Instinct as a Foundational Concept in Adam Smith s Social Theory
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Instinct as a Foundational Concept in
Adam Smith s Social Theory
Tetsuo Taka
Abstract:
Adam Smith s social theory analyzes and interprets both the unfolding and accumula-
tive structures of human nature and society while considering the foundation of hu-
man instinct My reinterpretation makes it possible to achieve a coherent understand-
ing of The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations and to recognize
the commonalities among Smith Hume and Darwin with respect to the viewpoint of
evolutionary point of view
Smith s concept of instinct is distinctly biological; it differs obviously from
Locke s philosophical concept and Hume s psychological one There is no doubt that
Smith followed Locke and Hume in terms of his empirical understanding of human
knowledge and ways of thinking; nonetheless Smith remained convinced that ani-
mals had instincts-that is they are born with innate programs As shown in his de-
tailed descriptions in Of the External Senses -including those of instinctual per-
ception among the young of the partridge the goose and suckling animals as well as
worms that have no head but yet search for food-Smith came to this idea through
elaborate direct observations and indirect observations via the work of Linnaeus For
Smith the human species incorporates the instincts of self-interest self-preserva-
tion and mutual altruism sociability the propensity to exchange This understand-
ing is maintained without any change from that outlined in the Letter to Authors of
the Edinburgh Review to that in the sixth edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments
JEL classification numbers: B 10 B 31 B 41
The purpose of this essay is to suggest prets both the unfolding and accumulative
on the basis of a precise examination of structures of human nature and society while
Adam Smith s conception of instinct considering the foundation of human instinct
-mainly scrutinized in his posthumous arti- in a biological sense This approach has
cle Of the External Senses ES hereafter therefore some bearing on recent works that
-that his social theory analyzes and inter- focus on the importance of a biological ap-
Part of this paper was read at First ESHET-JSHET Meeting Sophia-Antipolis 2006 and at Smith in Glas-
gow 09 University of Glasgow 2009 I would like to thank attendants of these meetings and two anony-
mous referees of this journal for their helpful comments Any remaining errors are mines alone
The History of Economic Thought Vol 53 No 2 2011 The Japanese Society for the History of Eco-
nomic Though2 53 2
proach to Smith Schabas 2003; 2005 as veals his genius seems to be inadequate and
well as the methodological similarities be- superficial: no explanation is provided as to
tween Smith s theory of sympathy and Dar- why Smith had to extend his observations of
win s evolutionary understanding of the hu- animals there
man species Evensky 2005; Laurent and It might well be that the latter half of
Cockfield 2007 ES including the greater part of the section
As to biology two facts seem to be im- Of the Sense of Seeing was written after
mediately noteworthy First Smith s letter to 1766-68 when the 12th edition of Linnae-
Andreas Holt October 1789 says that he us s Systema Naturae was published and
studied botany with no great progress stocked in Adam Smith s library Unlike ear-
while writing Wealth of Nations 1776; WN lier editions that show his arrangements and
hereafter at Kirkaldy COR 252 ; botany nomenclature to the learned the 10th edi-
was the name given at that time to the disci- tion adopted definitions of Classes and Or-
pline now known as biology with the latter ders of animals that were suitable for use
being a term used since the beginning of the even by amateurs Cain 1992 245-46 ; it
1800s Farber 2000 77 Second Adam was also expanded to 1 384 pages from the
Smith s library included not a few biology previous edition s 227 eventually reaching
botany books such as Buffon s Histoire 2 299 pages in the 12th edition That both the
Naturelle 1749-67 Fontenelle s Oeuvres new Order Gralae and the Class Mammalia
1752 Linnaeus s Systema Naturae coined by Linnaeus in the 10th edition of
1766-1768 Miller s Gardener s Diction- Systema Naturae in 1758 are used by Smith
ary 1769 and Ray s Synopsis Methodica in the latter part of the article has been point-
1696/1724 Smith mentions Buffon s work ed out by Brown 1992 334 Rather than
in A Letter to the Authors of the Edinburgh be considered a meritorious finding Brown s
Review 1755-56; LER hereafter and WN estimation of the dating of ES between 1758
and Linnaeus s in ES and October 1759 has been challenged by
The posthumous article ES is usually Smith scholars since these facts are inciden-
looked at from the point of view of philo- tal rather than essential to Smith s argument
sophical psychology rather than that of natu- Ross 1995 104; Schabas 2003 266-67 fn
ral philosophy ; it is guessed that it was writ- However it cannot be overlooked that the
ten before Smith became closely ac- animal kingdom Linnaeus divides into six
quainted with Hume -that is before 1752 classes and to each he adds their generic
Wightman 1980 speculates that ES was and specific characters; before him nobody
written prior to 1752 before Smith was had clearly distinguished the Vermes from
closely acquainted with Hume 133-34 the Insects Engel-Ledeboer and Engel
This interpretation seems perfectly sound 1964 9 Smith mentions Linnaeus toward
and persuasive for the first half of the essay; the end of his article: That numerous divi-
however Wightman s appreciation of the lat- sion of animals which Linnaeus ranks under
ter half of the essay and the fact that Smith s the class of worms have scarcely any of
careful field observations on animals re- them any head They neither see nor hearTaka: Instinct as a Foundational Concept in Adam Smith's Social Theory 3
have neither eyes nor ears: but many of them to and inseparable from the nature of animal
have the power of self-motion and appear to life and existence ES 49 must be shown
move about in search of their food ES in relation and comparison to the other four
83 We recognize that Smith s understand- senses Third the existence of instinct in man
ing of biology as witnessed in ES had great- and animal in the sense of innate pro-
ly surpassed that seen in The History of As- grammed behavior suggests the possibility
tronomy probably written before 1758; of complementing the inadequacies inherent
HA hereafter in which he says that all in Hume s empiricism
things endowed with a power of self-motion Like many other enlightenment philoso-
beasts birds fishes insects are classed under phers Smith also pays attention to Che-
the general name of Animal HA II 1 selden s report1 on a young gentleman who
This shows clearly that Smith had no knowl- was born with a cataract and whose sight
edge of Wermes worms when writing HA was restored through an operation Follow-
