CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS - The Politics of Jacob Zuma
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CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS Bulletin N°84 — Winter 2010 concernedafricascholars.org The Politics of Jacob Zuma Edited by Sean Jacobs 01-03 Editor’s introduction 39-45 Populism and the National Democratic Sean Jacobs Revolution in South Africa Ari Sitas 04-07 Presidentialism and its pitfalls: towards a theory of how not to understand the Zuma 46-51 Jacob Zuma and the evanescent legacy of presidency nineteenth-century Zulu cosmopolitanism and Suren Pillay nationalism Hlonipha Mokoena 08-11 Scoring an own-goal Peter Dwyer 52-61 Tradition’s Desire: the politics of culture in the rape trial of Jacob Zuma 12-33 The Zuma era in ANC history: new crisis or Thembisa Waetjen & Gerhard Maré new beginning? Raymond Suttner 62-65 Jacob Zuma’s Robben Island legacy Fran Buntman 34-38 Why is the ‘100% Zulu Boy’ so popular? Benedict Carton 66-67 Review: Zunami! The 2009 South African Election by Roger Southall & John Daniel Sean Jacobs
Editor’s Introduction Introduction The Politics of Jacob Zuma Sean Jacobs Jacob Zuma, the President of Africa’s most powerful corruption charges against Zuma — decided to relieve democracy since April 2009, and the recently chosen Zuma of his duties as deputy president. A few months ‘African President of the Year’ (Sapa 2009), arouses later Zuma was charged with raping the HIV-positive strong passions from his supporters and detractors. daughter of his former cellmate on Robben Island. A longtime ANC official from a humble peasant back- Though Zuma was acquitted of the rape charge, during ground in what is now Kwazulu-Natal province, Zuma the trail he claimed to have showered after sex to pre- was picked by the ANC to be the country’s deputy vent possible infection and also suggested that his al- president under Thabo Mbeki in 1999. leged victim invited sex by dressing provocatively. His supporters — who held marches and rallies outside the The men, close colleagues during exile (and during the court — also threatened his accuser with death. She early years of negotiating with the Apartheid govern- eventually sough asylum in the Netherlands. ment), appeared to only enjoy a friendly rivalry at that point. By most accounts, Zuma would have been set for cer- tain political isolation. Instead, a combination of fac- So when it came to predicting who would lead South tors resurrected his political career. Africa when Mbeki departed the national stage, most observers did not think of Zuma as a serious contend- Zuma’s warm personality contrasted sharply with er. He hardly featured in the daily cut and thrust of Mbeki’s cold, secretive and paranoid character (Mbeki national politics, save for spearheading a ‘moral re- at one point had the Minister of Police investigate three generation’ effort and co-chairing a national body to of his rivals for ANC President). Zuma’s poor back- coordinate the government’s AIDS prevention and ground — he is from a peasant family; his single moth- treatment effort with NGOs. No one took the focus er was a domestic to white Durban families — also dif- on morals seriously and Mbeki was really in charge of fered from Mbeki’s status as an ANC insider (Mbeki’s AIDS policy. father was a rival of Mandela and served more than two decades on Robben Island; in fact, Mbeki was sent Then in 2004 Shabir Shaik, a close associate of Zuma, out of South Africa to prepare him for leadership). was tried on charges of corruption and fraud relating to a controversial $5 billion government arms deal. Mbeki’s government also became associated with cro- During the trail it emerged that Shaik managed Zu- ny corruption and loyalty to non-performing ministers ma’s finances and that Zuma was probably embroiled and senior government officials, AIDS deaths (and in a corrupt relationship with Shaik (he was accused denialism) as well as other negative social indicators of procuring bribes for Zuma from arms manufactur- (massive unemployment and growing class fissures ers). among blacks, among others). In June 2005, President Mbeki — alluding to possible Mbeki’s critics inside the ANC and its allies (the trade union movement and communists) found in Jacob Zuma — ‘the 100% Percent Zulu Boy’ — an ambitious Sean Jacobs is an Assistant Professor of Media and Cul- politician and willing accomplice. ture in the Graduate Program in International Affairs at the New School, New York. BULLETIN N°84 - WINTER 2010 CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS
Sean Jacobs Introduction : The politics of Jacob Zuma For Mbeki’s opponents ground zero would be the par- idential terms. This means Zuma will now certainly ty’s national conference in December 2007 — where dominate South African politics for the next decade. the ANC usually anoints its leaders and, since 1990, when it was unbanned, its presidential candidates. Unlike his predecessors as South Africa’s democratic presidents — Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki — Publicly Mbeki — who by now could not conceal his Zuma is a relatively close book. He is also not known open disdain for Zuma, denied that he wanted to to write things down. change the country’s constitution and serve a third term, leaving it to his surrogates to publicly promote But Zuma, like Mbeki before him, is considered a po- the idea. When his proposal of a third-term was re- larizing figure in mainstream accounts. Journalist jected by the ANC, Mbeki in- Mark Gevisser (2007), who stead offered to remain only authored a 900-odd page bi- as party president. Publicly Mbeki denied that he wanted ography of Thabo Mbeki, lat- No one could predict what fol- to change the country’s constitution er declared that he is not a fan of Zuma. Gevisser later wrote lowed next: Zuma trounced and serve a third term, leaving it to an article for the British Pros- Mbeki in elections for party pect Magazine to declare that leader (he won nearly twice his surrogates to publicly promote the he would not vote for the ANC the number of voters Mbeki got). idea. When his proposal of a third- with Zuma as leader (Gevisser 2009). Former ANC member term was rejected by the ANC, Mbeki of parliament, Andrew Fein- With Mbeki now controlling stein, in his book about the the state and Zuma the party, instead offered to remain only as arms deal, described Jacob something had to give. It was clear Zuma’s camp held the party president. No one could predict Zuma as morally compro- mised. Some, like journalist upper hand and in September what followed next: Zuma trounced Alec Russell, hedge their bets 2008 Mbeki resigned his post on Zuma. In his recent book as the country’s president. Mbeki in elections for party leader— on South Africa, Russell (who This plunged the ANC into its first serious crisis since the —he won nearly twice the number of was a fan of Mbeki’s rightwing economic policies) speculates 1970s (then a group of rabid voters Mbeki got. on what kind of leader Jacob African nationalists were ex- Zuma will be: ‘If South Africa pelled because of their views is lucky, Zuma will be its Ro- of whites and communists). nald Reagan’. That is if Zuma Some party leaders close to Mbeki eventually broke leaves the governing to technocrats, while working to away to form the Congress of the People (COPE) in ‘make the country feel good about itself’. At the same October 2008. Though the ANC appointed the party time Zuma could develop into a ‘Big Man personality secretary-general, Kgalema Montlante, as President cult’ and a ‘charismatic