Xenophobia in Action: Ultranationalism, Hate Speech, and the Internet n Japan
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Xenophobia in Action:
Ultranationalism, Hate Speech,
and the Internet ¡n Japan
Tomomi Yamaguchi
JLOU Koreans are cockroaches! Cet out of Japan! Throw them into Tokyo Bay!"
Waving giant Rising Sun flags, the speaker screams the chant into a megaphone,
joined by rally participants parroting him. This scene is common at rallies held as
part of the new right-wing, national chauvinistic, racist, and xenophobic movement
that emerged in Japan in the mid-2ooos, with participants calling themselves the
Action Movement or Action Conservatives (Kodo-suru Undo or Ködö-suru Hoshu;
hereafter referred to as the Action Conservative Movement, or ACM).i Known for
its street actions and hate speech against ethnic minorities, foreigners, and countries
perceived to be a threat to Japan's sovereignty, the ACM actively uses the Internet
to spread its message to the public. The group has very few spectators at its rallies
other than the police, yet its public activities are recorded in videos that appear
online. Online viewers number in the thousands and sometimes even in the hun-
dreds of thousands.2
This movement is all part of a notable surge in online xenophobic discourse
since 2000, which has been tied to numerous attacks on people of Korean and Chi-
nese ancestry, a trend particularly prominent on Japan's largest anonymous message
board, 2channel.3 Those who post right-wing, ultranationalist, and chauvinistic mes-
sages on the board have come to be called the "Net Far Right" {netto uyoku).'^ By the
mid-2ooos, this right-wing discourse had started to move beyond the Internet and
Radical History Review
Issue 117 (Fall 2013) DOI 10.1215/01636545-2210617
© 2013 by MARHO: The Radical Historians" Organization, Inc.
99
the ACM had taken its polemics to the streets. The oldest and most notable groups
in the movement include the Group That Seeks Recovery of Sovereignty (Shuken
Kaifuku wo Mezasu Kai, hereafter referred to as Shuken) and the Citizens' Group
Refusing to Tolerate Special Rights for Koreans in Japan (Zainichi Tokken wo Yuru-
sanai Shimin no Kai, or Zaitokukai), established in 2006 and 2007, respectively.
Heavily influenced by online discourse, ACM activists continue to target and
attempt to marginalize people of Korean and Chinese ancestry and other minor-
ity groups whom they consider to be threats to Japan.s At the same time, heav-
ily debated interpretations of Japan's colonial past and current political relations
with neighboring countries also motivate the groups' harsh critiques against other
nations, especially North and South Korea and China. ACM activists use a broad
scope to criticize any foreign practices that are perceived to threaten Japan's sov-
ereignty and traditions — such as the marine mammal protection activism by the
West — and they also attack the Japanese Left, which they see as also destroying
Japau.6 At leftist rallies where, for example, the emperor system may be criticized,
the ACM frequently stages counteractions.'' Although those in the movement hold
a variety of stances, some factions, especially Zaitokukai, have held counteractions
against pacifistic A-bomb anniversary events in Hiroshima and against the newly
strengthened antinuclear movement that has grown in the wake of the Fukushima
Dai'ichi Nuclear Power Plant's disaster in March 2011.
This article, based on myfieldworkwith ACM groups, investigates the use
of online communication and social media in connection with the ACM in Japan.s
My primary focus is the significance of the Internet and online video streaming
and sharing in particular for the ACM. I examine the function of those media in
the making of the movement's action styles, by fostering real-time, synchronous (or
quasi-synchronous) communications between activists and spectators.^ I also discuss
the problems resulting from the movement's excessive dependency on online video.
While the activities of the ACM initially garnered little attention, in the past
few years, journalists and scholars have begun to point out the significance of the
Internet as a platform for the group.!« Yasuda Koichi conducted extensive journal-
istic research on the ACM and published a book titled Netto to aikoku {The Inter-
net and Patriotism). As the title indicates, Yasuda points to the ACM's extensive
use of the Internet to collect information, communicate, and organize.^i Sociologist
Higuchi Naoto, who interviewed ACM members, also insists that the ACM's mobili-
zation strategies utilizing the Internet have been successful, as most members came
to be interested in the ACM via the Internet.12 Rumi Sakamoto's analyses of online
right-wing claims demonstrate that online culture does not always promote a truly
democratic forum but sometimes contributes to the formation of nationalism.i3 By
analyzing a 2channel thread of Tsushima, a disputed island territory between South
Korea and Japan, Sakamoto finds the pattern that a thread starts with a minor,
rather than an internationally major, news story involving Korea and develops it into
TOO Radical History Review
a "repetition of well-rehearsed" Internet right-wing stances. She states that "the
global and transnational electronic network has in this case produced an inward-
looking and xenophobic nationalism with little awareness of the outside world."!''
Yasuda points to the struggling economic situation of quite a few Zaitokukai
members and indicates that a desire for recognition among Japan's troubled younger
generation might explain the emergence, and popularity of, Zaitokukai. One person
I interviewed, a temporary worker in her early forties, stated that she joined the
movement because of the possible threat of her job being relocated to Ghina, due
to the impact of a globalized economy. Higuchi, however, points out that Zaitoku-
kai's members are not necessarily struggling economically, nor are they necessarily
"not in education, employment, and training" (NEET) as generally imagined.i^ He
regards the unresolved colonial history of Japan, and hatred toward neighboring
countries, to be connected to the excessive hate against resident foreigners.i^ While
explanations of the movement's emergence may vary, the AGM deals with contro-
versial political issues in contemporary Japan, such as attempts to give the multi-
generational resident Korean population limited voting rights, the existence and role
of ethnic Korean schools, the land disputes between Japan and its neighboring coun-
tries, and the debates on the interpretation of Japan's colonial history.
The Emergence of the Net Far Right and the ACM
The image of the "Far Right" in Japan is most likely connected to the negative asso-
ciations people have of right-wingers, of their driving around in black vans, with
booming voices piped through megaphones, and their loud music, paramilitary uni-
forms, and suspected connections to the yakuza (organized crime).i^ These right-
wingers, called the Gaisen Uyoku (Demonstrating Right-Wing), still characterize
the popular imagination, but researchers argue that they started to lose their power
and influence in the 1970s.i^
Beginning in the 1970s, the emergence of a more grassroots right-wing move-
ment, spearheaded mainly by the religious Right, such as Seichö no Ie (the House
of Growth), as well as the Association of Shinto Shrines (Jinja Honchö), became
highly visible.i9 Its most obvious action was a move to pass a law requiring the use
of imperial-era names and dates in official documents.20 In this effort, the religious
Right took a relatively grassroots strategy toward mass organizing. Its targeting of
local assemblies to pass resolutions supporting the legislation resulted in the suc-
cessful national adoption of the law in 1979.21 The movement then turned its efforts
to revising the postwar constitution, especially the controversial article 9, which
bans Japan from participating in wars or having a standing army.
