10 Conflicts to Watch in 2023 - Crisis Group
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Commentary Published 1 January 2023
Originally published in Foreign Policy
By International Crisis Group
10 Conflicts to Watch in 2023
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sent shock waves round the world.
As our look ahead to 2023 shows, several other crises loom as well.
W
ill he or won’t he? This time last in Russia’s military that operations in Syria
year, that was the question. Rus- (2015) and Ukraine (2014 and 2015) had dis-
sian President Vladimir Putin had guised. It has revealed resolve and competence
massed almost two hundred thousand troops in the West that fiascoes in Afghanistan, Iraq,
on Ukraine’s borders. U.S. intelligence warned and Libya had obscured (though admittedly
that Russia was preparing for all-out war. All things might have been different had the U.S.
the signs pointed to an assault, bar one: it been under other leadership).
seemed unthinkable. Still, the war is far from over. Russia’s
True, Russia had attacked Ukraine in 2014, economy has adapted to massive Western
and in the spring of 2021 had staged a dress sanctions. The Kremlin appears convinced that
rehearsal for an invasion, building up forces on Russia has staying power. Moscow might yet
the frontier before sending them home. Putin force an ugly settlement and set a troubling
seemed ever angrier at Kyiv’s refusal to bow to precedent for aggression elsewhere. If, on the
his will. He openly derided Ukrainian national other hand, Putin feels truly in peril, due to
identity and sovereignty. Still, it was shocking, Ukrainian advances or other reasons, it is not
when Russian forces did roll in, that a nuclear- impossible – unlikely, but hard to completely
armed power in 2022 would seek to conquer a rule out – that he will use a nuclear weapon
neighbour in an act of unprovoked aggression. as a last roll of the dice. Whatever happens in
Beyond the devastation in Ukraine, the war has Ukraine, the West and Russia will likely remain
cast a long shadow over global affairs. a miscalculation away from confrontation.
For Russia, so far it has been disastrous. For China, the war has been mostly a head-
An offensive that was supposed to subjugate ache. Despite Chinese President Xi Jinping’s
Ukraine, weaken the West, and strengthen the public embrace of Putin and continued trade
Kremlin has, up to now, done the opposite. It between the two countries that has helped
has turbo-charged Ukrainian nationalism and Russia weather sanctions, Beijing’s material
pushed Kyiv closer to Europe. It has breathed support has been lacklustre. Xi Jinping has not
new purpose into a previously adrift NATO. sent weapons. He appears disturbed by Putin’s
Finland and Sweden joining the alliance, which travails and nuclear bluster. Beijing does not
seems on track, will dramatically shift the bal- want to undercut Moscow and is unlikely to
ance of force in Northern Europe, more than compel Putin to reach a settlement. But neither
doubling the length of Russia’s borders with does it wish to provoke Western capitals by
NATO states. The war has laid bare weaknesses abetting the invasion. It watches warily as U.S.
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 1 JANUARY 2023 2
allies in Asia bolster defences and seem even balance in Libya and the South Caucasus and
keener to keep Washington around, even as expanding drone sales. For Saudi Arabia, the
they still want access to Chinese markets. The abrupt removal of Russian oil from the market
war has heightened fears of a Chinese assault was a boon. It forced a visit from Biden, who
on Taiwan. But an invasion that seemed too had entered office promising to shun Saudi
risky for Beijing in the near term even before Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Riyadh
the war seems – at least for now – even less decided, with other oil producers, to keep prices
likely. The massive sanctions imposed on Russia high, much to Washington’s fury. India, at once
are not lost on China. Nor are Moscow’s battle- a U.S. security partner and major purchaser
field failures. of Russian arms, has both bought knock-off
As for the relationship – between the U.S. Russian oil and chided Putin for his nuclear
and China – that will dominate the coming dec- sabre-rattling. This is no coordinated non-
ades, the Russia-Ukraine war has not changed aligned movement. But activist middle powers
the fundamentals. U.S. House Speaker Nancy feel space to chart their own course and, while
Pelosi’s August visit to Taiwan riled Beijing, few welcome big-power rivalry, will seize the
but the meeting three months later between opportunities that multipolarity brings.
U.S. President Joe Biden and Xi promised a Elsewhere in the global south, the war
resumption of dialogue. Competition is still exposed raw nerves. Most non-Western capitals
baked into the two countries’ foreign policies, joined in UN General Assembly votes against
however. Chinese designs upon Taiwan are not Russia’s aggression. But few have condemned
going anywhere. Though the world’s two big- Putin publicly or imposed sanctions. Many have
gest economies remain entwined, technological reason – trade, mostly, but also historical ties or
decoupling is underway. reliance on Kremlin-linked Wagner Group mer-
The war has shone light on non-Western cenaries – not to break with Moscow. They see
middle powers’ influence and autonomy. Tur- picking a side or incurring costs for a war many
key, long walking a tightrope between NATO believe is Europe’s problem as against their
membership and ties to Moscow, has brokered, interests. Frustration with the West plays a role
with the United Nations, a deal to get Ukrain- too, whether over COVID-19 vaccine hoard-
ian grain onto global markets via the Black Sea. ing, migration policy or climate injustice. Many
The initiative follows years of Turkish assertive- see a double standard in outrage over Ukraine
ness abroad, including tipping the battlefield given the West’s interventions elsewhere and
“ Outside Europe, the war’s biggest
ramifications are economic.”