populist,’ according to Russell of South Africa, it was clear that the preferred can- (2009). But with the exception of Russell, none of the didate of those who had ousted Mbeki, was Zuma. In other books claim to be about Zuma specifically. early 2009 the corruption charges against Zuma was dismissed. Soon after he was declared the ANC’s can- To shed light on the politics and ideology of Jacob didate for President. Zuma, contrary to elite opinion, Zuma, we approached a number of experts (among especially foreign and domestic media, emerged as a them historians, political scientists, and sociologists) capable leader, rallying the ANC’s core supporters and based inside and outside South Africa, to shed led on running a smooth, tight election campaign to be elect- Zuma’s politics and biography. In these essays, the ed as South Africa’s third democratic president. contributors attempt to get beyond the headlines to explore aspects of Zuma’s political identity, his class Zuma had campaigned with the promise that he would politics, biography (Robben Island, his Zuluness), his only serve one term, but in June 2009 he announced political alliances, style of government, gender poli- that he wants to serve the maximum allowed two pres- tics, among others. CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS BULLETIN N°84 - WINTER 2010
Sean Jacobs Introduction : The politics of Jacob Zuma Essays are by Suren Pillay, Peter Dwyer, Raymond Sut- Gevisser, M. 2009. Why I didn’t vote for the ANC, tner, Ari Sitas, Hlonipha Mokoena, Thembisa Waetjen Prospect Magazine, May, pp.19-20, http://www. and Gerhard Mare and Fran Buntman. There is also prospectmagazine.co.uk/2009/05/whyididntvoteanc/ an essay by an Anonymous contributor. Rather than summarize them here, we have decided to let them Russell, A. 2009. Bring Me My Machine Gun: The speak for themselves. Battle for the Soul of South Africa, from Mandela to Zuma. New York, Public Affairs. Layout and additional editing for this issue was done by Jacob Mundy, my fellow editor of the Bulletin. South African Press Agency (SAPA). 2009. ‘Zuma Crowned African President of the Year’, Mail & Guardian online, 11 November 2009, http://www. References mg.co.za/article/2009-11-11-zuma-crowned-african- president-of-the-year. Gevisser, M. 2007. Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred. Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball BULLETIN N°84 - WINTER 2010 CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS
Article Presidentialism and its Pitfalls: Towards a theory of how not to understand the Zuma Presidency Suren Pillay It was an unthinkable for many. That Jacob Zuma cal science literature, has already predetermined what would become President of post-Apartheid South Afri- it looks for, even if it can’t always govern the timing of ca. Or rather it was unthinkable for many in the West, events, as the epics of Greek political tragedy demon- and for many of the elites in the postcolonial world. At strate. some point South Africa possessed one of the neatest narratives in the history of national liberation move- In Africa we perhaps suffer the worse forms of this ments. A globally condemned problem- racism, and genre of understanding political life and leadership, a globally revered leader- Nelson Mandela. A history since we have to live with cardboard cut-out carica- of violence that was transcended through forgiveness tures, such as a ‘Big Man’ theory of African politics, and reconciliation. That was a much consumed ver- still very much alive in African Studies it seems, given sion of the story in most of the world. The untidiness the glut of B-movie ‘analyses’ of Robert Mugabe we of historical actualities is of course a different mat- have seen over the last decade. It would however be ter. And yet it seems that the untidiness of actuality unfair to castigate scholars in and of African political always struggles to find voice when it doesn’t seem to life alone for mobilizing this heuristic device. It is a tell the story that is required. Perhaps that is because mode of understanding political life that exceeds us we grasp the world through genres of understanding. and is often taken from elsewhere and travels like a Our historical-political events, like our economic fates, global cookie cutter in the sky, landing on a sovereign are told through classificatory systems, concept reper- territory, and forcing its template onto the ground so toires, metaphors, and idioms that allow us to make that what emerges in relief are things like ‘The Presi- the specificity of a moment both commensurate with dent’ and ‘the Masses’. All eyes are put on the leader if other specific moments in other places at other times. we want to understand what’s going on, and what’s go- Specificity is therefore inserted and dissolved into ing to happen. My point is not that this is necessarily historical Time and space so that we can tell a story wrong in some places at some times. Its just that this who’s dimensions, characters, and plot we are roughly mode of analyses might not apply so well everywhere already familiar with. We have good stories, and bad all of the time. And one place it doesn’t apply to very stories. There are the inspirational stories, the trag- well too is in the analysis of the rise to power, and the edies, dramas, and the farces, perhaps too much farce. practices of political power, the policies and futures Political life in liberal democracies, totalitarian states we are going to have under the Presidency of Jacob and other forms of centralized authority embodied in Zuma. That is because while we might refer to him as a person has a genre of its own, through which we seek President Zuma, and whilst we have a very complex to make sense of it all. Yet in making sense of the in- institutional machinery designed around him, called dividual leader, the genre that governs plot, character the “Presidency”, it would be an analytical mistake and narrative in political journalism and much politi- to understand Jacob Zuma’s occupation of the presi- dency in the way that we might understand the rise to power of a political leader in a Presidential system, Suren Pillay is a Senior Researcher in Democracy and where an electorate votes directly for the president Governance at the Human Science Research Council in who is required to spell out an individualized vision South Africa CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS BULLETIN N°84 - WINTER 2010