In the 1990s, the grassroots conservative movement became more visible. A
key event was the controversy over former "comfort women," which finally gained
attention in the mainstream media in Japan after Kim Hak-sun came forward in
Yamaguchi \ Ultranationalism, Hate Speech, and the Internet in Japan loi
South Korea in 1991, resulting in extensive discussion of Japan's war responsibility
and the interpretation of its colonial history. 22 The formation of the Society for His-
tory Textbook Reform in 1996 and the 1997 formation of Japan's largest conservative
alliance organization, Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi), representing a combination
of traditionally conservative organizations such as the Association of War-Bereaved
Families and the religious Right, played a significant role in buffering a burgeoning
revisionist discourse.23 Crassroots conservatives also started to engage in the move-
ment to publish and disseminate a revisionist history textbook extensively in the late
1990s. The revisionist view emphasizes positive aspects of Japan's colonialism, while
deemphasizing its negative attributes and the atrocities associated with it. The
movement spread not only via a network of conservative activists but also through
the popular media. 24
In an ethnography of the Society for History Textbook Reform, Oguma Eiji
and Ueno Yoko characterize these new conservative and nationalist activists as
"ordinary citizens."25 At the time of this surge in "new" grassroots conservatism,
organizations such as the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by
North Korea (Kazokukai) and the National Association for the Japanese Kidnapped
by North Korea (Sukuukai) were also established, in 1997 and 1998, respectively.26
The conservative movement became much more accessible for "ordinary" citizens
at that point.
In the early 2000s, the next surge in nationalist and xenophobic discourse
occurred, coinciding with the proliferation of the Internet in Japan. Zaitoku-
kai leader Sakurai Makoto repeatedly mentions in his writings and speeches that
the 2002 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup,
cohosted by South Korea and Japan, led to a boom in Korean popular culture in
Japan but also exposed extensive anti-Korean sentiments.2" That is, there emerged a
stark contrast between the success of South Korean popular cultural products (the
"Korean Wave"), such as TV dramas and Korean popular music (K-pop), and per-
sistent fears regarding the missile launches and covert hostile activities of the com-
munist government in North Korea. Also in 2002, the North Korean government
acknowledged its past abductions of Japanese citizens.^« With the extensive media
coverage of this revelation, the conservative organizations working on the abduction
issue, Sukuukai and Kazokukai, also received major attention from the media and
the general public. I observed that quite a few ACM activists wear the "blue ribbon"
badge that is a sign of support for the abduction victims and their families, and some
of them claim that the abductions, which they frequently mention in their demon-
strations, had a major influence on their becoming conservative activists.
As these events unfolded, attacks against Koreans became more extreme on
the Internet, most notably on the anonymous message board 2channel. Started in
1999, 2channel grew to become the largest message board in Japan. While 2channel
1O2 Radical History Review
has a huge number of boards encompassing a wide variety of topics and political
orientations, attacking Korea and resident Koreans in Japan became a prominent
même on many of the boards on 2channel.
In spite of the extensive online attacks against Koreans, critic Ogiue Chiki
argues that many Japanese Internet users do not actively commit to specific social
movements. Instead, he claims that Japanese Internet users base their opinions
on how interesting the material is, rather than on any particular ideology.29 In his
view, the most important point Internet users considered when engaging in various
practices was whether attacking particular individuals, groups, or countries could
be considered "fun." Sakamoto also insists that the Net Far Right nationalism is
"aggressive and shrill, but fragmentary."30 Sociologist Kitada Akihiro argues that
since the 1990s, "the sociality of connectedness" has heightened among the youth.^i
Kitada states that "teasing" functioned as a cynical critique of authority on early
2channel posts, but the nature of the acts started to change as the purpose of online
communication shifted to remaining connected.32 Regardless of their initial mean-
ings or intentions, however, these xenophobic "jokes" soon spread beyond the Inter-
net to the mass media and came to have political meanings.33
The Hate Korean Wave Manga {Manga Kenkanryû) comic book then
emerged out of the anti-Korean online discourse to become a best seller in 2005,
followed by sequels and spin-off titles.34 Heavily influenced by the online discourse
and its popularization by the Kenkanryû, the ACM emerged to target and further
the marginalization of Koreans, Chinese, and other minorities residing in Japan,
along with those perceived to be "invading" Japan and having "special rights" that
violate the sovereignty and rights of the Japanese people. The idea oí zainichi tok-
ken, the "special rights" of resident Koreans, emerged out of online anti-Korean
discourse, and it was adopted in the second volume oí Hate Korean Wave Manga.^^
A book titled The Zainichi Special Rights (Za zainichi token) was then published in
2006 and spread the concept further.3^ Zaitokukai, in particular, states that its aim
is the abolishment of the special permanent residency status given to resident Kore-
ans in 1991.3^ Higuchi points out that the ACM might be the first openly xenophobic
movement in modern Japan.38
The first ACM group was the Tokyo-based Shuken, begun in July 2006 and
led by activist Nishimura Shuhei. Nishimura, who was born in 1950 and is a for-
mer corporate accountant, is usually soft-spoken but transforms into a charismatic
and aggressive speaker during street rallies. Shuken has engaged in a wide variety
of issues including Tibet's sovereignty, Japan's territorial disputes with China and
South Korea, the perception of colonial history as related to China and Korea
(e.g., the Nanjing Massacre and "comfort women"), and the whaling controversy,
particularly concerning Sea Shepherd and the 2009 documentary film The Cove.^^
The most important issue, according to the group's website, is the fight against
Yamaguchi \ Ultranationalism, Hate Speech, and the Internet in Japan 103
"China's invasion of Japan."*« The concern over China is especially notable, likely
influenced by Nishimura's own personal history of visiting China in his youth.
While he seems to have positive memories of being welcomed, he also told me,
critically, of vivid memories of the extreme poverty that he saw in communist
China at that time, far worse than that found on the agricultural farms of his
native Akita Prefecture."*!
