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RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA ISSN 2039-4667; E-ISSN 2239-2629
DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2018.0001 Vol. 9 (2018), n. 1, pp. 1-13
STUDI
From Empathy to Empathies. Towards a Paradigm
Change
Laura Boella(α)
Ricevuto: 7 marzo 2018; accettato 10 aprile 2018
█ Abstract Today’s debate on empathy is characterized by an interplay between neuroscience, philosophy
of mind and phenomenology that has led to several distinct definitions of empathy (enlarged, restricted,
minimalist). Much of the difficulty in defining empathy is due to the emphasis on its prosocial value, a
feature that has made it a “keyword” of our time. Does the role empathy has been assigned in social inter-
actions imply its involvement in matters of identity, similarity and affective resonance? What happens
when the flow of sensations and emotions between humans produces more complex interactions and gi-
ves rise to feelings of estrangement, facing the unknown, or a fear of others? We need a paradigm shift in
which we consider empathy in practice, rather than theory. We need to consider how various empathies
arise in different contexts and manifest in diverse ways. In this way, we can shed light on the limits and
failures of mutual comprehension, and arrive at a more radical and realistic vision of the great challenge
involved in relating to others.
KEYWORDS: Empathy; Phenomenological Approach; Intersubjectivity; Neuroscience; Otherness
█ Riassunto Dall’empatia alle empatie. Verso un mutamento di paradigma – Il dibattito attuale
sull’empatia è caratterizzato dall’intersezione tra neuroscienze, filosofia della mente e fenomenologia e
sono state proposte diverse definizioni dell’empatia (allargata, ristretta, minimalista). Molte delle difficol-
tà nel definire l’empatia derivano dalla priorità attribuita al suo valore prosociale, l’aspetto che ne ha fatto
una parola chiave del nostro tempo. Per esplicare il ruolo che le viene assegnato nelle interazioni sociali,
l’empatia deve implicare identità, somiglianza e corrispondenza affettiva? Che cosa accade quando il flus-
so di sensazioni e di emozioni tra esseri umani genera movimenti più complessi, in cui emergono
l’estraneità, l’ignoto, la paura dell’altro? È necessario un cambiamento di paradigma e considerare
l’empatia non in teoria, ma in pratica. E guardare alle empatie, i cui contesti e differenti manifestazioni
mettono in luce limiti e fallimenti della comprensione reciproca, guadagnando una visione più radicale e
realistica della grande sfida che caratterizza le nostre relazioni con gli altri.
PAROLE CHIAVE: Empatia; Approccio fenomenologico; Intersoggettività; Neuroscienze; Alterità
(α)
Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università Statale degli Studi di Milano, via Festa del Perdono, 7 - 20122 Milano (I)
E-mail: laura.boella@unimi.it ()
Creative Commons - Attribuzione - 4.0 Internazionale2 Boella
█ What is empathy? “What is empathy?” is the compulsory
question that sets in motion many studies
EMPATHY, AS EDITH STEIN CLEARLY noted in and articles on empathy. The term has a va-
the title of her 1917 book,1 is a problem, and riety of meanings, and there is little consen-
this is still true today despite profound changes sus on its actual definition,3 with accurate
in our scientific and philosophical understand- and articulate notions found side by side with
ing. One cannot deny that empathy has rela- generic and broader ones. Daniel Batson
tional and social significance, but to this day its identifies eight distinct yet connected
role in individual and collective life remains “things”, or phenomena called empathy. Bat-
unclear. Studies in which cognitive and non- son works on empathy-altruism relations and
cognitive abilities enable us to mind reading believes that this plurality of definitions re-
have raised the question as to whether mind sults from researchers trying to answer two
reading is identical to empathy or whether it different questions at once: «how can we
has its own unique qualities.2 know others’ feelings and thoughts?» and
The debate triggered by this question has «how can we respond to others’ suffering
produced a great number of contributions, with sensitiveness and care?».4 Answering
but the time to re-launch research has come: the former would require a specific kind of
this implies overcoming stereotypes and “knowledge”: “recognising” others; answer-
rhetoric, and identifying empathy as an in- ing the latter would require a specific kind of
stinctive shared feeling that directly connects action: seeking to help others with their
individuals to groups, humanity, nature and needs. Opinions on the role of shared affec-
allows for mind-reading, access others’ minds tion, caring about others’ well-being, com-
(which has proven to be difficult, just as it is prehension and imagination, and the rela-
obviously dangerous if used to manipulate or tionship between empathy and social cogni-
control). It is a true challenge, especially tion accordingly differ.
nowadays since empathy, as recent experi-
mental data suggest, has become a unique re- █ “Enlarged” empathy
search field of its own, in which scientific and
philosophical perspectives are not meant to A vague and confused definition of empa-
be unified in the name of a simplistic idea of thy would turn it into an umbrella term, cov-
synthesis, but should both seize the oppor- ering a number of different experiences.
