Commentaries Kazakhstan's Disturbances: Internal Dynamics and External Dimensions
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Commentaries
Kazakhstan’s Disturbances:
Internal Dynamics and External Dimensions
Zaki Shaikh
March, 2022 - Shaban 1443 H.
This article begins by analyzing the factors contributing to the recent unrest in Kazakhstan and how
Russian commentators have leveraged media debates to call for the deployment of peacekeeping
troops to the Central Asian country. Next, it explores the possible motivations driving Kazakh and
Russian leaders’ cooperation in the deployment, along with the longer-term implications for their
two countries. Finally, the article discusses the lessons that can be drawn from the recent events in
Kazakhstan and what they might mean for Central Asia writ large.
The Factors Underlying the Unrest was widely believed to be Nazarbayev’s anointed
In early January 2022, peaceful demonstrations successor. Then, on March 20, 2019, Nazarbayev
over fuel prices in Kazakhstan’s oil city of stepped down as president, Tokayev—as Senate
Zhanaozen quickly spread to other cities, especially chair—took over as acting president. He won a
the former capital Almaty, sparking violent protests snap presidential election in June 2019 and has
over broader questions of economic hardship, served as president since then.
lack of political participation, and government However, Nazarbayev not only retained positions
inaction in resolving these issues. The power as the chairman of the ruling party, Nur Otan but
struggle between the administration of President also as the head of the over-arching Kazakhstan
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and supporters of the National Security Council.(1) Moreover,
country’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, Nazarbayev continued to enjoy effective control
is increasingly seen as the root cause of the over the National Security Committee through
disturbances. In autumn 2013, when Tokayev his trusted aide Karim Massimov, who had served
was made Chairman of Kazakhstan’s Senate, he as Kazakhstan’s prime minister from 2007–2012
Kazakhstan’s Disturbances:
Internal Dynamics and External Dimensions Commentaries 1and again from 2014–2016, thus still wielding power, and that the [potential] loss of Kazakhstan
enormous power. As a result, some have ridiculed would finally reduce the Russian Federation to a
Tokayev as a puppet of the ex-president.(2) peripheral country that could be ignored by all.”(5)
The recent unrest, therefore, appears to be part of a Some observers drew analogies with earlier
battle for control of the highest echelons of power anti-government protests in Georgia, Armenia,
between President Tokayev and his predecessor. Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine, questioning whether
The clearest evidence of the underlying struggle there was a risk of a second “Orange Revolution”
is Massimov’s detention on suspicion of treason in Kazakhstan.(6)
on January 8, 2022.(3) Despite this move, Tokayev One ultra-conservative outlet claimed that the
was unsure whether Kazakhstan’s 120,000 uprising in Kazakhstan might even have been
military personnel and 60,000 national guards a kind of rehearsal for instigated tumult inside
would support him or Massimov. At that point, he Russia itself.(7) Andrey Pinchuk, a senior leader
turned to Russia for help. In response, President of Russian separatists in the Ukrainian Donbass,
Vladimir Putin deployed 2,500 peacekeeping claimed that the unrest was instigated by those
troops from the Collective Security Treaty aligned with Western interests: “The elites of
Organization (CSTO) to help restore order. (4)
Kazakhstan have long been closely patronized
by various Western structures ranging from
Rationale for Russian Intervention the Soros Foundation to other pro-Western
To understand the rationale for intervention, it institutions... We are now seeing the results
is worth reviewing the Russian media’s broad of this … Events in Kazakhstan … have been
debate on Kazakhstan. A unifying theme – voiced inspired by Western intelligence services and
