ARISTOTLE'S CIRCULAR TELEOLOGY
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ARISTOTLE’S CIRCULAR TELEOLOGY
Juan Pablo Bermúdez Rey
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
In this paper I will present my interpretation of Aristotle’s final causality. In the first
part, I refer to the questions that have been considered primary for a study of
Aristotelian teleology, I mention some traits of the currently dominant interpretative
tendency, and I expose some problems I find in it. In the second part, I offer a new
interpretation, which I call circular teleology hypothesis, whereby I try to preserve the
favorable aspects of the current interpretative tendency and at the same time face the
problems it leaves unsolved.
1. THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS & THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION
1.1. The Fundamental Questions of Aristotle’s Teleology
According to Allan Gotthelf (1997: 72-75), a complete interpretation of Aristotle’s
teleology must answer three main issues:
1) Issues about the basis of teleology: What trait(s) must a phenomenon have for it to be
teleologically explicable? That is, what is(are) the feature(s) such that, if a given
phenomenon has it(them), it is teleologically explicable, and if it does not, it is not
teleologically explicable?
2) Issues about the analysis of teleological explanations: What are the basic categories of
teleological explanations? Is the structure of the teleological explanation the same for
every kind of phenomenon, or does it vary?
3) Issues about the extent of teleological explanations: What entities or processes can
receive teleological explanations, and what entities cannot (e.g. human actions, organic
parts and processes, the unmoved mover, rainfall, transformations of the sublunary
elements, heavenly motions)?
Gotthelf claims that the boundaries between the three questions are blurry, so an
answer to one of the questions would most surely give clues or presuppose particular
answers to the other questions. For Gotthelf, however —and he seems to be right—,
the most fundamental of the three questions is the one about the basis, because in
order to justify an answer to the second or the third questions, a reference to an
interpretation of the first one would be necessary (cf. Gotthelf 1997: 75). So the best
starting point for an interpretation of Aristotelian final causality is defining the basis
of teleology.
1.2. The Currently Dominant Interpretative Tendency
The question about the basis of Aristotelian teleological explanations has been
answered in many diverse ways (many of which are classified and resumed in Gotthelf
1997). However, a prominent feature of some of the theories about the basis is that
they have as a consequence that the extent of teleological explanations is restricted tobiological phenomena and human action: those interpretations exclude the possibility
of assigning a teleological role to all other kinds of phenomena of the Aristotelian
cosmos —e.g. those relative to the simple and celestial bodies—. Two examples of
such interpretative tendency are the following:
1. Allan Gotthelf (1987) contends that Aristotle uses teleology for explaining
phenomena which cannot be completely explained by means of merely material
explanations. Material explanations are those which only make reference to “element-
potentials”, i.e. the powers of motion and transformation of the elemental bodies.
Thus, only the phenomena which cannot be entirely explained by reference to element-
potentials may be considered teleological. The main feature of teleological
explanations is thus that they make reference to a different kind of potential:
“potential for form”, which is irreducible to element-potentials. According to this, a
phenomenon is teleological if, and only if, element-potentials are not enough to
explain it, that is, if irreducible potentials for form must be mentioned in the
explanation.
From this interpretation of the teleological basis it follows that it is impossible to
explain the motions and transformations of the single bodies teleologically, since they
are entirely explainable by reference to element-potentials. Only biological or human
phenomena can legitimately receive a teleological explanation.
2. According to James G. Lennox (2001e), every teleological process follows a structure
he calls formal replication: A form, which exists at the beginning of the process
instantiated in an entity, coordinates all the stages of the process in such a way that
the final result is a new entity which exemplifies exactly the same form that
coordinated the process. This replication process occurs in human art and in the
reproduction of living beings (those not generated spontaneously): In art the form
preexists in the artist’s soul and is transmitted to the product through the artist’s
tools; in living organisms, the form exists in the male, adult organism and is
transmitted to its offspring through semen.
Teleology, according to this interpretation, is linked with organic reproduction or
artistic production and is thus only applicable to the biological and human realm. The
formal replication scheme is not applicable to the motions of the heavenly bodies —
since they do not participate in generation— or the transformations sublunary simple
bodies —since they are not living beings—.
If the recent history of Aristotelian exegesis is taken under account, the fact that
teleology is in many cases strongly attached to biology seems natural. During the last
half century, what might be called a ‘paradigm change’ has been occurring in the
studies of Arisotle’s philosophy: Thanks to the pioneering works of David Balme, the
philosophical significance of Aristotle’s biological writings has been for the first time
taken into account. Those scholars influenced by Balme (e.g. Gotthelf and Lennox)
have continued to underline the importance of Aristotle’s biological ideas for the
interpretation of the more traditional and popular aspects of his thought. The fact
that the philosophy of biology has become a cardinal subject for English-speaking
philosophers has also contributed to the popularity of the biological tendency of
interpretation.
