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No. 02 No. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath February 2021 Darkness at Dawn The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath DIPLOMAT RISK INTELLIGENCE MONTHLY REPORT 1 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly Report
No. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath CEO and Publisher James Pach Director of Research Abhijnan Rej Editorial Advisors Shannon Tiezzi Catherine Putz Sebastian Strangio Design Stefan Yanku Published by Diplomat Media Inc. 1701 Pennyslvania Avenue Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20006 United States of America © Diplomat Media Inc. 2 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly Report
No. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly Report
No. 2, February 2021
Darkness at Dawn
The Myanmar Coup
and Its Aftermath
Dr. Lee Jones
Hunter Marston
David Scott Mathieson
Dr. Avinash Paliwal
Abhijnan Rej
Sebastian Strangio
Yun Sun
3 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly Report
No. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
Table of Contents
Executive Summary 5
Introduction 6
Myanmar Between Populism and Putsch 10
David Scott Mathieson
Myanmar’s Protracted Ethnic Conflicts 14
Hunter Marston
Myanmar’s Political Economy 18
Lee Jones
Strategic Implications of the Myanmar Coup for China 23
Yun Sun
India’s Interests in Myanmar 27
Avinash Paliwal
Myanmar and Democracy in Southeast Asia 31
Sebastian Strangio
The Authors 35
4 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly Report
No. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
Executive Summary
On February 1, the Myanmar military, also known as the Tatmadaw, staged a coup d’état and
imposed a one-year state of “emergency.” It has also jailed prominent leaders including State
Counsellor Aung Sun Suu Kyi and appears to be increasingly comfortable with repressing en-
suing protests using extreme force. In the process, the Tatmadaw has significantly imperiled
Myanmar’s slow but steady democratic transition, created considerable complications for West-
ern as well as regional powers, including China, and stands to also fuel the country’s ethnic
conflicts. Furthermore, the power-grab sits on top of a rapid decline in democratic norms across
Southeast Asia in general and portends ill for the future of democracy in the region. Western
powers are unlikely to have ready instruments at hand to compel the Tatmadaw into reversing
its moves. Growing China-U.S. rivalry is also likely to act as a geopolitical shield for the insular
military regime which has, historically, been suspicious of Beijing.
In this edition of the DRI Monthly Report, six prominent experts and long-time specialists in
Asian affairs examine the various factors that are likely to shape what would follow the Feb-
ruary putsch. The report examines Myanmar’s internal politics, political economy, ethnic con-
flicts, and relations with neighboring major powers China and India, as well as ASEAN.
Based on analyses presented in this report, Diplomat Risk Intelligence concludes:
1. The Tatmadaw is likely to be insulated from the effects of targeted Western sanctions. As
such, sanctions are unlikely to change its calculus. At the same time, the Myanmar military
is banking on the assumption that China will continue to shield it from the worst, should the
international community – the Biden administration, in particular – adopt a significantly
tougher stance towards it.
2. Even if the Tatmadaw steps down at some point in the near future, making the way for fresh
elections, the National League for Democracy’s long-term future remains uncertain, given
both Suu Kyi’s advancing age and the autocratic style of governance it practices. The extent to
which transnational influence could consolidate pro-democracy agitations in a concrete way,
leading to significant pressure on the junta, remains unknown.
3. Trade and investment ties provide the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASE-
AN) and China considerable leverage in shaping the Tatmadaw’s behavior. However, neither
is likely to advance beyond a point in pressuring the junta, for varied reasons. At the same
time, Western nations, as they devise their responses to the coup, will be mindful of how
their coercive measures could end up affecting the general population, especially Myanmar’s
ethnic minorities.
4. China has emerged as a net loser from the February coup. Beijing would have preferred poli-
cy continuity that the new NLD government would have provided, and its geoeconomic plans
involving the country now stand imperiled. That said, China will continue to protect the
Myanmar military, though apprehensively given concerns that Myanmar could emerge as
a flashpoint in China-U.S. ties. For the Biden administration, its response to the Myanmar
coup, and ability to shape the junta’s behavior, will serve as a crucial test when it comes to
balancing realpolitik imperatives and commitment to liberal values.
5. Given its concrete stakes in Myanmar, India is unlikely to pressure the Tatmadaw even
though it remains, on paper, committed to a democratic regime in Naypyidaw. That said, the
February coup is unlikely to affect India’s counterinsurgency campaign in the country’s res-
tive northeast bordering Myanmar. New Delhi will, however, keep a close eye on the coup’s
downstream effects on the Rohingya crisis. Following the military power-grab, prospects of
safe repatriation of the Rohingyas look even bleaker.
5 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly Report
No. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
Troops marching past the senior
leaders during Armed Forces Day in
Yangon, March 27, 1997.
Photo: Flickr, Stephen Brookes
Introduction
How the February 1 coup could play out depends on a number
of interrelated though distinct factors. This report presents a
comprehensive yet lean picture after integrating all of them.
Abhijnan Rej
Less than four weeks since a menacing mob What led the Tatmadaw to do what it did? Of
stormed the U.S. Capitol, illustrating sudden course, as many have already pointed out,
ways in which even lodestars of democracy the overwhelming victory of the NLD in the
can be imperiled, an early morning coup in November 2020 elections – and the lacklus-
Myanmar highlighted how a variety of fac- ter performance of the military’s own par-
tors – including, but not only, elite competi- ty – may have been one driver. It may very
tion, international structural changes and well be that Myanmar’s military had also
incomplete state building – could throw na- calculated that the growing rivalry between
scent and imperfect democracies off kilter. China – a country that it is not normally pre-
disposed to thinking well of – and the U.S.
