Germany's Policy towards Russia in the Context of the Key Post-Cold War International Security Challenges - CEJSH
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Bezpieczeństwo
teoria i praktyka
Security
theory and practice
e-ISSN 2451-0718 2021
ISSN 1899-6264 No. 1 (XLII)
DOI: 10.48269/2451-0718-btip-2021-1-006
Received: 13.01.2021
Accepted: 14.03.2021
Michał M. Kosman
Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1966-9658
Germany’s Policy towards Russia
in the Context of the Key Post-Cold War
International Security Challenges
Introduction
German-Russian relations have a long-standing tradition. Over the last couple of cen-
turies, both nations have interacted socially, economically, culturally, and politically.
There are examples of numerous cooperative experiences between them, but the
two world wars of the first half of the twentieth century largely dominated the mu-
tual image of the other side as a mortal enemy. To this day, the Great Patriotic War
has been a major element shaping Russia’s historical identity. In turn, during the Cold
War, the attitude of the USSR towards the two German states was determined by an
inter-bloc confrontation. Allied-vassal relations with East Germany contrasted with
the confrontational nature of relations with West Germany, albeit to some extent mit-
igated by tendencies towards normalisation, which were expressed in the USSR-West
Germany treaties of 1955 and 1970.
The political changes that occurred in Europe and the world at the end of the
Cold War particularly affected the USSR and the then German states. The German
Democratic Republic was incorporated by the Federal Republic of Germany, which
thus witnessed a significant increase in its territorial and demographic potential and
strengthened its position in the European Communities, and the emerging European
Union. A different fate befell Russia, which, as the successor of the Soviet Union, ex-
perienced a significant reduction in territorial and demographic resources and lost
its superpower status. However, it still remained the largest country in the world in
terms of territory, and its population, economic and military potential – factors that
93Michał M. Kosman
secure its place among the leading powers. The united Germany and Russia had to
rearrange their relations on completely new principles, different from the realities of
the East-West conflict. A potentially propitious ground for future relations was cre-
ated by the favourable stance of Moscow – represented by Mikhail Gorbachev – to-
wards the reunification of Germany in 1990. Shortly after the end of this process,
but still more than a year before the ultimate collapse of the USSR, both countries
concluded a treaty on good-neighbourliness, partnership and cooperation.1 A posi-
tive harbinger were also the excellent personal relations between Chancellor Helmut
Kohl and President Boris Yeltsin after the collapse of the USSR.
The goal of this paper is to discuss the position of Germany towards Russia
against the backdrop of selected international security problems after the end of
the Cold War. The primary focus has been placed on such issues as the enlargement
of NATO in 1999, the Kosovo conflict, the 2003 Gulf War, the Russo-Georgian con-
flict, and the conflict in Ukraine. The author has used the findings of his research to
date on Germany’s policy towards Russia.2 Throughout the drafting of the paper, an
analysis of the literature on the topic in question was used, while the institutional
and legal analysis turned out to be a valuable tool too, helpful in the study of the
documents cited.
The issue of NATO enlargement
One of the most serious problems on the international security agenda in the 1990s
was the expansion of NATO geared towards the inclusion of a group of former USSR
states. However, this issue only began to take shape in the middle of the decade.
Before this took place, the top priority for the German government was the with-
drawal of Soviet/Russian troops from the eastern federal states. The determination to
achieve this goal was hardly surprising, because the situation in the USSR in the last
months of the state’s existence, and in Russia immediately after the collapse of the
superpower, was far from stable: the state’s political foundations were forged in the
circumstances of the constant conflict that was taking place between President Boris
Yeltsin and the Supreme Council. In the event of any major disturbance in Russia, the
presence of its troops in Germany could pose a threat to their national sovereignty.
They had about 340 thousand soldiers, and in addition to that, a little over 200 thou-
sand civilian workers and their families. The resilient German diplomacy shortly after
the reunification of the state, which took place on 3 October 1990, led to the con-
clusion of two agreements with the Soviet Union on this matter. The first one – i.e.
the agreement on some transitional measures (commonly referred to as the finan-
cial arrangement) was concluded on 9 October 1990. It provided that the German
part would allocate approx. DM 12 billion for expenses related to temporary stay, the
1
Vertrag über gute Nachbarschaft, Partnerschaft und Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Bundesre-
publik Deutschland und der UdSSR, Bulletin. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung,
No. 133, 15.11.1990, pp. 1379–1382.
2
See: M.M. Kosman, Polityka RFN wobec ZSRR/Rosji w latach 1989–2009, Bydgoszcz 2013; idem,
Konflikt rosyjsko-ukraiński o Krym (2014–2019). Wybrane aspekty z uwzględnieniem stanowiska
Niemiec, Bydgoszcz 2020.
