ANALYSIS - THE ROLE OF FOREIGN ACTORS IN LIBYA: THE CASE OF PRESIDENT MACRON'S ENIGMATIC LIBYA POLICY - ORSAM
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ANALYSIS 273
J a n u a r y 2 0 2 1
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN ACTORS
IN LIBYA: THE CASE OF PRESIDENT
MACRON’S ENIGMATIC LIBYA POLICY
Abdennour Toumi
ANALİZ
Ocak 2021 26 Konu Başlığı
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Ankara - TURKEY ORSAM © 2021
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Publication Date: 31 January 2021
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ANALYSIS 273
January 2021
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN
ACTORS IN LIBYA: THE CASE
OF PRESIDENT MACRON’S
ENIGMATIC LIBYA POLICY
About Author
Abdennour Toumi
Abdennour Toumi, a journalist and a North African Studies expert at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM), received his PhD in
Toulouse University Political Science department. His articles are published in the National Turkish newspaper Daily Sabah English. He
worked as a lecturer at Portland Community College in the Department of Middle Eastern and North African studies. He was the reporter
at Maghreb & France Arab Daily News. Currently, he is the member of Paris France Arab-American Journalists Association and Chicago IL
USA. Mr. Toumi focuses on North Africa’s socio-political mutation, the role of Turkey in the region, immigration issues and North African
diaspora in France.
CONTENTS
3 INTRODUCTION
4 FRANCE ACCUSES TURKEY OF VIOLATING
ARMS EMBARGOES IN LIBYA
5 WHAT DOES PRESIDENT MACRON NEED FROM THE
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES?
7 FRANCE’S MILITARY PRESENCE IN LIBYA
10 FRANCE AND LIBYA FACE OFF IN CHAD’S CIVIL WAR
11 LIBYANS TALK AND TALK BUT DO NOT BUY
14 CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
rance’s foreign policy has been orchestrated a prudent foreign policy in office,
F known for its realism and stead-
fastness under all presidents of the
which matched his character and a long-run-
ning course of realpolitik designed by the first
French Fifth Republic.1 However, President socialist President François Mitterrand in the
Emmanuel Macron has shifted his foreign po- ‘80’s and early ‘90’s.
licy towards idealism unlike his predecessor
Francois Hollande, a paradigm that can put Unlike his late predecessors and despite
France’s foreign policy goals in the MENA his own constitutional attributes, foreign policy
region at great risk. The risk stems from the was not related directly to President Macron’s
challenges which idealism presents to the persona. Similarly, he did not place much em-
domestic political imperatives. phasis on it during his presidential campaign
in 2017, although he adopted a constructive
President Macron is haunted by the ghosts position on the E.U., a contrastingly aggres-
of one-term presidents like his predeces- sive one on Syria and a preemptive defense
sors President Nicolas Sarkozy and Presi-
policy in the Sahel, notably in Mali. He even
dent François Hollande. President Macron,
paid a visit to the French troops stationed in
however, has taken over an unusual determi-
Northern Mali on his very first day in office.
nant and objective of foreign policy from his
mentor and predecessor, former President Does President Macron really have a for-
François Hollande. President Hollande had eign policy in Libya? According to history
1
“How French Government Works”, Gouvernement.fr, https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/how-government-works, 2020.
www.orsam.org.tr 3
ANALYSIS 273
January 2021
The Role of Foreign Actors in Libya: the Case of President Macron’s Enigmatic Libya Policy
and geopolitics, France should. latest verbal escalation between
Nonetheless, President Macron the two countries’ presidents
has been displaying a style that over the French president’s dec-
is likely to push France into iso- larations on Islam and his poli-
lation because of his foreign cies with Muslims in France have
affairs and European minister, worsened the relations between
Jean-Yves Le Drian. For instance, the two countries.