by different commentators – is the assertion that interested organizations.”(8) Russia’s ultra-right
foreign elements, seeking to undermine Moscow’s newspaper, Zavtra, reported: “the intelligence
core interests and security across its periphery, services of foreign powers have made their nests
were behind the unrest. This threat perception ties in Kazakhstan: America (through the structures
Russia’s long-term interests with Tokayev and of Nazarbayev), England (through Pakistani
provides justification, in turn, for the deployment intelligence), and China (through the state
of troops under the umbrella of the CSTO. security system). But for now, Kazakhstan’s drift
Some Russian war games experts have long away from the sphere of Russian national interests
anticipated instability in Kazakhstan and other towards the West and China has been stalled.”(9)
parts of Russia’s “near abroad.” The 2014 Some Russian conservatives suspected certain
Ukrainian mass protests, resulting in the ouster European actors were conspiring to destabilize
of pro-Moscow Ukrainian President Viktor Eurasian societies.(10) Alexander Dugin, a leading
Yanukovych were followed by the formation of nationalist ideologue, claimed that the “West has
a new pro-Western government in Kyiv under planned to keep Russia, Belarus and Ukraine
Petro Poroshenko. The turmoil was seen as “a occupied in a permanent conflict, [and …]
big blow to the position of Russia as a regional create a continuous Russophobic front … on the
Kazakhstan’s Disturbances:
2 Commentaries Internal Dynamics and External Dimensionswestern borders of Russia. The West will increase cement a new quasi-authoritarian system. As a by-
pressure, synchronizing it with this deliberately product of the unrest, the established dual power
provoked confrontation.” He expects pressure to arrangement has now effectively ceased to exist in
increase as the 2024 Russian elections approach Kazakhstan.(14)
and argued that Russia and Belarus need to be Domestic observers anticipate the strengthening
prepared for such developments. In an interview of Tokayev’s position following the suppression
with a conversative Russian TV channel, Dugin of protests, as well as measures to reshape
further claimed that the “outcome [of the present Nazarbayev’s political legacy. An analyst at the
unrest] could have seen Kazakhstan turned Carnegie Center in Moscow, Andrey Kolesnikov,
into yet another front of Atlanticism against views it as “beneficial for Tokayev to claim that
Eurasianism.”(11) there was a synchronically organized conspiracy
Many voices suggested that the unrest was being [despite] the spontaneity of the protests.”(15)
hijacked by extremist groups enjoying foreign Nevertheless, a stirred-up government in Kazakhstan
support. According to Konstantin Strigunov, an will look for Moscow’s support. Referring to
analyst: “It is not civilians who are protesting the political price Tokayev may need to pay, a
against the rise in gas prices … but militants Kazakh politician predicts that Tokayev will face
‘armed to the teeth’ with excellent street battle consequences for requesting the deployment of
tactics.”
(12)
Others implied that demonstrations foreign troops, as some will see him as a leader
posed a risk to the Russian ethnic minority in who compromised the country’s sovereignty.(16)
Kazakhstan. According to Russian journalist Russian opinion makers suggested that
Kyril Shulkin, “had Kazakh protestors achieved Kazakhstan may need to meet certain conditions
their aims, the Russian population would have in return for Russian troops helping to restore
been compelled to leave the country.”(13) order.(17) Edward Chesnokov, a journalist with
Komsomolskaya Pravda, suggested, among other
Implications for Kazakhstan things, that “Kazakhstan should give institutional
and Russia guarantees to the Russian and other national
What happened in Kazakhstan is a classic minorities.” He also demanded that Russian be
example of political power and financial declared a state language and proposed declaring
resources being redistributed in a conflict all foreign NGOs as “undesirable” organizations.
