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REGIONAL PROGRAM POLITICAL
DIALOGUE SOUTH MEDITERRANEAN
INSIDE LIBYA
INSIDE
LIBYA
June 2021 No°11
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DIALOGUE SOUTH MEDITERRANEAN
FOREWORD
The Regional Program Political Dialogue South Mediterranean (PolDiMed) of the Konrad-Ade-
nauer-Stiftung (KAS) in cooperation with LIBYA DESK™ is delighted to continue our monthly
reports on Libya for 2021. This format examines the most important political, economic and
social developments of the previous month, which are of central importance for understanding
the situation in Libya. The report is based on reliable Libyan sources and provides a summary
and a contextualisation of developments in the wider Libyan context. The report is usually being
published every first week of each month.
While much attention has been paid to the external and geopolitical dimensions of the situa-
tion in Libya, voices from within Libya are central to understanding local developments and the
evolution of the Libyan conflict as well as its impact on the wider Mediterranean region. As an
inclusive Libyan-led and Libyan-owned mediation with regards to the political, economic and
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military tracks are without alternative, these monthly reports emphasise the most important
events within Libya and aim to give a better picture of what happens “Inside Libya”.
Based on existing KAS-PolDiMed formats such as the Libya Brief and the Libya Task Force, we
consider it necessary to shed light on the dynamics within Libya and to emphasise the impor-
tance of continuing and facilitating a national dialogue process in the spirit of the UN-led Berlin
process.
We hope that these monthly reports will give our readers a better picture of the dynamics of the
ongoing Libyan conflict, its actors and multiple dimensions.
Thomas Volk
Director
Regional Program Political Dialogue South Mediterranean
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Divisions in Libya are still vivid and continue slowing down progress toward guaranteeing the
timely holding of elections and the necessary withdrawal of foreign mercenaries.
2. The policy of appeasement adopted by the Government of National Unity (GNU) has faced
backlash from both sides of the political spectrum.
3. The GNU’s mandate and tools at hand are not sufficient to reconcile national divisions. Ins-
tead, piecemeal efforts are made to listen to grievances and defuse potential tensions.
4. The High National Election Commission (HNEC) has given a tight deadline to the House of
Representatives (HOR) and High Council of State (HCS) to clarify the elections’ legal basis.
However, disagreements could lead to critical delays and force the UN to propose alternatives.
5. The announcement of the Second Berlin Conference to be held on 23 June raises hopes of
a united international front to support Libya’s political roadmap. However, several issues could
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harm the Conference’s significance.
6. The Government of National Unity and House of Representatives are locked in a silent battle
of wills over the budget’s adoption.
7. Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt are accelerating political and commercial ties to Tripoli in the hope
of sharing Libya’s large economic potential.
8. Momentum to remove mercenaries and reopen the coastal road is stalling. Nonetheless, at-
tempts are ongoing to limit the presence of sub-Saharan mercenaries in Libya.
9. Interior Minister Khaled Mazen has increased visits to security directorates and devised pre-
liminary plans to gain relevance and secure the 24 December elections.
10. June promises more diplomatic discussions over the Libyan file and could bring aboutmuch
needed solutions to the current military and legal deadlock in the country.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 02
Executive Summary 03
Contents 04
Libya’s executive authority caught in the middle of past fault lines 05
From the goal of national reconciliation to the reality of defusing tensions 06
The clock is ticking for the general elections’ legal basis 08
International momentum to support elections on 24 December 10
Libya faces prolonged delays with the budget adoption 11
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Regional countries increase political and economic ties with Libya 13
Chadian crisis prompts a refocus on southern border security 14
Ministry of Interior seeks to become a force to be reckoned with 15
Conclusion & Forecasts 16
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LIBYA’S EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY CAUGHT IN THE
MIDDLE OF PAST FAULT LINES
The policy of appeasement adopted by the Government of Natio-
nal Unity (GNU) has faced backlash from both sides of the political
spectrum.