It seems appropriate therefore to seek ing recovery however it was found that his
evidence in dating ES-first to carry out a prior touch-acquired knowledge of particular
reinterpretation of ES; second to compare objects did not accord with his new sight-ac-
Smith s biological conception of instinct quired knowledge and so he at first learned
with Locke s philosophical and Hume s psy- to know and again forgot a thousand things
chological and physiological conceptions; in a day When the young gentleman saw a
and third to survey Smith s references to in- painting with perspective and a variety of
stinct from his A Letter to the Authors of paints its plain surface led him to ask which
the Edinburgh Review to the sixth edition of was the lying sense feeling or seeing? After
The Theory of Moral Sentiments observing a superb landscape at Epsom-
downs one year later he called it a new kind
I The Dating of ES: Smith s Interest of seeing Smith interprets the case thus:
in the Instinctive Power of Percep-
tion Though it may have been altogether by the
In the latter part of ES Smith tries to estab- slow paces of observation and experience
lish three propositions First four classes of that this young gentleman acquired the
sensations-namely heat and cold taste knowledge of the connection between visi-
smell and sound-are not naturally per- ble and tangible objects; we cannot from
ceived as external and independent substanc- thence with certainty infer that young
es or even as qualities of such substances children have not some instinctive percep-
but as mere affections of the organs; they tion of the same kind In him this instinc-
can exist nowhere but in the organs ES tive power not having been exerted at the
25 says Smith and the different degrees of proper season may from disuse have
these sensations altogether result from expe- gone gradually to decay and at last have
riences Second the genuine possibility that been completely obliterated Or perhaps
neither man nor animal was ever born with- what seems likewise very possible
out the sense of touch which seems essential some feeble and unobserved remains of it4 53 2
may have somewhat facilitated his acquisi- row seem to emerge from the shell blind
tion of what he might otherwise have continue to be so for at least some days
found it much more difficult to acquire thereafter and are fed through the joint labor
ES 69 of both parents However before leaving the
nest they evidently enjoy all the powers of
What Smith wants to insist here is this: vision in the most complete perfection Smith
whilst long and harsh experiences of training therefore concludes that in so short a period
are indispensable in making use of the facul- they cannot be supposed to have acquired
ty of sight human beings must have some those powers from experience and must
innate instinctive perception that is free therefore derive them from some instinctive
from any experiences if they are to connect suggestion ES 71
visual and tactile knowledge consistently 2 This kind of instinct is not confined to
This is nothing but a distinct critique of pure the bird The young of quadrupeds such as
and simple empiricist epistemology since the cow and the horse like those of the
Smith said that antecedent to all experience greater proportion of birds that make nests
the young of at least the greater part of ani- upon the ground seem to enjoy the faculty
mals possess some instinctive perception of of sight just after birth Even the young of
this kind seems abundantly evident ES the human species who spend enough time
70 While the linnet and the thrush feed in the arms of their mothers for learning the
their young by dropping food into their bills principle of association of ideas by obser-
the hen does not Since the young partridge vation and experience must have the same
and goose also seem to feed themselves im- instinct since Nature it may be said never
mediately upon hatching they seem to un- bestows upon any animal any faculty which
derstand the language of Vision as well as is not either necessary or useful and an in-
they ever do afterwards Smith says there- stinct of this kind would be altogether use-
fore this is the case so far as less to an animal which must necessarily ac-
quire the knowledge which the instinct is
I have been able to observe with those of given to supply long before that instinct
at least the greater part of the birds which could be of any use to it ES 74 Smith
make their nests upon the ground with the therefore says thus:
greater part of those which are ranked by
Linnaeus in the orders of the hen and the Children however appear at so very early
goose and of many of those long-shanked a period to know the distance the shape
and wading birds which he places in the and magnitude of the different tangible ob-
order that he distinguishes by the name of jects which are presented to them that I
Grallae ES 70 am disposed to believe that even they may
have some instinctive perception of this
On the other hand the greater proportion of kind; though possibly in a much weaker
those organisms ranked by Linnaeus in the degree than the greater part of other ani-
orders of the hawk the magpie and the spar- mals A child that is scarcely a month oldTaka: Instinct as a Foundational Concept in Adam Smith's Social Theory 5
stretches out its hands to feel any little stance which is fitted for filling them in-
play-thing that is presented to it It distin- creases and irritates that uneasy sensation
guishes its nurse and the other people who and produces hunger or the appetite for
are much about it from strangers It clings food ES 77-78
to the former and turns away from the lat- It is worth noting here that Smith s obser-
ter Hold a small looking-glass before a vations probably assisted by Linnaeus s
child of not more than two or three months thoroughgoing descriptions of animals ge-
old and it will stretch out its little arms be- neric and specific characters are tolerably
hind the glass in order to feel the child accurate and appropriate and his understand-
which it sees and which it imagines is at ing that an uneasy sensation of being un-
the back of the glass It is deceived no filled or the appetite for food has its ori-
doubt; but even this sort of deception suf- gins in the function of each bodily organ
ficiently demonstrates that it has a tolera- While the human species consists of an or-
bly distinct apprehension of the ordinary ganic unity of different organs the mind
perspective of Vision which it cannot well Smith seems to explain is activated not only
have learnt from observation and experi- by the different sensations of the organs but
ence ES 74 also by the formation of new connections
among them in the absence of experience
Smith s examination of the sense of sight is This is not a mechanical or machine view of
notably different from Berkeley s in the an animal of self-motion but rather a biolog-
sense that Smith elucidates the perspective ical or evolutionary view of them for he
vision of infants as an innate instinct that is sought to combine instinct with experiences