CONTRIBUTORS
Richard Atwood,
Comfort Ero,
Crisis Group Executive
Crisis Group President
Vice President
& CEOINTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 1 JANUARY 2023 3
colonial record. Many global south leaders also is not a spent force, but some of its champions
believe, particularly when it comes to sanctions, suffered setbacks. Plus, multilateral diplomacy
that Western governments have put fighting largely muddled through. Notwithstanding
Russia over the global economy. their bitter differences, China, Russia and
Indeed, outside Europe, the war’s biggest Western powers still mostly saw the UN Secu-
ramifications are economic. Financial jitters rity Council as a venue to manage crises outside
triggered by the invasion and announcement Ukraine. A deal that could end Ethiopia’s hor-
of sanctions roiled markets that COVID-19 had rific war and warmer Colombia-Venezuela ties
already shaken. Food and fuel commodity prices show that peacemaking elsewhere can trundle
shot up, sparking a cost of living crisis. Though along despite conflict in Europe.
prices have since come down, inflation remains Overall, though, it was an unsettling year, all
rampant, magnifying debt problems. The the more so given that it’s the latest in a string
pandemic and economic crisis are two among of them. The pandemic upended much of the
several mutually reinforcing threats, notably globe. An angry mob stormed the U.S. Capitol.
also including climate change and food insecu- Temperatures in parts of the world threaten
rity, that can beset vulnerable countries and fuel human survival. Now, a major war rages in
unrest. On this year’s list, Pakistan is a prime Europe, its architect invokes nuclear escala-
example. Many countries are in similar boats. tion, and several poor countries face debt crises,
Did 2022 give any cause for optimism for hunger and extreme weather. None of these
the year ahead? Given Ukraine’s anguish, find- events arrived without warning, and yet a few
ing good in the war might seem perverse. But years ago they would have boggled the mind.
had Kyiv put up less of a fight, had the West They also come as the number of people killed
been less united than it was under Biden’s lead- in conflicts is ticking up and more people are
ership, and had Russia prevailed, Europe, and displaced or hungry, many due to war, than at
arguably the world, would be in a more danger- any time since World War II.
ous place. Nor was Putin the only strongman So, will 2023 see major powers go to war
who had a bad year. Several populists, whose or break a nearly 80-year nuclear taboo? Will
politics have recently sown much discord, also political crises, economic hardship, and climate
lost out. Jair Bolsonaro was defeated in Brazil. breakdown cause social meltdown in not just
Former U.S. President Donald Trump appears, individual countries but a swath of the world?
for now, a diminished figure. Marine Le Pen Worst-case answers to this year’s big questions
failed to win the French presidency. In Italy, seem far-fetched. But after the past few years, it
where populists did win power, they mostly would be complacent to dismiss the unthinkable.
tacked centre once in office. Far-right populism
1. Ukraine
Thus far, Ukraine has resisted Russia’s assault, was as fierce as Russia’s planning was inept.
thanks to Ukrainians’ valour and Western aid. Driven back from around Kyiv in the spring,
But after nearly a year of fighting, there’s no Moscow concentrated forces in the east and
end in sight. south. Then, in late summer, Ukrainian troops,
When the Kremlin launched its all-out inva- now armed with more powerful Western-sup-
sion in February, it seemingly expected to rout plied weapons, advanced there, too.
Ukraine’s government and install a more pliant Yet Moscow has upped the ante. It mobilised
regime. It miscalculated. Ukraine’s resistance perhaps 300,000 additional men, althoughINTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 1 JANUARY 2023 4
data is unreliable. At least as many Russians Western unity thus far shows few cracks. Many
fled the country and shortages of personnel and European capitals believe Ukraine’s defeat, in
gear still plague the army. The Kremlin also emboldening Moscow, would endanger them.
announced the annexation of parts of Ukraine, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit
including territory it does not control. It began to Washington at the end of 2022 confirmed
a punishing campaign of airstrikes on Ukrain- bipartisan support there, despite grousing from
ian infrastructure. The resulting power outages the Republican Party’s right flank.
have rendered many areas nearly unlivable. As for the truly cataclysmic scenario – a
As many as one in three Ukrainians have been potentially nuclear escalation between NATO
displaced over the past year. and Russia – both Moscow and Western capi-
Thus far, little suggests either Kyiv or tals have taken pains to avoid direct clashes.