The tenth edition of Inside Libya argued that the Government of National
Unity (GNU) and Presidential Council (PC) do not represent a cohesive
executive authority and that they are faced with rival stakeholders who
expect contradictory actions from them. This situation demonstrates that
instead of overcoming Libya’s divided political scene, the executive au-
thority has been caught in the middle of old fault lines in an attempt to
strike a delicate balance between eastern and western factions through
appeasement and outreach. For instance, a few weeks after being por-
trayed by hardline eastern factions as an entity beholden to Tripoli-based
militias, Libya’s executive authority was accused of harbouring “anti-re-
volutionary” elements by western armed groups. On May 7, these accu-
sations culminated in the storming of the Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli, the
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temporary seat of the PC. The incident was subsequently played down by
the executive authority’s leadership, whose top officials were not present
in the landmark building when it was stormed.
The personalities accused of being “anti-revolutionary” were Foreign Mi-
nister Najla al-Mangoush and newly appointed head of Intelligence, Hus-
sein Mohamed Khalifa al-Aaeb, who is known to have had strong ties with
the former regime and later with the eastern-based Libyan National Army
(LNA). Al-Mangoush was vilified in a vicious smear campaign portraying
her as a die-hard supporter of LNA Commander Khalifa Haftar and was
targeted for her leading role in demanding the removal of all foreign forces,
including Turkish-backed soldiers. Similarly, armed groups from the “Vol-
cano of Rage” coalition (Al-Bonyan Al-Marsoos in Arabic) called upon the
PC to withdraw the nomination of al-Aaeb, whom they consider an agent
of Haftar and who has been accused of graft by the Audit Bureau. Notably,
the storming of the Corinthia Hotel was carried out by Emad Trabelsi, the
former Intelligence Chief, which shows that the government’s strategy of
apportionment does not always strike the right tone with every stakehol-
der and that the current political setting in Libya creates awkward situa-
tions for the executive authority.
A more recent cumbersome moment was the military parade to mark the
7th commemoration of the LNA’s Operation Dignity in Benina’s Military
Base on May 29, a show of force for which Khalifa Haftar invited the PC,
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the GNU, as well as House of Representatives’ (HOR) Speaker Agila Saleh.
Apart from Deputy PM Hussein al-Qatrani, none of the invitees showed
up at the parade, with Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba and PC Head
Mohamed al-Menfi excusing their absence due to their respective visits to
Algeria and Tunisia. In contrast, Vice-President Abdullah Hussein al-Lafi,
who is closer to western factions, was the only official to clearly reject the
invitation by lambasting the event as “unilateral” and “dangerous” enough
to motivate other armed groups across Libya to parade without the PC’s
permission. Considering the tense oversight of the executive authority’s
actions by western-based militias, Libyan officials chose the path of least
resistance by not appearing next to Haftar on this day, but the LNA Com-
mander may use this cold shoulder as an opportunity to delegitimize the
executive authority amongst eastern factions and highlight some level of
hypocrisy as such officials have publicly participated in ceremonial mi-
litary events in Tripoli and Zawiya. The fact that Agila Saleh also missed
the event due to a meeting with UN Envoy and Head of the United Nations
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) Ján Kubiš shows that the parade failed
to score its expected attendance and was generally perceived as an out-
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of-place event by the absent guests. However, those absentees also failed
to clearly take a stance against the event in defence of their mandate to
control and unify military institutions.
FROM THE GOAL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
TO THE REALITY OF DEFUSING TENSIONS
The executive authority’s mandate and tools at hand aren’t suf-
ficient to reconcile national divisions. Instead, piecemeal efforts
are made to listen to grievances and defuse potential tensions.
With memories of conflict still fresh in Libyans’ mindset and the promise
of a political shakeup by year’s end, the North African country is not best
placed for a genuine and comprehensive attempt at reconciliation. In fact,
progress on this sensitive issue has been slow, with the PC receiving a fair
amount of criticism concerning its lack of concrete action to tackle national
divides. Criticisms range from the perception that the executive authority is
too intent on pleasing the international community and expanding business
relations at the expense of domestic affairs, to accusations of running a
show where outreach meetings are mere photo-ops and attempts at recon-
ciling the nation are tepid and half-hearted. Such views are understandable
considering the fact that the executive authority now has to face its limits
that currently include a 7-month mandate, the lack of an approved budget,
a highly divisive political space where electoral stakes exacerbate tensions
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and internal disagreements that severely hamper outreach efforts since
many officials are either unable or unwilling to leave their regional enclaves.