Shuken does not have a membership system; instead, the group issues online
calls for participants for each action via its blog. Twitter, and other social networking
services. Twenty to thirty volunteers usually gather for weekday actions and more for
weekend ones, according to Nishimura.^s
Zaitokukai was established in January 2007. Sakurai, its leader, was born in
1972 and is a former temporary municipal government worker. What characterized
Zaitokukai, at least initially, was the notion of zainichi tokken, which the group has
accused resident Koreans of having and which it points to in order to legitimize its
actions.43 Attempts to integrate the multigenerational resident Korean population
by offering limited voting rights have been met with the criticism that "foreigners"
should not have voting rights at all and that resident Koreans should be treated
"equally" with other foreigners. The group also harshly criticizes pachinko parlors, a
gaming business that is considered a traditional Korean niche in Japan.^4 Zaitokukai
soon started to deal with other issues, not necessarily relevant to resident Koreans,
such as counterdemonstrations at leftist rallies and gatherings.
While Shuken takes a rather elitist stance and has a limited number of
members, Zaitokukai aims to turn its group into a mass movement, prompting the
establishment of regional branches across Japan. The organization's official mem-
bership count is 11,893 as of July 5, 2012, although "membership" in this group
simply means registering one's e-mail address on the organization's website. While
the commitment of its members may be questioned, and in fact many nonsupport-
ers and opponents of the group became "members" in order to obtain information,
its leader Sakurai considers having the e-mail addresses of more than ten thousand
people to be an effective method of spreading information on the group's claims and
activities.''S The ages of the members vary, but many of its leaders and members are
in their thirties and forties.
Seeing himself as a right-wing revolutionary and, interestingly, a Maoist as
well, Shuken leader Nishimura told me that he was determined to transform the
existing, established conservative movement into a more action-oriented one, by
staging street demonstrations incorporating Japan's national flag, generally called
the Hinomaru (circle of the sun)flag.''^Due to theflag'sassociation as a prewar tool
of colonization and a postwar symbol of ultranationalism, its display has always been
controversial in postwar Japan. Nishimura argues that conservatives should proudly
display the flag during their demonstrations.^^ He also emphasizes that Japanese
1O4 Radical History Review
should call China "Shina," a term that is generally regarded as having derogatory
connotations and that has thus been avoided in public in postwar Japan. He argues
that Shina is not a derogatory word.4S For him, street actions that have the visual
impact of Rising Sun flags are vital as accompaniment to the shocking speeches
delivered there. Nishimura, Sakurai, and other ACM leaders openly criticize exist-
ing mainstream conservatives—the likes of the Nippon Kaigi—as kireigoto hoshu
(idealist conservatives), who only study and engage in internal discussions but do not
openly demonstrate and rally with Hinomaru flags.^s
At the same time, ACM members consider themselves "ordinary citizens"
and unlike traditional ultra-right-wing activists, who often demonstrate in public
with sound trucks and wearing paramilitary uniforms. The most visible difference
between the two groups is their clothing; male ACM leaders tend to wear business
attire, such as a suit and tie, and other activists wear casual, everyday clothes. The
visibility of women is also a significant means to enhance the "ordinariness" of the
ACM. Women are encouraged to deliver speeches, walk in front of the group, and
wear the kimono not only as the epitome of Japanese women's tradition but for visual
impact. Female leaders are also visible in the movement, which is a major difference
from the traditional "black van" right-wingers. Two women whom I interviewed said
that they were also in charge of delivering online content and carrying video cam-
eras to take videos of the demonstrations, going beyond being only the objects of
video shooting.
The movement's conceptualization of "action" is deeply connected to the
use of the Internet. In my interview at a café in Tokyo, a Zaitokukai public relations
representative and corporate worker, Yoneda Ryuji, told me that the introduction
of high-speed broadband Internet service in the 2000s — starting with DSL and
quickly leading tofiber-opticand wireless 3G networks — coincided with his group's
history and that such technological progress made the widespread adaptation of
online streaming services possible for the movement. The former vice president
and secretary of the group, Yamamoto (Sakura) Yumiko, also mentioned the influ-
ence of the development of technology on Zaitokukai's activism. All AGM groups
and their leaders have their own websites or blogs, which they use to announce
their actions and report on them in detail. Moreover, social networking services,
especially the Japanese service called mixi, have also functioned as effective
recruitment and organizing tools. With the proliferation of online streaming, mes-
sage boards, and social networking sites such as mixi and Twitter, the Internet has
permeated every aspect of their activism. At the same time, the groups are highly
dependent on the Internet to drum up support. They do not issue any paper-based
newsletters except for occasional flyers, and they do not engage in much in-person
community organizing. These are major differences from the more mainstream,
grassroots conservative movements, which have started to utilize the Internet but
Yamaguchi \ Ultranationalism, Hate Speech, and the Internet in Japan 105
also continue to use traditional means such as print materials and local community
organizing.
While the Internet can be an effective tool for the AGM, it does not nec-
essarily mobilize people to participate in street actions, and its leaders, such as
Nishimura and Sakurai, recognize this limitation. Yet despite the movement's lack of
mass media attention, combined with its resistance against a mainstream media that
it considers to be biased toward the Left, the Internet still remains an indispensable
means to claim its existence and spread hate. The movement's actions are influenced
and even structured to a certain extent by Internet-based communication, especially
video streaming and video sharing. In the next section, I detail a specific action,
using ethnographic descriptions, to further discuss the influence of online video on
the movement and its actions.
Demonstration as Performance with Online Video Sharing
On a hot, sunny day in June 2010,1 went to a street demonstration by the AGM for
the first time. A right-wing person whom I had come to know via my research on
antifeminism was a participant, and it was he who had invited me to the demonstra-
tion. The demonstration was by Shuken, on the day of the trial of New Zealander
Peter Bethune, a member of Sea Shepherd, at the Tokyo District Gourt. Bethune
had been charged with forcibly boarding a Japanese whaling vessel.
Just outside the Hibiya subway station, I was immediately bombarded with
the waving of large red-and-whiteflags,both Hinomaru and prewar Rising Sun flags
(which are seen as more aggressive, with their closer ties to Japanese imperialism). I
then saw a group of about twenty Shuken members, carrying various signs criticiz-
ing Bethune, Sea Shepherd, and "Western whites." Uniformed police surrounded
them, and a little farther away security police (kôan) were taking notes on small
memo pads.^" Reporters from New Zealand and Japan were also present. Shuken
members, with cameras stationed in front of the group, occupied the best spots for
video and photo documentation. Most pedestrians who happened to be walking in
the area clearly avoided making eye contact with the group, passing by the scene as
quickly as possible.
