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ERGY SEC
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Energy Security:
Operational Highlights
No 12 2019
ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 12 1
This is a product of the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (NATO ENSEC COE). It is
produced for NATO, NATO member countries, NATO partners, related private and public insti-
tutions and related individuals. It does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO or NATO
ENSEC COE. The views presented in the articles are those of the authors alone.
© All rights reserved by the NATO ENSEC COE. Articles may not be copied, reproduced, dis-
tributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO ENSEC COE and the respective
publication.
2 No 12 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS
Beyond the era
of fossil fuels
CONTENTS
4 Editorial
5 Changing security aspects for future energy
systems: Renewable energy and possible risks
at the local, regional, and global levels
BY MS JULIA VAINIO, NATO ENSEC COE
11 Risk factors of energy sector transitions –
views from the Nordic-Baltic countries
BY MS JULIA VAINIO, NATO ENSEC COE
21
A Review of Fuel Cells and Their Military Applications
BY MR DAMIEN MAYOR-HILSEM, AND DR. REINER ZIMMERMANN, NATO ENSEC COE
32 Renewable Energy Infrastructure: Physical and Cyber
Vulnerabilities Assessment
BY DR. NICOLAS MAZZUCCHI, FONDATION POUR LA RECHERCHE STRATÉGIQUE (PARIS)
ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 12 3
Editorial
by COL Romualdas Petkevičius (LTU-AF)
is that hydrogen can be a decisive response to
the country´s energy and climate challenges.
One of the articles in this Operational Highlights
provides an overview of hydrogen as part of a re-
Director of the NATO ENSEC COE silient energy strategy for NATO defence.
T
he latest NATO This monumental change is also visible within
Declaration from NATO militaries. Promising examples from
Brussels in July the US military bases in Mississippi, Califor-
2018 reinstated the nia, and Massachusetts show the integration
importance of energy se- of solar and wind-powered micro grids to sup-
curity in the common secu- port the bases and provide them energy inde-
rity of NATO. The need for pendency and security.
stable and reliable energy
supply, the diversification In the military sphere, NATO ENSEC COE has
of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and had a continuous positive input in enhancing
the interconnectivity of energy networks, were renewable energy applications in the military.
highlighted as critical importance. The fourth Innovative Energy Solutions for
Military Applications (IESMA2018) held in Vil-
Energy systems across NATO nations are in the nius gathered a new record number of partici-
process of transformation quite unseen since pants from various NATO and Partner nations,
the industrial revolution. Promising results who showcased the numerous ways NATO and
from Italy, where renewable energy capacity has its members are already deploying renewable
grown from a mere 1.7 GW in 2000 to 34.5 GW energy sources and storage options in the op-
in 2017 (and is expected to grow to 63.4 GW in erational theatres. Especially the strong sup-
2030!), from the UK, where wind already cre- port from industry has convinced us that there
ates on an optimal day a third of the electricity is a huge potential for innovative energy solu-
used in the Great Britain electricity system, or tions for military in the future.
from Germany, where renewable energy sourc-
es have overtaken coal as the most important But as a NATO Energy Security Centre of Ex-
power source, show that we are on a steady path cellence, we also carry our responsibility in
toward an era beyond the fossil fuels. monitoring and analysing regional and global
developments in our field. As promising as the
Transforming energy systems requires not only future looks, NATO nations need to stay awake
production capacity, but also distribution, de- and vigilant. This edition of Operational High-
mand-side flexibility, and energy storage. With lights is set to help succeeding in exactly that
companies such as Veolia in France, who focus – three of the articles play the devil’s advocate
on the commercial-based recycling of solar in looking at the different risk factors our trans-
panels, we can hopefully cut some of the im- forming energy system might bring forth.
port dependency of monopolistically produced
rare earth minerals and materials that the re- We introduce a methodology of different risks
newable energy industry requires. The recent that academia has identified as future risk
successful implementation of Tesla big battery factors, and then ask various country repre-
in Hornsdale, Australia, shows that technology sentatives to assess their countries’ prepar-
developments are happening faster than most edness against these threats. We also have
people can even imagine. a closer look at the renewable energy infra-
structure vulnerabilities, especially those re-
In a post-fossil fuel era, research and develop- lated to cyber-threats. Lastly, we provide an
ment is required on various different means of overview of the recent R&D done on hydrogen
energy production. NATO partners across the fuel cells in the military domain – an area of
globe, such as Japan, are ambitious in pioneer- development we are sure will gain more pop-
ing as a “hydrogen society”. The vision in Tokyo ularity in the coming years.
