DRAFT IN DEVELOPMENT Last Update : 16th July 2020 - Local Outbreak Control Plan for Covid-19 infection
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Local Outbreak Control Plan for Covid-19 infection DRAFT IN DEVELOPMENT Last Update : 16th July 2020
Contents (cross linked to the Local Outbreak Control Plans seven areas)
Glossary Supporting Vulnerable People 2 6
• Barking and Dagenham’s support offer
Introduction • Specialist support hub
What are the key components Methods for Testing 3
• National portal & MTU arrangements
Guiding Principles • Additional testing capacity
Local Outbreak Control Plan seven areas Data Integration 5
• Local reporting arrangements
Governance 7 • GDPR & Data Security
• National governance • Roles & Responsibilities
• Role and responsibilities in London
• Local governance Communications & Engagement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
• Escalation Criteria • Build on prevention messages
• Range of levers available to encourage • Raise awareness of NHS Test & Trace
compliance locally • Support area outbreak plan
• Local lockdowns
Risk Matrix
Settings 1 2 4
• Setting specific action cards
• Surge capacity planning
Glossary BAME: Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic LOCP: Local Outbreak Control Plan CCG: Clinical Commissioning Group LCRC: London Coronavirus Response Centre CQC: Care Quality Commission MDT: Multi-Disciplinary Team DPH: Director of Public Health MTU: Mobile Testing Unit GDPR: General Data Protection Regulation MSOA: Middle Layer Super Output Area HMO: House of Multiple Occupation PCN: Primary Care Network HR: Human Resources PHE: Public Health England IMT: Incident Management Team PPE: Personal Protective Equipment JBC: Joint Biosecurity Centre SPOC: Single Point of Contact LBBD: London Borough of Barking & Dagenham UTLA: Upper Tier Local Authority LA: Local Authority
Introduction This document is intended to outline seven steps in local preparedness to prevent, control and manage Covid-19 incidents and outbreaks, if and as when they emerge. It describes our local whole system response and it has been developed with a wide range of stakeholders and overseen by the Health Protection Board. It is signed off by the Recovery & Legacy Group and approved at the Health and Wellbeing Board on 28 July 2020. This Plan is iterative and will be regularly updated, as further evidence and guidance emerge. London as a global city, with celebrated diversity and numerous ports of entry has an established ‘world class’ health protection system. The local and London public health response will be designed around these responsibilities and existing health protection good practice. Together with our partners we will utilise local governance and partnership arrangements to ensure the design of our Local Outbreak Plan Control Plan for Covid-19 infection is developed and delivered to meet local needs. Within these plans we will need to consider what preventative measures are required, how the situation in schools and care homes are monitored, possible scenarios and what strategies are needed to manage an outbreak in these settings (such as temporary closures to allow the deep cleaning of facilities). As part of our local response, will be able to draw on the expertise and support of the London Coronavirus Response Centre (LCRC). The main aim of the Plan is to: Build on existing plans to prevent and manage outbreaks in specific settings, ensure the challenges of Covid-19 are understood, consider the impact on local communities and ensure the wider system works together to contain the spread of infection locally.
What are the key components of our Local Outbreak Plan?
A document, easily understood & shared to provide assurance in preventing & managing outbreaks
• Practical and in simple language and clear objectives
• Likely to have a web based version for easy access and sharing
• Primary audience include local decision makers, advisors and stakeholders most likely to be affected by
the plan. It should be accessible to the general public to build confidence and trust
Content developed to enable day to day working & rapid escalation of actions if / when required
• Detailed governance arrangements with clear roles and responsibilities
• Mapped interfaces with key stakeholders and flow of information day to day and in case of outbreak
• Trigger points for escalation outlined
• Key processes to be followed proactively day to day (e.g. infection control) and in case of outbreak
• Develop or plug into existing plans for high risk locations / vulnerable people
• Summary of risks associated with each theme, and suggested mitigations
• Proactive and reactive communications and engagement plans including pre-prepared / example
materials, and usage of data to tailor messaging to clusters
Supported by key tools
• Templates e.g. SITREP, readiness, tracing data to receive
• Checklists and other proformas
• National assurance and support frameworkGuiding Principles
Barking and Dagenham’s Local Outbreak Control Plan (LOCP) is guided by the principles and legislative framework specified in the
document below and signed by Association of Directors of Public Health, Faculty of Public Health, Public Health England, Local
Government Association, Solace and UK Chief Environmental Officers Group.
There are four principles for the design and Operationalisation of LOCPs arrangements, including local contact tracing, if needed.