Shuken leader Nishimura gave a loud and aggressive speech. He claimed that
Bethune and Sea Shepherd activists were racists, ethnocentrists, and terrorists who
were impeding Japan's sovereignty and passing judgment on Japanese tradition and
culture. He screamed: "We won't tolerate New Zealanders! They despise Japan's
tradition and culture! Tear apart New Zealanders!" About twenty of the participants
chanted and screamed in support of Nishimura's speech, saying, "Tear them apart!"
and "We won't tolerate them!"5i Nishimura engaged in a confrontation with the
police and court personnel, and as the activists became more excited, the area filled
with tension. The cameras followed closely.
io6 Radical History Review
Nishimura Shuhei speaking at the Shuken demonstration against Sea Shepherd in Tokyo, June 2010,
with the Hinomaru flag and uniformed police officers surrounding the group. Photograph by the author
After several other members gave their speeches, Nishimura announced the
end of the demonstration. Then a sudden transformation occurred among the activ-
ists: their demeanor changed dramatically from being loud and aggressive to calm
and cheerful. At that moment, I realized that the aggressiveness and hostility exhib-
ited in the demonstration was largely a performance staged by the activists.
I observed similar moments of transformation in all the demonstrations by
ACM groups that I attended. When I talked to, or interviewed activists, they acted
calmly and nicely, even when they were aware that I did not share their political
opinions. Yasuda also writes throughout his book that he observed similar changes
in the movement's activists, from being outwardly ordinary and calm people to
aggressive racists delivering hate speeches.^2
Moreover, the ACM's performances are not targeted toward people watching
them on-site, as most of those at the scene were police officers. Instead, the activ-
ists perform for their online audience on YouTube, Ustream, Nico Nico, and other
video-sharing and -streaming services. For this reason, camcorders and personal
computers for online video sharing or streaming appear to be the necessary and
central components of their activism. While this particular action was one of the
rare occasions when TV cameras and reporters covered the movement, the position-
ing of the group's own video camera crew was definitely at the center of the events.
Yamaguchi \ Ultranationalism, Hate Speech, and the Internet In Japan 107
Nishimura Shuhei speaking at the Shuken demonstration against the Korean Elementary School of
Kyoto, with group members taking videos and photographs, February 2011. Photograph by the author
The performative aspect of the ACM's demonstration, combined with the
movement's extensive use of shocking rhetoric, is aimed to draw the attention of
its online audience; the group's aggressive performances, including a brief police
chase that one participant initiated by running to an area not designated for the
demonstration and a scene in which participants surrounded one of Bethune's white
male supporters, have all worked well for this purpose. Thus posting video online
has been a powerful tool for the movement, increasing its audience exponentially.^3
Shuken is reported to be the first to use online video services to post videos
of its on-street actions and gatherings among ACM members.^4 Nishimura said that
younger members of the group started to use websites, blogs, and online videos to
spread their claims, and the method functioned well to recruit participants for their
actions.
Nico Nico Douga / Namahôsô and Zaitokukai
Zaitokukai's strategy of using net-based video-sharing services has been consistent
throughout the group's history.^s The introduction of the Nico Nico Douga (video)
service in late 2006, and later the Nico Nico Namahösö (live streaming) service in
December 2008, occurred just when Zaitokukai was established in early 2007 and
had started to grow.To8 Radical History Review
Nico Nico Douga is administered by 2channers Nishimura Hiroyuki and his
colleagues, and like other video-sharing services, users can post and share their
own video clips. What is unique about Nico Nico Douga is that comments appear
directly on the video, allowing commentators to directly post about what happens in
the video and thereby creating a special sense of synchronous sharing of the vievsdng
experience. The service grew quickly, and Nico Nico Douga is now the fourteenth
most visited website in Japan.^^
With the introduction of Nico Nico Namahösö, the shared experience of
video viewing became a truly synchronous experience, not just with the other view-
ers but also with the activists as well. As critic Hamano Tomoshi writes, for Nico
Nico's viewers, posting and viewing comments became much more significant than
actually watching the video, a fact clearly seen when viewing a popular video on
Nico Nico Douga; the screen is so completely filled with viewers' comments that
one cannot see the video itself. Moreover, while viewers have to register for the Nico
Nico service, their comments on the site appear anonymously since their usernames
do not show up on-screen. The shared experience of anonymous viewing and par-
ticipation in synchronous communication becomes the core objective of many Nico
Nico users.5''
Zaitokukai frequently broadcasts its gatherings, actions, and announcements
via Nico Nico Douga and Nico Nico Namahösö. According to Yamamoto, a for-
mer Zaitokukai administrator, she had originally suggested the use of Nico Nico
Namahösö instead of Stickham or Ustream, which the group had previously used
for its live broadcasting. She found that the immediate reaction from viewers, who
posted supportive comments and videos, effectively stimulated the group.^^ Zaitoku-
kai also maintains a weekly live-streaming slot, which frequently features broadcasts
by its leaders. Additionally, spontaneous broadcasts are stored on the Douga site
before viewers spread them to other video-sharing sites.
Online video is such a central part of Zaitokukai that it organizes demonstra-
tions and gatherings with Nico Nico Namahösö in mind. For example, in June 2011,
I attended a Zaitokukai gathering in Saitama Prefecture. I went to the gathering
with one of the event's speakers, Murata Haruki, a conservative activist, whom I
had met at another demonstration in Osaka some weeks earlier. On the way, I asked
Murata how many people he expected to see in the audience, and he said, smiling,
two or three people at most.'^^ He answered my surprise by stating that the main
purpose of the groups' gatherings was to record the event on video and broadcast
it online. Murata usually speaks to the camera rather than to the audience, most
of whom he expects to be group members. What I saw at the gathering confirmed
Murata's point. The gathering started right on time, when the reserved time slot
for Nico Nico Namahösö began, and it ended when the slot was over.^" In addi-
tion, rather than answering questions from the floor, the organizers were clearly
more interested in the comments and questions from the viewers on the Nico NicoYamaguchi | Ultranationalism, Hate Speech, and the Internet in Japan log
Namahösö service. The ACM would appear to care more about how many Nico
Nico viewers it can entice with verbal bombast and how many comments its videos
receive and less about its in-person audience.
