What Makes Civil Society Strong? Testing Bottom-up and Top- down Theories of a Vibrant Civil Society
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What Makes Civil Society Strong? Testing Bottom-up and Top-
down Theories of a Vibrant Civil Society
Stefanie Bailer
Center for Comparative and International Studies, University of Zurich,
8001 Zürich,stefanie.bailer@ipz.uzh.ch
Thilo Bodenstein
Jean Monnet Chair für Europäische Integration, Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich
Politische Wissenschaften, , D-14195 Berlin, t.bodenstein@jmc-berlin.org
V. Finn Heinrich
Civicus World Alliance for Citizen Participation, finn.heinrich@civicus.org
Paper to be presented at
Conference of the Swiss Political Science Association, St. Gallen, 8-9 January 2009
1Introduction
Since the mid-1980s, the concept of civil society has made a dramatic re-entry into the social
science and global policy discourse. Together with the closely related concept of social capital,
civil society is seen as a powerful force in fostering democracy, good governance, sustainable
and equitable development and social cohesion, amongst others.1 Accordingly, most of the
empirical work on the topic has focused on examining civil society’s ability to fulfill these
functions. While many expectations about civil society’s potential have had to be toned down
and, in some cases, even rejected, the relevance of civil society for democracy and development
overall has largely been vindicated.2 If civil society is such a crucial component of democratic,
equitable and cohesive societies, then it is important to explore the factors that make civil society
strong. Surprisingly, while most grand theories in the social sciences have addressed this question
in one way or the other, it has not attracted much attention from empirical social scientists.
Although there has been a significant growth in empirical studies in recent years,3 few
comparative analyses have tested the various competing explanations for the strength of civil
society. This paper seeks to make a contribution to filling this gap in knowledge about the causes
1
For an overview of these arguments, see L. Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society—Towards Democratic
Consolidation.” Journal of Democracy, 5, no. 3 (1994): 4-17; G. White, “Civil Society, Democratization and
Development (I): Clearing the Analytical Ground” Democratization 1, no. 3 (1994): 375-90; and, critically, J.
Howell and J. Pearce, Civil Society and Development. A Critical Exploration (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002);
A. C. Armony, The Dubious Link. Civic Engagement and Democratization (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2004).
2
R. D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work—Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993); J. Fisher, Nongovernments. NGOs and the Political Development of the Third World (West Hartford:
Kumarian Press, 1998). For critical accounts, see O. G. Encarnacion, “Beyond Civil Society: Promoting Democracy
After September 11.” Foreign Policy, Fall (2003): 705-20; Armony, The Dubious Link.
3
Putnam, Making Democracy Work; L. Salamon and H. K. Anheier, “Social Origins of Civil Society: Explaining the
Nonprofit Sector Cross-Nationally” Voluntas, 9, no. 3 (1998): 213-48; M. J. Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society
in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); E. Schofer and W. Longhofer, “The
Structural Sources of Associational Life,” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological
Association Philadelphia, PA, 2005; M .Freitag, “Bowling the State Back in: Political Institutions and the Creation of
Social Capital” European Journal of Political Research, 45, no. 1 (2006): 123-52; C. J. Andersen and A.
Paskeviciute, “How Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity Influence the Prospects for Civil Society: A Comparative
Study of Citizenship Behavior” Journal of Politics 68, no. 4 (2006): 783-802.
2of a strong civil society—an issue which has important implications for public policy and
democratic theory alike.
The paper will proceed as follows. The next section discusses the concept of civil society
and its applicability to empirical research, and develops an operational concept of civil society’s
strength for the empirical analysis that follows. Then we review the existing theories about civil
society, identify specific hypotheses for empirical testing and introduce the data and methods for
the subsequent analysis. The central sections present a measure of civil society’s strength, put the
various hypotheses to the test via multivariate regression models, and offer a discussion of the
emerging results. The conclusion explores the implications of the results for policy, research and
theory.
An Operational Concept of Civil Society and its Strength
It has now become commonplace among social scientists to bemoan the ‘fuzziness’ and
complexity of the civil society concept, particularly for the task of empirical social analysis.4
While the lack of a commonly agreed definition and civil society’s strongly context-driven nature
certainly make the concept a fairly difficult subject to examine through comparative empirical
work, we agree with those who consider civil society an important and useful heuristic tool to
describe a crucial component of today’s societies.5
4
N. Chandhoke, “The "Civil" and the "Political" in Civil Society” Democratization 8, no. 2 (2001): 1-24; D. Lewis,
“Civil Society in African Contexts: Reflections on the Usefulness of a Concept” Development and Change 33, no. 4
(2002): 569-86, 582; K. Tester, Civil Society (London/New York: Routledge, 1992).