Additionally, sceptics have also raised the question of whether it is possible
for the PM to distinguish outreach campaigns and apportionments from his
potential electoral bid as Abdulhamid Dabaiba continues to increase the
number of cabinet deputies either to appease key actors or solidify his al-
lies’ grip on key positions, as seen this month with the appointment of four
deputies to the Foreign Ministry or earlier with the nomination of a Deputy
Finance Minister who has direct ties with his nephew Ibrahim Dabaiba.
Generally, local notables have voiced their dissatisfaction at the lack of
concrete action to swiftly empty prisons from political detainees or imple-
ment basic reforms for social and economic development. This is particular-
ly true of the Fezzan region, Libya’s marginalised south, where a large part
of the political leadership remains imprisoned due to their perceived loyalty
to the former regime. In this case, the executive authority can only hope to
take a stand to defuse tensions and mitigate grievances through meetings
with local notables and policy discussions at the ministerial level. For ins-
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tance, tribal representatives from the Qadhadfa, Magarha and Awlad Sulei-
man have previously met with Deputy PC Head Abdullah al-Lafi to discuss
the prompt release of those arbitrarily detained and better treatment of their
kin in the rest of the country – without much progress by the end of May. The
Minister of Economy and Minister of State for Economic Affairs also started
consultations over the inclusion of the south in their Investment Map, which
would see the construction of new refineries, free economic zones, solar
energy plants and agricultural developments in the region. Deputy PM Ra-
madan Ahmed Boujenah has also led discussions to improve fuel deliveries
to the south, where commodity prices are subsequently higher than the rest
of the country.
It remains to be seen whether such efforts will bring actual results or are just
piecemeal attempts at defusing tensions. A reactive policy toward peace and
reconciliation from the executive authority will not be enough to overcome
Libya’s challenges. More proactiveness is needed so that the PC/GNU not
only reach out to stakeholders but also develop long-lasting trust and follow
up more constructively with them. The PC still has the time to follow through
and officially launched the work of its National Reconciliation Committee in
late May. This augurs a new series of meetings that could potentially accele-
rate political detainees’ release and prepare the ground for a national peace
conference. Despite shortcomings, the executive authority’s current work
still is a great improvement from the policies of the Government of National
Accord (GNA) considering that officials from the GNU/PC have actually co-
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vered ground throughout western, eastern and southern Libya. For instance,
al-Menfi’s visit to the eastern city of Derna in early May was the first by a
high profile official since the 2011 revolution, and Minister of Local Govern-
ment Badraddin al-Toumi managed to review the needs of the eastern mu-
nicipalities of al-Bayda and Benina. Additionally, prisoners of war were also
exchanged between the LNA and Volcano of Rage this month, which is the
sixth batch of such prisoner releases since the end of the conflict last year.
THE CLOCK IS TICKING FOR THE GENERAL ELEC-
TIONS’ LEGAL BASIS
The High National Election Commission (HNEC) has given a tight
deadline to the House of Representatives (HOR) and High Council
of State (HCS) to clarify the elections’ legal basis. However, disa-
greements could lead to critical delays and force the UN to step in.
With the July 1 deadline set by the HNEC fast approaching, establishing
an electoral framework and constitutional basis for elections has been the
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priority for not only UNSMIL but also foreign powers supportive of the 24
December general elections. According to the HNEC’s Chairman, Emad al-
Sayeh, the elections’ legal basis represents 30% of the remaining work to
prepare the electoral process since technical, logistical, and training tasks
are already well underway. In late April, the UN Envoy Ján Kubiš had conve-
ned the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum’s (LPDF) Legal Committee (LC) to
write down a draft proposal on a constitutional basis for elections, which
was later discussed virtually by LPDF members between 26-27 May. In his
opening remarks, the UN Envoy adopted a stronger tone than usual by re-
minding LPDF members that the electoral date was non-negotiable and that
most Libyans surveyed by UNSMIL supported the holding of elections be-
fore organising a referendum on the 2017 draft constitution. Additionally, he
reminded LPDF members of their narrow mandate and called upon them to
review the LC’s proposal in an expedient manner, so as to solve outstanding
issues instead of coming up with new ones.
Regrettably, the live-broadcast LPDF session was inconclusive as it included
a lot of bickering over the issue of dual citizenship for candidates and de-
monstrated once again the divide between supporters and opponents of
direct elections, as well as those who hope to avoid elections altogether.