On February 1, the Myanmar military, also may provide it with a geopolitical shield, in a
known as the Tatmadaw, seized power sur- manner of speaking, which would insulate it
prising many international observers. Since from harsh international penalties.
then, the Tatmadaw has arrested civilian
leaders, including State Counsellor Aung Sun And then of course, there could have been
Suu Kyi and others from the deposed Nation- more primeval reasons why the Tatmadaw
al League for Democracy (NLD) government staged the coup, belying expectations: fear
and imposed a one year “emergency” period. (of what a new NLD government could mean
Equally worryingly, it appears to be increas- in terms of the future of its power-sharing
ingly comfortable using force against those arrangement with civilian governments),
who oppose its power grab – which is to say, honor (the Tatmadaw, in many ways, is ac-
a large fraction of Myanmar’s population, es- customed to seeing itself as an unchallenged
pecially the country’s young – bringing back pillar of authority) and interest (any chal-
its menacing history to fore once again. lenge from the new civilian government to
6 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly Report
No. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
The Tatmadaw, even through a period of
relative economic liberalization, has maintained
significant stakes in Myanmar’s economy
its authority would have had downstream nance approach. Prognosing a bleak future
effects on its economic and political heft and for the country ahead based on the Tatmad-
self-ascribed image). aw’s history of brutality, Mathieson foresees
the military continuing to repress a public
But the simple fact of the matter remains: not inclined to give in easily to another bout
we still don’t know for sure. But a good place of dictatorship.
to start looking for answers – not just about
the causes of the Tatmadaw’s power-grab The February 1 coup stands to affect the fu-
but, more importantly, for what lies ahead ture of ethnic minorities of Myanmar, most
of Myanmar following the coup, both in the importantly of the Rohingya who have been
short as well as the medium term – would be relentlessly and brutally repressed by the
to individually examine each of the differ- Tatmadaw, leading to one of Asia’s worst
ent variables that may have been, and will humanitarian crises in the recent years. In
continue to be, either at play or be impacted his contribution, Australian National Uni-
down the road: domestic politics, political versity scholar Hunter Marston assesses the
economy, ethnic conflicts, the role of great role of the Tatmadaw in the Rohingya crisis
and neighboring powers, as well as the larg- and concludes that with the military at the
er frame of democratic backsliding in South- helm in Naypyidaw, prospects for safe re-
east Asia within which the February 1 coup patriation of Rohingyas back to their home-
must be situated. land look bleak. However, Marston notes
that the international community is likely
The February 1 coup stands to affect the future of to adopt measures against the Myanmar
military independent of its humanitarian
ethnic minorities of Myanmar, most importantly commitments.
of the Rohingya who have been relentlessly
The Tatmadaw, even through a period of
and brutally repressed by the Tatmadaw relative economic liberalization, has main-
tained significant stakes in Myanmar’s econ-
In order to present a comprehensive yet lean omy, which depends heavily on trade with,
picture that looks at each of these (often in- and investment from, Southeast and East
terrelated) factors, DRI approached a group Asian countries. Assessing the past and pres-
of six internationally renowned experts. It ent of Myanmar’s political economy, Queen
tasked them with preparing a summary of Mary University of London scholar Lee Jones
the state-of-play when it came to these vari- presents a detailed look at China’s economic
ables, each contributor matched with one set interests in the country, cautioning us, how-
of questions around a specific driving factor, ever, not to view China as a unitary, strate-
or area of impact as the case may be. gic entity when it comes to its commercial
ties with Myanmar. He also examines the
The report starts with an article by David prospects of Western economic sanctions in
Scott Mathieson, a longtime Myanmar an- shaping the Tatmadaw’s future calculus, as-
alyst, who looks at domestic politics in the sessing that targeted sanctions are unlikely
country, with a focus on the Tatmadaw’s po- to have any meaningful effect on it.
sition within Myanmar and its dynamics vis-
à-vis the various ethnic groups. He also looks Contemporary geopolitics continues to pro-
at NLD’s future, given its personality-driven vide one of the main contextualizing frames
organizational structure and flawed gover- for the Tatmadaw’s power-grab. In her arti-
7 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly Report
No. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
Contemporary geopolitics continues to
provide one of the main contextualizing
frames for the Tatmadaw’s power-grab
cle, Stimson Center analyst Yun Sun takes a northeast frontier, and the linkages between
close look at China-Myanmar relations, and insurgents in India’s northeast and Myan-
the Myanmar military’s relationship with mar. After assessing New Delhi’s larger stra-
Beijing. She points out a considerable degree tegic stakes in Myanmar – and its relation-
of apprehension in China that Myanmar ship with the Tatmadaw – he also situates
could emerge as a flashpoint in China-U.S. the extant conditions in the Rakhine State
relations, even though Beijing would have in India’s security calculations, including
preferred for policy continuity in Myanmar the prospects of radicalization of Rohingya
through an NLD government. In the past Suu refugees.
Kyi and the NLD has provided considerable
backing for Chinese infrastructure projects In the concluding article of the report, The
in the country. However, while Sun assess- Diplomat’s Southeast Asia editor Sebastian
es China to be a net loser from the coup, she Strangio takes a long view of the Tatmadaw’s
foresees that Beijing will continue to stand power-grab, situating it within the larger
by Myanmar’s military for varied reasons, arc of contemporary politics in Southeast
despite considerable bad blood between the Asia. He looks at the transnational nature of
two. protests against authoritarianism in the re-
gion and the role social media has played in
If China is one behemoth neighbor of Myan- consolidating protest movements across bor-
mar with considerable stakes in the coun- ders. Strangio foresees the 10-nation Associ-
try, India is the other. In an article on In- ation of Southeast Asian Nations as faltering
dia-Myanmar relations and New Delhi’s in its response to the February coup. He diag-
security interests in its eastern neighbor, noses the reasons behind the February coup
School of Oriental and African Studies schol- as lying within Myanmar’s borders and the
ar Avinash Paliwal first maps India’s coun- country’s patchy record when it comes to eth-
terinsurgency efforts in the country’s restive nic inclusion and state-building.
8 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly Report
No. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
In this May 6, 2016, file photo,
Aung San Suu Kyi, left, Myanmar’s
foreign minister, walks with senior
General Min Aung Hlaing, right,
Myanmar military’s commander-in-
chief, in Naypyitaw, Myanmar.
Photo: AP Photo, Aung Shine Oo, File
Myanmar Between Populism
and Putsch
The Tatmadaw simply wanted power and to redraw the
parameters of privileges contained in the 2008 constitution.
The NLD’s own autocratic style did not help matters.