94Germany’s Policy towards Russia in the Context of the Key Post-Cold War...
process of withdrawing troops and support for soldiers to adapt to life in their home-
land, including the construction of housing for them.3 The actual agreement on the
withdrawal of troops was concluded on 12 October 1990. It specified the status of
Soviet troops in Germany, as well as the pace and details of their withdrawal.4 It was
possible to bring this process to an end by 1994. Indeed, on 31 August, the last train
with soldiers on board departed for Russia, and on 9 September, the last plane de-
parted from Germany.5
As for the NATO enlargement process, it is clear to see that it was Germany that
became the main promoter of the expansion of the alliance to include Poland, al-
though, admittedly, this support sounded with varying intensity at various stages of
the process. As a rule, German political forces understood Polish security interests and
aspirations to join the alliance, resulting from its traumatic historical experiences. At
the same time, NATO enlargement was also in the interest of Germany, which would
lose its status as the alliance’s eastern flank. Enlargement was also interpreted as in-
creasing the sphere of stability around Germany and, more broadly, across Europe.
By promoting this process, however, Germany wanted to avoid any disturbances that
could arise in a situation of excessive pace of it. The too rapid expansion of NATO
could provoke some violent reactions in Russia and strengthen nationalist and com-
munist circles, thus weakening the position of President Boris Yeltsin, who was re-
garded in the West as a friendly and predictable politician. The Russian side used the
argument that during the German unification process, Mikhail Gorbachev, agreeing
to Germany’s presence in NATO, was to receive an oral assurance from US Secretary
of State James Baker in February 1990 that there would be no further enlargement of
the alliance in the future.6
Poland’s geographical location determined the role of Germany as the gateway to
the alliance, as well as to the European Union. Russia’s strategy, in turn, boiled down
to attempts to block or at least delay the process of NATO enlargement to the east,
and to establish closer institutional ties with the alliance. The latter goal was also fol-
lowed by German diplomacy, which, on the one hand, promoted NATO’s eastern en-
largement, and on the other, tried to involve Russia in cooperation with the pact in
order to alleviate Russian fears arising from NATO’s approach to its borders. Hence,
one can express a view on Germany’s double strategy in the enlargement process. In
May 1994, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel even formulated the thesis about
Germany’s special responsibility in its relations with Russia.7 Under the conditions of
the time, it was obvious that the main candidates for NATO were the countries of the
3
Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung der
Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken über einige über leitende Maßnahmen, Bulletin.
Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, No. 123, 17.10.1990, pp. 1281–1283.
4
Vertrag zwischen der Bundesendesrepublik Deutschland und der Union der Sozialistischen So-
wjetrepubliken über die Bedingungen des befristeten Aufenthalts und der Modalitäten der
planmäßigen Abzugs der sowjetischen Truppen aus dem Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land, Bulletin. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, No. 123, 17.10.1990, pp. 1284–
1300.
5
S. Satjukow, Besatzer. „Die Russen” in Deutschland 1945–1994, Göttingen 2008, pp. 11–17.
6
K. Schroeder, Die veränderte Republik. Deutschland nach der Wiedervereinigung, München 2006,
p. 168.
7
Archiv der Gegenwart, 14.05.1994, p. 38963.
95Michał M. Kosman
Visegrad Group. For this reason, German diplomacy in the mid-1990s cooled down
the desires voiced by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to join the organisation. This po-
sition was clearly expressed by Volker Rühe, the German Minister of Defence, during
his visit to these three countries in August 1995.8
As mentioned above, an important element of Germany’s strategy was to al-
leviate Russia’s reservations towards the NATO enlargement by drawing it into in-
ternational cooperation and seeking some form of its institutional ties with NATO.
Moscow’s role in the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina was appreciated
by Chancellor Helmut Kohl after the conclusion of the treaty ending the conflict
in December 1995.9 It should be remembered, however, that the election cal-
endar in Russia influenced the German strategy at that time, as presidential elec-
tions were held there in mid-1996. The cautious approach taken by German diplo-
macy in its statements regarding NATO enlargement was aimed at not weakening
the election chances of Boris Yeltsin, who was friends with Helmut Kohl. Only after
his re-election on 3 July 1996, could the debate on this matter be accelerated.
Helmut Kohl, during his visit to Moscow on 7 September 1996, announced talks
with NATO candidates for the next year, emphasising his understanding of Russia’s
interests.10 Before they took place, in May 1997 the institutionalisation of relations
took place between the two parties, postulated earlier by Germany, by signing
the NATO-Russia Act. They were based on the consultations provided for in the
document within the newly created NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council11 (since
2002, the NATO-Russia Council). In December 1997, protocols on the accession of
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO were signed, which opened the
way to the ratification procedures. The ratification debate in the Bundestag took
place on 26 March 1998. The eastern enlargement of NATO was approved by the
overwhelming majority of the votes of CDU/CSU, FDP, SPD and parts of the Greens.
The PDS, part of the Greens and two SPD MPs voted against. A large part of the
Greens, four SPD MPs and one Christian Democrat abstained.12 Thus, the result of
the vote testified to the fundamental consensus of the German political elite on
NATO enlargement, which was formally completed on 12 March 1999. It is worth
emphasizing that the new SPD-Greens coalition, formed after the elections in au-
tumn 1998, took an extremely important and difficult decision to take part in the air
strikes against Yugoslavia against which Russia was intensely protesting. Of the
major political parties, only the PDS protested against the air raids.
8
Archiv der Gegenwart, 11.09.1995, p. 40340.
9
Erklärung der Bundesregierung. Deutsche Beteiligung an den militärischen Maßnahmen zur
Absicherung des Friedensvertrages für Bosnien-Herzegowina, Bulletin. Presse- und Informations-
amt der Bundesregierung, No. 103, 11.12.1995, p. 1010.
