INSTABILITY AND INTERRELATED CONFLICT: EVOLVING SECURITY DYNAMICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
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INSTABILITY AND INTERRELATED CONFLICT:
EVOLVING SECURITY DYNAMICS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Authors: Dr. Aaron Stein and Ms. Leah Pedro The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung or the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The Foreign Policy Research Institute is a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy- oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities. Editing: Thomas J. Shattuck Design: Leah Pedro © 2021 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute April 2021
INSTABILITY AND INTERRELATED CONFLICT:
EVOLVING SECURITY DYNAMICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Syria/Iraq office
convened a two-day virtual dialogue that brought together experts and policymakers from
the United States, European Union, and Middle East to discuss developments in the region.
A follow-up to a 2019 conference held in Iraq, this dialogue focused on the challenges
posed by the conflict in Syria, the role of the Russian Federation in the Middle East, and
the future of Iranian-American tensions. Each half-day seminar featured two panels and a
moderated discussion led by FPRI Director of Research Dr. Aaron Stein. What follows is a
summary of the debates and actionable conclusions.
Key Conclusions
America’s regional adversaries Great powers compete differently
use the U.S. military presence in in the Middle East. Russia and
the region to try to drive a wedge China have differing interests in
between Washington and its the Middle East, but each share
allies and undermine faith in the an interest in decreasing regional
American security guarantee. trust in the United States as a
trustworthy ally.
Cessation of the conflict in Syria
is detrimental to the country’s The Turkish-Russian relationship
population. Achieving this will likely remains of great interest for
require bilateral talks between the Trans-Atlantic alliance, and
the United States and Russia, but it remains to be seen how this
Moscow remains committed to cooperative and competitive
undermining Western interests in relationship will impact U.S. and
the Middle East. allied interests.
The Biden administration has Iran remains a critical country for the
expressed clear interest in United States, but disagreement
deprioritizing the Middle East, continues about how to best
choosing instead to focus the approach managing U.S. relations
brunt of U.S. resources on the Indo- with the Islamic Republic.
Pacific and Europe. Policymakers
must remain engaged in supporting
post-conflict nation-building efforts
to prevent the relapse of violence.
3
Panel 1: be to first stop the fighting. Considering
the recent history of conflict in the
The New Security Landscape region, there is significant evidence that
in the Middle East: Trends and intervention is not ideal for stopping war,
Challenges with “Syria as the poster child.” Rather
than continuing the pursuit of military
Following war against the Islamic State’s support and weapons sales to foreign
territorial caliphate, new tensions have militias, the panelist suggested a focus on
emerged in the Middle East. In Syria, economic assistance and nation-building
Russia and Iran remain diplomatically and is necessary, particularly as the foreign
militarily committed to the success of the policy focus shifts to Asia.
Bashar al Assad regime, all but ensuring
that the regime will remain intact and be AN INITIAL
able to govern well into the 2020s. The
concurrent deterioration in9 American- REQUIREMENT FOR
Iranian relations has raised questions
PERMANENTLY CEASING
about the viability of the ongoing, but
narrowly defined, war against the Islamic THE CONFLICT MUST
State and whether the U.S. presence can
be sustained. Iran, too, faces questions
BE TO FIRST STOP THE
about its role in the region after years of FIGHTING.
isolation during the Trump administration
and support for sub-national allies in Iraq The Biden administration has frozen
and Yemen. sanctions and has sought to tamp down
tensions with Iran after four years of
Presenters and participants convened the Trump administration’s pursuit of a
to discuss regional trends and how they “maximum pressure” policy of sanctions
impact American and European interests. and military action. Progress on the Joint
The first panelist addressed broader Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
trends within the region, noting two major has remained stagnant, and the focus on
trends that have endured: governments reaching an agreement on a return to the
have been unable to meet the needs nuclear deal will have to move quickly, lest
of their people (often authoritarian, otherwise risk the election of a hardline
non-democratic regimes), and state- leader in Iran’s upcoming presidential
on-state competition has been fueled election.
by competing Russian and American
security interests. An initial requirement
for permanently ceasing the conflict must
4
U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken join NATO Secretary General Jens
Stoltenberg for a joint news conference in Brussels on April 14, 2020. (defense.gov)
The panelist concluded that it is likely that short of war,” is being carried out as an
the United States will continue to seek to attempt to stress the Iranian system and
recalibrate its regional policy to better weaken alliances, with the goal of forcing
fit with the greater priority American capitulation or regime collapse in the
leaders are placing on competition with country. Iran has withstood the campaign
China. This emphasis on great power and imposed costs of its own on the United
competition may decrease U.S. appetite States for its economic sanctions. These
to play a large role in regional civil sanctions, a panelist noted, have not led
wars, given that such involvement risks to a decrease in Iranian asymmetric action
distracting from more poignant threats in the Persian Gulf, and Iran has worked
to U.S. national security interests. These through its regional clients to attack U.S.
