INSIGHT REPORT Russia: Elections in a turbulent year - International SOS
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INSIGHT REPORT Russia: Elections in a turbulent year AUGUST 2021 • Russia will hold State Duma (parliamentary) elections on 17-19 September. The ruling United Russia (UR) party is expected to retain its majority and an election victory will serve as an endorsement of the government and President Vladimir Putin’s rule. • Widespread unrest is unlikely, though well-attended anti- government rallies may occur in major cities around the dates of polls. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, these are unlikely to be authorised and as such will be forcibly dispersed by the security forces. • The elections will not prompt any wider deterioration in the local security environment. A heightened security force presence should be expected in urban centres on polling days. • Managers should conduct a risk assessment for domestic workforce and international assignees. This will enable the adoption of appropriate risk mitigation measures for in- country people.
INSIGHT REPORT Russia OVERVIEW Russia will hold State Duma (parliamentary) elections on 17-19 September, which the ruling UR party, closely affiliated to Putin, is expected to win. The party has always been the frontrunner. However, UR’s victory now seems all but confirmed following turbulent political events in the last 12 months and in the absence of a credible alternative after a widespread crackdown on the independent opposition. The parliamentary elections remain important, however, serving as a vote of confidence from the electorate for both the government and Putin. While the upcoming polls do not represent a significant threat to UR’s rule, the party will want to solidify its position after a change in cabinet and prime minister in January 2020. Despite a drop in public approval ratings since 2018, Putin continues to enjoy high levels of support among the population. However, defeats for several UR candidates in the 2019 local elections, as well as a reduction in approval ratings for the government, have highlighted growing popular dissatisfaction with UR’s leadership. In the lead-up to the September elections, the government has demonstrated its eagerness to avoid public discontent by scrapping unpopular COVID-19 policies. CONTEXT A turbulent economy Although it is the authorities’ political crackdown that grabs headlines outside Russia, domestically it is the difficult economic conditions that most concerns Russians. Key drivers for the government’s falling popularity ratings are the economic downturn, high inflation rates and a reduction in real spending power for the general public, fuelled by low energy prices and exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Modest economic growth in recent months has provided a brief respite but continuous surges in COVID-19 cases and rising interest rates will challenge further growth in the coming months. Despite public discontent with some government policies, the lack of a credible political alternative means UR’s position remains largely unthreatened. Political protests There have been substantial political protests across Russia over the last 12 months, from weekly demonstrations in Khabarovsk (Khabarovsk kray) in the far east to countrywide demonstrations related to the arrest of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in January 2021. Navalny’s arrest and his subsequent imprisonment prompted the largest opposition protests in Russia since 2011. Large demonstrations occurred sporadically across the country until mid-April. However, the opposition failed to sustain attendance amid a broad crackdown by the authorities. This fits a general pattern that has emerged in Russia in recent years, whereby well-attended anti-government protests occur periodically but are generally not sustained for long periods. INTERNATIONAL SOS AUGUST 2021 2
INSIGHT REPORT Russia A decimated opposition Khabarovsk protests While Russia’s political opposition has long operated under stringent conditions, in recent Protests in Khabarovsk presented months, the authorities have used legislation a unique challenge to the federal to undermine it. Navalny, the most prominent authorities, occurring far from traditional opposition leader, has been in prison since centres of the capital Moscow and St January, when he returned to Russia following Petersburg. The protests were sparked treatment in Germany for nerve-agent poisoning. by the arrest on 9 July 2020 of Sergei His organisations have been outlawed, branded Furgal, governor of Khabarovsk kray, as extremist and their online presence blocked. on allegations he helped organise three His supporters are banned from standing for murders years ago. election and many of his key associates have fled Furgal was elected in 2018, unseating the country. Additionally, several independent the long-time UR incumbent. Thus, many media organisations have been shut down or perceived his arrest as being politically sidelined after being labelled ‘foreign agents’. motivated. The protests also highlighted Navalny was perceived as a political threat discontent over what some outside by the Kremlin due to his growing popularity the capital see as Moscow-dominated at a time when government approval ratings policies. Tens of thousands participated were below 30%, according to some polls. In at the height of the demonstrations. regional elections held in September 2020, UR The response from the authorities was won comfortably but was rattled by opposition noticeably muted and contrasted starkly victories in two cities. In Tomsk (Tomsk province) with the typically forcible dispersal and Novosibirsk (Novosibirsk province), Russia’s of demonstrations in Moscow or St third-largest city, allies of Navalny won seats, Petersburg. When protests occur in displacing previous UR majorities. The wins were Russia’s two largest cities, the authorities a result of Navalny’s ‘smart voting’ strategy. tend to portray them as elitist and Aimed at undermining UR’s rule, the strategy disconnected from the rest of the focused on uniting the opposition against one country. Widespread demonstrations rival candidate and was planned to be deployed in the provinces, however, proved during the upcoming polls as well. Coupled harder to characterise in this manner. with Navalny’s increasing online popularity – his The gatherings gradually petered out videos highlighting official corruption frequently but proved to be a worrying sign to the generated millions of views – it became clear he Kremlin. presented a real political threat. However, in less than a year, that threat has been contained. INTERNATIONAL SOS AUGUST 2021 3