tunity to be conceptually renewed. Stephanie Preston and Frans de Waal recently
Today’s debate centres on the neuroscienc- stated that it would be possible to unite empir-
es, philosophy of mind and phenomenology ical data from each field, from neurosciences
and the exchanges between them. Recent re- to psychology – using a method based on the
search on empathy is especially aware of its “perception-action” model. Empathy would
manifold profiles, and many crucial differences include “all processes that emerge from the
related to reflections on mirror systems, simula- fact that observers understand others’ states
tions, emotions and shared representations by activating their own personal, neural, and
have emerged in the study of what is currently mental representations of that state”. Empa-
called empathy. Such differences are however thy is therefore defined as “emotional and
often juxtaposed, and the lines between each mental sensitivity to another’s state, from be-
field and the next become blurred. The core of ing affected by and sharing in this state to as-
this debate is to explore internal differences in sessing the reasons for it and adopting the
what we consider empathy to be; it is only by other’s point of view”.5 Primatologist Frans de
exploring these that we can take new scientific Waal, synthesising his own research, suggest-
and philosophical perspectives enabling both ed a model analogous to a matryoska doll, rep-
research fields to reach their potential. resenting the linear development of empathicFrom Empathy to Empathies 3
behaviour from the animal to the human. In and social cognition therefore overlap, and
his view the “cosmopolitan ape” has a basic empathy’s different perceptive-emotional,
sympathetic, associative and cooperative core cognitive and practical-moral components
(mirroring processes, bodily synchronisation, maintain an extrinsic relationship. In this
imitation, emotional contagion), which then light, empathy is not different from our daily
becomes more stratified in humans, requiring encounters with others and can be identified
more sophisticated abilities, such as changes with the original relational character of the
in perspective and caring about others’ wellbe- human condition.
ing. This is how the complexity of empathy is Is there then nothing “special” about em-
naturalistically reduced, making way for a pathy? Is empathy a sort of unconscious soci-
broad and generic definition that also includes ality based on an original bodily interde-
its negative aspects.6 pendence that allows for a level of under-
The difference in psychic and behavioural standing necessary to live our daily lives? Is
phenomena related to empathy – all of which empathy simply the transmission and circula-
vary in relation to functions, biological pro- tion of sensations and lived emotions from
cesses and effects – is acknowledged in a one subject to another?
more articulated way by those who suggest a
“broader” notion of empathy, in which affec- █ “Restricted” empathy
tive sharing, attribution of feelings and men-
tal states, association and cooperation, whilst A number of scholars have attempted to
being present, play a different role.7 answer these questions by suggesting more
In distinguishing mirroring and mentalizing exacting definitions, refusing to identify em-
empathic processes, Alvin Goodman believes pathy with mind reading and aiming to dis-
that the latter, overlapping with mind reading, cover what is “special” about empathy and dis-
are an extended form of empathy, in which the tinguishes it from sympathy and contagion. It
«term’s emotional and “caring” connotation», should be noted that these approaches also in-
corresponding to forms of affective empathy, is volve affective matching, considered to be a
bracketed.8 Goldman’s position reflects the en- key component or a consequence of empathy,
counter with the neurosciences – especially the and the “as if” of simulation. This might re-
discovery of mirror systems – and the ToM mind us of Frédérique de Vignemont and
simulationist variant, which have played a vital Pierre Jacob, who listed five conditions that
role in recent research on empathy. The ability define empathy: The empathiser and his tar-
to attribute mental states to others is no longer get must experience a similar feeling, a prod-
based on inferring procedures, but on an “im- uct of the perception or imagination of the lat-
mediate resonance”, which allows us to fully ter’s situation by the former, accompanied by
understand a bodily movement or a facial ex- the awareness that a “cause-effect” connection
pression signifying fear, rage, or disgust via an between the two feelings exists. Empathy is
“embodied simulation” (or automatic internal finally completed by attending to others’ well-
simulation). Other imaginative and re-enactive being.11 Amy Coplan reached similar conclu-
conscious activities are added to this first sions: she strongly urged for a restricted defi-
mechanism.9 nition of empathy, but gave one that has an
Reinterpreting the simulationist variant affective and a cognitive component whilst
of the “Theory of Mind” in light of empathy10 excluding contagion and identification:
causes a deep shift in perspective: once the
recognition of others’ intentions, emotions Empathy is a complex imaginative proce-
and sensations produces an understanding of dure in which an observer simulates anoth-
their meaning, bodily interdependence di- er’s psychic states whilst maintaining a firm
rectly becomes intersubjectivity. Empathy distinction between himself and the other.124 Boella
These examples show how difficult it is to perience works) end up overturning the rela-
ignore a number of aspects pertaining to tion between empathy and compassion.
what is commonly considered to be empathy, When we try to define the specific quality of
even by including recent developments in an empathic experience, phenomena such as
experimental research and contrasting affec- empathic distress and negative feelings con-
tive identification with the necessity of dis- cerning this empathic condition (depression,
tinguishing between self and other. Unlike refusal to help others) emerge. Motivation to
what is commonly thought, the neuroscienc- take care of others therefore becomes prob-
es have not simplified the problem of empa- lematic, and we cannot avoid making a dis-
thy, but on the contrary, have made it more tinction between empathy (“feeling with”)
complex. Data pertaining to mirroring pro- and compassion (“feeling for”, which is char-
cesses make it impossible to ignore the role acterized by positive feelings aiming to re-
of bodily interdependence and the neurobio- lieve others’ unease) if we wish to maintain
logical mechanisms of affective matching affective sharing as one of empathy’s key
and motor imitation. It is therefore necessary components.14 This distinction has been em-
to investigate the localisation of this type of braced, not accidentally, by those who, like
vicarious response in the empathic experi- Paul Bloom, are “against empathy” and in fa-
ence. Does this element simply “trigger” em- vour of “rational compassion”.15
pathy processes or is it one of its key compo- Several definitions of empathy (by no
nents? The different answers given by schol- means an academic issue alone) disclose the
ars attest to the complexity of the issue. most interesting aspect of this debate: it
Frédérique de Vignemont and Pierre Jacob seems clear that difficulties in defining empa-
observed that the pain inflicted by a needle- thy derive from the priority assigned to af-
sting can trigger a similar physical sensation of firming or denying its prosocial value, the as-
anxiety in the observer, accompanied by a mus- pect that has made it a key-word in our time.