1.3. Two Problems of the Biological Interpretative Tendency
Just like any interpretative tendency, the emphasis on biological issues sheds light onsome previously underrated aspects of Aristotelian thought, and leaves aside other
issues, formerly held as central to understand Aristotle's philosophy.
One aspect of Aristotle’s thought that has been vehemently defended by the
biological interpreters is that Aristotle’s teleology is immanent in two important ways:
1. Finality in natural phenomena of the Aristotelian cosmos does not depend on external
agents, such as the Timaeus’ Demiurge. Rather, the good or usefulness in natural
processes is due to the very nature of each entity; no reference to external creators or
organizers is needed. There is no cosmic artisan in Aristotle’s universe (cf. e.g. Kahn
1985: 185 & Balme 1987: 275).
2. Each natural being is the end (i.e. the beneficiary) of its own motions. This means that
when an entity performs a natural teleological process, the end of that process is the
good of the natural entity that performs the process —not the good of any other
different entity— (cf. e.g. Balme 1987: 278-279, Johnson 2005: 3-5).
Now, some aspects of Aristotelian thought are obscured due to the new emphasis on
biology, and that may cause biological interpretations some problems:
i) The unmoved mover seems to have no important teleological role in the cosmos:
In an especially famous passage of the Metaphysics, Aristotle claims that the
unmoved mover participates in the for the sake of which in the sense that it
«causes motion by being loved» by the other beings (Met. XII.7.1072b3), and
asserts that «heaven and nature depend upon such a principle» (Ib. 1072b13-14).
Regardless of the particular interpretation of these passages one is to accept, it
seems undeniable that the unmoved mover should have a pretty important role in
the teleological landscape of Aristotle’s cosmos. However, biological
interpretations tend to consider that the teleological role that Aristotle assigns to
the unmoved mover is unimportant to account for Aristotelian teleology (cf.
Gotthelf 1987: 210 n.13).
ii) Some phenomena have an end but are not teleological: A fundamental principle of
Aristotle’s natural teleology is that «nature does everything for the sake of
something» (Resp. 3.471b25-26 & PA I.1.641b12).1 If, however, nature does
everything for the sake of something, shouldn’t this be applied to all natural
beings, including the elements and heavenly bodies? For Aristotle claims that
simple bodies are natural (Phys. II.1.192b8-12), and that the motion of every
simple body has an end (telos) to which it tends, namely arriving at its natural
place (Phys. IV.1.208b9-22), and he says heavenly bodies are living beings who
move for an end (Cael. II.12). But the biological tendency, by restricting the scope
of teleology, would force us to make a distinction between phenomena which have
an end and teleological phenomena. Must we say that, although nature makes
everything for the sake of something, it only works teleologically with respect to
living sublunary beings, and not regarding the elements or the stars (cf. Gotthelf
1987: 211-213)? That seems odd.
If what has been said so far is correct, we must conclude that a strictly biological
interpretation of teleology implies (I) ignoring the teleological role of the unmoved
mover, and (II) distinguishing between for-the-sake-of-something phenomena and
1 Cf. some variations of the principle: DA III.12.434a31-32; Somn. 455b17-18; IA 704b15-18;
GA 738a37-738b1; PA 687a16; EN 1099b21-22. (Also cf. Lennox 2001d).teleological phenomena. This passage by David Balme seems to be a clear example of
the latter:
If there is ‘teleology’ in the movements of the heavens (though really this is a misuse
of the word), it has no connection with natural teleology on earth. For the stars, sun
and planets consist of a separate element, aither, which does not exist on earth and
naturally moves in circles. Their movements cause the earth’s seasons, and therefore
exert a general influence upon growth, but nothing more detailed.2 The sublunary
elements, air earth fire and water, act teleologically only when they are part of a living
body; outside that (for instance in the occurrence of rainstorms) there is no final cause
acting on them. Aristotle confines natural teleology to sublunary life (Balme 1987:
277; italics are mine).
I have tried to argue that the confinement defended here by Balme seems to be
problematic in the light of some important Aristotelian passages, for (i) it does not
provide a satisfactory account of the relations between supralinary and sublunary
beings; (ii) by failing to do so, it denies an important influence of the unmoved mover
in sublunary life (since the unmoved mover's influence seems to be transmitted
through the supralunary to the sublunary entities); and (iii) by denying that teleology
is applicable to simple bodies, it forces us to make a paradoxical distinction between
teleological phenomena and end-directed phenomena.