4 No 12 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS
Changing security aspects
for future energy systems:
Renewable energy and
possible risks at the local,
regional, and global levels
by Ms Julia Vainio
RENEWABLES WILL CHANGE THE ENERGY estimated to increase globally by two and a
SECURITY LANDSCAPE IN THE FUTURE half times the current amount by 2040, based
I
on the two degrees Celsius target of limiting
n the energy domain, the increase in the the rise in global temperature [1]. NATO Alli-
use of of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) ance and Partner Nations are in the forefront
is usually portrayed as the ultimate goal of deploying RES in their power production.
for nations to strive towards. They provide Developments in the energy sector will also
means of diversification and energy inde- change the geography of energy production,
pendency for nations. as more importance is put on optimizing the
production of RES in the countries where that
However, in the last few years, discussion energy is consumed [2].
has risen on the possible threats that might
emerge alongside the expansion of renewa- This article focuses specifically on the elec-
bles in the global energy sector. These chang- tricity production side of renewable energy
es do not happen radically or overnight. They utilization.
develop over time as energy sectors gradual-
ly change from the phasing out of fossil fuels By renewable energy, we adhere to the Inter-
to the phasing in of renewable technologies. national Energy Agency’s (IEA) definition of
RES:
The evolution of energy sectors in incorpo-
rating renewables varies already consider- “Energy derived from natural processes (e.g.
ably among nations, and the trend is only set sunlight and wind) that are replenished at a
to continue. Energy production from RES is faster rate than they are consumed. Solar, wind,
by Ms Julia Vainio
Miss Julia Vainio works as a Subject Matter Expert in the Strategic Analysis
Division at the NATO ENSEC COE. Email: julia.vainio@enseccoe.org
ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 12 5geothermal, hydro, and some forms of biomass as those means of power production that
are common sources of renewable energy.” [3] serve a certain group of end-users near the
production site. A wind power park producing
This review article has two main functions. electricity for a near-by village is an example
First, to increase awareness about a set of of a local level energy system.
possible threats to nations and regions that
the academic literature, as well as various Regional risks
recently published policy papers, have identi-
A regional level energy system could be an
fied. It comprises different threats to nations
offshore windfarm or a hydropower station
and regions associated with the increase of
that produces electricity for the national
RES on a general scale.
transmission grid, which then distributes it
on a regional basis.
Second, it also identifies new threats and
ways in which these threats could be catego-
Global risks
rized. The methodology can act as a future
reference point for extended country or re- Even though global energy systems are most
gion specific analyses. often understood as involving fossil fuel
driven markets, electricity produced by us-
The topic is divided into different dimensions; ing RES can have global risks as well. Power
risk factors on the local, regional and global units producing renewable energy are sig-
scale. The factors are further categorized as nificantly more metal intensive than power
being either economic and political risk fac- units producing energy from fossil fuels, and
tors, technical risk factors, or environmental the raw materials required to produce these
risk factors. power units are often highly concentrated on
certain geographic regions and countries [5]
The categorisation follows loosely the [6]. As demand for these materials grows, it
themes presented in the most recent NATO might create new political capital for those
Allied Command Transformation Strategic countries that have them. For example, the
Foresight Analysis report [4], where the char- European Commission has identified raw
acteristics of the future of warfare were clas- materials as critical assets for the European
sified into the following chapters; political, Union in terms of the supply risks and their
human, technology, economics or resources, economic importance. [7]
and environment. The purpose of this article
is not to act against implementing new ener- CATEGORISATION OF IDENTIFIED RISKS:
gy sources and technologies, but to prepare ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL, TECHNOLOGI-
NATO Alliance and Partner Nations for the CAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS
future.
CATEGORISATION OF IDENTIFIED RISKS; Economic and political risks
LOCAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL RISKS Economic and political risks mainly deal with
questions on policy decisions with regards to
Some of the identified risks have overlapping
energy strategies: how is the system able to
qualities and they can be categorized into
adapt to new small scale producers and local
several different categories. For the purposes
grids; what will the reduced security of de-
of clarity, we have categorised each risk only
mand mean to traditional energy exporters,
once and assigned it to the category where
and how are different nations able to finance
its risk profile could be seen as most notable.
the investment heavy energy sector transfor-
mation.
Local risks
Local level energy systems can be imagined In most NATO nations, significant renewable
6 No 12 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTSenergy investments are done in a market en- Especially in NATO and EU countries, most of
vironment where the investor is expecting a the hydropower capacity available is already
certain Return of Investment (ROI) for their in use. This would mean that most of the
product. Along with several other variables, growth would have to come from other RES,
such as market competition and the cur- such as wind, solar, and biofuels. As wind and
rent regulatory environment, this expected solar power provide the greatest potential for
ROI plays a part in determining what sort of the required growth, the electrification of the
power generating assets to build and where. energy system is a likely future outcome. [10]
Just like with fossil fuel power generating This would essentially require sectors like
units, and with renewable units such as hy- transportation to switch from carbon-based
dropower plants, Photovoltaic (PV) cells, and fuels to electric vehicles and means of trans-
wind turbines, there is a constant trade-off portation.
between the best possible geographical loca-
tion, the best possible building materials, and Environmental risks
the ROI wanted from the project. This might
mean that the investor or company is more Identified environmental risks include pos-
willing to cut costs on the mechanics or grid sible negative public perception towards in-
connections of wind turbines, or neglect the creasing the land-area to allow more RES
security measures of industrial control sys- such as wind turbines to be constructed or
tems of these power-producing units in order biomass plantations to be grown; or envi-
to increase their expected short-term profit ronmental regulations that might prohibit
from the project. the building of additional grid infrastructure
or mining sites required to mine rare earth
Technological risks minerals.