Sauren Pillay Presidentialism and its Pitfalls: Towards a theory of how not to understand the Zuma Presidency and policy agenda. cal tsunami’, but who’s fragile unity is scattered all over the shores. That movement which produced that Jacob Zuma might rather be understood as an ‘emp- spectacular but now spent wave is drawing its parts ty signifier’, as the name that marks something to be together to find and maintain a post-tsunami coher- contested over, to be filled in, and to be discursively ency. Witness the struggles over where the center of managed. The rise of Jacob Zuma to the presidency gravity for dealing with economic policy lies today: is is quite distinct to the individual who went into exile, it with the newly created Planning Commission, head- who spent a month locked in the same jail cell with ed by a senior figure of the past executive responsible his comrade Thabo Mbeki in Swaziland in the 1980’s, for overseeing what was seen as conservative neo-lib- who became head of ANC intelligence in exile, and eral fiscal policy that hurt the poor, or does it lie with who became Deputy President of the ANC, and of the the new ministry for Economic Development, headed country. Whilst Mr. Zuma is by a deployee of the labour not reducible to any one of movement who is not tainted these, his public persona is a Post-apartheid South Africa has by being part of the previous compound of all these facets. To understand the “Zuma contended with two main legacies. political administration? The ‘constitutive outside’, to in- Presidency” I would argue The first is the legacy of the exclusion voke a concept from Ernesto requires studying two dimen- Laclau, of the forces that con- sions. Firstly, it requires a of the majority of those who resided gealed around Jacob Zuma- historical analysis of the ANC in exile, the transformation in it from the political community the figure of Thabo Mbeki and what he stood for — has large- of the liberation movement of citizens. The second legacy it ly been vanquished at the top into a political party, and an and its remnants are slowly understanding of the local ef- confronts is the effects of economic being rooted out throughout fects of a post-political tech- no-administrative rational- exclusion and marginalization, the bureaucracy. The strug- gle now is within the diverse ity of governance in a specific which impoverished the majority of unity that cohered around a global economic context after particular set of grievances, the Cold War. Jacob Zuma is its residents at the gain of its few and that found a groundswell the name of a confluence of different forces, interests and citizens. The relationship between in the form of Jacob Zuma as the agent of change. pasts that intersect to name representing “the will of the people” him, as it were, and that come Political events in South Africa together in a movement that (the democratic imperative) and understood as a Zuma-Mbeki translates into a displacement of a sitting President who rep- making “a better life for all” (the personality struggle, as much as the Tsvangarai-Mugabe af- resents another countervail- developmental imperative) is however fair in Zimbabwe is told this ing movement. I prefer then way, do not encourage us to to think of events as marking not a seamless one. understand our politics as confluences, of ruptures, of structurally shaped and his- congealing and of dissolving, of a multiplicity of things torically grounded. We are encouraged rather to con- that are constantly coming together and coming apart. struct personality archetypes which become turn-keys Secondly, I would view the figure of Jacob Zuma- to unravel the mystery in the drama. Yes, Thabo Mbeki as-President as a person within the webs that have and Jacob Zuma lend themselves to stark contrasts — been spun around him that congealed into the ‘politi- the urban sophisticated intellectual who is thoughtful and reticent versus the formally uneducated goat herd- er who is warm and approachable. We may even find . For one of the more thoughtful analyses of the confluence of local socio-economic shifts, the rise of Jacob Zuma and ‘Zulu- ness’ as an idiom of populism in Kwazulu Natal, see Ari Sitas’s discussion document, ‘Populism and the NDR in South Africa’ . The general secretary of the country’s largest trade union 2007, http://iolsresearch.ukzn.ac.za/FullVersionPopulismandN- federation, Zwelinzima Vavi, described Zuma’s bid for the Presi- DRinSouthAfrica12070.aspx, accessed on 28 October 2009. dency as an ‘unstoppable tsunami’. BULLETIN N°84 - WINTER 2010 CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS
Sauren Pillay Presidentialism and its Pitfalls: Towards a theory of how not to understand the Zuma Presidency in the person of Thabo Mbeki that story we are look- perative’. The second legacy it confronts is the effects ing for, of a seemingly deliberate individualized rise of economic exclusion and marginalization, which to power that appears less constituency based- he is impoverished the majority of its residents at the gain quoted as saying when he came back from exile that he of its few citizens. Improving the basic conditions of had ‘no constituencies’, where rivals like Chris Hani at life for the majority therefore defines the state’s ‘de- Mafikeng in1991, Cyril Ramaphosa at the negotiations velopmental imperative’. The relationship between in Kempton Park, Tokyo Sexwale later on — potential representing ‘the will of the people’ — the democratic rivals that might have eclipsed him, are outmaneu- imperative — and making ‘a better life for all’ — the vered in one way or another. We might find in Mbeki developmental imperative — is however not a seam- who participated in the secret talks with the apartheid less one. regime whilst simultaneously drafting resolutions for the South African Communist Party demanding mass The presidency under Mandela and Mbeki read its insurrection, a certain double-speaking tendency driv- mandate- the ‘delivery’ of basic services and the im- en by a larger vision, in that case the realization that an provement of the welfare of the majority of citizens armed struggle was unlikely to conquer power and that lives — as an administrative matter to be resolved negotiations were the only viable route. To that extent, by expertise. Its criteria for success or failure is to be we could argue that Mbeki possessed a discernable ‘vi- able quantify its achievements with regard to delivery. sion’ which was stamped onto the Presidency, spelt There is a remarkable moment at the ANC conference out in his ‘I am an African’ speech, in the commitment at Polokwane in 2007 where Mbeki and Zuma squared to peacekeeping in the continent, in the style of deal- off against in each in the vote for leadership of the ANC. ing with the political events Mbeki is met with open hostility in Zimbabwe, in the stance by a pro-Zuma audience of del- on HIV/Aids, in the style of The challenge is going to be how egates, whom the chairperson appointments and of dealing with critics of the vision that [Zuma] manages and is managed by struggles to reign in. Mbeki’s advisers suggested to him that emerged from the Presidency, the contending forces at work on the he use the opportunity to make either through what it said or a speech that was emotive, and refused to say. Presidency once they start criticizing that spoke to the hearts of del- On the other hand, it would be what he actually begins to stands for. egates, that ‘looked people in the eye’, as Ronnie Kasrils said. difficult to find a policy quar- Mbeki however, consistently rel between Thabo Mbeki and technocratic, looked down and Jacob Zuma; the latter was a cooperative part of the read the text of a speech crowded with facts and fig- executive that made policy under the former’s presi- ures about the achievements of the Presidency. The dency. What then is at stake in the divisive question audience was visibly bored and yawned through it. of ‘succession’ in the ANC and of the country that The technocratic and the popular seemed worlds apart brought Jacob Zuma to power? How then did Jacob in that moment. Zuma emerge as the symbolic figure that represents ‘the Left’ of the tripartite alliance partners, as well as Another dimension to the story is that citizenship in a popular figure who’s increasing legal woes only en- South Africa, which was racially and ethnically exclu- deared him more and more to grassroots sympathy? sive, seeks to create a legal subject of the political in Even if they possess very distinct personalities, why is a context where the Law still lacks legitimacy in the it that the traits of the one resonated with the mass eyes of many South Africans, particularly its punitive base of the ANC at this point in time rather than the side. Its important to note that the more Zuma be- traits of the other? came a subject of punitive law, as an accused of either corruption or rape, the greater the public displays of Post-apartheid South Africa has contended with two popular support were. Jacob Zuma, as a victim of Law, main legacies. The first is the legacy of the exclusion of resonated with the political disposition of many black the majority of those who resided in it from the politi- South Africans towards law, as a codification of injus- cal community of citizens. Transforming all who lived tice towards them, and therefore lacking legitimacy in it into full legal citizens defines its ‘democratic im- and authority. In a recent piece, Slavoj Zizek notes CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS BULLETIN N°84 - WINTER 2010