10
Archiv der Gegenwart, 7.09.1996, p. 41375.
11
Grundakte über gegenseitige Beziehungen, Zusammenarbeit und Sicherheit zwischen Nordat-
lantikvertrags-Organisation und der Russischen Föderation, Bulletin. Presse- und Informations-
amt der Bundesregierung, No. 43, 3.06.1997.
12
Plenarprotokoll 13/224, Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, 224. Sitzung, Bonn,
Donnerstag, den 26. März 1998, pp. 20461–20463.
96Germany’s Policy towards Russia in the Context of the Key Post-Cold War...
Key challenges of the first decade of the 21st century:
the war in the Persian Gulf, and the Russian-Georgian
conflict
The first decade of the new millennium brought a series of new challenges to in-
ternational security that activated both Germany and Russia. Two of them will be
discussed in this section, i.e. the Persian Gulf War of 2003, and the Russo-Georgian
conflict of 2008. In the case of the former, Germany and Russia adopted a common
position, while the latter gave rise to divergent views.
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States became the
addressee of numerous expressions of solidarity expressed inter alia by Chancellor
Gerhard Schröder, and President Vladimir Putin.13 The speech given by President
Putin to the Bundestag on 25 September 2001, which was approved by all major
German political circles, was an opportunity to condemn terrorism and demon-
strate the commonality of views.14 At the same time, the president used the oppor-
tunity to place the intervention in Chechnya in the broad front of the war against
terrorism, which usually clashed with the Western perception of the conflict.
However, while the American intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001 was
generally recognised as an admissible and justified act of self-defence, the plans
to attack Iraq and their implementation in 2003 were strongly condemned by Ger-
many, Russia and France. They were the foundation of the rapprochement of the
three countries. Regarding Germany, apart from the peculiar post-war culture of
pacifism, the campaign before the elections to the Bundestag in autumn 2002
undoubtedly played an important role, the driving force of which in the case of
the SPD and the Greens was the sharp criticism of Washington’s war plans. Res-
olution 1441 of the United Nations Security Council of 8 November 2002, calling
on Iraq to cooperate with the international community in verifying allegations
of possession of weapons of mass destruction and announcing “serious conse-
quences” if refused,15 actually only camouflaged the divergence between the US
and its critics (in Germany, Russia and France), which later gave rise to distinct in-
terpretative differences. Russia, Germany and France, unlike the United States, ar-
gued that the resolution did not authorize the use of force against Iraq. On 10 Feb-
ruary 2003, the already mentioned three made a declaration in Paris demanding
the strengthening of the inspection instrument, calling on Baghdad to cooperate.16
A similar document appeared on 15 March 2003.17 However, this did not prevent
the American attack, which increased tensions on both sides of the Atlantic. The
joint front of the trio against the Iraq war brought together its leaders (Chancellor
13
M. Thumann, ‘Putin Tritt dem Westen bei’, Die Zeit, No. 42, 11.10.2001.
14
Archiv der Gegenwart, 27.09.2001, p. 45287.
15
Resolution 1441 (2002) adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th meeting, on 8 November
2002, https://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf [accessed: 20.12.2020].
16
H. Monath, ‘Dreierkoalition gegen den Irak-Krieg’, Der Tagesspiegel, 11.02.2003, https://www.ta-
gesspiegel.de/politik/dreierkoalition-gegen-den-irak-krieg/388754.html [accessed: 20.12.2020].
17
Archiv der Gegenwart, 20.03.2003, p. 46193.
97Michał M. Kosman
Gerhard Schröder, President Vladimir Putin, and President Jacques Chirac), who
met at tripartite summits several times in the following years (April 2003, Sep-
tember 2003, August 2004, March 2005). Interestingly, the factor that strength-
ened the German-Russian relations in this period were the strong positive feelings
that could be seen between Schröder and Putin. It was only after the German elec-
tions in 2005 and the assumption of the chancellor’s chair by Angela Merkel at the
head of the grand Christian Democratic-Social Democratic coalition that Ameri-
can-German relations were slowly returning to their former tracks, while the chan-
cellor herself had less understanding than her predecessor for the shortcomings of
Russian democracy.
The second half of the decade brought another security challenge on the conti-
nent. It consisted of a series of events, including the disputes over the independence
of Kosovo, the debate on Georgia and Ukraine’s membership in NATO, and the Geor-
gia-Russia conflict in 2008.
The future status of Kosovo after the 1999 conflict was one of the major polit-
ical issues on the Old Continent. Both Germany and Russia, as well as the US, the
UK, France and Italy, were participants in the contact group working to stabilize
the Balkans.18 The so-called Plan of Ahtisaari, named after the former president of
Finland, envisaged, among other things, the independence of Kosovo under inter-
national supervision. Also, the efforts of the US, Russia and the EU, working until
December 2007 (German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger led the talks on behalf of
them) did not bring any effects.19 As a result, on 17 February 2008 Kosovo saw the
declaration of its independence with the approval of Germany and the majority of
Western countries and Russia’s opposition.20 Thus, Germany and Russia took dif-
ferent positions on Kosovo, as in 1999.