They are stated below:
1. Be rooted in public health systems and leadership
2. Adopt a whole system approach
3. Be delivered through an efficient and locally effective and responsive system including being informed by timely access to data
and intelligence
4. Be sufficiently resourced
Read the document hereBackup
Our Covid-19 Local Outbreak Plan builds on existing plans to manage outbreaks in specific settings,
ensure the challenges of Covid-19 are understood, considers the impact on local communities and
ensure the wider system capacity supports the Director of Public Health
Capacity Stakeholders Scale Integration & Delivery Communication
& Engagement
• Increased capacity • Significant and sustained • Plans must be able to • Requirement to integrate • Requirement for comms
requirements for: increase in number of deal with outbreaks at with new bodies, including:
o Community campaign, with more
stakeholders, including: an unprecedented scale o NHS Test & Trace
engagement o Residents across multiple frequent and consistent
o Testing o Support and Assurance messaging & broader
o Contact tracing o Employers locations and facility teams
o PHE types simultaneously scope and channels
o Infection control • Requirement to integrate
o Support for o NHS (e.g. The leader, cabinet
multi-source data to support members, Director of
vulnerable o Facilities e.g. schools, • Some plans will involve local decision making
people hospitals coordination across Public Health, CEO
o Enforcement • Requirement to collaborate school leaders,)
• Specialist expertise o Joint Biosecurity Centre other London boroughs with PHE Health protection •
(JBC) and in some cases Requirement for
required teams, MDT LA, CCGs, proactive comms and
• Mutual aid o National government London as a whole hospitals, GPs, around
arrangements o Local & national media comms plans
infection control, advice on
available o Community, faith and ground, delivery etc.
voluntary sectorLocal Outbreak Control Plans seven areas
1
2
3
4
5
6
7Governance
The Director of Public Health is the identified Barking and Dagenham 7 NHS Test and Trace Programme single point of contact (SPOC) The Director’s primary role is to give assurance that the key organisational elements outlined below are aligned and functioning effectively.
Who are the key decision makers?
Level Decision maker(s) Co-ordination, advice and engagement
Individual Individuals or bodies responsible for that setting • London Coronavirus Response Centre
setting (e.g., Head Teacher, restaurant owner) • Director of Public Health and team
• Multi-functional Silver Groups
London Depending on the specific action required • Covid-19 Health Protection Board (Local
Borough of decisions may be taken by the: Outbreak Control Board)
Barking & • Acting Chief Executive • Barking and Dagenham Strategic Gold
Dagenham • Director of Public Health Command
• Acting Deputy Chief Executive/Monitoring
Officer/Gold Commander
London Agreed cross-boundary decisions will be • Local Resilience Forums
implemented at London system level through the • GLA
London Coronavirus Response Centre • New Contain/Joint Biosecurity Centre
Support and Assurance Teams
National Under specific escalation scenariosRoles and responsibilities in London 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A Joint Agreement between the LCRC and the London boroughs Directors of Public Health for supporting the management of Covid-19 outbreaks and complex settings has been agreed. This Joint Agreement provides a framework for joint working between the LCRC and the public health structures in the London boroughs (LA) for managing Covid-19 outbreaks. Details the following: • Summarised roles by setting (LAs and LCRC). • Brief Standard Operating Procedures/Roles and responsibilities for London boroughs and LCRC, by setting type This Agreement will be kept under monthly review initially due to the rapidly changing regional situation and guidance, and fluctuating capacity across the system. This document is therefore intended to be flexible and adaptable for local operation due to the different support and capacity arrangements available in local systems in London. Read the document here.
Local Governance
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
• Chaired by Director of Public Health and include • Chaired by Cabinet Member for Social Care &
the whole system membership including PHE, Health Integration and includes Chief Officers,
EHOs, PCN/GP, HR, B&D Collective Met Police, Healthwatch, DPH, CCG, GP
Governing Body members, elected members. If
• Oversee development of and provide assurance local lock-down needs to be imposed, Leader will
that there are safe, effective and well-tested chair the Board;
Local Outbreak Plans in place to protect the
health of local population during Covid -19 • Political and partnership oversight of strategic
pandemic. response and proactive engagement with the
public.
• Read the Terms of Reference here Covid-19 Health
• Read the Terms of Reference here
Health and
Protection Wellbeing
Board Board
• London boroughs of Barking and Dagenham,
Redbridge and Waltham Forest and includes all
Category 1 responders;
Supported at a national level by Government
Tri Borough
Departments (CCS/RED), TTCE programme and Resilience • Responsible for determining Council’s overall
proactive management and emergency response,
Joint Biosecurity Centre and at a Forum deployment of local resources and escalate need
regional level by Local Resilience Forums and for mutual aid, if needed.