5
M .Edwards, Civil Society (London: Polity, 2004); M. Bratton, Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa. IDR
Report 11, 6 (Boston: Institute for Development Research, 1994); P. Kopecký, “Civil Society, Uncivil Society and
Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe” in Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist
Europe, eds. P. Kopecký, and C. Mudde (London: Routledge, 2003): 1-18.
3Fortunately, recent years have witnessed important conceptual and methodological
advances in the study of civil society.6 Firstly, there is a growing consensus to treat civil society
as a specific component, rather than as a property of society. In other words, while up to the
1990s, civil society was often still seen as a synonym for a ‘good society’, this usage has almost
completely disappeared and the term is now widely accepted to describe the space between the
market, the state and the family where people associate voluntarily. More specifically, civil
society is increasingly seen to encompass two key components: the structural features of
associational life, such as the extent of citizen participation and the distribution of civil society
organizations (CSOs), as well as the ‘cultural’ values which are generated and expressed in these
organizations.
Secondly, with the growth of empirical studies on the topic, definitions which include
normative entry criteria for civil society (that is, only those activities and associations which are
democratic, public good-oriented or progressive, are part of civil society) have become less
common. Thus, we identify a growing tendency towards conceptualizations of civil society as the
arena for any type of collective citizen action outside the state, the market and the family. It is
also increasingly recognized that civil society cannot be equated with similar concepts, such as
the third sector, nonprofit sector or voluntary sector, since the empirical boundaries of civil
society are broader and its epistemological foundation in democratic theory necessitates a
different, that is, political, perspective than the economic approach of studying the third sector.7
To make the concept of civil society applicable for empirical research, an operational concept for
6
For an overview, see V. F. Heinrich, “Studying Civil Society Across the World. Exploring the Thorny Issues of
Conceptualization and Measurement” Journal of Civil Society 1, no. 3 (2005): 211-28.
7
A. Fowler, “Civil Society Research Funding From a Global Perspective: A Case for Redressing Bias, Asymmetry,
and Bifurcation” Voluntas, 13, no. 3 (2002): 286-300; M. Lyons, “Nonprofit Sector and Civil Society: Are They
Competing Paradigms?”, Centre for Australian Community Organisations and Management Working Paper 35,
Sydney, 1996.
4this multidimensional phenomenon needs to be developed. As argued elsewhere,8 a two-
dimensional concept which examines civil society’s structural and cultural components is
theoretically grounded and resonates with most existing operational concepts of civil society and
related phenomena, such as social capital.9 The structural component, which can be broken down
further into (a) the extent and forms of civic engagement, and (b) key characteristics of organized
civil society, has received strong attention in empirical research. In contrast, the cultural
component of civil society’s norms and values has been largely under-researched, but is crucial in
understanding civil society’s dynamics and role in governance and development. It has become
clear that civil society cannot be solely defined by its size and structural configuration, but that
the specific identities, norms, and values underpinning the actions of civil society actors need to
be taken into account.10 Thus, while we do not assume a normative entry criterion for civil society
actors, we nonetheless hold that the extent to which civil society espouses and promotes certain
values is a key component of its capacity to foster democracy and development.
The research undertaken by the CIVICUS Civil Society Index Project (CSI) offers a
comprehensive examination of civil society’s structure and values. CSI is a quantitative index
based on country experts’ evaluations. 11 CSI’s structure dimension covers both aspects of
individual civic engagement (for example, membership in CSOs, volunteering, charitable giving,
collective community action) and the key features of the civil society sector, such as its resources,
8
Heinrich, Studying Civil Society, 218-219.
9
This concept encompasses the CSI’s structure and values dimensions. The other two CSI dimensions, environment
and impact, are not included here, since they are the causes (environment) and consequences (impact) of a civil
society which is strong in structure and values.
