HYBRID COE'S KEY THEMES AND APPROACHES TO COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS IN 2022 - HYBRID COE
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Hybrid CoE’s
key themes and
approaches to
countering hybrid
threats in 2022
Hybrid CoEThe European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats tel. +358 400 253800 www.hybridcoe.fi
Hybrid CoE is an international hub for practitioners and experts, building participating states’ and institutions’ capabilities and
enhancing EU-NATO cooperation in countering hybrid threats located in Helsinki, Finland
2HYBRID COE’S KEY THEMES AND
APPROACHES TO COUNTERING
HYBRID THREATS IN 2022
Introduction work in analyzing, monitoring and countering
hybrid threats in 2022. It then outlines the main
2021 was still affected by the pandemic and the operational modes of the Centre with some new
intensifying great-power rivalry in its shadow. innovations included.
Hybrid CoE broadened its work to encompass the
areas identified by Participating States as key chal- Hybrid CoE’s key themes and approaches
lenges, and continued to adjust its forms of activity to countering hybrid threats in 2022
to conditions under which possibilities for travel
and physical events were still highly constrained. In As defined in its constitutive document (Memo-
addition to a growing number of virtual meetings randum of Understanding), Hybrid CoE’s key goal
and workshops, monthly webinars were organ- is “to serve as a hub of expertise supporting the
ized to introduce new themes and perspectives. Participants’ individual and collective efforts to
The Centre’s publications activity was also further enhance their civil-military capabilities, resilience
intensified. and preparedness to counter hybrid threats with
Hybrid CoE continued to consolidate its fields of a special focus on European security”. The Cen-
expertise and organize its work so that interaction tre fulfils this goal by providing a platform for its
with key stakeholders and delivery of its capacity in participants to come together, share best prac-
support of them would be smooth and easy. When tices, build capability, test new ideas and practise
launching new workstrands, Hybrid CoE reached defence against hybrid threats. As a hub of exper-
out to its stakeholders to identify their interests tise, the Centre leads the discussion on countering
and demands regarding the topic. Many successful hybrid threats through research and sharing best
projects have been further developed into modules practices.
to be provided for the Participating States on a Hybrid CoE’s assets are linked to its role as
recurring basis. a network-based organization coordinating and
Along with its leading role in the Horizon supporting the expertise of its networks of practi-
2020-funded EU-HYBNET project, the Centre tioners, academics and private sector represent-
extended its networks further and strengthened its atives. Enhancing both cross-governmental and
close cooperation with various EU and NATO bod- public-private dialogue is an essential part of the
ies. The Centre’s training and exercises activities Centre’s work.
have expanded and been incorporated into many Thematically, the Centre’s work plan for 2022
thematic workstrands to enable the Participating can be divided into three major fields of interest:
States to test both their national preparedness for
hybrid threats and their opportunities for mutual - Strengthening knowledge about the particular
cooperation to counter them. characteristics of hybrid threats with their
Hybrid CoE’s work plan for 2022 is firmly operational logic, and making proposals to
anchored in the work and fields of expertise devel- counter them.
oped during the previous year. New topics have - Strengthening knowledge about hybrid threat
been added on the basis of demand, and changes in action as a part of the strategies and policies
the hybrid threat landscape. The work plan firstly of actors in charge of them, and creating ideas
presents the key thematic fields for the Centre’s about how to cope with them.
3- Strengthening knowledge about the key There are several workstrands planned for 2022
vulnerabilities of Western societies with where the particularities of hybrid threat action
respect to hybrid threats and providing ideas will be analyzed by mapping their emergence
about how to address them. within a specific geopolitical region or in a thematic
context. The Research and Analysis (R&A) function
In the following sections, the Centre’s work plan will carry out a project on the Eastern Partnership
will be presented by grouping the workstrands countries by exploring patterns and trends in their
planned under these three main themes. security developments relevant to hybrid threats.
The ongoing work on hybrid threat potential in
Strengthening knowledge about the and towards the Arctic will move into its second
particular characteristics of hybrid threats phase, building on the first phase’s scoping work
with their operational logic, and making and framework tabletop exercise training module
proposals to counter them. to develop further iterations through case stud-
ies on how hybrid threats are manifesting at local,
Hybrid threats differ from the traditional forms national and regional levels amongst the Participat-
and instruments of power projection in interna- ing States.
tional politics by virtue of their operational mode, Another workstrand will focus on identifying
instruments, and ways of using them. There are trends in the global economy from the hybrid
thus many particularities, ranging from the use of threat point of view, resulting in a trend report and
various interfaces to causing confusion and ambi- an expanded network of practitioners and experts.
guity and further to the use of proxies, which make This work is based on joint efforts between COI
the detection of responsibilities difficult. They are V&R and the R&A function, and will draw inspira-
all aimed at preventing the target from effectively tion from an external baseline study on the strug-
responding to the action and protecting itself gle for positions in the global economy, commis-
against it. As a consequence, hybrid threats usually sioned in 2021.