cular contraction related to the localisation, du- Must the definition of empathy encompass
ration, and intensity of the stimulus. This is a identity, similarity and affective correspond-
contagion effect, which often causes subjects to ence if we want to fully understand its role in
focus on themselves and not on the other. But human relations? Is the mirror analogy appro-
empathic responses to others’ pain do not al- priate, or does empathy merit deeper research
ways require the direct reproduction of a pain- as to what happens when the mirror breaks,
ful stimulus on our own skin, nor a mental im- and the flux of sensations and emotions be-
age of what is happening to others. Under- tween humans makes way for more complex
standing that another is in pain depends on an transformations, in which estrangement, the
affective response that is different from experi- unknown, difficulty and fear of reaching others
encing pain or another form of suffering in the actively take part? Should we be more deeply
first person. Some experiments suggest this moved by others’ misery and suffering, or
could be part of a bodily “feeling” which trig- should we recognise others and the value of
gers less common and more contextual aspects their experiences as human beings?
of pain, such as its unpleasantness.13
In light of questions arising from experi- █ What empathy is not: The phenomenolog-
mental studies, empathy appears to be a ical perspective
complicated experience, in need of media-
tions, some of which diminish the role of the █ Minimalist empathy
immediate and involuntary affective re-
sponse between individuals. The studies on Current positions in philosophy of mind
pain-empathy mentioned above (which aim and the cognitive sciences have focused on
to understand how the “I feel your pain” ex- significant moments in the history of empa-From Empathy to Empathies 5
thy, specifically referring to Theodor Lipps’s Zahavi’s version of empathy refers to ex-
thought and to the phenomenological per- perience, and not to experimental conditions
spective. Edith Stein16 and Max Scheler17 en- and abstract theoretical models that have lit-
gaged in a critical debate on Lipp’s theories in tle or no contact with real life. Empathy is
the first twenty years of the 20th century, radi- not a feeling, but it is a perceptive intentional
cally renewing the philosophical approach to act of an I that, in making contact with the
empathy. Phenomenological theories have re- world, does not only interact with objects like
cently returned to the foreground providing mountains and cars, but also with other indi-
many alternatives to contemporary debates. viduals and their physical, psychic and men-
Among the great philosophical currents of tal unity.22 Empathy for Zahavi is a kind of
the 20th century, phenomenology was especial- «knowledge by acquaintance», that Husserl
ly vital in terms of a new openness to the neu- called «immediate experience of others».23
rosciences; its “naturalization”18 was a matter Others are identified as others, and empathy
of discussion during the Nineties. Thereafter, cannot therefore be confused with contagion,
scholars wondered whether interpreting mir- sympathy or compassion, but it is required by
ror systems and their role in understanding all of these. That the bodily interactions and
others could be considered the corroboration the perception of others as embodied minds
of various phenomenological hypotheses on has “cognitive” potential has been confirmed
intersubjectivity.19 by recent experimental data.
The philosopher Dan Zahavi, the neuro- There is, however, an important differ-
scientist Shaun Gallagher and several other ence. Having immediate experience of others
researchers20 have recently endeavored to re- does not simply mean acknowledging the
discover the phenomenological perspective. original relationality among humans, but is
Dan Zahavi, in particular, has critically dis- the revelation of the other’s I as different and
cussed embodied simulation theory and oth- not belonging to our own experience; there-
er main stream approaches to empathy, fol- fore, no attribution of emotion, thoughts, or
lowing Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler and wishes derives from it. Imitation, projection,
Edith Stein. He has reached the conclusion internal reproduction or simulation of others’
that a “minimalist” approach to empathy psychic states (along with analogic inference
should be encouraged.21 from our own experience to others’ behav-
Ruling out the need to reach a definition, iour) are even less necessary to understand
Zahavi has pursued a phenomenological per- that others are living an emotion, or to per-
spective believing this would provide a rigor- form an action with a goal. Empathy primari-
ous theoretical framework that takes both ly puts us in the presence of different acting
experimental data and aspects of current and thinking subjects who inhabit the same
concepts of social cognition into account. We world. The empathiser therefore is not com-
are in front of an ambitious attempt to bring pelled to use his own mental repertoire to
analytic and continental philosophy together, understand others. Empathy per se does not
which requires a complex operation: on the make it possible to understand the specific
one hand, Zahavi deconstructs affective, content of others’ experiences, and does not
cognitive and ethical-practical components produce a prosocial motivation to act in the
that are found in commonly held notions of interests of or care for others’ wellbeing.
empathy. Aided by phenomenology, on the According to Dan Zahavi empathy is a
other hand, he reinterprets affective reso- form of «fundamental sensitivity towards
nance, confirmed by experimental data, animacy, agency, and emotional expressivi-
translating it with reference to embodiment ty».24 Its primary focus is not what we have
as the main feature in the interaction with in common with others, but how we experi-
others’ sensations, emotions, and intentions. ence the existence of others who are different6 Boella
from us. “Minimalist” empathy therefore dif- Deconstructing and removing from empathy
fers greatly from current positions in con- what it is not could essentially highlight its
temporary debates, and its significance is limitations, especially regarding its role in so-
mainly negative, since it focuses on what em- cial life and morality.
pathy is not. In order to clarify this point, it would be
useful to reconstruct the greater theoretical
(1). Empathy is not sharing identical or similar picture in which Zahavi has placed his criti-
feelings, and does not require this compo- cal dialogue with the main actors in today’s
nent as a precondition. Intentions, debate. As we have seen, he starts from redis-
thoughts, and volitions can also be empa- covering the originality of phenomenological
thised with. Data pertaining to subper- thought on empathy; he unifies Husserl’s,
sonal motor-imitation and neuronal reso- Scheler’s and Stein’s contributions by observ-
nance mechanisms are not part of this ap- ing their development in other thinkers’
proach to empathy, but are included in thoughts, especially in Maurice Merleau-
different phenomena, such as contagion Ponty.25 This approach gives little im-
and affective identification. portance to elements which contrast greatly
across phenomenologists, and overlooks per-
(2). Empathy is not intersubjectivity. Interac- plexities that brought them to abandon re-
tion and interdependence between two flections on empathy and to concentrate on
subjects are at the basis of the human different fields of research.