between old and new elites against a backdrop Chesnokov also deemed “pointless” any
of quasi-revolution on the streets. The protests deployment of troops from the CSTO “without
and their aftermath enabled President Tokayev creating a common security set up (army and
to consolidate power and begin the process of special services under joint control).”(18)
taking back control of state corporations, law Some ultra-right and populist Russians have
enforcement agencies, and the government from gone even further. The politician Sergei Mironov,
Nazarbayev’s supporters. His next step may be co-chairman of the Fair Russia Party, called for
to hold early parliamentary elections to further keeping a CSTO peacekeeping detachment in
Kazakhstan’s Disturbances:
Internal Dynamics and External Dimensions Commentaries 3Kazakhstan on a permanent basis.(19) Following withdrawal from CIS institutions.(25) On the
the news about the unrest in Kazakhstan, there other hand, these developments might embolden
were demands that Russia annex Kazakhstan. (20)
entrenched elites in CIS member states. As Valery
The leader of the Russian Liberal Democratic Chaly, ex-Ukrainian ambassador to the United
Party, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, spoke about the States, has pointed out: “The CSTO creates more
circumstances that could enable at least a partial conditions for the preservation of regimes. Putin
annexation. (21)
Another Russian Member of has shown such efficiency precisely through
Parliament from Dagestan vociferously called for the recent policing mission, allowing Putin to
the wider annexation of Kazakhstan. (22)
take credit that he effectively suppressed the
Although these views might be considered on revolution.”(26)
the fringe, many observers anticipate that the For Russia, the resolution of the crisis in
new developments will push Kazakhstan into Kazakhstan demonstrated to regional actors the
some type of “union” with Russia over the long tangible benefits of allying with it and avoiding
run. With an eye on domestic political pressures, any uncertain and destabilizing entanglements
Kazakh political scientist Sultanbek Sultangaliev with the United States or the European Union. As
argues that the Kremlin is “in dire need of a new Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov asserted: “The
Crimea” to bolster its popularity at home. In West watched with amazement at how rapidly
this vein, Moscow “came with a swift plan and the units sent by all CSTO countries to help allied
executed it,” returning Kazakhstan firmly into Kazakhstan at the request of its president were
its orbit.(23) Even if the Crimea analogy does not deployed.” He further added that “we must keep
hold, at a minimum, the Kazakh authorities may our powder dry, yet we must be ready. We can
need to consult more closely with Moscow in the see continued encroachments from the outside to
future, according to Dimitry Evstafiev of Russia’s derail the situation in Central Asia and other CSTO
National Research University. He foresees countries. These encroachments have become
Kazakhstan assuming a role similar to Belarus much more persistent, risky, and dangerous after
vis-à-vis Russia.(24) the Americans fled Afghanistan along with the
rest of NATO.” (27)
A Restoration of Russian Implicitly, the intervention has also served as
Pre-eminence in Central Asia? a warning for Central Asian leaders to avoid
The deployment of CSTO troops to Kazakhstan solidarities that might undermine Russian
has been anxiously observed by some member influence in the region. Moscow’s Nezavisimay
states of the Commonwealth of Independent Gazeta boasted that Russia has “plucked
States (CIS). For example, analysts in Azerbaijan Kazakhstan out of the chain of the Turkic world.”(28)
have questioned whether the CSTO intervention An emboldened Russian commentator, Andrei
in Kazakhstan might aggravate the political crisis, Grozin, advised Central Asian leaders to depend
strengthen anti-Russian sentiments, and trigger on their neighbors in the event of any protests and
popular movements in other member states urging not to tell themselves “fairy-tales about Turkic
Kazakhstan’s Disturbances:
4 Commentaries Internal Dynamics and External Dimensionsunity” or democracy.(29) Accordingly, a possible player in providing security for these states.
consequence of the events is that affiliations Moreover, its presence, partially as a consequence
with Turkey—for instance, through the Turkic of these recent events, will continue to deepen
Council—will have a lower priority for Central and grow across Central Asia for the foreseeable
Asian elites. future. The absence of any contending rivals serves
While the crisis in Kazakhstan may have ushered to reinforce this trend. For example, the American
in a new era for the Russian presence in post- and European footprints are minimal, and although
Soviet Central Asia, it also illustrates the fragility China is emerging as a major economic player in
inherent to many of the Eurasian states that the region that could potentially threaten Russia’s
emerged in 1991.(30) As the thirtieth anniversary presence, it shares many of the latter’s anxieties
of independence was commemorated in these and concerns over “Color Revolutions.” More
countries, their elites now need to think hard about importantly, the relationship between Moscow
how, and in alliance with whom, they can safeguard and Beijing in Central Asia is defined more by
their states’ long-term well-being and integrity. As complementarity than fundamental competition.
Kazakhstan has shown, Russia remains a pivotal In short, Russia is here to stay.
Kazakhstan’s Disturbances:
Internal Dynamics and External Dimensions Commentaries 5References
(1) Arkady Dubnov, “A New Stage of Moscow’s Presence in the post-Soviet Space Begins” [in Russian], Fontanka,
January 8, 2022, https://www.fontanka.ru/2022/01/08/70364159/.