Identified technological risks focus on base- Another future risk factor will be the recy-
load issues; what happens when more RES cling rate of renewable energy supplies. Tra-
with intermittent power producing capabili- ditional fossil fuel plants such as coal fired
ties are introduced into the electricity system; turbine plants might have a lifetime of around
the adequacy of storage capacities; long dis- 40 years, whereas nuclear power plants can
tances between producing power units and be utilised for 60 years on average [11]. The
markets, and on technological uncertainty. average technical lifespan of a hydropower
plant varies from 40–150 years with easily
In order to maintain grid reliability, the Eu- replaceable mechanical or electrical parts
ropean Network of Transmission System requiring maintenance anywhere from 15–
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) has es- 70 years [12]. At the same time, an average
timated that the increase of RES in Europe lifespan of a wind turbine is around 25 years.
by 2030 will require around 150 billion euros Given the high number of rare earth minerals
in investments to grid infrastructure alone and other critical materials needed to pro-
[8]. To elaborate on the issue, Germany has duce wind turbines and PV cells, the life cy-
spent an estimated 189 billion euros since cle assessments and recycling rates of these
2000 on its energy transition known as the units need to be given top priority.
’Energiewende’ that is set to transfer its en-
ergy sector [9]. The heavy investments need- METHODOLOGY TO ASSESS SECURITY
ed for the transformation of energy systems
RISKS IN THE FUTURE
can create further divergence and inequality
between neighbouring nations or regions, as Table 1 compiles a list of risk factors in re-
one country or region might have the resourc- lation to the future of renewables. The risk
es and political will to advance the transfor- factors have been analysed according to rec-
mation of their energy system, whereas the ommendations made within the academic lit-
other might not. erature. The table presents the risks in three
ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 12 7categories in columns (economic and politi- ferentiate between the geographical scopes
cal, technological, environmental), mapped of the referenced academic research or policy
against categories in three different rows (lo- papers. Some of the identified risk factors
cal, regional, global). This article does not dif- might not be relevant for all NATO nations.
Risk factors
Economic and political Technological Environmental
Geographical risk factors risk factors risk factors
scope
Local • Lobbying both for and against • Lower grid reliability [15] • Environmental regu-
renewables – the risk of unin- lations prohibiting
formed policy decisions [13]
• Base-load issues
new grids, building
• Corruption – the risk of
• Compromised cyber secu- sites or mining
rity of individual electricity
uninformed policy decisions • NIMBY2 people
producing units
• Social unrest where large scale
biomass plantations might sub-
stitute small-scale farming [14]
Regional • Subsidization of RES might • Inadequate storage • Threats to biodiversity
lead to market distortions or capacity [17] [19]
creation of a new market that
disrupts the current system [16]
• RES usually located else-
where to where the need
• The level of resilience of the or consumption is
interconnected system to
large-scale terrorist attacks or
• Potential targets for
terrorist groups [18]
sabotage
• Cyber-attacks on the grid
or power producing units
Global • Investment heavy sector – re- • Technological uncertainty • Environmental risk
sources for Research and De- [24] factors related to non-
velopment (R&D) needed, which energy resources,
might produce more winners such as mining of rare
and losers [20] earth minerals
• Weakened security of demand • Need for an increased
for fossil-fuel based energy recycle rate of RES
exporters [21]
• Scarcity of critical resources
[22]
• Limited supply chain of critical
resources
• Violations of intellectual
property rights [23]
Table 1 Energy-generated threats that could arise from the implementation of RES to electricity systems divided by
risk factors and geographical scope. Inspiration from the work of Bengt Johansson [18]. The list is not exhaustive.
2
“Not In My Backyard” people, often describes a group of people who in principal support a certain decision as long as it does not have
any consequences in their lives.
8 No 12 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTSCONCLUSIONS dia/doclibrary/171004_sfa_2017_report_
hr.pdf
In the future, the energy systems of NATO Al-
liance and Partner Nations will go through
[5] Kleijn, René, van der Voet, Ester, Kramer,
significant changes. The societies will adapt
Gert Jan, van Oers, Lauran, and Coen van der
to more low-carbon based economies that
Giesen. “Metal requirements of low-carbon
will have global as well as local level conse-
power generation.” Energy: 36 (2011):5640–
quences. These consequences can be both
5648.
positive and negative.
[6] Semkin, Nikita, Lyyra, Satu, and Olli Sipilä.
