regardless of See “Democracy Stirs in the Middle East,” Economist,
their political affiliation (witness the praise March 5, 2005, p. 9.
28
See “Grudging Respect,” New Republic, March 21,
from liberal quarters).28 Surely these events 2005, p. 7.
must count in any evaluation of the war 29
Someone could perhaps call the “grand strategy” an
under humanitarian intervention principles. intention, but I think it is more accurately described as
motivation. For even if the security of the United States
But an examination of the record discloses
is not enhanced, and even if the Middle East or the rest
a second humanitarian rationale, which I of the world are not democratized, Iraq would still be
will call the grand (and, because of its bold- liberated.
30
ness, more disquieting) humanitarian The text of the address can be found in “There Is No
Justice Without Freedom,” Washington Post, January 21,
motive for the intervention in Iraq (again, in 2005, p. 24; available at www.washingtonpost.com/wpd
addition to other motives, such as disarming yn/articles/A23747-2005Jan20.html. I quote from there.
ending tyranny in iraq 11001-020_Teson.qxd 7/6/05 9:57 AM Page 12
tyranny in the world.” In this conception, peace. It assumes (correctly, I think) that
values and interests converge, since “the democracies are more peaceful, and that
survival of liberty in our land increasingly the surer way to neutralize the enemies of
depends on the success of liberty in other the West is to help ordinary people in the
lands.” Peace and liberty are linked in Kant- Middle East get rid of their authoritarian
ian fashion, for “the best hope for peace in regimes.33 Second, as of this writing there
our world is the expansion of freedom in are some indications that the grand strat-
all the world.” Critics were quick to point egy may be working. Events in Palestine,
out that this speech evinced yet more Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria
aggressive purposes, such as invading Iran allow for (very cautious) optimism. Ordi-
or Syria. This criticism, however, overlooks nary citizens in Arab countries have been
the president’s cautionary remark that the emboldened by the announcement of the
promotion of global freedom “is not pri- U.S. policy that it will not support repres-
marily the task of arms.” sive regimes.34 Yielding to popular pres-
The doctrine of the second inaugural sure, Syrian troops have left Lebanon after
address, in its abstract form, is admirable. twenty-nine years of occupation. In Egypt,
But that does not automatically mean that President Mubarak announced important
its application to this particular case is jus- political reforms. Saudi Arabia held its first
tified.31 One may reject it for two reasons. It election in its history (although flawed for
may be conducted in impermissible ways, lack of women’s vote).35 In Iraq itself, there
or it may simply fail. The grand strategy are conflicting signs about whether the
may violate the strictures of the doctrine of insurgency may be picking up or winding
double effect by violating deontological down,36 and any enthusiasm would be pre-
constraints or imposing unacceptable mature, as history has taught us not to be
costs; alternatively, it may be unsuccessful. too optimistic about that troubled region.
As Michael Walzer has reminded us, justi- Yet surely critics must concede at least the
fied wars (and political strategies that
include wars) must have reasonable
chances of success.32 It is far from clear that 31
Cf. Kant’s distinction between pure and impure duty.
this strategy will succeed, and if it collapses, See Robert B. Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics (Oxford:
so will the humanitarian justification. Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 9.
32
Unfortunately, success is an integral part of Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York:
Basic Books, 1977), pp. 109–26.
the justification for war, even if it can only 33
See the discussion in Fernando R. Tesón, A Philoso-
be determined ex post. Should the Coali- phy of International Law (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
tion fail to liberate Iraq (narrow strategy), Press, 1998), ch. 1.
34
See “Special Report, Middle East: Something Stirs,”
to democratize and pacify the Middle East, Economist, March 5, 2005, pp. 24–26; Neil MacFar-
and to promote liberal democracy in the quhar, “Unexpected Whiff of Freedom Proves Bracing
world (grand strategy), then the judgment for Mideast,” New York Times, March 6, 2005, p. 1.
35
See Todd S. Purdum, “For Bush, No Boasts, but a
of history on the whole effort will be, no
Taste of Vindication,” New York Times, March 9, 2005,
doubt, less kind. p. 10.
36
I would like to make two points in cau- Compare John F. Burns, “On Iraq’s Street of Fear,
tious defense of the grand strategy. First, The Tide May Be Turning,” New York Times, March 21,
2005, p. A1, with John F. Burns and Eric Schmitt, “Gen-
the grand humanitarian rationale properly erals Offer Sober Outlook on Iraqi War,” New York
underscores the link between freedom and Times, May 19, 2005, p. A1.
12 Fernando R. Tesón001-020_Teson.qxd 7/6/05 9:57 AM Page 13
possibility that the grand strategy may not never intended only to punish Hussein.
have been as reckless as they thought.37 In They could have done that simply by
Palestine, the death of Yassir Arafat, the removing him and then leaving the coun-
promise of pullout by Israel, and the recent try—indeed, in that way they would have
meetings between President Bush and the saved Coalition lives and billions of dollars.
