Columbus, Ohio Group Violence Intervention
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
1
Columbus, Ohio
Group Violence Intervention
Problem Analysis Report
April 2021
Please note:
The following information is confidential and shall not be disclosed, copied, distributed, or
otherwise disseminated unless approved by the Columbus Police Department.
2 Contents 1. Executive Summary…………………………………………………………………………………………………………...3 2. Groups and the Concentration of Violence ................................................................................... 4 2.1. GVI Overview ……………………………………………………………..…………………………………………5 3. Methods ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….....7 3.1. Group Audit ................................................................................................................................. 8 3.2. Incident Review .......................................................................................................................... 8 4. Results……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..………11 4.1 Group Audit Results .................................................................................................................. 11 4.2 Overview of Incident Review Results ..................................................................................... 12 4.3 Incident Review Results: Group Member Involvement (GMI) ............................................ 14 4.4 Incident Review Results: Group Intelligence ......................................................................... 15 4.5 Incident Review and Group Audit Results Combined .......................................................... 18 5. Discussion, Limitations, and Implications……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..………20 6. Next Steps and Implementation……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..…….23 Appendix A: Group Audit Table……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..……..………28
3 1. Executive Summary This report presents findings from the National Network for Safe Communities’ (NNSC) problem analysis of serious violence in Columbus, Ohio. Specifically, it details NNSC’s data collection methodology and summarizes the key findings related to the basic demographics of victims and suspects in homicides, the nature of the relationships between victims and suspects, the amount of law enforcement intelligence as it relates to serious violence and those involved in it, and the connection between homicides and violent street groups. Finally, the report describes the current implications of the data analysis and immediate next steps required to implement violence prevention work. The problem analysis included two exercises, a group audit and a violent incident review. The goal of the problem analysis is to capture frontline law enforcement insight into local violence dynamics to expand opportunities for prevention and intervention. During the group audit, Columbus Police Department (CPD) personnel and their law enforcement partners identified 17 active street groups comprised of approximately 480 individual group members. The law enforcement personnel also provided detailed information regarding the relationships between these groups, the areas they operate, and particularly violent and/or active group members (all contained herein). Following the group audit, NNSC conducted the violent incident review exercise, in which law enforcement personnel discussed every homicide that occurred in Columbus from January 2020 through September 2020. Based on these exercises, law enforcement confirmed that at least 36% of homicides involved group members as suspected perpetrators, known victims, or both (NNSC refers to these incidents as “group member involved” or “GMI”); another 10% of homicides were suspected, though not confirmed, to involve group members (categorized as “likely GMI”). In 22% of homicides, the law enforcement personnel did not know whether a group member was involved (referred to as “unknown GMI”). Finally, the remaining 33% of homicides were confirmed to not involve any known group members (“non-GMI”). These findings are consistent with cities across the country, where groups typically drive at least half of all serious violence. The problem analysis highlighted the value of a routinized process to systematically operationalize street level intelligence and track the involvement of street groups in serious violence. NNSC recommends that law enforcement partners institutionalize regular violent incident reviews (often referred to as “shooting reviews”) to assess homicides and extend this review to nonfatal shootings, and to periodically review all incidents coded “unknown” and “likely GMI” to gain a more accurate assessment of which groups are most active.
4 Known, active groups and group members are involved with almost half of all homicides in Columbus. There is a significant opportunity to reduce serious violence in Columbus through the NNSC’s Group Violence Intervention (GVI). As detailed on the subsequent pages, the data collected and analyzed will inform the design and implementation of the GVI framework in the city. 2. Groups and the Concentration of Violence NNSC’s problem analysis exercises are grounded in the emerging science of violence prevention. This nascent strand of research, described in brief below, has important implications for intervention—both in Columbus and beyond—and is therefore summarized in this report. Half of America’s homicides occur in just 127 American cities; more than a quarter of homicides occur in neighborhoods that contain just 1.5% of the country’s population, and as little as 5% of blocks in cities generate over half of all complaints of crime and violence (Aufrichtig, Beckett, Diehm, & Lartey, 20171; Weisburd, 20152). Those neighborhoods where violence concentrates are often next door to communities that experience little to no serious violence, as in Chicago, where neighborhood homicide rates vary between under 4 per 100,000 to over 80 per 100,000 (Mason, 2017 3 ). While the geographic concentration of violence is stark, the most serious violence— homicides and shooting violence—are also concentrated socially and correspond to particular demographic profiles and social connections. Victimization rates vary widely across gender, age, and race: for example, black males ages 15 to 34 are seventeen times more likely to be victims of homicide than non-Hispanic white males of the same age (Cook & Pollack, 20174). Interpersonal connections also influence serious violence. According to Tracy and collaborators: "exposure to a victim or perpetrator of violence in one’s interpersonal relationships and social networks increases the risk of individual victimization and perpetration" (Tracy, Braga, & Papachristos, 20165). Papachristos et al. have analyzed social networks using arrest records and determined the consistent concentration of a city’s gun violence within small social networks and the "transmission" of victimization along those social connections (Green, Horel, and Papachristos, 20176). This research identifies subsets of society that experience tremendously disproportionate amounts of the most serious community violence. 1 Aufrichtig, A., Beckett, L., Diehm, J., & Lartey, J. (2017). Want to fix gun violence in America? Go local. The Guardian. 2 Weisburd, D. (2015). The law of crime concentration and the criminology of place. Criminology, 53(2), 133-157. 3 Mason, M. (2017, December). Homicide in Chicago community areas 2007–2015: Concentrated risk and stable rates. Illinois Violent Death Reporting System. 4 Cook, P. J., & Pollack, H. A. (2017). Reducing access to guns by violent offenders. RSF. 5 Tracy, M., Braga, A. A., & Papachristos, A. V. (2016). The transmission of gun and other weapon-involved violence within social networks. Epidemiologic reviews, 38(1), 70–86. 6 Green, B., Horel, T., & Papachristos, A. V. (2017). Modeling contagion through social networks to explain and predict gunshot violence in Chicago, 2006 to 2014. JAMA internal medicine, 177(3), 326–333.