Integrated Care Systems (e.g., for mutual aid and
escalation) • Read the Terms of Reference hereCovid-19 Health Protection Board Incident Management Team In case of local complex settings outbreak or community cluster that needs investigation, LCRC or Director of Public Health will convene an Incident Management Team (IMT) that will report to Covid-19 Health Protection Board. The purpose of the IMT is to agree and coordinate the activities of the key stakeholders involved to manage the investigation and control of an individual outbreak situation. This includes assessing the risk to the public’s health and ensure control measures are implemented as soon as possible. Notification of an incident or outbreak will come via various sources (e.g. LCRC, Enforcement, local schools etc.) and this will trigger data flow. Incident Management Team meeting may be convened when there are: • 2 or more cases in a setting • A single case in complex setting Cases in three household at an MSOA level (Director of Public Health likely to be the main lead for IMT) Read the IMT meeting Terms of Reference and Agenda here
Escalation criteria
Setting Criteria for escalation Escalation to:
Covid-19 Health Protection Group Strategic Gold Command
(Recovery & Legacy Board)
Events /gatherings (any setting ) - Death of a child Yes - immediate Yes - immediate briefing needed
- Outbreak linked to a major public Yes – immediate Yes – immediate briefing needed
building, faith gathering or event in the
borough
Schools/Childcare/Early Years - More than one case in a school/EY Yes Yes – routine reporting only
setting
- Setting not able to contain outbreak
- School closure Yes – immediate Yes – immediate briefing needed
- Media interest in outbreak/cases Yes Yes
Adult social care/Supported Living - More than 6 cases in ASC setting Yes Yes – routine reporting only
- Setting not able to contain outbreak
- Cases linked to a hospital outbreak Yes Yes
Large employers - More than 6 Cases in setting Yes Yes
Homeless setting - More than 6 cases in setting Yes Yes – routine reporting only
- Setting not able to contain outbreak Yes Yes
Council as workplace - Any outbreak Yes Yes
Local businesses - More than 6 cases in setting Yes Yes – routine reporting only
- Setting not able to contain outbreak Yes YesThe five steps for introducing a local lockdown: ü Monitoring. PHE will work with the joint biosecurity sector by looking at data on the spread of coronavirus and people's behaviour across the country. They will look for emerging trends, rising cases and other indicators, while taking into account local factors. ü Engagement. If monitoring identifies local problems, NHS Test and Trace and PHE will work with the relevant local authority to develop a deeper understanding of the problem and identify solutions. They will work with local agencies to keep the local community informed at every stage, so they know what they need to do. ü Testing. Testing at a local level will then be scaled-up, combined with contract tracing through NHS Test and Trace to try to control the virus at that stage. ü Targeted restrictions. If the virus continues to spread, activities at particular locations will be restricted and individual premises will be closed. Hotspots will have access restricted, with people who have spent time there tested and contact tracing carried out for anyone who tests positive. ü Local lockdown. If the previous measures do not stop the spread, local lockdowns will be extended across whole communities, with businesses and schools shut down as people are urged to stay at home.
Local Lockdowns 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 • At present, there are limited powers given directly to Local Authorities to impose Lockdowns on the population level. Most powers under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and the amended Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 and associated regulations, give statutory responsibilities to Director of Public Health to plan and oversee outbreak control and management or detain individual cases that pose infectious risk to the general population, via designated ‘Proper Officer’, who is appointed by PHE London. • Schedule 22 of the Coronavirus Act 2020 provides further powers relating to events, gatherings and premises. For the purposes of preventing, protecting against, delaying or otherwise controlling the incidence or transmission of coronavirus or facilitating the most appropriate health care response, events or gatherings can be restricted or other requirements imposed and premises can be closed. • Schedule 21 of the Coronavirus Act provides extensive powers to public health officials (PHE’’s Proper Officer, police and immigration officers that exist for the period that the Secretary of State has declared that: coronavirus constitutes a serious and imminent threat to public health in England, and that the powers conferred by the Schedule will be an effective means of delaying or preventing significant further transmission of coronavirus. This is currently not passed on to Local Authorities. Further information is awaited on the following: • Governance • Regulations of this etc. • What stage (within action cards) is it implemented • Recovery following local lockdown Read the document here.