I believe all the problems of biological interpretations mentioned here are
present in such interpretations due to what might be called a teleological paradox: As
we have seen, a thesis that biological interpreters defend by all means is that
Aristotle's teleology is immanent. But if we accept a strong interpretation of the idea
that 'nature always works for an end', we seem to be necessarily forced to deny
teleological immanence to some extent. For if we accept the idea that elemental
transformations (e.g. rainfall) are for the sake of something, we must state what they
are for, and are thus tempted to say that rainfall exists for the sake of plantations, so
that they may grow. Such a view would imply denying the absolute immanence of
teleology.3
2 This seems to be a third problem of biological interpretations: they provide no satisfactory
account of the relations between the sublunary and the supralunary zones, even though
Aristotle says things such as that the cause of a man is his father and the sun (Phys. II.
2.194b13) and that the motion of the sun is cause of the continuity of sublunary generation
and destruction (GC. II.10). There seems to be something “more detailed” behind such claims.
A purpose of this paper is to take them seriously.
3 The two most famous defenders of the teleology of rainfall, David Furley (1985) and David
Sedley (1991) argue for a non-immanent (even anthropocentric) view of Aristotelian teleology.
Many philosophers with a biological tendency have strongly criticized their views (Wardy
1993; Lennox 2001: 201 n.5; Johnson 2005: 149-157 & Judson 2005). There seems to be a
strong tendency to believe that accepting the teleology of rainfall (or any other elemental
phenomenon) leads directly to the denial of teleological immanence. (That seems to explain
why Johnson's (2005) account of the teleology of the elements ends up contradicting itself:
First he defends the thesis that elemental transformations are teleological (145-149), but then
he dedicates seven pages (149-157) to attack the idea that meteorological events such as
rainfall —clearly a case of elementary transformations— are teleological.)A similar paradox follows from accepting a strong influence of the unmoved
mover in all of nature: some interpreters would take such influence as evidence for a
cosmic teleology, which embraces all of the natural entities directing them to a single,
universal good: the good of each entity would be subsumed under the good of the
whole universe. Since such an account would imply denying teleological immanence,
biological interpreters tend to reject the teleological importance of the unmoved
mover as a principle upon which all heaven and nature depend. The same kind of
problem follows from giving teleological importance to the connections between
sublunary and supralunary entities: that seems to imply a sort of cosmic teleology
harmful to a strong immanent account of final causality.
However, Aristotle's view of nature demands us to take seriously the ideas that
everything nature does is for the sake of something, that the unmoved mover is a
teleological principle, and that there is a strong connection between the supralunary
and a sublunary worlds. Anyway, one of the achievements of biological interpretations
is the defense of the idea that the very essence of nature (a teleological principle of
motion internal to each entity) implies that we cannot weaken immanence in any way.
So we must find a way to take the former ideas seriously, without weakening
immanence in any degree.
As a conclusion of the first part of this paper, I propose that if we want to
advance in the interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology, we must look for an answer to
the question of the basis that, at the same time, preserves the achievements of the
biological interpretations (such as immanence) and avoids their problems (such as an
excessive limitation of the extent of teleology and a disavowal of the importance of
the unmoved mover).
I go on to advance an answer intended to do just that. To the question of the basis
of Aristotelian teleology, the circular teleology hypothesis —which I will now
introduce and support— answers that a phenomenon is teleologically explicable if, and
only if, it is a circular motion or an imitation of circular motion. In what follows I will
develop an argument in favor of the hypothesis.
2. THE CIRCULAR TELEOLOGY HYPOTHESIS
The hypothesis is based upon some of the principles of Aristotle’s conception of the
cosmos, so it is necessary to offer a brief summary of his cosmology as the first part
of the argument.
2.1. Aristotelian Cosmology, Exposed as Concisely as Possible
2.1.1: The Constitutive Elements of the Cosmos – Aristotle’s cosmos is divided in two
parts: the supralunary region, inhabited by the celestial bodies (the fixed stars, the five
planets, the Sun and the Moon), and the sublunary region, inhabited by ourselves and
the bodies around us. All the bodies of the Aristotelian cosmos either are constituted
by simple bodies or are simple bodies, so called ‘elements’. There are five kinds of
simple bodies: Ether, on the one hand, which conforms the celestial bodies; and fire, air,
water and earth, on the other, which constitute all of the bodies of the sublunaryregion. Each one of these four bodies is characterized as having a distinctive pair of
primary qualities. Such qualities are distributed among the four sublunary elements
thus (cf. GC II.2-3.):
FIRE AIR WATER EARTH
Hot X X
Cold X X
Dry X X
Moist X X
There are important differences between the existence of the sublunary elements and
the ether: Whereas the latter, existing eternally, is not subject to generation or
destruction, the sublunary elements are generated and destroyed by transforming into
one another. A transformation of a sublunary element into another occurs when one
(or more tan one) of its qualities changes into its opposite. For example, when the
water’s coldness changes into heat, what once was water (cold+moist) becomes air (hot
+moist) (cf. GC II.4).