Negative Consequences: Online Videos, Hate Speeches, and Arrests
While the Internet, especially online video sharing and streaming, has become an
indispensable part of the ACM, it has also hurt it, leading to court cases, arrests, and
internal conflicts. Three of the incidents that led to arrests were caused by ACM
activists based in the Kansai region of western Japan, by a group generally referred
to as Team Kansai and composed of members from Zaitokukai and Shuken and
independent activists.^! These incidents have had a particularly negative impact on
the movement.
In the first incident, on December 4, 2009, Team Kansai went to the Korean
Elementary School of Kyoto, while students were still in class, and protested against
the school's use of the public park across the street as the school's playground, a
practice that had been ongoing for years as a result a compromise stemming from a
serious lack of funding and infrastructure at the school. The demonstration involved
extensive hate speech against resident Koreans, including "These are the children
of spies!" and "You stink of kimchi!" Next, on April 14, 2010, Team Kansai went to
Tokushima Prefecture and protested against the Tokushima Teachers' Union for its
alleged misuse of donation money for impoverished children after the union gave
a small portion of it to a local Korean school. Team Kansai physically entered the
union office and screamed the name of the chief secretary repeatedly, calling her
"unpatriotic" and "a traitor," actions clearly aimed at appealing to future watchers
of the video online. Another arrest happened on May 31, 2012, after four Team
Kansai members went to Rohto Pharmaceutical and coercively protested against
the company's use of a Korean actress, whom they claimed to be anti-Japanese, in
its commercials.
The video clips of the actions were broadcast live via Nico Nico Namahösö,
posted on Nico Nico Douga by a member of Team Kansai, and copied to YouTube
as well. The videos were subsequently used as evidence against them in their arrests
and court trials.^2
The negative consequences experienced by Team Kansai are the result of its
excessive use of and dependency on online communication, especially of unedited
live-streaming services, as a means of activism. A former Team Kansai member who
was arrested for his actions in Tokushima and Kyoto stated in criminal court that the
extreme speech was necessary to attract as many online viewers as possible for the
streaming. Another former member, who now participates in a different conserva-
tive group, told me that if her speeches were praised in comments on Nico Nico, she
and others felt elated. The movement leaders encouraged her to become even more
aggressive and suggested more shocking and derogatory expressions to be used in
her speeches.mo Radical History Review
These incidents can cause their victims lasting psychological damage. One
such victim told me about her distress when the video featuring her, including
derogatory remarks against her, remained online.^^ Even after repeated requests to
YouTube and Nico Nico Douga, the videos remained, partially because activists and
viewers reposted the videos as soon as they were taken down. Viewers of the videos
also created a landslide of derogatory comments, which are particularly visible on
Nico Nico, where users' text dances across the image. The power of the video cam-
era and the possibility of online posting are enormous, making it difficult to openly
oppose hate speech and other actions on the action's site, where a camera is present
and all actions can be broadcast live, or later, with derogatory and discriminatory
comments from viewers.
Live streaming also permeates activists' everyday lives, blurring the distinc-
tion between their private and public selves. Some members broadcast their drinking
parties and personal conversations, along with footage of themselves singing karaoke
or simply talking to the camera. Two AGM members — a man and a woman—told
me during an interview in December 2012 that streaming video through Nico Nico
Namahoso while alone is extremely addictive because of the immediate comments
from, and interaction with, those viewing it. Furthermore, internalfightswithin the
movement have been broadcast online, making internal conflicts within the groups
extremely difficult to resolve and sometimes even leading to court cases.^^
Conclusion
The AGM successfully used the Internet to spread its racist propaganda, but such
tactics also had negative effects. To appeal to a wider audience, AGM activists sought
to present themselves as "ordinary" citizens, yet, at the same time, the extensive
recording and dissemination of aggressive hate speech to attract viewers created
a form of celebrity that undermined the very movement that spawned it. The style
also has caused serious problems to the movement itself and to people influenced by
such actions and speeches.
The nationalist and xenophobic discourse that emerged from the anonymous
discussions on 2channel created an influential même that had a potential impact
on public opinion and resulting governmental policies; for example, ethnic North
Korean high schools still cannot receive the tuition exemption or assistance that
other high schools, including private schools and some other international schools,
receive.65 Moreover, video sharing and live streaming greatly influence the move-
ment's actions, by fostering real-time, synchronous (or quasi-synchronous) com-
munication between activists and spectators. With the proliferation of online live
streaming, and services such as Twitter, the Internet has become an even more
effective realm of communication for supporters and critics alike.
As synchronous live-streaming modes oí communication spread further, and
with the development of smartphones and other mobile technologies, we live in anYamaguchi \ Ultranationalism, Hate Speech, and the Internet in Japan m
increasingly connected and digital world in which activists can share their messages
as "ordinary" citizens with others anywhere and at any time. This capability offers
new possibilities for social movements (of both the Left and the Right), such as the
surge in antinuclear activism in Japan, with the heavy use of Twitter and Ustream as
organizing tools and for disseminating information. Outside Japan, the American-
developed 4chan, which is heavily influenced by the Japanese 2channel, has also
increased in popularity, leading to the proliferation of "haektivism," with activists
breaking into specifically targeted computer systems and networks to disrupt or
temporarily disable them.^^ Furthermore, the Arab Spring and the recent Occupy
movement highlight the use of Twitter, Facebook, and other social networking ser-
vices in mobilizing social movements.
The use of the Internet can, however, have negative consequences, as the
case of ACM demonstrates. Unlike the examples of the Arab Spring, the Occupy
movement, and even the 4chan-based Anonymous, it is conservatives and right-
wingers who use the Internet much more effectively to spread their claims in Japan,
with little doubt that the ACM is the most active among them. The Right in Japan
has been reenergized, first through the use of popular media such as manga in the
1990s and then via the use of social media since the mid-2ooos.
While there have been occasional gatherings and actions against the ACM,
the proliferation of right-wing discourse and hate speech against the Left, minori-
ties, Koreans, Chinese, welfare recipients, and women on 2channel, Nico Nico
Douga, and Nico Nico Namahösö makes it difficult to challenge the ACM. This
difficulty is in part characterized by a fear of extensive hostility and defamation,
particularly online.^^ Moreover, as Yasuda notes, citing writer Shibui Tetsuya, when
the Internet became widely available in the 1990s, left-leaning intellectuals tended
to distance themselves from it due to a fear of becoming the subjects of online
attacks from nonacademics.^^ With some exceptions, such as the recent antinuclear
movement and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LCBT) movement, which
include participants with a variety of political orientations, I argue that in Japan the
use of the Internet by the Left has been much less visible than that by the Right.
