Behind Enemy Plans A Process-Tracing Analysis of Germany's Operational Approach to a Western Invasion
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Troops and crewmen aboard Coast Guard–manned
LCVP as it approaches Normandy beach on D-Day,
June 6, 1944 (National Archives and Records
Administration/U.S. Coast Guard Collection)
Behind Enemy Plans
A Process-Tracing Analysis of Germany’s
Operational Approach to a Western Invasion
By Bradley Podliska, Karin Hecox, and Oliver Sagun
No plan survives contact with the enemy.
—Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke the Elder
ixty-four years after Moltke’s
Dr. Bradley Podliska is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies at the Air Command
and Staff College. Major Karin Hecox, USMC, is the Deputy Branch Chief, Operations Division, J32
S observation, two mid-level
German commanders, faced with
the herculean task of changing the
Intelligence, Reconnaissance Operations, Joint Staff. Major Oliver Sagun, USAF, is Division Chief, C4
course of history on an early June 1944
Systems and Support, Headquarters, United States Forces Japan. morning, failed in their duties. In using
JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Podliska, Hecox, and Sagun 107phenomenon (in this case, German
Figure 1. German Chain of Command defense of its Western theater) in a
sequential manner.7 One such process-
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces tracing test is the hoop test. For a
Hitler
hoop test, a fact must be able to “jump
through a hoop” in order to be consid-
ered true. The hoop, in this case, is an
OKW–Armed Force OKL–Luftwaffe OKM–Navy OKH–Army
High Command High Command High Command High Command element of operational design assigned to
Keitel Goering Doenitz Hitler an individual German leader or general
(see figure 1). In other words, a German
commander is eliminated as being at fault
OB West Third Air Force Navy Group West
for the D-Day loss if the commander did
Rundstedt Sperrle Krancke in fact conduct his responsibilities as as-
signed in planning.8
Staff, Panzer
German War Strategy
Army Group G
Blaskowitz
Army Group B
Rommel
Group West Understanding Germany’s war strat-
Schweppenburg
egy, operational environment, and
Personal Access
problems is crucial to contextualizing
Direct Chain of Command Hitler and his commanders for the
Conditional Tactical Control of Certain Elements hoop test.9 Hitler, adhering to his
Mein Kampf objective of lebensraum
structured and qualitative analysis to West), and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, (living space) in the East, first secured
examine German strategy and opera- Army Group B, contributed to the his eastern flank by invading Poland,
tions in the events leading up to and German failure at Normandy.3 next conquered Western Europe, and
on D-Day, the loss can be traced to More specifically, the research remains then began his campaign to defeat
Admiral Theodor Krancke, commander problematic because it fails to answer Russia.10 The Russian invasion stalled,
of Naval Group West, and Field Marshal basic questions: Did the Germans have a and by autumn 1942, the Germans
Hugo Sperrle, commander of Luftwaffe plan in place to defeat an Allied Western changed their strategy to focus on a
Third Air Fleet. Infighting, conflict- invasion? If so, did Hitler and his com- global war, not a theater war. Several
ing authorities, and lack of warfighting manders follow the plan? To put it simply, new factors were at play: First, Hitler
capabilities clearly hampered German who lost D-Day? These questions are realized the Eastern Front had become
command and control of operations on independent of Allied plans and actions a quagmire. Second, the Allies opened
the Normandy coast. The Germans did and cover the events leading up to and on a second front in North Africa. Third,
have a plan, however, and Krancke and the day of the invasion. the Germans reached their zenith of
Sperrle proved to be the weak links: By organizing German plans into manpower (losses could not be made
Both failed to execute when facing an elements to create a cognitive map or up).11 By summer 1943, the German
Allied invasion on the Western Front. operational approach, historians may situation worsened. Tunisia in North
This failure is counter to the mytho- better understand the German defeat.4 Africa fell. Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz
logical story of D-Day. The Allies, with An operational approach is “a broad lost the U-boat Atlantic campaign, and
overwhelming force and an overabun- description of the mission, operational a German operation to halt Russian
dance of courage, executed a brilliant concepts, tasks, and actions required to advances failed. Moreover, the Allies
assault plan and won the longest day. As accomplish the mission.”5 Specifically, it invaded Italy and began a relentless air-
the story goes, the Allied invasion was is the plan of how Hitler and his gener- bombing campaign over Germany.12 By
so superior and heroic that nothing the als sought to defeat a Western invasion. the fall, with manpower and resources
Germans did mattered; the good guys Constructing a German operational becoming scarce, the Oberkommando
were bound to win.1 At least superficially, approach post hoc will also help future der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces High
this story fails to go beyond some notable joint planners better understand a com- Command, or OKW) issued a directive
facts. Adolf Hitler micromanaged tactical mander’s role and responsibilities in requiring all changes in strength to be
actions, and given his late wake-up on executing an operational plan.6 approved.13
June 6, the Allies took full advantage.2 The German operational plan can