in his anti-Turkey rhetorical style
in the last couple of months, FRANCE ACCUSES
while Turkey is a NATO ally and TURKEY OF VIOLATING
a major intelligence and military ARMS EMBARGOES IN
asset in the MENA region to fight LIBYA
the IS Organization in Syria and Beyond the maritime inci-
Iraq, Ankara was infuriated about dent, during a press meeting
undiplomatic French foreign af- last July the French Ministry of
fairs minister statements about Armed Forces said: “At the bot-
At the bottom of the Operation Peace Spring last tom of the case, there are repea-
the case, there fall. Last summer, with the naval ted violations of the embargo by
are repeated incident between France and Turkey and a record of falsificati-
violations of Turkey on June 10 off the Libyan ons and trafficking.” Paris indeed
the embargo coast - the Frigate Courbet in- denounced the Turkish military
by Turkey and cident - France accused Turkey intervention in Libya alongside
and took the case to a high in-
a record of the government of national unity
stance of NATO and did call the (GNA) of Tripoli, led by Premier
falsifications
EU Commission for more sanc- Fayez Al-Sarraj2 recognized by
and trafficking.
tions against Turkey. the U.N., and France protested
before participating again in Op-
With the latest tensions in
eration Sea Guardian.
the Eastern Mediterranean, in
which France explicitly sided In order to better understand
with Greece following Turkey’s France’s foreign policy in Libya,
gas drilling mission in the Med- it must be put into perspective.
iterranean, the tension is over For a long time, Paris had an
gas reserves and maritime rights ambiguous relationship with the
and has prompted fears that Al-Qaddafi regime. Over the last
tensions could escalate further century and a half, France has
between the two neighboring never had a coherent strategy
countries. Hence, Paris is bring- in Libya. French authorities have
ing down 71 years of principles been inconsistent and impatient
of collective security since the with this territory that acts as a
creation of NATO and since the kind of black hole for its MENA
adhesion of Turkey in 1952. The foreign policy framework. The
2
”Libya’s PM Fayez Al-Sarraj Reportedly Set To Resign”, Middle East Eye, 16 September 2020.
4 www.orsam.org.tr
Abdennour Toumi
history of Franco-Libyan relations is littered In desperate attempts President Macron
with diplomatic about-faces and they are less wants to bring together the two main bellig-
a sign of an in-depth understanding of the lo- erents in the Libyan armed conflict, LNA chief
cal realities than a sign of French single-mind- Khalifa Haftar and the GNA Premier Fayaz
edness in arbitrary or distorted interpretations Mustafa Al-Sarraj. However, President Ma-
of Libyan politics. cron’s latest initiative, is too little and too late
because of his ambiguous and paradoxical
The relations between the two countries
policy in Libya. President Macron domestical-
resembles a revival of Napoleonism while the
ly is facing serious socioeconomic challenges
French return to Libya is a strategic imperative
following the impact of COVID-19 crisis mis-
according to President Macron. However, re-
management, which has added as another
lations between Paris and Tripoli deteriorated
layer to the narrative in his presidential sto-
in 2019 only to worsen from the full support
ry-line campaign populist discourse in 2022.
of Khalifa Haftar by France. Meanwhile France
has been endorsing the legal government Such an initiative existed already in the
(GNA) in Tripoli led by Fayaz Al-Sarraj, head of frame of 5+5 Mediterranean dialogue creat-
the legitimate government recognized by the ed in 1990 in Rome as a sub-regional system,
international community. a security initiative to secure closer cooper-
ation between the five Western Mediterra-
In May 2018, France hosted a meeting in
nean E.U. member states and the five Arab
Paris bringing together Libya’s four principal
Maghreb countries. This was enhanced by the
competing leaders to endorse a roadmap for
Euro-Mediterranean conference in Barcelona
the country’s stalled peace process. This was
in 1992.3
to be sanctioned by key external stakehold-
ers, including the U.N. The proposed draft WHAT DOES PRESIDENT MACRON
agreement called for Libya to organize elec- NEED FROM THE NEIGHBORING
tions by the end of 2018, support adoption of a COUNTRIES?
constitutional framework, reintegrate military
“This re-engagement of the Libyan neigh-
forces through the ongoing Egypt-led secu-
bors is essential in the long-term,” said Presi-
rity dialogue and reunify financial institutions.