2.1.2: Natural motions & places of the elements – Aristotle’s cosmos is spheric, its
center coinciding with the center of the earth, its limits corresponding to the
concentric sphere which is further from the center, inhabited by the fixed stars. To
each of the simple bodies naturally belongs a simple motion, according to which it
moves, unless something impedes it —i.e. unless it is forced by something external to
move against its natural tendency— (Cael. I.2.269a2-4, I.7.274b2-3). Aristotle
recognizes two kinds of simple motion: circular motion —i.e. locomotion around the
central point— and rectilinear motion —i.e. motion towards the center or away from it
and towards the periphery—; all other motions are combinations of those two (Cael. I.
2.268b17-22).
The natural motion of ether is circular locomotion around the center of the
cosmos; each of the sublunary elements, on the other hand, moves by nature according
to a particular kind of rectilinear motion: earth moves towards the center of the
cosmos and fire moves toward the periphery, thereby occupying the inner and outer
extremes of the sublunary region; water and air occupy the intermediate place
between fire and earth, and their natural motions are opposed to one another in the
same way fire and earth’s motions oppose reciprocally. The hot elements —fire and air
— are light: they tend to move upwards, away from the center; and cold elements —
water and earth— are heavy: they tend to descend, to move closer to the center (Phys.
IV.5.212a20-31; GC II.3.330b30-331a1).
From this it follows that each of the elements has a proper place in the Aristotelian
cosmos. The proper place of the element x is the place toward which x moves
naturally —unless something impedes it—, having arrived at which x naturally stops
(Phys. IV.1.208b9-22). Thus the sublunary elements are ordered according to its
proper place, from the nearest to the center to the furthest: earth, water, air, fire.
Now, if each of the sublunary elements has a proper place in which it rests by
its own nature, arguably ether should also have a proper place in which it stops? Onthis issue, Aristotle says: «Everything that moves stops when it arrives at its proper
place, but for the body [which moves] in circles, the place where it started and the
place at which it arrives are the same» (Cael. I.9.279b1-3). Thus, since for an ethereal
body the starting point and the point of arrival are one and the same, when it
completes one turn, it immediately starts a new one. Its motion is thus continuous.
A body which naturally moves in a straight line cannot stay in motion
continuously, for either it arrives at its proper place and rests, or it is stopped by the
action of another body. Instead, a heavenly body which moves in circles moves
continuously for all eternity (Cael. I.3; Met. XII.8.1973a24-b3).
2.1.3: Circular motion & rectilinear motion – Aristotle's theory of motion (Phys. III.1)
considers four different kinds of change: (I) change of place or ‘locomotion’, (II)
change in quantity, (III) change in quality (IV) generation and destruction. In the eigth
book of the Physics, Aristotle establishes a hierarchy among the four kinds of change,
according to their level of perfection. The conclusion is that locomotion is the most
perfect kind of motion, because it can be produced without the other motions being
produced but none of the others can be produced without it; because it is the first one
according to time, for eternal entities —namely the heavenly bodies— only change by
moving from one place to another; and because locomotion appears in the most perfect
entities —i.e. in the superior animals and in the heavenly bodies— (Phys. VIII.7).
After having established that, Aristotle proceeds to classify the two kinds of
locomotion according to their level of perfection: «The beginning of [rectilinear]
motion does not coincide with the end of the preceding motion, whereas in a circular
movement [beginning and end] coincide, and it is thus the only perfect motion» (Phys.
VIII.8.264b19-29). So, since a body which moves rectilinearly goes from one place
which is not its proper place, to its proper place, and there it stops, beginning and end
do not coincide in rectilinear motion; whereas a body which moves in circles starts and
ends its motion in the same place, and that makes the continuity and eternity of its
motion possible.
Thus circular motion is the paradigmatic case of motion in the Aristotelian
cosmos. It is the most perfect activity a natural entity can perform in the Aristotelian
cosmos, since it is the only one that can be eternal, and the eternal is more perfect than
the impermanent. 4
Although only celestial bodies can move in circles, their circular motion produces
powerful echoes in the sublunary region: due to their influence, the process of
generation and destruction of natural sublunary entities is continuous (cf. GC II.10;
Met. XII.6.1072a9-18). Before explaining how this happens, it is necessary to mention
the motions of the heavens and particularly of the sun.