“internal civil wars,” the speaker argued, allies and partners. As one participant
“turn to large-scale proxy wars,” and noted, the role non-state actors play in
these conflicts are not synched up with the region may continue in the near-to-
the Biden administration’s priorities. medium term, even if Washington and
Tehran agree to a detente. In Iraq, for
The second panelist began by noting example, non-state actors could continue
that the local conflicts have continued to to harass U.S. and NATO forces for their
occur at the regional level, and Turkey own parochial reasons. However, as
and Russia are the key accelerators that other participants argued, Iran may be
integrated local conflicts into bilateral able to clamp down on many of its clients,
dynamics and split them into two spheres and a modicum of stability could spread
of influence. The U.S. campaign of from the state-to-state level to the state-
maximum pressure on Iran, or “all means to-nonstate level.
5
SYRIA IS A NEW KIND The discussion turned to the broader,
positive trends in the Levant stemming
OF HUMANITARIAN from the Trump administration’s
SUFFERING AND facilitation of the Abraham Accords and
the normalization of relations between
DISSOLUTION NOT SEEN much of the Gulf Arab states and
Israel. Though the Accords were seen
BEFORE, ONE WHOSE
as a step in the right direction, there
PROLONGED POVERTY are further steps necessary to move
toward genuinely effective policies in
AND PROFOUND the region, rather than “the same old
HUNGER COULD LEAVE A habits with different language,” as one
participant characterized the status quo
DELETERIOUS IMPACT. policy approach in the Middle East. The
remaining question with the Accords is
More broadly, other non-state actors
the way to instrumentalize them. One
in the greater Levant area have more
member of the conversation pointed out
closely aligned with state actors for
that a locally driven approach to economic
support and political legitimacy. As a
problems would likely be more effective
participant argued, in Syria, the Syrian
than attempting to find one regional fix-all
Democratic Forces (SDF) are dependent
approach.
on the United States for protection from
hostile actors, including Turkey and the
Most participants expressed some
Russian Federation. Al Qaeda and its
discontent with the amount of action
former affiliates, in contrast, have had
taken by the Biden administration on
more trouble working with regional states,
addressing the situation in the Middle
and therefore its power has abated.
East, especially with Iran. Much of this
The regional conditions, however, have
conversation revolved around the JPCOA
continued to deteriorate, and the more
and American inaction. One panelist
fundamental concern is that the war in Syria
made the argument that the Biden
and its convergence with the economic
administration has made an effort to
crisis brought on by the COVID-19
show that the Middle East is no longer
pandemic have negatively impacted the
the top priority, and that message has
region. As a participant noted, “Syria is a
materialized through inaction.
new kind of humanitarian suffering and
dissolution not seen before, one whose
prolonged poverty and profound hunger
could leave a deleterious impact.”
6
Countries Hosting Syrian Refugees
Europe
1.1M
Turkey
3.6M
Lebanon Iraq
880K 240K
Jordan
Egypt
660K
130K
(Data: UNHCR/OCHA, March 2021)
This early policy choice, this same panelist acknowledged similarities between Iran
noted, has disappointed EU members and the North Korea, in which aggression
because the bloc is waiting for the new attracts its own “leverage” in dealing with
administration to clarify its position on the the United States.
Iran nuclear deal and expressed concern
Panel 2:
that the Biden administration was moving
too slowly on formulating its Iran policy.