David Scott Mathieson
The Myanmar military’s coup d’état on Feb- The sweeping victory of the Tatmadaw’s
ruary 1 arrested the gradual democratic avowed nemesis Aung San Suu Kyi and her
reforms the country had experienced since National League for Democracy (NLD) party
2010. The ultimate irony of the putsch is that in the November 2020 elections delivered
it ends an experiment in hybrid regime for- two key messages. First, the majority of reg-
mation that the military, or Tatmadaw, had istered voters, over 65 percent, wanted the
carefully crafted around the 2008 constitu- NLD to continue to rule as it had done since
tion. Opening up a formerly closed and re- its previous landslide in 2015. Second, they
pressive society with the tightly controlled clearly did not want a return to military rule.
elections of 2010, the military retained The Tatmadaw’s commander in chief, Senior
sweeping constitutional power, a quarter of General Min Aung Hlaing, took a different
all parliamentary seats, three key ministries approach. Arresting Suu Kyi, the President
of defense, border affairs and home affairs, U Win Myint, and other elected officials just
their extensive building holdings intact and hours before the parliament was due to con-
inviolable, and their freedom and impunity vene, was a clear lurch backwards. Even the
guaranteed. The opening of the country – it title of the new junta, the State Administra-
is misleading to refer to it as a transition – tion Council (SAC), harkens back to previous
was also impelled by a move away from de- manifestations of military rule.1 The coup
pendency on China, broadening investment, has sparked unprecedented nationwide pro-
and reaping the windfall of increased inter- tests, the rise of a Civil Disobedience Move-
national investments. Conventional wisdom ment (CDM) incorporating a loose collective
within intellectual and analytical circles in of NLD supporters, activists, civil servants,
Myanmar, as well as diplomats and the busi- students, artists, workers unions, and almost
ness community, refused to contemplate the all representatives of a broad and diverse so-
reversal of such a prize arrangement. ciety. The aims of the movement are straight-
9 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly Report
No. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
Following five years of an ongoing civil war involving routine war
crimes and crimes against humanity, charges of ethnic cleansing
against the Rohingya Muslims, and mounting international
accountability efforts, was the military more vulnerable to pressure?
forward: reverse the coup, install the demo- cy in negotiating with the military. She is
cratically elected representatives of the 2020 without doubt arrogant, aloof and resistant
polls, and repeal fully, not amend the contro- to compromise, but why make a deal with
versial 2008 constitution. a dishonest military which has rejected the
people’s will, which was overwhelmingly
The Tatmadaw’s Thinking clear?3 Emerging narratives of electoral ir-
regularities feeding the military narrative
The military staged the coup for a mixture of of a corrupt poll are misguided: the military
reasons, that included competition between simply wanted power and to redraw the pa-
two arrogant leaders, Min Aung Hlaing and rameters of privileges contained in the 2008
Aung San Suu Kyi; festering decades-long an- constitution.
imosity between the military and the NLD;
and the failure of both sides to adequately Past Imperfect, Future Bleak
address decades of uneven development and
civil war. 2 Another key factor could well be The Tatmadaw is irrefutably the most re-
that the military calculated a second-term viled institution in Myanmar. Unifying
NLD government would pursue a more con- much of a diverse and divided country is a
frontational constitutional reform process shared antipathy towards the military both
than the five years of major missed oppor- over the coup, and for its abuses, greed, land
tunities between 2015 to 2020. Following grabs and entitlement, and its legacy of re-
five years of an ongoing civil war involving pression. The military may have had a de-
routine war crimes and crimes against hu- gree of support amongst the population for
manity, charges of ethnic cleansing against its perceived role in defending the country;
the Rohingya Muslims, and mounting inter- a 2019 attitude survey by the People’s Alli-
national accountability efforts, was the mil- ance for Credible Elections (PACE), a Myan-
itary more vulnerable to pressure? Molding mar election support organization, claimed
an elaborate conspiracy of a stolen election trust in the Tatmadaw at 30 percent, with 22
out of NLD incumbent advantage, major percent claiming no trust, and 30 percent re-
breaches of COVID-19 restrictions by the sponding that they didn’t know.4 This likely
NLD and curtailing opposition party activi- reflects that many people in central Myan-
ties, manipulation of voting rolls and ballot mar are, or likely now, were, ambivalent to-
papers, gave the Tatmadaw a constitutional wards the military, but that many in ethnic
trigger to declare a state of emergency. states have reasons to revile the Tatmadaw.
Even the title of the new junta, the State However, the military also doesn’t seem
vexed by its unpopularity. It’s unshakable
Administration Council (SAC), harkens back certainty in its right to rule inures it from
to previous manifestations of military rule criticism, and in many ways, it revels in its
notoriety. The NLD was reluctant to openly
criticize the military for its ongoing atroci-
In the manner of illegal coup makers every- ties, and for all of Aung San Suu Kyi’s plat-
where, the military set a one-year timetable itudes to human right norms before she as-
for holding “free and fair” elections, and sumed power, she had no interest in justice
pursuing what it calls a “genuine discipline or accountability when she assumed nation-
flourishing democracy” through law and al power. The military, far from feeling safe,
order – the obvious vocabulary of military mistrusted her even more. It is in Myanmar’s
dictatorship since 1962 in Myanmar and ethnic states that hatred for the Tatmadaw
around the world. Suu Kyi bears no respon- is at fever pitch. A 70-year long civil war be-
sibility for this coup, despite her obstina- tween the Tatmadaw and almost every non-
10 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly ReportNo. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
The Tatmadaw’s unshakable certainty in
its right to rule inures it from criticism,
and in many ways, it revels in its notoriety
Bamar Buddhist ethnic group in the country after the 1988 coup. But this will likely come
has killed hundreds of thousands, driven at grave costs to the environment and to nat-
millions of refugees across borders, and ap- ural resource extraction, a flourishing nar-
peared intractable. A ten-year nationwide cotics trade, and multitudes of local armed
peace process has achieved little, despite actors involved in illicit enterprises, often
tens of millions of dollars in Western donor with Tatmadaw backing.
peace support. 5 Ten minor groups signed a
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in Where Does the NLD Stand?