distinct from the associationist principle of in growth Besides this the following state-
empiricism; Berkeley s treatment of it on the ment shows clearly that Smith s approach
other hand is limited mostly to a mechanical was also a psychological one:
inquiry of sight as the outcome of an optical
device or machine Smith s argument is much All the appetites which take their origin
strengthened by the fact that in the case of from a certain state of the body seem to
the newborns of all suckling animals of suggest the means of their own gratifica-
Mammalia they begin immediately sucking tion; and even long before experience
through the use of the sense of smelling re- some anticipation or preconception of the
gardless of sight capabilities Although they pleasure which attends that gratification
seem to draw their nourishment through In the appetite for sex which frequently I
tubes and canals like a vegetable in the am disposed to believe almost always
womb as soon as they come into the world comes a long time before the age of puber-
this new set of tubes and canals which the ty this is perfectly and distinctly evident
providential care of Nature had for a long The appetite for food suggests to the new-
time before been gradually preparing is all born infant the operation of sucking the
at once and instantaneously opened and only means by which it can possibly grati-
they require filling The smell of the sub- fy that appetite It is continually sucking It6 53 2
sucks whatever is presented to its mouth It side in which it felt the agreeable and to
sucks even when there is nothing present- withdraw from that in which it felt the dis-
ed to its mouth and some anticipation or agreeable sensation But the very desire of
preconception of the pleasure which it is to motion supposes some notion or precon-
enjoy in sucking seems to make it delight ception of externality; and the desire to
in putting its mouth in the shape and con- move towards the side of the agreeable or
figuration by which it alone can enjoy that from that of the disagreeable sensation
pleasure There are other appetites in supposes at least some vague notion of
which the most unexperienced imagination some external thing or place which is the
produces a similar effect upon the organs cause of those respective sensations ES
which Nature has provided for their grati- 85
fication ES 79
The above citation gives evidence of why
It is abundantly evident that what Smith here Smith insisted neither man nor animal was
calls the appetite or anticipation or pre- ever born without the Sense of Touching
conception of the pleasure is in short the which seems essential to and inseparable
instinctive or innate faculty of cognition from the nature of animal life and existence
While some anticipation of the pleasure is ES 49 Smith here reconfirms that the
premised it exists as the cause for continu- consciousness of the positional distinction
ing to suck rather than starting to suck In- between the internality and externality of a
stinct is therefore the principle which substance is an indispensable sense for all
teaches the child to mould its mouth into the animals including Worms The distinctive
conformation and action of sucking even be- ability to distinguish between the internality
fore it reaches the object to which alone that and the externality of a substance is defi-
conformation and action can be usefully ap- nitely vital for individual animals The sens-
plied ES 80 Citing the fact that there are es that find externality agreeable or not
among the Worms in Linnaeus s classifica- therefore are different from anything else in
tion some animals that have scarcely a head a utilitarian sense since those sensations ap-
and neither eyes nor ears but nonetheless pear to have been given us for the preserva-
have the power of self-motion and move tion of our own bodies even though the
about in search of food Smith summarizes agreeableness of Heat and Cold has been
the concept of instinct thus: found from experience ES 86 :
A new-born animal which had the power The desire of changing our situation nec-
of self-motion and which felt its body ei- essarily supposes some idea of externality;
ther agreeably or disagreeably more heat- or of motion into a place different from
ed or more cooled on the one side than on that in which we actually are; and even the
the other would I imagine instinctively desire of remaining in the same place sup-
and antecedently to all observation and ex- poses some idea of at least the possibility
perience endeavour to move towards the of changing Those sensations could notTaka: Instinct as a Foundational Concept in Adam Smith's Social Theory 7
well have answered the intention of Na- tion
ture had they not thus instinctively sug- This conception of instinct seems com-
gested some vague notion of external ex- pletely consistent with the current biological
istence ES 86 understanding of it Ethologist Konrad
Lorenz says that the recognition of an ene-
Smith applies the same biological under- my-which in mallards and many other birds
standing to the sense of Hearing He is much is an inborn instinct-must be learned per-
disposed to the belief that Sound may in- sonally: An animal which does not know its
stinctively and antecedently to all observa- enemy by instinct is informed by older and
tion and experience obscurely suggest some more experienced fellow-members of its spe-
vague notion of some external substance or cies who or what is to be feared as hostile
thing which excites it Although Sound is Lorenz 1952 2002 133 137 While
merely perceived in the ear by a sense recep- Mayr distinguishes Lorenz s theory as evo-
tor all animals and especially men are too lutionary epistemology we must not over-
careful and cautious about unusual and unex- look Mayr s comment on what is a great
pected sounds Smith interprets this response mystery for the philosophers :
to unusual sounds thus: This effect too is
produced so readily and so instantaneously Even the most primitive protists have an
that it bears every mark of an instinctive sug- apparatus for sensing and responding to
gestion of an impression immediately struck the dangers and opportunities they encoun-
by the hand of nature which does not wait ter in their habitat More than a billion
for any recollection of past observation and years of natural selection have elaborated
experience ES 87 the genetic program of the human species
This reasoning explains Smith s conclu- from that of a simple protozoan into that
sions in ES: the three senses of Seeing Hear- of mankind Thus the new biological un-
ing and Smelling seem to be given to us by derstanding of the nature of genetic pro-
Nature not so much in order to inform us grams has finally explained what for such
concerning the actual situation of our bodies a long time had been a great mystery for
but as concerning that of other external bod- the philosophers Mayr 1997 74
ies-which though at some distance from
us may sooner or later affect that actual situ- Although Smith naturally had no knowledge
ation and eventually either benefit or hurt us of the nature of genetic programs in modern