Sauren Pillay Presidentialism and its Pitfalls: Towards a theory of how not to understand the Zuma Presidency that “the key fact here is that pure post-politics (a re- gime whose self legitimization would have been thor- oughly ‘technocratic’, presenting itself as competent administration) is inherently impossible: any political regime needs a supplementary ‘populist’ level of self- legitimization”. The contrast of Zuma to Mbeki as a ‘populist’ leader to a centralizing one, in this context is both misleading and simultaneously useful. What is misleading is the view that Zuma in his person repre- sents a ‘populist’ leader, in the mould of figures like Argentina’s Juan Peron. I would argue rather that the campaign around Zuma takes on populist forms which are projected onto Zuma, whilst we are likely to see that in practice his governance imperatives will force him to manage the relationship between technocratic problem solving, and popular approval, necessary el- ements of all democratic regimes and their leaders. Zuma has already shown himself willing to criticize the constituency that brought him to power. The chal- lenge is going to be how he manages and is managed by the contending forces at work on the Presidency once they start criticizing what he actually begins to stands for. . Slavoj Zizek, ‘Against the Populist Temptation’, http://www. lacan.com/zizpopulism.htm, accessed on 20 October 2009. . According to a newspaper account, addressing workers debat- ing to go on strike, he remarked ‘There is no pandering to the unions. Asked if he felt indebted to unions, Zuma said: ‘Not at all’. James Macharia ‘There is no Pandering to Unions’, Mail and Guardian, 12 August 2009. Also August this year Zuma paid a surprise visit to the town of Balfour, which had experienced pro- tests, to check in on local government officials. The Mayor was apparently off sick, but rushed to the office when he heard of his visitor. Karabo Keepile ‘The day the President came knocking’, Mail and Guardian, 26 August 2009. There have been similar visits elsewhere in the country, not only by himself, but by other ministers, who have been vocal in the criticisms of perceived incompetence. BULLETIN N°84 - WINTER 2010 CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS
Article Scoring an own-goal Peter Dwyer South Africa is revolting. Since May 2009 there has and the Soh Africsn Communist Party (SACP) as rep- been a wave of uninterrupted township as police clash resenting a new start for the ANC government after 12 on an almost weekly basis with unemployed protestors years of neoliberal polices imposed by former Presi- and striking workers. A recent estimate counts 63 ma- dent Thabo Mbeki. The belief in Zuma as a fresh start jor ‘service delivery’ protests since January 2009 with has not been missed. One protestor Sandile Mahlangu 24 percent of protests taking place in Guateng and 19 claimed “President Zuma promised to rid government percent in the Western Cape and Mpumalanga. As the of corruption and lazy officials”. protests continue, increasing strain is being put on the Tripartite Alliance as some African National Congress The township protests coincided with an outbreak (ANC) leaders in national and provincial government of national strikes. These latest strikes followed the have accused the South African Communist Party month long strike in June 2007 that was the long- (SACP) and the South African National Civic Organi- est and largest public-sector strike in the history of sation (SANCO) of being behind violent protests. South Africa and included over 700,000 workers on strike and another 300,000, for whom it was illegal What are misleadingly called ‘service delivery’ protests have to strike, taking part in militant marches, pickets and been about a wide range of issues and have included the work- other forms of protest. In August 2008 another gen- ing poor, the unemployed and students protesting about in- eral strike brought the economy to a standstill when creased student fees at campuses across the country from Cape COSATU called its two million members out on a one- Town to Johannesburg. In October in Gugulethu up to 2000 day strike in protest of rising prices of food and fuel. people protested about the lack of jobs being created for local This strike followed an announcement that electricity people at a new Square Mall that recently opened. To the far prices would increase by 27.5 percent. Since the start north in Nelspruit people protested outside the 2010 Mbombe- of 2009 there have been 24 officially recorded major la stadium at 6am demanding that the government build them protests across the country and government officials a school they were promised when they were relocated to make believe that the rate of protests this year will exceed way for the World Cup stadium. And still the protests erupt and those for 2007 and 2008. spread. During the past several weeks Sakhile informal settle- ment in Standerton has been rocked by violent protests Although South Africa is Africa’s most successful econ- culminating in an incredible 10,000 people marching omy (it contributes a third of all sub-Saharan Africa’s to hand over a memorandum to the local council. 48 countries), not everyone has benefitted equally. Since the late 1990s South Africa’s economy has grown What is in part fascinating about this wave of pro- at 6 percent each year and inflation has been reduced tests and strikes is that they come just months after to around 6 per cent, on a par with other similar econo- the April re-election of the African National Congress mies. Yet this has been done through introducing neo- (ANC) and the new President Jacob Zuma. He was seen liberal policies with tight control over public spending by many, particularly his supporters in COSATU the and service delivery, that has hit the poorest hardest Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) as money has been diverted from public spending into tax cuts for the rich and middle class. Increases in gov- ernment budget allocations have come not through Peter Dwyer teaches Political Economy at Ruskin College, some fundamental shift in macroeconomic policy but Oxford. Prior to this he worked in South Africa for 4 years in research and popular education. through emphasising fiscal efficiency. Such ‘efficiency CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS BULLETIN N°84 - WINTER 2010