5 The social connections described by Papachristos and partners above are often identifiable as street groups. Street groups take various forms, from more established hierarchical gangs to small, loosely aligned sets of individuals that do not have a group name. In a review of 23 sites where NNSC has conducted a problem analysis, NNSC found that, on average, 0.6% of a city’s total population was recognizable to frontline law enforcement as involved in this violent group dynamic, and that this tiny fragment of the overall population was connected to 50% of homicides, on average. By identifying these active groups and their members, law enforcement can more effectively focus on the population in their city most likely to perpetrate and be victimized by serious violence. Legal and professional framings around such issues as “gangs”, “gang validation”, “gang statutes” and “gang-related violence” can have a profound impact on frontline law enforcement’s perceptions of these dynamics. American policing’s longstanding focus on formal definitions of gang membership; descriptions of gangs as hierarchical, organized, and business-oriented; and the belief that gang-involved violence is most often conducted in furtherance of the gang’s interest often conflicts with the reality on the ground. Officers at the street level, in contrast, typically find that the groups most relevant to local violence dynamics are not necessarily “gangs” by any legal definition, nor do most of their activities have anything to do with the gang’s interest. Rather, these groups are small, loosely connected, and fluid; the violence they are involved in is typically related to issues of disrespect, standing personal disputes and intimate relationships, and small amounts of money or drugs. The formal processes governing intelligence management, arrests, and convictions are not responsive to this frontline reality; they are designed to support the aforementioned longstanding legal definitions of gangs and gang-related violence. GVI was created in partnership with frontline law enforcement officers, as a strategy that could align policing’s intelligence gathering and law enforcement responsibilities with the frontline officers’ lived realities of group dynamics around violence. 2.1. GVI Overview The National Network for Safe Communities’ Group Violence Intervention has repeatedly shown that cities can dramatically reduce violence when community members and law enforcement join together to directly engage with active, violent street groups and clearly communicate: 1) a credible community message against violence; (2) a credible law enforcement message about the consequences of further violence; (3) a credible and genuine offer of help for those who want it. NNSC defines a group as two or more people who engage in violence and/or criminal activity together. A group may be highly organized or very diffuse, and may not meet the statutory
6 definition of a gang. Regardless of their label or composition, groups co-offend and commit retaliatory violence in similar ways; in doing so, group members face extraordinary risk of victimization. This intense concentration of violence requires that public safety practitioners adopt a tailored approach. To do this work, a city must assemble a partnership of law enforcement, social service providers, and community actors (parents, clergy, street outreach workers, neighborhood associations, formerly incarcerated people, and others) to engage in a sustained relationship with violent groups. A key moment in the strategy is a “call-in,” a face-to-face meeting between group members and the partnership, repeated at intervals as necessary. The partners deliver key messages to group members: violence is wrong and has to stop; the community needs them safe, alive, free from incarceration, and with their loved ones; unconditional support is available to all who will take it; and violence will be met with swift, certain, and fair consequences. A central operational shift is that law enforcement puts groups on prior notice that law enforcement will meet group-involved violence with a specific and swift response directed at the group as a whole rather than at individuals. Individual violent offenders receive the same enforcement attention as they had previously. However, their fellow group members get new attention for any new crimes committed, outstanding warrants, probation and parole violations, open cases and other possible formal and informal levers that can be pulled to apply unwanted pressure. The intervention combines this prior notice of potential law enforcement exposure with a powerful message against violence from community members whom the group members respect and a reorganized, streamlined social service structure tailored for group members who need and want support. The aim is to create collective accountability to reduce informal peer dynamics in the groups that promote violence, reassert community standards against violence, and offer genuine help for those who will take it. When considering whether GVI is appropriate for a particular city, NNSC works with local law enforcement personnel to analyze recent violent incidents and to assess which—if any—active groups are responsible for or are most closely associated with those incidents. NNSC refers to this process as the problem analysis. By identifying these active groups and their members, public safety practitioners can accurately and effectively focus on the population in their city most likely to perpetrate and be victimized by non-fatal shootings and homicides.