Despite its presence on the Internet, the ACM itself remains a relatively
minor social movement. The arrests in Kyoto and Tokushima and the heightened
police surveillance of the ACM have spread a negative impression of the movement.
With internal conflicts and splits, the movement has seen a stunt in its growth at
the moment. At the same time, however, it is notable that some ACM members are
moving away from street demonstrations and online activism; they are now involved
in supporting political candidates or running for political offlces themselves.^^ ACM
activists also constitute some of the membership of an extreme right-wing political
party, Ishin Seito-Shinpü (Restoration Political Party-New Wind). Unlike Creece's
Colden Dawn, the New Wind has never won a seat through elections and does not
have widespread public support. Yet quite a few ACM leaders whom I interviewed112 Radical History Review
in December 2012 were actively engaged in supporting the campaigns of candidates
from the conservative Japan Restoration Party and the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) for the lower house in the 2012 election. Those two parties, especially the
LDP, won landslides in the election.™
Therefore, the online proliferation of the conservative and right-wing dis-
course, in which the ACM plays an enormous role, cannot be simply ignored as
a minor trend or as limited actions by extreme individuals. As I have explained,
the ACM deals with controversial political issues in contemporary Japan, such as
attempts to give the resident Korean population limited voting rights, the existence
and role of ethnic Korean schools, land disputes between Japan and its neighboring
countries, and the debates on the interpretation of Japan's colonial history. Surging
online nationalism and racism, influenced by the ACM, may have had an impact on
public opinion on those controversial issues. With ACM activists' increasing involve-
ment in party politics and political campaigning, it may further influence election
results and, eventually, the direction of Japan's domestic and foreign policies.
Notes
A previous version of this article was originally presented as a paper on the panel "Ethnographies
of'New' Grassroots Racism and Xenophobia in Japan" at the annual meeting of the Association
for Asian Studies, Toronto, March 16, 2012. I would like to thank the Toyota Foundation and
Montana State University for supporting the field research for this study. I am also grateful to
Norma Field, Haeng-ja Ghung, Itagaki Ryuta, Emi Koyama, Youngmi Lim, and Saito Masami
for their comments on an earlier draft of this article and to Bethany Grenald for editorial help.
Finally, many thanks to the editors of this issue of Radical History Review for their valuable
assistance.
I use the conventional order of family name and then first name to refer to the Japanese
names in this article, except for those of academics who are living outside Japan and mainly
producing their work in English.
1. While Sakurai Makoto, the leader of one group, calls his movement the Action Gonservative
Movement, the founder of the movement, Nishimura Shuhei, does not call himself a
conservative, and he calls his group the Action Movement. In this article, I use the
expression "the Action Gonservative Movement," as it is the term more widely known to
refer to the movement.
2. Since February 2013, counteractions against the AGM became active in Tokyo and Osaka,
and the number of counteractivists and spectators increased significantly, to several
hundred, outnumbering the AGM activists at the events. See Ishibashi Hideaki, "Anti-
Korean Protests Trigger Gounter-Protests Against Hatemongers," Asahi Shimbun, March
26, 2013, ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social affairs/Aj2oi3O326oo97. The access
numbers of the AGM posts on Nico Nico Douga, a video-sharing website, vary from around
one hundred to over ten thousand. Since some of the videos were broadcast live online
initially, and then copied onto other sites such as YouTube, there is likely much more access
to these videos. Journalist Yasuda Koichi writes that the viewers of one AGM faction's Nico
Nico Douga videos are sometimes in the tens of thousands. Yasuda Koichi, Netto to aikoku
(The Internet and Patriotism) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2012), 33.
3. A message board is an online discussion site on which people can post their messagesYamaguchi | Ultranationalism, Hate Speech, and the Internet in Japan 113
and hold conversations. The 2channel site has about six hundred active boards with many
threads within each board.
4. I am adopting the English translation oí netto uyoku from Martin Fackler, "New Dissent
in Japan Is Loudly Anti-foreign," New York Times, August 28, 2010, www.nytimes.com
/20io/o8/2g/world/asia/29japan.html?pagewanted=all.
5. Interestingly, however, some ACM members are also ethnic minorities; in fact, the first
vice president of Zaitokukai was a resident Korean. The ACM accepts them as exceptions:
nonthreatening minorities who are willingly patriotic to Japan.
6. Japan's practice of whale hunting (which is mostly commercial, under the name of "research
whaling"), while a cultural tradition, has been controversial and particularly criticized
by countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The mammal
protection activism of the West, characterized by Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd, also
harshly criticizes this practice.
7. The war responsibility of the emperor, which has remained officially unaddressed, has
been a controversial topic in post-World War II Japan. On this controversy, see Norma
Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor: Japan at the Century's End (New York: Vintage
1993). Some leftists argue for the abolishment of the emperor system and stage actions each
August 15 in front of the controversial Yasukuni Shrine commemorating the war dead. The
ACM groups always stage counterdemonstrations against the leftists on August 15, the day
the emperor Hirohito declared Japan's surrender, ending World War II in 1945. On this
day each year, the area surrounding the Yasukuni Shrine becomes chaotic as right-wingers
gather to commemorate the war-dead, left-wingers stage counteractions, and the ACM and
other right-wing activists stage counter-counteractions against the Left for criticizing the
emperor system.
8. From May to June 2010, February 2011, May to June 2011, and December 2012 to January
2013,1 conducted participant observations of ACM demonstrations, rallies, gatherings, and
court proceedings in Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka. I have also interviewed more than twenty
activists who are or were involved in the movement and people who, in general, have been
affected, infiuenced, and/or attacked by the ACM. Moreover, I have conducted an analysis
of ACM members' online communications. The activists I interviewed were aware that I
was a left-leaning feminist who did not agree with many of their political causes.
9. Hamano Tomoshi, Äkitekucha no settaikei {The Ecosy.stem of Architecture) (Tokyo: NTT
Shuppan, 2008).