Peter Dwyer Scoring an own-goal savings’, argue COSATU and others, are at the expense The government claims to have built over two million of social spending for the working class. new houses but there are still 2000 informal settle- ments across South Africa, in which people live with- Yet the ANC government has found the money to line out sanitation and electricity in shacks made of corru- the pockets of big business through billions of pounds gated iron and waste materials. On average there are 10 of tax cuts as they have reduced corporation tax from shack fires a day killing several hundred people a year. 50 percent in the early 1990s to less than 30 percent These disasters devastate the lives of all concerned, today. The growth in the economy in the last few years putting young children, the old and disabled people is linked to the growth in global demand, particular- particularly at risk and making the poor and vulner- ly from China, for South African manufacturing and able destitute. Life in the shacks is one of permanent primary commodities. As elsewhere in the world this drudgery as one shackdweller Funake Mkhwambi told coincided with a financial and speculative boom re- how ‘My shack gets flooded every year. I have to move sulting in property prices rocketing by 400 per cent every winter to stay with my cousins elsewhere. We – higher than the rise in property prices in the USA are a family of 8, including 5 children who often get and Ireland. Whilst there has been investment in in- sick because of the cold and dirty water’. frastructure, this has been money based on Private Finance Initiatives simi- Two sets of figures re- lar those in the UK, with leased in October 2009 money ploughed into tourist projects such as Between 2003 and 2006, the number of reveal much about South Africa one of the most un- the football stadiums for days lost to strikes rose from 500,000 to 2.6 equal countries one earth. the 2010 World Cup, the The Sunday Times annual controversial World Bank million, most of which took place in 2006. rich list shows that de- backed Lesoto Highlands Water Project and an elit- June 2007 witnessed the largest strike in spite the recession ‘... ex- ecutives are pocketing all ist fast rail service (that South Africa history. It lasted four weeks, sorts of additional bonus- avoids Soweto) between es and making mega-prof- Johannesburg and Preto- with 11 million strike days lost as public its on unacceptably gener- ria that will largely serv- ice rich and middle class sector workers marched and struck and an ous share options. This is in addition to huge basic commuters. underlying current of which was a growing salaries and performance bonuses, with bonuses Although the proportion antipathy towards the ANC leadership. still being earned by many of people living below the despite the nonperform- poverty line dropped from ance of their companies’. 58 percent in 2000 to 48 percent in 2005 and many At the same time the Labour Force Survey shows that families have access to social grants and other poverty 1 million jobs have been lost in the last year with of- alleviation programmes, many households and com- ficial unemployment put at 24.5 per cent but many in munities remain trapped in poverty. Some 75 percent civil society put the figure at over 40 percent. A figure of African children lived in income poverty in 2007, that will continue to rise as the global economic cri- compared to 43 percent of ‘coloured’ children, 14 per- sis starts to bite in a country whose recent economic cent of Indian children and 5 percent of white children. fortunes have been built on demand for commodities Little wonder that South Africa is a country in turmoil such as coal, gold and platinum. as the anger and bitterness of shattered dreams of liberation eats away at the very fabric of society. It is Little wonder that the demand for jobs and decent an anger that is also expressed in the average of 50 wages is at the heart of calls from township protestors people a day murdered and high levels of child abuse and striking workers alike and a growing unemployed and rape. Although crime figures have fallen over the peoples movement organises mass thefts of basic past several years, they are still high by international foodstuffs in cites such as Durban. This is a country standards in which one worker feeds on average another 5 mem- bers of the family. In a country in which the every other BULLETIN N°84 - WINTER 2010 CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS
Peter Dwyer Scoring an own-goal 18-24 year old is unemployed a cursory glance at the which took place in 2006. June 2007 witnessed the media coverage reveals poor, hungry, angry faces. Yet largest strike in South Africa history. It lasted four having promised to create 500,000 jobs in a recent weeks, with 11 million strike days lost as public sec- state of the nation address, President Zuma retracted tor workers marched and struck and an underlying and stated that ‘These are not the permanent jobs the current of which was a growing antipathy towards the economy should create but opportunities that should ANC leadership. help our people survive in the short term’. And already analysts are already talking of, when it comes, a job- Paradoxically, it was during this period that COSATU’s less recovery. role in the Alliance led some activists on the left to dis- count the role of the working class – some even repeat- To understand today’s protests and strikes it is impor- ing the 1970s theory about the unionised representing tant to understand the significance of the election of a ‘labour aristocracy’. If this was the case, what sense Jacob Zuma and the expectations he unleashed. But it could possibly be made of the strikes at the level of po- was an earlier rising tide of worker and township mili- litical analysis, let along political engagement? tancy that he deftly rode so enabling him to win the presidency of the ANC. By 2006 there were on average What is clear is that political transformations have approximately 6,000 township and community pro- followed from labour struggles. So the last important tests a year across the country. event came in December 2007 These were largely local-based revolts against the failure of the Zuma, unlike Mbeki, is seen as a at the ANC Polokwane congress. The writing was on the wall for ANC government to satisfy ‘serv- “man of the people” and a friend Mbeki, the coup against him ice delivery’ demands. These re- only a matter of time. In short volts occurred at a greater rate of the workers who is willing to these events, notably the upris- then any other country in the world. But important in which listen to the trade unions. Touted ings and strikes - represented a revolt against Mbeki’s neo- have also been the independ- as a leftist by his supporters, he liberalism. A revolt that cata- ent ‘social movements’ typified pulted Zuma to the head of the by the Anti-Privatization Forum sounds more like a US Republican, ANC. Some on the left missed who have emerged since 1999 largely as an attempt to coordi- said one newspaper columnist, as how the rising militancy rever- berated inside the ANC and ar- nate struggles against the ANC’s he calls for tougher action against gued that Mbeki was replaced relentless commodification and as president due to the internal privatization of basic services crime and freer markets. conflicts. But the conflicts inside and produced the first cracks in the ANC reflect the anger and the ANC monolith, proving that frustration with ANC neoliberal you can challenge the ANC’s commitment to neo-lib- policies and Mbeki’s fate was not sealed by internal eralism. But it was the recent strikes that destroyed party manoeuvres but by general strikes and protests Mbeki that breathed new life into the left inside the in recent years that Zuma cleverly latched on to with Alliance. help from the SACP and COSATU. By seeming to vic- timise