7 3. Methods NNSC strongly recommends that cities conduct a problem analysis before implementing GVI in order to identify active groups and assess the proportion of violence that is connected to group members and group dynamics. Ideally, frontline law enforcement personnel and key public safety practitioners participate as one cohort in both problem analysis exercises (the group audit and violent incident review); participating as one group helps strengthen working relationships between the units and partners present. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, NNSC conducted the problem analysis in person over two to three days, depending on the jurisdiction and volume of violent incidents under review, and worked closely with law enforcement partners to identify the practitioner cohort, secure a space to occupy for the duration of the exercises, and assemble information about incidents to be reviewed. Given the travel and gathering restrictions that emerged due to COVID-19, NNSC and the Columbus partners instead conducted a modified problem analysis by video conference over January 6, 7, 15, and 27. This modified problem analysis also limited the number and type of incidents reviewed, leading to the decision to focus on homicides. For the modified analysis, NNSC worked with the Columbus Police Department (CPD) personnel to assemble a cohort of knowledgeable executive leadership and frontline officers from within the department, including the Criminal Investigations subdivision, the Patrol Operations subdivision; multiple shifts from the Homicide Cold Case Unit, the Critical Incident Response Team (CIRT), the felony assault squad, the Drug Crime Bureau, the Criminal Intelligence Unit, Zone 4, and more. Columbus also mustered participation from other law enforcement agencies, including representatives from Franklin County Attorney’s Office and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. NNSC staffed the group audit with a team of six: two tasked with co-facilitating the incident review, two with co-facilitating the group audit, and the remaining two with coding for the incidents. NNSC facilitated the formal group audit and the violent incident review in two half-day video conference calls on Zoom. In order to gain a fuller picture of group and violence dynamics in Columbus, NNSC also facilitated two follow-up sessions with crime and intelligence analysts in the Columbus Police Department. At the outset of the problem analysis, the NNSC team informed the participants that their contributions would be anonymous and that the information shared during the research exercises was confidential and protected under a data sharing agreement between NNSC and the Columbus Police Department.
8 3.1. Group Audit NNSC first guided the assembled law enforcement and public safety professionals through a group audit, which gathers information on active violent street groups. As a reminder, NNSC uses the term “group” instead of “gang,” defining street groups as two or more people who engage in violence and/or criminal activity together, who may or may not meet the statutory definition of a “gang.” The purpose of the group audit is: 1) to identify all groups contributing to the most serious violence in Columbus and 2) to identify those group-involved individuals who are most closely associated with violence (as victims or offenders). The group audit draws primarily from the street experience of knowledgeable police officers and other frontline personnel rather than from formal or written intelligence. During the group audit, participants from Columbus identified active groups and the following specific characteristics of the groups: Group name, if any Estimated number of members Estimated age range of members Illegal activities of the group (e.g., assaults, homicides, narcotics sales) Territory or neighborhood, if applicable Impact players, if known Group alliances Group feuds Current level of violence Current level of organization 3.2. Incident Review Following the group audit, NNSC facilitated the incident review. The purpose of the incident review is to assess a city’s violent crime problem by retrospectively reviewing each homicide reported within the city for a pre-determined timeframe. Prior to the violent incident review, NNSC staff explained to the law enforcement cohort that the goal was to gather information about these incidents that are not routinely captured in the official records, such as officers’ impressions and “word on the street.” The NNSC team also explained the differences between “group-motivated” or “gang-motivated” and “group member involved” (GMI), reiterating the importance of using the group member involved definition to gauge the level of group violence in Columbus. Identifying GMI incidents
9 captures all violence in which group members participated, as victims or perpetrators, irrespective of motivation. NNSC uses this measure because all violence connected to groups shares a specific and powerful influence: the group itself. Any type of social group establishes expected norms and conduct for its members. This is no different for street groups involved in violence, which have established norms and conduct such as illegal gun carrying and the promotion of violence to settle disputes. These norms and the social pressure applied by the group facilitate violence and encourage behaviors that pose particular challenges to public safety. Group culture that places a premium on status and respect, in addition to group acquisition and sharing of weapons, means group norms and activities have significant effects on violence committed by individual group members, even beyond violence specific to promoting the group’s interests. By assessing “group member involved” incidents, rather than limiting the analysis to “group-motivated” incidents, the NNSC team captures a full measure of the violence connected to street group dynamics. Using a PowerPoint presentation with one slide per incident and an Excel spreadsheet of incidents, the research team systematically guided the participants through each incident, inquiring about the following measures: Narrative of the incident Whether violence was start of/part of a retaliatory cycle Whether victim(s) were known to the law enforcement cohort before the incident Victim’s group affiliation, if any Whether suspect(s) were known to the law enforcement cohort before the incident Suspect’s group affiliation, if any Victim/suspect relationship NNSC reviewed 107 homicide incidents from January 2020 through September 2020. The goals of the incident review were: 1) to understand the context and driving causes of the most serious violence, 2) to determine the extent to which the street groups identified in the group audit contributed to the most serious violence in the city for the given time period and 3) to establish a baseline for comparison against future violent incident data. NNSC codes an incident as “group member involved” if any of the following is true: Victim is a known group member. Suspect is a known group member.
10
The circumstances and context of an incident are clearly connected to group violence but
information about the victim and/or suspect is unknown
NNSC codes an incident as “likely group member involved” if any of the following is true:
The victim and/or suspect are loosely or tangentially associated with a group of individuals,
but the associations are not entirely clear.
Multiple victims and/or suspects are involved in the incident, and the circumstances of the
incident suggest a group dynamic.
An incident is classified as “unknown GMI” if there is not enough information to determine group
member involvement. Lastly, an incident is classified as “non-GMI” if law enforcement knows that
neither the victim(s) nor the suspect(s) involved in the incident are associated with a group and
nothing about the incident suggests a group dynamic. Figure 1 below visualizes the coding process
in a flowchart.