If collaboration and co-ordination efforts are insufficient, established
pathways may be used to escalate decision making to higher levels
National National level1
London London Coronavirus Response Centre
London borough level
Deep local infection
UTLA control expertise C-19 Health
Protection
Health &
wellbeing Lead public communications
Board Chief Board
Council Chief Exec. DPH Exec &
Ultimately accountable for Public facing oversight
DPH
Sub-UTLA escalation
Strategic Co- Liaison with Ministers as needed
Rapid deploy resource ordination
Group (Gold)
Setting Individuals or bodies responsible for that setting (e.g., Head Teacher, restaurant owner,
Care Home manager, faith leaders etc)
1. National level may include NHS Test and Trace service (including Contain/JBC), Chief Medical officer,
Test and Trace Whitehall, Cabinet Office Briefing Office (COBR) etc.Settings
Prevent and manage outbreaks – NHS Test and Trace
The London Coronavirus Response Centre working with the London boroughs provides an integrated
Covid-19 Test and Trace service, designed to control the virus and enable people to live a safer and more
normal life
Test
Rapid testing, at scale, to identify and treat those with the virus
Test
Trace
Integrated tracing to identify, alert and support those who need to self isolate
Enable Trace
Contain Identify outbreaks using testing and other data and contain locally and minimize spread
Contain
Enable
Use knowledge of the virus to inform decisions on social and economic restrictions
Continuous data capture and information loop at each stage that flows through Joint Biosecurity Centre to recommend actions
Underpinned by a huge public engagement exercise to build trust and participation
Note: Test, Trace, Contain, Enable diagram is illustrative onlyThe table below summarises the role of the Council and LCRC in managing local outbreaks as part of the Test and Trace system:
Range of levers available to encourage compliance locally
The Health and Wellbeing Board has a mandate to … and are well-placed to encourage
provide public communications and provide local compliance
accountability…
Behavioral nudges
• Social media
• Tailored local marketing
Health and Wellbeing
• Local champions
Board will:
Resource Comms. • Provide public-facing Active communication
Deployment delivery oversight of NHS
Lead • Public Q&A forums
Lead Test & Trace locally
• Press calls
• Provide timely
communications to the
public Political engagement
• Act as liaison to Ministers • Possible option for Ministers to chair
Public combined Local Outbreak Control
Health Lead as needed
Boards until legislation is approvedWhat is our approach to local containment?
● It is of utmost importance that we understand the geographic spread of the virus and take rapid steps in order to
contain any potential outbreak and keep our communities safe.
● In order to do that, we need to know what is happening, and have robust principles for decision making, co-
created and agreed by all stakeholders.
● These principles are set out in the Contain Framework (previously called the playbook/toolkit).
● We will then ensure that decision makers have the guidance they need via the Action Cards.
Contain Framework Action CardsPrevent and Manage Outbreaks in various settings 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Setting Schools & Care Hospitals Places of Workplaces Community
Early Years Settings Worship Clusters
Action Card Read the Read the Read the Read the Read the Read the
document document document document document document
here here here here here here
Plans/Risk Read the Read the Read the Read the Read the Read the
assessment document document document document document document
tools here here here here here here1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Surge Capacity Resource Plan From September onwards into the winter months we will be managing the usual winter pressures, other communicable diseases along with Covid-19. We have been advised that no modelling of demand has been done. Therefore, our services will have to flex to meet the peaks and dips in demand over the next 10 months. The Covid-19 Health Protection Board will need to consider where additional surge resourcing will be needed across the Council as part of the business continuity planning process. The Board will recommend to the Recovery & Legacy Group the use of the £1,566,647m Local Authority Covid-19 Test & Trace Service Support Grant Determination 2020/21. The purpose of the grant is to provide support to local authorities in England towards expenditure lawfully incurred or to be incurred in relation to the mitigation against and management of local outbreaks of Covid -19. The majority of the Grant will be held as a contingency and will be deployed based on need as it arises or is anticipated on a case by case basis. Actions • Mutual aid plans are developed by LCRC and London boroughs • Discussions between Tri-Borough Resilience Forum and at the London level are taking place to agree escalation points/mutual aid mechanisms • Director of Public Health and Consultants may be required for surge capacity for BHR wide local outbreak investigation and contact tracing • Escalation points for surge capacity/large outbreak plan to be developed and agreed including recovery process.
Supporting Vulnerable People
Supporting vulnerable residents 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Supporting vulnerable residents through our front line services is core Council business. Our Community Solutions Service will be ensuring that a comprehensive system of support is and remains in place as we all respond to Covid-19 at the individual and at the community level. Working together with our partners, we want to ensure that no one becomes more vulnerable or is left without appropriate support as a result of the rollout of the national Test and Trace service. Where the contact tracing process identifies a complex case or one involving a high-risk location, the case will be referred to LCRC and the Director of Public Health and his team to deal with. These teams have worked in this way for many years and have tried and tested ways to deal with such complex cases. All referrals from the LCRC for the supporting vulnerable resident pathway will come to the Director of Public health as the Council’s single point of contact. The Public Health team will undertake their normal health protection practice which is: • Check the resident is not known to council services in respect of safeguarding. If known the case is directly referred to social care as per existing protocol • If the resident is not known to services, the Public Health team will refer the resident to the Adult Intake Team in Community Solutions. The intake team will assess the residents needs and put a support package in place for the duration of the isolation period Contact: intaketeam@lbbd.gov.uk or phone 020 8227 2915 if you would like further advice or support.