10
For conceptualizations which stress the relevance of norms and values, see Heinrich, Studying Civil Society;
Bratton, “Civil Society and Political Transition”: 2-3; H. Anheier, “Measuring Global Civil Society.” in Global Civil
Society Yearbook 2001, eds. H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 221-
30; A. Fowler, “Strengthening Civil Society in Transition Economies – From Concept to Strategy: Mapping an Exit
in A Maze of Mirrors” in NGOs, Civil Society and the State: Building Democracy in Transitional Societies, ed. A.
Clayton (Oxford: INTRAC, 1996): 12-33.
11
See fn. 6.
5infrastructure, and modes of interaction. The values dimension postulates a list of key values and
norms (democracy, transparency, non-violence, tolerance, gender equity, poverty eradication,
environmental sustainability) and examines the extent to which civil society practices these
values internally and promotes them within society at large. Since the CSI assesses the extent to
which civil society’s structure and values conform to a specified ideal type, the data can serve as
a measure of civil society’s internal strength, defined as its capacity to contribute to democracy
and development. In other words, the higher the scores for structure and values, the stronger civil
society is in both its make-up and activism. In the subsequent empirical analysis, we will use this
two-dimensional concept of civil society as a measure of its strength. First, let us examine the
various conditions and factors which have been postulated in the literature as contributing to a
strong civil society.
Explaining Civil Society—Overview of Competing Theories
Given that civil society, as the sphere of autonomous citizen action outside of the state and the
market, is located at the heart of a democratic society, it does not come as a surprise that most
strands of political science theorizing touch on the issue—often in conjunction with theories
about democracy. While in the past no comprehensive empirical investigations of the competing
theories had been undertaken, recent years have witnessed the emergence of a fervent debate,
particularly between approaches highlighting societal factors and those emphasizing the impact
of political institutions on civil society. The following section summarizes the key theoretical
approaches and their hypotheses.
1. Socioeconomic development. Classical modernization theory postulates that the higher the
degree of socioeconomic development of a country, the stronger its civil society, since
development leads to a growth in the middle class and to modern forms of social
6integration, which, in turn, are key drivers of a vibrant civil society.12 Recent elaborations
of modernization theory, particularly the human development theory, develop more
complex models combining economic, institutional and cultural factors which enhance
people’s capabilities and opportunities to act freely.13 These capabilities are seen as fertile
ground for the development of a strong civil society.14
2. Political culture. Different from an emphasis on socioeconomic processes, approaches
rooted in the political culture paradigm focus on the effects of a country’s cultural
traditions and legacies, such as the dominant mode of social interaction in society, its
ethnic and religious composition, and sociopolitical traditions (for example, its colonial
experience or its experience of communism). The most prominent proponent of this line
of argument is Robert Putnam, whose ‘bottom-up’ approach argues that the historical
patterns of civic engagement in public life and of the spread of social trust in a given
society impact the chances of developing a vibrant civil society today.15 A different
argument is postulated by Huntington, namely that a country’s ‘civilizational’
background, particularly its religious outlook, has important bearings for its chance to
sustain a democracy and thereby also a vibrant civil society.16 Others have pointed
towards the negative effects of social heterogeneity for the prospects of a strong civil
12
S. M. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”
American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 69-105; for a critique, see Howell and Peace, Civil Society,
Chapter 4.
13
R. Inglehart and C. Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
14
C. Welzel, “Humanentwicklung und der Phasenwechsel der Zivilgesellschaft: Ziviles Engagement in 50 Nationen“
in Schatten demokratischer Legitimität: Informelle Institutionen und politische Partizipation im interkulturellen
Demokratievergleich, eds. H.J. Lauth and U. Liebert (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999): 207-36.
15
Putnam, Making Democracy Work; R. D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American
Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).
16
S. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations” Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 3 (1993): 22-49; also Welzel,
Humanentwicklung, 218-9.
7society,17 although there are also studies indicating a positive relationship between these
two factors. Lastly, recent studies contrasting the strength of post-Communist civil
societies with those in post-authoritarian and Western countries have highlighted the
importance of a country’s experience with Communism for its political culture and the
prospects of civil society.18 This experience is seen as relevant as it shapes the political
culture of a country via the long-term experience with a specific political regime. In the
case of Communism, it is argued that it led to general mistrust towards civic engagement
and associational life, as well as a growth in private networks at the expense of
involvement in public life.