Cognizant of the fact that presidential elections would diminish the power of
the HOR and HCS, as well as upend their positions within these national ins-
titutions, opponents of direct elections have turned a blind eye to UNSMIL’s
recommendations and called for holding the constitutional referendum be-
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fore elections. This demand is made under the pretext of ensuring enough
legislative oversight and defined presidential prerogatives, but it generally
serves the interest of those defending the status quo or fearing that direct
elections would lead to the victory of figures such as Saif al-Islam Gaddafi
or Khalifa Haftar. Pro-referendum calls were also advanced by about 100
politicians and legal activists, including members of the Constitution Draf-
ting Assembly (CDA), who released a statement rejecting the LC’s proposal
and argued that holding a referendum would be the least complicated and
shortest way to end Libya’s transitional phase. A number of voices within
Libya’s Islamist political currents, particularly those close to HCS Chairman
Khalid al-Mishri, have also warned against direct presidential elections and
accused UNSMIL as well as foreign countries of lobbying for such elections.
These attacks against direct elections corroborate claims from Emad al-
Sayeh that hardliners from both the HOR and HCS seek to obstruct elec-
tions by pushing for an early referendum and changing the HNEC’s board
of directors. Ján Kubiš also chided LPDF members for mirroring positions
from HOR and HCS members and warned that “political obstructionism to
preserve the status quo is not an option and cannot continue.”
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These divisions do not bode well for the timely adoption of a legal basis for
elections. Following the LPDF’s indecisiveness, the ball is now in the court
of the HOR and HCS, which have until mid-June to clarify the constitutional
basis and electoral framework for elections. Failing this, a new legal battle
is likely to arise with each of the HOR, HCS and UNSMIL having their own
recourse at hand. In fact, should national institutions fail to make progress
or decide to hold a constitutional referendum, UNSMIL has the option of
tasking the LPDF with approving the constitutional basis on a voting mo-
dality similar to the one used to agree on the selection mechanism for the
executive authority earlier in the year. However, nothing ensures that such
voting modality would secure an agreement on time and national institu-
tions might protest this procedure and further seek to control discussions
over the elections’ constitutional framework. For now, UNSMIL and HNEC
seem to have garnered enough goodwill from HOR Speaker Agila Saleh to
hold general elections first and foremost, but obstructionist voices within
the HOR and HCS remain powerful and could lead to delays beyond the July
1 deadline. Should UNSMIL fail to prevent national institutions from schedu-
ling an early referendum, there would then be a high probability for elections
to be postponed and the political environment to decay.
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INTERNATIONAL MOMENTUM TO SUPPORT
ELECTIONS ON 24 DECEMBER
The announcement of the Second Berlin Conference to be held
on 23 June raises hopes of a united international front to support
Libya’s political roadmap. However, several issues could harm the
Conference’s significance.
Since March 2021, when the GNU took office, the international community
has demonstrated greater commercial and diplomatic interest for Libya.
The confidence in Libya’s political transition is high enough for an increa-
sing number of countries to consider physical presence in Tripoli necessa-
ry to properly follow current developments. As such, the European Union’s
mission reopened its Tripoli office in May whilst Egypt, Austria and Spain
declared they would soon reopen their embassies. Libya’s foreign ministry
is also pushing for the UN’s humanitarian agencies as well as the United
States to resume work from inside Libya, going as far as proposing the
reopening of the American Consulate in Benghazi to demonstrate trust in
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Libya’s newfound stability. Importantly, Washington has finally taken on a
more prominent role to voice support for timely elections and push for the
immediate withdrawal of foreign mercenaries from Libya. In May, the US
Ambassador Richard Norland was not only appointed as Special Envoy to
Libya but welcomed US Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
Affairs Jeffrey Hood in a rare high-level visit to Libya, where they met Dabai-
ba, al-Menfi and al-Sayeh to signify that the United States would apply pres-
sure should elections be postponed.