INSIGHT REPORT Russia The systemic opposition Alexei Navalny in Russia is relatively weak and rarely challenges UR. The lawyer-turned-campaigner and long-time critic of Putin has However, in the current been arrested several times since coming to prominence in 2008. political environment, even 20 August 2020: Navalny falls ill on a flight from Tomsk to some members of the systemic Moscow. The plane makes an emergency landing and Navalny is opposition have been removed later brought to Germany for treatment. German authorities later from the ballot. Communist say Navalny was poisoned by a nerve agent. Party member and former presidential candidate Pavel 17 January 2021: Navalny returns to Russia after five months in Grudinin was barred from Germany. He is detained by the police at passport control on running for the Duma after arrival in Moscow. the electoral commission accused him of having offshore 2 February 2021: Navalny is convicted of violating his probation assets. Grudinin contested by seeking life-saving treatment in Germany. He is ordered to and won 12% of the vote in spend two years and eight months in a penal colony. the 2018 presidential election 9 June 2021: A Moscow court designates Navalny’s political network and was almost guaranteed a as extremist, paving the way for its operations to be shut down. parliamentary seat. OUTLOOK The ruling UR party will maintain its parliamentary majority with an election win. There will be minimal security risks associated with the elections due to the tightly controlled political environment and COVID-19-related restrictions on public gatherings. Heightened security should be anticipated in urban centres on polling days. Anti-government protests may occur in main urban centres, but any such gatherings will be tightly policed and likely forcibly dispersed. A victory for UR will reinforce support for Putin’s broader political agenda. Social unrest Widespread unrest related to the elections is unlikely while well-attended anti-government rallies may occur in major cities in the lead-up to and the aftermath of the polls. Additionally, official bans on primary independent opposition groups limit the potential for organised mass protests. Demonstrations which do occur are likely to be concentrated in Moscow, a more traditional stronghold of anti-government expression, though the potential for such events in other regions cannot be discounted. Reports of widespread irregularities could fuel protests, but all such gatherings will be tightly policed. Any demonstrations will be unauthorised due to COVID-19-related restrictions on public gatherings and are liable to be forcibly dispersed. Heightened security will be in place in major urban centres on polling days. Unauthorised protests should be avoided by in-country workforce due to the credible risk of unrest. INTERNATIONAL SOS AUGUST 2021 4
INSIGHT REPORT Russia Communication blocks Localised communication blocks and/or targeted shutting down of social media sites may occur around the elections, in response to any calls for protests. The authorities have previously instituted blocks on social media and messaging applications in the vicinity of planned opposition protests. Technology companies have come under increasing pressure from the authorities to censor political content on their platforms. In recent months, Russia has taken legal action against several US social media companies for failing to remove online content. Government media regulators deliberately slowed internet traffic to specific social media sites in March 2021, though the move inadvertently brought down other websites. In July 2021, a Moscow court fined a US technology company more than $40,000 for failing to store the data of Russian users on local servers. They will continue to exert financial, legal and political pressure on domestic and foreign technology companies to censor or remove content associated with the political opposition. After the elections There will be no deterioration in the local security environment due to the elections, which will pass off peacefully or with some sporadic but localised instances of unrest. The vote is widely considered as an important part of Putin’s efforts to reinforce his rule ahead of the 2024 presidential election. Following a referendum on removing presidential term limits in 2020, Putin can theoretically remain president until 2036. A strong electoral showing for UR will reinforce public support for the government and Putin’s continued leadership. Although public discontent with economic conditions may prompt some voter dissatisfaction, the majority of the electorate is likely to call for renewed economic policies, rather than a new government. The economic rebound in recent months will also reduce broader discontent, but even further slumps are unlikely to prompt protests, considering the lack of a cohesive opposition. The authorities will continue to use recently introduced legislation to limit organised opposition activity after the elections. INTERNATIONAL SOS AUGUST 2021 5
INSIGHT REPORT Russia RECOMMENDATIONS TO MANAGERS What you should do now • Closely monitor developments ahead of the elections, including levels of attendance at anti-government protests and any resultant increase in disruption. • Ensure escalation plans are up-to-date and fully implementable at short notice, taking into consideration the limitations posed by COVID-19-related restrictions. • Conduct a risk assessment for domestic workforce and international assignees. A forward-looking approach will enable you to adopt appropriate risk mitigation measures for in-country people. These may include increased security at accommodation and worksites and bolstered communication plans that aim to combat misinformation and disinformation. • Advise in-country workforce to avoid discussing political or other sensitive topics in public or on social media. All information circulating on social media and news channels should be verified through reliable sources. • Advise local employees who intend to vote to follow the guidelines set out by the authorities, and have a clear plan for how, when and where to vote. What to look for The following triggers could indicate a deterioration in the security environment and warrant a change in our advice: • Widespread, credible allegations of electoral fraud. • Simultaneous demonstrations attracting thousands of people in multiple regions for several consecutive days. • Calls by leading opposition figures, in Russia or abroad, to protest over the results in the aftermath of the elections. INTERNATIONAL SOS AUGUST 2021 6
INSIGHT REPORT Russia ACTIONABLE INSIGHTS AND UNPARALLELED SERVICES International SOS and its network of partners combine the world’s leading security and medical risk specialists. With an access to over 3,200 security specialists led by our 200 dedicated security experts based in our Assistance Centres and offices around the world, we provide a comprehensive suite of integrated security risk services for the global workforce and managers tasked with keeping people safe, secure and healthy. We deliver timely, actionable security intelligence, analysis, advice and on-the-ground assistance. INTERNATIONAL SOS SECURITY PRESENCE For follow-up questions about the assessments or recommendations in this Report, please call your nearest Assistance Centre. Copyright © International SOS, 2021. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part prohibited without the prior consent of the Company. INTERNATIONAL SOS AUGUST 2021 7
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