occur in many domains simultaneously, and are Another key effort to map and identify emerging
designed to remain below the threshold of detec- hybrid threat activities takes the form of Hybrid
tion and attribution. CoE’s internal open-source monitoring system –
Hybrid CoE continues to work on studying the Monitoring, Assessment and Reporting Group
particularities of hybrid threat action both through Capability (MSG) – established in spring 2020 to
conceptual work and by mapping the forms of monitor hybrid threat activities in the COVID-
ongoing hybrid threat activity. 19 framework. Apart from enhancing situational
One of the main efforts in this context takes awareness in the Centre, the system has produced
place in the framework of the Deterrence Work- monthly reports for the Centre’s networks, focus-
strand, which has been continued from its initial ing on actors and thematic fields of hybrid threat
conceptual analysis phase into a module consisting activity (Russia, China, the Arctic, Deterrence,
of both training and exercise activities, as well as etc.). In 2022, the monitoring capacity will be con-
various case studies in support of them. The goal tinued with a focus on hybrid threat activities in
is to increase understanding of how deterrence general, and new emerging threats and trends in
against hybrid threats can be built, what the var- particular. In addition to bi-monthly reports pro-
ious policy instruments are, and how the EU and vided for Hybrid CoE’s networks, an annual report
NATO can best be involved in this activity. COI will be launched in June built on the data and find-
Hybrid Influencing (HI) leads the project and will ings from that year. MSG is a Centre-wide project
continue offering exercises to the Participating involving participants from all of the Centre’s func-
States, as well as publishing a further set of case tions, monitoring hybrid threat activity in their field
studies. A mid-term review of the deterrence work of interest. It also serves as an important tool for
is planned for Q3/Q4 2022. the Centre’s internal professional development.
4A new workstrand will be launched by COI V&R led by the R & A function comparing and contrast-
in the field of ‘instrumentalized migration’, which ing the strategic cultures of authoritarian states
focuses on the use of irregular migration flows as (“Seeing red”), already launched in 2020. The aim
a hybrid threat instrument. The workstrand will is to enable the Centre’s networks to understand
approach this phenomenon at a general level by not just what but why actors such as Russia and
addressing issues such as legal vulnerability used China make certain choices, enabling efforts to
to exert pressure and create instability in the anticipate and counter hybrid threats. In 2022, the
target countries. It will also study the set of tools workstrand will produce a comparative analysis
used by state and non-state hybrid actors. Work research report as well as a methodology paper
will start by organizing expert meetings and focused on enhanced best practices. This project
commissioning background studies on the topic. will take advantage of the Centre’s strengthened
Finally, the Centre’s work on enhancing knowl- expertise on China, building on existing Hybrid
edge about the particularities of hybrid threat CoE work as well as the intensified expert-pool
action will continue in the thematic field of cyber activity in the field.
and modern technologies. Both of these themes Another workstrand under the leadership of
build on the earlier work of the Community of COI HI will deepen earlier work on non-state
Interest on Strategy and Defence (S&D), which actors functioning as proxies in hybrid threat oper-
will now be taken further. The results of an earlier ations, and develop the conceptual work into the
project on Hybrid Warfare: Future & Technologies form of more concrete detection and response
(HYFUTEC) will be used to enhance knowledge analysis. New case studies will analyze the stra-
about the use of modern technologies in improv- tegic drivers underpinning the use of non-state
ing multidomain situational awareness. The cyber actors by state actors. The broader goal is to
power project will continue to focus on the inter- prepare to detect, deter and prevent or mitigate
linkages both between cyber power and the cyber hybrid threats caused by the use of non-state
domain and hybrid threat action. Its results are actors.
disseminated through an annual cyber sympo- There are also many other workstrands where
sium and regular publication of Hybrid CoE cyber the role of hybrid threat actors will be analyzed
papers. as one element among a multifaceted set of ques-
tions. The workstrands on Cyber (COI S&D) and
Strengthening knowledge about hybrid Economic Resilience (COI V&R) can be mentioned
threat action as a part of the strategies and as two examples, with the first focusing on cyber
policies of actors in charge of them, and threat capabilities and strategies as one question,
creating ideas about how to cope with and the latter on the economic potential of the key
them. global actors with its possible hybrid threat impli-
cations in mind.
Another key theme in Hybrid CoE’s work plan
deals with hybrid threat action as a part of the Strengthening knowledge about the key
broader strategies and policies of actors in charge vulnerabilities of Western societies with
of them. This approach is designed to enhance respect to hybrid threats and providing
knowledge about similarities and differences ideas about how to address them.
between different actors, as well as the more
detailed political logic behind the selection of The third key theme for Hybrid CoE’s work
means used. The ultimate goal of the Centre’s work in 2022 deals with identifying Western actors’
in this respect is to provide ideas about how to vulnerabilities to hybrid threats, and building
cope with these forms of action. resilience and response capabilities.