Zuma, Mbeki enhanced his popularity and cre- Despite being written off by many commentators on ated a new leader for millions of disaffected people. the left as ‘bought off’ or ‘tied to the apron strings of the ANC’ there has been a revival of the organised Zuma unlike Mbeki is seen as a ‘man of the people’ working class. A significant turning point was the and a friend of the workers who is willing to listen to 2006 violent security guard and cleaners strike that in the trade unions. Touted as a leftist by his support- some cases went beyond the control of the trade union ers, he sounds more like a US Republican, said one leaders and began, however falteringly, to show signs newspaper columnist, as he calls for tougher action of independent rank and file action. against crime and freer markets. Prior to his election as president one of Zuma’s closest advisers, former Between 2003 and 2006, the number of days lost to trade union leader Gwede Mantashe, met with inves- strikes rose from 500,000 to 2, 6 million, most of tors in Cape Town and stressed the ways to accelerate CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS BULLETIN N°84 - WINTER 2010 10
Peter Dwyer Scoring an own-goal South Africa’s rate of investment, fight crime and pro- tests have focused on issues such as lack of water and vide a progressive social safety net. He said that under housing, the recent protests have been more general- President Zuma’s leadership ‘this isn’t about business ised and more violent. As protestor Mzonke Poni told versus the poor, it’s about creating an environment for reporters ‘Whenever the ANC government fails to de- business while tending to the needs of the poor.’ At liver, it comes up with excuses and blames it on indi- one point prior to his election Zuma talked of estab- viduals. It’s true that its councillors lack commitment lishing a ‘pact’ between businesses, government and and skills, but it is the national leadership that is also unions to address low wages, strikes and inflation. Yet to blame – and meanwhile people have to suffer. The this has already been shattered by the strikes and pro- only way the government notices us is when we ex- tests and instead of bringing social peace, the Finan- press our anger and rage. Then they understand how cial Times has noted ‘There is an ugly, unpredictable we feel.’ The protests and strikes caught many people mood among South Africa’s poor’. by surprise with some commentators expressing dis- belief at the level of political anger at a government It is this mood of militancy; militant strikes and the elected just three months before with 66 per cent of township protests over the last few years that have the vote. As one commentator said about South Africa had the cumulative effect of blowing apart the neo- ‘They just don’t vote they throw bricks as well’. Unless liberal consensus in the Alliance. With the election of something drastic is done then the bricks look set to be Jacob Zuma as president many hoped that this would thrown in the future as residents involved in the latest usher in a new period of social stability. 15 years of out break of protests in Eldorado Park in Johannes- ANC rule have seen South Africa become the most un- burg threatened “We will protest at the stadiums (of equal country in the world but also the protest capi- the 2010 World Cup) so the tourists can see how bad tal of the world. In May 2008 government and police we have it here” said Hilton Cannell a member of the figures noted that between 1997 and 2008 there had resident’s housing committee. By focusing much of its been 8695 violent or unrest‑related crowd manage- capital infrastructure spending on the World Cup in ment incidents and 84, 487 peaceful demonstrations the hope that it would trickle down to the unemployed or peaceful crowd management incidents. and working poor the government increasingly looks like it has scored an own-goal. The difference this time is that whilst previous pro- 11 BULLETIN N°84 - WINTER 2010 CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS
Article The Zuma era in ANC history: New crisis or new beginning? Raymond Suttner The inauguration of the Jacob Zuma government was law and constitution and rights, even where if a poll met with considerable popular approval and initially were taken, for example, on the death penalty, it might generated a great deal of euphoria, hope and encour- be that it would be lost. But seen in the context of the agement, (as well as dread and contempt on the other constitution as a whole these must be defended, and hand). While this paper attempts to move behind these part of leadership is to drive the democratic and trans- emotions to the character of the phenomenon, I have formatory project, if it is that. That must include using no contempt towards the outpouring of joy and hope political leadership as a way of raising consciousness invested in what is claimed to be a new beginning, al- of those who are not fully conversant with the emanci- beit not always for the same reasons. patory nature of certain elements of the constitution. This is not restricted to the death penalty, but also gen- It is not easy to explain the joy that appears to have der, identity and other questions. This is not patronis- been evoked. At the same time, having said that, much ing but a fact of life, that some are not always aware of the discourse within the African National Congress of the implications until these are explained, through (ANC) -led alliance and what is said to be at issue in the strong, clear leadership. rise of Zuma and at the level of much of the leadership is the relationship between the masses and leadership, I am in agreement with Williams, that the masses are a question on which the new president is said to be not an ignorant mob, but believe that we need to be quite different from former president Thabo Mbeki. aware that there are various levels of information that This is not an easy issue on which to pronounce. I write guide any action and that the current mass support, with full consciousness that there is a body of think- may change — not as the wind blows — but for rea- ing that equates the masses with an ignorant mob who sons that are in the main based on rational and some- spell danger to democracy. times irrational factors, that may be temporary or of greater or lesser duration and whatever information is I am with Raymond Williams (1983: 298) in rejecting at their disposal. Already some of the original ardour that view and one of the points where I disagree with is being displaced by anger in strikes and protests all the forms of governance after 1994, is that they over service delivery, often met by what appears to be were not mass driven as the Reconstruction and De- excessive force (Benjamin 2009). It may be that the velopment Programme (RDP), the ANC’s initial blue- often loosely used concept of populism will provide print for transformation intended, and the people were clues, possibly in conjunction with Bonapartism, to mainly passive recipients of government delivery. the understanding of this set of relationships (see, for But there is a caveat and a problem in the relation- example, Marx 1934; Laclau 1977; Gellner & Ionescu ship between mass driven democracy and government 1969; Taggart 2002). At the same time the series of and state leadership and institutions of our democ- high wage rises (though not high in relation to costs of racy. Sometimes the Constitutional Court and politi- living), are causing anxiety to capital. cal leaders have to give a lead in interpretation of the Thus my support for popular power has a degree of conditionality and is as much a problem to be solved Raymond Suttner is Research Professor, College of Hu- as it is a goal. Nowhere in the world has there been man Sciences at the University of South Africa in Pretoria. a successful combination of mass and representative He can be reached at rsuttner@worldonline@co.za and democracy. The formula for their interaction has still suttnrs@unisa.ac.za. CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS BULLETIN N°84 - WINTER 2010 12