(2) Ruslan Burnashev, “The Institution of Conditional Dual Power has Ceased to Exist in Kazakhstan” [in Russian], Azattyq,
January 10, 2022,
https://rus.azattyq.org/a/politologi-o-perestanovkah-vo-vlasti-kazahstana-iz-za-protestov/31642614.html.
(3) Konstantin Remchukov, “The Most Serious Thing to Consider is Tokayev Mentioning Massimov’s Treason” [in Russian],
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 10, 2022,
https://www.ng.ru/politics/2022-01-10/100_echo01001022.html.
(4) Formed in 2002 but based on the 1992 Collective Security Treaty in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), the CSTO currently has six members — Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
See Alexander Cooley, “Preserving Autocracies is a Primary Goal for Regional Organizations like the CSTO,” The
Washington Post, January 13, 2022,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/01/09/kazakhstan-called-assistance-why-did-russia-dispatch-troops-so-
quickly/. See, also, Julia Emtseva, “Collective Security Treaty Organization: Why are Russian Troops in Kazakhstan?”
EJILTalk blog, January 13, 2022,
https://www.ejiltalk.org/collective-security-treaty-organization-why-are-russian-troops-in-kazakhstan/.
(5) For an eye-opening anticipation of events, see Kirill Ksenofontov, “The Likelihood of a Maidan in Kazakhstan” [in
Russian], Sputnik Pogrom, March 9, 2015,
https://sputnikipogrom.com/foreign-policy-today/31326/kazakh-maidan/.
(6) “Does Kazakhstan Risk a New ‘Orange Revolution’?” [in Russian], Tsargrad, January 5, 2022,
https://tsargrad.tv/articles/dom-pravitelstva-v-chjornom-dymu-kazahstan-stanovitsja-oranzhevym-prjamaja-
transljacija_473318.
(7) Vladimir Khomayokov, “Kazakhstan Serves as a Test Case with Eyes Set on Russia” [in Russian], Tsargrad, January 5,
2022, https://md.tsargrad.tv/articles/kazahstan-malaja-rossija-repeticija-udalas_473463.
(8) “As Kazakhstan’s Protest Assumes Orange Color, CSTO Troops are Ready to Act” [in Russian], Tsargrad, January 5, 2022,
https://tsargrad.tv/articles/dom-pravitelstva-v-chjornom-dymu-kazahstan-stanovitsja-oranzhevym-prjamaja-
transljacija_473318; Elizabeth Poteychuk, “What’s Happening Now in Kazakhstan is ‘A Continuation of the Anti-Russia
Project’” [in Russian], Zvezda, January 5, 2022,
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/2022151631-ljSbs.html.
(9) Alexander Prokhanov, “Returning to Cyrillic Alphabets” [in Russian], Zavtra, January 9, 2022,
https://zavtra.ru/blogs/kirillitca_vozvrashaetsya.
(10) Alexander Dugin, “Is the Near Abroad Getting Closer? What is Happening Along the Russian Borders?” [in Russian],
Presentation at the XXVIII Assembly of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP), December 16, 2020,
http://svop.ru/без-рубрики/35373/.
(11) Alexander Dugin, “Kazakhstan paid a price for distancing away from Moscow” [in Russian], Tsargrad, January 8, 2022,
https://tsargrad.tv/articles/aleksandr-dugin-vsjo-proishodjashhee-v-kazahstane-cena-za-otdalenie-ot-moskvy_474087
Konstantin Strigunov, “A Global Maidan: The Strategy of the West is to Tie Russia, Belarus and Ukraine in Permanent
Conflict” [in Russian] VPK News, December 27, 2021,
https://vpk-news.ru/articles/65287. See also Experts’ Comments, “The Protests Were Battles Waged by Foreign Bandits”
[in Russian], Tsargrad, January 5, 2022,
https://nsk.tsargrad.tv/news/mirnyj-protest-v-kazahstane-politolog-dal-chestnyj-otvet-jeto-boi-z’arubezhnyh-
bandformirovanij_473505; Dmitry Kozurov, “Were the Russians Framed in the Kazakh Fiasco Prior to Talks with
NATO?” [in Russian], Tsargrad, January 5, 2022,
https://rostov.tsargrad.tv/news/majdan-v-preddverii-peregovorov-s-nato-i-ssha-russkih-podstavili_473287.