condition, which takes form in relation- As we have seen, Zahavi’s starting point is
ship with others. Besides empathy, in- the phenomenological thesis, according to
tersubjectivity therefore requires other which the existence of other sentient, acting
kinds of relations: not only vis-à-vis, but and thinking beings is not a theoretical ques-
also in absentia or via cultural and artis- tion but a “given fact” that belongs to every-
tic products, not only in dual forms (you body’s experience of reality. He radicalizes
and I), but also collectively (we). this phenomenological thesis putting the ac-
cent on the immediate intuitive form of per-
(3). Empathy is not mind reading, which is ceiving others.26 Empathy is therefore pri-
“reading” others’ minds as if behaviour- marily an actual encounter, a direct, face to
al or bodily signatures were similar to face contact between two individuals corre-
written characters (through which read- sponding to daily experience where, through
ers retrace the meaning these signatures gestures, posture, tone of voice, we gain im-
express). Perceiving others not only in- mediate access to the effective singularity of
volves a physical perception as res exten- others, and not to a “doppelgänger”. Human
sa, through which one can infer the res beings outside the I are part of reality as
cogitans, the invisible mental states. much as trees and cathedrals, but their lives,
Others appear as a mind-body unity, emotions, and thoughts exist within them,
comprehending unknowns and inacces- and are not progressively perceived as physi-
sible elements. cal qualities like strata of psychic life. What is
this kind of direct and immediate perception
(4). Empathy is not the origin of morality in- of others’ physical and psychic existence,
tended as an ethics of caring. then? To answer this question, Zahavi refers
to Max Scheler, the phenomenologist who
█ The complexity of empathy most accurately defined the experience of
other subjects as a form of perception.27
One might wonder how the minimalist According to Scheler, perception of others
theory deals with the complexity of empathy. is based on the ability to detect their mentalFrom Empathy to Empathies 7
states directly within their expressive manifes- the other is living something and has experi-
tations, and not through them. In physical en- ences of his own.33
counters it is not only a body or a mind con- This is a crucial point: to fully compre-
fronting another, but “possible expressive uni- hend another person, the dynamics of being a
ties” and “possible actions unities”.28 Laughter, living body (Leib) interfacing with the self,
handshakes, hugs are more than the effect of the others and the world is more important
subjective states, they make the latter manifest than simply sharing an emotion. More espe-
to others and bring them to fulfilment. A re- cially, it allows us to exclude a notion of em-
pressed or blocked state, not “culminating” in pathy as an individual mental or affective
expression, loses intensity even for the person state, in order to insist on its nature as a phe-
experiencing it in the first person.29 nomenon that depends on the relations be-
The thesis of the direct perception of oth- tween two subjects and their specific con-
ers requires a deeper analysis: Scheler thought tents. The self and the other coexist in a
that expressive phenomena did not reveal common world, and their bodies have vari-
others’ transparency, but that there was a ous degrees of similarity and difference
horizon of hidden intimacy that could not be which are not pre-given, but emerge in the
expressed.30 What does the immediate en- dynamic relation of their bodily interde-
counter allow us to “know” and how reliable is pendence and through their sharing the same
it, if it does not concern “knowing everything” perceptive field.
about others and their gestures, movements The phenomenological conception of a
and facial expressions? A number of elements living body that moves around the world and
from Husserl’s tormented reflections on em- meets other beings, and in doing so produces
pathy and Edith Stein’s early work31 put in the and shares meanings, suggests a new vision of
context of developments in Merleau-Ponty’s “sharing” others’ lives. Reciprocity and col-
thought32 now enter Zahavi’s greater picture: laboration stem from the movements of bod-
it is now possible to reconstruct the immedia- ies that are not merely spectators of each
cy of others’ experience by conceiving of per- others’ behaviour, but interact and are mutu-
ception as a movement of active world- ally involved, both emotionally and sensory.
exploration on the part of interacting subjects, An analogous shift in perspective relates to
each starting from their own perspective. “comprehension”: we know that emotions
Zahavi especially focuses on Husserl’s in- have an intentional character, because they
depth analysis of genetic dynamics concern- are the experience of an event, a threat, a be-
ing direct and immediate identification of haviour belonging to the outside world. Un-
others and the bodily involvement in empa- derstanding why another is angry is not being
thy. In the fifth Cartesianische Meditationen angry, but focusing on his world-perspective,
Husserl had introduced the idea of Paarung on his suffered injustice, tuning to his re-
(“coupling”), believing that the expressive sponse to the resources the world has offered
and relational potential of gestures, facial ex- him, maybe seeing a future possibility for ac-
pressions, movements and posture indicates tion for ourselves in that same response.
direct and immediate communication among Zahavi’s work on a unified phenomenologi-
individuals. Yet, this “passive” (unconscious cal background follows le fil rouge of the ele-
and involuntary) characterization (of cou- ments that define empathy in his perspective:
pling) did not mean it was reduced to the experiential “knowledge” of others, embodi-
subpersonal level of automatic physiological ment as lived interaction and sharing with the
procedures. In a moving body that intersects, world. Empathy, however, has other profiles,
obstructs and overlaps its perspective and its that are sometimes accomplished through di-
intentions with those of another body, there rect, physical perception, but sometimes do not
is an inherent pre-reflective awareness that require it. An encounter with another can result8 Boella
in a reciprocal “you and I” relation, as in con- the complexity of empathy by giving the
versation and in doing something together, phenomenological approach to empathy a
such as watching a film or dancing. In other key role, as a form of «fundamental sensitivi-
cases, it can be an asymmetrical experience. In ty to animacy, agency and emotional expres-
daily life it is also possible that we are uninter- sivity».37 How should we interpret this
ested in someone we meet and in his experienc- statement? Is empathy a basic capacity to
es, and we stop at the notion of “someone” evaluate the authenticity or inauthenticity of
smiling happily, lost in their own thoughts, multiple forms of intersubjective relations?