Changes towards more RES based energy
“Global energy sector transitions will have an
systems have several positive benefits and
impact on geopolitics.” Prime Minister’s Of-
there is significant political will behind them.
fice, Policy Brief: Government plan for analy-
However, the security environment will con-
sis 14/2017. September 11, 2017. https://ti-
tinue to evolve as new risk factors and threats
etokayttoon.fi/julkaisu?pubid=21501
follow from the systemic changes in how we
produce and use energy. In order to better
O´Sullivan, Meghan, Overland, Indra, and Da-
adapt to the changing energy environment,
vid Sandalow. Working paper: the Geopolitics
NATO Alliance and Partner Nations must un-
of Renewable Energy. Center on Global Energy
derstand these changes.
Policy, Columbia University and the Geopolitics
of Energy Project, Harvard Kennedy School.
In today’s world, energy - and especially elec-
June 2017. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/pub-
tricity - pertains in every aspect of society.
lications/geopolitics-renewable-energy
Understanding the interdependencies of risk
factors associated with RES and being aware
Johansson, Bengt. “Security aspects of fu-
of how they might affect individual NATO na-
ture renewable energy systems – a short
tions or the Alliance as a whole will enable
overview.” Energy 61, (2013): 598–605.
NATO to better prepare itself against future
operational challenges.
[7] European Commission, DG Enterprise and
Industry. “Report on critical raw materials for
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10 No 12 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTSRisk factors of energy
sector transitions –
views from the Nordic-
Baltic countries
by Ms Julia Vainio
ABSTRACT METHODOLOGY
T
his article sets out to discover the A total of 15 experts in 14 different occasions
extent of how energy Subject Mat- were interviewed for this article. A majority
ter Experts (SMEs) in Nordic-Baltic of the interviewed SMEs, six people, work
countries perceive any emerging in various levels of policy planning and im-
threats stemming from energy system trans- plementation in the civil sector. Four people
formations turning them from fossil fuel work in the academic sector, three people in
consuming to renewable energy dependent non-profit organizations, and both transmis-
countries. Through interviews conducted sion system operators and the private sector
with energy SMEs in Estonia, Finland, Latvia, are represented by one person interviewed
Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden, it became from each. It is noteworthy that several of the
clear that attitudes and preparedness for SMEs have worked extensively in the field of
new types of risks were dependent on the en- energy in various different roles.
ergy mix of each country. Most identified local
risks were either technical or market-related The majority of the interviewees were either
in their nature, whereas the political and eco- recommended by the Ministries of Employ-
nomic risks were identified more often on the ment, Energy, Foreign Affairs, or Defence (or
regional and global level. All the people in- the equivalent of each Ministry), or selected
terviewed considered the increase of use of based on their academic merit and relevance
Renewable Energy Sources (RES) in electric- to the topic. At least one civil servant working
ity production as more of a positive course of in the field of energy from each nation is rep-
evolution than a negative one. resented. Of the 15 people interviewed, three
by Ms Julia Vainio
Miss Julia Vainio works as a Subject Matter Expert in the Strategic Analysis
Division at the NATO ENSEC COE. Email: julia.vainio@enseccoe.org
ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 12 11people were from Sweden, three from Fin- discussed both the threats that the increase
land and three from Estonia, and two people of use of renewables might bring to differ-
were from each of Norway, Latvia, and Lithu- ent sectors in society, as well as the possible
ania. An anonymized list of the interviewees threats that might delay the implementation
can be found at the end of the article. The in- of RES.
terviewees are referred to by their personal
identification numbers in the footnotes. NORDIC-BALTIC STATES DIFFER IN THEIR
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION SOURCES
The method used to conduct the interviews
was a pre-structured format of four ques- In presenting country-specific energy system
tions, and the qualitative interviews were ei- details, we have relied on the comprehensive
ther carried out over the phone or in person. work done by the Nordic Energy Research,
The interviewees were provided with the draft Nordic Council of Ministers and International
version of the article “Changing security as- Energy Agency organisations [1]. Despite the
pects for future energy systems: Renewable geographical proximity, the energy genera-
energy and possible risks at the local, re- tion portfolios vary from country to country.
gional, and global levels”. The pre-structured There is a close co-ordination of power sup-
interview questions included both questions ply in the Nordic power market, where Nord
about the interviewee’s professional opin- Pool power exchange covers Denmark, Esto-
ion on the risks to the energy security of the nia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and
country they reside in, as well as questions on Sweden. Regional interconnectors among the
how the country they reside in has prepared Nordic-Baltic countries provide for increased
for any emerging threats from the increase security of supply, lower the system costs,
of RES in their energy mix. The questions in- and facilitate the integration of renewables.
cluded a local, regional and global aspect to
the issue. In terms of electricity generation and con-
sumption, Norway is entirely reliant on one
• Question 1: ”Are you aware whether your source of energy for generation. Over 95% of
country has identified risks to their energy the country’s production is from hydropower
security that stem from renewable energy plants and pumps. Norway is also an active
sources? If yes, what are these risks? If no, exporter of electricity and it is set to increase
why not?” the amount of interconnectors to neighbour-
ing countries in the future. (Figure 1.) In 2015,
• Question 2: ”In your opinion, what are the 97.9% of Norwegian electricity and heat out-
main concerns of your country with the in- put came from hydro, geothermal, solar,
crease of renewable energy sources to its wind, biofuel or waste sources. [2] Norwe-
energy mix?” gians, by far, are at the top of the leader board
of the nations examined in terms of the use of
• Question 3: “In your opinion, does your RES to produce electricity.