dent Macron in his speech to the United Na-
Thus, in September, President Macron, tions General Assembly. He did not, however,
considering his yearly UNGA speech, an- name which countries he wanted to involve in
nounced that he wanted to gather together the talks or elaborate on the details. Follow-
all of Libya’s neighboring countries to help ing the 2015 Shkirat Agreement, Morocco has,
find a solution to the country’s conflict. “This is to some extent, excelled in reviving this ac-
the initiative that France wishes to lead in the cord, despite its rejection by Haftar last sum-
coming weeks in conjunction with the Secre- mer. Yet Rabat has launched another round of
tary General of the United Nations, bringing peace talks last September in the Bouznika
together all the neighboring countries to help meeting in the province of Casablanca under
bring about the Libyan solution,” said Presi- the auspices of UN Interim Libya Special En-
dent Macron. voy, Stephanie T. Williams. This is to revive the
3
“The Barcelona Process Or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, Barcelona.com, https://www.barcelona.com/barcelona_news/
the_barcelona_process_or_euro_mediterranean_partnership#:~:text=The%20Barcelona%20Process%20or%20Euro%2DMediter-
ranean%20Partnership%20(Euromed),the%20Mashriq%20and%20Maghreb%20regions., 2020.
www.orsam.org.tr 5ANALYSIS 273
January 2021
The Role of Foreign Actors in Libya: the Case of President Macron’s Enigmatic Libya Policy
Libyan Political Dialogue Forum
spirit of the Skhirat Agreement, byan dialogue in Bouznika, re-
bringing again the Libyans’ polit- lated to the unification of the
ical rivals to the negotiation table sovereign positions included in
in Rabat. A peace talks process Article 15 of the Libyan Political
is taking place between Tunis, Agreement signed in Skhirat.
Tunisia and Tangier, Morocco.
This peace process could be
Libya has been in a state of cha-
The last time os since 2011 and divided since
a breakthrough if all sides stick
the peace talks 2014 between rival factions in to their promises, especially the
process was the east and west, with major in- Eastern side. As the United Nati-
ons has taken the leading role in
about a political stitutions also split or controlled
bringing all parties to the nego-
process but this by armed groups.
tiating table to discuss the po-
new round of Recently, Moroccan Foreign litical solution, it seems the UN
peace process Minister Nasser Bourita has said is trying to include a wide range
talks seems to that Libyan members of Par- of people, bringing all different
look to resolve liament meeting in Moroccan parties together without exclu-
the military Tangiers will decide the date ding any groups and is learning
issues such and place of the coming mee- a lesson from the past.
as the role of tings expected to take place in
foreign fighters Libya. He will strive to unify po- The last time the peace talks
process was about a political
in Libya. sitions on the outcomes of the
Libyan political dialogue, hoping process but this new round of
it would lead to a thaw between peace process talks seems to
the parties after years of division. look to resolve the military is-
The Moroccan Foreign Minister sues such as the role of foreign
explained that this meeting was fighters in Libya. The issue of
a reaffirmation of the understan- foreign fighters is a key factor in
dings reached by the Libyan-Li- deepening the conflict further,
6 www.orsam.org.trAbdennour Toumi
and that is why this time it is different than the legitimate government of Premier Fayaz Mus-
earlier ones. tafa Al-Sarraj, the Chairman of the Presiden-
tial Council of Libya and the Head of National
On the other hand, Algeria has been try-
Accord Government formed on 17 December
ing extremely hard since the election of Pres-
2015 in the country’s capital Tripoli.
ident Tebboune in December 2019 in Tunisia
and has fully supported a peace process and France has been involved in the Libyan
a political solution in Libya. Last June, Egypt conflict since the beginning of the Libyan up-
did launch a peace initiative in Libya that was rising against the Al-Qaddafi regime in 2011,
supported by France, the US, the United King- which led to the ousting of the Colonel Mua-
dom, Russia, Greece, Italy, the United Arab mmar Al-Qaddafi. France played a significant
Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, Alge- role in his capture, according to French mili-
ria, the Arab League, and the African Union. tary sources that were responsible for target-
ing the Libyan leader’s convoy, which led to
In November, in the Tunisian town of Gam- his capture and summary execution by the
marth, Libya’s rival factions met for another rebel forces.
round of a peace talks process brokered by
the United Nations Mission in Libya. The goal An investigation by the French newspa-
per, “Le Monde” in February 2016 revealed
has been to outline a roadmap to presidential
that France had secretly deployed its special
and parliamentary elections in the country.
forces and the operational arm, called “ser-
However, since the fall of the Libyan lead- vice action”, of the French General Directorate
er and the takeover of operations by NATO of External Security (DGSE) for very precise
forces, France has had three Presidents, Pres- strikes against targets designated as affiliates
idents Sarkozy, Hollande, and the current of the Islamic State in Libya. Its aim was to
President Macron, whose foreign affairs min- contain the eventual development of the IS
ister was President Hollande’s defense min- Organization threat in Libya.
ister. The situation got worse under President
Although Paris never acknowledged of-
Hollande and today it has become clear that
ficially providing weapons, training, intel-
Paris is not shying away from taking a side in
ligence, and Special Forces assistance to
the bloody conflict in Libya.