10. Yasuda, Netto to aikoku; Higuchi Naoto, "Zaitokukai no ronri" ("The Logic of Zaitokukai
Activists") (1-7), Tokushima daigaku sögö kagakubu shakai kagaku kenkyü {Tokushima
University Social Science Research Social Science Research Journal) 25 (2011): 53-107;
Higuchi, "Zaitokukai no ronri" (8 and 9), Tokushima daigaku chiiki kagaku kenkyü
{Tokmhima University Area Studies Journal) no. 1 (2012): 105-11; Higuchi, "Zaitokukai no
ronri" (10), Asia taiheiyô kenkyü sentänenpö {Asia-Pacific Research Center Annual Report)
(2011-2012): 49-55; Higuchi, "Zaitokukai no ronri" (11-14), Tokushima daigaku chiiki
kagaku kenkyü, no. 2 (2012): 144-64; Higuchi, "Zaitokukai no ronri" (15-16), Tokushima
daigaku sögö kagakubu shakai kagaku kenktjü, 26 (2012): 159-201; Higuchi "Ködö-suru
hoshu no ronri" ("The Logic of the 'Aggressive Conservative' Movement") (1-3), Tokushima
daigaku chiiki kagaku kenkyu 1 (2012): 71-104; Higuchi, "Ködö-suru hoshu no ronri"
(4) Ibaragi daigaku chiiki sögö kenkyujo nenpö {Ibaragi University Institute of Regional
Stit.dies Annual Report), no. 45 (2012): 161-76; Higuchi, "Kôdô-suru hoshu no ronri" (5-6)
Tokushima daigaku chiiki kagaku kenkyü, no. 2 (2012): 123-43.
11. See Yasuda, Neifo Í0fli^ofe«,44.Radical History Review
12. Higuchi Naoto, "Haigai shugi undo no mikuro doin katei: Naze Zaitokukai wa doin ni
Seiko shitanoka" ("Micromobilization Processes of Nativist Movement Organizations: The
Anatomy of Digitally Enabled Movements"), Asia Taiheiyö Review, no. 9 (2012): 2-16.
13. Rumi Sakamoto, " 'Koreans, Go Home!' Internet Nationalism in Contemporary Japan as a
Digitally Mediated Subculture," Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 9, no. 10 (2011), www
.japanfocus.org/-Rumi-SAKAMOTO/3497.
14. Ibid.
15. The term NEET originated in the United Kingdom and has spread widely in Japan since
2000. See Kosugi Reiko, "Youth Employment in Japan's Economic Recovery: 'Freeters' and
'NEETs,'" Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, May 11, 2006, www.japanfocus.org/-Kosugi
-Reiko/2022.
16. "Nihongata haigai shugi—higashi ajia chiseigaku kara kangaeru" ("Japanese-Style
Naüvism—Thinking from the Geopolitical Perspective"), paper presented at Shakai
undö-ron kenkyökai (Theories of Social Movements Research Meeting), Meiji University,
Tokyo, April 21, 2012.
17. The yakuza are Japan's mafia, and they engage in and control various illegal enterprises
such as drug dealing, blackmailing, and prostitution. Jeff Kingston, Contemporary Japan:
History, Politics and Social Change since the ig8os (Maiden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010),
227.
18. Hori Yukio, Sengo no uyoku seiryoku (Post-war Right-Wing Force), rev. ed. (Tokyo: Keiso
Shobo, 1983).
19. Seichö no Ie is a "new religion" that was founded in 1930 by Taniguchi Masaharu and which
spread in post-World War II Japan. The religion's teaching has characteristics of Buddhism,
Christianity, and Shintoism and emphasizes the importance of family, ancestors, and faith
under one universal God. Seicho no Ie has had a tremendous impact on the conservative
and right-wing movements and since the 1970s has led to the spread of a mass conservative
movement of the rehgious Right, as Hori discusses. See Hori, Sengo no uyoku seiryoku,
219-43-
20. The Japanese calendar system combines the imperial-era name (e.g., Heisei) and the year
of the emperor's reign (such as 25); for example, the year 2013 is Heisei 25. Since the Meiji
Restoration of 1868, the era name corresponds to the reigning emperor, with the adoption
of a "one reign, one era name" system. The law requiring the use of the imperial-era dating
system in official documents (rather than the Gregorian calendar) was introduced in 1979
and reflects the advancement of conservative and nationalist political interests.
21. Hori, Sengo no uyoku seiryoku, 219—43.
22. "Comfort women" are women and girls from Asia and the Pacific who were forced into
sexual servitude for Japan's imperial troops during World War H.
23. Uesugi Satoshi, "Nihon ni okeru 'shükyö uyoku' no taitö to 'tsukuru kai,' 'nihon kaigi' " ("The
Rising Religious Right in Japan and the 'Society for History Textbook Reform' and 'Japan
Conference'"), Senso Sekinin Kenkyu 39 (2003), www.asyura2.com/0311/nih0n10/msg/1179
.html.
24. The role of cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori was especially significant; his work, particularly
his 1998 On War, became highly influential in the historical revisionist movement, and
many ACM activists whom I interviewed cited it as one of the texts that most influenced
them. See Rebecca Clifford, "Cleansing History, Cleansing Japan: Kobayashi Yoshinori's
Analects of War and Japan's Revisionist Revival," Nissan Occasional Paper Series, no. 35
(Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, University of Oxford, Oxford, 2004).Yamaguchi \ Ultranationalism, Hate Speech, and the Internet in Japan 115
25. Oguma Eiji and Ueno Yoko, Iyashi no nashonarizumu (Comforting Nationalism) (Tokyo:
Keio Gijuku Daigaku Shuppankai, 2003), 9.
26. There were some incidents of Japanese citizens being abducted by North Korea between
1977 and 1983. To date, the Japanese government has identified seventeen abductees.
27. Sakurai states that people started to realize at the 2002 World Cup that something was
wrong with Korea and Koreans, a sentiment that eventually led to the publication of "Hate
Korean Wave" manga. See Yamano Sharin and Sakurai Makoto, "Sökatsu zainichi &
hannichi tono gonenkan sensö" ("Reviewing the Five-Year Struggles with Resident Koreans
and Anti-Japanese Activists"), in Yamano Sharin, Manga Kenkanryû (Hate Korean Wave
Manga) (Tokyo: Shinyûsha, 2011), 1:267. Anthropologist Elise Edwards points out that the
"Hate Korean Wave" started with the depiction of the 2002 FIFA World Cup. She observed
the surge of anti-Korean discourse among soccer fans in Japan at the time. Elise Edwards,
"Foul Play: The 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup and a New Tide of Korea-Bashing" (paper
presented at the annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Montreal,
November 18, 2011).