Enduring Challenges: The
An American participant argued against Syrian Civil War
this perception, suggesting that all
signals from the Biden administration The Syrian civil war continues without
indicate that the administration is moving end. The tenuous, country-wide decrease
quickly to clarify its position on the in violence could fall apart at any moment,
JCPOA. Another panelist elaborated on leading to violence in Idlib and the mass
the challenges facing current and past displacement of innocent civilians. The
U.S. administrations; both the Obama United States is also balancing its broader,
and Trump administrations wanted to geostrategic effort to prioritize the threat
get out of the Middle East, and the Biden from China as Washington grapples with
administration is trying to figure out the enduring challenges stemming from
how it can take necessary action rather the war against the Islamic State. This
than only make statements. The long- war, too, has strained ties with Turkey
term, strategic approach for Asia has and led to frictions with Russia and Iran.
been effective, and its core difference This panel discussed the Syrian civil war
from Middle East policy is the proactive and options to manage the violence, as
moves taken instead of consistently well as efforts to reach agreement to end
reacting to new problems. In the closing the war.
remarks of the discussion, one participant
7A United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) trailer used in cross-border humanitarian operations to
Syria. (unhcr.org)
The second panel began with an overview The panel also evaluated American
of the current situation in Syria. The first foreign policy in Syria and identified
speakers noted that Idlib has not seen potential outcomes. Identifying the overall
much violence recently, but the situation policy goals in Syria continues to be a
remains dire because of challenges challenge for Washington. The presence
stemming from delivering food across the of Russians and Iranians poses a question
shared border with Turkey. Food insecurity for political debates in Washington about
among the Syrian population is increasing, U.S. policy and how it is formulated, given
with sanctions and unstable humanitarian the emphasis on planning for war with
aid worsening the situation. The looming a peer adversary: Is Syria a venue for
issue is that the United Nations Security challenging Russia in the Middle East, or
Council will vote in July on extending the is it a distraction? This question, a panelist
cross-border authorization to deliver aid noted, is accompanied by the underlying
via borders outside direct Syrian regime view that the Syrian state is failed and
control. The panel agreed that Russia is broken, and restitution would require
expected to veto the resolution, as it did significant investment, one not likely to
in 2020, arguing that any relief should be supported by the United States and
be distributed via Damascus and not its allies. For the current administration,
from points outside of the country. If the a panelist argued that President Joseph
resolution does not pass, then it is unclear Biden is averse to open-ended conflicts
to what extent the Biden administration and is committing to focusing the bulk
plans to engage diplomatically. of U.S. resources on the Indo-Pacific and
Europe. Both panelists noted that one
enduring challenge the United States
8United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe address current
challenges with foreign terrorist fighters at a February, 2020 conference. (osce.usmission.gov)
faces in Syria is the continued presence of may require circumventing a NATO Ally to
foreign detainees held in SDF detention work with an adversary.
camps. The United States has sought to
pressure Middle Eastern and European
governments to take back their fighters,
Panel 3:
but have failed to find a durable solution.
The Iran Question: To Engage
The presence of these fighters is certain
to influence U.S. deliberations about its
or Not Engage?
options in Syria and hinder any effort
The Biden administration has signaled
to move forward. Another problem left
a willingness to return to the JCPOA, a
behind by the previous administration
proposal that is certain to have support
concerns foreign fighters and repatriation.
from the EU-2 (France and Germany) and
A panelist concluded by acknowledging
Great Britain. The region’s reaction may
the severity of the situation in Syria and
differ, with Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the
the necessity for bilateral talks with
United Arab Emirates hesitant to fully
Russia.
endorse any rapprochement with the
A large portion of the subsequent Islamic Republic. The American-Iranian
discussion evaluated the Russian relationship has considerable impact
presence in Syria. Now seen as “very on broader regional security dynamics.
much a player” in the Middle East, This panel explored the broader Iranian
Russia’s prevalence in the region has question and the role that Washington
changed significantly since 2015. Turkey’s and Europe should consider during any
discontent with the U.S.-backed SDF has potential engagement with Tehran.
only made a relationship with Russia more
opportunistic, and Turkish-American The first panelist addressed the maximum
relations are not likely to improve. The pressure campaign that the Trump
discussion reached a consensus that administration pursued against Iran,
bilateral talks with Russia regarding the arguing that the policy has had a negative
Syria conflict are becoming inevitable and impact on regional stability and security.