The personal feuds and fights over power, be analyzed with process-tracing, a The Operational
especially the one between Field Marshal popular qualitative method for perform- Environment in 1944
Gerd von Rundstedt, Oberbefehlshaber ing within-case analysis. Process-tracing In defending about 1,000 miles of the
West (Supreme Commander West, or OB evaluates causal links and describes a Atlantic Wall, the Germans assessed
108 Recall / Behind Enemy Plans JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021Troops wade ashore from LCVP landing craft, off Omaha Beach, June 6, 1944 (National Archives and Records Administration/U.S. Army Signal Corps Collection)
defense of the coastal environment Allies to have a tank superiority ratio of under OKW, and, on paper, had the sub-
based on forces available, evaluation of 10 to 1.18 From April to May 1944, the ordinate units of Army Group B, Army
the threat, and terrain. In consultation Fremde Heere West (Foreign Armies Group G, and Panzer Group West.22
with the navy, OB West assessed sectors West) reported the number of Allied Rommel was responsible for the
for suitability of troop landing, and divisions as 75 to 90 divisions (a misin- defense of Normandy, where he had
defensive obstacles were placed accord- formed count due to double agents and the Seventh Army with the 84th Corps
ingly.14 Both the OKW and OB West bureaucratic rivalry). The extreme esti- being the forward corps. In total, the
expected the Allies to land at a port.15 mates led Hitler to believe there would Seventh Army had 14 infantry divisions,
The Oberkommando der Marine (Navy be a diversionary attack first, followed 1 Panzer division, and 47 heavy guns.
High Command, or OKM) stated that by the main attack.19 The 716th Division—comprising mainly
an attack would occur at high tide.16 To counter this threat, Germany old men, teenagers, convalescents, and
The Germans expected to be able to prepared 10 Panzer divisions and 50 ethnic Germans from occupied ter-
move and resupply troops rapidly to the infantry divisions to defend against an ritories—covered the British beaches.
invasion area via rail.17 invasion.20 These units were organized The 352nd Infantry Division and 726th
under a German command and control Regiment covered Omaha Beach. The
Defining the Problem structure that was disjointed, convo- 352nd Division consisted of 12,734 veter-
The problem Germany faced in 1944 luted, and contradictory.21 Directly ans with modern weapons (for example,
was how to defeat enemy forces on under Hitler was the OKW, the OKM, 105-millimeter [mm] and 150mm artil-
multiple fronts. For the Western inva- the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe lery pieces). The 709th Infantry Division
sion, German estimates varied widely (Luftwaffe High Command, or OKL), covered Utah Beach and the Cherbourg
from 10 Allied divisions to as many as and the Oberkommando des Heere port.23 The Luftwaffe Third Air Fleet,
70 divisions. Germany expected the (Army High Command). OB West fell under Sperrle, reported directly to OKL,
JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Podliska, Hecox, and Sagun 109Figure 2. German Operational Approach
Problem: How to defeat Allied forces on multiple fronts with minimal manpower
Defense of German Panzers
fortresses and defensive/obstacle engage/defeat COG Termination
fortified areas plan landing forces Allies denied Political, social, economic,
Deny Freedom of
Maneuver freedom of and military domination
OB West/Army Group B movement over its adversaries
Bomb UK Bomb troop Coastal
ports transports defense Deny Allied forces
Deny Massing of Forces the ability to mass Allied Military Endstate
3rd Air Force forces ISO landing Forces Defeat of Allied Invasion
Bomb U-Boat Mine-laying Defend the Channel
beaches Patrols operations and North Sea area
Deny Ability to Deny Allied forces Objectives
Land Forces the ability to land
Navy Group West at the beaches Defeat of Allied
beach landing
under Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering. to assess an individual German leader military endstate was the defeat of an
It operated in a “cooperative” relation- or general. The elements of operational Allied invasion.33
ship with OB West.24 Planes employed in design are taken from Joint Publication Hitler believed that the Allies, if
coastal defense were under the control (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning, and include: defeated on the beach, would not make
of OB West. Otherwise, OB West had to another invasion attempt. He could then
• center of gravity (COG)—a source
request the services of Third Air Fleet,25 focus on defeating Russian forces.34 As
of power that provides strength,
which consisted of the 2nd, 9th, and such, he made his strategy clear with
freedom of action, or will to act
10th Flying Corps, 2nd Air Division, 2nd Fuhrer Directive 51, dated November
• lines of operations (LOO)—actions
Fighter Corps, and 122nd Reconnaissance 3, 1943. The directive ordered com-
or activities on nodes or decisive
Group.26 Sperrle had 319 operational manders to upgrade coastal defenses and
points designed to achieve an
aircraft under his command at the time mass Panzer divisions.35 Furthermore, on
objective
of the Allied invasion.27 Notably, a major- December 20, during a situation update
• decisive points—geographic points,
ity of the German fighter aircraft and meeting, Hitler made clear, “I have stud-
events, or factors that allow a com-
reserves, some 600, were stationed in ied most of the [reports] now. There’s
mander to achieve an advantage
Germany for defense of the homeland.28 no doubt that the attack in the West will
• objectives—what militarily must be
Navy Group West, under Krancke, re- come in the spring; it is beyond all doubt.