3. Political institutions. In stark contrast to bottom-up arguments emphasizing cultural and
other societal factors, institutionalist scholars adopt a ‘top-down’ perspective and
postulate that key characteristics of the country’s political context are crucial in shaping
civil society. Here, two strands can be distinguished. Firstly, there are approaches,
grounded in historical institutionalism, which emphasize path-dependent relationships
between key processes and structures of a country’s history (such as the constellation of
social forces, particularly organized religion, or the emergence of different types of
welfare regimes) and the size and shape of contemporary civil society.19 Secondly, other
studies suggest that features of the current political environment, such as the quality of
democracy, effectiveness of the state, extent of rule of law and other factors of a
17
D. L. Costa and M. E. Kahn, “Civic Engagement in Heterogenous Communities” Perspectives on Politics, 1, no. 1
(2003): 103-12; H.J. Lauth, “Zivilgesellschaft als Konzept und die Suche nach ihren Akteuren” in Die Praxis der
Zivilgesellschaft. Akteure, Handeln und Strukturen im internationalen Vergleich, ed. A. Bauerkämper
(Frankfurt/New York: Campus, 2003): 31-54.
18
Howard, Weakness of Civil Society.
19
Salamon and Anheier, Social Origins.
8democratic governance system, provide important enabling conditions for the growth of
civil society.20
4. International influences. Scholars interested in the effects of globalization and the ‘world
system’ argue that current global processes lead to the diffusion of dominant cultural
frames, values and resources to nation-states, which support the development of civil
society.21 Here, the integration of domestic civil society into global society, usually
measured by the number of international NGOs (INGOs) in the country, is a crucial
indicator. A slightly different argument examines the consequences of the aid system and
the question of the extent to which civil society can be strengthened through international
development assistance.22
While a rather intense debate has emerged among American scholars—particularly between
proponents of Robert Putnam’s bottom-up approach rooted in political culture and Theda
Skocpol’s top-down perspective focusing on political institutions—about the driving factors
behind the growth of civil society in the United States,23 cross-national comparative studies about
the relative impact of these competing theories and their hypotheses have been rare. The few
existing studies lead to inconclusive and sometimes even contradictory results, stressing the
influence of the previous regime type and other historical factors,24 the world system,25 current
20
A. Hadenius and F. Uggla, “Making Civil Society Work, Promoting Democratic Development: What Can States
and Donors Do?” World Development, 24, no. 10 (1996): 1621-1639; M. Alagappa, “The Nonstate Public Sphere in
Asia. Dynamic Growth, Institutionalization Lag” in Civil Society and Political Change in Asia. Expanding and
Contracting Democratic Space, ed. M. Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004): 455-77; R. Pekkanen,
Japan's Dual Civil Society. Members Without Advocates (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).
21
Schofer and Longhofer, Structural Sources; J. Boli and G. M. Thomas, Constructing World Culture. International
Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
22
K. Biekart, The Politics of Civil Society Building. European Private Aid Agencies and Democratic Transition in
Central America. (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 1999); Howell and Pearce, Civil Society and Development.
23
Putnam, Bowling Alone; T. Skocpol and M. Fiorina (eds.), Civic Engagement in American Democracy
(Washington: Brookings Institute, 1999); G. Gamm and R. D. Putnam, “The Growth of Voluntary Associations in
America, 1840-1940”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 29 (1999): 511-57; T. Skocpol, Diminished Democracy:
From Membership to Management in American Civic Life (Oklahoma City: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003).
24
Howard, Weakness of Civil Society; Salamon and Anheier, Social Origins; Putnam, Making Democracy Work.
9institutional arrangements,26 or societal characteristics.27 A primary reason for the disparate
results is the vastly different conceptualizations of civil society, which range from individual
attitudes (such as generalized trust) or individual behavior (turnout in referenda, membership in
voluntary organizations, amongst others) to organizational data, such as the number of
organizations in a country, and sectoral characteristics at the macro-level, such as the number of
employees in CSOs expressed as a share of the total labor force of a country. In the following, we
will test the competing hypotheses employing information from the CSI dataset to measure the
dependent variable. This seeks to overcome the restrictions of existing datasets by including
individual, organizational and macro perspectives as well as measuring both the structural and
cultural components of civil society.