Raymond Suttner The Zuma era in ANC history: New crisis or new beginning? to be worked out, though writers like Arblaster believe munist domination. The expulsion of the ‘Gang of 8’ that such structures for popular involvement are al- in 1975 was also for ideological reasons, as was that of ready there with new modes of communication in the the Marxist Workers Tendency in the 1980s. Most or twenty-first century (Arblaster 2002: ch.8). all of these people were allowed re-admission to the The rest of this paper contextualises the rise of Jacob ANC after it’s unbanning in 1990, thus signifying the Zuma within ANC history, attempting to characterise principle that it is better to have the differences within the extent to which the Zuma - led ANC and govern- the organisation than outside, as enemies. ment represents a rupture and continuity in the recent and overall history of the organisation, mode of its In the years following the establishment of the ANC it leadership and the democratic dispensation inaugu- pursued a policy of petitioning the British Empire and rated in 1994. To what extent is it Zuma or unfinished the Union governments, a strategy that was an adapta- business of ANC history with which we are concerned? tion to the new conditions that the organisation found To what extent has the ANC itself made the elements itself in, with the defeat of armed resistance. Over time, of Zuma leadership which many find offensive or to this approach proved fruitless and led to decline in what degree are they outcomes that were part of a the organisation and its being overshadowed by other range of ones that could potentially have emanated political and workers organisations. I am not thereby from ANC history and patterns of organisation? What seeking to criticise the early approach, without qualifi- is the chain of causality? cation, and the work of Peter Limb (2002) in particu- lar shows that it was more complex than going ‘cap in hand to the masters’. It was however revived from the Brief overview of recent history 1940s, first through the efforts of individuals like Dr A.B. Xuma as president and Rev (later Canon) James The ANC was established as the South African Native Calata as secretary-general (Walshe 1970: 256). The National Congress (SANNC) in 1912 and although its establishment of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) in history has been varied, a constant theme, which was 1944 could build on the organisational structures that periodically marred by splits and expulsions, has been Xuma and Calata had started. Without this their state- the need for unity. Much of the argument in this paper ments may have remained radical rhetoric. and what I intend to develop relates to unity and its re- lationship to opposition, pluralism, constitutionalism, The 1950s, following the adoption of the YL’s pro- essentialism and other factors, though much is only gramme of action saw the development of mass and alluded to and not attempted to finalise in argument in radical programmes and organisational steps. The the present paper. On the eve of founding the organi- 1952 Defiance campaign represented an embryonic re- sation, Pixley ka Isaka Seme, in a famous statement jection of legal obligation and allegiance to the apart- spoke of the need to draw lessons from the inter-chief- heid state. The ‘M Plan’ was preparation for potential dom /kingdom divisions that had led to the conquest banning which was adopted following the illegality of of the African people and said there should be unity. the Communist Party. That party re-established itself ‘We are one!’ (Seme 1972[1911]: 71-3). He also spoke as the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1953 of the SANNC as a ‘native union’ of the African people, and possibly earlier if we were in possession of more carrying, though he did not say so, revolutionary po- data on political activities in the rural areas (Suttner tentionalities as a counter union to the white Union of 2008: ch.2-3). South Africa (Jordan 1988: 107-24). The Defiance campaign, initiated shortly after Chief This theme of unity continued to be on the lips of the Albert Luthuli entered politics and was dismissed as a most famous ANC leaders. While this was preceded chief, represented a break in the chain of legality that and followed by minor splits or expulsions, there was had characterised previous ANC politics. It saw the a major breach in this unity with the Pan-Africanist ANC membership rise from 7000 to 100,000 paid up Congress (PAC) breakaway in 1959 due to ideological members (Karis and Carter 1973: 427; Bensonn 1985, disagreements mainly over certain clauses of the Free- 150). The defiers were led by volunteers, swearing an dom Charter and the role of whites and alleged Com- oath and wearing a special uniform. The uniform may . For a comprehensive discussion, see Gerhart 1978. 13 BULLETIN N°84 - WINTER 2010 CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS
Raymond Suttner The Zuma era in ANC history: New crisis or new beginning? have carried symbolic military connotations thus echo- 2006). ing talk that was current about ‘fighting back’ and tak- The proceedings of the Congress of the People at Klip- ing up arms. At the same time, the cap that was worn town were halted just after the point of adoption, and derives from Gandhi and thousands of years of Indian the Charter was used as a basis for prosecution in the peasant history (Suttner 2009a: 61). Treason Trial, involving between 30 and 156 of the top leadership for 5 years. While this was a blow to or- Sisulu indicated that they specifically chose the word ganisation it provided opportunities for meetings and ‘defiance’ rather than ‘passive resistance’ used in the friendships to develop, one of the most noteworthy be- 1946-1948 Indian anti-pass campaigns, to raise the ing that between Luthuli and Moses Kotane, General level of struggle, even to a revolutionary level, where Secretary of the SACP, who became Luthuli’s closest people would be prepared to give their lives. That is adviser and confidant (Bunting 1998: ch.14; Magu- why the volunteers were called ‘defiers of death’ (Si- bane, et.al. 2004: 65). sulu 2001: 79). Before the Treason Trial acquittal, the Sharpeville What Luthuli brought to the fore, along with the youth massacre occurred in 1960, followed by the banning leaders already mentioned, was the ethical canon that of the ANC and PAC, and the detention of many lead- distinguished the best of the ANC. He represented the ers under the state of emergency. Of great symbolic notion of a leader who sought nothing for him or her- importance at this time were photographs of Luthuli, self, who was prepared to lose all, and prayed that he Mandela and Sisulu setting their passes alight. People would resist any temptation not to do what was his still speak today of how these images stirred them. moral duty to his people (Suttner 2009c). Many cad- res were very learned in political theory, but they were This is an example of the Gandhian principle that the not prepared when it came to putting their