country believe that regional insecurities will
increase because of energy system transfor- Nuclear power plays a large role in electric-
mations?” ity and heat production in both Finland and
Sweden. Where in Sweden the political dis-
• Question 4: “In your opinion, does your cussion has circled around the possibility of
country believe that global insecurities will phasing out nuclear power plants, Finland
increase because of energy system transfor- has a fifth nuclear reactor under construction
mations?” and a sixth one is in the planning phase. In
2017, Sweden produced nearly as much elec-
Many of the SMEs approached the emerging tricity from hydropower plants as it did from
security threats in a two-fold manner: they nuclear power plants. Wind power production
12 No 12 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTSFINLAND
Geothermal/ Natural Geothermal/
Natural gas solar/etc.
gas solar/etc. Coal
16.37 Coal 2.35
0.43 1.26 5.20
8.79
Biofuels/
waste Biofuels/
Geothermal/ 11.97 waste Hydro
Hydro
solar/etc. 11.81 16.77
Natural 75.31
gas 2.52 Coal Oil
products Oil
2.6 0.15 products
0.25
Biofuels/waste 0.21 Nuclear
0.42 23.25
Oil
products Nuclear
0.03 Hydro 56.35
137.91
NORWAY SWEDEN 0.89
ESTONIA 8.60
0.06
0.89 0.03
0.13
0.15 2.76 RUSSIA
LATVIA 0.77 1.86
DENMARK
0.883 1.979
0.507 0.275
0.349
KALININGRAD
LITHUANIA
GERMANY POLAND BELARUS
NETHERLANDS
Oil products Nuclear Geothermal/solar/etc. Coal
Natural gas Hydro Biofuels/waste
Figure 1 Electricity output from different energy sources in Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden
in 2016 (TWh). The arrows show the main bilateral electricity trades in the region (the thickness of the arrow dem-
onstrates the amount of electricity that flows through the interconnections). Data: IEA World Energy Balances 2017,
Nordic Energy Research, Litgrid. Figure design by Rasa Ulevičiūtė
ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 12 13in Sweden is the largest among Nordic-Baltic air quality targets set by the European Union
states. (Figure 1.) In 2015, 57.2% of Swedish for 2026. It is likely that Estonia will begin
electricity and heat output came from hydro, a large-scale phase out of oil shale-based
geothermal, solar, wind, biofuel or waste power plants and will in the future focus on
sources. [3] In other words, Sweden already the refining of oil shale. [9] In 2015, 15.7%
produces more than half of their electricity of Estonian electricity and heat output came
using RES. from geothermal, solar, wind, biofuel or
waste sources. [10]Current data puts Estonia
Like in Norway, Latvia’s indigenous electricity at the bottom of the leader board of the na-
production relies on large hydropower plants. tions examined in terms of the use of RES to
The three largest plants formed around a produce electricity.
third of Latvia’s electricity production in 2015.
The annual variation in hydropower genera- GEOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENCES IN ENERGY
tion is relatively high (±30% between 2012 SYSTEMS CREATE DIVERSE RISKS
and 2015), which leaves Latvia to utilize natu-
ral gas, biomass, and biogas to cover the rest All interviewees approached the issue of in-
of the electricity generation demand. [4] In creasing use of RES as an essentially posi-
tive step for the energy security of the Bal-
2015, 50.3% of Latvian electricity and heat
tic Sea Region. The projected RES-led world
output came from hydro, geothermal, solar,
system was described by one interviewee as
wind, biofuel or waste sources. [5]
“a more boring place to live in”, where global
energy security risks will decrease as energy
In 2017, in addition to nuclear power, thermal
sources become more diversified and decen-
power plants that commonly use biomass,
tralized2.
peat, and coal provided for most of the elec-
tricity needs for Finland. (Figure 1.) In 2015,
However, there was a wide consensus that en-
45.2% of Finnish electricity and heat output
ergy system transformations bring forth new
came from hydro, geothermal, solar, wind,
threats and vulnerabilities, as well as new
biofuel or waste sources. [6]
opportunities. One interviewee was worried
about the public’s inadequate understand-
Much like Finland in the Baltic Sea Region,
ing of energy system knowledge and how this
Lithuania is more dependent than its Baltic
might create “unrealistic assumptions on the
neighbours on electricity imports. This situ-
success of renewable energy transformation
ation has been prevalent ever since the shut-
compared to the real share of renewable en-
down of the Ignalina nuclear power plant in
ergy production on a global scale”3.