Data and Methods
The dependent variable, the ‘strength of civil society’, was measured as an additive index by
summing the scores of the CSI structure and values dimensions.28 The structure dimension
investigates the makeup, size and composition of civil society and thus encompasses especially
civil society actors. Overall 21 indicators are summarized in the six subdimensions to describe
the structure of civil society: breadth of citizen participation, depth of citizen participation,
diversity within civil society, level of organization, inter-relations, and resources. The values
dimension describes a so far often neglected side of principles and values practiced in a civil
society. Overall 14 indicators measure the seven subdimension of values: Democracy,
transparency, tolerance, nonviolence, gender equity, poverty eradication, environmental
25
Schofer and Longhofer, Structural Sources.
26
Freitag, Bowling the State Back in; Schofer and Fourcade, Structural Contexts.
27
Andersen and Paskeviciute, Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity.
28
While other approaches to combining these two dimensions would have been possible (e.g. factor analysis,
multiplicative index), we decided to use a simple additive index to make the results as easily interpretable as possible
and avoid any complex assumptions about their relationship.
10sustainability. In each of the countries included in the Civil Society Diamond a National Index
Team used a combination of methods – secondary data review, stakeholder consultations,
population surveys, media review and desk studies to gather the necessary information to score
each of the indicators on a scale between zero to three according to qualitatively defined
benchmarks. An aggregation of these numbers into subdimensions and dimensions form the
respective values and structure dimensions of the Civil Society diamond. The indicators were
presented to National Advisory Boards composed of civil society representatives who discussed
in a citizen jury approach the indicators and also carried out the scoring of the dimensions29. The
data was collected between 2004 and 2006 and is currently available for 45 countries and
territories.30 The scores of the dependent variable for each country in the dataset are listed in
Annex 1. Most of the independent variables, that is, the measures of the hypotheses presented
above, were provided by the Quality of Government Dataset.31 This dataset is a meta-set of the
major existing international datasets commonly used in comparative politics. Table 1 below lists
the variables and their operationalization for our competing hypotheses for the strength of civil
society.32
29
This data description draws on V.F. Heinrich, C. Malena. “CIVICUS Civil Society Index – Conceptual
Framework and Research Methodology” in V. Finn Heinrich (2007), “CIVICUS Global Survey of the State of Civil
Society Volume 1 Country Profiles”, Kumarian Press Inc., p.1-13
30
For our analysis, we eliminated the following territories, since data for most of the explanatory variables was
missing: Taiwan, Scotland, Wales, North Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Hong Kong and Orissa (India).
31
J. Teorell, S. Holmberg and B. Rothstein “The Quality of Government Dataset", Version 15 November 2006,
Göteborg University: The Quality of Government Institute, available at http:// www.qog.pol.gu.se.
32
Data sources: A. Heston, R. Summers and B. Aten. “Penn World Table Version 6.1”, Center for International
Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002 (GDP per capita); http://hdr.undp.org/
(Human Development Index); M. G. Marshall and K. Jaggers. “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics
and Transitions, 1800 – 2002” in Dataset Users’ Manual. (Maryland: University of Maryland, 2002) (Regime
Durability, Democracy); M. Golder, “Democratic Electoral Systems Around The World”. Electoral Studies 24
(2005): 103-121 (Post-Soviet Countries); World Value Survey, http://webapp.icprs.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPRS-
STUDY/03975.xml and CSI population survey (Trust); A. F. Alesina, A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat, R.
Wacziarg, “Fractionalization”. Journal of Economic Growth 8 (2003): 155-194, (Ethnic and Religious
Fragmentation); D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, Governance Matters V: Aggregate and Individual
Governance Indicators for 1996-2005 (The World Bank, 2006). (Government Effectiveness); World Bank. WDI
11Table 1 about here
Describing Civil Society’s Strength around the World
This section examines the descriptive findings of the composite index of civil society’s strength.
The regional distribution of the index is shown in Figure 1. The “box” indicates where 50% of
the scores are located; the vertical line shows the position of the median. The findings
demonstrate that scores for the composite measure of civil society’s strength are highest in
Western and Southern Europe, followed by post-Communist Europe, Asia, Latin America, and
sub-Saharan Africa, with the Middle East and Mediterranean at the bottom. These findings are
broadly in line with previous research on this topic.33 The rather strong performance of certain
post-Communist countries, which has not been found in existing research, is likely to be a
consequence of a multidimensional measure of civil society (which goes beyond levels of civic
engagement), as well as recent trends towards a more vibrant civil society, partially as a
consequence of accession to the European Union.34
The figure highlights one region with a particularly high score—Western Europe—and one
region with a particularly low score—the Middle East. It also depicts the intra-regional variance
of scores and shows that civil society’s strength among sub-Saharan African countries is far more
diverse than, for example, among post-Communist European countries, indicating substantial
differences in the quality of civil society in Africa.