Moscow will back down. Ukrainians see each The West has rejected ideas of no-fly zones, for
new attack and revelation of Russian abuses example, and drawn a line at supplying some
(including summary executions and sexual advanced weaponry. Russia has avoided strikes
abuse) as more reason to fight. In Russia, on NATO territory. Putin has repeatedly refer-
propaganda and oppression deter opposition. enced Russia’s nuclear capacity, seemingly aim-
Neither side shows genuine appetite for peace ing to warn off the West, though has recently
talks. Ukrainians are understandably loath to walked back his rhetoric. A nuclear strike would
give up land when they’ve been winning it back. serve little military purpose and could trigger
Moscow, despite saying it is open to diplomacy, precisely the direct NATO involvement Moscow
still demands that Kyiv capitulate, scorning hopes to avoid. Still, the possibility cannot be
the Ukrainian government as Nazis controlled dismissed, particularly if Putin feels his grip
by a degenerate West. By escalating after each on power slipping. Indeed, the war has created
setback, Putin seems to be blowing up his own probably the highest risk of nuclear confronta-
off-ramps. tion in sixty years. It also sets the stage for what
Stalemate is setting in, though how long could be a long standoff, with Europe poised
it will last is anyone’s guess. Dug in, both for ever-more dangerous showdowns, whatever
sides probe for openings to inch forward. A happens in Ukraine.
new attack on central Ukraine from Belarus, Certainly, Western leaders should keep the
though much hyped, seems improbable given door open to a settlement by making clear to
low odds of success. Moscow hopes that win- the Kremlin the benefits, particularly in sanc-
ter cold and high gas prices, brought about by tions relief, that would follow a deal Ukraine
Western boycotts of Russian hydrocarbons, will can live with. For now, though, they judge that,
sour Europeans on supporting Ukraine. But for all the war’s horrors, backing Ukraine, even
at some risk of nuclear escalation, is better than
allowing Russia to prevail through a brutal mili-
“ Both Moscow and Western tary campaign and nuclear menacing. That’s a
capitals have taken pains to tough calculation to make; to some degree, it
avoid direct clashes.” disconcerts other parts of the world. Thus far,
though, it’s the right one.INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 1 JANUARY 2023 5
2. Armenia and Azerbaijan
If the war in Ukraine has reverberated across seized territory inside Armenia proper. Each
crises worldwide, its impact has been espe- bout of attacks was progressively bloodier.
cially acute in the South Caucasus. Two years The war in Ukraine has also overshadowed
after their latest war over Nagorno-Karabakh, peace talks. Moscow has historically tended
Armenia and Azerbaijan appear headed toward to lead peacemaking efforts over Nagorno-
another confrontation. Russia’s travails in Karabakh. The 2020 ceasefire was supposed
Ukraine have upset calculations in the region. to open up trade in the region, including by
A new war would be shorter but no less dra- reestablishing a direct route through Armenia
matic than the six-week conflict in 2020. That from Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhchivan on
war, which killed more than 7,000 soldiers, saw the Iranian border. Improving trade would pave
Azerbaijani forces rout Armenians from parts the way to compromise on the thorny question
of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and nearby of Nagorno-Karabakh’s future. (After the 2020
areas, all of which had been held by Armenian war, Yerevan dropped its decades-long demand
forces since the early 1990s. Moscow eventually for a special status for Nagorno-Karabakh, but
brokered a ceasefire. it still wants special rights and security guar-
Since then, the balance has shifted further antees for Armenians living there; Baku argues
in Azerbaijan’s favour. The Armenian army has that local Armenians can enjoy rights like any
not replenished its troops or weapons, as Rus- Azerbaijani citizens.)
sia, its traditional arms broker, is short on sup- In late 2021, Moscow accepted new Euro-
plies. Azerbaijan, by contrast, has been ramping pean Union-led mediation between Armenia
up. Its army outmatches Armenia’s several and Azerbaijan, hoping that it would reinforce
times over, is far better equipped, and is backed Russia’s peacemaking, which had been making
by Turkey. Heightened European demand for little headway. Since the war in Ukraine began,
Azerbaijani gas has also emboldened Baku. however, Moscow views the EU’s diplomacy
Russia’s travails in Ukraine matter in other as part of wider efforts to curb Russia’s influ-
ways too. As part of the 2020 ceasefire, Russian ence. Despite attempts by Western capitals, the
peacekeepers deployed to areas of Nagorno- Kremlin refuses to engage.
Karabakh still settled by Armenians. Russia has As a result, there are two draft agreements
beefed up its border guards and military per- floating around – one prepared by Russia and
sonnel along parts of the Armenia-Azerbaijan another Armenia and Azerbaijan themselves
border that, since the war, have become new have developed with Western backing (many
front lines. The idea was that the contingents, sections of which have contrasting text pro-
though small, would deter attacks because Baku posed by the two sides). Each draft tackles trade
would be wary of needling Moscow. and stabilisation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani
But Russian forces have not stopped several border, with the fate of Armenians in Nagorno-
flare-ups this past year. Azerbaijani troops in Karabakh left to a separate and so far uniniti-
March and August captured more territory in ated process. The bilateral track supported by
Nagorno-Karabakh, including strategic moun- the West is probably more promising, in part
tain positions. In September, Azerbaijani forces because it’s home-grown, though how MoscowINTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 1 JANUARY 2023 6
would respond if it yields an agreement is The danger is that the talks go nowhere or
unclear. In any case, the two sides are far apart. another flare-up sinks both the Moscow-led and
Baku holds all the cards, and it would gain more West-backed tracks, and Azerbaijan takes what
from a deal, notably in terms of trade and for- it can by force.
eign relations, than it would militarily.