ES 88 Smith s conclusions might be in biology that was still the issue for him
short summarized as follows: all the sensa- Smith s original concern in ES was episte-
tions of animals whether independent or mology-that is the reason why sensory or-
composite sensations must not be under- gans generated completely different sensa-
stood as the effects of experience and obser- tions from the material characters of the ob-
vation alone: some kind of instinct includes ject of cognition-and so he made inquiries
not only real information of one s standing into their part in the whole intermediate
but also futurity concerning self-preserva- causes of external sensations none of which8 53 2
bear the smallest resemblance to vibration or tary program in the brain-must result from
motion of any kind and which no philoso- an inquiry into the unknown principles and
pher has yet attempted to explain to us ES intermediate causes of external senses not
42 In other words Smith was thinking from the viewpoint of a transcendentalist but
about the relationship between instinct and from a rigorous empiricist
experience-that is simple and compound
sensations -in animal development II Instinct and Experience in Percep-
Two points therefore should be cited tion: The Early Psychological
here First Smith s conception of instinct Approach
does not indicate that he decisively criticized Smith s conception of instinct somewhat
and rejected the empiricist epistemology of resembles the ideas of contemporary leaders
Locke and Hume since Smith believed that of biological science like Linnaeus and Buf-
humans learn to distinguish between simple fon although they refer not to instinct but in-
and compound Sensations altogether by Ex- ternal sense in cases where external sense is
perience SE 32 Therefore Lindgren s the topic While Linnaeus refers to the ex-
1969 comment that Smith has kept the ternal and internal senses Engel-Ledeboer
predominantly conventionalist epistemolog- and Engel 1964 26 no explicit or concise
ical position is quite correct Ibid 901 explanation is provided It can safely be said
Second one should not overestimate that the internal senses had previously in-
Smith s comment vis-à-vis Berkeley s philo- dicated the neural system and brain and the
sophical analysis as argued in New Theory external senses the bodily organs but ex-
of Vision Berkeley 1709 in which he says ternal and internal senses was replaced by
that he has scarcely any thing to add to what sensory organs after the 10th edition of
Berkeley has already done ES 43 Systema Naturae in 1758 Judging from the
While Smith mentions Berkeley s discourse argument that individuals lack in their
on Sight and its connection to Touch Smith s prime and tender age absolutely all knowl-
agreement with Berkeley is limited to the edge and are forced to learn everything by
analysis of the physical intermediate caus- means of their external senses Engel-
es of sight-that is the mechanism of an Ledeboer and Engel 1964 18 Linnaeus
optical device of Sight Unlike Berkeley seems not to have any exact notion of in-
Smith confronts the biological matters of in- stinct
stinct in animals according to many elabo- In Histoire Naturelle Buffon discusses
rate observations of the sensational and cog- internal senses at large in The Natural His-
nitive development process of young animal tory of Man and external senses mainly in
and human species and he raises serious A Dissertation on The Nature of Animals
doubts about rigorous empiricist interpreta- While Buffon indicates that the internal
tions of external senses The novel original sense is equal to the mind vol 3 98 and
but faint idea that all animals must be born that the nerves are the immediate instru-
with an innate instinct to receive and process ments of feeling vol 3 286 his funda-
various sensations-something like a heredi- mentally physiological and complicated ex-Taka: Instinct as a Foundational Concept in Adam Smith's Social Theory 9
planation of the internal and external senses no philosopher has yet attempted nor
appears explicitly in the following quotation: probably ever will attempt to explain to us
37
The internal sense differs in the first place Then it can therefore be safely said that
from the external senses by the faculty Smith embraced little of the interpretation of
which it possesses of receiving every spe- the internal and external senses that had been
cies of impression; while the external made by preceding natural philosophers 3
senses are only affected in one mode cor- instead establishing a modern concept of in-
responding to their conformation: the eye stinct independently according to his vari-
for instance is not more affected with ous observations Besides neither Linnaeus
sound than the ear with light Secondly the nor Buffon adopts instinct as a key concept
internal sense differs from the external in their theories They seem therefore to
senses by the duration of the vibrations take at best a midwife role for Smith s ad-
excited by external causes In every other vancement of biological thinking
article both these species of senses are of The concept of instinct however can-
the same nature The internal sense of a not be limited to biology Since sense itself
brute as well as its external senses is pure is the main subject of psychology and the
results of matter and mechanical organiza- critical subject touching the core of philoso-
tion Like the animal man possesses this phy Locke and Hume each naturally take the
internal material sense; but he is likewise term instinct into consideration
endowed with a sense of a very different While Locke uses the term instinct in-
and superior nature residing in that spirit- stinctu in the sense of impulse or drive
ual substance which animates us and su- in his Essays on the Law of Nature he ex-
perintends our determinations vol 3 plicitly denies such notions in the Human
496-97 Understanding as innate laws of nature and
innate practical principles Locke 1693
There is no indication that Smith accepted 1995 I iii 2-3 ; he declares that the word
Buffon s explanation of internal and external instinct has no significance nor do the
senses Moreover it is clear that Smith was words sympathy or antipathy Ibid III
critical of this kind of philosophical and xi 8 Locke s argument-that God spoke to
pseudo-physiological interpretation of the man that is directed him by his Senses
internal sense given his criticism of such an and Reason as he did the inferior Animals
explanation of the Sensation of Taste in ES: by their Sense and Instinct which he had
Certain juices of the exciting body are sup- placed in them to that purpose to the use of
posed to enter the pores of the palate and to those things which were serviceable for his
excite in the irritable and sensible fibers of Subsistence and given him as means of his
that organ certain motions or vibrations Preservation Locke 1698 2002 205
which produce there the Sensation of Taste -shows obviously that instinct is a distin-