(12) Evgeny Satanovsky, “Are Jihadi Mercenaries Behind the Pogroms in Kazakhstan?” [in Russian], Vesti, January 06, 2022,
https://www.vesti.ru/article/2660779.
(13) Kyril Shulkin, “Had Kazakh protestors achieved their aims, the Russian population may have been compelled to leave the
country” [in Russian], Znak, January 6, 2022,
https://www.znak.com/2022-01-06/esli_by_perevorot_v_kazahstane_udalsya_russkim_prishlos_by_bezhat_kolonka_
kirilla_shuliki.
Kazakhstan’s Disturbances:
6 Commentaries Internal Dynamics and External Dimensions(14) Elijah Kusa, “Clan War and Russian Intervention” [in Russian], Forbes, January 6, 2022,
https://forbes.ua/ru/news/viyna-klaniv-ta-vtruchannya-rosii-chomu-gazoviy-bunt-u-kazakhstani-ne-takiy-i-
gazoviy-06012022-3141. See, also, Boris Davidenko, “As the Regime skipped a generation, people were sick of
paternalism”, January 06, 2022, [in Russian],
https://forbes.ua/ru/news/gosudartsvo-propustilo-novoe-pokolenie-lyudi-zaboleli-paternalizmom-a-govorit-
s-eyforicheskoy-tolpoy-nevozmozhno-chto-dumaet-posol-kazakhstana-v-ukraine-o-protestakh-v-ego-
strane-06012022-3131.
(15) Elnur Alimova, “Nazarbayev’s ‘Wrecked Reputation’ and Tokayev’s Chances?” [in Russian], January 13, 2022, Azattyq,
https://rus.azattyq.org/a/nuzhno-uhodit-vovremya-razrushennaya-reputatsiya-nazarbaeva-shansy-tokaeva-i-lovushka-
dlya-avtokrata/31651888.html.
(16) Shavkat Turgaev, “Why Did Tokayev Summon the CSTO Forces to the Country?” [in Russian], Current Time, January
6, 2022,
https://www.currenttime.tv/a/byl-zagovor-protiv-tokaeva-v-tom-chisle-so-storony-silovikov-eks-premer-kazahstana-
obyasnyaet-zachem-prezident-pozval-v-stranu-sily-odkb/31642686.html
(17) “Dictating Conditions for Deploying Troops” [in Russian], Telegraf, January 6, 2022,
https://telegraf.by/world-news/ochen-smeshnaya-nezavisimost-v-rossii-vydvinuli-tokaevu-trebovaniya-v-obmen-na-
mirotvorcev/.
(18) “Russia Posed Eight Conditions for Deploying Troops in Kazakhstan” [in Russian], Tsargrad, January 6, 2022,
https://tsargrad.tv/news/russkim-dolzhny-dat-garantii-komande-tokaeva-dali-nenavjazchivyj-sovet_473703.
(19) Danila Titorenko, “The State Duma Proposes Leaving the CSTO Contingent in Kazakhstan Permanently” [in Russian],
January 6, 2022,
https://www.gazeta.ru/army/news/2022/01/06/17107129.shtml.
(20) Julia Polushina, “Calls to Return Southern Siberia May Reappear on the Agenda” [in Russian], January 5, 2022,
https://7x7-journal.ru/articles/2022/01/05/na-povestku-dnya-mozhet-vstat-vozvrashenie-yuzhnoj-sibiri-v-rodnuyu-gavan-
kak-sobytiya-v-kazahstane-mogut-povliyat-na-rossijskuyu-politiku. Many bloggers reproduced the claims made in Miron
Grigoriev, “The land of Kazakhstan is In Fact Russian Southern Siberia” [in Russian], Sputnik Pogrom, February 8, 2016,
https://sputnikipogrom.com/politics/50622/russian-land-of-kazakhstan-4/#.Vr1lC0AUNwD.