2015, but the larger groups were excluded,
including the United Wa State Army (UWSA) The future of the NLD over the next five years
with over 25,000 soldiers and Chinese weap- has been under question even before the 2020
onry, and the ultra-violent and aggressive elections. What will a post-Aung San Suu Kyi
Arakan Army (AA). The military breached NLD look like? Many observers believed that
the ceasefire repeatedly. The nationwide without a clear succession plan, and a style of
peace process was already dead: the military party leadership best described as unflinch-
killed it. Promises of peace from this mili- ingly autocratic, there was little democracy
tary cannot be taken seriously. The military within the NLD, but unquestioning faith to a
wants to hold power, not resolve conflict. charismatic leader.8 Much of the party’s sup-
This put them in symmetry with the NLD, port throughout Myanmar rested on idolatry
who did little beyond empty symbolic ges- of its leader: many of its local party officials
tures to pursue peace.6 and elected members were dismissed in large
part as mediocre functionaries, displaying a
The Tatmadaw is likely calculating that similar distain for local sensibilities as mili-
tary officials. It was highly likely the “league”
it can placate the many ethnic insurgent would splinter into regional chapters once
groups in the hinterlands with temporary the Aung San Suu Kyi era was over.
political and economic arrangements The party had frustrated a host of import-
ant actors in Myanmar’s evolving political
system: ethnic political parties, civil society
Many of the ethnic armed organizations leaders outside the NLD party framework,
(EAOs) are hedging their bets on the coup; human right promoters, former dissidents
some have condemned it and others have and intellectuals and many journalists.
equivocated.7 The antipathy towards Aung There are many people in Myanmar who are
San Suu Kyi and the dismissive treatment stridently anti-coup but have little support to
of ethnic communities have contributed to extend for the NLD. It is highly unlikely that
a reluctance to speak out. The coup will ad- the NLD will contest any SAC sanctioned na-
versely everyone in the country, every single tionwide elections, even if many of its mem-
community, including the Rohingya and eth- bers could be released. They will see, justi-
nic minorities in conflict zones. For the Ro- fiably, a truly rigged election to supplant a
hingya especially, they must be rattled at the flawed genuine election and won’t play along.
thought the chief architect of the 2017 ethnic Many in Myanmar are likely to boycott them
cleansing and expulsion is now completely in also, either through solidarity with the NLD
charge, unbound from any limited civilian or simply because they will continue to op-
restraint. The Tatmadaw is likely calculat- pose the coup. But Suu Kyi finds herself once
ing that it can placate the many ethnic insur- again under detention, and with still signifi-
gent groups in the hinterlands with tempo- cant domestic support, but almost evaporat-
rary political and economic arrangements, ed international solidarity. A combination of
similar to the “standfast” agreement forged Tatmadaw repression and her own flawed
11 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly ReportNo. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
The Tatmadaw’s may still be in power after one year, but the
only certainty in the near future is a non-stop contest with the
very population they claim to defend but seek to repress
governance style, and advancing age, is like- deferential, more progressive society will
ly the endgame of her three decades-long not wish to be wrenched back to the past.9
grudge match with the military. But the other certainty is the Tatmadaw’s
propensity for extreme violence and com-
Predicting events in Myanmar has always pulsion for stone-age dictatorships.10 For the
been perilous. Post-coup speculation is many protestors throughout Myanmar this
simply spurious just three weeks after the is a struggle for democracy and diversity.
formation of the SAC. Only two things are For the Tatmadaw, it is a war of survival, and
certain. The Tatmadaw underestimated their stranglehold over the country since the
the nationwide wave of anger at its seizure 1950s has been tightened after a decade of
of power and have been uncertain on how an illusionary light grip. They may still be in
to respond to demonstrations of such size, power after one year, but the only certainty
irreverence, humor, inclusivity and dyna- in the near future is a non-stop contest with
mism. They have not faced anything like this the very population they claim to defend but
since 1988, and now a wired, younger, less seek to repress.
Notes
1 Speech by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Chairman State Administration Council (SAC), February 9, 2021,
https://www.seniorgeneralminaunghlaing.com.mm/en/24280/republic-union-myanmarspeech-chairman-state-
administration-councilsenior-general-min-aung-hlaing-public/.
2 David Scott Mathieson, “The Story Behind the Myanmar Coup,” New York Times, February 2, 2021, https://www.
nytimes.com/2021/02/02/opinion/myanmar-coup.html.
3 Mary Callahan, “Aung San Suu Kyi’s quiet, puritanical vision for Myanmar”, Nikkei Asia, March 29, 2017 https://asia.
nikkei.com/Politics/Aung-San-Suu-Kyi-s-quiet-puritanical-vision-for-Myanmar.
4 Citizens Political Preferences for 2020 (Yangon: People’s Alliance for Credible Elections, 2019),45.
5 Bertil Lintner, Why Burma’s Peace Efforts Have Failed to End Its Internal Wars (Washington DC: United States
Institute of Peace, 2020).
6 Lahpai Seng Raw, “Is there light at the end of the tunnel?” Transnational Institute, February 18, 2021, https://www.
tni.org/en/article/will-there-ever-be-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel.
7 Lawi Weng, “Junta scrambles to form ethnic alliances amid nationwide dissent,” Frontier Myanmar, February 23,
2021, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/junta-scrambles-to-form-ethnic-alliances-amid-nationwide-dissent/.
8 Khin Zaw Win, “Aung San Suu Kyi overlooked Myanmar’ deepest problems”, Open Democracy, February 12, 2021,
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/author/khin-zaw-win/.
9 Richard Lloyd Parry, “Leaderless Burmese uprising is confounding expectations”, The Times of London, February
18, 2021, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/leaderless-burmese-uprising-is-confounding-expectations-
7mj2205ws.
10 David Scott Mathieson, “Myanmar’s Army of Darkness”, The Nation, February 12, 2021, https://www.thenation.
com/article/world/myanmar-burma-coup-rohingya/.