Figure 1. GMI Incident Review Coding Process Diagram11
Information and current intelligence on the complex group dynamics within a city are usually
scattered among frontline personnel and not systematically collected and analyzed. The problem
analysis synthesizes frontline intelligence across different agencies and units to create a current
snapshot of local group and violence patterns and concentration. Unpacking serious violence in
this way helps answer questions such as: what proportion of the city’s serious violence involve a
group member either as a suspect or as a victim? To what extent are victims and suspects of
serious violence connected to groups, and which groups are driving the violence? How do “non-
GMI” incidents compare to those incidents that do involve group members? Do victims and
suspects know each other prior to an incident? What can we learn about various characteristics,
such as out of jurisdiction connections, which overlap with the incidents reviewed? These
diagnostic questions help lay a foundational understanding of serious violence and its
intersection with high-risk group networks. The answers to these questions pertaining to
Columbus are laid out in the Results section and then contextualized in the Limitations and
Implications section that follows.
4. Results
This section includes NNSC’s analysis of the data collected during the group audit and the violent
incident review.
4.1 Group Audit Results
Columbus frontline law enforcement identified 17 active, violent groups in the city, made up of
approximately 480 active group members (using high-count estimates). This group population
represents only 0.05% of the population of Columbus.7 The group audit table, appearing at the
end of this report (Appendix A), relays the key information captured on each group, including size,
age range, violence level, current activities, and degree of organization. The characteristics of the
groups identified during the group audit are largely in line with NNSC’s findings in many other
cities across the United States. Groups in Columbus, for instance, are loosely organized in structure
and have identifiable conflicts and alliances with the small number of active groups.
NNSC and the Columbus law enforcement partners identified the 17 active, violent groups,
depicted below in Figure 2. As illustrated by the straight red lines below, NNSC found a particularly
volatile and active rivalry between MOB, East Haven Bloods, Elaine Gangster Crips, and Blam
Squad. These rivalries are all the more notable as law enforcement partners categorized many of
these groups as “high” for level of violence (see Appendix A). According to the Columbus law
enforcement partners, group rivalries and alliances are volatile and changeable; they did not
7
The 2019-estimated population for Columbus is 898,553.12 identify and standout sustained feuds between groups. The alliances between groups – illustrated by the green lines below –are mostly based on relationships between individuals in the connected groups, rather than structural alliances. Figure 2. Columbus Group Sociogram Even accounting for the difficulty of analyzing groups with little known information, the total number of individuals involved in group dynamics - the 0.05% - is a tiny fraction of Columbus’ population. 4.2 Overview of Incident Review Results This section describes basic insights about the incidents reviewed during the problem analysis. NNSC and the Columbus partners reviewed 107 homicide incidents from January 2020 through September 2020. Table 1 looks at the basic victim and suspect characteristics of an incident. At least 92% of homicides involved only one victim. More than 66% of homicides had at least one named,
13
identified suspect. In over half of the homicides (55%), a victim and suspect pair involved in the
homicide knew each other prior to the incident.
Table 1. Homicide Incident Victim and Suspect Context
Homicide
Incident with only one victim 92.5%
At least one suspect identified? 66.4%
Did a victim and suspect pair know each other? 55.1%
Note: at least one suspect identified means that during the problem analysis, at least one suspect was identified by name, date
of birth, and gender. This does not imply that the suspect was charged.
Table 2 looks at the age and gender of victims and suspects. Eighty-five percent of homicide victims
and 90% of identified suspects are male. The average age of homicide victims is 29; the average
suspect age is 28. Half of homicide victims and half of homicide suspects are between the ages of
18 and 29. Much smaller, though noteworthy, percentages of victims and suspects were under
the age of 18 – 14% of homicide victims and 17% of homicide suspects. Similarly, 17% of homicide
victims and suspects in the incidents discussed were aged 30-39. The overwhelming majority of
victims and suspects in the incidents discussed were male, and a significant proportion were also
between the ages of 18-29; these findings align with what NNSC typically finds in jurisdictions
across the U.S.
Table 2. Victims and Suspect Age and Gender
Victims Suspects
17 and younger 14.4% 17.1%
18-29 48.6% 50.0%
30-39 17.1% 17.1%
40-49 9.0% 5.7%
50+ 10.8% 10%
Average Age 29 28
Male 84.6% 89.5%
Female 15.4% 10.5%14
4.3 Incident Review Results: Group Member Involvement (GMI)
The violent incident review categorizes incidents based on the involvement of a jurisdiction’s
active, violent street groups. Incidents involving a member of a violent group (as either a victim or
suspect) are group member involved or “GMI” incidents. Table 3 below displays the breakdown of
GMI incidents resulting from the problem analysis.
NNSC and Columbus participants found that 36% of homicides reviewed were confirmed to involve
group members. Adding in incidents categorized as “likely GMI”, this percentage climbs to 46%.
Thirty-three percent of incidents were confirmed by law enforcement to be entirely unrelated to
groups or group members (“non-GMI”). An additional 22% of the homicides were classified as
“unknown GMI” because the cohort was unable to say with confidence whether or not the
incidents involved group members. As new and better information on suspects, groups, and
connections to other incidents emerges, “unknown” incidents can usually be reclassified to reflect
the extent of group involvement.When cities implement GVI, NNSC typically finds that more
incidents are tied to group members than were originally coded due to an enhanced
understanding of what constitutes a group and an increase in intelligence on the active groups.