A few weeks later, from 2 to 4 April 2008, a NATO Summit was held in Bucharest.
One of its most important items on the agenda was the issue of expanding the al-
liance to include Georgia and Ukraine, i.e. the countries that had previously been
a part of the USSR. However, while Russia’s protests in the event of the enlargement
to include the Baltic states or Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were not ex-
cessively sharp, the accession of the two countries mentioned above to the Alliance
was unacceptable to Moscow. This was due not only to prestige reasons, but also to
the geostrategic situation in the Black Sea basin, which, if both countries – especially
Ukraine – were admitted to NATO, would radically change to Russia’s disadvantage.
This issue was also of interest to German political circles. The grand coalition repre-
sentatives, both Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, believed mostly that one
should be careful in promoting enlargement, bearing in mind how sensitive such
a scenario is for Russia.21 Chancellor Angela Merkel and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who were present at the Summit in Bucharest, rejected the
18
N. Mappes-Niediek, ‘Poker ums Kosovo’, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, No. 3, 2007,
p. 279.
19
‘Deutscher Diplomat sucht Lösung für Kosovo’, Die Welt, 9.08.2007, https://www.welt.de/politik/
article1092518/Deutscher-Diplomat-sucht-Loesung-fuer-Kosovo.html [accessed: 20.12.2020].
20
D. Reljić, ‘Russlands Stimme ertönt in Serbien’, Russland-Analysen, No. 163, 2.05.2008, pp. 2–5, ht-
tps://www.laender-analysen.de/russland/pdf/Russlandanalysen163.pdf [accessed: 20.12.2020].
21
‘Wieviel Osten verträgt die NATO’, Der Tagesspiegel, 3.04.2008.
98Germany’s Policy towards Russia in the Context of the Key Post-Cold War...
possibility of granting Georgia and Ukraine a Membership Action Plan, fearing an es-
calation of tensions in relations with Moscow.22 France took a similar position. Ulti-
mately, in point 23 of the Summit Declaration, a rather vague provision was adopted
that both countries could become NATO members in the future.23 As regards the en-
largement of the alliance, Germany has therefore clearly demonstrated its under-
standing of Russia’s position, taking into account its reservations and sensitivity to its
perception of security.
The German side showed less leniency towards the Russian military action
against Georgia a few months later, from 7 to 10 August 2008. It was a response to
the Georgian shelling and occupation of Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, a re-
bellious Georgian province supported by Moscow. According to Tbilisi, Georgia’s ac-
tions were a reaction to the Ossetian attacks on Georgian villages. Georgia was the
most favoured by Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, while the other countries in-
itially took a more neutral stance. On behalf of the EU, mediation was undertaken by
France, the Presidency of the Council of the European Union at the time, represented
by President Nicolas Sarkozy, who, together with Russian President Dmitry Med-
vedev, agreed on the terms of the truce on 12 August 2008. They were also included
in the conclusions following the meeting of the EU Council on 13 August 2008.24 It
should also be emphasised that, apart from President Sarkozy, the German side also
actively supported efforts to end the conflict, involving the experienced diplomat
Hans-Dieter Lucas.25 Foreign Minister Steinmeier sought a truce by conducting ac-
tive telephone diplomacy with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and the heads
of diplomacy of Russia and Georgia.26 Chancellor Merkel also called for an end to
hostilities, demanding that Georgia’s territorial integrity be respected. At the same
time, a significant part of German politicians warned against overly harsh reactions
towards Russia after the end of the fighting.27 Nevertheless, a conviction prevailed
that Russia’s reaction was definitely exaggerated and disproportionate to the actions
of Georgian troops, as was clearly stated by Chancellor Merkel during her meeting
with President Medvedev on 15 August 2008 in Sochi.28
22
‘Merkel sperrt sich gegen rasche Nato-Osterweiterung’, Die Welt, 3.04.2008, https://www.welt.
de/welt_print/article1865497/Merkel-sperrt-sich-gegen-rasche-Nato-Osterweiterung.html [ac-
cessed: 20.12.2020].
23
Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3.04.2008, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_
texts_8443.htm [accessed: 20.12.2020].
24
Council conclusions on the situation in Georgia (13/08/2008), https://www.consilium.europa.
eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/102315.pdf [accessed: 20.12.2020].
25
‘Bundesregierung bemüht sich um Waffenstillstand in Georgien – Steinmeier entsendet Emis-
sär’, 10.08.2008, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/080810-bm-telefonate-
geo/225344 [accessed: 20.12.2020].
26
‘Bundesminister Steinmeier Ruft Parteien in Südossetien auf, aus Spirale gegenseitiger Dro-
hungen und Gewalt auszubrechen’, 8.08.2008, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/
newsroom/080808-suedossetien-bm/225858 [accessed: 20.12.2020].
27
‘Deutsche warnen vor neuer Isolation Russlands’, Die Welt, 23.08.2008.
28
‘Merkel redet Medwedew ins Gewissen’, Der Spiegel, 15.08.2008, https://www.spiegel.de/poli-
tik/ausland/georgien-krise-merkel-redet-medwedew-ins-gewissen-a-572360.html [accessed:
20.12.2020].