12 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly ReportNo. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
Rohingyas in Bangladesh, 2013
Photo: EU/ECHO/Pierre Prakash
Myanmar’s Protracted
Ethnic Conflicts
The February coup is unlikely to make a difference to the
Rohingyas as chances of their safe repatriation appear slim.
Hunter Marston
Myanmar’s long-running ethnic armed con- signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
flicts, which emerged soon after Burma’s in- (NCA) with eight of 15 EAOs invited to the
dependence in 1948, proved broadly imper- talks. 2 The remaining seven armed groups
vious to the country’s partial transition to declined to sign due to lingering political dis-
democracy in 2010. When Myanmar’s former agreements over the definition of federalism
military junta, the State Peace and Develop- and the imbalanced distribution of power
ment Council (SPDC), dissolved in March between the central government and power-
2011, the new government led by the Union ful military on the one hand, and the ethnic
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) – states and minority regions on the other.
mostly comprising retired military generals
and officers – quickly formed a new ceasefire When Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League
negotiations team and reached out to the rep- for Democracy (NLD) won elections in 2015,
resentatives of ethnic armed organizations it prioritized the peace process in its policy
(EAOs).1 platform. However, the NLD put in place a
new negotiations team and dissolved the
Despite the dramatic transfer of political MPC which had demonstrated some success
power that occurred in Naypyidaw in 2011, under the previous government of President
Myanmar’s EAOs continued to contest cen- Thein Sein. Despite pledges to build a gen-
tralized state authority and the entrenched uine federal union premised on democra-
power of the Myanmar military (known as cy and respect for minority groups’ rights,
the Tatmadaw in Burmese). However, the the NLD encountered significant resistance
new ceasefire negotiations team, led oddly from various EAOS involved in the peace
enough by Minister of Rail Transportation U process, particularly the powerful Northern
Aung Min, demonstrated substantial success Alliance, a coalition of four ethnic armed
in talks with various EAOs. In 2015, the gov- groups including the powerful Arakan Army
ernment-led Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) (AA). These four groups in addition to at least
13 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly ReportNo. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
The civilian NLD government proved less villages.6 The military played a central orga-
nizing role in the violence, which led to the
constructive in advancing the preceding flight of more than 800,000 refugees to Ban-
USDP government’s peace process gladesh since 2017.7
What Does the Coup Mean for the Future?
three other holdouts from the NCA refused to
sign onto the government’s peace deal. Thus, Myanmar has repeatedly asserted its will-
democracy has failed to resolve Myanmar’s ingness to repatriate displaced persons from
protracted ethnic conflicts; if anything, the Rakhine State without formally acknowledg-
civilian NLD government proved less con- ing the brutal crimes committed by the mili-
structive in advancing the preceding USDP tary against the Rohingya. Despite continued
government’s peace process. pressure from the Bangladeshi government
on Myanmar to begin identifying individu-
The Rohingya Crisis and the Military’s Role als eligible for repatriation, Naypyidaw has
dragged its feet and continually failed to
Amidst the NLD and Tatmadaw’s shared in- approve more than very limited numbers of
ability to wind down ethnic conflicts, the refugees for resettlement. In late 2017, Dhaka
Rohingya crisis erupted in 2016. The Rohing- sent Naypyidaw a list of roughly 100,000 Ro-
ya, a minority Muslim group that has resid- hingyas for verification, but Myanmar only
ed in Myanmar’s western Rakhine State for approved several hundred by mid-2018.8 The
centuries dating back at least to the arrival Burman majority is extremely hostile to the
of British imperial power, has a long histo- Rohingya and broadly sympathetic to the
ry of persecution at the hands of Myanmar’s military’s offensive in Rakhine State. There-
military. 3 In 1978, General Ne Win’s regime fore, the Myanmar government has been re-
targeted the Rohingya in an effort to drive luctant to welcome Rohingya back into the
country. At the same time, many Rohingya
Following the coup, prospects for do not wish to return voluntarily given their
fear of further violence and mistreatment
repatriation appear bleak within Myanmar and lingering distrust to-
ward the Tatmadaw.
perceived “foreigners” out from northern Following the coup, prospects for repatri-
Arakan (today Rakhine) State, leading to vi- ation appear bleak. The new junta has ap-
olent expulsion of Rohingya refugees into pointed controversial former NLD member
neighboring Bangladesh.4 In 1982, the re- Thet Thet Khine as Minister for Social Wel-
gime passed a Citizenship Law which effec- fare, Relief and Resettlement. In this posi-
tively stripped the Rohingya of citizenship tion, Khine will nominally be responsible
and rendered them stateless. 5 Further per- for resettlement of the Rohingya. Telling-
secution pushed out waves of Rohingya ref- ly, Khine has expressed pro-military and
ugees in the 1990s before the present-day anti-Rohingya views in the past.9 Nay San
crisis. In 2017, the military responded to Lwin, co-founder of the Free Rohingya Co-
sporadic attacks on police outposts in 2016 alition, has said Thet Thet Khine “is com-
by a ragtag militant group calling itself the pletely anti-Rohingya. If repatriation takes
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) place, she has to deal with the Rohingya.
by launching devastating “clearance opera- [The military] has chosen people who are
tions,” indiscriminately targeting civilians completely anti-Rohingya, so we are not ex-
that resulted in shocking reports of sexual pecting anything.”10 To many Rohingya and
abuse, torture, and destruction of Rohingya ethnic minority groups within Myanmar,
14 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly ReportNo. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
The Tatmadaw has always displayed
obstinacy in the face of western sanctions,
and new targeted sanctions are unlikely to
significantly change its thinking now
Aung San Suu Kyi and the Burmese military munity from international prosecution or
are of a kind, and neither are trusted. While at least ignore global condemnation for its
some EAOs that had signed the 2015 ceasefire latest power grab. The prospect of further
agreement had built a degree of trust with international criminal investigation into
the military, other ceasefire agreements had the Tatmadaw’s crimes against the Rohing-
unraveled under the NLD’s watch, and Suu ya has informed the military’s calculations
Kyi failed to garner much goodwill among for over four years and does not appear to
ethnic minority groups (even if the military have altered its chosen path. If anything,
operated entirely independent of civilian Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing and
oversight). The Kachin Independence Orga- senior generals have doubled down on the
nization, for instance, was largely silent fol- path they chose despite Aung San Suu Kyi’s
lowing the military coup and remains gener- appearance at The Hague to defend them
ally apathetic towards Suu Kyi and the NLD.11 against allegations of genocide and despite
the international outcry their acts have pro-
voked. The Tatmadaw has always displayed
There is no overt conflict between the obstinacy in the face of western sanctions,
and new targeted sanctions are unlikely to
targeted sanctions that the United States has significantly change its thinking now.