Table 3. Percentage of homicides reviewed that are group-member involved (GMI)
GMI Homicide
Yes 35.5% (38)
Likely 10.3% (11)
Unknown 21.5% (23)
No 32.7% (35)
Total 100% (107)
Note: Number of incidents is shown in parentheses.
Figure 3 below shows how the confirmed GMI (“Yes”) incidents were coded as such. In the
incidents reviewed, a victim’s group involvement was the basis for confirmed GMI classification
equally as often as a suspect’s group involvement (both 34%). Twenty-nine percent of GMI
incidents were so coded because both the victim(s) and suspect(s) were known to be group
members. A small percentage of incidents were coded based on the incident’s circumstances
rather than concrete knowledge of the victims’ or suspects’ affiliations. This is encouraging – law
enforcement in Columbus had a great deal of information on groups and group members and was
usually able to identify GMI incidents based on specific knowledge of the people involved.15
Figure 3. Breakdown of confirmed GMI ("Yes") incidents by basis for classification (known as
GMI source)
2.63%
28.95% 34.21%
34.21%
Victim Suspect Both Context
4.4 Incident Review Results: Group Intelligence
This section explores violence dynamics specifically relevant for implementing GVI. Based on
national research, NNSC knows that group involved violence tends to involve individuals who know
each other and that groups often have longstanding vendettas or beefs with other groups. Group
members also tend to be disproportionately victimized by violence. To begin understanding the
extent to which these elements are present in Columbus, the NNSC team coded for the following
17 variables, which are not mutually exclusive:
Suspect Identified: was at least one suspect identified by full name and date of birth?
Knew each other prior: did at least one victim-suspect pair know each other prior to the
incident?
Intimate Partner Violence (IPV): did the incident involve former or current intimate
partners?
Robbery: did the incident involve taking property unlawfully from a person by force or
threat of force?
Drugs: did the incident involve a transaction with drugs?
Money: did the incident involve a dispute over money?16
Intimate Partner Violence Spillover: did the incident involve a third-party victim connected
to an IPV incident?
Personal Dispute: did the incident involve a spontaneous argument between individuals?
Accidental: was the incident an accidental death?
Family Violence: did the incident involve domestic violence (non-IPV)?
Unintended: was the victim an unintended victim?
Internal: did the incident involve an internal dispute within a group?
Group Dispute: did the incident involve a feud between groups?
Hit: did the incident involve a paid hit or bounty?
Retaliation: was this incident in retaliation for prior violence?
Multiple victims: did the incident involve more than one victim?
Burglary: did the incident involve breaking and entering into a home?
Figure 4 displays the intersection of these variables with group involvement across incidents under
review. The figure combines confirmed (“Yes”) and likely GMI incidents to compare them to
incidents that were non-GMI. Law enforcement identified at least one suspect for all non-GMI
incidents compared to about 60% of yes and likely GMI incidents combined. This is consistent with
what NNSC sees in cities across the country—law enforcement partners are often better able to
identify suspects in non-GMI incidents than in GMI incidents. Similarly, NNSC found that a majority
of victim-suspect pairs in non-GMI incidents knew each other (74%) compared to 57% of yes and
likely GMI incidents. As is often the case, NNSC believes that the percentage of GMI incidents, in
reality, is likely to be higher (especially if suspect information was known and/or confirmed).
The remaining incident characteristics reveal important differences between yes and likely GMI
incidents and “non-GMI” incidents. NNSC found that GMI incidents involved characteristics such
as money (24%), drugs (18%), retaliation (18%) and group disputes (16%). To a lesser extent, these
incidents also involved robbery (14%), paid hits (6%), and internal disputes (4%). Incidents coded
as “non-GMI” involved personal disputes (46%), IPV (14%), family violence (14%), and IPV spillover
(9%). While there is some overlap between GMI and non-GMI incidents (e.g., money, accidental,
burglary, and personal dispute), the differences presented in this figure suggests that GMI
incidents are distinct from non-GMI not only in kind, but also in the way that either can be
addressed, particularly those involving IPV and related dynamics. 8
Figure 4. Incident Characteristics - Confirmed GMI and Likely GMI versus Non-GMI
8
The Intimate Partner Violence Intervention (IPVI) is a focused deterrence strategy at NNSC. To learn more about
the intervention and where it’s been implemented, visit: https://nnscommunities.org/strategies/intimate-partner-
violence-intervention/17
100.00%
80.00%
60.00%
40.00%
20.00%
0.00%
Yes and Likely GMI Non-GMI
Figure 5 shows that GMI incidents much more often involve male victims and suspects than non-
GMI incidents. Ninety-one percent of all victims and suspects in GMI or likely GMI incidents are
male versus 83% for non-GMI incidents. This finding, that males are overwhelmingly involved in
violence in Columbus, is in line with what NNSC typically sees in cities across the country. Group
violence, as noted above, is even more likely to involve males—both in Columbus and nationally.
To the extent that women are involved in violent incidents in Columbus, NNSC found that female
victims and suspects are more likely to be involved in incidents that are not group member
involved as well as those that involve intimate partner violence.
Figure 6 examines the ages of victims and suspects in GMI incidents versus incidents with no
group involvement. GMI incidents involve younger individuals compared to non-GMI incidents:
66% of all victims and suspects in GMI incidents are between 18 and 29 and only 17% percent
were under the age of 18. Conversely, non-GMI victim and suspects were generally older,
exceeding the ages of yes and likely GMI victims and suspects in all categories over the age of 29.