This greater US involvement ahead of the 23 June Second Berlin Conference
is proof of tightened coordination between Washington, Berlin, Rome, Paris
and London over the Libyan file. The challenge for them will be to reach an
understanding with more recalcitrant powers like Turkey and Russia so as
to ensure the eventual withdrawal of foreign mercenaries from Libyan ter-
ritory. Germany has already started consultations with countries present in
Libya and Chancellor Angela Merkel emphasized to Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan how important a signal such as the removal of mercenaries
would be for a return to normal in Libya. Nonetheless, facts on the ground
are very different from what they were in January 2020 during the First Berlin
Conference as the current status quo does not encourage any of the inter-
vening actors to take the risk of reconsidering the extent of their military
presence. Rather, Turkey continues to signal that it wants the centre stage in
defining Libya’s future security and military landscape through several high
level meetings, one of which was held in early May with Defence Minister
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Hulusi Akar and Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu in Tripoli. Ankara knows
that its military presence and ensuing stability in Libya is bearing its fruits
as Turkish exports rose 50% in the first four months of 2021, and is therefore
not in a hurry to revise its position. Instead, Turkey continues to cultivate
ties with western Libyan figures and to push forward Security Sector Reform
(SSR) as well as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)
plans that would secure its interests even in the event of a troop withdrawal.
Ankara’s influence over figures such as Deputy PM Abdullah al-Lafi and Mi-
nister of State for Political Affairs and Communication Walid al-Lafi already
shows that Turkey has cultivated its allies as the former called for a Libyan
foreign policy drawing a fine line between countries that supported the civil
state (i.e. Turkey) and those who supported oppression (i.e. pro-LNA coun-
tries). Walid al-Lafi is thought to have been heavily involved in the pro-Tur-
key media campaign against Foreign Minister Najla al-Mangoush.
In addition to likely non-cooperation from the likes of Turkey and Russia, the
Second Berlin Conference could fall victim to delays in clarifying the elec-
tions’ constitutional basis. The July 1 deadline given by HNEC for national
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institutions to clarify such a basis is very close to June 23 and would give
international participants very little to work with should the legal deadlock
continue. Finally, the conference will also be a test case for more benevolent
powers to show that they wholeheartedly support general elections by De-
cember 24. Despite growing international support for elections, there is still
the risk that countries take too much a liking to the current state of affairs
and start dreading the upcoming elections as a potential disruption to their
security and business interests. In fact, European powers are already pres-
sing Libya’s new leadership to bolster border security in the Sahel as well
as the Mediterranean to tackle the migratory issue. This remains a tricky
issue in Tripoli considering past experiences and the Foreign Minister has
declared that “Libyans will not act as guards for the borders of Europe.”
LIBYA FACES PROLONGED DELAYS WITH THE
BUDGET ADOPTION
The Government of National Unity and House of Representatives
are locked in a silent struggle of wills over the budget’s adoption.
Despite the House of Representatives’ (HOR) clear recommendations for
amending the 2021 draft budget, the GNU’s revised version of early May
did not bring any major changes. In fact, the total of the amended budget
was reduced by just 2.2bn LYD (€400m) – taken mainly from the develop-
ment chapter – instead of being cut by 20% as recommended by the HOR.
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Naturally, this amended draft was rejected during a parliamentary session
between 24-25 May in Tobruk, where several MPs recalled that the 2021 bud-
get should only be worth around 76bn LYD (€14bn), not have any emergency
chapter and detail the expenses expected under the development chapter.
This quagmire has been made worse by poor communication between the
GNU and HOR as well as poor media coverage over this important matter. In
fact, MPs are both uninformed and skeptical about the GNU’s budget drafts,
with many claiming that government accountability will be compromised
should the budget be approved. For instance, the moderate bloc has already
raised its concerns about the Prime Minister’s announcement of recons-
truction funds for Benghazi, Derna, Sirte and Murzuq worth altogether 3bn
LYD (€555m). According to this bloc, the fact that no anti-corruption mecha-
nisms or detailed development plan were presented or the fact that no one
explained why these four cities were chosen over others shows the lack of
transparency on the GNU’s part as well as potential avenues for self-enrich-
ment. Even more so, Dabaiba placing under his own office the Organisation
for Development of Administrative Centres, which is headed by his uncle Ali
Dabaiba, has further raised concerns that the Dabaibas are seeking ave-
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nues for kickbacks to contracts that the GNU is preparing itself to sign.