accomplished to achieve an endstate
ported directly to OKM, under Doenitz. . . . If they attack in the West, [then] this
• military endstate—the point at which
As with Third Air Fleet, only naval ele- attack will decide the war.”36
the military instrument of power is
ments involved in coastal defense were Hitler also took extensive steps
no longer needed to achieve national
under the control of OB West. Naval to turn the war bureaucracy toward
objectives
artillery, deployed on land, remained these objectives. First, he concentrated
• termination—the conditions that
under navy control, unless a land invasion his power.37 On March 23, 1943, he
must exist at the end of military
was occurring.29 Navy Group West assets issued an order stating that higher com-
operations.31
included the 5th Torpedo Flotilla, the 15th mands could not prevent subordinate
Patrol Boat Flotilla, the 5th Schnellboot Hitler’s Actions Regarding the units from reporting directly to him.38
(S-Boat, or, by the Allied name, E-Boat) Termination Criteria and Military Rommel, for example, appealed to
Flotilla, and the 9th S-Boat Flotilla, which Endstate. For Germany, Hitler was clearly Hitler to place the army and labor forces
in total consisted of 20 to 30 E-boats, responsible for setting the termination under him for the purpose of defend-
6 torpedo boats, 20 minesweepers, 3 to criteria and for approving, if not crafting, ing against a Western invasion. Hitler
4 destroyers, and 4 to 5 U-boats in the the military endstate. In U.S. joint doc- denied his request.39 Second, and despite
English Channel area.30 trine, the President sets the termination claims to the contrary, Hitler moved
criteria of every operation, according forces to the West. For example, in
A Process-Tracing Analysis to JP 5-0.32 For a hoop test to be ac- March 1944, Hitler ordered the Panzer
of Germany’s Operational cepted, Hitler must have failed to set the Lehr (Teach) Division to be removed
Approach to a Western Invasion termination criteria or approve a military from the West and used in Hungary.
Hitler and his commanders’ plan to endstate. In terms of German operations However, the division was sent back
defeat the anticipated invasion can be in the West, the termination criteria were to France in May.40 Hitler also ordered
organized into elements of operational political, social, economic, and military light antiaircraft weapons to France,
design (see figure 2). Elements are used domination over its adversaries. The even at the expense of protecting the
110 Recall / Behind Enemy Plans JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021Soldiers relax outside French café, in Sainte-Mère-Eglise, France, June 6, 1944 (National Archives and Records Administration/National Museum of the U.S. Navy)
German homeland.41 Most important, Doenitz’s Actions Regarding the By spring 1944, the German navy was
Hitler ordered forces comprising troops Military Endstate, Objective, COG, greatly diminished, but in anticipation of
from Eastern European countries (for LOO, and Decisive Point. Doenitz was a cross-channel invasion, OKM deployed
example, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania) to responsible for helping craft the military its largest and deadliest E-boats (a fast
be moved to the West. In total, 72 bat- endstate, identify the enemy operational attack craft), the S-38/100 class, along
talions were deployed in France by early COG, prepare the LOO, and determine with minesweepers to the West to defend
1944.42 Third, at the beginning of April the decisive points.45 In addition to the the channel invasion area.47 Moreover,
1944, Hitler believed the attack would already stated military endstate, the OKM planned to send out 40 U-boats
come at Normandy.43 objective was the defeat of an Allied at the time of the invasion.48 Fearing
Hitler anticipated the Allied attack, landing, and the agreed-upon Allied an invasion, it placed no less than 34
and he was focused intensively on the operational COG was fielded forces, in E-boats in Cherbourg and in Boulogne,
Western invasion and how to stop it. In particular those landing on the coast.46 bracketing the future invasion area.49 The
fact, Hitler’s intuition was confirmed on The LOOs involved the establishment deployment effectively placed any Allied
the afternoon of June 5 from intelligence of the Atlantic Wall and joint operations. landing in “deadly peril.”50 It also had
reporting of radio intercepts that the The most important decisive point was radar to help direct forces when the Allies
invasion would occur on June 6.44 Thus, the invasion landing site. If Doenitz were detected crossing the channel.51
Hitler performed his planned duties on carried out these assigned elements, the Doenitz, like Hitler, focused on stop-
D-Day. hoop test is rejected. ping a Western invasion. The deployment
JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Podliska, Hecox, and Sagun 111of the preponderance of naval forces in trust, serving as “the funnel through forces were to withdraw to a defensive
the anticipated attack area, which could which Hitler’s orders passed and which line running from the Seine River above
have potentially defeated an invasion, received reports, complaints, and ques- Paris southwest to Switzerland. If an at-