As is the case nationally, the majority of group violence in Columbus involves individuals aged 18-
29; incidents with victims and suspects over the age of 29 in Columbus were far more likely to be
deemed non-GMI. Of those involved in confirmed and likely GMI incidents under the age of 18,
nearly 70% were victims in such incidents. Thirty-six percent of victims in non-GMI incidents
under the age of 18 were victims of domestic violence.18
Figure 5. Gender of Victims and Identified Suspects: Comparing Yes or Likely GMI incidents
versus Non-GMI incidents
100.00%
80.00%
60.00%
40.00%
20.00%
0.00%
Male Female
Yes and Likely Non-GMI
Figure 6. Age Ranges of Victims and Identified Suspects: Comparing Yes or Likely GMI incidents
versus Non-GMI incidents
100.00%
80.00%
60.00%
40.00%
20.00%
0.00%
0-17 18-29 30-39 40-49 50+
Yes and Likely GMI Non-GMI
4.5 Incident Review and Group Audit Results Combined
Figure 7 below combines information from the group audit and incident review to compare
Columbus’ group population to that population’s involvement in serious violent incidents
occurring in during the period under review. According to estimates made during the group audit19 there are approximately 480 active group members in Columbus. This means that at most, 0.05% of the city’s population is associated with a minimum of 36% of recent homicides. Figure 7. Population v. 2020 Homicide Concentration NNSC also analyzed the role specific groups played in homicides during the same period. In figure 8 below, the blue bars show each group’s involvement in violence as a suspect and the orange bars show how often the group was victimized. TnA was, by far, the most victimized group (by incident count). Short North Posse (SNP) and Blam Squad were the groups that perpetrated violence most frequently, followed by several other groups. While TnA was noticeably involved in homicides during the period under review, participation in violent incidents was scattered across many groups. Figure 8. Homicide Confirmed GMI Incidents: Counts of incidents involving a group by victim and suspect
20
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Victim Group Suspect Group
5. Discussion, Limitations, and Implications
The results displayed in this report are largely in line with NNSC’s national experience. The most
important findings are that 1) Columbus clearly has an extremely small number of individuals who
are disproportionately at risk for involvement in violence; and 2) these individuals are operating
in a small number of groups. GVI is designed to address those very dynamics. The findings in this
report show that Columbus is in fact experiencing group dynamics driving violence similar to those
found in cities that have successfully implemented GVI.
Columbus has active, violent groups that were discussed during the group audit and the incident
review. A large proportion of the violence was connected to group members, both in terms of
victimization and perpetration. For incidents occurring from January 2020 through September
2020, this report finds that a significant proportion of the city’s homicides are group member
involved—at minimum 36% to upwards of 45%, including likely GMI incidents. NNSC has found
that sites typically begin implementation with a GMI percentage between 30 and 60 percent. The
findings here suggest that street-level violence dynamics in Columbus are consistent with NNSC’s
national experience. Moreover, in NNSC’s experience, there is reason to believe that “likely”
incidents are in fact GMI; however, NNSC does not code incidents as “confirmed GMI” without
conclusive statements from law enforcement that the victim, suspect, or both is in fact a group
member. An innocent bystander shot during a drive-by shooting at a street shrine for a previously
killed group member, on the anniversary of that group member’s death, in which no suspect21 information was gathered, is an example of an incident that would be coded as “likely GMI”, but is almost certainly driven by group dynamics. While the National Network usually finds a concentration of violence in cities across the U.S., the group landscape in Columbus is even more concentrated than is typical, with 0.05% of the city’s population associated with a minimum of nearly 36% of recent homicides. This reality—that an extremely small number of identifiable group members are responsible for a significant proportion of homicides and shootings—highlights the need for a narrow and focused public safety effort on this high-risk population. By focusing on the small percentage of the population that is most likely to perpetrate and be victimized by serious violence, GVI has repeatedly demonstrated that violence can be dramatically reduced. The group dynamic in Columbus suggests that violence is not necessarily driven by the kind of standing feuds and retaliation that characterize group violence in some other cities. The incident characteristics in Figure 4 suggest that money, drugs, and robbery are equally as important as retaliation and group feuds. While the group involvement counts in Figure 8 suggest that most groups are not engaged in retaliatory homicides, the addition of nonfatal shootings could greatly shift this understanding of violence dynamics in Columbus. Another key finding in Columbus sheds important light on the nature of the problem: while the majority of violence in Columbus involves adults, juveniles are also a small part of the highest risk networks in Columbus. Most of the juveniles that were involved in confirmed and likely GMI incidents were victims (70%). Law enforcement should continue to track changes in victimization in this age group. Nearly a quarter of “non-GMI” violence in Columbus involved an intimate partner relationship (14% were coded as IPV and 9% as IPV spillover). Comprising 15% of all violent crime nationwide, intimate partner violence is both persistent and pervasive in American communities. As with other serious violence, the gravest intimate partner violence with respect to the most vulnerable victims tends to be driven by small numbers of identifiable “chronic” offenders who commit a wide variety of crimes at relatively high rates. NNSC’s Intimate Partner Violence Intervention (IPVI) is grounded in these core truths and the local Columbus dynamics around intimate partner violence may be worth discussing with the city in more detail as the GVI work gets underway. A small, but unavoidable limitation of this problem analysis was that it was conducted over Zoom. In pre-pandemic settings, NNSC has found that in-person meetings are much more conducive to longer conversations and varied discussions. Zoom only allows one participant to speak at a time and it is not as engaging as an in-person site visit. However, the Columbus partners were highly prepared and very willing to participate which made the Zoom problem