By the end of May, the results of the Tobruk parliamentary session were
unclear due to several contradictory statements. Initially, it was believed
that MPs had agreed to at least pass chapter one covering salaries while
curtailing government access to state funds for broader expenses. However,
MP Abu Bakr Saeed appeared on media to disprove this news by saying that
the HOR could not approve only part of the budget and that subsequent
parliamentary sessions would be held in June to pass the budget under
certain conditions. Several MPs are still waiting for the HOR and HCS to
reach an understanding on sovereign positions, following several meetings
in May including in Bouznika, Morocco, and accelerate the unification of
state institutions – a step they deem necessary to ensure enough parlia-
mentary oversight over budget disbursements. Even more controversial in
the budgetary debates is the attempt by eastern MPs to carve out a piece of
the budget to finance the LNA and somehow institutionalise it as the “Army
General Command” alongside the Defence Ministry, a highly unlikely step
considering opposition to the LNA and the fact that this allocation would
probably not buy Khalifa Haftar’s obedience to the GNU.
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REGIONAL COUNTRIES INCREASE POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC TIES WITH LIBYA
Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt are accelerating political and commer-
cial ties to Tripoli in the hope of sharing Libya’s large economic
potential.
For neighbouring countries, Libya is an important factor in determining se-
curity and the health of the economy. Traditionally, the country has provided
employment opportunities and remittances, been a large market for agricul-
tural and industrial goods as well as a source of tourism revenues for the
likes of Tunisia, Egypt and to a lesser extent Algeria. Now that the outlook
for stability in Libya is relatively positive, these three countries are bolste-
ring ties with the GNU to play their natural part in Libya’s reconstruction
- which has recently been estimated at 600bn LYD (€111bn) over 10 years by
Libya’s Minister of State for Economic Affairs. On 22nd May, Tunisian Prime
Minister Hichem Mechichi visited Tripoli where he signed a memorandum
of understanding to ease the movement of citizens and trade between the
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two countries – with Letters of Credit no longer required for Tunisian goods
entering Libya by land. Ultimately, it is believed that up to 500,000 Tuni-
sians could find work in Libya, principally in the services sector as long as
the Libyan Dinar regains some of its value. In a show of solidarity, Libya also
proposed to deposit €1bn into the Central Bank of Tunisia to help the fiscal-
ly-challenged country secure a much-needed loan from the IMF.
Egypt’s large construction sector also aims at carving a large chunk out of Li-
byan reconstruction contracts and at easing freedom of movement between
the two countries as it is believed that up to 3 million Egyptian workers could
end up working in Libya. In addition to deep-rooted commercial and cultural
ties, neighbouring countries also offer potential solutions to Libya’s imme-
diate problems, including the electricity shortage. Egypt’s Electricity Trans-
mission Company is already developing studies to double the linkage line’s
capacity to 500MW and would ultimately target a capacity of up to 3GW in
the long-term. Algeria, which shares the characteristics of a hydrocarbon
economy with Libya, also represents a potential source of electricity as well
as technical cooperation in the oil and gas sector. In fact, the Libyan Minister
of Oil and Gas as well as the General Electric Company of Libya’s (GECOL)
Chairman have accompanied PM Dabaiba in his visit to the Algerian-Libyan
Forum in Algiers to potentially carve new partnerships in the energy sector.
The Ministry of Transport and Foreign Minister were also present at the Fo-
rum and led to agreements on the reopening of the Debdab border crossing
as well as resumption of air traffic between Algeria and Libya.
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CHADIAN CRISIS PROMPTS A REFOCUS ON
SOUTHERN BORDER SECURITY
Efforts to remove mercenaries and reopen the coastal road are
deadlocked. Nonetheless, efforts are ongoing to limit the pre-
sence of sub-Saharan mercenaries in Libya.
Ján Kubiš, the UN Envoy to Libya, has clearly stated that efforts to remove
foreign mercenaries from Libya have stalled. The proposition stemming from
the International Follow-up Committee on Libya (IFCL) to have a sequenced
withdrawal of Syrian mercenaries with UNSMIL monitoring was not received
positively by either Turkey or Russia as it faced a sequencing issue. Specifi-
cally, Turkey relies more heavily on Syrian mercenaries than Russia and has
therefore requested that Moscow remove its nationals present in the Wagner
private military contractor as a first step – something that Russia, in turn, is
only ready to do if Ankara removes its officers as well. Similarly, the coastal
road remains closed despite growing calls from the inhabitants of Sirte to
reopen this lifeline and gain access to much needed primary goods. The 5+5
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Joint Military Commission (JMC) is therefore left with little to work with but
it is seeking to establish a unified and apolitical technical sub-committee
focused on DDR to identify and categorize Libyan armed groups with the
eventual goal of dismantling them.