announced against members of the military
The Dilemma Facing the International
regime and ongoing humanitarian aid flows Community
to civil society groups in Myanmar
The international community will contin-
ue to direct humanitarian assistance to Ro-
As mentioned above, the coup does not bode hingya refugees in Bangladesh as well as
well for Rohingya repatriation to Myan- civil society groups within Myanmar that
mar. Moreover, many Rohingya still living work with internally displaced Rohingya in
in Rakhine State fear for their future since refugee camps in Rakhine State. Generally
the military, which perpetrated atrocities speaking, there is no overt conflict between
against them in 2017, is once again in pow- the targeted sanctions that the United States
er.12 While Commander-in-Chief Min Aung has announced against members of the mil-
Hlaing mentioned resettling “refugees from itary regime and ongoing humanitarian aid
Bangladesh” in a speech on February 8, this flows to civil society groups in Myanmar. The
appears more politically motivated than a U.S. Department of State has made clear that
genuine commitment to repatriating Ro- assistance to Rohingya communities will
hingya (whom the senior general avoided continue,15 and USAID immediately redirect-
specifically naming).13 Some Rohingya say ed $42.4 million away from the junta toward
they will refuse to go back regardless of the civil society organizations.16 The European
military’s assurances.14 Union will review its own sanctions policies
during a meeting on February 22, according
The international response is unlikely to to Josep Borrell, High Representative of the
have an immediate effect on Rohingya com- EU.17 In short, any forthcoming sanctions are
munities (more on this below). The military unlikely to affect humanitarian assistance to
will continue to operate with relative im- the Rohingya.
15 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly ReportNo. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
Notes
1 “Burma transfer of power complete,” BBC, March 30, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
pacific-12903507
2 Antoni Slodkowski, “Myanmar signs ceasefire with eight armed groups,” Reuters, October 15, 2015, https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-idUSKCN0S82MR20151015
3 For more on the origins of the Rohingya as a distinct ethnic group within Burma, see Azeem Ibrahim, The
Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar’s Hidden Genocide (London: Hurst & Company, 2016).
4 For more on the history of the Myanmar military’s persecution of Rohingya, see Elliott Brennan and Christopher
O’Hara, “The Rohingya and Islamic Extremism: A Convenient Myth,” The Diplomat, June 29, 2015, https://
thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-rohingya-and-islamic-extremism-a-convenient-myth/.
5 Md. Haque, “Rohingya Ethnic Muslim Minority and the 1982 Citizenship Law in Burma,” Journal of Muslim Minority
Affairs 37, no.4 (November 2017): 1-16.
6 “Rohingya Refugee Crisis Timeline,” UNHCR, last modified August 25, 2019, https://www.unrefugees.org/news/
rohingya-refugee-crisis-timeline/
7 “Rohingya refugee crisis 2017-21,” ActionAid, last modified February 12, 2021, https://www.actionaid.org.uk/
about-us/what-we-do/emergencies-disasters-humanitarian-response/rohingya-refugee-crisis-explained
8 For more on Myanmar’s inadequate repatriation efforts, see International Crisis Group, “The Long Haul Ahead for
Myanmar’s Rohingya Refugee Crisis,” Report no. 296, May 16, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-
asia/myanmar/296-long-haul-ahead-myanmars-rohingya-refugee-crisis.
9 “Former Aung San Suu Kyi ally says no betrayal in taking Myanmar military job,” Channel News Asia, February 6,
2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/myanmar-former-aung-san-suu-kyi-ally-no-betrayal-military-
job-14122280
10 Allegra Mendelson, “‘It’s a façade’: As military makes overtures, what’s next for the Rohingya?,” Southeast Asia
Globe, February 12, 2021, https://southeastasiaglobe.com/myanmar-coup-rohingya-2/
11 Joe Kumbun, “Why is the Kachin Independence Organization Keeping Silent on the Myanmar Coup?,” The Diplomat,
February 11, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/why-is-the-kachin-independence-organization-keeping-
silent-on-the-myanmar-coup/
12 Ashley Westerman, “What Myanmar’s Coup Means For The Rohingya,” NPR, February 11, 2021, https://www.npr.
org/2021/02/11/966923582/what-myanmars-coup-means-for-the-rohingya
13 “Military rule will be different this time: Army Chief,” Mizzima, February 9, 2021, http://mizzima.com/article/
military-rule-will-be-different-time-army-chief
14 Julhas Alam, “Rohingya refugees fear returning to Myanmar after coup,” Associated Press, February 3, 2021,
https://apnews.com/article/rohingya-myanmar-coup-9506980524e748baf577a085ae0f4d30
15 U.S. Department of State, “Briefing with Senior State Department Officials On the State Department’s Assessment
of Recent Events in Burma,” Office of the Spokesperson, February 2, 2021, https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-
senior-state-department-officials-on-the-state-departments-assessment-of-recent-events-in-burma/
16 U.S. Agency for International Development, “USAID Immediately Redirects $42 Million in Response to the Military
Coup in Burma: Statement by USAID Acting Administrator Gloria Steele,” Office of Press Relations, February 11,
2021, https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/feb-11-2021-usaid-immediately-redirects-42-
million-response-military-coup-burma
17 Kim Tong-Hyung, “Countries weigh sanctions on Myanmar,” Canberra Times, February 11, 2021, https://www.
canberratimes.com.au/story/7123401/countries-weigh-sanctions-on-myanmar/
16 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly ReportNo. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
Weaving factory at Inle Lake in
Myanmar, 2013
Photo: Flickr, Paul Arps
Myanmar’s Political Economy
While the Tatmadaw remains deeply entrenched in business
despite a relatively liberal economic regime, targeted
Western sanctions are unlikely to make it change course.