2009. Most of Lithuania’s electricity produc-
tion capacity is gas generation based. The
THE COLLISION OF NATURAL SECURITY
country has also hydropower that can be
used to balance short-term variability in the INTERESTS AND WIND FARMS
power system. [7] In 2015, 40.8% of Lithuani- The impact of wind farms on national security
an electricity and heat output came from hy- has raised concern at least in Estonia, Fin-
dro, geothermal, solar, wind, biofuel or waste land, Lithuania and Sweden, and several of
sources. [8] the interviewees raised the issue.
A significant part of electricity generation in The Estonian Ministry of Defence has de-
Estonia is based on oil shale. These allow clined nearly a dozen wind farm projects
the country relative electricity independ- from being developed in the East Viru area.
ence. However, the oil shale infrastructure If built, the projected parks would disturb
is old and faces significant modernization the operation of the air surveillance radar in
procedures in order to comply with the new Kellavere, which detects aircrafts approach-
14 No 12 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTSing from Russian airspace. The Ministry of er system to return to its normal state after
Defence has also prohibited wind parks in a disturbance. Disturbances to the system
the Lüganuse municipality based on national can vary between sudden changes of load
security interests [11]. In south-east Finland, (such as the result of a particularly windy day
more than 200 wind energy projects have across the Baltic Sea Region), line-to-line
been declined due to the suspected disrup- faults, malfunctioning or improper operation
tions to military radars if built [12]. of equipment, and so on.
In Lithuania, the wind farms in the Šilutė Intermittency forms a part of the system
and Tauragė districts of western Lithuania stability. RES like wind and solar are consid-
have been identified as impacting the ability ered as intermittent generation technologies,
of the armed forces’ air surveillance radars where the supply of energy into the electricity
to detect and track air targets [13]. Defence grid is dependent on the availability of their
interests in protecting low-flying zones for primary energy source. The production of
the Swedish Air Force have led the previous electricity from RES does not necessarily fol-
Swedish Government to curb the possible low the demand curve, and in systems with
wind power production sites for commercial high input of intermittent sources of energy,
purposes. [14] there is a risk of inadequate production of
electricity. Storage options, interconnectivity
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THREATS to other energy systems, and compensation
WERE THE MOST COMMONLY IDENTIFIED from other sources of electricity are consid-
RISK FACTORS ered as options to increase the system stabil-
ity and reduce intermittency issues.
Each interview was analysed in terms of
content and the answers were categorised The second question required the expert to
according to three themes: political or eco- assess their main concerns for their country
nomic risk factors; technological risk fac- related to the increase of the use of RES in
tors; or environmental risk factors. Even their country’s energy mix. The most occur-
though there was a lot of diversity among the ring identified threats were:
answers, some themes appeared consist-
ently throughout the interviews. This article • “Not in my backyard!”6
includes those risk factors that were men- • Bad policy-making7
tioned by three or more interviewees. • Price for consumers8
• BRELL9
The first question required the expert to eval-
uate the different threats stemming from the Political and market related risks dominated
use of RES that their respected country had the answers to the second question. In addi-
identified to date. The most occurring identi- tion, issues such as: wind volatility; different
fied threats were support mechanisms for the markets; the EU
and green energy development measures;
• System stability4 and conflicts with radars and radio signalling
• Intermittency issues5 were mentioned.
Both of these threats are technological risk There seemed to be some spill-over effect of
factors. electricity sector security concerns, as sev-
eral interviewees from the Baltic States men-
Power system stability is the ability of a pow- tioned the desynchronization of the Baltic
2
Interviewee number 8 5
Interviewee number 4, 10, 11, 12 8
Interviewee number 4, 7, 13
3
Interviewee number 6 6
Interviewee number 3, 7, 10, 11 9
Interviewee number 5, 7, 13, 14
4
Interviewee number 5, 11, 13 7
Interviewee number 3, 6, 7, 12
ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 12 15States from the BRELL10 network as a secu- on different forms of power production re-
rity risk that also has relevance to the trans- quire stable, long-term policy planning. How-
formation of energy systems. The vulnerabil- ever, when embarking on something new, it is
ities related to the increase of the use of RES not always clear which decisions and results
and synchronization to the Central-European are the most optimal for each country and
network were also mentioned as regional region in the long-term. Uninformed policy
concerns, not only as national level concerns. decisions, bad policy-making and external
The increase of the use of RES does not have pressure from lobbying groups were identi-
an immediate causality with synchronization fied as serious risks related to the increase
issues, but both are part of a larger, more in the use of RES. Manipulation of policymak-
comprehensive security landscape. ers from the incumbent industry, or an un-
successful RE subsidy scheme that enables
Concern over the high cost of RES for con- companies to take advantage of the system,
sumers was also more pronounced among were mentioned as examples of risks.