4 The term 'perfect' (teleios) is related to the term 'end' (telos), so although the latter does not
appear in the passages discussed, the presence of the former gives a teleological scent to the
hierarchy of motions built by Aristotle in the last book of the Physics. Thus, the thesis that
circular motion is the most perfect motion suggests that it is the best motion, in the sense that
it is the only motion capable of eternal performance. Its capability of eternity is what makes
circular motion the paradigmatic case of motion.2.1.4: The motions of the sun & the other heavenly bodies – Aristotle accepted the
basic structure of Eudoxus’ astronomical theory (cf. Met. XII.8), which explains the
apparent motion of the heavens by means of a system of concentric spheres in which
heavenly bodies are fixed. The fixed stars, embedded in a sphere whose center is the
center of the universe, circle around the center once a day, moving from east to west,
with a constant speed and direction.
Such mechanism suffices to account for the apparent motion of the fixed stars, but
the motion of the other heavenly bodies (i.e. the sun, the moon and the five planets
known at the time) is more complex. As regards the sun, it not only seems to describe
a circle similar to that of the fixed stars each day: it also has an annual apparent
motion with respect to the fixed stars. Throughout one year, the sun travels around
the constellations of the Zodiac, describing a circle that is inclined with respect to the
circle described by the fixed stars.
To explain this phenomenon, Eudoxus posited the existence of a sphere that
makes the sun move in a way analogous to the motion of the fixed stars, and a second
sphere, whose axes are fixed within the first sphere and inclined with respect to the
axes of the first one. The second sphere confers an additional motion to the sun: it
makes the sun move in the direction opposite to that of the first motion (i.e. from west
to east), and completes a full circle in a year. This makes the sun describe an inclined
and contrary motion with respect to the motion of the stars during along a whole
year. We call the sun's inclined circle ecliptic.5 Image 1 shows the ecliptic's inclination
in relation to the 'celestial equator', i.e. the circle perpendicular to the axis of the
sphere of the fixed stars. 6
According to Aristotle, the motion of the sun along the ecliptic is the efficient
cause of the continuous generation and destruction of the elements (GC II.10.336a15-
b24), of meteorological phenomena (Meteo. I.2.339a21-32), of the human being (Phys.
II.2.194b13; Met. XII.5.1071a13-17) and, in general, of any other sublunary natural
motion (Cael. II.1.284a2-11). Let us see how this occurs.
2.1.4: The inclined circle & sublunary beings – Aristotle asserts that the circular
motion of the celestial bodies is the cause of both generation and destruction. But a
simple motion cannot be the cause of both generation and destruction, for one thing
cannot be the cause of both something and its opposite; further, if two phenomena are
causes of contrary processes, those two phenomena must be contraries themselves.
This is where the multiple motion of the sun plays its role. The inclined circle
makes the sun move with a double, contrary motion: thanks to its inclined motion, it
approaches and moves away from the earth. While it approaches, it produces
generation; whereas while it moves away it causes destruction. Since the sun's process
of approaching and moving away from the earth is continuous and eternal, the
subsequent process of generation and destruction of sublunary beings becomes
5 Eudoxus added a third sphere to the explanation of solar motion, and Calippus proposed
two more. Although Aristotle followed both proposals, he did not give these extra spheres
importance for the explanation of sublunary phenomena, so I will leave them aside.
6 Image 1: WIKIPEDIA .continuous and eternal too (GC II.10.336a15-b24)
There seems to be something odd here. How can it be that the sun, while
embedded in a sphere whose center is the very center of the earth, approaches and
moves away from earth itself ? Wouldn't the sun necessarily be always at the same
distance from the earth, since its orbit is circular? Certainly the Sun is always at the
same distance from the earth considered as a whole. But, due to the inclination of the
circle of the ecliptic, its distance varies with regard to each hemisphere: Since the
circle is inclined, during half of the sun's path it will move to the north of the celestial
equator line, which means it will be closer to the northern than to the southern
hemisphere. And the opposite happens during the other half of the sun's annual circle:
when it goes further south than the line of the equator, it is closer to the southern
than to the norhtern hemisphere. Thus, although the sun is always at the same
distance from the earth taken as a whole, it approaches and moves away from each
hemisphere. Image 2 helps visualize the sun's approaching and moving away from the
hemispheres.7
The sun is the motive cause of sublunary generation and destruction because,
when it approaches, its fast motion generates heat that pervades the atmosphere and
makes the cold elements turn into hot elements and thus move upwards in the form of
steam or vapour. And when the sun moves away, the contrary process occurs: as the
heat of the atmosphere dissipates, hot elements turn into cold elements and move
down. Such a process is repeated continuously and eternally, just like the annual
motion of the sun. A special example of these sublunary transformations is rainfall.