In particular, Iran’s policy of exacting a
9An attack on a Norwegian-owned oil tanker in June of 2019 is one of several in the Persian Gulf. (share.america.gov)
cost on the United States and its regional no longer the end goal, but the starting
partners for the imposition of sanctions point for further negotiations. The second
has led to a series of escalatory actions in panelist began by noting that Iran is acting
the Strait of Hormuz, Iraq, and Yemen. The more aggressively than the historical
Gulf States have also sought to respond norm and cautioned against treating the
to Iranian actions, especially regarding firing of missiles and the mining of ships as
the conflict in Yemen and deepening the “normal acts.” The panelist underscored
U.S. military presence in the region. that Iran is pursuing such policies
during a time of state-to-state peace—a
The panelist argued that the Gulf States fact that cannot be overlooked when
have internalized the shifts occurring in outsiders judge Iran’s regional policies
U.S. domestic politics and understand and national security decision-making.
that Washington is likely to prioritize its Iran’s intent, the panelist suggested, is to
interests in Asia in the near-to-medium make the Arab states more apprehensive
term. This realization is driving some states about supporting U.S. sanctions and to
to recalibrate their approach to Iran. This punish these states for close ties with
realization, the panelist argued, is in part Washington. Iran’s use of non-state actors
driven by recognition in Gulf Arab capitals drives down its costs because “those that
that their assertive policy in Yemen has are dying are not Iranian.” This policy also
led to pushback in Washington, leading to benefits Iran because it makes attribution
calls to decrease U.S. support for the war. more difficult, giving Iran the means to
The concern is that the maximum pressure deny involvement and to obfuscate any
policy has been deleterious for U.S. and collective response.
Arab interests in the region. In particular,
the concern now is that Iran has the upper
hand and that a return to the JCPOA is
10TEHRAN IS ALSO States should act with more urgency
because the JCPOA could ensure a return
ATTUNED TO U.S. to a “cold detente” with Iran that lowers
DOMESTIC DEBATES regional tensions and contributes to the
broader American goal of ensuring Iran
ABOUT ITS FUTURE cannot develop nuclear weapons without
being detected. The June 2021 Iranian
PRESENCE IN THE
presidential election could hamper talks,
MIDDLE EAST. particularly if a hardliner is elected and
the window for a return to the JCPOA
Tehran is also attuned to U.S. domestic closes.
debates about its future presence in
the Middle East. Therefore, one prong A participant challenged the idea that
of Iran’s regional strategy is to drive up Iran was committed to pushing the United
the cost of the American presence, with States out of the region entirely, arguing
the intent of pushing out the U.S. military. that Iran derives some benefits from the
This policy, the panelist noted, is driven continued U.S. presence. This participant
by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards suggested that the American presence
Corps (IRGC), which “has a firm hold on has become a crutch for Iran to justify
strategic policy for Iran.” The IRGC has its foreign policy and its support of non-
also managed to keep the politics of the state actors. A complete U.S. withdrawal,
JCPOA at arm’s length inside Iran and a participant noted, could fracture
has let the moderate, civilian-led wing of Iranian-backed groups in Iraq and upset
the government take the blame for the elements of Tehran’s foreign policy. The
U.S. withdrawal, without offering a viable conversation then shifted to a broader
alternative to ease sanctions. According discussion about the impact of a U.S.
to the panelist, “The [IRGC] had no withdrawal for regional stability and, in
ownership in negotiating or ‘owning’ the particular, American interests in Iraq. A
diplomatic process. Furthermore, the participant suggested the “IRGC and its
IRGC is not in need of sanctions relief proxies are ‘soul searching’ to reshape
from a political standpoint: they are strategy in Iraq and Syria” and that not
already applying pressure, and basically all aspects of Iranian foreign policy have
have free reign in the region in the been successful in the Middle East.
meantime.” Both panelists believed that
a return to the JCPOA would eventually
“get done,” but only after the Supreme
Leader is convinced of a need to return.
A few participants noted that the United
11IRAN AND ITS NON- tangential effort to reach detente.
STATE ALLIES IN IRAQ
PANEL 4:
HAVE SOUGHT TO Great Power Competition: The
CAPITALIZE ON U.S. Role of External Actors
ACTIONS TO PORTRAY The defeat of the Islamic State’s territorial
caliphate and the transfer of power in
AN IMAGE OF SUCCESS.
the United States has raised questions
Iran and its non-state allies in Iraq have about American policy, along with those
sought to capitalize on U.S. actions to of its closest allies in Europe. The Syrian
portray an image of success. As one conflict has also led to Russia’s return
participant suggested, the withdrawal to the Middle East, prompting broader
of some forces from Iraq allowed for the discussions about Moscow’s visions for
groups to suggest that their actions were the region. Turkey, too, has expanded
the reason for Washington’s withdrawal, its regional footprint, using a coercive
portraying independent U.S. actions as a policy that mixes military intervention
victory. This portrayal, a participant noted, and aggressive rhetoric to carve out a
stemmed from Iran’s broader support for regional role. This panel focused on the
“causing havoc in Iraq with rocket fire.” The role of external actors in the Middle East
participants disagreed about the extent to and whether the region could become
which Iran was directly responsible for all a venue for great power competition
of the actions of the proxies it supports in between rival states or return to a pre-
Iraq, but there was a consensus that “Iraqi Syrian civil war status quo.