28. See Yasuda, Netto to aikoku, 45-56.
29. Ogiue Chiki, "Interrupting the 'Cender-Free' Backlash on the Internet: Political Implication
of'Sociality of Connectedness' in Japanese Cyberspace" (paper presented at the annual
meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, March 28, 2009).
30. Sakamoto, "Koreans, Co Home!"
31. Kitada Akihiro, Warau nihon no "nashonarizumu" (Teasing "Nationalism," ofJapan)
(Tokyo: NHK Books, 2005), 206-8.
32. Ibid.
33. One example of political meaning generated by online discourse is the "feminism bashing"
that became prominent in the early 2000s. Using this example, Ogiue argues that many
Internet users engaged in protest activities against feminism, without any commitment to a
specific political stance. According to Ogiue, regardless of whether Internet users actually
opposed the idea of gender equality, the accumulation of such Internet postings was used
by specific activist groups. Ogiue claims that it is becoming even more important to discuss
the political effects of apolitical collective behavior on the Internet in contemporaiy Japan.
Ogiue, "Interrupting the 'Gender-Free' Backlash."
34. See Rumi Sakamoto and Matthew Allen, "Hating 'the Korean Wave' Comic Books: A Sign
of New Nationalism in Japan?," Asia-Paciflc Journal: Japan Focus, 2007, www.japanfocus
.orgAMathew-Allen/2535.
35. Yamano, Manga Kenkanryû, 2:59-82.
36. Nomura Hataru et al., eds., Za zainichi token (The Zainichi Special Rights) (Tokyo:
Takarajima-sha, 2007). The book states that there were more than two hundred thousand
hits for the search term zainichi tokken on Google in 2006, 5.
37. The group claims that this status is a "special right." Along with permanent residency status,
it lists other "special rights," such as Koreans' use of Japanese-style names as aliases (to avoid
discrimination) and their exemptions from certain taxes and fees (the latter claim is not
true).
38. Higuchi, "Haigai shugi undo," 1.
39. The Cove, directed by Louie Psihoyos (Los Angeles: Lions Gate, 2009), DVD. The film
won the Academy Award for best documentary feature in 2009. It features the practice
of dolphin hunting in Taiji, in Wakayama Prefecture, and questions the practice from an
environmentalist point of view. The ACM harshly criticized the fihn for attacking Japan'sn6 Radical History Review
cultural tradition and forcing Western values onto Japan. Shuken staged multiple protests
against theaters screening the film when it was released in Japan in 2010.
40. Shuken website, shukenkaifuku.com/Ppage id=5 (accessed July 15, 2012).
41. Nishimura Shuhei, interview by the author, Tokyo, February 12, 2011.
42. This information is from a court statement that Nishimura submitted to the Kyoto District
Court on June 28, 2012. Nishimura was one of the accused for the Kyoto Korean elementary
school civil case, and he submitted the statement when he was called to the court for his
examination at Kyoto District Court in July 11, 2012. He later posted the summary of his
court statement to his personal blog. Nishimura Shuhei, "Taigi wo Mamore! Kyoto jiken kötö
benron" (Keep the Moral Cause! Oral Arguments of the Kyoto Incident), Nishimura Shuhei
go kataru nippon-ism, July 15, 2012, nipponism.net/wordpress/?p=i66io.
43. See cndnotc 37 for the concept of zainichi tokken.
44. Pachinko is a game similar to pinball, and it is not only popular entertainment but also a
form of gambling in Japan. The balls won by a pachinko player can be exchanged at the
parlor for prizes, which can then be exchanged for cash. The pachinko industry generates
over ¥18 trillion in gross revenue per annum and, despite a recent decline in its popularity, is
the largest service industry in Japan. See Kinbasha Caming International, Inc., "Panchinko,"
www.kinbashainc.com/pachinko.html (accessed January 8, 2013); and @CreenBelt, "News
dash Sanka jinkö saido ochikomi 1260 man-nin ni" ("News Dash: The Number of People
Playing Dropped Again to 12.6 million People"), www.adcircle.co.jp/greenbelt/news
/contents/5389.html (accessed January 8, 2013).
45. Yamano and Sakurai, "Sökatsu zainichi & hannichi tono gonenkan sensö," 1:262.
46. Nishimura Shuhei, interview by the author, Tokyo, February 12 and June 20, 2012.
Nishimura also writes the same point in his blog. Nishimura Shuhei, "Hossoku goshunen:
Shuken wa hoshu dewa nai" ("Five Years since the Establishment: Shuken Is Not
Conservative"), Nishimura Shuhei ga Kataru Nippon-ism {Nippon-ism Spoken by
Nishimura Shuhei) (blog), July 22, 2011, nipponism.net/wordpress/?p=2734.
47. On the controversy of the Hinomaru flag, see Field, Realm of a Dying Emperor, chap. 1.
48. Shuken website, nipponism.net/wordpress/?p=2278 (accessed November 28, 2012).
Nishimura Shuhei, interview by the author, Tokyo, December 21, 2012.
49. On the Nippon Kaigi, see the discussion above.
50. The presence of the köan—both security police (köan keisatsu) and the Public Security
Intelligence Agency (Köan Chösachö)—at the ACM's demonstrations is a sign that the
group is now a police target. That the agency's annual report now includes information on
the ACM along with that of the Aum Shinrikyö religion, the Japanese Communist Party,
radical leftist and rightist groups, and the antinuclear movement indicates that the ACM
is identified as a target of the agency. Public Security Intelligence Agency, "Annual Report
2011: Review and Prospect of Internal and External Situations," January 2012, 76-78,
www.moj.gojp/content/000096470.pdf.
51. The quotes are from the author's video recording of the demonstration on June 10, 2010,
translated from Japanese into English by the author.
52. See Yasuda, Netto to aikoku, 7, 40, 61, 69, 79-81, 124-25, 130, 151-52 for just a few
examples. The book is filled with various episodes of ACM activists acting calmly and nicely
in front of Yasuda, while delivering aggressive hate speeches in rallies.
53. Many of the interviewees involved in the ACM mentioned that their watching online videos
of ACM demonstrations motivated them to participate in the movement, and all noted
the power of video sharing and streaming to spread their messages. Many interviewees
indicated that the real personalities of the ACM leaders are different from those projectedYou can also read