2.1.5: Rainfall & circular motion – Since rainfall has had great importance in recent
discussions about Aristotelian teleology (Furley 1985, Sedley 1991, Wardy 1993,
Judson 2005, Johnson 2005: 149-158; supra n. 3), it will be useful to examine how
exactly Aristotle relates rainfall to the motion of the sun in his Meteorology, for it will
allow us later to defend a position regarding the teleology of rainfall:
Therefore, the first and dominant principle as mover is the circle in relation to which
the motion of the sun —which rarifies or condenses when it comes closer or further
away— is the evident cause of generation and destruction.
While the earth remains at its place, the moist which surrounds it (=water) is
taken upwards by being transformed into steam (=air) by the rays and by the other
heat that comes from above; then, when the lifting heat leaves [the moist], (partially
dispersed to the higher zone, partially weakened by going further towards the air
above the earth), the steam condenses again by cooling due to the loss of heat and
the place, and from air water is generated; and having been generated again, it is
taken towards the earth.
[…]
And so comes to be this circle that imitates de circle of the sun; for just like the
latter moves to the sides, the former moves up and down. And it is necessary to
consider this as a river which flows in circles upwards and downwards, common to
air and water; for when the sun is close, the river of steam flows upwards, and when
it moves away, the river of water flows downwards. And this wants to be generated
continuously according to this order (Meteo. i.9.346b16-347a12).
7 Image 2: HYPERPHYSICS .The continuity of rainfall is an example of how the influence of the sun makes the
processes of generation (and destruction) of sublunary beings continuous. Rainfall in
particular, and generation of sublunary beings in general, «imitates circular motion»
in that it is a continuous and eternal process, and a process whose beginning and end
are identical. Let us expand those features shared by sublunary natural processes and
circular movement a little further:
[Identity between beginning & end] It has been said (supra, 2.1.2) that what
distinguishes circular from rectilinear motion is that, whereas a body moving
rectilinearly (e.g. water falling from the sky) stops when it arrives at its proper place, a
body moving in circles never stops, for its place of arrival and its place of departure
are one and the same. In the passage cited above, Aristotle seems to imply that
something analogous happens in the case of rainfall: its starting point is identical to
its point of arrival. That becomes clear by analyzing rainfall as composed of two
stages: [1] water (moist+cold), which lies in the place proper to the cold, becomes
steam (moist+hot) and ascends to the place of the hot. Then, [2] steam (moist+hot)
condenses and becomes water (moist+cold), and thus falls to the place of the cold. The
final state of the process, at the end of stage 2, is identical to the initial state, at the
beginning of stage 1. Thus the beginning of rainfall is identical to its ending; or, as
Aristotle would say, rainfall can be seen as a motion which goes, not from A to B, but
from A to A. And that is circular behavior!
[Continuity & eternity] It is undeniable that rainfall is a phenomenon composed of
rectilinear motions (air's motion upwards and water's motion downwards). But, unlike
the rectilinear motions of those elements considered separately, which necessarily
stop, rainfall shares with circular motion its continuity, for, since the sun makes stage 2
occur after stage 1, and then makes 1 occur again… and so on continuously, rainfall
will take place continuously as long as its cause is present. And its cause has been and
will be present for ever. It follows that its effect has also occured and will keep
occurring eternally. Therefore, rainfall is a continuouos and eternal process in the
Aristotelian cosmos. (The same applies to all other sublunary phenomena governed by
the sun's motion.)
That is what it means for a sublunary motion to imitate circular movement. 8
Having already resumed the basic aspects of Aristotle's cosmology, let us complete the
the argument for the circular teleology hypothesis.
2.2. The circular teleology hypothesis
8 In an excellent passage, Johnson (2005: 147-149) argues that the 'imitation' of the motion of
the heavens by the sublunary elements is to be understood as 'resemblance', and not as a
conscious emulation of circularity. I agree entirely. What I would like to add to Johnson's
analysis is that circular supralunary motion and sublunary motions caused by the sun resemble
each other in that (i) the beginning and the end are identical, and (ii) the motion is continuous
and eternal.At this point it is convenient to summarize and remember the goal of this inquiry. The
fundamental issue of Aristotelian teleology is the one relative to its basis, i.e. the
question about the feature(s) that any given phenomenon must have to be considered
teleological. The biological interpretative tendency, currently dominant in Aristotelian
exegesis, correctly defends the idea that Aristotelian teleology must be considered
immanent, but while trying to defend the immanence of teleology, it seems to meet
three problems: (i) it tends to leave aside the unmoved mover's teleological role; (ii) it
limits the extent of teleology to biological and human phenomena, and thus forces us
to accept that there are processes that are natural and thus end-directed, but not
teleological; and (iii) it leaves the connection between sublunary and supralunary
entities unexplained. The purpose of this text is to put forward an answer to the
question of the basis of teleology that would solve the problems of the current
interpretative tendency, while preserving its strong immanence.