Israeli and Palestinian leaders may offer a That they remained in Iraq partly in pur-
glimmer of hope for this most intractable suit of national interest means that they
of conflicts. had a nonaltruistic (yet defensible) motive.
One last point about intent. A critic may But their staying means that they intended
claim that removing Hussein does not yet to go beyond punishment of the tyrant. So
turn the action into a humanitarian inter- the humanitarian action is this: the intent
vention. The Coalition should have to remove a vicious dictator, plus removing
intended, in addition, to establish a liberal him, plus not allowing this act of liberation
democracy, or at least to secure basic to be destroyed by behavior driven by any
human rights in Iraq. Because (among nonhumanitarian motive. By helping Iraq
other things) the United States apparently in the way I described (organizing elec-
did not properly plan for the reconstruc- tions, facilitating the liberal constitution,
tion stage, the criticism goes, the interven- and fighting the insurgents), the Coalition
tion was not humanitarian but merely has satisfied the strictures of the humani-
punitive. As a preliminary matter, it is far tarian intervention doctrine.
from obvious that it is wrong to depose a Having established that the war in Iraq
ruler guilty of atrocities in order to get him satisfies the first principle of the humani-
punished—say, by surrendering him to the tarian intervention doctrine I outlined ear-
International Criminal Court. Be that as it lier, that a justifiable intervention must be
may, I agree that had the Coalition merely aimed at ending tyranny or anarchy, I turn
wanted to remove Hussein and then to examine the intervention under my
remained utterly indifferent to what hap- other principles. The war in Iraq, I will con-
pened to the Iraqi people, the interven- clude, fares reasonably well. I will concen-
tion’s humanitarian character would have trate on three criticisms of the war: that the
been in doubt. Imagine that the Coalition, Iraqi regime, bad as it was, did not qualify
after removing Hussein, would have turned as a proper target of intervention; that the
the country over to an equally vicious (but intervention was illegitimate because it was
pro-Western) ruler. Such action would not welcomed by the Iraqis; and that the
have shown “atrocious” or “wicked” intent intervention was illegitimate because it
and would have deprived the intervention lacked proper authority.38
of any humanitarian character, for the rea-
sons Mill and Aquinas gave. But, clearly,
37
that was not the case, however imperfect Even in France, where defending the war is quite a
risky business, some voices have started wondering.
the planning might have been. The United
See Guy Sorman, “Et si Bush avait raison?” Le Figaro,
States is attempting (clumsily perhaps) to February 26, 2005, p. 10.
38
help the Iraqis rebuild their society along Space constraints prevent me from discussing here
liberal lines, and, despite ferocious insur- an important additional question: whether the costs
of the intervention were morally acceptable. I
gency, the enterprise may succeed. The address the point in Tesón, Humanitarian Interven-
United States and the United Kingdom tion, ch. 10.
ending tyranny in iraq 13001-020_Teson.qxd 7/6/05 9:57 AM Page 14
WHY IRAQ WAS A CASE OF SEVERE prison, or buried in mass graves. Since Hus-
TYRANNY sein didn’t seem to be committing any new
atrocities, intervention to remove him at the
Supporters of humanitarian intervention moment the Coalition did could not be jus-
agree that the bar for intervention should be tified on humanitarian grounds.
set high.39 One would have thought that if Of course, if the perpetration of ongoing
ever a government met that standard, Hus- atrocities were a sine qua non requirement
sein’s regime did. Many critics of the inter- of the legitimacy of intervention, then by
vention grudgingly concede that at least this definition the intervention in Iraq would
requirement was met. During his twenty- not qualify. But the standard proposed by
four-year rule, Hussein presided over a state Human Rights Watch is inadequate. If it
of terror.40 In addition to suppressing all were correct, all that mass murderers would
civil and political liberties, Hussein mur- have to do to avoid being overthrown is to
dered around 100,000 Kurds in 1988; killed speed up the executions. One of the most
about 300,000 Shia after the 1991 war; buried terrifying facts of World War II was the
about 30,000 in a single grave; murdered speed and determination with which the
around 40,000 marsh Arabs; caused mil- crumbling Nazi regime kept exterminating
lions of people to flee; and tortured many Jews until the very last moments of the war.
hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, Under the theory endorsed by Human
between 1968 and 2003.41 His cruelty and Rights Watch, Hitler could not have been
ruthlessness are legendary, and even the legitimately removed, on humanitarian
harshest critics of the war do not challenge grounds alone, once there would have been
the propriety of committing him to trial for no more Jews to save. The Pakistani mili-
war crimes and crimes against humanity. tary would have been better off finishing its
In a report released in January 2004 and job of exterminating Bengalis quickly in
widely echoed in the media, however, Ken- order to block any argument for the
neth Roth, executive director of Human humanitarian legitimacy of India’s action.
Rights Watch, argued that the war in Iraq And Slobodan Milosevic should have done
cannot be justified as humanitarian inter- the same thing in Kosovo in 1999. And, as I
vention because the regime was not tyranni-
cal enough at the time of the invasion.42
39
Roth gives several arguments (including See, e.g., ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, pp. 31–32.