the interviewees from the Baltic States. The
main concern was whether the increase of The third question required the interviewees
the use of RES would financially strain the to assess those threats that their respected
end-consumers and thus lead to decreased country might identify as a regional threat in
popularity of RES production. the energy system transformation. The most
commonly identified threats were:
The interviewees often mentioned not only
risks that were enhanced due to the increase • Cyber threats for the transmission network11
of the use of RES, but also risks that might • Renewables’ tax for large customers12
prohibit the extension of the use of RES in • Subsidies and market distortions13
their respected countries. One of the latter
risks included a negative public perception Close to half of the respondents mentioned
regarding Renewable Energy (RE) infrastruc- growing cyber vulnerability as a risk factor
ture. Dr. Mazzuchi successfully demonstrates due to the increased complexity of the en-
in the article Renewable Energy Infrastruc- ergy system, and, in some cases, because of
ture: Physical and Cyber Vulnerabilities As- the inadequate system security of RE power
sessment [15] that due to the distributed production. Case examples have shown how
nature of these facilities, they require more wind turbines are often physically accessible
surface space to provide for the same power for intruders, which consequently allows the
generation that a more energy intensive pow- intruder to place rogue devices on the In-
er plant might need. In addition, the techni- dustrial Control Systems (ICS). This, in turn,
cal requirements of intermittent power gen- might allow the intruder to penetrate the
eration require significant investments in the network and cause large-scale damage [16].
grid maintenance and extension. In relation However, many of the interviewees felt that
to these requirements, the public opinion of there is already increased awareness of hy-
“Not In My Backyard” (NIMBY) was identified brid and cyber threats that has also affected
by several interviewees as problematic for in the way operators and actors operate in
the increase in the use of RES. the field of energy.
Political decision-making has a large influ- The other two identified risk factors (’renew-
ence on the energy system transformation. ables’ tax for large customers’, and ’subsidies
Both private and public investing decisions and market distortions’) were categorized as
10
Belarus-Russia-Estonia-Latvia-Lithuania Integrated/Unified Power System network
11
Interviewee number 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13
12
Interviewee number 4, 6, 7
13
Interviewee number 5, 6, 7, 13
16 No 12 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTSpolitical or economic risk factors. There was the minerals was identified as a possible so-
a consensus among the Baltic States inter- lution to this vulnerability, the process of re-
viewees that increased renewables’ taxes and cycling alone does not seem to be enough to
state subsidies not only distort fair market cover the increasing demand for the materi-
competition, but they might also act as a hin- als. The process of recycling will often result
drance for attracting large, energy intensive in certain impurities (required in the process
industries to the countries in question. One of of recycling) being left in the recycled mate-
the interviewees referred to unfair market in- rials. These impurities narrow the suitable
teractions, where state-subsidized fossil fuel applications for the recycled material in the
energy producers from third party countries future [18].
(i.e. outside the European Union) could gain
access to the European Union’s internal elec- If we are set to reach the targets of the Paris
tricity market14. This would enable the third Agreement18, the world needs to decrease
country producer to unfairly subsidize its its consumption of carbon dioxide emitting
product, offering lower prices than the local sources of energy. This would mean vast re-
production and thus distorting the European duction in the consumption of coal, oil, and
Union’s markets. gas, which would have a significant impact on
countries dependent on fossil fuel exports.
The fourth question required the interview- For countries with an abundance of fossil
ees to look beyond the Baltic Sea Region and fuels, such as Russia, oil and gas taxes rep-
focus more on the global shifts that might be resent a major share of the country’s budget
expected from the increase in the use of RES. revenue. It is estimated that during times of
Risks related to the political and economic high oil prices, the revenue obtained from
environment were among the most common- oil and gas taxation accounts for half of the
ly identified risks. The most frequently identi- federal budget of Russia; even during times
fied threats were: of low prices of oil, the proportion remained
high at 40% of the federal budget revenue.
• The escape of the energy intensive industry15 [19] Several of the interviewees identified this
• The supply chain and geopolitics of rare loss of future revenue as a threat to global
earth minerals16 stability. Unless countries wealthy in fossil
• Russia as a resource state17 fuels, such as Russia, manage to transform
their energy systems in synergy with the rest,
With the increase of zero-marginal cost pro- they could face internal disruptions or be-
duction of renewable energy, one of the com- have aggressively in the markets to maintain
monly identified threats was the escape of their dominant player position. However, the
the energy intensive industry to more south- RE transition is not considered to be “rapid
ern countries where solar power could be enough to surprise exporters of fossil fuels”,
harnessed more efficiently than in the north. as one interviewee suggested19.
The concentration of mining and supply RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES ARE NOT
routes of earth minerals critical for the RE in- CONSIDERED AS RISK FACTORS TO
dustry to one major supplier, China, was seen
NATIONAL SECURITY
as a future risk factor. Mineral commodities
used in solar power systems such as gallium, NATO and EU countries around the Baltic
germanium, and indium are all mainly pro- Sea Region are highly developed in their use
duced by China. [17] Even though recycling of of RES as a source of power production. The
14
Interviewee number 6 18
The central aim of the Paris Agreement is to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate
15
Interviewee number 1, 2, 6 change by keeping a global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-indus-
16
Interviewee number 1, 4, 11 trial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
17
Interviewee number 1, 2, 5, 12 19
Interviewee number 14
ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 12 17effects and vulnerabilities of these sources ducers and oil consumers will decrease, oil
have been studied to varying degrees, but producing states need to find new markets
identification of any risk factors have yet to or disrupt the energy transformation to their
appear in most national energy development benefit.
strategies.