Recap…support offer support offer
Barking and Dagenham’s
• Barking & Dagenham Citizens Alliance Network
1
(BD-CAN) – generalist support for vulnerable members
of the community who lack support networks and need
help with simple, practical tasks
• The Specialist Support Hub – specialist support for
2
our vulnerable residents, including anyone who
currently receives adult social care services or who has
been identified as extremely vulnerable by the NHS
• Community Solutions – integrated front door support
3
on issues ranging from homelessness, debt advice,
benefits support, job support, food, early help
• Central food hub – coordinated access to food supply
managed across a network of distribution sitesSpecialist support hub
Main community partners are the ILA and DABD:
Supports the following residents:
1
• Anyone who is shielding – who has received a letter from
the NHS telling them they are extremely vulnerable
• Anyone who receives adult social care, whether arranged
• Food shopping (the resident pays for
by the Council or arranged privately
the food shopping but not the service)
• Anyone living in specialist Council accommodation such
2
as sheltered housing, a hostel or a domestic violence • Medication
refuge • Gas and electricity top up
• Anyone who has recently come out of hospital and needs • Referrals on to other partners including
support Reconnections
• Anyone who is not known to social care, but who is
3
believed to be especially vulnerable due to additional
needsSupported access pathway for vulnerable residents 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A supported access pathway is also under development to address some of the risks with applying the national model locally. This approach is based on Community Solutions, B&D Collective, NHS and other colleagues working together to support our most complex and vulnerable residents by using relationships of trust, wherever they may exist. We recognise that in order to support people best we need to take a person-centred approach which builds on existing relationships. This means that in developing a pathway for ‘supported access’ we recognise that the initial referral point could come from a variety of locations depending on who the resident feels most comfortable with for example: GP, pharmacist, faith leader, food bank, other B&D Collective organisation, social worker, local public services (like mental health, SEND etc), housing officer, Facebook, mutual aid provider etc. Residents who go through the supported access pathway is also intended to put in place the support the resident might need to enable them to participate in testing and possible 14 day self isolation (e.g. translation, food and supplies, financial support etc. The supported access pathway will evolve from our learning from the BD-Can programme and Community Solutions Specialist Support Hub.
Local Testing Capacity
Access to Testing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 This section outlines arrangements for local testing to ensure rapid access for residents and settings. Whilst, in the majority of cases it is expected that testing will be done through the national testing process, localised capacity has also been created as we recognise that many of our residents will struggle to engage for a variety of reasons with the national testing system. Since May 28 2020 anyone (including the under fives) with symptoms can get a test via a the NHS portal https://www.nhs.uk/ask-for-a-coronavirus-test Most testing is via self-test swab kits either from home delivery, fixed or mobile drive thru or for whole home testing. There are a range of online portals for key workers, care homes, employers of key workers There is also a North East London local offer which offers individual home or drive through tests to essential workers and has also been focussed on care settings, using a self-test model by staff who then test residents. This model, using the capacity at the Barts Lab, is being flexed to support other local settings to target and proactively test in possible hotspot locations, like care homes unable to access the care home portal (non CQC registered, non-elderly population), hostels and temporary group housing for the homeless, and similar locally identified locations. In the event of an outbreak we will draw on this local testing capacity if necessary to expedite access to testing in the borough. Where appropriate the Director of Public Health may need to arrange for the rapid deployment of mobile testing units to assist in the management of a local outbreak. A response of this or a similar nature may require activity across a range of local partners, and the Covid-19 Health Protection Board will provide the means of coordinating that action.
Methods for testing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The primary method for testing is the national testing portal.
Key workers (inc. teachers and
Residents directed to Residents
social workers) directed to testing
testing via comms via comms
Key workers
Residents who have Key workers access priority
symptoms access testing testing through dedicated Care settings
online or by calling 119 website
Book testing via
following options Care settings directed to national
testing portal for that setting
Mobile testing Drive through
Home test kits
unit testing
Care setting access testing for
National testing should symptomatic and non-symptomatic
residents via a national care home
offer a 48-72 hr turnaround testing portalAdditional Testing Capacity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In the case of large outbreaks we may need to expedite testing. Access to these tests will be determined on a case
by case basis, requiring a specific request from Director of Public Health
LCRC
LCRC identifies a situation
MTU cell
Intelligence data where enhanced investigation Notified by DPH
London Borough is required.
of Barking &
Dagenham
Standard MTU
LA/LCRC identifies need for operating procedures
local testing at scale are followed.
Can LBBD DPH notifies MTU cell
Yes. support scale of No.
and confirms number of
testing required? tests needed and day of
testing (as early as next
Read the document here day).