Khalifa Haftar, it seems that Paris had been in-
volved probably since 2015 in training Haftar’s
FRANCE’S MILITARY PRESENCE IN
military forces. Paris, under the orders of its
LIBYA
Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian, cur-
In the context of the Libyan civil war, the rently minister of foreign affairs, had decid-
French have a military presence in the North ed that Khalifa Haftar would be Libya’s next
African state. This is no secret to anyone, de- strongman to rule the country. Yet the latest
spite all efforts by the French ministries of de- developments on the ground are showing
fense and foreign affairs to hide the fact about the opposite.4 The death of three undercov-
French military and intelligence presence in er French soldiers in a helicopter crash in
Libya. They are supporting Haftar, a dual cit- Libya in 2016 while conducting an operation
izen (Libyan and American), and the ongoing against an “Islamist” group suddenly revealed
military struggle between his troops and the France’s secret presence in Libya.
4
“Haftar Losing Battles In Libya’s Civil War”, The Media Line, 23 December 2020.
www.orsam.org.tr 7ANALYSIS 273
January 2021
The Role of Foreign Actors in Libya: the Case of President Macron’s Enigmatic Libya Policy
On the other hand, Khalifa Haftar has made ment with the Emirati, Saudi, and Egyptian re-
no secret of the deal with France nor about gimes, to whom it has sold billions of dollars
the modern weaponry he had received from of weapons and who back Haftar.
Paris and the UAE during his debacle march
The three Arab countries distrust Al-Sar-
to Tripoli in Spring 2019. This was despite a
raj’s Tripoli-based government because of
U.N. arms embargo on Libya. In fact, Khalifa
the support it receives from Turkey and Qatar.
Haftar’s spokesman revealed at a press con-
Also, according to French reasoning, the con-
ference that a French naval force had docked
flict in Libya relates to the fight against “Islam-
at the Sidra oil terminal with the specific task
ic” terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel belt and the
of protecting the oil fields from attacks by Is-
continued struggle against terrorism at home,
lamists or by forces loyal to the Tripoli Gov-
and, more importantly, to fight political Islam
ernment.
in the region.
The spokesman said that the French task
force was composed of French military of- Backed by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi
ficers specializing in aviation and that their Arabia, Russia and Egypt, the “strongman” of
number was in the dozens. He noted that the the east recently is facing a challenge from
French contingent had emptied the port’s wa- Aquilla Salah,5 the head of the eastern Liby-
ter storage containers to fill them with fuel. an parliament in Tobruk. Khalifa Haftar feels
He further elaborated that Haftar’s forces en- emboldened by the support of important re-
joyed Emirati, Egyptian, and French support gional players, or proxy players, who are giv-
mainly in the form of intelligence assistance ing him legitimacy, France is said to be one of
and special forces stationed in Al-Kharruba them, although Paris publicly denies support-
base (east of Benghazi, in the middle of Cyre- ing Khalifa Haftar.
naica), six kilometers from a separate Libyan On the ground, however, the situation is
military base. far from certain. Khalifa Haftar has urged his
As the situation has unfolded in the Arab troops to inflict “an even harder” lesson on
press, France’s stance on the Libyan conflict forces loyal to the country’s internationally
is unclear. One of President Macron’s first dip- recognized government. They have put up a
lomatic initiatives as president in 2017 was to counter-offensive in the south and east, de-
invite the two competing heads of govern- spite a fragile cease fire that exists between
ment in Libya, Fayaz Al-Sarraj (Government of the Libyan armed rivals. Khalifa Haftar’s mi-
National Accord) and Haftar (Libyan National litias, however, have violated the agreement
Army), to try to broker a power-sharing deal. for the fourth time since it was declared last
month.