Lee Jones
Since the collapse of the old “socialist” re- Small and medium private businesses also
gime in 1988, Myanmar has undergone a emerged, notably in the garments sector, but
state-managed transition to capitalism, pow- the aforementioned corporate interests, and
erfully shaped by the military’s political and surviving state-owned enterprises, dominat-
economic interests.1 The previous military ed the emerging market economy, and large-
regime (1988-2010) gradually liberalized ly monopolized inward foreign investment
the economy, with key business opportuni- through the 1990s and 2000s. This approach
ties, concessions and state contracts handed served the military’s state-building efforts.
to politically sensitive business interests, It maintained political control of the econo-
including: my, precluding the emergence of an indepen-
dent capitalist class. And it bound peripheral
• So-called “national entrepreneurs,” widely elites more closely to the center, by redirect-
called regime “cronies”: big business- ing some of the illicit trade and wealth con-
men, close to senior generals, whose nected to the black market (e.g. smuggling
businesses became Myanmar’s leading and drug-trafficking) into the formal econ-
conglomerates; omy, including through widespread money
• “Ceasefire capitalists”: elites from/ linked laundering. It also entrenched control of the
to ethnic-minority armed groups which economy in the hands of “untouchable” so-
entered ceasefires with the regime in ex- cio-political interests, creating a permanent
change for economic concessions; and check on reform and anti-corruption efforts.
• The military itself, through two conglom-
erates: Myanmar Economic Holdings Despite further liberalization since 2011,
Ltd (MEHL), with interests in banking, particularly under the Thein Sein admin-
trade, tourism and precious stones, and istration (2011-16), the interests embedded
Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), during military rule were not significantly
with interests in heavy industry and dislodged. Some enterprises not obviously
commodities. linked to the old regime have been able to
17 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly ReportNo. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
It is unhelpful to consider “China” as a
single, unitary actor with a clear strategic
interest in Myanmar’s economy
capture some of the fruits of liberalization, China’s Economic Interests in Myanmar
and some Western companies previously de-
terred by sanctions have entered the market, Myanmar’s trade and inward investment
e.g. the Norwegian firm Telenor, which sup- remains dominated by Southeast and East
plies mobile telecommunications. However, Asian countries, despite the lifting of West-
crony capitalists also retooled themselves to ern sanctions in 2012. China became Myan-
survive in a more competitive environment, mar’s largest foreign investor and trading
securing licenses in newly liberalized sec- partner in the 2000s and has remained so
tors and partnering with foreign investors. since (see Tables 1 and 2). Indeed, the scale of
Military firms remained exempted from Chinese dominance is even greater than re-
public scrutiny and accountability, and ef- corded in Myanmar’s official (and generally
forts to improve transparency around re- poor quality) national statistics. Much trade
source extraction amounted to very little. occurs informally across the two countries’
Post-2011, the formal military budget has highly porous 2,000 kilometers long border,
increased in absolute terms, while the Tat- parts of which are controlled by ethnic-mi-
madaw’s business income has probably also nority armed groups. For example, Global
increased. Witness estimates that 50 to 80 percent of
Myanmar’s jade “is smuggled straight over
the Chinese border,” including with the in-
Table 1 – Myanmar’s Major Trading Partners3 volvement and complicity of military and
(percentage share) militia-linked companies, depriving the state
of some $6 billion in revenue in 2014 alone. 2
Exports Imports Large projects aside, much investment is also
1995-2010 2011-2019 1995-2010 2011-2019 not registered with or approved by authori-
ASEAN 43% 34% 6% 40% ties on either side.
China* 10% 34% 26% 32%
It is unhelpful to consider “China” as a single,
Japan 5% 6% 0% 9% unitary actor with a clear strategic interest in
South Korea 1% 3% 27% 5% Myanmar’s economy. Chinese traders and in-
India 14% 8% 2% 4% vestors in Myanmar are remarkably diverse
in terms of size and ownership, from small
EU-28 14% 8% 6% 2%
family ventures, through small and medium
U.S. 4% 2% 3% 1% firms based in Yunnan, to larger, provincial
* includes Hong Kong and Macao and national state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
The central Chinese government is neither
fully aware nor in full control of all of this ac-
Table 2 – Myanmar’s Major Sources of Foreign Direct Investment 4 tivity. Recently, for example, Beijing has had
(USD million, percentage share) to publicly disown the controversial Shwe
Kokko project on the Thai-Myanmar border
1988/9 – 2010/11 2011/12 – 2019/20 near Myawaddy. Hong Kong-registered firm
ASEAN 12,761.1 35% 26,600.2 54% Yatai International claimed that this $15 bil-
China** 15,905.3 44% 14,918.6 30% lion project – encompassing real estate, ca-
sinos, an industrial estate and airport, to be
Japan 211.9 1% 1,675.4 3%
built on land grabbed by the Myanmar mil-
EU-28 3,471.2 10% 3,671.2 7% itary and an aligned “border guard force” –
South Korea 2,916.9 8% 1,076.3 2% was part of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”
United States 243.6 1% 275.3 1% (BRI). Following widespread complaints, Bei-
jing was forced to deny any such link. 5 Even
** includes Hong Kong
apparently “geostrategic” investments typ-
18 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly ReportNo. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
The Chinese government is unlikely to
welcome the military’s seizure of power
ically emanate from the purely commercial with the West. Chinese policymakers and
interests of SOEs prospecting for business, investors will worry what the Tatmadaw’s
subsequently leveraging policy and finan- return to direct rule will mean for their in-
cial support from government agencies. For vestments, and for stability along the border,
example, plans for the Sino-Myanmar oil where previous upsurges in conflict have led
and gas pipelines were initially developed to significant refugee flows into China. Bei-
by scholars in China’s Yunnan province in jing has openly called for dialogue to resolve
league with a Chinese oil company, play- Myanmar’s political crisis and get “the coun-
ing on vague elite concerns about “energy try back on track as soon as possible.”8 But
security.” ultimately it will work pragmatically with
whoever is in charge in Naypyidaw to secure
However, China does see Myanmar as an im- Chinese interests.