3. Iran
Massive anti-regime protests, Iran’s merciless seems unlikely to happen – at least not unless
crackdown and its supply of weapons to Rus- another trigger tips the balance or leaders
sia have left the Islamic Republic more isolated emerge from among protesters. Nothing, as yet,
than at any point in decades just as a crisis over suggests the regime will splinter. But nor can
its nuclear program is brewing. a crackdown quell deep societal anger. Some-
The protests rocking the country have thing has broken. The regime cannot turn the
posed the most durable and determined threat clock back.
to the Islamic Republic’s authority since the Meanwhile, talks to revive the 2015 nuclear
2009 Green Movement. Tens of thousands of deal, stalled since early September, are now
mostly young people, fronted by women and in deep freeze. Tehran’s nuclear capability
schoolgirls who reject the compulsory hijab as has advanced leaps and bounds over the past
a symbol of misogyny and broader oppression, few years. Its uranium enrichment capacity
have taken to the streets in acts of raw defiance has expanded, its breakout time is down to
against the regime. almost nil. Monitoring by the International
The Iranian government has killed hun- Atomic Energy Agency is severely curtailed. The
dreds of people in response, including dozens of moment the U.S. and its allies have long hoped
children. Formal executions of protesters follow to avoid – when they must choose between the
trials human rights groups regard as shams. possibility of Iran acquiring a nuclear bomb or
Thousands are in jail, many subject to horrific using force to prevent that happening – seems
torture. The regime paints what is an emphatic to be coming into view.
grassroots expression of popular anti-govern- Even if they can muddle through for some
ment sentiment, particularly among youth and months, October 2023, when UN restrictions
in long-neglected peripheries, as a foreign plot. on Iran’s ballistic missiles lapse, is a flash point.
Few buy it. Viewing those restrictions as crucial to contain-
The challenge for Iran’s heroic young ing Iran’s proliferation of missiles and drones,
protesters is to win over older middle-class especially to help Russia in Ukraine, Western
Iranians, many of whom sympathise but fear leaders’ only option for stopping them from
the regime’s violence or radical change. More expiring is to snap back UN sanctions. That
of them might join were the protests to reach will likely prompt Iran to withdraw from the
a critical mass, but without their joining that Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – a potential
casus belli for the U.S. and Israel. Any strike by
them on Iran’s nuclear program would risk set-
“ Talks to revive the 2015
ting off a tit-for-tat escalation across the region.
nuclear deal, stalled since With Iran furious at Saudi Arabia for its support
early September, are now in for satellite channels that Tehran blames for
deep freeze.” fuelling protests to a multifaceted confrontationINTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 1 JANUARY 2023 7
between Iran and Israel that could heat up with nuclear threat in mind. Given today’s poison-
Israel’s new far-right government, risks abound. ous relations, prospects for talks to defuse the
In this light, keeping the door open to diplo- nuclear crisis appear dim. But at least gaining
macy makes sense. Western capitals, revulsed an understanding over each other’s red lines
by the Islamic Republic’s repression at home, could help keep a lid on tensions until there is
incensed by its arms supplies to Russia, and more space for de-escalation and substantive
under pressure from vocal domestic constitu- diplomatic engagement. It’s hard to see protest-
encies who savage anyone who recommends ers gaining were the nuclear crisis to come to a
talking, understandably worry that engaging head – more likely the embattled regime could
Tehran could throw the regime a lifeline. Thus change the subject at home and exert an even
far, however, they have opted not to totally tighter grip.
sever contacts – partly because some need to
negotiate hostage releases but mostly with the
4. Yemen
Yemen is in limbo. A truce in April between and fuel shortages that placed new pressures on
Houthi rebels and the country’s internation- all parties.
ally recognised government, backed primarily The resulting stalemate created space for
by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates mediation. In early April, the UN announced a
(UAE), lapsed in October. Major fighting has two-month truce between Hadi’s government
not resumed, but both sides are preparing to go and the Houthis. Riyadh, increasingly disil-
back to war. lusioned with the war, backed the deal. Several
The UN-brokered truce was an unexpected days later, Hadi resigned. He was replaced by
bright spot in a brutal eight-year conflict. In an eight-man presidential leadership council
November 2021, Houthis, who control much (PLC), handpicked by the Saudis and Emiratis,
of Yemen’s north west, seemed to be nearing which is more representative of the coalition
victory. Had they taken the city of Marib and of Yemeni factions fighting the Houthis and,
nearby oil and gas facilities, that would have almost as often, each other.
won them the war for the north, bought their Initial hopes that a broader settlement
quasi-state badly needed funds, and spelled would follow have dimmed. After two exten-
the end for then-President Abed Rabbo Man- sions, UN-led negotiations over an expanded
sour Hadi’s government. Their offensive was truce collapsed in early October, scuttled by the
averted when UAE-affiliated forces pushed the Houthis’ demand that the government pay rebel
Houthis out of strategic territory in Marib and military and security force salaries. (According
neighbouring Shabwah in January 2022. The to sources on both sides and in the UN, the gov-
Houthis responded with cross-border missile ernment and Saudis had agreed to pay civilian
and drone strikes on the UAE and Saudi Arabia. salaries but drew the line at covering the cost of
Then the Ukraine war prompted global food forces fighting against them on the ground.)