But how those juices should excite such mo- guishing mark of animals that lack reason
tions or how such motions should produce Having much knowledge of the classification10 53 2
of plants studied during his formative years however is not liberated from the confusion
Sloan 1972 21 Locke uses not a few bio- of reason with instinct since he insists that
logical metaphors in An Essay Concerning reason is nothing but a wonderful and unin-
Human Understanding Unlike Smith how- telligible instinct in our souls which carries
ever Locke s observation of the development us along a certain train of ideas and endows
of a newborn child simply leads him to the them with particular qualities according to
ultimate empiricist interpretation of percep- their particular situations and relations This
tion: the assumption of a blank paper tabu- instinct tis true arises from past observation
la rasa brain Locke 1693 1995 II and experience Hume 1739-40 2001
i 2:20-22 Locke intends to explain how the 1 3 16 9 Here one can see that the distinc-
mind works and how the human species tion between the innate faculty program
comes to know truth Pinker 2002 5 but and the learned faculty fades into ambiguity
he has no intention of explaining how the Nevertheless it may be worthwhile to
mind emerges note that Hume s observations of animal be-
Hume on the other hand repeatedly in- havior are on rare occasions no less accurate
sists that animals and humans alike learn and keen than those of Smith After enumer-
from experiences and have some form of in- ating a number of specific animal behaviors
stinct Besides his concept of instinct to show their particular excellence Hume
seems to be closer to an innate faculty than concludes that pride and humility are not
Locke s since he says that as justice evi- merely human passions but extend them-
dently tends to promote public utility and to selves over the whole animal creation and
support civil society the sentiment of justice says thus:
is either derived from our reflecting on that
tendency or like hunger thirst and other ap- The causes of these passions are likewise
petites resentment love of life attachment to much the same in beasts as in us making a
offspring and other passions arises from a just allowance for our superior knowledge
simple original instinct in the human breast and understanding Thus animals have lit-
which nature has implanted for like salutary tle or no sense of virtue or vice; they
purposes Hume 1751 2004 III 40 So quickly lose sight of the relations of blood;
long as Hume argues that though the in- and are incapable of that of right and prop-
stinct be different yet still it is an instinct erty: For which reason the causes of their
which teaches a man to avoid the fire; as pride and humility must lie solely in the
much as that which teaches a bird with such body and can never be placed either in the
exactness the art of incubation and the mind or external objects But so far as re-
whole economy and order of its nursery gards the body the same qualities cause
Hume 1748 1999 IX 6 his views of in- pride in the animal as in the human kind;
stinct and of the continuity between animals and tis on beauty strength swiftness or
and the human species seem to be perfectly some other useful or agreeable quality that
consistent with modern biology-based under- his passion is always founded Hume
standings Hume s conception of instinct 1739-40 2001 2 1 12 5Taka: Instinct as a Foundational Concept in Adam Smith's Social Theory 11
In short Hume s conclusion that all the in- mines him to seek society for its own sake:
ternal principles that are necessary in us to but according to the one the misery of his
produce either pride or humility are com- original state compelled him to have re-
mon to all creatures Ibid 2 1 12 9 are course to this otherwise disagreeable rem-
nothing but results of the method of en- edy; according to the other some unfortu-
quiry which is found so just and useful in nate accidents having given birth to the
reasoning concerning the body to our unnatural passions of ambition and the
present anatomy of the mind Ibid vain desire of superiority to which he had
2 1 12 2 before been a stranger produced the same
Then what is confirmed sufficiently is fatal effect According to both those
the fact that Smith s view of instinct with all laws of justice which maintain the present
his premature thinking is far more consistent inequality amongst mankind were origi-
with modern biological insights than Locke s nally the inventions of the cunning and the
or Hume s whose empirical analyses were powerful in order to maintain or to acquire
performed mainly from psychology and phi- an unnatural and unjust superiority over
losophy-based aspects and with fewer bio- the rest of their fellow creatures LER
logical insights and observations It is how- 11
ever a matter of course that the term biolo-
gy here refers to understanding behavior ac- While Smith does not here define the term
cording to the genetic program while the instinct positively he seems to believe
term psychology refers to understanding firmly that there is in man a powerful in-
behavior according to the work of the mind stinct which necessarily determines him to
or physiological cause-and-effect seek society for its own sake Although
most contemporary Scottish thinkers asserted
III Conceptual Elaboration of that human sociality was instinctive or ap-
In-stinct and the Propensity to petitive Berry 1997 25 Smith s under-
Exchange standing of instinct seems to go beyond
Even if the above remarks are supportable Hume s view of it in the sense that even
and persuasive it must nonetheless be admit- Hume had become enmeshed in the conven-
ted that no definite conclusion can be drawn tional meaning of instinct as a wild animal
from them before verifying that Smith used passion or emotion We find the same usage
them consistently in his early and late writ- in The Theory of Moral Sentiments 1759;
ings This procedure seems indispensable in TMS hereafter although there the expres-
providing clues to the dating of Of External sion is slightly different from that used in
Senses Smith s first use of that term appears LER:
in LER:
Though man be naturally endowed with a
Both of them Mandeville and Rousseau desire of the welfare and preservation of
however suppose that there is in man no society yet the Author of nature has not