The Chadian crisis erupting in April has motivated regional leaders to take
the issue of armed groups’ cross-border movements more seriously, with the
Sudanese and Chadian governments holding discussions on arrangements
to disarm their nationals operating as militiamen in Libya. The US Special
Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, Donald Booth, also called upon the Su-
danese armed opposition to withdraw from Libya and Niger’s permanent
representative to the UN called on Sahel countries and Libya to bolster their
security coordination as well as prevent the spread of terrorism. Mohamed
al-Menfi also travelled to Nigeria for an extraordinary summit of the Lake
Chad Basin Commission, focused on the current security situation. Gene-
rally, Sudanese and Chadian fighters have been less supervised and more
mobile than Syrian mercenaries, which has given rise to several clashes with
Libyan civilians such as those reported this month in the southern areas of
Houn and Sukna where Janjaweed fighters encroached upon private farm
lands. Considering the risk to national security that sub-Saharan merce-
naries represent for Libya and the fact that sub-Saharan governments are
becoming more willing to cooperate with Tripoli to solve this issue, there
may be additional efforts in the coming months from the PC/GNU to remove
these mercenaries by for instance solving their grievances over non-pay-
ment of dues.
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MINISTRY OF INTERIOR SEEKS TO BECOME A FORCE
TO BE RECKONED WITH
Interior Minister Khaled Mazen has increased visits to security
directorates and devised preliminary plans to gain relevance and
secure the 24 December elections.
Over the last years, Libya’s multiple poles of power and security providers
have made it hard for the Ministry of Interior to enjoy state monopoly over
violence and be a force to be reckoned with in Libya’s security landscape. This
has been true of the GNU’s Minister of Interior, Khaled Mazen, who is general-
ly not the first person to be called by high officials to ensure a strong security
detail as western-based militias have most of the security cards in their hands.
However, the minister and his undersecretaries have recently pushed for tigh-
ter coordination with security directorates all over the country, including in
cities under the nominal control of the LNA as well as military powerhouses
like Misrata. Their consultations are aimed at unifying the country’s official
security facilities and reinforcing their capacity so as to slowly regain state
INSIDE LIBYA
relevance in the security sector. On May 11, the Ministry of Interior announced
an ultimatum of 1-month for any individual carrying unlicensed weapons to
deliver them to the nearest police station and also called on every local secu-
rity institution to establish a weapon licensing department. While it remains
unlikely that the decree would do much to decrease the vast number of small
arms in the country, it finally is a concrete action taken toward disarmament
and further pacifying the country ahead of elections.
However, it is important to note that monopoly of state violence for the GNU
is still a far cry as the LNA has time and again shown it considers itself to be
Libya’s armed forces and a major security provider in Cyrenaica, whilst other
armed groups such as the 444 Brigade continue to further institutionalise
themselves into the de facto security provider in Tripolitania. Days after Prime
Minister Dabaiba visited Bani Walid on 20 May with a large ministerial dele-
gation to discuss a wide range of issues including security, the 444 Brigade
launched a security wall going from western Tripoli to Bani Walid involving
about 1,000 soldiers to secure the area, which is a central node of human
trafficking and smuggling in the western region.
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CONCLUSION & FORECASTS
Partly due to the month of Ramadan’s hiatus, April and May did not bring
much constructive developments in regards to the establishment of a legal
basis for elections, the adoption of the budget by the HOR or progress in
the withdrawal of foreign fighters. Instead, the last weeks have shown that
Libya’s usual divides are still vivid and that major figures on both ends of the
political spectrum lack the willingness to work toward genuine national re-
conciliation. Those figures are still engaged in a tug-of-war that has made it
near impossible for the new executive to act as an overarching authority and
transcend regional divisions. This has meant that the GNU has been caught
in the middle of domestic power plays and now needs to let go of its grand
ambitions to instead focus more seriously on the immediate requirements of
the political roadmap for Libya.