demonstrates that Doenitz fulfilled the tions.”56 As OKW chief, Keitel did not tack occurred in Normandy or along the
military endstate, objective, COG, LOO, have any command authority, but he did channel coast, defensive tactics were to be
and decisive point requirements. have the authority to issue directives, used to throw the invaders back into the
Goering’s Actions Regarding the prepare operational plans, and coordinate sea. Failing this, defeated forces were to
Military Endstate, Objective, COG, joint operations.57 This lack of command withdraw behind the Seine.64
LOO, Decisive Point, and Ordering authority makes it more difficult to pin a Fourth, regarding the decisive
Operations. Goering, like Doenitz, was specific failure on Keitel in accepting the point, OKW determined in 1943 that
responsible for helping craft the military hoop test. the Fifteenth Army sector, an area from
endstate, identify the enemy operational First, regarding the endstate and Belgium south to Rouen, France, would
COG, prepare the LOO, and determine objective, OKW took extensive steps to be the decisive point in the expected
the decisive points.52 Goering, however, defeat an Allied landing. Beginning in invasion.65
was able to order operations. This addi- 1942, OKW (and OB West) designated Finally, OKW served as an arbiter of
tional duty, while giving him more power high-priority harbors as “fortresses” and disputes and established its authority as
and authority, also means that Goering lower priority harbors as “fortified areas.” necessary.66 For example, the Germans
has a greater chance of passing the hoop Between these harbors was a system of believed the Panzers were key to repel-
test of failing to have carried out his strongpoints, which consisted of bat- ling the Allied invaders, and on this
responsibilities. teries protected by infantry.58 Then, in Rundstedt and Rommel were in dis-
Goering understood the urgency of coordination with Rommel, OKW (and agreement. Rundstedt was clear that the
repelling the invasion, and he planned to OB West) established a beach defensive invasion needed to be stopped on D-Day,
recall all German fighters defending the system. The Germans, relying on con- not D-Day plus one. He was skeptical
homeland and send them to the invasion scripted labor under Organization Todt, that he had the resources to defeat the in-
sector. At the commencement of an inva- poured concrete for bunkers and put in vasion; thus, he believed keeping reserves
sion, Goering would send out a coded place a multilayered defensive belt, which out of reach of naval artillery and aerial
message: “Threatening Danger West.” consisted of Belgian Gates festooned bombardment was key. These reserve
Moreover, Goering ordered that 50 per- with mines, Hemmenbalk tripod-shaped forces would then be sent to destroy
cent of all units be kept in readiness status ramps, Czech hedgehogs, and 2,000 the Allies on the beach.67 Alternatively,
to conduct low-level attacks to support stakes with mines.59 In terms of opera- Rommel shared the view of OKW that
the army in defensive measures.53 tional defense, the Germans flooded wide forces, including mobile artillery and
Goering, like Hitler and Doenitz, swaths of area to make the terrain impass- Panzer tanks, should be placed as close
focused on stopping a Western inva- able.60 In terms of tactical defense and to to the shore as possible. Rommel went so
sion. The readiness order and the plan prevent Allied access to road networks, far as to send almost daily requests to OB
to defeat a landing demonstrate that beach draws were closed off with ob- West for tactical changes.68 Both generals
Goering fulfilled the military endstate, stacles, mines, and gun emplacements.61 appealed to OKW, and OKW effectively
objective, COG, LOO, and decisive point Second, regarding the Allied opera- divided up the Panzer divisions between
requirements. Goering failed, however, tional COG, on January 28, 1944, OKW the two generals. Rommel was given con-
to place additional forces in the West in briefed Hitler that the Allies had 488 trol of three divisions, and the remaining
anticipation of an invasion. Moreover, combat vehicle landing ships, a sufficient were kept under the Panzer Group West
he retained operational authority, and he number to land 25 divisions in each Commander General Leo Geyr von
believed June 5 reports that an imminent wave.62 The critical vulnerability of the Schweppenburg, who reported directly to
invasion was a feint. Therefore, Goering fielded forces was the troops, still in naval Rundstedt.69
did not issue “Threatening Danger West” transport from the United Kingdom to As a second example, OKW made the
until June 7 and thus partially failed to the beaches of Normandy. decision to disaggregate Eastern troop
carry out his responsibilities.54 Third, OKW established plans that units and integrate them into German
Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel’s laid the groundwork for LOOs. In its regiments rather than deploy them as in-
Actions Regarding the Military planning, it ordered that if an attack oc- dependent units. A “Commander of the