Two key workstrands planned for 2022 will shed One of the leading joint workstrands for the
light on hybrid threat actors: the first is a project Centre in this field deals with resilience, and the
5way in which resilience within different political deals with key issues of Safeguarding Democratic
and societal domains can be challenged by hybrid Processes. This workstrand is led by COI HI and
threat actors. This workstrand is a joint effort encompasses Situational Awareness (especially
between R&A and COI V&R and is carried out through Open-Source Intelligence training), public/
as a cooperative project with the Joint Research private engagement (focusing on large tech compa-
Centre of the European Commission (JRC). It thus nies), analysis of disinformation tools used to chal-
builds on previous cooperation in the framework lenge Western democracy, and training to counter
of the Conceptual Framework for Hybrid Threats election interference. These projects will now be
project with the JRC. taken further with an expanded team, building
Another external cooperation project related partly on cooperation with key partners such as the
to this theme is the Resilient Civilians project EEAS and the NATO StratCom COE.
(funded by the NATO Science for Peace and Secu-
rity Programme). R&A’s contribution to this project Hybrid CoE’s operational modes for 2022
takes the form of the delivery and execution of
an exercise in support of decision-makers’ abil- Hybrid CoE’s Helsinki-based office currently
ity to include civil society actors in the policies of hosts 36 members of staff representing 12 dif-
building resilience. COI V&R’s work on resilience ferent nationalities and a wide variety of profes-
focuses further on public-private partnerships in sional backgrounds. The secondments from the
enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructures. Participating States – currently 15 experts – play
COI V&R will continue with the workstrand on an important role in this context as the Centre
Maritime Hybrid Threats, focusing among other leads and coordinates Hybrid CoE’s multifaceted
things on legal vulnerabilities in the framework of international activities. In 2020 a new publica-
international law at sea. An earlier published hand- tions editor function was established to further
book consisting of different legal scenarios will strengthen the high quality and profile of Hybrid
be updated in 2022 with training events based on CoE’s publications. In 2021 the fields of expertise
them to be continued. were enhanced by creating a position for a China
Another workstrand with the general goal of expert. In 2022 a modest growth in staffing is to be
mapping vulnerabilities is the COI V&R-led work expected.
on Aviation and Space, which started with the Hybrid CoE’s operational modes combine a wide
publication of a baseline study in 2021. This work range of activities to ensure that the Centre is a
will now be taken further by organizing an expert credible and relevant leader in promoting a greater
workshop to define the more detailed topics to be understanding of hybrid threats, from small brain-
addressed in this context from the point of view of storming sessions and sets of consecutive work-
hybrid threats. shops to large-scale meetings and conferences.
In 2021, a workstrand was established under These are sustained by the Centre’s own research
this general theme by COI S&D, focusing on the activities, and studies and reports commissioned
Strategies and Policies of Hybrid CoE’s Participat- from the Centre’s academic and practitioner expert
ing States in countering hybrid threats. By high- networks. Various forms of training, exercises and
lighting similarities and differences, this compar- capabilities provided for different audiences form
ative analysis of the approaches aims to provide an important part of the Centre’s commitment to
good practices and allow administrations to learn applying work to counter hybrid threats.
from each other. This work will now be continued
on the basis of experiences and data accumulated Networks and partnerships
during the first year and culminating in the publica-
tion of an annual report. As Hybrid CoE is a network-based organization,
The final workstrand under the theme of map- its networks and partnerships will also play a key
ping vulnerabilities and enhancing resilience role – and will be developed further – in 2022. In
62020, the Centre’s IR unit started a comprehensive ment” project funded by NATO’s science for peace
mapping of the expectations and interests of its mechanism and led by the Arctic University of
Participating States vis-à-vis the Centre, and this Tromsø will continue in 2022.
