Greece external relations briefing: Greek Foreign Policy for 2021

ISSN: 2560-1601

                                                                                     Vol. 36, No. 4 (GR)

                                                                                           January 2021

                                Greece external relations briefing:
                                    Greek Foreign Policy for 2021
                                           George N. Tzogopoulos

                                                              1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11.

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Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin
Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping                         china-cee.eu

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Greek Foreign Policy for 2021

      The last semester of 2020 was particular difficult for Greek foreign policy but ended with
the decision of the Turkish government to withdraw ‘Oruc Reis’ vessel form disputed waters of
the Eastern Mediterranean. As a result, Athens and Ankara resumed discussion in the format
of exploratory talks on 25 January 2021. The evolution of Greek-Turkish relations will
dominate in Greek foreign policy calculations in the new year. The possibility of a breakthrough
is limited but the restart of talks itself constitutes a positive development that has been
welcomed by the international community, which expects from the two sides to peacefully solve
their differences. While diplomats will engage in discussions at the technical level, Greece and
Turkey will have an opportunity to construct a more positive agenda, even if thorny issues
remain unsolved, for example in the context of the multilateral dialogue for the Eastern
Mediterranean that the EU has proposed.

      The evolution of Greek-Turkish relations will be the main issue of interest for Greek
foreign policy in 2021. The withdrawal of the Turkish ‘Oruc Reis’ vessel from the Eastern
Mediterranean in December 2020 opened a new window of opportunity for Athens and Ankara
to resume dialogue. This dialogue is being conducted in the context of exploratory talks.
Exploratory talks did resume on 25 January 2021 indeed. The Greek delegation held discussions
in Istanbul with the Turkish one. It was the first time the two sides met after 2016 when the 60th
round – and until January 2021 the last one – had been organized in the Greek capital.
According to media information, the two delegations will meet in Athens in due time in their
effort to continue exchanges. Both the EU and the US have welcomed the resumption of
exploratory talks.

      The restart of exploratory talks itself is positive because it can perhaps contribute to the
reduction of tensions. In the absence of those talks for almost five years, Greek-Turkish
relations entered a phase of misunderstandings that culminated in the standoff of the second
half of 2020. The format of the exploratory talks allows the Greek and the Turkish delegations
to informally exchange views. The aim is to reach common ground at the technical and
diplomatic level in order for the political leadership of the two countries to make decisions.
Historical experience suggests that this common ground can be achieved at the technical and
diplomatic level. The choices of political leaders are not always on the same line, however.

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Greece is hoping for calmness in its neighborhood. Its current priority is to place the virus
under control and work on the post-COVID-19 economic recovery. Tensions with Turkey,
especially of the extent of the last months of 2020, cause turmoil that can occasionally be
uncontrollable. Under calm and stable conditions, Greece is able not only to concentrate on the
management of the pandemic but also elaborate on the modernization of its armed forces. In
last days of December 2020, for instance, Greece and Israel finalized an agreement to open a
new international flight training school in the city of Kalamata. And in January 2021, the
purchase of Rafale fighters from France was sealed. French Defense Minister Florence Parly
also made an offer to sell a new generation of frigates that might be arguably co-produced by
the two countries.

      On the whole, two schools of thought prevail in the Greek political discourse. The first,
where Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis adheres to, suggests that dialogue with Turkey is a
necessary component of Greek foreign policy. The second, where former Prime Minister
Antonis Samaras belongs to, considers dialogue an anathema as long as Turkey provokes and
threatens Greece and hopes for the implementation of sanctions in order for Turkey to change
its behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean. It should be mentioned, however, that exploratory
talks were normally evolving during Samaras’ tenure as Greece’s prime minister from 2012
until 2015. Although the general foreign policy of Turkey is currently different in comparison
to those years, it is questionable what way he would follow as acting premier.

      Exploratory talks, as the lemmas denote, is not a formal type of dialogue but an informal
discussion process that can possibly lead to formal dialogue. This is where the problem begins.
The agenda of Greece differs from that of Turkey. While Greece is prepared to discuss the
delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone in the Aegean and the
Eastern Mediterranean as well as the breadth of territorial waters, Turkey pushes for a wider
agenda. This includes the militarization of some Aegean islands, the sovereignty of some
Aegean islets, the breadth of airspace and issues of search and rescue. If there is a convergence
of interests, the two countries can either agree politically on a type of solution or refer their
dispute to the International Court of Justice. No Greek government will give in and accept the
Turkish comprehensive list of demands. For its part, Turkey will hardly be prepared to discuss
maritime zones only. The likelihood of an impasse is high according to publicly available
resources.

      In the scenario that Turkey accepts formal dialogue to focus on maritime zones only, a
compromise between the two countries will be required. This compromise, which will be
possibly finalized at the International Court of Justice, will cause waves of reaction in Greece

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– even before the relevant announcement is made. Samaras has already given an interview to
the Sunday edition of Kathimerini in which he clearly expresses his disagreement with the
resumption of exploratory talks. Whether this disagreement is a firework or can lead the right-
wing MPs of New Democracy to challenge Mitsotakis’ foreign policy capacity will be seen. As
far as Greek media are concerned, they have downplayed the importance of dialogue throughout
2020 in a manner that cannot be easily reversed.

      Another interesting question is how the restart of Greek-Turkish exploratory talks will
impact on regional developments. The EU has already started preparations for the so-called
multilateral dialogue for the Eastern Mediterranean. While seven actors, namely Greece,
Cyprus, Italy, Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan, have already established the
East Med Gas Forum, the European approach is more holistic and considers the participation
of Turkey a prerequisite for the promotion of successful solutions in the Basin. The possibility
of a multilateral dialogue is theoretically promising but wars in Syria and Libya as well as the
Cyprus Question render the process particularly difficult. Nevertheless, talks on cooperation
under the EU umbrella will certainly contribute to a better understanding among countries in
the Eastern Mediterranean. Such a positive agenda will play a role of reconciliation in spite of
severity of existing problems.

      From the moment exploratory talks resumed, Greece can hardly play the card of sanctions
against Turkey at the EU level – with the exception of the Turkish violations of the Exclusive
Economic Zone of Cyprus. Brussels as well as the international community – including all
members of the UN Security Council – expect from Athens and Ankara to solve their
differences in a peaceful way and via dialogue. The current situation requires a delicate and
careful management by the Greek side. A failure in the launch of formal dialogue due to
Turkey’s insistence on its demands could perhaps create the impression that Greece derailed
the process. Greece needs not only to adamantly support its positions but improve its public
diplomacy tools in order for its partners to be well aware of its cause.

      Conclusion

      Following six months of serious disagreements that could have led to a military incident
in the Eastern Mediterranean, the beginning of 2021 finds Greece and Turkey prepared to start
dialogue in the context of exploratory talks. The resumption of those talks in Istanbul on 25
January and the commitment of both sides to continue the process in Athens generates hopes.
What matters, at first, is the reduction of tensions between two NATO member-states that can

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be a source of regional instability. The resumption of exploratory talks, of course, can hardly
guarantee success. The recent Istanbul round was the 61st one and all previously held 60 rounds
had failed to yield fruitful results. It is particularly difficult for Athens and Ankara to solve their
differences due to diverging mindsets and contradictory agendas. Trust can hardly be restored
and time is required. Throughout 2021 Greece is expected to engage in rounds of exploratory
talks with Turkey but also focus on the modernization of its armed forces. A new type of
cooperation with Ankara and other regional countries is possible, even if the most difficult
issues remain unsolved.

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