Now, as Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le
Drian was the architect of the “behind Haftar” Then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in
strategy, he has convinced president Macron the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, fully sup-
that he should bet on Haftar rather than on ported his country in the 2011 NATO-coalition
Al-Sarraj. France is the second importer of military intervention in Libya.6 Thus, France as
Libyan oil and this could be tied to Paris’ align- a pivotal European state ended up with the
5
“France Concedes Haftar In Libya Is A ‘Liability”, Anatolian Agency, 6 July 2020.
6
“Obama scolds Sarkozy over Libya”, Thelocal.fr, https://www.thelocal.fr/20160311/obama-scolds-sarkozy-over-libya , 11 March 2016.
8 www.orsam.org.trAbdennour Toumi
The 2011 NATO-coalition military intervention in Libya
decisions made by super-pow- acting “hypocritically” by collab-
ers that aligned with the national orating with authoritarian and
security interests of the non-Ar- corrupted regimes. However,
The French ab regional power countries like considering President Sarkozy’s
approach Turkey and Israel in the east- relations with the Libyan leader,8
towards its ern Mediterranean. In 2008, the France adopted a leading role in
allies in the Mediterranean Union became a the military and intelligence in-
region was full potential instrument of the dear tervention in Libya in 2011. Thus,
of rhetorical and individual efforts of Presi- the French approach towards
and cautionary dent Sarkozy who attempted to its allies in the region was full
discourses, and accelerate the process across of rhetorical and cautionary
never towards neighboring countries. This proj- discourses, and never towards
“regime change,” ect was fruitless7 because of the “regime change,” despite the
despite the high stake of heterogeneous overwhelming lack of legitimacy
strategic interests of fifteen dif- and credibility of those regimes.
overwhelming
ferent Mediterranean countries
lack of The reaction of Paris to the
including Libya and Turkey.
legitimacy and popular revolts in Tunisia and
credibility of In the face of France’s real- Egypt was bound by a “wait-and-
those regimes. politik stance on the MENA re- see” approach despite growing
gion before and during the Arab opposition towards the Arab re-
uprisings, Paris was accused of gimes. For instance, Madame Al-
7
“25 Years Of The Barcelona Process”, Union For The Mediterranean, 2020.
8
“Former French Leader Nicolas Sarkozy Haunted By Gaddafi’s Spy”, TRT World, 25 February 2019.
www.orsam.org.tr 9ANALYSIS 273
January 2021
The Role of Foreign Actors in Libya: the Case of President Macron’s Enigmatic Libya Policy
liot Marie, then-foreign minister coalition who were implement-
in President Sarkozy’s cabinet, ing Paris’ foreign policy. This was
had made the remarkable sug- under a “socialist” president and
gestion to equip Tunisian police foreign affairs minister Laurent
with metal sticks and modern Fabius.
helmets during the Jasmine up-
rising against President Ben Ali. FRANCE AND LIBYA FACE
According to Mme. Secretary OFF IN CHAD’S CIVIL
Alliot Marie who offered French WAR
“savoir-fer” before the MPs in Chad’s civil war (1979-1986)
the French Parliament in Janu- was turning into an international
ary 2011, it was a law-and-order confrontation, with France and
matter for the police to resolve.9 Libya as major foreign players.
Libya had occupied a par- Libyan-backed rebels of former
ticular place in French foreign President Goukhouni Woddei
Al-Qaddafi
policy, when viewed from the swept down from the North in a
warned that, major attempt to overthrow the
historical relations between the
‘’All foreign government of Hassan Habré. To
two countries. Paris’ foreign pol-
intervention stop them, France, as the former
icy became trapped between
in Chad will colonial power in the northern
two ways of thinking, like the
be considered diplomats in Quai d’Orsay or like central Sahelian African coun-
by us as an act the thinkers and the designers in try, has moved quickly to sup-
of war against Parisian Ivy schools (l’E.N.A. and ply President Habré with mod-
Libya.’ Sciences Po), universities and ern weapons, troop trucks, fuel,
think-tanks. Thus, the Gaullists and spare parts, as well as an
and the Atlanticists guided Paris’ undisclosed number of “civilian
foreign policy orientation. experts.’’ President François Mit-
terrand warned on a trip to Cam-
The ideologue Atlanticists,
eroon that, ‘’France must repeat,
however, have defended a for-
that it cannot accept reckless
eign policy close to Washington
actions that would make Chad
rather than seeking an indepen-
fall prey to foreign adventures.”11
dent foreign policy, pushing for
an idealist E.U. common foreign Libyan leader Muammar
policy.10 This was so, for instance, Al-Qaddafi’s next move was un-
when the U.S. was searching known, but some thought he
for allies to intervene in Syria in may send his troops into Chad
2013. Paris did not hesitate to just as he did in 1980.12 ‘’We have
participate with an international no intention of intervening,’’ he
9
“French Foreign Minister Alliot-Marie Quits Over Tunisia”, BBC News, 27 February 2011.