22 analysis experience as productive as possible. Secondly, the data collection exercises on the 15th and 27th of January were conducted with the help of crime and intelligence analysts within the Columbus Police Department. While the analysts provided a wealth of information, it is possible that information from other areas, such as patrol, could have supplemented NNSC’s understanding of the group violence in Columbus. Finally, larger jurisdictions present unique problems for virtual data collection exercises. Given the sizeable number of homicides and nonfatal shootings and the limitations of data collection via Zoom, NNSC did not review nonfatal shootings. Historically, NNSC has found that homicides present a more consistent picture of GMI dynamics than nonfatal shootings; therefore, NNSC believes that the GMI derived from the homicides reviewed is an accurate representation of those dynamics. The findings in this report are limited to the information provided and shared by partners in attendance at the virtual group audit and violent incident review; all findings in this report are subject to change as the intelligence is confirmed and refined. While the information outlined in this report is meant to provide law enforcement practitioners with clear insights into violence dynamics in Columbus, NNSC’s experience is that local practitioners are ultimately the experts who hold the keys to their city, its dynamics, and its residents. In conclusion, NNSC’s findings indicate that there are small number (17) of high-risk groups and group members (480) in Columbus. As is typical in cities across the U.S., these groups have identifiable conflicts and alliances with a small number of active groups in the city. Given the fact that these groups and their members are small in number and were quickly identifiable by law enforcement personnel, NNSC anticipates that the Columbus partnership will be able to quickly begin direct messaging to these high-risk group members. Custom notifications—often conducted in homes, hospitals, jails, or even outside—are a method to directly communicate the GVI message to specific individuals, for specific reasons, at specific times. In any given city, custom notifications are done by strategically identifying the already small number of group members and impact players who are driving violence. Customs are deployed to quickly interrupt cycles of violence, address retaliation and active disputes, calm hot spots, and address “impact players.” As the Columbus partnership already has a strong understanding of the nuances in local group dynamics, particularly the existing conflicts and alliances, NNSC also expects the GVI team to tailor messaging to any beefing groups. As noted earlier, NNSC’s findings also indicate that violence in Columbus is overwhelmingly concentrated demographically, as the majority of victims and suspects were male and between the ages of 18-29. It is crucial that the demographics of group-involved individuals in Columbus is kept in mind when engaging in support and outreach in Columbus; in order to be seen as
23 credible, the offer of help should always be tailored to meet the needs of this unique population of group-involved individuals. Similarly, the offer of support should, whenever possible, be tailored to the group dynamics on the ground. At the time of the problem analysis, TnA was the most victimized group (by incident count) in Columbus. This finding indicates that members of this group are at heightened risk to be victims of group violence moving forward, and thus, any messaging to its members should be grounded in an offer of support and safety. Lastly, as is often the case with frontline law enforcement personnel, those who participated in the problem analysis held an enormous amount of intelligence on the incidents, the groups, and the group members. While there were minor intelligence gaps surrounding some of the incidents and those involved, NNSC expects these gaps to shrink in due time, given the already robust intelligence of violence in Columbus. The National Network for Safe Communities looks forward to continuing work with partners in Columbus to reduce violence and increase public safety through the implementation of GVI. 6. Next Steps and Implementation NNSC recommends the following next steps to build on the intelligence gathering practices established during the problem analysis and support the ongoing implementation of GVI. I. Compare NNSC findings with current Columbus Police Department intelligence. The Columbus Police Department should begin by vetting NNSC’s findings regarding the total number of active groups in Columbus and build out the existing intelligence on all groups, especially the lesser-known ones. CPD should work to enhance the information on all groups identified during the group audit, keeping in mind that groups can vary in size and level of organization. GVI works in part by leveraging the informal social control that individuals have over one another when they have social relationships; it is critical to identify the smallest meaningful subsets of larger umbrella groups to harness those peer dynamics. II. Routinize group audits. The group information presented in this report is current as of September 2020, when the data was collected. In NNSC’s experience, groups are extremely fluid and naturally transition over time, with changes in membership, activities, conflicts, and alliances. Therefore, it is essential to develop a system to regularly review the nature of active groups in Columbus at any given time and to establish tracking measures to monitor the fluid dynamics of local violence and group membership. This process should focus not only on the groups mentioned in this report, but also
24 include any groups of two or more people who engage in crime and/or violence together. It is NNSC’s experience that many high-rate offenders who associate in groups will not necessarily fit the statutory definition of a gang member, nor will they meet the common perception of what constitutes a gang member. As law enforcement partners in Columbus continue to gather intelligence on active groups in the city, NNSC strongly recommends that partners look beyond formal gang affiliation and instead focus on loose networks, crews, and groups that are driving the violence. Columbus partners should also take this opportunity to classify groups as “inactive,” if they are no longer actively engaging in serious violence in Columbus. Law enforcement partners—including police, prosecutors, and probation—should meet for routine intelligence updates on a quarterly to biannual basis to discuss all group characteristics reviewed during the group audit process and the emergence of any new groups or the desistance of any groups and group members. NNSC recommends that Columbus partners plan to refresh the existing group audit in early summer 2021. III. Begin and institutionalize regular shooting reviews to monitor violence and track group activity. NNSC recommends that the law enforcement partners in Columbus work to formalize weekly violent incident reviews, often referred to operationally as shooting reviews, focused on nonfatal shootings and homicides that occur in the city. Shooting