rocket attacks were coordinated with Iran
and the Iranian leadership most probably This panel touched on the role of great
gave these groups a green light.” These power rivalry and its impact on the Middle
actions, participants noted, give Iran a tool East. The first panelist began by stating
to further increase pressure on the United the obvious: Great power competition is
States, especially given the broader focused on America’s relationship with
efforts to increase Iranian leverage before Russia and China and the competition
any talks with Washington about a return for global influence. In the Middle East,
to the JCPOA. Any such return, a panelist the panelist suggested that Russia and
argued, would likely also entail briefing China define interests differently. Russia,
America’s Arab partners and the Israelis, the panelist argued, was more security-
both of which have expressed skepticism focused, while China was more focused
about the nuclear deal and the implied on its economic interests. Russia has
been the “alternative weapons provider
12Iranian President Rouhani discussing economic opportunities with members of the Chinese governement in March and
April of 2021. (president.ir)
to conflict in the Middle East,” and China F-16. The panelist pointed out that
has been the financial support for projects following this incident, Ankara appealed
in the Gulf and Israel, in particular those to NATO for support. However, after
which enhance port access. Both Russia a June 2016 rapprochement, Ankara
and China, the panelist noted, seek to and Moscow have sought to manage
undermine elements of U.S. policy in disputes on a bilateral basis without
the region and undermine regional trust Western involvement. The two sides
in the American security commitment. have also deepened military cooperation,
The second panelist examined Turkey’s the panelist noted, pointing to Turkey’s
relationship with Russia and their purchase of a Russian air and missile
engagement over shared interests in defense system. After the purchase,
Syria. The panelist began by noting how Turkey has resisted Western pressure to
much the Turkish-Russian relationship cancel the deal, repeatedly saying that the
has changed over the past five years and agreement with Russia is a “done deal.” In
that the conditions are now favorable for other regional conflicts, such as Libya and
a cooperative relationship, given shared Nagorno-Karabakh, the two sides pursued
distrust of the West. This cooperative a similar formula. While Russia and Turkey
relationship does not, the panelist noted, favored different actors, they negotiated
mean that the two sides are perfectly directly to manage the conflict and to
aligned, but that they have prioritized keep Western actors at arm’s length. This
cooperation over competition. The low dynamic, the panelist argued in her final
point for the Turkish-Russian relationship remarks, comports with each country’s
came in November 2015, following the domestic politics and the desire to have
downing of Russian Su-24 by a Turkish regional responses to regional problems.
13RUSSIA IS MORE LIKELY As another participant noted, the
geographic dynamics inherent to the
TO ENGAGE WITH A Cold War have changed since 1991.
COERCIVE TURKEY Turkey, he argued, was no longer the
lone U.S. allied state on the Black Sea
RATHER THAN A and that Ankara’s geography was not as
valuable as it once was. This reality, he
HOSTILE U.S.
argued, should reframe how European
A plurality of the participants expressed and American policymakers view Turkey
concerns about the Russian-Turkish vis-à-vis its importance to Western
relationship and whether Ankara’s foreign security structures. A panelist contested
policy decisions undermined American this point, arguing that Ankara’s location
interests in the Middle East and broader was important for elements of Operation
Eastern Mediterranean region. Similarly, Inherent Resolve. The two participants
participants suggested that Moscow had agreed that retaining basing access to
modified its Soviet-era policy of trying Turkey was in the West’s interests, but that
to split NATO by pitting member states Ankara had its own parallel interests that
against one another. In this case, Turkey necessitates “planning around Turkey”
has emerged as a useful foil for collective for certain military contingencies in the
burden-sharing precisely because it has Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean.
run afoul of much of its traditional allies.
For some of the Turkish participants, there
was general agreement that the current
cooperative relationship with Moscow
has an “expiration date” and that tensions
inherent in the bilateral relationship could
re-emerge. One participant argued,
“Russia is more likely to engage with a
coercive Turkey rather than a hostile U.S.”
One participant pointed out, “the greatest
challenge for the U.S. in the region
which remains is the actions of allies in
the region,” as relationships with some
regional actors have deteriorated and
threatened the ability for Washington to
“win” the great power competition.
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