Such an answer will be attainable after analyzing a passage from On generation
and destruction, to which we will now turn.
2.2.1: Analysis of the teleological argument in GC II.10 – GC II.10 begins with a
mechanical-efficient argumentation which concludes that generation and destruction of
sublunary beings is continuous due to the motion of the sun around the ecliptic
(336a15-b24; cf. supra, 2.1.4). But that is not the only line of argument that Aristotle
uses to justify the continuity of generation and destruction: After concluding his
mechanical argument, Aristotle seems to argue for the same thesis (namely that
generation and destruction are continuous) from a teleological perspective:
As has been said, generation and destruction will always be continuous, and will never
cease, due to the cause we have talked about. And it is reasonable that this happens; for
since we say that in everything nature always does the better, and being is better than
not being […], and it is impossible for it [i.e. 'being'] to be present in every thing due
to the fact that some things are distant from the principle, the god filled up the
universe in the remaining way, making generation continuous; for thus he unifies
being in the highest degree, since the closest thing to being is that generation also be
generated forever.
And the cause of this, as has been said many times, is circular locomotion, for it is
the only one that is continuous. That is also why all other things which transform
reciprocally according to their affections and powers —e.g. simple bodies— imitate
circular translation; for when air generates from water, and fire from air, and then
water from fire, we say that generation has completed the circle, because it has come
back again. Therefore rectilinear locomotion which imitates circular locomotion is
continuous (336b25-337a7).
Let us try to restate the most important aspects of this argument:
1. The nature of each thing always strives for the better (beltion).
[In other words: out of two possible options, the nature of each thing will
always do the one that is better.]
2. Being is better (beltion) than not being.
3. In things which are distant from the principle, Being cannot be present.[In this context, Being = continuous and eternal activity.]
4. The closest thing to Being is continuous generation (for it becomes continuous
and eternal by imitating circular motion).
Therefore,
The nature of things which are distant from the principle always strives for
continuous generation.
Two things might need clarification: By «things which are distant from the principle»,
Aristotle means sublunary beings, which are distant from the principle upon which all
heaven and nature depends: the unmoved mover (Met. XII.7.1072b13-14). In this
context, then, «Being» cannot simply mean 'existing', for even sublunary beings exist,
and we need a sense of 'being' that is applicable to supralunary entities and not to
sublunary entities. And the ontological difference between sublunary and heavenly
beings is, as we have seen before, that the latter necessarily participate in generation
and destruction, whereas the former live an eternal existence of full activity (Met. IX.
8.1050b6-30). So «Being» should mean 'eternal continuous activity' in this context.
‘Being eternally and completely active’ is the most perfect sense of ‘being’ for
Aristotle. In fact, that is the unmoved mover's way of being, and we could say that is
why every being in the cosmos loves it: the Aristotelian god moves other beings
insofar as those beings wish to exist in the same way it exists, namely a full,
continuous, and eternal activity. That is why the unmoved mover —more precisely, the
mode of existence of the unmoved mover— is the end which all things in the universe
seek; thus it moves them as their end (Met. XII.7.1072a19-b4). But this does not oppose
to the immanence of teleology, for the nature of each natural entity seeks for its own
continuous and eternal activity. So every teleological process is inspired by the
unmoved mover, but that does not mean that it has produced the processes as a
craftsman, nor does it imply that a natural teleological process performed by a certain
entity has as its natural end the good of another entity. The unmoved mover's
primordial place in teleology is assured, and the immanence of teleology is preserved.
2.2.2: The teleology of circular motion – From the GC II.10 passage recently
examined, it can be inferred that the end which every natural being seeks is eternal
activity, i.e. God's mode of existence. And every kind of natural entity reaches that
end for itself in its own way and measure:
- Celestial bodies reach that goal by means of circular motion, which is the only
motion that can be continuous (Met. IX.8.1050b6-30).
- Sublunary beings, on the other hand, cannot move circularly, but can «participate in
the eternal and divine» by means of the imitation of circluar motion, that is, by
means of continuous generation:
o Simple bodies are continuously generated by means of processes of
continuous reciprocal transformation (eg. rainfall);
o Sublunary living beings are continuously generated by means of
reproduction.