99Michał M. Kosman
To sum up, it can be noted that Berlin, on the one hand, assessed President
Saakashvili’s decision to take offensive actions against South Ossetia as hasty, and, on
the other hand, the Russian response was disproportionate. Russia seemed to have
achieved its goal by strengthening its influence in the Caucasus and practically post-
poning the prospect of Georgia’s membership in NATO ad Kalendas Graecas. How-
ever, the anti-Georgian operation called into question the image of Russia as a pre-
dictable country and partner in solving international security problems in Germany,
although it was only the Ukrainian conflict that fully shattered this image.
The conflict in Ukraine: a challenge to European security
Undoubtedly, Russia was the central point of reference in Germany’s policy towards
the post-Soviet space. It can also be noted that the German interest in Ukraine was
somewhat more distant from Berlin’s eastern policy. It was only the Orange Revolu-
tion, which took place at the end of 2004, that drew more attention of the German
political elite to Ukraine. The social protests that broke out in this country after
the rigged presidential elections made a strong impression on the West. Gerhard
Schröder and Joschka Fischer were heavily involved in resolving the crisis. The Chan-
cellor conducted an active “telephone diplomacy” with President Putin, while the
Minister of Foreign Affairs – as Heinz Timmermann wrote – encouraged the EU High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, to actively
undertake diplomatic efforts and support Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski,
who was mediating in Kiev.29 The repetition of the second round and the election of
pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko were welcomed in Germany.
Ukraine came back to the centre of European politics almost a decade later. At the
end of 2013, the fate of the association agreement between Ukraine and the Euro-
pean Union, which was to be signed at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius on
29 November 2013, was being resolved. However, the Russian side increased pres-
sure on Ukraine to discourage its rapprochement with the EU. From mid-2013, there
were customs restrictions or suspension of imports of certain Ukrainian products,
coupled with clear signals that these measures would be intensified in the event of
further rapprochement between Ukraine and the EU. Moscow combined this with an
incentive tactic, offering Ukraine loans of around EUR 11 billion and a temporary re-
duction in gas prices, which was impressive compared to EU proposals of around EUR
600 million to partially cover the budget deficit.30 The sum of pressure and incentives
directed at President Viktor Yanukovych resulted in the decision not to sign an associ-
ation agreement with the EU, which was announced by the Ukrainian authorities be-
fore the Vilnius summit. A wave of protests swept across Ukraine, and on 18–20 Feb-
ruary 2014, several dozen people died during the fighting in the streets of Kiev. Only
the mediation of the ministers of foreign affairs of Poland, Germany and France, i.e.
29
H. Timmermann, ‘Die deutsch-russischen Beziehungen im europäischen Kontext’, Internationale
Politik und Gesellschaft, No. 1, 2007, p. 108.
30
K. Böttger, ‘Auf dem sicherheitspolitischen Auge blind: die EU-Außenpolitik angesichts der
Ukraine-Krise: Zustand und Entwicklungsoptionen’, Integration, No. 2, 2014, p. 99.
100Germany’s Policy towards Russia in the Context of the Key Post-Cold War...
Radosław Sikorski, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Laurent Fabius on 21 February 2014,
brought an end to the bloodshed.
The dynamic logic of those events then led to the resignation and flight of Ya-
nukovych to Russia, the annexation of Crimea by Russia on 18 March 2014, and the
start of separatist actions in eastern Ukraine and the establishment of the self-pro-
claimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic there. As a result,
as of 17 March 2014,31 sanctions were imposed on Russia by the EU, including diplo-
matic and economic measures, and a freezing of assets and the possibility of certain
people traveling to the EU. The shooting down of a Malaysian airliner over eastern
Ukraine on 17 July 2014 by separatists added fuel to the fire in Russia’s relations with
the West. At the same time, however, diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict were
implemented. They were conducted within the framework of the Trilateral Contact
Group covering Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE – and their first clear effect was the
conclusion of a ceasefire agreement in eastern Ukraine on 5 September 201432 in
Minsk, and the Normandy format covering Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France.
The Normandy format came into being at the meeting of the leaders of these
countries during the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Allied landings in
Normandy. The most noteworthy result of its activities was the conclusion of the
Minsk agreement on 12 February 2015, providing inter alia the suspension of mil-
itary operations, withdrawal of heavy weapons, creation of a buffer zone between
the parties to the conflict, allowing OSCE observers to act, exchange of prisoners
of war, access to humanitarian aid, restoration of Ukrainian authorities’ control
over the border with Russia, constitutional reforms taking into account the special
status of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, etc.33 Successive occasional meetings
did not bring such spectacular effects, but they allowed for the maintenance of
a constant dialogue. Both sides – the Ukrainian and the separatists – accused each
other of breaking the agreement in the following years. Although so far it has not
been possible to fully implement it and end the conflict, it should be appreciated
that it has stabilized and it has not spread more widely. Following Bogdan Koszel,
the main role in the development of the Minsk agreement was played by Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel, who held talks in Kiev, Moscow, Munich, Washington and Ot-
tawa within a few days before its conclusion.34
The diplomatic activities were accompanied by the application of the instru-
ment of the above mentioned sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia. They were
an expression of sharp disapproval of Moscow’s actions, which was also expressed
31
Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect
of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence
of Ukraine, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014D0145&-
from=PL [accessed: 20.12.2020].