Setting lead or LA notifies
all people who need to be
tested.Data Integration and Joint Biosecurity Centre Arrangements
Data sharing and reporting In the context of Covid-19 this means: • Timely data flows from testing to be able to predict and intervene in outbreaks • Updated evidence on spread of infection and control measures Daily data reports will be provided at regional level for London on numbers of cases and contacts successfully traced and numbers escalated to the LCRC. Weekly epidemiology and quality monitoring reports will provide further granularity on programme effectiveness. Scoping work with London stakeholders across the NHS, local government and Directors of Public Health have highlighted the need for borough level data to identify individual support needs, track local disease transmission and inform testing capacity. This will be provided by the Joint Biosecurity Centre. Additional epidemiological modelling will be provided by PHE London to further understand disease transmission at borough level. Alongside this the Director of Public Health will need to work closely with the Joint Biosecurity Centre, which has the role of bringing together data from testing and contact tracing, alongside other NHS and public data, to provide insight into local and national patterns of transmission and potential high-risk locations and to identify early potential outbreaks so action can be taken.
GDPR and Data Security We are required to adopt a proactive approach to sharing information by default, in line with the Instructions of the Secretary of State, the Statement of the Information Commissioner on Covid-19 and the Civil Contingencies Act. The Secretary of State has issued 4 notices under the Health Service Control of Patient Information Regulations 2002 requiring the following organisations to process information: NHS Digital, NHS England and Improvement, health organisations, arm’s length bodies, local authorities, GPs. These notices require that data is shared for purposes of coronavirus (Covid-19) and give health organisations and local authorities the security and confidence to share the data they need to respond to coronavirus (Covid-19). They can be found here https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-notification-of-data-controllers-to-share- information. The data sharing permissions under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the statement of the Information Commissioner all apply. Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA) and the Contingency Planning Regulations, Category 1 and 2 responders have a duty to share information with other Category 1 and 2 responders. This is required for those responders to fulfil their duties under the CCA. Public Health England Covid-19 Testing Data Sharing Contract in place. Start date: 26 June 2020. End date: On expiry of the Covid-19 – Notice under Regulation 3(4) of the Health Service Control of Patient Information Regulations 2002 (currently 30th September 2020)
Local data reporting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Current Council reporting mechanisms are outlined in the table below.
LBBD produced
Reports sent to DPH Data sets in public domain
reports
Confirmed covid Coronavirus in the Death registrations COVID-19 outbreaks Deaths involving
Report Test and Trace
and occurrences in care homes COVID-19 by
cases (from UK by local authority Cases by care setting
title report (LA level) deprivation (ONS)
LCRC) (HM Gov) (ONS) (PHE)
• All cause and • suspected or • List of care setting
• Confirmed cases
COVID-related confirmed outbreak
• Cases by pillar in Test and Trace • Daily confirmed • COVID-related affected by Covid-19
Dataset/ deaths by date of COVID-19 in care
with postcode, • Cases completed cases deaths by MSOA • Total confirmed and
registered, date and homes
report age at onset, • Total number of • Rate of cases (per place of death • By upper and lower • Age standardised suspected cases in
ethnicity, gender contact reported 100,000) death rate by Barking and
contents • Contacts
• By upper and lower tier local authority,
London boroughs Dagenham care
and occupation • Cases by MSOA tier local authority, region and PHE
completed region and country centre settings
Frequency Daily
Daily Daily Weekly (Tuesday) Weekly (Thursday) Infrequently Daily
of reporting
• Age-specific
rate of cases 7-day moving
Excess deaths in
Further (per 10,000) average of cases
2020 compared to
analyses • COVID-19 for Barking and
the 5 year average
cases by LSOA, Dagenham and
done MSOA and London
(2014-2018)
WardList of reports to the Director of Public Health
Subject Content Sender Sender email Frequency
Contact Tracing Update Notification that the daily contact tracing update by UTLA, daily COVID-19 Contact Tracing Cell: data and WNCoV.datacontacttracing@phe.gov.uk Daily
yyyymmdd surveillance reports and exceedance reports have been uploaded to the surveillance
PHE SharePoint site – reports no longer included in email Field Service, National Infection
Service, Public Health England
PHEC Daily COVID-19 Daily PHE regional report summarising data on laboratory-confirmed PHE London Incident ICC.London@phe.gov.uk Daily
surveillance report COVID-19 cases and reported COVID-19 outbreaks/clusters Coordination Centre
LCRC Daily Data London Coronavirus Response Cell Daily Data Summary (cases and PHE London Incident ICC.London@phe.gov.uk Daily
Summary and LSAT situations) and LSAT Postcode Data (line listing with postcode, age) Coordination Centre
data
PHEC Weekly COVID-19 Weekly report summarising data on laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 PHE London Incident ICC.London@phe.gov.uk Weekly
surveillance report cases; reported COVID-19 outbreaks/clusters; syndromic surveillance Coordination Centre
indicators; and hospital and ICU/HDU admissions
Care homes COVID-19 Information for each care home in borough on the following: DHSC Covid-19 Testing COVIDCareHomeTestingReferrals@dhsc.gov.uk Twice per week
Order Report for Local • Registered places Programme
Authorities (contains • Total no. of residents
local data only not • Number / % of symptomatic residents
London) • Total no. of staff
• No. of tests requested
• No. of tests delivered
DHSC testing London • DHSC pillar 2 testing regional dashboard for London DHSC Covid 19 team Tom.addey@adphlondon.org.uk on behalf of Weekly
dashboard John.Mitchell@dhsc.gov.uk
NHS Digital pillar 2 • NHS Digital has produced Pillar 2 Testing Dashboards using current NHS Digital Pillar 2 Service Team ccsm@nhsdigital.nhs.uk N/a - dashboard
testing dashboard data to provide anonymous counts of Covid-19 tests completed and
tests which are deemed void, aggregated by Upper Tier Local
Authorities
Daily Exceedance Report Regional daily exceedance report. An exceedance means that an area has PHE Contact Tracing Cell: data WNCoV.datacontacttracing@phe.gov.uk Daily
a greater than expected rate of infection compared with the usual and surveillance
background rate for that location. Areas are RAG rated and in depth
reports are produced for areas that have exceeded (RED reports). These
are shared with the appropriate DsPH.