10
“Libya’s Lessons On Syria”, Foreign Policy, 4 September 2013.
11
William Echikson, “France and Libya facing off in Chad’s civil war”, Christian Science Monitor, 8 July 1983.
12
“Libya/Chad: Beyond Political Influence”, Crisis Group, 23 March 2010.
10 www.orsam.org.trAbdennour Toumi
told the French newspaper “Le Matin.” But the French admit that intervention this time
Al-Qaddafi warned that, ‘’All foreign interven- around is no more likely to create a lasting
tion in Chad will be considered by us as an peace than the last time.
act of war against Libya.’ and he added that
he thinks the United States is trying to broad- LIBYANS TALK AND TALK BUT DO
en the conflict by pushing Zaire, Sudan, and NOT BUY
Egypt to intervene.13 The recent relations between the two
countries can be summed up in three sym-
But the French were also worried about
bolic dates, representing the milestones of a
Libyan adventurism and a possible escalation
realpolitik that is now closing in like a trap on
on Al-Qaddafi’s part. The Libyan leader had
Libya as much as on France.
long talked of creating a “Pan-Islamic”14 em-
pire stretching across the Sahara and French • 2007, a Sarkozy-Gaddafi “honeymoon” pe-
officials said installing Mr. Woddei as Chad’s riod, as a U.S. ambassador put it.
leader would be a first step toward this goal.
• 2010, the moment of lost illusions has ar-
Such a design would threaten Egypt and Su-
rived, as demonstrated by the unvarnished
dan and both countries have joined France in
comment of a French diplomat: “The Liby-
announcing that they are prepared to ‘’take
ans, they talk, they talk but they don’t buy
measures’’ if the Libyan-backed intervention
anything (from us)”.15
of Chad continues.
• 2011, war - at France’s initiative.
Libyan meddling in sub-Saharan Africa
also scares Francophone West Africa. But The French highlight how Al-Qaddafi was
most of West Africa is looking to France for so recently, unambiguously and largely un-
protection from the Libyans. According to the successfully courted for his wealth before
French weekly magazine “Le Point,” the Pres- suddenly becoming a despot. He was worthy
ident of Guinea, Ahmed Sekou Touré, phoned of odium against whom Paris has led what
the Élysée Palace in Paris last week and re- interior minister and Sarkozy insider, Claude
minded a top adviser to President Mitterrand, Guéant, controversially called a “crusade.” The
‘’France has its responsibilities with regard to outcome of this appears increasingly uncer-
its former colonies.’’ Politically, Chad is a sad tain.
story. Since it became independent in 1960, it
The ambassador describes, not without
has lapsed into civil war after civil war. The ba-
irony, the “honeymoon” former President
sic division is between the Muslim north and
Nicolas Sarkozy enjoyed with the Libyan
the Christian and animist south. But personal
leader during a visit by the French president
and tribal animosities played a larger role in
to Tripoli on July 25th, 2007. The title of the ca-
recent developments.
ble is unambiguous: “President Sarkozy’s Trip
Considering Chad’s history and its ram- to Libya sets High hopes for Lucrative Con-
bunctious northern neighbor, however, even tracts.” 16
13
“Mot Clé: Zaïre 1971-1997”, Le Monde Diplomatique, October 2020.
14
Kim Willsher, “France’s Foreign Minister Did Speak To Tunisian President While On Holiday”, the Guardian, 16 February 2011.
15
“Special Briefing Via Telephone with Richard Norland, U.S. Ambassador To Libya”, U.S. Embassy In Libya, 5 June 2020.