powerful instinct which necessarily deter- entrusted it to his reason to find out that a12 53 2 certain application of punishment is the Second the concept of instinct as an proper means of attaining this end; but has innate trait in the first edition of TMS con- endowed him with an immediate and in- tinued to be maintained even in 1790 Below stinctive approbation of that very applica- are three passages from the supplemented tion which is most proper to attain it The portion of the sixth edition oeconomy of nature is in this respect ex- actly of a piece with what it is upon many There seems to be in young children an in- other occasions Nature has constant- stinctive disposition to believe whatever ly in this manner not only endowed man- they are told Nature seems to have judged kind with an appetite for the end which it necessary for their preservation that they she proposes but likewise with an appetite should for some time at least put implicit for the means by which alone this end can confidence in those to whom the care of be brought about for their own sakes and their childhood and of the earliest and independent of their tendency to produce most necessary parts of their education is it Thus self-preservation and the propaga- intrusted Their credulity accordingly is tion of the species are the great ends excessive and it requires long and much which Nature seems to have proposed in experience of the falsehood of mankind to the formation of all animals TMS II reduce them to a reasonable degree of dif- i 5 10 fidence and distrust TMS VII iv 23 Two points are worthy of special attention Here the meaning of implanted program of here First Smith s arguments that the en- instinct is expressed clearly recalling a sim- dowment of the Author of nature is nothing ilar argument on children s instinctive ap- but an instinctive approbation of the welfare prehension of the ordinary perspective of Vi- and preservation of society constitute in- sion as developed in ES 4 The concept of deed a radical critique of both Mandeville instinct is more thoroughly elaborated and Rousseau since both of them conclude upon to suggest the innate or implanted fea- that laws of justice are nothing but devices tures of the child without using the term in- for maintaining an unnatural and unjust su- herited A similar recognition reveals itself periority despite their opposing preconcep- in the second quotation below tion of the natural state Notwithstanding his theological style of description Smith s for- Those unfortunate persons whom nature mula of instinct-pleasure/reason-punish- has formed a good deal below the common ment is biological since it does not contra- level seem sometimes to rate themselves dict Darwin s theory of evolution Smith be- still more below it than they really are lieves that all animals including humans By an instinct of pride however they set have an implanted end of self-preservation themselves upon a level with their equals and propagation of the species universally in age and situation; and with courage and Who implanted it-be it the Author of nature firmness maintain their proper station or nature itself-matters not to him among their companions By an opposite
Taka: Instinct as a Foundational Concept in Adam Smith's Social Theory 13
instinct the idiot feels himself below every TMS VII iv 25
company into which you can introduce
him Some idiots perhaps the greater There are two decisive points of interest
part seem to be so chiefly or altogether here First the desire of being believed per-
from a certain numbness or torpidity in the suading leading and directing other people
faculties of the understanding But there is treated as an instinct Second the faculty
are others in whom those faculties do not of speech that distinguishes the human spe-
appear more torpid or benumbed than in cies is founded upon the social instinct of
many other people who are not accounted humans This new insistence on instinct
idiots But that instinct of pride necessary upon which is founded the faculty of
to support them upon an equality with speech appears first in the 1790 edition of
their brethren seems totally wanting in the TMS and affords us an important clue not
former and not in the latter TMS VI only for achieving a more accurate dating of
iii 49 ES but also for understanding the true and
ethological meaning of the propensity to
Considering the continuity and increase of truck barter and exchange in WN
conceptual maturity of instinct between the The term instinct never appears in WN
first edition 1759 and the sixth 1790 it In the opening paragraph of Chapter 2 of its
must be natural for us to estimate that the Book 1 Smith refers not to the instinct to
dating of ES especially the latter part of it truck barter and exchange but to the pro-
is later than 1759 and much earlier than pensity to truck barter and exchange :5
1790-probably after 1768 when the 12th
edition of Linnaeus s Systema Naturae was This division of labour from which so
completed However the exact date of writ- many advantages are derived is not origi-
ing ES would be provably later than 1768 if nally the effect of any human wisdom
we were to compare Smith s interpretation of which foresees and intends that general
propensity to exchange in WN with in- opulence to which it gives occasion It is
stinct in TMS In the third quotation Smith the necessary though very slow and grad-
says thus: ual consequence of a certain propensity in
human nature which has in view no such
The desire of being believed the desire of extensive utility; the propensity to truck
persuading of leading and directing other barter and exchange one thing for another
people seems to be one of the strongest of WN I ii 1
all our natural desires It is perhaps the in-
stinct upon which is founded the faculty of Then it will be necessary to establish wheth-
speech the characteristical faculty of hu- er instinct and propensity are the same so
man nature No other animal possesses this as to be interchangeable or not A clue to a
faculty and we cannot discover in any possible answer to this question is found in
other animal any desire to lead and direct the very next sentence:
the judgment and conduct of its fellows14 53 2
Whether this propensity be one of those rather than the very clear conception laid out
original principles in human nature, of in 1790-the latter of which showed the
which no further account can be given; or most advanced and mature conception of
whether, as seems more probable, it be the instinct in line with that of modern biology
necessary consequence of the faculties of In other words Smith s confidence in the ter-
reason and speech, it belongs not to our minology was not entirely strong prompting
present subject to enquire It is common to him to deliberately choose not to decide
all men and to be found in no other race of whether the propensity to exchange was the
animals which seem to know neither this original principles in human nature in WN
nor any other species of contracts WN It therefore seems appropriate that the dating
I ii 2 of ES is 1768-1775
IV Concluding Remarks
Considering that the italics in this passage
were not included in Early Draft of part of The connection between instinct and the
The Wealth of Nations 6 ED hereafter propensity to exchange then is summarized
and appear first in WN it seems appropriate as follows While the propensity to exchange
to suppose that Smith probably tried to de- is founded on the instinct of the social ani-
cide whether this propensity was a matter of mal to seek out and enjoy the company of
instinct or a necessary consequence of the other group members-and thus demands
faculties of reason and speech without real- the mental capacity to keep track of given
izing the anticipated result but failed to do and received favors-humans exchange