40Pillar 1 testing (NHS/PHE labs) Pillar 2 testing (commercial partners)
Results
care home
initial
cases referred All postive results reported into the SGSS (second generation surveillance system)
for testing
Care home direct contact Results reviewed by LCRC Results flow into CTAS Daily review by Field Services (PHE)
London Coronavirus response cell
School direct contact (part of Health protection, PHE) Complex case identifed at Tier 2
e.g. care homes, vulnerable people
Assimilation
referred to Tier 3, LCRC*
All outbreaks and received cases Data from HP zone extractred by FS
input into Hpzone
Information from SGSS and HPzone combined
Data flows LCRC reports includes results from
Pillar 1 and Pillar 2
FS reports includes results from
Pillar 1 ONLY (at the moment)
for Covid-19
cases and Reports to DPH in local authorities, some to wider
stakeholders
situations From LCRC From FS
Daily summary - Number of new and cumulative cases (pillar 1 Exceedance reports Daily new cases reported with statistical assessment of
and 2, from SGSS) impact on trend, localities where number of new cases
exceed expected trend are highlighted
- List of new situations e.g. care homes created
by LCRC (from HP-Zone, gives name of
REPORTING
establishment, daily list)
- Complex cases and situations notified from PHE Daily - Number of new and cumulative cases (pillar 1 only, from
Tier 2 contact tracing Surveillance reports SGSS)
- Cumulative number of situations by type - Graph of age and sex distribution of total cases (pillar 1
(from HP-Zone) only, from SGSS)
- Cumulative number of confirmed and - Number of new outbreaks of suspected or confirmed
suspected deaths of care home residents (from COVID-19 in care homes for prior week and cumulative
HP-Zone) total (from HP-Zone)
Daily Individual data Line listing to all boroughs of new cases with
postcode and age
Weekly reports: Weekly summaries of the above data Weekly reports Summary of surveillance systems reports
* care home residents, schools and connected workplaces are mandatory fields for data entry.
Care homes, schools and other situations are escalated as per protocol
Postcode and workplace "coincidences" are picked up by CTAS and HP zone and reviewed
Regular surveillance reports reviewed by PHE LCRC/ FSInformation received
Query from settings or Information from Local
All positive results reported into the SGSS (second
member of the public Authority, Other
generation surveillance system). Results flow into CTAS. Notifications from GP or other
re. school, workplace, PHEregions, Devolved
Complex case or setting identified at Tier 2 and referred healthcare settings
prison, hostel, care Adm, International
to Tier 1
home office
London Coronavirus Response Cell (Tier 1) receive notification/information/query from setting, LA or GP
or referral from Tier 2
Risk assessment
SINGLE CASE IN A SETTING Information on case, outbreak or community cluster uploaded to HPZone (PHE case
Clinical team provide advice and manage contacts, management system)
Data flows for testing and infection control
Clinical team provide information materials to the
Outbreak setting
Clinical team recommend ongoing control measures Clinical team gather information and conduct risk assessment with the case or setting
Management DPH notified
OUTBREAK (2 OR MORE CASES) IN A SETTING OR A CASE
IN A COMPLEX SETTING
Hospital
Prison and hostel/homeless school/educationa workplaces care homes and community faith and other
prescribed places services l settings other care settings clusters settings
Hospital lead outbreak of detention
response; LCRC provide
Outbreak management
advice and support
Arrange IMT with Arrange incident management meeting when required with setting and relevant stakeholders
setting and including Local Authority (DPH, EHOs, adult social care, children and young persons services)
relevant
stakeholders
including
Healthcare, MoJ
or Home Office.