work will continue annually. In 2021 it was com-
plemented by bilateral (virtual) meetings between Training and exercises
Steering Board Chair Jori Arvonen and all of the
Participating State representatives in Hybrid CoE’s Through the Training and Exercises func-
Steering Board. Continuous dialogue with the Cen- tion, Hybrid CoE’s work is uniquely positioned to
tre’s key stakeholders is a vital part of its activities remove impediments to cross-societal, intra-gov-
and takes continuously place in the form of meet- ernmental approaches aimed at reducing the
ings and visits at various levels. effects of hybrid threats on individual member
Hybrid CoE will also continue its close coop- state societies and institutions. The Training and
eration with the EU institutions (the Commission Exercises function continues to support the Cen-
including DG DEFIS and the Joint Research Cen- tre’s work by taking a pragmatic approach through
tre, the Council and its bodies including the EEAS, the development of original hybrid threat-related
the European Defence Agency and the European training and exercise programmes. In 2022, Train-
Security and Defence College, as well as the Euro- ing and Exercises will expand the reach of the
pean Parliament including its committees and sec- Centre by providing expertise in both NATO and
retariat). It will continue to support the incoming EU exercises, build Participating State capacity
Council Presidencies in the Horizontal Working though hybrid training opportunities, and create
Party and in the POC meetings of the Hybrid original exercises inspired by the conceptualization
Fusion Cell. Hybrid CoE’s experts will present their of hybrid threats. Exercises will continue to be the
work to the relevant political and military bodies best way to offer the network of practitioners an
of NATO (including the Hybrid Analysis Branch of opportunity to apply counter-hybrid threat tools to
the Joint Intelligence and Security Division and the strengthen knowledge and build institutional mus-
Enablement and Resilience Section of the Defence cle memory to counter future hybrid effects.
Policy and Planning Division). The annual High Continuing to produce innovative ways to
Level Retreat, bringing together leading EU and explore the spectrum of hybrid threats in a prag-
NATO officials, will continue to provide an informal matic way, the Training and Exercises function will
platform for discussions between the two look at ways in which wargaming can provide a
organizations. platform to better strengthen democratic institu-
During 2022, the Centre will continue its work tions, communicate with populations, and develop
to deepen and structure its various partnerships. a whole-of-society approach to recognizing,
Cooperation with international and non-govern- responding to, and defending against threats such
mental organizations will also be further systema- as disinformation. Through funding from the US
tized as the Centre’s networks continue to grow. Global Engagement Center, Training and Exercises
The Research and Analysis function will con- leads a series of events that will allow participants
tinue to support the Centre’s work by establish- to develop and employ their own strategies to
ing networks with the transatlantic academic and counter disinformation through the use of a virtual
research community. Its expert pools provide a tool exercise platform.
for this – an assessment of the forms and composi- In 2022, a Hybrid 101 training module will be
tion of the pools has recently taken place, ensuring offered to the Participating States and other stake-
their full representativeness with respect to the holders, consisting of topical presentations and
Participating States. The EU-HYBNET project will briefings. The wargaming course organized in 2021
provide additional tools for the Centre to create is planned to be run in 2022 as well.
networks and partnerships with new actors and In 2021, the Centre started to compile a cata-
the “Resilient Civilians in a Hybrid Threat Environ- logue of training events and exercises to provide a
7better overview of its programme and the options Events and conferences in hybrid form
available for its stakeholders. This practice will con-
tinue in 2022. After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic,
Hybrid CoE shifted its modus operandi from
Publications organizing physical events to running all of the
activities online. This practice will continue next
Through its publications, the Centre will continue year in parallel with the increasing number of
working on delivering timely and tailored analysis physical events.
and advice on hybrid threat-related issues. The In 2022, Hybrid CoE will continue organizing
Centre’s publications range from short paper for- monthly webinars. The purpose of the webinars
mats such as the Strategic Analysis papers, which is to have a discussion on topical hybrid threat-
aim to seed discussion, to longer edited Research related issues, to introduce new topics, or to
Reports designed to contribute to the existing aca- approach a well-known challenge from a fresh
demic body of knowledge, as well as more focused angle. Webinar topics are closely linked with the
manuals and lessons learned, which present timely work done at the Centre. Topics can also be chosen
and targeted recommendations, and Records, according to the feedback received from Hybrid
which present workshop and exercise summaries CoE network members. Webinars will be organized
and project outcomes. The papers are divided into under the Chatham House Rule, so that discus-
public and limited release publications. The public sions can take place in a safe space. Speakers will be
publications are aimed at a broader audience, while invited from academia and/or from government.
the limited release publications cover more tar- In addition to monthly webinars, Hybrid CoE will
geted and sensitive subjects. act as a co-host or support virtual events organ-
During 2022, the Centre’s aim is to reinforce ized by distinguished think tanks, with a view to
external communication about its publications promoting the Centre’s work and expertise, and
to ensure that Hybrid CoE is leading the discus- to contributing to the public discussion on hybrid
sion on hybrid threats, as well as providing timely threats.
and practical insights for the Participating States, The functions will gradually increase the number
NATO and the EU. Communication with key stake- of physical meetings and events to maximize inter-
holders will be streamlined as a part of the Cen- action with Participating State practitioners and
tre’s new communications strategy, the gradual other stakeholders in the framework of all work-
implementation of which started in 2021. The goal strands. In 2022, the Centre will organize major
is to ensure smooth and efficient communication events on themes cutting across its work plan. The
about the Centre’s work and activities, including High Level Retreat will bring leading EU and NATO
publications, with its key stakeholders. practitioners together to discuss important hybrid
threat-related topics.
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Hybrid CoE
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