portant part of the BRI. Under Thein Sein, re-
lations were frosty following the suspension Other Investors
of the Myitsone dam project, causing Chi-
nese investments and megaprojects to halt. Non-Chinese investors are also nervously
However, Beijing subsequently invested con- watching the situation. Very few have re-
siderable efforts and resources to court the acted strongly. Thailand’s Amata has put on
National League for Democracy (NLD) and hold a 2,000 hectare, $1 billion real estate
wider civil society, securing Aung San Suu project near Yangon, citing fear of Western
Kyi’s approval for the BRI, and a bilateral sanctions.9 Japan’s Kirin Holdings will also
agreement to initiate a China-Myanmar Eco- wind up its joint venture with MEHL,10 while
nomic Corridor (CMEC) in 2017. CMEC groups Singaporean tycoon Lim Kaling has pulled
and restarts several long-running projects, his investment in Myanmar’s Virginia To-
some of which have been downsized in re- bacco.11 But most companies are adopting a
sponse to the NLD’s concerns about costs, “wait-and-see” approach. Footloose Western
debt, likely returns, and civil society opposi- investors, notably in the $6 billion garments
tion. Beijing sees stability as essential to the industry, which accounts for about 30 percent
smooth implementation of BRI projects and of Myanmar’s official exports, are nervously
has consequently intervened in Myanmar’s watching for Western sanctions or consumer
tortuous “peace process” to try to help pacify boycotts, and could quite easily shift produc-
the borderlands, through which major trans- tion to other low-wage economies.12
boundary infrastructure must be built.6
However, as Table 2 shows, most foreign in-
Most foreign investors hail from Asian vestors hail from Asian states that will not
impose embargoes. Unless they are targeted
states that will not impose embargoes by secondary sanctions, their businesses are
unlikely to be directly affected. They will
Consequently, as the Chinese ambassador be more concerned with what the military’s
has frankly stated: “The current develop- State Administration Council does next. The
ment in Myanmar is absolutely not what regime’s proposed Cyber Security Law will
China wants to see.”7 Being hyper-nation- make it exceedingly difficult for many com-
alist, the Tatmadaw is uncomfortable with panies, not just those in the information
its dependence on Chinese patronage and and communication technology sector, to do
largesse, and deeply suspicious of Chinese business in Myanmar.13 Quite apart from the
authorities’ ties to several ethnic-minority negative impact on civil liberties and human
armed groups. The ex-military government rights, such regulation could easily damage
of Thein Sein sought greater equidistance in Myanmar’s already difficult business envi-
foreign relations, pursuing rapprochement ronment and drive disinvestment. Any signs
19 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly ReportNo. 02 Darkness at Dawn: The Myanmar Coup and Its Aftermath
The Biden administration is clearly intent on using
Myanmar to signal to the world that “America is back”
that the military intends to cling to power usual,” with generals and cronies continuing
longer than the maximum two-year period to “profit personally while the Burmese sink
allowed by the 2008 constitution, which the into worse poverty.”17 Targeted sanctions
Tatmadaw claims to be acting in accordance are thus unlikely to make any difference.
with, will further dampen business confi- Nonetheless, the need to be seen to be “doing
dence and investment prospects. something” will probably drive more West-
ern governments into imposing them. The
Prospects for Sanctions same goes for arms embargoes, which will in
no way affect a military that sources every-
The Biden administration is clearly intent on thing it needs from China, Russia, and other
using Myanmar to signal to the world that partners.
“America is back”. It has imposed targeted
sanctions on 10 Tatmadaw leaders and three A more fundamental problem with targeted
military-linked gemstone companies.14 Re- sanctions is that their use rests on the faulty
ports suggest that U.S.-held assets worth $1 assumption that manipulating a few indi-
billion have been frozen. However, the basis viduals’ personal wealth and convenience
for such claims is unclear. It seems unlikely will suffice to change political outcomes.
that Tatmadaw personnel or entities would It is doubtful that this has ever been borne
keep such large amounts there, given the out in reality. The Tatmadaw typically inter-
sanctions imposed on military figures, in- venes in politics when it believes that its core
cluding the commander-in-chief, Min Aung values – the so-called “three national caus-
Hlaing, since the 2017 atrocities in Rakh- es” – are at stake. It is foolish to imagine that
ine state. Pre-2010 asset freezes netted just the generals will sacrifice these values for
$700,000 in the U.S. and only 70,000 euros in pecuniary benefit, especially of a very limit-
the European Union.15 ed sort. The experience of 1988-2010 demon-
strates that the military is willing to endure
The Tatmadaw typically intervenes in politics sanctions, even those that cause widespread
suffering, in order to impose a political set-
when it believes that its core values – the so- tlement of their choosing.
called “three national causes” – are at stake
Recognition of this fact is likely to restrain
Western governments from imposing any-
Nothing has changed since to supply any thing more than symbolic sanctions in the
greater leverage over powerful individuals. short to medium term. Civil society groups
As Table 2 shows, Western investment re- which once championed sanctions are now
mains very limited in Myanmar. Most West- much more cautious, calling only for tar-
ern investors have understandably declined geted measures that avoid punishing the
to partner with military-linked entities. population.18 Many Western diplomats also
Myanmar’s military elites and their families recognize that pre-2010 sanctions were un-
generally do their banking, shopping, and so successful. Admitting this publicly, the U.K.
on in Asian and Gulf states (mostly notably, government, the “penholder” on Myanmar at
in Singapore). Past experience shows that the United Nations Security Council, resisted
they can easily evade travel bans where nec- calls for fresh sanctions after the Rakhine
essary by securing passports in other names, atrocities.19 They will consequently be wary
and route financial transactions through of imposing tougher measures, particular-
proxy companies.16 U.S. diplomats them- ly those that might impose costs on Myan-
selves concluded in 2008 that targeted sanc- mar’s long-suffering population, which is
tions on regime “cronies” may have “compli- already reeling from the impact of COVID-19
cated their lives” but “it remains business as restrictions.
20 Diplomat Risk Intelligence Monthly ReportYou can also read