Fighting is mostly on hold even without the
“ In early April, the UN announced
a two-month truce between Hadi’s government
and the Houthis.”INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 1 JANUARY 2023 8
truce. Major ground offensives and cross-border and use the money and time to regroup. Some
attacks have not resumed, and talks continue, Houthi leaders hope for a wider agreement with
mostly now through bilateral Saudi-Houthi Riyadh that entails a Saudi exit from the conflict
channels. But tensions are rising. The Houthis and cements the Houthis’ status as Yemen’s
have launched what they call warning shots dominant force. But such an arrangement, by
at PLC-controlled oil and gas infrastructure, ignoring the interests of many anti-Houthi fac-
leading to a halt in oil exports. They say oil tions that already chafe at being left out of bilat-
sales can resume when they and their forces are eral talks, would likely plunge Yemen into a new
paid their share of revenues. In retaliation, the phase of war. Even with the Saudis out, it seems
government sought to halt fuel imports into the unlikely that the Houthis could easily overrun
Houthi-controlled Red Sea port of Hodeidah, all of Yemen, as the Taliban did in Afghanistan.
but Riyadh stopped it. Both sides are report- Better would be an extended truce that paves
edly building up forces and military equipment the way to intra-Yemeni talks. A genuine set-
around key front lines. tlement has to meet all major Yemeni factions’
The risk of renewed war is uncomfortably requirements and probably requires UN media-
high. Some within the Houthi camp lean toward tion. But with the Houthis sensing that they
another offensive, though for now, while prob- get more through intransigence and Iran, the
ably stronger than their rivals, the Houthis are one outside actor with some influence over the
starved of funds and their forces are weakened. group, in no mood to help, such a settlement is
Alternatively, they might strike a deal with the perhaps the least likely scenario.
Saudis on salary payments, extend the truce,
5. Ethiopia
One of 2022’s deadliest wars, in and around August, it broke down, and full-fledged war
Ethiopia’s Tigray region, has for now ground to resumed. Federal, Amhara, and Eritrean forces
a halt. Two of the main belligerents – Ethiopian again overwhelmed Tigray’s defences.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and The toll has been staggering. Research-
the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), ers in Belgium’s Ghent University estimate
which dominated Ethiopian politics for decades that 385,000 to 600,000 civilians had died of
before Abiy assumed power in 2018 and then war-related causes as of August 2022. Sources
fell out with him – signed a deal on 2 November from both sides say hundreds of thousands of
in Pretoria, South Africa, and, 10 days later, a combatants have died in fighting since August
follow-up agreement in Nairobi. But the calm is 2022. All parties stand accused of atrocities,
fragile. Key questions remain unsettled, notably with Eritrean forces leaving a trail of particu-
whether Tigray’s forces will disarm and whether larly cruel devastation. Sexual violence has
Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, whose army been rampant, seemingly used strategically to
has been fighting alongside Ethiopian troops, humiliate and terrorise civilians. For most of
will withdraw his troops to the internationally the war, Addis Ababa blockaded Tigray, cutting
recognised border. off electricity, telecommunications, and bank-
Hostilities broke out in late 2020 when Tig- ing and constricting food, medicine, and other
ray’s forces seized a series of national military supplies.
bases in the region, claiming to be pre-empting The Pretoria agreement was a victory for
a federal intervention. Over two years of fight- Abiy. Tigray’s leaders conceded to restoring fed-
ing, the advantage tipped back and forth. A eral rule and disarming within a month. Addis
March 2022 truce offered some respite. In late Ababa said it would lift both the blockade and aINTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 1 JANUARY 2023 9
“ The Eritreans, for their part, have not pulled out.
Nor have Tigrayans handed over weapons.”
terrorism designation on the TPLF. In Nairobi, end up his biggest headache. In 2018, Abiy’s
Abiy’s commanders appeared to offer a more peace deal with Isaias ended decades of hostil-
flexible timeline for disarmament, agreeing that ity between the two countries, even if to some
Tigrayan forces would give up heavy weapons degree also paving the way for the joint Ethio-
as Eritrean and Amhara regional fighters with- pia-Eritrea offensive against Tigray. Abiy has
draw. Since then, the truce has held. Aid has come out on top in his struggle with the TPLF.
surged, and federal authorities have reconnected But despite all the bad blood, he probably needs
Mekelle, the Tigrayan capital, to electricity. some form of accommodation with Tigray’s
But plenty could go wrong. A dispute over leaders to avoid sowing the seeds of another
Western Tigray’s fertile borderlands, which the insurgency. His government needs to determine
Amhara call Welkait and claim as their own, is the TPLF’s role in any interim regional admin-
especially thorny. The Eritreans, for their part, istration and whether to permit some Tigrayan
have not pulled out, though reports suggest soldiers to become regional forces or re-enter the
some of their troops have begun withdrawing. federal army. Whether the Ethiopian prime
Nor have Tigrayans handed over weapons. The minister recognises the need for magnanimity is
parties need to coordinate a delicate sequenc- unclear. Equally critical, though, is whether, if he
ing, lest each side blame the other for delays. does, he can sell that to Isaias, who joined the
It’s Abiy’s battlefield ally, Isaias, who could war hoping to kill off his archenemy, the TPLF.
6. Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes
M23, a previously dormant rebel group, which to local dynamics. The Congolese government
UN reports suggest is backed by Rwanda, is had been trying to reassert its authority in the
wreaking havoc in eastern Democratic Republic troubled east, home to dozens of rebel groups,
of Congo. Fighting has driven tens of thousands including some from neighbouring countries.
of people from their homes and could spiral Last year, Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi
into a wider regional proxy war. invited in Ugandan troops to fight the Allied
M23 holds several towns and surrounds Democratic Forces, a mostly Ugandan group
the provincial capital of Goma. In 2013, the that declares itself part of the Islamic State. The
group was beaten back by a ramped-up UN Congolese president appears to have quietly
force but now appears well-armed and organ- approved Burundian operations on Congolese
ised. It includes ex-Congolese soldiers, many of soil, too. That irked Rwandan President Paul
whom are Tutsis, an ethnic group spread across Kagame. He saw his neighbours’ presence as
Africa’s Great Lakes, and profess to champion potentially depriving Rwanda of influence in
communal interests. eastern Congo, where it has economic interests,
M23’s sudden re-emergence owes as much like Burundi and Uganda, and has long fought
to tensions among Great Lakes states as it does insurgents of the Democratic Forces for theINTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 1 JANUARY 2023 10
Liberation of Rwanda (known by the French it appears reluctant to take on insurgents and
acronym FDLR), a remnant of the Hutu militia is deeply unpopular among many Congolese.
responsible for the 1994 genocide. Instead, Kenya, as part of the regional force, has
Tshisekedi accuses Kagame of backing M23 the unenviable task of taking the fight to M23.
as a way to extract Congolese resources. UN Long-suffering locals have high hopes that
experts also point to Rwandan support for the Kenyan troops can beat back rebels, but Kenya
rebels, with one leaked UN report in December sensibly views the goal more as securing Goma
2022 saying there was “substantial evidence” and its surrounding main roads and pushing
that the Rwandan army directly intervened in M23 into a ceasefire. The group might then
Congo’s fight against M23 and backed the group rejoin peace talks between the Congolese govern-
with weapons, ammunition and uniforms. ment and dozens of eastern armed groups from
Kigali rejects the allegations. In turn, it accuses which it had been expelled due to the fighting.
the Congolese army of working with the FDLR Getting Rwanda on board will be crucial,
(which Tshisekedi denies, though UN reporting given its influence on M23 leaders. The best
also largely confirms). shot to achieve that lies in concerted diplo-
An added complication is Congo’s general macy by East African leaders aimed at repair-
election in 2023. The vote could mark for the ing relations between Kagame and Tshisekedi,
country another step away from its disastrous which has shown some initial signs of progress,
civil wars two decades ago. But suspended alongside efforts to curb collaboration between
registration or voting in the east due to violence the Congolese military and the FDLR. The East
would cast a shadow over the results. Tsh- African force is an opportunity, in other words,
isekedi might also want to turn up the anti- to make space for diplomacy as much as it is to
Rwanda rhetoric when campaigning, which fight M23.
would endanger minorities that some Congo- If that diplomacy fails, Kenyan troops could
lese already paint as M23 supporters. get bogged down in eastern Congo’s treacher-
An East African military mission – minus ous terrain. Already, the deployment of so many
Rwanda, whose contingents Kinshasa neighbours’ forces in eastern Congo runs the
rejected – has a mandate to restore calm to east- risk of a return to the proxy wars that tore the
ern Congo. The UN has a 14,000-strong peace- region apart in the 1990s and 2000s.
keeping force, with many housed in Goma, but
7. The Sahel
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger show no signs of so does finger-pointing within the army. Two
beating back stubborn Islamist insurgencies. coups this past year, both triggered by massa-
Western leaders, whose military involvement cres of troops by militants, have seen a lieuten-
over the past decade has done little to stem vio- ant colonel, Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba,
lence, seem at a loss at how to respond to coups seize power in January, only to be ousted in
in Burkina Faso and Mali. September by a previously unknown captain,
Burkina Faso is in the direst straits. Jihadi Ibrahim Traoré. Traoré himself is struggling
groups control an estimated 40 percent of its to unify divided security forces. He may follow
territory, including vast rural areas in the north the lead of his Malian counterparts by playing
and east. Militants have laid siege to a major to populist sentiment, criticising France, and
northern town, Djibo, for months. Fighting has drawing closer to Russia. Most worryingly,
killed thousands of people and driven nearly 2 Traoré is recruiting volunteers to battle jihadis,
million from their homes. As the losses mount, which could send ethnic bloodshed spiralling.INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 1 JANUARY 2023 11
Mali suffered two coups of its own, in 2020 Benin borders, drawing closer to the capital,
and 2021. The state is virtually absent in the Niamey.
far north. There, Islamic State- and al-Qaeda- Outside involvement in the Sahel is evolving
linked militants fight one another and battle fast. France, which intervened to oust mili-
non-jihadi rebels, who are predominantly tants from northern Mali in 2013, has ended
Tuareg, a community that spans much of the its operations in that country, given fraught
Sahel. Tuareg rebels inked a deal with Bamako ties with Bamako, though it retains bases in
in 2015, hoping to win army positions and Niger. A UN mission, in Mali since April 2013,
devolution. But now, feeling abandoned, some has also struggled to make headway. The West
rebels may see benefit in again uniting with now seems most concerned with preventing
jihadis. (Al-Qaeda-linked militants joined and jihadis from spreading southward to the Gulf of
then usurped a Tuareg-dominated separatist Guinea. Regionwide anger against the French is
rebellion that captured northern Mali about rising, thanks in large part to a decade of West-
a decade ago.) Farther south, in central Mali, ern failures to check militants’ advances but
fighting that pits Malian forces and Russian also to Russian disinformation. Wagner’s brutal
Wagner Group mercenaries against militants guns for hire are hardly likely to do better, but
seems stalemated and marked by both sides’ many locals chafe at criticism of the Russian
rampant human rights abuses. group given past the West’s legacy.