Two of the most important requirements are the adoption of a constitutional
basis and electoral law for the 24th December elections, as well as the wit-
hdrawal of foreign fighters from Libya. In June, these two requirements are
INSIDE LIBYA
likely to be brought forward by the international community thanks to seve-
ral events such as the G7 Summit on 11-13 June, discussions at the Security
Council presided by France, the Biden-Putin meeting on 16 June and, more
importantly, the Second Berlin Conference on 23 June. Both UNSMIL and
Germany have spearheaded consultations with important foreign stakehol-
ders in Libya, including Turkey and Russia, and the Conference will be crucial
in not only assessing progress toward achieving the political roadmap but
also devising failsafes should a legal basis for elections not be attained by
July 1 and belligerent powers refuse to kickstart the demilitarisation process.
In this view, the work of the 5+5 JMC should be empowered by the inter-
national community so that its proposed solutions can materialize and
bring change in the form of a unified battalion as well as a technical DDR
sub-committee. Equally, the idea of a sequenced departure of foreign fi-
ghters should not be abandoned as Turkey and Russia cannot expect the
current status-quo to last perpetually. There are still avenues to convince
such countries that Libya’s stability demands new security arrangements
and that supporting the momentum for elections will benefit all countries
involved since any delay has the potential to erupt in renewed conflict and
the cancellation of contracts/MoUs currently under consideration. It is also
high time for spoilers to bear the consequences of their actions through in-
ternational sanctions, particularly if status-quo figures manage to derail the
timely adoption of a constitutional basis and electoral law to delay elections
into 2022 or even later. Eventually, if Libya does not regain momentum for its
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political process, it could be envisaged for the PC to legislate elections by
decrees with United Nations’ oversight so as to guarantee popular soverei-
gnty and avoid renewed conflict.
During his speech at the LNA’s military parade on May 29, Khalifa Haftar
made it clear that the alternative to elections would be war. This was one of
his most coherent speeches politically, in which he expressed support for
the further implementation of the political roadmap while threatening those
muddling the work of the 5+5 JMC as well as legal developments to gua-
rantee elections. As explained in the tenth edition of Inside Libya, this places
Libya at a crossroad similar to the weeks running up to the 4th April 2019
Tripoli offensive, when Haftar had voiced threats against the GNA should
they not follow through with their commitments to the political transition.
The resumption of war would be catastrophic for Libya as it would further ce-
ment the national divides that the political roadmap has sought to allay over
the last months. Importantly, the LNA is not in a position to win the war that
its commander is warning about, but it is powerful enough to hold its ground
and support the rise of another parallel government in the east.
INSIDE LIBYA
On another note, June will also be the unofficial start of campaigning as the
Parties Affairs Committee of the Justice Ministry will start granting permits
to parties wishing to engage in political work. This is when the PC/GNU will
need to be active in pushing forward a code of conduct for the 24 December
elections, so as to ensure that each of the before, during and after phases of
voting are free and do not lead to spoilers rejecting the end results. Adopting
a code of conduct will require from the executive authority a more effective
outreach programme so as to ensure that all stakeholders feel confident
enough to participate in the elections and accept its results. Preparing a
national peace conference in the coming weeks would be an important step
to bring about a more conducive environment for elections, and institutions
like the PC and HNEC should take the lead on such initiatives. Both institu-
tions remain the best suited to reach out to the widest range of stakeholders
and raise awareness amongst voters and candidates so as to make sure that
the 24 December elections represent a landmark event capable of galvani-
zing a majority of Libyans to express their will through the ballot box.
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Authors: Mohamed Dorda, Oliver Crowley and Daniel Moshashai from LIBYA DESK™.
Contacts: EDITOR@LIBYADESK.COM | WWW.LIBYADESK.COM | @LIBYADESK
INSIDE LIBYA
Disclaimer: The information and views set out in this publication are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung or its
Regional Program Political Dialogue South Mediterranean.
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V.
Thomas Volk
Director
Regional Program Political Dialogue South Mediterranean
www.kas.de/poldimed
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V.
Regional Program Political Dialogue South Mediterranean
Le Prestige Business Center, No. F.0.1
Rue du lac Windermere, Les Berges du Lac
1053 Tunis, Tunisia
Telefon: +216 70 029 460
E-Mail: info.poldimed@kas.de
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Attribution- Share Alike 4.0 international” (CC BY-SA 4.0),
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