40
The regime’s brutality has been amply documented.
lack of humanitarian intent, which I already The ever-present terror visited on Iraqis by the secret
discussed), but his main one is that “the police and similar branches of the ruling Baathist Party
scope of the Iraqi government’s killing in are well described in Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear:
The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkeley: University of
March 2003 was not of the exceptional and California Press, 1998), esp. chs. 1 and 2.
dire magnitude that would justify humani- 41
See, inter alia, Con Coughlin, Saddam: King of Terror
tarian intervention.” For Human Rights (New York: HarperCollins, 2002); Louis Wiley, Sad-
dam’s Killing Fields, vol. 1 (videocassette) (Alexandria,
Watch, only countries where there are ongo-
Va.: PBS Video, 1992). The Iraqis themselves are com-
ing or imminent atrocities qualify as targets piling millions of documents attesting to the horrors of
for intervention. Hussein had perpetrated the regime. See the work of the Iraq Memory Founda-
his major crimes before the war, and maybe tion at www.iraqmemory.org.
42
Ken Roth, “War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Inter-
intervention would have been justified then. vention,” Human Rights Watch World Report 2004;
But by 2003, his victims were in exile, in available at hrw.org/wr2k4/3.htm.
14 Fernando R. Tesón001-020_Teson.qxd 7/6/05 9:57 AM Page 15
indicated above, it is far from obvious that will not return to power—such is the level of
removing a perpetrator of past atrocities in trauma produced by the tyrant’s pervasive
order to have him punished by the appro- repressive methods.46
priate courts should not count as humani- Critics, however, are not convinced. They
tarian intervention. claim that the armed resistance in Iraq
For those reasons, the bar should be set at shows that the Iraqis did not want to be res-
the perpetration of severe tyranny, which cued, that the war was a unilateral act of the
includes not only consummated or ongoing Coalition, insensitive and indifferent to the
atrocities, but also pervasive and serious wishes of the Iraqi population.47 For these
forms of oppression. The Kosovo Commis- critics, in order for the intervention to be
sion, perceptively, saw that it was unreason- legitimate, it (and subsequent liberal
able to set a standard of ongoing killings for reforms) must be accepted by the Iraqi
justification under the doctrine. The com- population. The more insurgency there is,
mission declared that the intervention had the less justifiable the war was in the first
been morally legitimate, not only because it place, because even if the Coalition
had stopped ongoing ethnic cleansing, but intended to liberate the Iraqis, continued
because “it had the effect of liberating the
majority of the population of Kosovo from 43
Independent International Commission on Kosovo,
a long period of oppression under Serbian
Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons
rule.”43 This is exactly the right standard for Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 4;
Iraq as well. Rulers like Hussein remain emphasis added.
44
proper targets of intervention even after I do not address here whether intervention is justi-
fied to spread democracy, or to establish liberal institu-
they have committed their worst crimes, and tions in societies that suffer not severe but “ordinary”
pervasive, violent, cruel, and continuous tyranny. The Iraqi regime certainly met the standard of
oppression made Iraq a good candidate for severe tyranny I propose.
45
This is particularly obvious when the Iraqis them-
humanitarian intervention. The notion that selves (as opposed to critics of the war) are allowed to
all mass murderers have to do to remain speak. See, e.g., Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani,
safely in power is to stop murdering should “What Iraq Needs Now,” New York Times, July 9, 2003, p.
A21. See also Stephen Morris, “Why We Had to Fight—
be rejected. In fact, at some point mass
Iraq 366 Days Later,” Weekend Australian, March 20,
killings have to stop. Hutus cannot continue 2004, p. 28; Daniel Byman, “Constructing a Democratic
axing Tutsis to death in Rwanda forever. Yet Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities,”International Secu-
under the Human Rights Watch standard, rity 28, no. 1 (2003), pp. 47–78; and Nancy Gibbs, “When
the Cheering Stops: Jubilation and Chaos Greet the Fall
the most efficient mass murderers are of the Saddam Regime,” Time, April 21, 2003, p. 40.
immune to intervention.44 46
Paul Berman, “Silence and Cruelty,” New Republic
Online, June 17, 2004, contends that Iraqis had suffered
“psychological demolition.”
HOW IRAQIS WELCOMED THE 47
See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, “Anti-U.S. Outrage
INTERVENTION Unites a Growing Iraqi Resistance,” New York Times,
April 11, 2004, p. 14. There was, of course, ex ante anxi-
ety and suspicion at the occupation, which expressed
There is solid evidence that the great major-
the legitimate desire of the great majority of Iraqis that
ity of ordinary Iraqi citizens have seen the the Coalition leave once it could plausibly do so. But
overthrow of Hussein as a blessing, the best these sentiments are perfectly severable from the wel-
thing that has happened to them during come by the great majority of the Iraqis of their libera-
tion. My discussion here addresses only the claim that
their lifetimes.45 In fact, some Iraqis may the insurgency alone is evidence of the Iraqi will not to
still find it difficult to believe that Hussein be liberated.
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