so However as pointed out in the discussion more things than mere favors The propensi-
of the third quotation Smith distinctly ex- ty to exchange is therefore a special trait of
presses in the sixth edition of TMS his new the human species which has the faculty to
belief that the faculty of speech is founded distinguish slight differences among things
on the social instinct of humans-that is on in addition to faculties relating to the making
the desire of being believed the desire of of contracts languages are indispensable
persuading of leading and directing other here record-keeping and accounting
people Then it can be safely said that Smith s concept of instinct in ES as ex-
Smith s conception of instinct at the time amined above demands some more or less
of writing WN had not yet matured to the intrinsic programs of all animals-programs
level of evolutionary epistemology or had that are indispensable for the self-preserva-
been still in bewilderment; therefore he was tion and the propagation of the species 7 In
forced to be satisfied with some vague con- contrast the propensity to truck barter and
ception of propensity to exchange at that exchange might properly be the necessary
time This appears to be positive evidence consequence of the faculties of reason and
that the latter and more substantial part of ES speech That is to say this propensity is not
was written before 1776 while writing WN instinct but the product of very long experi-
since the treatment of instinct in the latter ences so that it may supposedly be called
part of ES continues to be premature level ethnological instinct of humans In relationTaka: Instinct as a Foundational Concept in Adam Smith's Social Theory 15
to this due attention should be paid again to ciple which works separately and independ-
Smith s assertion in 1790 that the faculty of ently
speech which characterizes human nature is
founded upon the social instinct-powerful Man has almost constant occasion for the
instinct which necessarily determines him to help of his brethren and it is in vain for
seek society for its own sake-of humans him to expect it from their benevolence
and also to Charles Darwin s evolutionary only He will be more likely to prevail if
interpretation of the connection between so- he can interest their self-love in his favour
cial instinct and sympathy 8 Putting all ac- and shew them that it is for their own ad-
counts together it may well be said that vantage to do for him what he requires of
Smith had already established the modern them Whoever offers to another a bargain
evolutionary epistemology substantially by of any kind proposes to do this WN
1790 I ii 2
Smith s concept of the propensity to ex-
change therefore does not stay on the sim- So far as the propensity for exchange gives
ple level of instinct so far as members within foundation upon which WN was written it
a group exchange favors with each other must not be overlooked that this properly hu-
According to the modern biology-especial- man propensity is the consequence of both
ly evolutional ethology social animals like self-interest and sociability-social instinct
chimpanzee and bonobo definitely seek and At that time Smith had not clear understand-
enjoy company de Wall 1996 170 and ing between them yet
behave on the principle of reciprocal ex- Accordingly the concept of instinct is
change or reciprocal altruism because indi- more general broad and basic than the pro-
viduals have the mental capacity to keep pensity to exchange since the former is com-
track of given and received favors and can mon among all social animals To put it
apply this capacity to almost any situation slightly differently the propensity to ex-
Ibid 153-54 Smith s positive recognition change cannot be released without social in-
of the continuity of reciprocity among mem- stinct of animals In this sense and in this
bers is it must be observed reflected in his sense only Smith follows and accepts
insistence: it is by treaty by barter and by Hume s insistence that reason is nothing but
purchase that we obtain from one another a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our
the greater part of those mutual good offices souls which carries us along a certain train
which we stand in need of WN I ii 3 of ideas and endows them with particular
In relation to self-love however it must qualities according to their particular situa-
be observed that the self-interest mentioned tions and relations Hume 1939-40 2001
by Smith on the propensity to exchange is 1 3 16 9 although he does not accept
nothing but the other member s self-love Hume s insistence that this instinct tis true
Self-love is understood rather as an external arises from past observation and experience
and relative principle which interests other Ibid Smith s conception of instinct as
member s self-love than as an internal prin- affirmed above rigorously excludes all em-16 53 2
pirical sentiments and knowledge Smith s modation and conveniency of the species
own advancement lies in his evolutionary Each animal is still obliged to support and
way of understanding human traits; that the defend itself separately and independently
human species has not only the fundamental and derives no sort of advantage from that
instinct of other social animals but also the variety of talents with which nature has
additional tracking inclination or disposition distinguished its fellows Among men on
grown on it through succeeding experienc- the contrary the most dissimilar geniuses
es 9 are of use to one another; the different pro-
One thing however still requires atten- duces of their respective talents by the
tion It is very easy for us to find population general disposition to truck barter and ex-
thinking 10 indispensable to the evolutional change being brought as it were into a
biology in Smith s evolutionary argument common stock where every man may pur-
that in the mechanism of a plant or animal chase whatever part of the produce of oth-
body every thing is contrived for advancing er men s talents he has occasion for WN
the two great purposes of nature the support I ii 5
of the individual and the propagation of the Tetsuo Taka: Faculty of Economics
species But in these and in all such objects Kyushu Sangyo University
we still distinguish the efficient from the fi-
nal cause of their several motions and organ-
izations TMS II ii 3 5 This shows explic- Notes
itly Smith s adequate comprehension of the 1 Cheselden s report on the recovery after
developmental process of Nature So long as long-term blindness is still mentioned by a
reciprocity or reciprocal altruism of human modern neuroscientist Fine 2003 915
being grows into the propensity to exchange 2 Smith s understanding was basically cor-
rect even from the modern view of neuro-
the achievement of the final cause of the
science See Kurson 2008 the exciting
self-preservation and the propagation of spe-
story of a person who blinded at age three
cies will be achieved since independent and and restored his vision after the stem cell