walking quickly or embodying a specific socio- Does the direct perception of others function
cultural type. Unlike manifold forms of group by “putting oneself in somebody else’s shoes”,
interaction, communitarian forms of life et si- through sympathy and compassion, as a “de-
milia, “social acts” such as promises and for- tector” for modulations in the intensity of
giveness only come into being via relations be- our sharing or caring for others, or for the
tween individuals.34 After identifying the other refusal of interest in others? We can wonder
as an experiencing subject (especially when whether a “minimalist” perspective, aiming
meeting him in person something does not to maintain a connection with philosophy of
work), various cognitive activities such as theo- the mind, the cognitive sciences and a wide
retical inference and imaginative simulations spectrum of disciplines which deal with em-
become necessary: these separate mind and pathy, ultimately sets itself the goals of play-
body, intention and gesture, emotion and ex- ing an important role in theoretical clarifica-
pression, deal with intersubjective and cultural tion. If not, could it be urging us to go “be-
context, and attempt to give an answer to the yond empathy”, as Zahavi’s first essay on
why and how of a given situation. empathy was entitled?38
Zahavi acknowledges that empathy is a
stratified experience, interpersonally and so- █ Empathy as a laboratory for experiences
cially, and that eventually it can articulate with
mind reading activities and contextual ele- The re-emergence of the phenomenological
ments. Admitting this, however, requires the heritage on empathy should be considered in
idea that its primary quality (“experiential light of the fact that it does not offer any kind
knowledge”) provides, as Husserl would have of complete theory; instead, it is a intermittent
said, «an intuitive fulfilment, a confirmation path that intertwines with other paths, even in
or satisfaction towards more indirect or signi- the generations after those of Husserl and
tive ways of the comprehension or the judge- Scheler.39 We should remember that phenome-
ment on the mental lives of others».35 The nological studies and debates took place
physical encounter, the essential element in around the time of the First World War and in
empathy, does not exclude the possibility of its immediate aftermath: they bear traces of a
empathising with a group (a grieving family), period shaken by strong social and political up-
with absent people (a population that has suf- heavals, which led to an ethical and intellectual
fered an environmental catastrophe), or with a fervor, eventually giving birth to the “revolu-
fictitious character from a novel. In Zahavi’s tion” of thought that distinguished the main
perspective, these are however derived forms, philosophical currents of the 20th century.40
since they delete the distinction between the From this point of view, the epochal passage we
self and the other, and therefore the distinc- are living in has similarly compelling character-
tion between empathy, sympathy, and com- istics, and urges us not to consider the phe-
passion, as well as the distinction between nomenological perspective on empathy as just
empathy as direct contact based on perception as another theory, but as a laboratory that has
and activities based on imagination.36 extended in many directions.
We can conclude that Zahavi deals with The contemporary political debate onFrom Empathy to Empathies 9
empathy has raised crucial points, such as contemporary debates the ethical-political
“humanitarian” wars, migrations, and the value of empathy is often the key criterion in
impact of new technology on individual and every conceptualisation. Empathy, however
social life. Though confused and excessive, defined, can manage (or fail) to broaden the
this powerful “empathy effect” reminds us of self’s references through both affective shar-
the conflicts and contradictions of the global ing and putting the self in others’ shoes.
world. Questions that arise around empathy Ultimately, it is difficult to attribute the
(interpersonal communication, social and task of bearing the complexity of intersubjec-
political forms of relationship, coexisting tive relations, their dependency on social and
practices) cannot be fully confronted in a cultural context, and judgement, and their
theoretical debate – even if philosophy of placement in institutional, juridical and eco-
mind and of cognitive sciences exactly repre- nomic structures to a unique function focal-
sent the role of science in social life today. ised on mental procedures pertaining to the
The evolution of phenomenology shows person who is empathising (and therefore
that a radicalisation is necessary. The “prob- has a skill). We must therefore ask whether it
lem” of empathy is very different nowadays is sufficient to refer to how individuals repre-
than it was in Edith Stein’s time, starting with sent others or “reflect” them by observing
the roles played by social interaction, perma- their behaviour (in other words, by using
nent telematic connection, and the global hori- their own lives as a model for others’ – via an
zon for knowledge and information exchange “as if”), in order to explain manifold forms of
in contemporary life. In this new picture, this interaction and communication.