Endstate, Objective, COG, LOO, and curred in southern France or in Brittany, Volunteer Units under the Commander-
Decisive Point. Keitel, like Doenitz German bombers were to bomb English in-Chief West (OB West)” was created
and Goering, helped craft the military ports, as weather permitted, and fight- for coordination of these troops, adding
endstate, identify the enemy operational ers were to be kept on call and launched to the bureaucratic confusion.70 As a
COG, prepare the LOO, and determine to assault the landing forces.63 German third example, Army Group B Chief of
the decisive points.55 Keitel was not a ground forces were to defend the for- Staff General Hans Speidel specifically re-
popular general, but he did have Hitler’s tresses at all costs, and then remaining quested an operational directive on April
112 Recall / Behind Enemy Plans JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 20211, 1944, and Hitler and OKW Chief of his plan was OKW approved and was take action to deny an Allied massing of
Staff General Alfred Jodl rejected his consistent with the approach to deny the forces in Western Europe. In this LOO,
request on the grounds that OB West Allies to land and establish a beachhead. Sperrle’s responsibilities involved all
and Army Group B bore the mission for Krancke’s Actions Regarding air activities in defending the beaches,
defeating the Allies on the beach.71 the LOO. Krancke, as an operational including reconnaissance, acting on
Keitel, like his peers and in his role as commander, would also have been intelligence, and bombing the landing
a de facto chief of Hitler’s personal staff, responsible for executing his assigned transports and forces.81
focused on stopping a Western invasion. LOO, denying the Allied ability to land Sperrle, like Krancke, grounded
The plan for how to defeat an invasion forces. This is a narrowly focused LOO his force due to weather.82 On D-Day,
such as bombing English ports, defend- and requires specific action by Krancke. Sperrle had a limited force of 80 service-
ing fortresses, and defeating the landing Together, this increases the probability able fighters (out of 319), but he still did
invasion at all costs fulfilled the military that a hoop test is accepted. not take the initiative and employ these
endstate, objective, COG, LOO, and Krancke did not conduct recon- forces.83 Three bombers were ordered
decisive point requirements, exonerating naissance patrols in the days prior to to bomb Allied troop transports, but
Keitel of responsibility. D-Day due to weather. Furthermore, the order was inexplicably rescinded at
Rundstedt’s Actions Regarding he restricted mine-laying operations to 9 a.m.84 Strafing runs were ordered on
the LOO. In JP 5-0, commanders are port.76 Krancke did not believe the Allies Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches after
responsible for executing actions, such would attempt a landing and wanted to 9:30 a.m., too late to impact the troop
as planned use of LOOs, in order to at- give his men a break, so he issued orders transports.85
tain the objective and military endstate.72 the night prior to D-Day to lower war Like Krancke, Sperrle failed to carry
As such, Rundstedt would have been readiness from condition two to condi- out the LOO of denying the Allies the
responsible for executing his assigned tion three.77 Furthermore, sailors, using ability to land at the beach. This failure
LOO, denying Allied freedom of maneu- position-finding radar, located surface was also one of inaction. Sperrle issued
ver. Like Keitel, Rundstedt was limited in ships during the early hours of June 6 but a stand-down order for planes, and he
the troops he actually commanded, which did not send out an invasion alert until failed to launch planes at the first sign
also lowers the threshold for rejecting the hours later.78 of an invasion. As such, Sperrle failed to
hoop test for him. The 15 E-boats of the 5th S-Boat and carry out his responsibilities per the op-
Rundstedt was initially distracted. He 9 S-Boat flotillas did depart at 4:30 a.m.
th
erational approach.
believed an attack would occur in the out of Cherbourg, but lacking any infor- Rommel’s Actions Regarding the
Pas de Calais area.73 Moreover, he got mation on the invasion fleet, the E-boats LOO. As an operational commander,
into a political squabble with Rommel. searched north despite the fact that the Rommel, like Krancke and Sperrle, would
Fearing Rommel had too much power, invasion fleet was south and east. Given also have been responsible for executing
Rundstedt sought to divide and dimin- the late launch of the E-boats, which a specific LOO. With his infantry and
ish Rommel’s area of responsibility and were designed to work in the stealth of Panzer divisions, Rommel was to lead
received OKW approval in April 1944 for the night, their efficacy against the inva- the main effort of German operations in
the creation of Army Group G, consist- sion fleet is doubtful.79 However, 15 denying the Allies freedom of maneuver.
ing of the 1st and 19th armies, with an E-boats, if launched based on radar find- If Rommel failed to execute in this effort,
area of responsibility of southern France. ings and in the darkness of night, could a hoop test is accepted.