The trend of increased electrification of so-
The distinction between risk factors caused cieties will only continue in the future, and
by the increase in use of RES or risk factors as one of the interviewees put it: ”The best
as a result of the increase in the use of RES energy mix is a well-balanced energy mix.”20.
proved to be hard to distinguish for many of
the interviewees. National energy strategies REFERENCES
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stitutions and Nordic Energy Research – an
Based on the interviews conducted for this intergovernmental organisation under the
article, it is clear that even though the uses Nordic Council of Ministers, © OECD/IEA 2016
of RES have unique geopolitical risks, they but the resulting work has been prepared by
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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
[14] Karagiannopoulos, Lefteris. “In Sweden,
wind farms and warplanes battle for airspace.” 1. Professor, Aalto University, Finland
Reuters, 18.04.2018. https://www.reuters. Doctoral Candidate, Aalto University, Finland
ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 12 192. Industrial Counsellor, Ministry of Employ- 9. Policy Director in the Energy and Climate
ment and the Economy, Finland Section, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, Norway
3. Director of Taastuvaenergia, Estonia
10. Research Director and Deputy Director,
4. Senior Expert, Ministry of Economic Affairs Stockholm Environment Institute, Sweden
and Communications, Estonia
11. Expert, Swedish Energy Agency, Sweden
5. Deputy state secretary for energy at Minis-
try of Economics, Latvia 12. Affiliate Professor of Renewable Energy,
Co-Director of Energy Area of Advance, Chal-
6. Lecturer at Vilnius Institute of International mers University, Sweden
Relations and Political Science, former Vice-
Minister of Energy, Lithuania 13. Head of Renewable Energy Resource Divi-
sion, Ministry of Energy, Latvia
7. Board member of AST - Augstsprieguma
tīkls, Latvia 14. Consultant on Public-Private Matters, Es-
tonia
8. Research Professor and Head of the Cent-
er for Energy Research at the Norwegian In-
stitute of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway
20 No 12 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTSA Review of Fuel Cells and
Their Military Applications
By Mr Damien Mayor-Hilsem, and Dr. Reiner Zimmermann, NATO ENSEC COE
NATO’S INTERESTS IN FUEL CELLS crease the risks for soldiers protecting fuel
I
convoys and to reduce NATO’s environmental
ncreased energy consumption of NATO na- footprint [2].
tions has led to research and development
efforts into replacing fossil fuel based The question of energy consumption for
sources of energy. Among the prospective armed forces will be a crucial issue for the
candidates are fuel cells, which present the years to come. In 2016, the United States mil-
advantages of high energy density (power to itary alone used 85.7 million barrels of fuel
weight ratio), high energy efficiency, no re- for a total cost of 8.7 billion dollars [3]. There-
charge time compared to batteries, and are fore, turning toward electricity powered mili-
silent usage. As an example of its high energy tary capacities rather than those powered by
density, the combustion of 1kg of hydrogen, a fossil fuels is an area worthy of exploration.
main chemical component used by fuel cells, In 2017, Donald Sando, deputy of the US Ma-
releases three times more energy than 1kg of noeuvre Centre of Excellence, declared that
oil and only emits water [1]. in 10 years from now some US army units will
be replaced by all-electrical ones [4].
For NATO, the search for alternatives to fos-
sil fuels has been on the agenda since 2012 In this scheme, fuel cells appear as an in-
by the successive declarations of the Chicago teresting lead for NATO’s needs as there is
summit (2012), the Wales summit (2014) and increasing interest for these applications
the Warsaw summit (2016). On the policy lev- from various states, and the defence indus-
el, the Green Defence Framework approved try. Fuel cells are devices that produce elec-
in February 2014 has a key role. Through its tricity through a chemical reaction of two or
three pillars; operational effectiveness, envi- more types of fuel. Contrary to batteries, they
ronmental protection and energy efficiency, produce energy as long as fuel flows through
it aims to face logistical challenges, to de- them. Therefore, like engines running on
By Mr Damien Mayor–Hilsem, and
Dr. Reiner Zimmermann, NATO ENSEC COE
Mr Damien Mayor–Hilsem holds a Master’s degree in Security,
Defence and Strategic intelligence studies from the Sciences
Po Rennes, France. Mr. Mayor–Hilsem interned at the NATO
ENSEC COE in 2018. Email: damien.mayor-hilsem@outlook.fr
Dr. Reiner Zimmermann is the Head of Research and Les-
sons Learned Division at NATO ENSEC COE. Email: reiner.
zimmermann@enseccoe.org
ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 12 21You can also read