“problem” should be radicalised by grasping It follows that it is necessary to venture be-
the ethical quality of the question, which yond definitions and options in favour or
emerged in the early Twenties. Since it con- against empathy to follow developments of
fronts others’ otherness, empathy raises the empathic experience and the changes that it
question of intersubjectivity. From this per- can undergo in different scenes and contexts of
spective, it is perfectly clear that post- intersubjective relations. In other words, it is
phenomenological thought has made the prior- necessary to abandon the idea of an ability sub-
itization of others an original datum that has suming in itself a variety of components, and to
thrown the subject off its pedestal, making em- pay attention to the multiple living, emotional,
pathy useless.41 Though a potent confutation of and cognitive experiences that result when the
its rhetorical version centred on the self, this empathic act allows us to understand that we
did not however answer questions that the em- are in presence of someone whose view of the
pathic act often cruelly raises. What kind of re- world is “his”, and not “ours”.
sponsibility comes from not being indifferent The question “What is empathy?” must
to others’ pain? What kind of freedom should therefore be reformulated in light of these new
others, whom I have identified as acting sub- questions. How can we explain that we are al-
jects in the world around me, enjoy? ways in contact with others and there are many
In contemporary debates, efforts to reach wicked and even negative forms in which we
a definition revolve around the question of tune into their requests or live enmities and es-
empathy’s role in social life: does it subsume trangement? What happens on the level of vital
within itself qualities that Darwin attributed movements, emotions, cognitive activities, de-
to it (thinking of evolutionary advantages for cisions in actions, when the empathic act offers
the weaker and younger, cooperation, and identification of another as an autonomous
association), or is it an exceptional quality of centre of agency in the world?
daily life to which we turn when we are inter- These questions require a new research
ested in another to the point that we wish to horizon, which should consider empathy not
discover what he is thinking and feeling? In theoretically, but practically. It is necessary to10 Boella
look to historical cultural and social situa- sociological stereotypes, is not enough.42 Empa-
tions in which tuning into others’ differences thy displays the fundamental dimensions of the
is difficult or rejected. Cases in which empa- relation between the I and reality: perception,
thy meets subjective or objective obstacles consonance and dissonance in bodily encoun-
are very useful for understanding its architec- ters, the sometimes contradictory dynamics of
ture, which is not composed of emotions and emotions that surprise us, and at the same time
prosocial behaviour only. Empathy can be are an answer to the threats and requests com-
celebrated as a natural human ability, but in ing from the outside world, the possibility of
concrete interactive situations it appears to seeing oneself as another. Seen in this light,
be an answer that follows different and often empathy does not automatically lead to an
unpredictable paths. There are many ways of “understanding” based on hypotheses, conjec-
stimulating it, blocking it, holding it back, tures or forecasts, nor to cooperation or altruis-
using it selectively for one’s own group, or for tic behaviour. It does remind us that the only
manipulation. Attention to social context way to “know” ourselves and others is by commit-
and cultural diversity is not however the only ting to the world as beings who move, act, and
thing in question, there may also be a se- suffer in time, discovering profiles and meanings
quence of positive and negative experiences of reality that depend on the others’ existence.
that arise from encounters with others. Empathy does not come “before”, and is
Empathy is placed out of people’s heads and not a condition for the possibility (or authen-
is not equivalent to a magical bridge connecting ticity) of different forms of cooperation, asso-
two inaccessible interiorities, but is the ciation, and participation in others’ destinies.
acknowledgement of the irreducible perspec- It does explain the transformative effect of
tive of others and of the interactions and com- our relations with reality every time another
munications that can (or cannot) stem from it. existence creates new experiences and mean-
In real life, we do not only see an action or a ings – not simply duties, contracts, debts and
face, but we follow them, imagine them, antici- credits. The empathic act, from this realistic
pate them; we accept or refuse the emotion or perspective, encompasses potential, limits,
the intention they show. We do not always re- and risks – in short, a variety of sliding doors.
spond to others’ feelings with that same feeling: Errors, inaccuracies, projections of ourselves
others’ joy or pain can leave us cold because we onto others, and fear of the other are certainly
have no reason to be concerned about them, problems related to the different ways in
and we deliberately wish to ignore them, or be- which we reach “knowledge” of others’ mental
cause social and cultural stereotypes prevail states. Their correction is not however an in-
over what we see. We must not therefore look dividual performance, which can be trained or
for an idealised empathy, but for empathies, taught with specific techniques. Seeing, feeling
whose contexts and different manifestations that another’s expression of interest betrays
bring out rejections, limits, paradoxes, difficul- flattery or hypocrisy, and attempting to detect
ties and failures, all of which give us a more re- the reasons behind it, are not perceptive or
alistic and radical view of the great bet charac- cognitive tasks, but concrete situations in
terising our relations with others. which relations with others are vigorously
Empathy is not an observing and sharing tested. Empathy triggers a generative dynamic
ability, eventually an ability to classify feelings, in which time plays an important role. Con-
needs, or others’ intentions, which can lead us text, concrete situations, a different focus on a
to “do” something (altruistic and caring behav- relationship often mark this point in terms of
iour). Identifying a depressed patient’s emotion disparity and asymmetry of power, knowledge
and executing codified “empathic” gestures (“I and emotional involvement. Starting from here,
know how you feel”), or subtly interpreting we can see how sensitivity, emotions, and
their interior life by adopting psychological or cognitive activities are intertwined, transformFrom Empathy to Empathies 11
themselves and mark the unpredictable out- MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 2006, p. 21, asserts
comes of every encounter with others. that today’s simulationists are the equivalent of
empathy theorists (especially Theodor Lipps) in
█ Notes the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth century.
11
See F. DE VIGNEMONT, P. JACOB, What is like to
1
E. STEIN, Zum Problem der Einfühlung, (1917), Feel Another’s Pain?, in: «Philosophy of Science»,
in: E. STEIN, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. V, Herder Ver- vol. LXXIX, n. 2, 2012, pp. 295-316.
12
lag, Wien/Leipzig 2010. A. COPLAN, Understanding Empathy: Its Fea-
2
For further reading, see L. BOELLA, Empatie. tures and Effects, in: A. COPLAN, P. GOLDIE (eds.),
L’esperienza empatica nella società del conflitto, Empathy. Philosophical and Psychological Perspec-
Raffaello Cortina, Milano 2018. tives, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, pp.
3
See J. MICHEL, Towards a Consensus about the 3-18, here p. 5.