Rundstedt named a trusted confidant, have potentially wreaked havoc on the Rommel was responsible for the
Johannes Blaskowitz, as commander.74 invasion fleet in a manner similar to the overall defense of Normandy, but the
However, Rundstedt attempted to April 1944 Lyme Bay disaster.80 command structure did not lend itself
execute his LOO. At 2:30 a.m. on June Krancke failed to carry out the LOO to unity of effort. Rommel’s ability to
6, Rundstedt ordered the 12th SS Panzer of denying the Allies the ability to land execute his LOO was limited, as he could
Division and the Panzer Lehr Division at the beach. This failure was based on not make an independent move. This
out of operational reserves and into ac- inaction. Despite the fact that he could remained a concern for Rommel leading
tion under the command of Rommel. not rely on his radar, Krancke issued a up to the invasion.86 Like Rundstedt,
OKW rescinded the order at about 6:30 stand-down order for his boats. As such, Rommel believed an attack would occur
a.m., stopping these forces when cloud Krancke failed to carry out his respon- in the Pas de Calais area.87 Rommel
cover still obscured their movement.75 sibilities per the planned operational visited his wife on June 6 and was not
Rundstedt took action and attempted approach. available to issue orders for 14 hours.88
to carry out his LOO. His political fight Sperrle’s Actions Regarding the The 21st Panzer Division, as a rare ex-
with Rommel, especially about how to LOO. Sperrle, like Krancke, would also ception, was directly under Rommel’s
place Panzer divisions, did not nega- have been responsible for executing a control. But its commander, General
tively impact the LOO or decisive point. specific LOO. For a hoop test to be Edgar Feuchtinger, did not receive orders
Rundstedt bears no culpability because accepted, Sperrle must have failed to to move his division until 10 hours after
JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Podliska, Hecox, and Sagun 113the start of the invasion. Once Rommel This article answers the question of used. See Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint
Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff,
took control, he ordered Feuchtinger who lost D-Day. Despite the common June 16, 2017), IV-19, available at .
Rundstedt, did not attack.89 Germans did take significant measures 7
David Collier, “Understanding Process
Rommel took action and attempted to defeat an Allied invasion. This Tracing,” PS: Political Science and Politics 44,
no. 4 (2011), 823–830.
to carry out his LOO. His political research also shows that the dynamics 8
Ibid., 826–827. A hoop test is a qualita-
fight with Rundstedt, especially about of infighting and conflict of authorities tive, sequential analysis of an event. In its scope,
how to place Panzer divisions, did not in mid-level leadership are critical it must account for commanders who still fol-
negatively impact the LOO or decisive elements in understanding strategic lowed the plan, but engaged in unique or cre-
point. Moreover, he did what he could; plan implementation. Commanders do ative tactical reactions to battlefield conditions.
9
See JP 5-0, Joint Planning, IV-16.
Feuchtinger’s failure to take action not operate in a vacuum, and as found 10
Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler’s
cannot be blamed on Rommel. in this case, mid-level leaders did not High Command (Lawrence: University Press of
follow instructions and plans. German Kansas, 2000), 67.
Conclusion pre-invasion efforts were all for naught. 11
Ibid., 189–193.
Examined through the lens of the joint This not only makes the adage of Moltke
12
Ibid., 198.
13
Ibid., 206–207. The OKW (Oberkom-
planning process, the German strategy the Elder relevant, but it also makes the
mando der Wehrmacht), despite consistent bu-
and plans to defeat an Allied Western advice of Dwight Eisenhower profound: reaucratic infighting that hampered operations,
invasion demonstrate that the popular “Plans are useless, but planning is released an optimistic forecast that Germany
arguments—blaming Hitler or Rommel indispensable.”90 JFQ “will win” the war.
or bad luck—do not hold up to a hoop
14
The navy concluded that the Normandy
coast, due to its reefs, was not likely an inva-
test analysis. The results of the hoop
sion target. Thus, no defensive obstacles were
test demonstrate that individuals failed Notes placed there. Rommel, arriving in winter 1943,
to execute their assigned responsibilities immediately ordered construction of defensive
in thwarting the D-Day invasion. Spe-
1
Robert Kershaw, Landing on the Edge of obstacles. See Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 40;
Eternity: Twenty-Four Hours at Omaha Beach Bodo Zimmermann et al., OB West (Atlantic
cifically, Krancke and Sperrle failed to (New York: Pegasus Books, 2018), xxv–xxvi; Wall to Siegfried Line), A Study in Command:
execute their LOOs. Goering also failed Mary Kathryn Barbier, D-Day Deception: Op- MS #B-308 GENLT Zimmermann, MS #B-672
to complete all his duties. Unlike Keitel, eration Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion GENMAJ von Buttlar, MS #B-718 GENLT
Goering asserted control over forces, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, Speidel, MS #B-633 GENFLDM von Rundstedt,
but he failed to issue a directive—even, 2007), 195. Notably, Kershaw points out that MS #B-344 GEN INF Blumentritt (Washing-
the Germans had a formidable force on D-Day ton, DC: European Command Historical Divi-
as in the case of Keitel, an incorrect one. within the Normandy theater. In particular, the sion, 1945), 21.