life on the type of leadership of the time would set the example line. Luthuli was very clear on the nature of his be- for their followers by being the first to take daring ac- liefs, but more importantly, he prepared himself for tion, which others were urged to follow. (This is not a road of hardship and ultimate ‘mysterious’ death. to suggest that being in the frontline is invariably the This is what he called ‘the gospel of service’, that peo- best way to lead). ple had to understand ‘no cross, no crown’ (Reddy 1991: 71), though the notion of the crown carried some The 1950s began and ended with defiance, ultimately ambiguity. Whatever he advised others to do, he was with banning of the ANC and its stating it would not prepared to do himself (Benson 1985: 144-5), in this abide by that decree (Suttner 2008: ch.2). The no- respect echoing Gandhi and foreshadowing Mandela tion of defiance, even in its earlier form in the Defi- (Chatterjee 2007: ch.4; Mandela 1994: 360). ance campaign crossed a threshold, in that from that moment the ANC implicitly denied any duty owed to The Defiance Campaign was followed by the Congress the authority of the day. That denial would increase in of the People campaign which gathered popular de- intensity after banning, and led to the later declara- mands and out of which the Freedom Charter emerged, tion of apartheid as a crime against humanity, and the which would serve as guidelines for a future democrat- ejection of the South African government from the UN ic state. Unlike other human rights documents in the General Assembly for not being representative of the ANC, like the African claims of 1945 (see Asmal, et. al. people of South Africa (Suttner 1984). While Luthuli 2005), and seldom if ever in international history has refers to the actions of the 1950s as non-revolutionary a document, whatever its flaws, derived from the ac- (Reddy 1991: 46-50), revolution may mean a single de- tual voices of the ordinary people (Suttner and Cronin cisive act or a series of embryonic acts of a transforma- tory or rebellious kind, such as the Defiance campaign. The counterposition of evolution and revolution is one of the problems in much of the thinking of Leninists . The inquest found nothing untoward, but anyone who is con- and those, including the ANC pursing a ‘decisive mo- versant with inquests during the apartheid era would not regard ment’ notion of national liberation (Hunt 1980; Ka- that as the final word. It is regrettable that there has been no state enquiry, as in the case of Samora Machel. garlitsky 1990; Lennin 1969[1918]). . See my interpretation, aided by theologian friends, in Suttner 2009c . Interview, J. Nkadimeng, Johannesburg, 2003. CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS BULLETIN N°84 - WINTER 2010 14
Raymond Suttner The Zuma era in ANC history: New crisis or new beginning? few months but found that it stretched into decades. The ANC underground experience, preceded by the This fed into problems of morale and discipline and SACP reconstitution in 1953, relied heavily on the while campaigns into then Rhodesia had more suc- experience of the latter, but it was difficult to take a cess than South African newspapers reported (Karis mass organisation underground and its military ef- and Gerhart 1997: 29), they led to divisions, includ- forts while dramatic were brought to a swift halt by ing complaints about the life style of the leadership, the middle of the 1960s, with all of the top leader- over-emphasis on international solidarity, and neglect ship in prison or exile. Bram Fischer lasted somewhat of armed struggle and the need to return to South Af- longer, but he was operating in virtual isolation and rica. One of the symptoms of this sentiment was the without much logistical support (see Meredith 2002; ‘Hani memorandum’, which nearly led to Chris Hani’s Clingman 1998). The Rivonia trial of 1964 again saw execution (Shubin 2008: ch.6). the spirit of denial of the legal right of the South Af- rican government to make laws, with all the prison- To attempt to heal these divisions and chart a way for- ers declaring that ‘the government not they should be ward, a consultative conference was held in Morogoro in the dock’ (Joffe 1995: 58-9). Later Mandela made in Tanzania in 1969. The conference emerged with a his famous statement that he was willing to live but if strategy and tactics document, which would have a necessary to die to realise the ideals of the liberation significant effect for generations to come (ANC 1969). movement (Mandela 1990: 181; on preparedness for This document, which may fall into the category of death, see Mandela 1994: 360). Gramsci’s reference to a party acting as an intellectual or ‘collective intellectual’ (Gramsci 1971: ch.1; Suttner 2005) was an intervention which drew many people to Between Rivonia and 1976 the ANC and gave those already there a feeling that the apartheid regime was not invincible; this was part of With the leadership in prison and some, such as Oliver the overall sense that there was both power and weak- Tambo and Yusuf Dadoo having been sent out earlier nesses in the make-up of the ‘enemy’ and its opponents. in order to start the international solidarity campaign, These had both to be exploited in a way that strength- history books record that a ‘lull’ reigned over South Af- ened the resistance and weakened the regime. rican politics, for the ANC was declared dead. Inkatha (with initial qualified support from the ANC) used the The period that followed saw some limited attempts opening to claim to be the heir to the ANC. This also at realising these overall goals, some with a measure created space for the fresh and defiant strands of black of success, others representing attempts but without consciousness (BC) to emerge. much success. In fact, it is not true that the ANC ceased to exist, The 1976 uprising was not initiated by the ANC. But and underground structures were re-constituted by a many BC individuals and leaders had contact with key number of groupings. They started on a small scale, ANC underground figures, on a strictly secret, con- but gradually developed the capacity to help families spiratorial basis. Many listened to Radio Freedom, of those in jail or detention, to send out individuals for the ANC illegal broadcasting station. Many were im- training and receive MK (mKhonto we Sizwe, Spear of patient to leave BC, but they were counselled to stay the Nation, the name of the ANC army) cadres who where they were by older people, such as Joe Gqabi. returned. It was slow, patient work, too slow for some Many left the country in the wake of the repression of the emerging BC movement, many of whom entered that accompanied and followed the uprising. The huge into dialogue with the underground and later came to influx of new, young and optimistic people into the appreciate the need for this careful, painstaking build- ing of the organisation (Suttner 2008: ch.4). . Interview E. Mtshali, (Johannesburg, 8 February 2003); Suttner At the same time those who had left for training in 2008: ch 7. There are a number of personal wounds that remain the early years of MK had expected to return within a from this period and are captured partly in Berstein (1994). This deserves a book on its own . Suttner (2008: ch.4), interviews with Murphy Morobe (Midrand, 26 August 2003) and Nat Serache (Johannesburg, 31 August . See works cited in Suttner 2008: chapter 4. 2002). 15 BULLETIN N°84 - WINTER 2010 CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS
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