Coordination and lead for outbreak agreed
RESPONSE - case finding, contact tracing, isolation, testing (if appropriate by PHE/NHS pillar 1, 2, MTU or Find
and Treat), decontamination, advice and communicationCommunication and Engagement
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Communications strategy to target three distinct themes These support all 7 areas of the local outbreak control plan. 1. Build on prevention messages (link with town centres campaign on reopening local businesses). 2. Raise awareness of test and trace (pan-London campaign in development to be adapted to meet local objectives). 3. Support LOCPs – Reactive communications actions rooted in area action plans. Objectives include: • Fulfil our legal duties of warning and informing (as set out in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004) and any other legislation introduced • Ensure we provide a single point of truth in terms of communications for key partner organisations locally and that all groups remain on message • Identify risks and vulnerabilities that could impact on our communications work • Scope opportunities to address misinformation • Ensure communications and actions around contact tracing are linked in with wider work being done by the Council on the digital divide.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Build on prevention messages
Current activity Next steps
• Town centre and Heathway campaign: Working with Consider wider dissemination of prevention messages via
businesses to safely reopen. Social distancing / print and digital channels.
prevention is being heavily promoted
• External comms: Prevention messages continue to be
shared via social media and digital channels such as
One Borough newsletter
• Internal comms: The internal team continue to provide
messaging around staying safe in and outside of the
workplace on Yammer, and via staff news letters1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Raise awareness of test and trace
Current activity Next steps
• Limited information on testing on /covid19 hub. • To address trust issues and encourage compliance we
Weekly promotion of mobile testing unit. will need to ensure the pan-London campaign is
adapted to reach Barking and Dagenham specific
• Pan-London comms group has completed audiences. Activity should be highly targeted using local
research on test and trace attitudes in London. advocates and partner channels to reach our
Only 44% of people would know how to get a test audiences.
(less amongst over 65s and BAME groups) 35%
know little or nothing about test and trace (higher • Develop a stakeholder map that breaks down audience
amongst younger and BAME groups). specific channels and advocates.
• Pan-London campaign (Keep London safe) is • Adapt the core script for Barking & Dagenham and
being developed with a communications toolkit for update key channels / share with partners.
use. Core script for frontline services should be
ready w/c 22 June along with a 40 second video • Create area specific videos with partners.
script.
• Visuals will also be focus grouped ready to be
issued by end of month.Support area outbreak plan 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Next steps Using the insight and stakeholder mapping from the London test and trace campaign we will identify communications actions that need to support the area action plans. As part of the wider toolkit content will be packaged and ready to go in the event of an outbreak. Keep London Safe campaign is in development
Local Planning Guides • https://www.lbbd.gov.uk/sites/default/files/attachments/1-Local-comms-planning-guide-29- June.pdf • https://www.lbbd.gov.uk/sites/default/files/attachments/2-LA-comms-matrix-planning-tool- 29-June.xlsx • https://www.lbbd.gov.uk/sites/default/files/attachments/3-Local-Outbreak-Plans-press- handling-guide-29-June.docx • https://www.lbbd.gov.uk/sites/default/files/attachments/Letter-to-LAs-on-data-access_9- July-2020.pdf.
Risk Matrix
Risks and threats 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Council is responsible for addressing issues of low-take up and engagement with hard-to-reach groups and
communities. Our challenge is that the assumption that most of the contact and engagement with the testing and tracing
regime will be managed through the app, website and phone and direct engagement with the public.
There are potentially several barriers to users successfully engaging with the proposed national model, which will be
particularly relevant to Barking and Dagenham:
• Gaining local communities’ trust with regards to national contact tracing initiative
• Digitally excluded groups being missed
• Residents without access to an email account being disadvantaged
• Residents facing financial hardship as a result of Covid-19, who would usually have access to a smartphone, but no
internet connection (due to insufficient funds)
• Demand for tests exceeds the number of tests available
• Tracing programme is unable to meet demand
• Exacerbating existing inequalities through the (method of) delivery of messages
• Access issues beyond our control are reflected negatively on the Council
• Those concerned about surveillance/ data protection may not engage with the contact tracing programme
• Covid-19-related fraud and scams undermining trust in the national programme and individual representativesRisk matrix (to be populated further)
HIGH
• Outbreaks in care settings, shared living, HMOs, special schools, school transport
HIGH RISK
• Places of worship such as churches, mosques
LIKELIHOOD • Lack of engagement with NHS Test and Trace and inability to contain local spread
MEDIUM
RISK • Outbreaks in people with substance misuse, hostels, DV Refuge and refugee
• Data sharing and publishing data to engage communities
• Outbreaks in workplaces such as Town Hall, Roycraft or Frizlands
STANDARD
RISK
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