reviews are operational, frontline meetings where recent shootings and homicides are discussed with law enforcement partners. They serve many purposes: to gather the best intelligence on group involvement in serious violence, to identify the most violent groups, to track the changing dynamics of groups, to share information among all operational partners, to devise operational responses to violence, and to hold partners accountable to commitments that are made. NNSC has found that instituting regular shooting reviews is the timeliest and most practical method for continually assessing group and gang dynamics and their impact on violence. Weekly shooting reviews will ensure this information is widely known across units and agencies, so it is also important to ensure that all relevant law enforcement partners attend these regular reviews, to harness and share as much information across agencies and units as possible. Weekly shooting reviews are also critical to keeping the promises that law enforcement typically makes to group members and community stakeholders as part of GVI: that violence will be met with a swift and certain response directed at the group as a whole rather than at individuals. This process helps ensure that GMI incidents and the groups involved in these incidents are accurately identified in a timely manner. This information also provides operational personnel with the intelligence necessary to determine the strategic application of direct communication
25 mechanisms, like custom notifications, to prevent retaliatory shootings. Information shared during shooting reviews can be used to track the most violent groups in the city based on their involvement in homicides and shootings, which can help direct law enforcement’s resources to those driving the violence. As NNSC is now in contract with the city of Columbus, NNSC will work with CPD to launch regular shooting reviews in the coming months. These reviews will elevate intelligence about group dynamics and drive intervention related to specific incidents. NNSC will also work with Columbus law enforcement partners to determine the best cohort to participate in shooting reviews in order to have the richest, most up-to-date information about these incidents, those involved, and connections to active, violent groups in the city. Since NNSC has a strong network of sites that conduct shooting reviews, CPD will be encouraged to observe this process firsthand (via virtual shooting reviews). IV. Continue to engage other partners. NNSC believes that including a wide representation from law enforcement agency partners in future group audits and incident reviews will prove to be beneficial. These processes benefit from the inclusion of all frontline law enforcement personnel who can share intelligence on the individuals and dynamics involved in particular incidents. At every stage of the strategy—regular shooting reviews, routine group audits, strategic enforcement action, custom notifications, and call-ins—NNSC has found that a comprehensive and committed partnership ensures access to accurate intelligence and effective enforcement. NNSC recommends expanding frontline law enforcement engagement to include a wide representation of patrol officers, particularly those who work nights in higher-violence areas, and across the department. Additionally, the GVI strategy benefits from committed engagement and collaboration from other law enforcement partners and agencies (e.g., probation, parole, prosecution, task forces, neighboring jurisdictions, etc.) V. Attend GVI University. In the time since the problem analysis was conducted, NNSC finalized a one-year contract to begin implementation of GVI in Columbus, OH. As part of this contract, NNSC will conduct a virtual workshop that will equip key Columbus executive partners and stakeholders—including law enforcement, social service providers, and community leaders—with an in-depth understanding of the GVI strategy. By the end of the GVI University, attendees will understand the concrete, actionable next steps for implementing the strategy in Columbus. NNSC always recommends that
26 executive law enforcement partners (from the local police department, probation/parole agencies, prosecutor’s office, and U.S. Attorney’s office) attend this session. VI. Plan for first direct communication with groups. GVI is rooted in direct communication with active groups delivered by a partnership of law enforcement, social service providers, and community members. While the implementation of GVI traditionally begins with a call-in, many cities are currently opting to utilize custom notifications and/or modify the call-in process (through video/virtual alternatives, for instance) due to existing health and safety concerns surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic. Assuming custom notifications are prioritized as the first form of direct messaging to groups in Columbus, an operational team should plan to begin delivering customs in late summer or early fall. Traditionally, NNSC recommends that cities convene a call-in (traditional or modified) approximately every four months during the first years of implementation to reach those at the highest risk and send the message about group enforcement, community concern, and available resources. Custom notifications and other forms of direct messaging are a constant throughout the year and should be used to interrupt “beefs,” prevent retaliation after a violent incident, calm outbreaks of group violence, and reinforce the core GVI message. The following is a checklist that outlines actions that the Columbus partnership should complete in advance of the first custom notifications and/or call-in. NNSC will work closely with operational partners to ensure the timely success of these actions. Identify group members to attend the call-in or to receive a custom notification. For a call-in, law enforcement works together with the project manager to select and notify group members to attend the call-in, typically through the channels of probation or parole. The group members chosen are not necessarily those at highest risk but simply representatives of each active, violent group in the implementation area who can be compelled to attend the call-in by the conditions of their probation or parole. Their role at the call-in is to act as messengers to carry the call-in message back to other members of their groups. The goal is to represent every single active, violent group in the district at the call-in. Custom notifications can follow a similar planning and vetting process, but do not need to rely on individuals who are on probation or parole. NNSC will work with the Columbus operational GVI team to decide if a call-in is appropriate or if the partnership should instead proceed with a robust, tailored custom notifications campaign. Ensure that credible and responsive support and outreach is in place. Offering unconditional support to those who want it is an indispensable component of GVI. Just as law enforcement
You can also read