How the simple bodies imitate circular motion through reciprocal transformations has
been previously explained along with the example of rainfall (supra, 2.1.5). Aboutcircular-imitative character of reproduction in living beings, it is pertinent to refer to
James G. Lennox's explanation of the formal replication process (2001e; cf. supra 1.2).
Such process can be understood as a case of imitation of circular motion, for the
beginning of the process (an adult form, instantiated in the male adult) is identical to
the end of the process (the same adult form, instantiated in its offspring), and the
process of reproduction is continuous and eternal.
The relation between reproduction, eternity and divinity is uncontroversial: it is
mentioned by Aristotle in several passages, such as this one, from De Anima which
presents reproduction as the most natural of the activities for living beings:
In living beings —in those which are complete and not mutilated, and do not have
spontaneous generation—, the most natural of their functions is to produce another
like itself (an animal an animal, a plant a plant) in order to participate in the eternal
and divine as much as possible; for every thing pursues this, and for the sake of this
they do the things they do by nature (DA II.4.415a26-b2).
Generally speaking, «beings which participate in motion —such as earth and fire—
imitate the indestructible entities, because even they are eternally active» (Met. IX.
8.1050b28-29). Particularly, organisms imitate the indestructible beings by means of
reproduction, for in reproduction beginning and end coincide, and through
reproduction each sublunary living being achieves eternal and continuous existence, as
far as it is possible for that kind of entity.
Now we can say that we have extended teleology to all natural entites
(including celestial bodies and sublunary elements) and explained the teleological
relation between supralunary and sublunary worlds, without compromising
teleological immanence. Events such as the motion of the stars or rainfall are
teleological in the sense that they are means through which the natural entities
involved reach the goal of eternal activity; and the relation of sublunary beings to
heavenly entities is that of imitation (the sun's mechanic effect on sublunary bodies
warrants the continuity and eternity of generation, and the identity of its beginning
and its end; those similarities give generative processes the teleological property of
imitation of the circular motions of the heavens).9 But all teleological processes
(elemental transformations, organic reproduction and heavenly motions) have as their
end the good of the natural entities that perform it, thus assuring immanence, and
thus, although teleology implies a certain imitative, cosmic hierarchy, in any case does
it imply that the good of the individual entity must be subordinated to some sort of
overarching cosmic good.
2.2.3: Conclusions – In order to conclude, let us go back to our starting point (supra,
1.1). This paper has the purpose of answering the question about the basis of
teleology (‘What feature(s) must a given phenomenon have to be teleologically
explainable?’) preserving teleological immanence and avoiding the problems of
9 The relation that becomes visible here between the mechanic effect of the sun and the
teleological imitative causality that stems from it raises the question of the relation between
efficient and final causality, which will not be dealt with here, but would be interesting to
investigate in the future.biological interpretations. The conclusions to which this reasoning has taken us thus
far are that (i) the end of every natural being is its eternal and continuous activity,
which is equivalent to the mode of existence of the unmoved mover, (ii) and that
natural entities reach eternal activity by means of circular motion or some sort of
imitation of circular motion. Thus our answer to the question about the basis of
teleology goes like this:
• CIRCULAR TELEOLOGY HYPOTHESIS: A phenomenon is teleologically
explainable if, and only if, it is a circular motion or an imitation of circular
motion.
This hypothesis is an interesting answer to the basis question because it allows to
preserve the immanence of Aristotelian teleology and at the same time solve the
previously mentioned problems of the biological interpretative tendency (supra, 1.3):
1. Immanence – Circular motion or its imitation are the natural immanent tendency of
each natural being, and to explain it there is no need to recur to a cosmic designer:
nature (i.e. the inner motive principle of each natural being) suffices to explain it all.
Plus, the goal of every natural being is its own eternity. So the hypothesis preserves
teleological immanence.
2. God's teleological role – The unmoved mover (or more precisely: its mode of
existence) is the end which every natural entity loves and seeks, i.e. eternal continuous
activity.
3. The extent of teleology in nature – Teleology covers all regular natural phenomena,
whether they are relative to simple sublunary bodies, living sublunary organisms or
celestial bodies. All of them, in fact, are either circular motions or imitations of
circular motion, and seek the eternity of the entity or entities involved in them.
4. The connection between the supralunary and the sublunary – Sublunary entities
imitate circular motion in the sense that, thanks to the sun's dual motion, their natural
motions are eternal and continuous processes, and in them beginning and end are
identical.
- Bogotá, Colombia
May 2007BIBLIOGRAPHY
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