Niger is in better shape, though there are Most vital at a moment of inflection for the
worrying signs there, too. The government region is that leaders rethink what has been a
“ Aid workers’ struggles to reach health
clinics combined with clean water shortages have
given rise to resurgent cholera.”
has either integrated civilian militias into the predominantly military-centric approach to
security forces or refused to arm them. Its tackling Islamists. Military operations play a
readiness to engage jihadi groups may also have role, but must be subservient to efforts to mend
contributed to a lull in violence. Still, President intercommunal relations, win over people in the
Mohamed Bazoum survived a coup attempt in hinterlands and potentially even talk to mili-
March 2021, and subsequent arrests, including tant leaders. Western governments should feel
among high-ranking officers, may have fuelled chastened by their record over the past decade.
hostility within the army. Jihadis have entered But as some Sahelian leaders turn to Moscow,
parks and forests along the Burkina Faso and it would be a mistake to cut ties and try to force
them to pick sides.INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 1 JANUARY 2023 12
8. Haiti
Since the murder of President Jovenel Moïse in stepped down, though Haitian police forces were
July 2021, Haiti has been paralysed by politi- able to recapture it some months later.
cal gridlock and rampant gang violence. Public The result has been humanitarian catastro-
services have collapsed and cholera is spread- phe. Half the population, 4.7 million people,
ing. Things are so bad that some Haitians now faces acute hunger, and almost 20,000 are
pin their hopes on foreign troops, despite the thought to be at risk of starving. Aid workers’
dismal legacy of earlier interventions in Haiti. struggles to reach health clinics combined with
Ariel Henry, Haiti’s interim prime minister clean water shortages have given rise to resur-
who took over from Moïse, enjoys support from gent cholera. A recent World Health Organiza-
influential foreign powers but faces stiff Haitian tion report said there were more than 13,000
resistance. Since he assumed power, Henry’s cases between early October and early Decem-
rule has been opposed by the Montana Accord, ber, with 283 recorded deaths – but these are
a group of opposition politicians and civil likely huge underestimates.
society representatives. Henry was supposed Faced with these challenges, Henry in
to steer a transition to elections, but rampant October called for foreign military support. Any
insecurity has prevented a vote, and Henry also such mission will have its work cut out fight-
disbanded the election commission. ing gangs of young men and children embed-
Hundreds of gangs control more than half of ded in densely populated urban areas. There’s
the country. They suffocate the capital, Port-au- political opposition, too: the Montana group
Prince, by blocking roads and imposing a reign largely opposes any mission, believing the
of terror, including using rape to punish and interim prime minister will use it to prop up
intimidate people, sometimes targeting children his rule. Many other Haitians are wary, given
as young as ten. The biggest coalition, the G9, is the island’s subjugation by outside powers and
headed by notorious gang leader Jimmy “Bar- the troubled record of previous foreign deploy-
beque” Chérizier. Haiti’s gangs have existed for ments. Yet an increasing number of people,
decades, often with ties to politicians. But their especially in areas that suffer the worst gang
power has ballooned since Moïse’s murder. violence, have expressed support out of sheer
Things have come to a head over the past desperation.
six months. In July, battles between the G9 and U.S. and Canadian sanctions on several sit-
another gang over Cité Soleil, a slum near Port- ting and former top politicians, alongside Ché-
au-Prince, killed more than 200 people in a lit- rizier, have sent shockwaves through Haitian
tle over a week. Two months later, Henry lifted elites and might give them some pause to think
fuel subsidies, sending prices spiralling and about future ties to gangs. But few foreign coun-
causing mass protests, which gang members tries are champing at the bit to deploy troops.
joined. The G9 then seized a major oil terminal, That said, if Henry and his rivals were to agree
leaving almost the entire country with shortages on the role of such a mission and on a transi-
of fuel, which has, among other things, disrupted tional road map, foreign forces could be Haiti’s
access to clean drinking water. Chérizier said he best hope. Even their arrival and the threat of
would only give the terminal back once Henry operations might lead gangs to abandon main
roads and loosen their chokehold on the capital.INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 1 JANUARY 2023 13
9. Pakistan
Pakistan is entering an election year with a deeply But Khan accuses Sharif, a cabinet minister, and
divided body politic, as former Prime Minister a senior military intelligence official of conspir-
Imran Khan whips up populist support against ing to murder him.
the government and the all-powerful military. All this bodes poorly for elections, due
Khan’s exit from office last spring came before October 2023. Already the main con-
alongside his fall from the Pakistan Army’s grace. tenders disagree on the rules of the game, with
Having won office backed by the top brass, Khan accusing top election officials of back-
relations deteriorated due to Khan’s inept rule, ing Sharif’s government. He looks set to reject
fiery anti-U.S. rhetoric, and attempts to plant the outcome if his party loses. Now under new
loyalists in top army positions. As support for command, the military vows to stay out of the
a no-confidence vote grew, Khan claimed that political fray. But the generals may find it hard
Washington was behind a plot to oust him. to stand by if things fall apart or head in a direc-
Army chief Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa rejected tion they perceive as threatening.