32
Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, Minsk, 05/09/2014,
https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/27596-protocolon-the-results-of-
consultations-of-the-trilateral-contact-group-minsk-05092014 [accessed: 20.12.2020].
33
Full text of the Minsk agreement, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/21b8f98e-b2a5-
11e4-b234-00144feab7de [accessed: 20.12.2020].
34
B. Koszel, Rola Niemiec w procesach decyzyjnych Unii Europejskiej w XXI wieku, Poznań 2019,
p. 341.
101Michał M. Kosman
by the German government. Angela Merkel has repeatedly accused Russia and the
pro-Russian authorities of Crimea of violating international law, supporting sanctions
and the suspension of talks on a new partnership and cooperation agreement with
Russia. The Social Democrats were somewhat less inclined to criticize Moscow, for
example, the government plenipotentiary for cooperation with Russia, Gernot Erler,
was somewhat sceptical about the effectiveness of the sanctions in an interview for
Deutschlandfunk.35 In particular, the economic circles, represented by Ost-Ausschuss
der Deutschen Wirtschaft, criticised the sanctions mechanism as affecting the inter-
ests of German enterprises dependent on trade relations with Russia. Ost-Ausschuss
representatives have repeatedly emphasized the losses that the German economy
suffered as a result of the sanctions.36 Also, representatives of the eastern federal
states, to a greater extent affected by the consequences of the sanctions, criticized
their application to Russia, regardless of party affiliation. An example of such an atti-
tude was the position formulated by the prime ministers of the eastern federal states
in January 2018. They assessed the EU sanctions as ineffective, emphasizing their
negative impact on enterprises in eastern Germany.37
The major German political parties also formulated positions on Russian actions
in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, although it should be noted that there were voices
deviating from the mainstream in individual parties. The CDU was critical of Russia’s
conduct, which was confirmed in many statements by Angela Merkel and other
party representatives, as well as in program documents. One of them was the res-
olution of the party’s special committee on foreign policy, security, development
and human rights of 16 November 2016. It criticised Russia’s use of a policy of force,
also in the form of a hybrid war in Ukraine, without direct military involvement. It
was stressed that the European Union and its member states should make efforts
to exert a positive influence on Russia while opposing its aggressive policy.38 Some-
times, the CSU representatives expressed a bit more conciliatory tone. Bavarian
Prime Minister Horst Seehofer met with President Putin in mid-March and then in
June 2017. At that time, he assured of his efforts to abandon the sanctions policy
by implementing the Minsk agreements. This conciliation was not surprising, given
that both politicians agreed on Bavarian investments in Russia.39
35
‘Ukraine-Konflikt – “Das Thema Sanktionen wird wieder auf die Tagesordnung kommen”’,
Deutschlandfunk, 29.8.2014, https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/ukraine-konflikt-das-thema-
sanktionen-wird-wieder-auf-die.694.de.html?dram:article_id=295940 [accessed: 20.12.2020].
36
See e.g. Statement des Ost-Ausschuss Vorsitzenden Eckhard Cordes zu den Wirtschaftssank-
tionen Russlands, 7.08.2014, https://www.ost-ausschuss.de/de/statement-des-ost-ausschuss-
vorsitzenden-eckhard-cordes-zu-den-wirtschaftssanktionen-russlands [accessed: 20.12.2020].
37
‘Abbau von Russland-Sanktionen gefordert’, Die Welt, 30.01.2018, https://www.welt.de/
wirtschaft/article172990746/Ostdeutsche-Regierungschefs-Abbau-von-Russland-Sanktionen-
gefordert.html [accessed: 20.12.2020].
38
Umgang mit Russland – Zehn Handlungsempfehlungen. Beschluss des CDU-Bundesfachau-
schusses Außen-, Sicherheits-, Entwicklungs- und Menschenrechtspolitik unter der Leitung von
Roderich Kiesewetter MdB sowie des CDU-Bundesfachasuschusses Europapolitik unter der Lei-
tung von Elmar Brok MdEP vom 16. November 2015, p. 2, CDU.de, https://www.cdu.de/system/
tdf/media/dokumente/151116-eu-russland-beziehungen.pdf?file=1 [accessed: 20.12.2020].
39
‘Seehofer trifft Putin. Milliardenauftrag für bayerisches Unternehmen’, CSU.de, 2.06.2017, https://
www.csu.de/aktuell/meldungen/juni-2017/seehofer-trifft-putin/ [accessed: 20.12.2020].
102Germany’s Policy towards Russia in the Context of the Key Post-Cold War...
In the statements of SPD politicians, one could often notice conciliatory tones
about the readiness to cooperate with Russia, nevertheless the annexation of Crimea
was assessed as a breach of international law, for example in the opinion expressed
by Frank-Walter Steinmeier.40 The essence of the SPD’s position could be found in one
of the 2017 programming documents, which read:
Unser Verhältnis zu Russland ist durch das Vorgehen der russischen Regierung in
der Ostukraine und den Bruch des Völkerrechts durch die Annexion der Krim bela-
stet. Fundamentale Prinzipien der europäischen Friedens- und Sicherheitsordnung
sind verletzt. Wir sind jedoch davon überzeugt, dass Frieden und Sicherheit in Europa
nur mit, nicht ohne oder gar gegen Russland möglich sind. Dafür bedarf es der De-
eskalation, der Rückkehr zum politischen Dialog und der differenzierten Anwendung
von Sanktionsmechanismen. Der politische Prozess für die Ostukraine, der den Aus-
brucheines offenen Krieges erfolgreich verhindern konnte, ist ins Stocken geraten.