Online, www.worldbank.org/data (Aid and Trade); Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International
Organizations: Guide to Civil Society Networks (Brussels, 2003 and 2004) (Density of INGOs).
33
L. M. Salamon and S. W. Sokolowski, “Measuring Civil Society: The Johns Hopkins Global Civil Society Index”
in Global Civil Society. Volume 2. Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector, eds. L. M. Salamon, S. W. Sokolowski and
Associates (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2004): 61-92; Schofer and Longhofer, Structural Sources.
34
Howard, Weakness of Civil Society; T. Petrova and S. Tarrow,.“Transactional and Participatory Activism in the
Emerging European Polity. The Puzzle of East-Central Europe”, Comparative Political Studies, 40, no. 1 (2007): 74-
94.
12Figure 1. about here
In general, the intra-regional variations are quite high, pointing to the conclusion that other
forces apart from mere regional characteristics must be at work in shaping civil society. These
political, social and economic factors will be explored in the next section.
What Fosters a Strong Civil Society?
In this section we discuss the main results of our analysis regarding the factors fostering a
strong civil society. Table 2 provides an overview of the results for the different explanatory
models, which are described in more detail below.35 In order to find the model that best predicts
the strength of civil society we tested a number of multivariate models for the different
theoretical hypotheses.36
In almost all models, two control variables are included for countries in Western Europe
and the Middle East because these regions exhibit extreme scores on the measure of civil
society’s strength. By taking account of these outliers, we control for unobserved variables that
might be specific to those regions, but not covered by our independent variables. We use two
dummy variables for Western European and Middle Eastern countries as a baseline model
throughout our estimation models. Both dummies explain about 20% of the overall variance. This
is a standard procedure, for instance in transition or corruption studies where dummies for Russia
or other outlying countries are often controlled for. Since we will never be able to include all
35
To test the competing hypotheses, we used ordinary least square regression analyses with robust standard errors.
36
While it is not possible to include all variables due to multicollinearity, we tested the different theories against
each other to be able to reject or confirm the competing hypotheses. Putting all variables into a single model would
lead to severely biased estimates when one or more of the independent variables highly correlate. In order to detect
instances of multicollinearity, we compute the Variance Inflation Factors; values below 5 show that independent
variables do not cause multicollinearity.
13unobserved variables in the models, controlling for outliers (in our case Western European and
Middle Eastern countries) with dummy variables does at least acknowledge these possible
unobserved effects.
Table 2 about here
Socioeconomic modernization
We cannot find a strong or distinct effect of socioeconomic modernization on civil society. While
the Human Development Index has a significant and positive effect on civil society’s strength,
this effect is not very robust.37 When controlling for other variables, the direction of influence
changes or loses its significance. The test statistic of interest—the significance level of the F-
test—indicates lower significance levels in this economic model in comparison with the political
or institutional models. The higher the significance of the F-test, the more salient is the impact of
the independent variable on the strength of civil society, our dependent variable. Thus, our
analysis provides only weak confirmation for the modernization theory’s hypothesis regarding
the positive influence of socioeconomic development on civil society.
Political culture
In models 2 and 3 we tested the political culture hypotheses concerning the influence of key
historical and current features of a country’s political culture on the state of civil society. We
expected an effect related to previous experience with Communism. Furthermore, we
investigated a self-reinforcing effect of experience with democracy, based on the assumption that
37
We have also tested another measure of socioeconomic development—GDP per capita—which has a positive yet
not significant effect on the strength of civil society. The result is listed in Annex 3.
14more established democracies produce a more conducive political culture for the development of
civil society. These effects, however, are not particularly strong, as one can see in model 2. The
measures of democratic regime durability and experience with Communism show the expected
positive coefficients, but no significance. This model is also quite weak and not very robust.
Thus, we cannot confirm the historical hypotheses of the political culture approach, which
highlight past experiences to predict the current strength of civil society. To some extent, these
results are quite encouraging because countries do not seem to be ‘stuck’ in their historic legacies
and seem to have the chance to develop strong civil society structures and values regardless of
their past. The strong performance of the Czech Republic, with an index score close to the
Western European median, is just one example of a country with a difficult historical legacy and
a rather vibrant contemporary civil society.