(21) “Zhirinovsky spoke about the circumstances which could lead to a partial annexation” [in Russian], Kun, 6 January, 2022,
https://kun.uz/ru/news/2022/01/06/jirinovskiy-zayavil-o-vozmojnom-prisoyedinenii-severnogo-kazaxstana-k-rossii. See,
also, Bulat Sultanov, “Kazakhstan’s Past Annexation to Russia in Perspective” [in Russian], IA Centre blog, December
27, 2017,
https://ia-centr.ru/publications/kak-prisoedinyalsya-kazakhstan-k-rossii-na-samom-dele-sultanov/. See, also, “Following
the Regime’s Collapse in Kazakhstan, Russia May Annex Parts” [in Russian], Gordonua, February 7, 2022,
https://gordonua.com/news/worldnews/esli-rezhim-v-kazahstane-ne-ustoit-rf-mozhet-nachat-vozvrashchenie-yuzhnoy-
sibiri-v-rodnuyu-gavan-a-ukraina-vzdohnet-svobodno-professor-solovey-1589463.html.
(22) “State Duma Deputy from Dagestan Calls for Joining Kazakhstan to Russia” [in Russian], Kavkaz, January 6, 2022,
https://www.kavkazr.com/a/deputat-gosdumy-ot-dagestana-prizval-prisoedinitj-kazahstan-k-rossii/31641996.html
(23) Opinions focusing on Mongolian, Turkic, Slavic, North Caucasian aspirations appeared on the “Golden Horde” portal.
See “Is it Possible for Kazakhstan to Join Russia?” [in Russian], Golden Horde, February 1, 2019,
https://zolord.ru/news/781.
(24) Dmitry Evstafiev, “The Unfolding Situation in Kazakhstan” [in Russian], Sputnik, January 6, 2022,
https://sputnik.by/20220106/po-belorusskomu-stsenariyu-rossiyu-i-kazakhstan-zhdet-glubokaya-
integratsiya-1059313653.html.
(25) “Analysts in Baku Assess the Consequences of the Entry of CSTO Troops into Kazakhstan” [in Russian], Kavkaz Uzel,
January 7, 2022,
https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/371991/.
(26) Andrey Glukhenky, “Putin Received a New Instrument of Aggression” [in Russian], Obozrevatel, January 11, 2022,
https://news.obozrevatel.com/abroad/putin-poluchil-novyij-instrument-agressii.htm.
(27) “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions at a News Conference on Russia’s Foreign
Policy Performance in 2021, Moscow, January 14, 2022” [in Russian], Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation, accessed February 12, 2022,
https://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/1794396/.
Kazakhstan’s Disturbances:
Internal Dynamics and External Dimensions Commentaries 7(28) Victoria Panfilova, “Russia Knocks Kazakhstan off the Turkic World” [in Russian], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 9, 2022,
https://www.ng.ru/cis/2022-01-09/1_8340_kazakhstan1.html.
(29) Ekaterina Galayda, “Why Assessment of Central Asian Leaders of their Control Over Their States is Make-believe” [in
Russian], National News Service (NSN), January 10, 2022,
https://nsn.fm/policy/nezaschischennyi-region-v-rossii-predrekli-povtoreniya-kazahskogo-stsenariya-v-srednei-
azii?clid=2362101. See, also, “What Factors May Undermine Turkish–Russian Cooperation?” [in Russian], Stan Radar,
January 12, 2022,
https://stanradar.com/news/full/48151-cumhuriyet-kazahstan-kak-pochva-dlja-podryva-turetsko-rossijskogo-
sotrudnichestva.html.
(30) Arkady Dubnov, “A New Stage in Moscow’s Presence in the Post-Soviet Territories Begins” [in Russian], Fontanka,
January 8, 2022, https://www.fontanka.ru/2022/01/08/70364159/; Gabriel Gavin, “After Kazakhstan, the CSTO Isn’t
Finished With Central Asia,” The Diplomat, January 25, 2022,
https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/after-kazakhstan-the-csto-isnt-finished-with-central-asia/.
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