free pursuits of self-love by individuals pro- transplant surgery and was forced to en-
gressively increase the common stock of the dure long dangerous and harsh experiences
population by the division of labor in order to utilize and enjoy his sight
3 There is a very interesting fact that the
The strength of the mastiff is not in the term internal sense consists of the key
least supported either by the swiftness of concept in Francis Hutcheson s Moral phi-
the greyhound or by the sagacity of the losophy Hutcheson s definition of it ap-
pears in the next argument Internal senses
spaniel or by the docility of the shepherd s
are those powers of determinations of the
dog The effects of those different geniuses
mind by which it perceives or is conscious
and talents for want of the power or dispo- of all within itself its actions passions
sition to barter and exchange cannot be judgments wills desires joys sorrows pur-
brought into a common stock and do not poses of action This power some celebrated
in the least contribute to the better accom- writers call consciousness or reflectionTaka: Instinct as a Foundational Concept in Adam Smith's Social Theory 17 which has for its objects the qualities ac- It is the necessary tho very slow and gradu- tions or states of the mind itself as the ex- al consequence of a certain principle or ternal senses have things external These propensity in human nature which has in two classes of sensation external and inter- view no such extensive utility This is pro- nal furnish our whole store of ideas the pensity common to all men and to be materials about which we exercise that no- found in no other race of animals a propen- blest power of reasoning peculiar to the hu- sity to truck barter and exchange one thing man species Hutcheson 1747 1990 6 for another That this propensity is common It is certain that Smith does not follow his to all men is sufficiently obvious ED teacher Hutcheson in this respect 21 4 In order to show the similarity I would 7 This condition seems strict one in Smith like to adduce a sentence from ES It since the trait being common to puppy seems difficult to suppose that man is the dogs and humans to act according to his only animal of which the young are not en- inclinations endeavours by every servile dowed with some instinctive perception of and fawning attention to obtain their breth- this kind The young of the human species ren s good will WN I ii 2 is not men- however continue so long in a state of en- tioned as instinct in WN tire dependency they must be so long car- 8 It seems better to quote directly from Dar- ried about in the arms of their mothers or of win: Social animals are impelled partly by their nurses that such an instinctive percep- a wish to aid the members of their commu- tion may seem less necessary to them than nity in a general manner but more com- to any other race of animals Children monly to perform certain definite actions however appear at so very early a period to Man is impelled by the same general wish know the distance the shape and magni- to aid his fellows; but has few or no special tude of the different tangible objects which instincts He differs also from the lower an- are presented to them that I am disposed to imals in the power of expressing his desires believe that even they may have some in- by words which thus become a guide to the stinctive perception of this kind; though aid required and bestowed The motive to possibly in a much weaker degree than the give aid is likewise much modified in man: greater part of other animals ES 74 it no longer consists solely of a blind in- 5 There is an exception of it and Smith stinctive impulse but is much influenced by uses the expression the trucking disposi- the praise or blame of his fellows The ap- tion WN I ii 3 In Lectures on Jurispru- preciation and the bestowal of praise and dence: Report of 1962-3 LJ A hereaf- blame both rest on sympathy; and this emo- ter however the disposition to truck bar- tion as we have seen is one of the most ter and exchange is used but in Early important elements of the social instincts Draft of part of The Wealth of Nations Sympathy though gained as an instinct is supposedly written in 1762 the propensity also much strengthened by exercise or hab- to truck barter and exchange is used it As all men desire their own happiness 6 In ED Smith said thusly This division praise or blame is bestowed on actions and of labour from which so many advantages motives according as they lead to this end; result is originally the effect of no human and as happiness is an essential part of the wisdom which foresees and intends that general good the greatest-happiness princi- general opulence to which it gives occasion ple indirectly serves as a nearly safe stand-
18 53 2
ard of right and wrong As the reasoning
powers advance and experience is gained Abbreviations of the works of Adam Smith
the remoter effects of certain lines of con- Citations from his works are shown by each
duct on the character of the individual and paragraph number not page
on the general good are perceived; and then COR 1977 The Correspondence of Adam
the self-regarding virtues come within the Smith edited by Ernest Campbell Mossner
scope of public opinion and receive praise and Ian Simpson Ross Oxford: Clarendon
and their opposites blame Darwin 1871 Press
1874 611 ED 1978 Early Draft of part of The Wealth of
9 It seems worthwhile to note Thomas Reid Nations in Lectures on Jurisprudence edit-
who strongly attacked Hume s empiricism ed by R L Meek D D Raphael and P G
Reid recognized the importance of instinct Stein Oxford: Clarendon Press
as a constituent power of the mind and uti- ES 1795 1980 Of the External Senses in
lized that conception of that instinct to Essays on Philosophical Subjects Oxford:
combat Humean skepticism Wood 1989 Clarendon Press
98 But Reid s conception of instinct is HA 1795 1980 The History of Astronomy
quite different from Smith s Reid viewed in Essays on Philosophical Subjects Oxford:
instinct as a blind impulse to actions me- Clarendon Press
chanically and physiologically Breathing LER 1755-56 1980 A Letter to the Authors
sucking and swallowing of a new-born of the Edinburgh Review in Essays on
child butting of a bull kicking of a horse Philosophical Subjects Oxford: Clarendon
biting of a dog therefore constitute in- Press
stincts for their self-preservation by God LJ A 1978 Lectures on Jurisprudence: Re-
Reid s argument that the merciful author of port of 1962-3 in Lectures on Jurispru-
our nature has adapted our instincts to the dence edited by R L Meek D D Raphael
defects and to the weakness of our under- and P G Stein Oxford: Clarendon Press
standing Reid 1788 1969 108 evi- TMS 1759 1976 The Theory of Moral Senti-
dently indicates his fundamental position is ments Oxford: Clarendon Press
not biological but philosophical WN 1776 1976 An Inquiry into the Nature
10 E Mayr s remark seems very important and Causes of the Wealth of Nations Ox-
Darwin eliminated any reliance on super- ford: Clarendon Press
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