The German chain of command was Germans had 14 infantry divisions, a Panzer 15
Kershaw, Landing on the Edge of Eternity,
disorganized and contradictory, and the division, and 47 heavy guns to fight an invasion 4; Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 82.
commanders seemed unwilling to take force of 6 amphibious divisions and 3 airborne 16
B.H. Liddell Hart, The German Gener-
the initiative or think critically once the divisions. In total, Germany could bring 58 to als Talk (New York: William Morrow & Co.,
60 divisions from around France to repel the 37 1948), 242.
invasion commenced. All of the incom- divisions of invaders. See Kershaw, Landing on 17
However, 3 weeks prior to D-Day,
petence and bad decisions were made in the Edge of Eternity, 34, 67. the Allies began a bombing campaign that
spite of Hitler’s order that subordinates 2
Stephen E. Ambrose, D-Day: June 6, eliminated 75 percent of the rail system within
could report directly to him. A thorough 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War 150 miles of Normandy. Normandy had been
understanding of this disorganization and II (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), effectively isolated. See Barbier, D-Day Decep-
481–482; Barbier, D-Day Deception, 165–167. tion, 178.
contradiction and its effect on German 3
David C. Isby, Fighting the Invasion: The 18
Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 78, 82.
D-Day operations would help explain German Army at D-Day (New York: Skyhorse 19
OKW maintained control over several
German failures, including the inaction of Publishing, 2016), 47–50. military intelligence agencies, including the
Krancke and Sperrle. Research generally 4
To be clear, the Germans did not think in Amt Ausland/Abwehr (Office of Foreign
focuses on Hitler and the high com- terms of the modern U.S. doctrine of opera- and Counterintelligence). Admiral Wilhelm
tional approach. Nonetheless, as a teaching and Canaris was chief of the Abwehr. Canaris did
mand, but a second area would be a more learning aid, professional military education not believe the Germans had the forces to win
nuanced examination of exactly what instruction structures historical operations and the war, and the Abwehr, based on double
Krancke and Sperrle were doing on June battles, such as Operation Torch, into an opera- agents, submitted unreliable reports. Canaris
6. A third area would be to determine tional approach as part of its curriculum. cared only about supplying reports consistently
what possibly could have happened if
5
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associ- to Keitel and was considered a poor organizer.
ated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, Hitler lost trust in Canaris and disbanded the
Krancke and Sperrle did not cancel recon- June 2020), 159, available at . High Command, 105, 175; Walter Warlimont,
ing attack was executed (for example, the 6
There are 13 elements of operational Inside Hitler’s Headquarters: 1939–45 (New
April 1944 Lyme Bay attack). design, but not all 13 elements need to be York: F.A. Praeger, 1964), 409.
114 Recall / Behind Enemy Plans JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 202120
Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 64. 47
Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 69; Tent, E- OB West, 37; Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 26,
21
Ibid., 19–20. Boat Alert, 51. 63.
22
Rommel and Army Group B were sub- 48
Only 10 to 15 U-boats went out after the 74
Zimmermann et al., OB West, 57–58.
ordinate to OB West only on paper. Rommel invasion. See Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 40. 75
Ibid., 72, 75; Isby, Fighting the Invasion,
consistently appealed to Hitler directly for op- 49
Tent, E-Boat Alert, 58. 29.
erational decision approvals. See Isby, Fighting 50
Ibid. 76
Kershaw, Landing on the Edge of Eternity,
the Invasion, 20, 48. 51
Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 69. 42, 74–75.
23
Kershaw, Landing on the Edge of Eternity, 52
JP 5-0, Joint Planning, IV-19–IV-40. 77
Tent, E-Boat Alert, 108.
3–9. 53
Bickers, Air War Normandy, 87. 78
Ibid., 109.
24
Zimmermann et al., OB West, 9. 54
Ibid., 88–89. 79
Ibid., 113.
25
Ibid. 55
JP 5-0, Joint Planning, IV-19–IV-40. 80
In the Lyme Bay disaster, 9 E-boats
26
Richard Townshend Bickers, Air War 56
Brett-Smith, Hitler’s Generals, 189. destroyed 2 landing ship tanks and killed 789
Normandy (London: L. Coopers, 1994), 88. 57
Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Com- servicemen. See ibid., 9–22.