16
“French ‘honeymoon’ to war: what US cables said about French courtship of Gaddafi”, Mediapart, 30 March 2011.
www.orsam.org.tr 11ANALYSIS 273
January 2021
The Role of Foreign Actors in Libya: the Case of President Macron’s Enigmatic Libya Policy
The ambassador continued, “Sarkozy’s ufacturer Alstom in the transport sector. Ac-
effort to derive real commercial gain from cording to the U.S cable,
his newfound relationship with Libyan lead-
“Franco-Libyan commitments to build a
er Al-Qaddafi is partly intended to make up
“nuclear reactor” for water desalination and
ground believed lost to the United States
to cooperate in the civilian nuclear field were
and others since Libya’s rehabilitation in late
clearly closely monitored and were the sub-
2003.”17
ject of several U.S. State Department reports
The cable mentioned the signing of an in 2007 and 2008.”
agreement between the Libyan regime and
Bab Al-Aziziya is the site that was bombed
Serge Dassault, head of Dassault Group, the
by U.S. planes in April 1986, at a time when
French civil and military aeronautics firm. This
Libya topped the list of rogue states. Ever
was for the renovation of twelve Dassault Mi-
since the bombing, Al-Qaddafi had displayed
rage-F1 fighter planes. These is the very same
it as a kind of revolutionary trophy. The bomb
Dassault whose jets are today bombing Libya.
impacts remain visible on the walls of the
That diplomatic cable also mentioned sever-
compound.
al other framework trade agreements signed
during the French president’s visit. For exam- Although known for his strong pro-U.S. ap-
ple, this includes French nuclear conglomer- proach, it was in this compound that, in 2007,
ate Areva, which is expected to benefit from Sarkozy made a number of trade agreements
the warmer relations between France and with Libya, posing for photographs with Col-
Libya, as do other French groups such as the onel Al-Qaddafi in front of the shell-ridden
petrol company Total and engineering man- walls.18
Emmanuel Macron
17
“From ‘Honeymoon’ To War: What US Cables Said About French Courtship Of Gaddafi”, Mediapart, 30 March 2011.
18
“Sarkozy Meets Gaddafi, Defense Partnership Sealed”, Reuters, 25 July 2007.
12 www.orsam.org.trAbdennour Toumi
France is pushing for regional military sup- Algiers. This was led by businessmen and for-
port in the Sahel, which is part of its national mer intelligence generals. It feels like Paris
security imperatives and hegemony. But the and Algiers have been enjoying a love/hate
proposed special forces are causing more relationship trajectory and this is going to
harm than good. The U.S. special forces are end. Certainly, it will have a direct echo with
doing the heavy lifting in terms of intelligence,
France’s role in Libya, the military in Algiers
sharing their information with Algeria, a pivotal
are not going to let Paris use Libya and even-
state in the Sahel and North Africa with Egypt
tually the Sahel as France’s rear base.
and Morocco.
Subsequently, Paris is showing concerns The situation of turmoil in Libya and the
about Algeria that it is in a historical turning Sahel needs a new paradigm that will be set
point, notably in the aftermath of the purge tactically and strategically and adding to the
operation launched by the military in Algiers turmoil is the fact that thousands of migrants
against the so-called “French connection” in are crossing to Europe.
www.orsam.org.tr 13ANALYSIS 273
January 2021
The Role of Foreign Actors in Libya: the Case of President Macron’s Enigmatic Libya Policy
CONCLUSION conflict do not respect the arms embargo on
Libya and that all the foreign parties menti-
Paris does not have much room left in the
oned support armed groups that have com-
aftermath of the fall of all the western cities
mitted grave human rights violations. The two
into the hands of the GNA forces. Yet, Par-
camps, the Government of National Accord,
is does have to review its foreign policy in
based in Tripoli, and the Libyan National Army,
Libya and “moonlight” for solutions with the
led by Hiftar and based in Benghazi are both
main super and regional powers. This is in-
supported by foreign combatants, notably
stead of pursuing its enigmatic foreign policy
from Syria and the Sudan. Syria has also in-
as in President Macron’s double-game tactic
tervened and sent a military plane to support
which he is playing in Yemen, Syria and Libya.
Hiftar, probably at Russia’s request.