Wir halten den noch an ihm fest. Substanzielle Fortschritte bei der Umsetzung des
Minsker Abkommens arden eine schrittweise Aufhebung der Sanktionen gegen Rus-
sland nach sich ziehen.41
The FDP took a fairly coherent position. Russia’s policy was strongly condemned
in a resolution published at the end of January 2018. In it, the FDP expressed the
view that:
Russland hat durch die völkerrechtswidrige Annexion der Krim und das militärische
Eingreifen in der Ostukraine die seitdem 2. Weltkrieg geltende Weltfriedensordnung
gravierend verletzt. Grenzen mit militärischen Mitteln zu verändern, ist ein Tabubruch,
der nicht hingenommen werden darf.42
The document advocated the maintenance of the sanctions and even their
tightening in the event of a further escalation of military operations in eastern
Ukraine. The Greens also openly criticized Russia’s actions in Ukraine, assessing the
annexation of Crimea as a disturbance to the European security architecture. They
advocated maintaining the sanctions until the full implementation of the Minsk
agreements.43
The Left took a clearly pro-Russian position. The views of this party were re-
flected in the application it submitted to the Bundestag at the end of No-
vember 2017. In it, it argued that the sanctions imposed on Russia did not resolve
40
‘Mehr Sicherheit für alle in Europa – Für einen Neustart der Rüstungskontrolle’, Auswärtiges Amt
– News, 26.08.2016, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/160826-bm-faz/282910
[accessed: 20.12.2020].
41
Zeit für mehr Gerechtigkeit. Unser Regierungsprogramm für Deutschland, p. 107, SPD.de,
https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Bundesparteitag_2017/Es_ist_Zeit_fuer_mehr_
Gerechtigkeit-Unser_Regierungsprogramm.pdf [accessed: 20.12.2020].
42
Beschluss des Bundesvorstands der FDP, Berlin, 29. Januar 2018. Recht wahren, Werte verteidi-
gen, Dialog führen – zehn Vorschläge für die Zusammenarbeit mit Russland, p. 1, FDP.de, https://
www.fdp.de/sites/default/files/uploads/2018/01/30/2018-01-29-buvo-rechte-wahren-werte-
verteidigen-dialog-fuehren-zehn-vorschlaege-fuer-die.pdf [accessed: 20.12.2020].
43
‘Wir stehen ein für Frieden und Menschenrechte’, Die Grünen, https://www.gruene.de/themen/
gruene-themen-von-a-bis-z/wir-stehen-ein-fuer-frieden-und-menschenrechte.html [accessed:
20.12.2020].
103Michał M. Kosman
the conflict and even aggravated it. The document advocated a departure from the
narrative blaming Russia for the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine44. A pro-Russian
position was also taken by the AfD, which entered the Bundestag after the 2017
elections. The party’s program reads that:
Das Verhältnis zu Russland ist für Deutschland, Europa und die Nato von maßgebli-
cher Bedeutung, denn Sicherheit in und für Europa kann ohne Russlands Einbindung
nicht gelingen. Wir setzen uns daher dafür ein, Konflikte in Europa friedlich zu regeln
und dabei die jeweiligen Interessen zu berücksichtigen.45
Also, numerous statements by politicians from this party confirmed the con-
sistent pro-Russian attitude and opposition to the sanctions.46
To sum up, it is clear to see that among the largest German parties there was
a major consensus on the conflict in Ukraine – greater or lesser support for the im-
position of sanctions against Russia and pressure on the implementation of the
Minsk agreements. On the other hand, the Left and the AfD voiced an opposite
opinion, and the politicians of the eastern federal states, which suffered the most
economically as a result of the sanctions, were generally in favour of lifting them.
Berlin’s strategy towards the Ukrainian-Russian conflict was aptly described by Er-
hard Cziomer, who argued that it was based on three key elements: readiness to
dialogue with Russia to end the conflict, readiness to maintain sanctions, and eco-
nomic and financial support for Ukraine.47
Conclusions
The issues related to European security discussed above could only be presented
briefly. Each could be the subject of a separate study, as they clearly do not exhaust
the catalogue of issues in German-Russian relations. They can also be joined by the
international repercussions of the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline –
an economic project with strong political implications. The Eastern Partnership pro-
jects and the German idea of the Partnership for Modernisation also had significant
consequences. Interesting threads are also related to the relationship between the
leaders, or the disputes between Russland-Versteher and the critics of Russia. Nev-
ertheless, this paper focuses on security problems understood in the traditional
44
Entspannung mit Russland – Keine Verlängerung der Sanktionen gegen Russland, Deutscher
Bundestag, Drucksache 19/95, 19. Wahlperiode, 22.11.2017, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/
btd/19/000/1900095.pdf [accessed: 20.12.2020].
45
Programm für Deutschland. Das Grundsatzprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland, p. 60, AFD.
de, https://www.afd.de/grundsatzprogramm/ [accessed: 20.12.2020].