13
Role of Empathy in Interpersonal Understanding, See F. DE VIGNEMONT, P. JACOB, What is it like
in: «Topoi», vol. XXXIII, n. 1, 2014, pp. 157- to Feel Another’s Pain?, cit. . The authors refer to
172. This contribution offers a critical review of the study of T. SINGER, B. SEYMOUR, J.
the main conceptualisations of empathy. The au- O’DOHERTY, H. KAUBE, R.J. DOLAN, C.D. FRITH,
thor believes that empathy can reach its goal for Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but not the
social comprehension even without a precise def- Sensory Components of Pain, in: «Science», vol.
inition of its components. CCCIII, n. 5661, 2004, pp. 1157-1162, whose re-
4
C.D. BATSON, These Things Called Empathy: sults were discussed by considering results ob-
Eight Related but Distinct Phenomena, in: J. DE- tained using another modality (TMS instead of
CETY, W. ICKES (eds.), The Social Neuroscience of fMRI), in A. AVENANTI, D. BUETI, G. GALATI, S.M.
Empathy, The MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 2009, AGLIOTI, Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation
pp. 3-15. Highlights the Sensorymotor Side of Empathy for
5
F.B.M. DE WAAL, S.D. PRESTON, Mammalian Pain, in: «Neuroscience», vol. VIII, n. 7, 2005,
Empathy: Behavioral Manifestations and Neural pp. 955-960. See also P. JACOB, Empathy and the
Basis, in: «Nature Reviews. Neuroscience», vol. Disunity of Vicarious Experiences, in: «Rivista in-
XVIII, n. 8, 2017, pp. 498-509, here p. 498. ternazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia», vol. VI, n.
6
See F.B.M. DE WAAL, The Age of Empathy: Na- 1, 2015, pp. 4-23. J. ZAKI, T.D. WAKER, T. SINGER,
ture’s Lessons for a Kinder Society, Three River C. KEYSERS, V. GAZZOLA, The Anatomy of Suffer-
Press 2009; F.B.M. DE WAAL, The Cosmopolitan ing: Understanding the Relationship between Noci-
Ape: Empathy, Morality, Community, Culture – ceptive and Empathic Pain, in: «Trends in Cogni-
Apes Can Have it All!, in: «Nautilus», vol. I, 2013, tive Sciences», vol. XX, n. 4, 2016, pp. 249-259,
pp. 46-57, here p. 50 (interview by S. Paulson). investigates the neurophysiological and psycho-
7
V. GALLESE, The “Shared Manifold Hypothesis”: logical nature of pain.
14
From Mirror Neurons to Empathy, in: «Journal of See T. SINGER, O.M. KLIMECKI, Empathy and
Consciousness Studies», vol. VIII, n. 5-7, 2001, Compassion, in: «Current Biology», vol. XXIV, n.
pp. 33-50, here p. 43, uses the term “enlarged em- 18, 2014, pp. 875-878.
15
pathy” to describe comprehension of others’ ac- See P. BLOOM, Against Empathy: The Case for
tions, emotions, and sensations on the basis of Rational Compassion, Vintage, New York 2017.
16
automatic and unconscious processes of embod- See E. STEIN, Zum Problem der Einfühlung, cit.
17
ied simulation. See M. SCHELER, Wesen und Formen der Sympa-
8
A.I. GOLDMANN, Simulating Minds: The Philos- thie (1923), in: M. SCHELER, Gesammelte Werke,
ophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading, Bd. VII, hrsg. von M.S. FRINGS, Franke Verlag,
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006, p. 4. Bern/München 1973, pp. 7-258.
9 18
Ibidem, p. 40, p. 43, p. 128 and p. 132. See C. See J. PETITOT, F, VARELA, B. PACHOUD. J. ROY
CATMUR, Understanding Intentions from Actions: (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology, Standford
Direct Perception, Inference, and the Role of Mirror University Press, Standford 1999; M. RATCLIFFE,
and Mentalizing Systems, in: «Consciousness and Phenomenology, Neuroscience and Intersubjectivity,
Cognition», vol. XXXVI, 2015, pp. 426-433. in: H.L. DREYFUS, M.A. WRATHALL (eds.), A
10
K.R. STUEBER, Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism,
Folk, Psychology and the Human Sciences, The Blackwell, Oxford 2006, pp. 329-345; S. GAL-12 Boella
LAGHER, D. ZAHAVI, The Phenomenological Mind, SERL, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. IV, hrsg. von W.
Routledge, London/New York 2008. BIEMEL, Martinus Njihoff, The Hague 1952.
19 24
See J.L. PETIT, Constitution by Movement: Hus- Ivi, p. 170.
25
serl in the Light of Recent Neurobiological Findings, See ivi, pp. 141-146, where Alfred Schutz’s
in: J. PETITOT, F, VARELA, B. PACHOUD. J. ROY thought is given considerable consideration. I shall
(eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology, cit., pp. 220- limit myself to direct references to phenomenology.
26
244; E. THOMPSON, Empathy and Consciousness, His position was not casually formalised and
in: «Journal of Consciousness Studies», vol. VIII, discussed as a direct perception theory account. See
n. 5-7, 2001 pp. 1-32; D. LOHMAR, Mirror Neu- S. GALLAGHER, Direct Perception in the Intersub-
rons and the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity, jective Context, in: «Consciousness and Cogni-
in: «Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences», tion», vol. XVII, 2008, pp. 535-543. For a critical
vol. V, n. 1, 2006, pp. 5-16. discussion, see P. JACOB, The Direct Perception
20
Dan Zahavi has actively participated in the debate Model of Empathy: A Critique, in: «Review of
of philosophy of the mind and cognitive sciences, Philosophy and Psychology», vol. II, n. 3, 2011,
taking positions on current theses. The results of his pp. 519-540; S. SPAULDING, Phenomenology of So-
critical discussion were collected and included in a cial Cognition, in: «Erkenntnis», vol. LXXX, n. 5,
unitary theoretical frame (see D. ZAHAVI, Self and 2015, pp. 1069-1089.