The new military dynamics developed after
the major developments on the ground and Here is another enigmatic element of
all of these peace talks initiatives that are try- French diplomacy since President Macron
ing to reach a breakthrough. Developments took office in May 2017. “Macron advocated for
following the election of a new administration smooth diplomacy, which is turning into inac-
in the U.S would be a game changer in the tion,” Prof. Emmanuel Dupuy said. In this com-
dynamics of the nine-year Libyan armed con- plex geopolitical game, France once again
flict, which would make it even more complex has thus systematically missed its second
for Paris’s diplomatic contradiction. chance after the Libyan fiasco in 2011.
Paris has always played a double-game in Paris’ intelligence and military presence in
the Libya crisis since its military engagement Libya, like in Syria, has become irrelevant. This
in April 2011. It is an absolute paradox that is, while their presence officially was aimed
shows the delinquency of its timid military to fight against the IS organization and illegal
action and diplomacy, a paradoxical foreign migration and human trafficking, it turned to
policy that is personified by Foreign Affairs support of a renegade military commander.
Minister Le Drian, who was also President Hol- This renegade military commander’s se forc-
lande’s defense minister. On the other hand, es are committing war crimes as a 14-month
Emmanuel Dupuy, the president of IPSE, Par- battle for the military conquest of the Libyan
is, said, “France’s military presence becomes a capital and the overthrow a legitimate gov-
de facto element of increasing insecurity for ernment recognized by international gov-
our own troops.” Adopting a more construc- ernments including the French government!
tive approach in spite of absolutely taking a France also does this in Syria, supporting
side could contribute to further isolation and separatists (Democratic Syrian Forces), which
jeopardize France’s national security. Nev- proves how limited its vision and influence in
ertheless, the result sounds worrisome and Libya and Syria are.
is shaping Paris’ concern about the Jihadists’
The “moral-politik” principle of France’s for-
dispersion from the Sahel 19
eign policy is damaging the credibility of the
President Macron has remained strangely country and its foreign policy determinants
silent too over the fact that all parties to the and principles, France’s Droits-de-l’homme
19 “Terrorism: France’s International Action”, France Diplomacy - Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, https://www.diploma-
tie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/terrorism-france-s-international-action/,
2020.
14 www.orsam.org.trAbdennour Toumi
(Human rights).20 An imperative is questioning that has already mourned many atrocities and
Paris’ independent foreign policy in the MENA wars.
region, notably in the Maghreb, while respect-
The strategic landscape is evolving so
ing the international law and non-govern-
mental organizations like MdM (Médecins du quickly that President Macron should take the
Monde) and MSF (Médecins sans Frontières), future of the new Libya into consideration. The
and the ongoing conditions in Libya and Syr- true evolution, however, is driven by the Turks
ia, won’t let Paris revive President Sarkozy’s who have put themselves in a very strong
Mediterranean Union project either. The re- position with the Italians and the Germans,
cent eastern Mediterranean Basin’s offshore negotiating overtly. The Turks are also coor-
natural gas prospects have roused tensions dinating with the Americans and holding the
between the five main countries that Paris Russians back, while imposing new imper-
sees as potential allies to contain Ankara’s ex- atives in NATO. However, when negotiating
ploration projects and role. with the French, one must speak to his adver-
saries/enemies and not to his friends. All the
France needs to overcome the void be-
tensions and contradictory ambitions of super
tween its words and deeds, as to be seen in
the case with Libya. France should cease turn- and regional powers depend on the priority of
ing a blind eye to grave violations there for the their interests. For instance, the fight against
sake of preserving its strategic or economic the ISO is no longer a valid argument since
interests. Macron’s selective indignation over Paris is siding with the Saudis and the Emir-
Libya harms both his credibility and the val- ates who are financing Al-Madkhalis.21 Yet, it
ues that he claims are cardinal principles of sounds inevitable that President Macron’s
his diplomacy, as well as the fight against im- Libya policy is better off with a cemented real-
punity and the return to stability in a country politik, rather than a quarantined irrealpolitik.22
20
Solene Jeanjean, “France’s reaction to the Arab Spring”, Bilgesam, 21 December 2011.
21
“Addressing The Rise Of Libya’s Madkhali-Salafis”, Crisis Group, 25 April 2019.
22
Védrine, H., “Le Monde du Défi”, Pluriel, 29 March 2017.
www.orsam.org.tr 15ANALYSIS 273
January 2021
The Role of Foreign Actors in Libya: the Case of President Macron’s Enigmatic Libya Policy
NOTES
16 www.orsam.org.trwww.orsam.org.tr orsamorgtr
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