46
See e.g.: ‘Jörg Meuthen: Dialog und Kooperation mit Russland statt Konfrontation und sinnlose
Sanktionen’, AFD.de, https://www.afd.de/joerg-meuthen-dialog-und-kooperation-mit-russland-
statt-konfrontation-und-sinnlose-sanktionen/; ‘Wirtschaftssanktionen gegen Russland be-
enden’, 28.05.2018, AfD Kompakt, https://afdkompakt.de/2018/05/28/wirtschaftssanktionen-
gegen-russland-beenden/ [accessed: 20.12.2020].
47
E. Cziomer, Wyzwania nowej roli międzynarodowej Niemiec w dobie globalizacji, kryzysów gospo-
darczych i finansowo-politycznych po 2007 roku, Kraków 2018, p. 195.
104Germany’s Policy towards Russia in the Context of the Key Post-Cold War...
context, related to the use of force. It is worth mentioning that in recent years,
the fate of the treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles (Intermedi-
ate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty – INF), negotiated and signed by Ronald Reagan
and Mikhail Gorbachev on 8 December 1987, at the end of the Cold War, has also
become a subject of keen interest of Germany. The agreement, which eliminated
US and Soviet nuclear missiles with a range of 500–5500 km from Europe, has be-
come one of the key steps to improve the security of the continent. Meanwhile,
since 2014, the United States has been accusing Russia of breaching the treaty by
producing and testing missiles exceeding the allowable range.48 President Donald
Trump’s announcements that he would withdraw from the treaty at the beginning
of 2019 (a six-month notice period since then) mobilized German diplomacy to
act to persuade Russia and the US to revise their positions. However, the talks be-
tween Minister Heiko Maas and the representatives of Moscow and Washington in
January 2019 brought no results. It seems that the objective difficulty indicated by
the Kremlin resulted, inter alia, from out of China’s reluctance to join potential dis-
armament treaty solutions49. The failure of Berlin’s efforts to save this particularly
important for European security agreement has shown the limited possibilities of
German diplomacy in the collision of the interests of the nuclear powers. It should
be emphasized that Germany was inclined to recognize Russia’s guilt for the termi-
nation of the treaty.
Another example that illustrates the perception of current international prob-
lems by Moscow and Berlin was provided by Angela Merkel’s visit to Russia on
11 January 2020. From the statements of both leaders at the press conference
crowning the meeting, it could be concluded that for both sides one of the key
goals was still the completion of the construction of the second gas pipeline Nord
Stream, despite the reservations formulated by Washington and some Central and
Eastern European countries. In line with the previous German arguments, Angela
Merkel once again emphasized the economic nature of this investment. President
Putin confirmed his readiness to transit gas through Ukraine for the next five years,
which was recently insisted on by the German side. The mutual interest of both
countries was also manifested in trade relations: President Vladimir Putin paid spe-
cial attention to the volume of trade, amounting to almost USD 44 billion in the
first ten months of 2019 (which placed Germany in the second place, following
China, among Russia’s trading partners), and to mutual investments (USD 20 bil-
lion of German investments in Russia and USD 9 billion of Russian investments
in Germany). Russia and Germany were in favour of maintaining the 2015 Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, which was terminated by the
United States. At the same time, both leaders skilfully masked in their statements
48
J. Durkalec, ‘Russia’s Violation of the INF Treaty: Consequences for NATO’, PISM Bulletin, No.
107 (702), 13.08.2014, https://pism.pl/publications/Russia_s_Violation_of_the_INF_Treaty__
Consequences_for_NATO [accessed: 20.12.2020].
49
‘Heikle Themen bei Besuch von Heiko Maas in Moskau’, Zeit Online, 18.01.2019, https://www.
zeit.de/news/2019-01/18/heikle-themen-bei-besuch-von-heiko-maas-in-moskau-190118-99-
615308?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F [accessed: 20.12.2020].; B. We-
sel, ‘Die Europäer und der INF-Vertrag – ratlos’, Deutsche Welle, 1.02.2019, https://www.dw.com/
de/die-europ%C3%A4er-und-der-inf-vertrag-ratlos/a-47324149 [accessed: 20.12.2020].
105Michał M. Kosman
the differences regarding the conflict in eastern Ukraine and Syria, reaffirming their
commitment to their peaceful resolution.50
In conclusion, it should be highlighted that from the German perspective, Russia
is an extremely important actor in the construction of international security. This is
due to its territorial, demographic, economic and military potential. German political
circles share the view that without Russia it is impossible to solve the key problems of
international security. After the end of the Cold War, in various statements and docu-
ments, German-Russian relations were even described with the term “strategic part-
nership.” A more reserved attitude towards Russia could be discerned during Angela
Merkel’s chancellorship. In fact, she did not hesitate to openly criticise the shortcom-
ings of Russian democracy and respect for human rights. The war with Georgia, fol-
lowed by the conflict in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, shook the image of
Russia in Germany, which from then on began to be treated as an actor causing inter-
national security problems, rather than as a partner in solving them. Having said this,
its potential and opportunities to both fuel and mitigate conflicts – in Europe and
around it (Ukraine, Syria, Libya) – do not leave an alternative to dialogue.
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