27
Richard Brett-Smith, Hitler’s Generals mand, 65, 78, 195–196, 198. 81
Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 83–84.
(San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1976), 125. 58
Zimmermann et al., OB West, 22–23. 82
Kershaw, Landing on the Edge of Eternity,
28
Bickers, Air War Normandy, 89. 59
Kershaw, Landing on the Edge of Eternity, 42, 74–75.
29
Zimmermann et al., OB West, 9; Isby, 128–129. 83
Bickers, Air War Normandy, 89. On D-
Fighting the Invasion, 19. 60
Zimmermann et al., OB West, 53. Day, the Allies had an air strength ratio of 25 to
30
Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 86; James F. 61
Kershaw, Landing on the Edge of Eternity, 1. See Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 28.
Tent, E-Boat Alert: Defending the Normandy 5. 84
Kershaw, Landing on the Edge of Eternity,
Invasion Fleet (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 62
In fact, the Allies could land only a third 219.
Press, 1996), 112. of this number; the Germans were falling for 85
Ibid., 259.
31
See JP 5-0, Joint Planning, IV-19–IV-40. Operation Fortitude, a deception campaign de- 86
Ruge, Rommel in Normandy, x, 109,
For a variation on center of gravity (COG), the signed to make the Pas de Calais seem to be the 119, 123, 124.
German military used the term Schwerpunkt intended target. See Heiber and Glantz, Hitler 87
Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 26, 63.
(weight of main effort). and His Generals, 953, 965. 88
Brett-Smith, Hitler’s Generals, 268.
32
Ibid., IV-19. 63
Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 83–84. 89
Ibid., 269.
33
Helmut Heiber and David M. Glantz, The combined air offensive concentrated on 90
Richard Nixon, Six Crises (Garden City,
Hitler and His Generals: Military Conferences bombing submarine construction yards, trans- NY: Doubleday, 1962), 235.
1942–1945: The First Complete Stenographic portation systems, manufacturing plants, oil
Record of the Military Situation Conferences, refineries, and other war-producing industries.
from Stalingrad to Berlin (London: Green- As such, Luftwaffe fighter operations shifted
hill, 2002), 311, 314, 918; Isby, Fighting the to protect the homeland. See Albert Norman,
Invasion, 71; Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Operation Overlord: The Allied Invasion of West-
Command, 207. ern Europe (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service
34
Heiber and Glantz, Hitler and His Gener- Publishing, 1952), 141.
als, 314; Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 92. 64
Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 65.
35
Friedrich Ruge, Rommel in Normandy: 65
Zimmermann et al., OB West, 33, 36.
Reminiscences (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 66
Keitel made a series of decisions that, at
1979), 4. best, demonstrated a lack of competence. OKW
36
Hitler was likely reviewing reports on the did not change its 1939–1941 decision model
Tehran and Cairo conferences, which finalized that assumed unhindered troop movements,
the plans for Operation Overlord. See Heiber despite the reports of subordinate commanders
and Glantz, Hitler and His Generals, 311, 314, that the Allies gained air superiority. See Isby,
918. Fighting the Invasion, 35. On June 6, 1944,
37
Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Com- OKW disapproved of the movement of seven
mand, 63. divisions from the Fifteenth Army to Norman-
38
Ibid., 203. dy. See Zimmermann et al., OB West, 85–87.
39
Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 42. A conse- 67
Ibid., 34–35, 50–51.
quence of this was that commanders, fearing 68
OKW consistently supported Rommel’s
betrayal and severe consequences for failure, requests. See Zimmermann et al., OB West,
began to underestimate their strength and 49–50; Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 66. Rund-
overestimate enemy capabilities. See Megargee, stedt also disagreed with Rommel in flooding
Inside Hitler’s High Command, 204. wide areas of the countryside, believing it was
40
Heiber and Glantz, Hitler and His Gener- too hard on the local population. On this mat-
als, 959. ter, OKW stepped in to side with Rommel. See
41
Ibid., 963; Isby, Fighting the Invasion, Zimmermann et al., OB West, 53.
88. 69
Brett-Smith, Hitler’s Generals, 34.
42
These troops were reported to have 70
Heiber and Glantz, Hitler and His Gener-
fought well at D-Day. See Heiber and Glantz, als, 970.
Hitler and His Generals, 438, 970. 71
Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 37.
43
Ibid., 965; Liddell Hart, The German 72
JP 5-0, Joint Planning, IV-28.
Generals Talk, 236–237. 73
Normandy was listed as the third most
44
Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 91. likely invasion target, after the Fifteenth Army
45
JP 5-0, Joint Planning, IV-19–IV-40. English Channel sector and the Fifteenth Army
46
Zimmermann et al., OB West, 41. Seine estuary sector. See Zimmermann et al.,
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