Another political culture variable in model 3 is generalized trust, which is often used to
account for the degree of social capital in societies. Although the impact of the variable
measuring the percentage of people trusting other people is positive as expected, it is not,
however, significant. One attribute of a country’s cultural context, namely ethnic and particularly
religious fragmentation, does influence the state of civil society quite distinctly, as one can see in
model 4. Whereas the variable for ethnic fragmentation is not significant (although it points in the
expected negative direction), the variable accounting for religious fragmentation is highly
significant and, at first sight, unexpectedly positive. Thus, the results seem to indicate that more
religiously fragmented countries exhibit stronger civil societies. In order to further investigate
this effect we controlled for the type of regime, taking up an idea formulated by Andersen and
Paskeviciute.38 In a comparative study, these authors found that the effect of social fragmentation
on civil society depends on the type of regime. We can confirm these findings when controlling
38
Anderson and Paskeviciute, Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity.
15for the type of regime using a dummy variable distinguishing full democracies and weak/non-
democracies.39 The results for model 9, reported in the annex, show an insignificant effect of
religion in weak/non-democracies, and for model 10, a very significant and positive effect of
religion in full democracies. We interpret this finding as an indicator that democracies are highly
capable of dealing with religiously fragmented societies.40 Furthermore, this result could be an
indicator for a hypothesis postulated by third sector scholars, namely that heterogeneous societies
have stronger civil societies, due to their stronger diversity of social interests and the
corresponding challenge of the state in catering for all these interests.41 Rather than relying on the
state, different social groups set up their own associations to service and represent these interests,
leading to a larger and more vibrant civil society. The postwar social model in the Netherlands is
an archetypical expression of these dynamics. From this vantage point, however, it is not quite
clear why the results do not show the same effect for ethnically heterogeneous societies. This
puzzle requires a further and more in-depth exploration.
Democratic governance
The strongest and most distinct effect on the strength of civil society is exerted by the governance
measure. This variable shows a robust, positive and significant effect and accounts for a large
amount of variance explained in model 5.42 Thus, our results show that the quality of political
institutions creates a positive climate for the development of civil society. Citizens in states with
39
A country is considered to be a full democracy if its score on the Polity index (ranging from -10 to +10) is 7 or
higher; see Marshall and Jaggers, Polity IV Project.
40
We dropped the Western Europe dummy in both models, because it is not relevant to the sub-sample of non-
democratic countries.
41
B. Weisbrod, The Voluntary Nonprofit Sector (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977); E. James, “The Nonprofit
Sector in Comparative Perspective” in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, ed. W. W. Powell (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1987): 397-415.
42 2
R indicates the share of the dependent variable’s variance (in our case, the strength of civil society) which is
explained by the respective explanatory model. It ranges from 0 to 1.
16reliable and strong political institutions are motivated to formulate their desires in public and are
prepared to form, and engage in, voluntary organizations. Importantly, model 5 also shows that
the existence of democratic institutions is not a significant and robust predictor for the strength of
civil society. Thus, the difference in the performance of the democracy versus the governance
measures highlights the fact that it is not enough to provide democratic institutions; democracy
must be realized effectively and credibly in order to promote civil society.
International factors
In models 6 and 7 we test the impact of international NGOs and international trade on the
strength of civil society. Interestingly, the prevalence of INGOs in the country does not impact
significantly on the strength of civil society. We also find no support for the correlation between
international aid per capita and the dependent variable, a result shown in model 11 in the annex.43
Exposure to international trade, in contrast, has a stronger effect on civil society. The result in
model 10 shows the expected positive sign, but falls short of significance. The overall model fit,
however, is much better than in the international aid model (model 11 in annex), as can be seen
from the F-test.
Conclusion: Good Governance, Strong Civil Society
What are the implications of our findings for civil society research and practice, and particularly
for the question of whether and, if yes, how civil society strengthening is possible? The analysis
reveals that the hypotheses of the political culture school about the ‘long arms of history’ cannot
43
The dummy for Western Europe is not included in this model, since these countries do not receive aid. The aid
variable is not significant but has a positive sign showing that the total amount of aid delivered to a country
positively impacts on the strength of civil society. However, this result should not be over-interpreted, for the F-
statistics in model 9 perform poorly.