27
Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy and Shame, See M. SCHELER, Wesen und Formen der Sympa-
Oxford University Press 2014). See also D. ZAHAVI, thie, cit., pp. 232-258. The last paragraph of the
J. MICHAEL, Beyond Mirroring: 4e Perspectives on third section is called: Fremdwahrnehmung. D.
Empathy, in: A. NEWEN, L. DE BRUIN, S. GALLAGHER ZAHAVI, Self and Other, cit., pp. 115-132, decides
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 4e Cognition, Oxford to define empathy using Scheler’s position on sym-
University Press, Oxford/New York 2016. For pa- pathy because of the distinction between the self
pers by scholars who work with Zahavi, see S. GAL- and the other, which also stands for sympathy. The
LAGHER, How the Body Shapes The Mind, Oxford fact that, according to Scheler, the “givenness of
University Press, Oxford 2005; S. GALLAGHER, Em- the other” stands on an original vital-unconscious
pathy, Simulation, and Narrative”, in: «Science in indistinction («an undifferentiated flux of experi-
Context, vol. XXV, n. 3, 2012, pp. 355-381; S. ences») that reproduces itself in cases of ideologi-
OVERGAARD, Wittgenstein and Other Minds: Re- cal subordination or deference to leading opinions
thinking Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity with Witt- is considered a second order phenomenon. See M.
genstein, Levinas, and Husserl, Routledge, London SCHELER, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, cit., p.
2007; T. FUCHS, H. DE JAEGHER, Enactive Intersub- 62 and pp. 239-240. This is one of the starkest
jectivity: Participatory Sense-Making and Mutual In- points of collision between Husserl and Stein. See
corporation, in: «Phenomenology and the Cognitive L. BOELLA, Il paesaggio interiore e le sue profondità,
Sciences», vol. VIII, n. 4, 2009, pp. 465-486. in: M. SCHELER, Il valore della vita emotiva, Gueri-
21
D. ZAHAVI, PH. ROCHAT, Empathy # Sharing: ni, Milano 1999, pp. 11-45.
28
Perspectives from Phenomenology and Developmen- See M. SCHELER, Wesen und Formen der Sympa-
tal Psychology, in: «Consciousness and Cogni- thie, cit., p. 56 and pp. 233-237.
29
tion», vol. XXXVI, 2015, pp. 543-553. In other Ivi, pp. 245-246.
30
essays Zahavi uses the adjective “lean”. Ivi, p. 77. See also E. HUSSERL, Zur Phänome-
22
D. ZAHAVI, Self and Other, cit., pp. 3-98. The nologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem
first part of the book explores the argument of an Nachlass (1929-1935). Dritter Teil, in: E. HUSSERL,
“experiential I”, whose “my” experiential feature Gesammelte Werke, Bd. XV, hrsg. von I. KERN,
is perceived in an intersubjective frame, but is not Martinus Njihoff, The Hague 1973, pp. 11-12; E.
mediated by social experience. It is an immediate HUSSERL, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser
contact with our own existence, a basic access to Vorträge (1931), in: E. HUSSERL, Gesammelte
our lived experience without which we would Werke, Bd. I, hrsg. von S. STRASSER, Martinus
have no experience. Nijhoff, The Hague 1950.
23 31
Ivi, pp. 151-152. See E. HUSSERL, Ideen zu einer Stein and Husserl investigated the expressive
reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische relation between body and mind. This point rep-
Philosophie, Bd. II, Phänomenologische Unter- resents a moment of fruitful exchange between
suchungen zur Konstitution (1912), in: E. HUS- them. See E. STEIN, Zum Problem der Einfühlung,From Empathy to Empathies 13
cit., pp. 93-103. sciousness and Cognition», vol. XXXVI, 2015, pp.
32
See M. MERLEAU-PONTY, Phénomenologie de la 532-542.
38
perception (1945), Gallimard, Paris 1976. D. ZAHAVI, Beyond Empathy: Phenomenological
33
E. HUSSERL, Cartesianische Meditationen, cit., Approaches to Intersubjectivity, in: «Journal of
pp. 123-126. Consciousness Studies», vol. VIII, n. 5-7, 2001,
34
M. SCHELER, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, pp.151-167.
39
cit., p. 230. See L. BOELLA, Edith Stein, in: A. CIMINO, V.
35
D. ZAHAVI, Self and Other, cit., p. 151, pp. 138- COSTA (eds.), Storia della fenomenologia, Carocci,
140, pp. 168-170. Roma 2012, pp. 145-158.
36 40
Ivi, p. 152. See M. GUBSER, The Far Reaches. Phenomenolo-
37
Ivi, p. 170. See also D. ZAHAVI, Phenomenology, gy, Ethics and Social Renewal in Central Europe,
Empathy and Mindreading, in: H.L. MAIBOM (ed.), Stanford University Press, Stanford 2014.
41
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Empa- See E. LEVINAS, Entre nous: Essais sur le penser-
thy, Routledge, London / New York 2017, pp. 33-43. à-l’autre, Grasset, Paris 1991.
42
For an explicit assertion of the “founding” role of the See J. HALPERN, From Detached Concern to Em-
direct perception theory, see J. KIVERSTEIN, Empathy pathy. Humanizing Medical Practice, Oxford Uni-
and Responsiveness to Social Affordances, in: «Con- versity Press, Oxford/New York 2001.
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