the conspiracy, concerned about the impact Another political crisis is the last thing Paki-
it might have on relations with the U.S., and stan needs atop many other challenges. This
rebuffed Khan’s last-ditch effort to win him year, devastating floods submerged a third of
over with an indefinite extension as chief. In the country, affecting one in seven Pakistanis;
April, Khan was ousted. A coalition government 20.6 million people still require humanitarian
headed by Shehbaz Sharif took over. aid. Credible estimates put total damages and
Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party economic losses at $31.2 billion, with at least
then quit Parliament and took to the streets. another $16.3 billion required for recovery. The
Countrywide, violent protests intensified when most vulnerable segments of the population,
Sharif’s government rejected Khan’s demand for women and girls, are among the worst affected,
snap polls. His supporters also slammed the top seeing their limited access to education, income,
brass, particularly Bajwa. Anti-Western rhetoric and health care further decrease.
has whipped up anger among a receptive public.
Khan’s claims that Sharif is mismanaging the
economy also strike a chord as living costs rise.
“ Thanks to the floods,
On Nov. 3, during a weekslong anti-govern-
ment march on the capital, Islamabad, Khan Pakistan now requires
was shot and wounded. The would-be assassin, even more aid.”
apprehended on the spot, insists he acted alone.
10. Taiwan
The biggest flash point between the U.S. and assessment is that Xi Jinping has set 2027 as
China looks increasingly unstable, as Washing- the date by which China’s military should be
ton seeks to maintain primacy in the region and capable of seizing Taiwan. For its part, the U.S.
Beijing pursues unification with the island. maintains a “One China” policy – aiming for a
Unification has long been China’s objective. peaceful resolution of Taiwan’s status without
Beijing says it hopes this happens peacefully, prejudging the outcome – and a posture of “stra-
but it will not rule out force. Washington’s tegic ambiguity” about whether it would comeINTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 1 JANUARY 2023 14
“ Breaching Taiwan’s defences would be a slog and ...
Beijing likely grasps the international opprobrium and
economic cost an offensive could trigger.”
to Taiwan’s defence. But with Beijing increas- economic cost an offensive could trigger – even
ingly powerful and assertive, Washington if the U.S. opts not to intervene militarily.
shows signs of hardening policies adopted when Still, credible U.S. threats – continuing to
China’s military was weaker. strengthen Taiwan’s self-defence capabilities,
Things heated up last summer, when outgo- making its Asia-Pacific military posture less
ing U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited vulnerable to Chinese attack, and identifying
Taipei, Taiwan’s capital. As a legislator, Pelosi punitive economic measures with allies and
does not report to U.S. President Joe Biden partners – can help deter Beijing. But such steps
(whose administration reportedly discouraged must go hand in hand with assurances that U.S.
the visit). But Beijing unsurprisingly saw her policy remains unchanged. If Beijing believes
visit as a powerful signal of support to Taipei that refraining from attacking gives Washington
and a harbinger of eroding U.S. commitment to and Taipei space to create conditions for Tai-
the “One China” policy. In response, it staged wan’s permanent separation, then its calculus
unprecedented military exercises around will lean toward war.
Taiwan and deployed warships and aircraft Biden seems aware of the danger. Although
across the “median line”, which has served as he has a troubling tendency to commit to aiding
the tacitly agreed upon edge of Chinese military Taiwan militarily (aides have walked back his
activity in the Taiwan Strait for decades. comments quickly each time), he was on script
Growing concern about China’s rise, its when he met Chinese President Xi Jinping face
assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific, and its com- to face during the G-20 meeting in November.
mitment to build its military capabilities have He assured Xi Jinping that U.S. policy remains
become a core preoccupation of U.S. policy. unchanged. Xi Jinping, in turn, told Biden that
Hawkishness on China – including related to China continues to pursue peaceful unification.
Taiwan – is a rare issue enjoying bipartisan con- Still, near-term hazards could increase
sensus in Washington. Both the Biden admin- tensions. On the U.S. side, Kevin McCarthy,
istration and Congress believe that the U.S.’ who led the Republicans while they were in the
ability to deter a Chinese invasion has slipped, House minority, has already said he will visit
and they want to build it back. Taiwan if he succeeds Pelosi as speaker. At a
For the U.S. government, the challenge is to minimum, China would respond with shows
make credible both the costs that China would of military strength on par with its exercises
incur should it launch a military campaign and in response to Pelosi. Should Beijing’s internal
the assurance that if it desists, Washington will economic and political woes mount, a more
not seek Taiwan’s permanent separation. forceful show of resolve is possible, particularly
China seems unlikely to invade any time if the U.S. is seen to be pressing its advantage at
soon. Breaching Taiwan’s defences would be a time of perceived Chinese weakness.
a slog and, having seen the West’s response Such an escalation would not spell war right
to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Beijing likely away, but it could inch the world’s mightiest
grasps the international opprobrium and economic and military powers closer to it. You can also read