17be confirmed—the strength of contemporary civil society does not seem to be dependent on
historical legacies. Neither the length of democratic experience nor the experience with
Communist rule is an important factor for the state of contemporary civil society. Also, a
country’s current level of social capital does not seem to influence the strength of its civil society.
While these ‘cultural’ variables do not show any effect at all, there is a strong and positive effect
of the performance of political institutions on civil society. This finding lends support to the
institutionalist approaches claiming that better governed states, reliable institutions and credible
civil servants and politicians are conducive to the creation of a vibrant civil society. In addition,
socioeconomic factors have a positive effect. These factors, particularly the Human Development
Index, are highly correlated with the quality of government, indicating that the positive
developments in politics, economy and civil society are closely interrelated. However, the causal
linkage determining which factor influences which is hard to establish and, as we described in the
introduction, a strong civil society is often seen as an important driving force for good
governance and development. Still, in our view, it is likely that the stronger influence runs from
the powerful and encompassing political and economic systems to civil society, rather than vice
versa.
This key result lends support to the so-called ‘top-down approach’ in current debates about
how to strengthen civil society, which argues that the shape and performance of political
institutions are key factors fostering a strong civil society. In contrast to the other conditions on
offer, particularly the verdict by Putnam that building a civic community is a lengthy and path-
dependent process, our conclusion paints a more positive picture of the possibilities of
strengthening civil society.
While we do not see any empirical support for the argument that the aid system can play
any direct role in building a vibrant civil society (and other influences of globalization do not
18seem to be influential either), the institutional argument nevertheless points towards a set of
conditions which are conducive to change. Even though it is a profoundly difficult task, good
governance can be fostered, not least with the support of local civil society. It seems that the
current trend in the international aid system to move towards supporting developmental states in
their task of fulfilling their key functions is an acknowledgement of this insight; though one
needs to caution against the aid system developing in a direction in which it will neglect the
political dimension, particularly human rights, and potentially abandon civil society and its
important democratizing and developmental roles altogether.
Thus, the challenge is to foster strong governing elites, reliable administrations and
democratic institutions, and, at the same time, strong civil societies. Unfortunately, current
trends, such as the growth in façade democracies, the frequent regress into authoritarianism and
the general reluctance of democratic governments to genuinely acknowledge the importance of
civil society and take concrete steps towards supporting its development, show the difficulties
inherent in building both strong states and civil societies. Future research should therefore
explore examples of good practice, where a strong and democratic state has emerged alongside a
vibrant civil society. In addition, recent innovations in participatory and deliberative democracy,
particularly in the global South, point to the possibilities of marrying effective democratic
governance with strong civic engagement. Thus, rather than seeing civil society and the state in a
zero-sum relationship, their development and performance should be seen as mutually
reinforcing.
19Table 1. Explanatory Variables
Hypothesis Variable Name Operationalization
Socioeconomic
modernization
GDP Average real GDP per capita (log) (1993–
2002)
Human development Human Development Index (2002)
Political Culture
Experience with Regime durability Number of years of experience with
democracy democratic government (2002)
Experience with Post-Communist countries Dummy variable accounting for previous
Communism Communist regime
Social Capital Trust Percentage of people claiming that most
people can be trusted (year varies by country)
Fragmentation Ethnic fragmentation Reflects probability that two randomly
selected people will not belong to the same
ethno-linguistic group
Religious fragmentation Reflects probability that two randomly
selected people will not belong to the same
religious group
Political Institutions
Political Quality Index of World Bank Governance Dataset
variables for regulatory quality, rule of law,
control of corruption and government
effectiveness (2002)
Democracy Polity index score (2002)
International Influences Aid Average aid per capita (current US$), 1993–
2002
Trade Share of exports and imports within GDP
(2006)
Density of INGOs Membership density of INGOs per million of
population (2004)
20Table 2. Explanatory Models for Civil Society’s Strength
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Socioeconomic Historical Social Fragmentation Democratic Global International
Modernization Political Capital Governance Civil trade
Culture Society
Western 0.374 0.616 0.55* 0.468 0.02 0.61* 0.639
Europe (1.24) (1.77) (0.28) (2.01) (0.07) (2.12) (2.51)
Middle East -0.424 -0.358 -0.38 -0.4* -0.698** -0.42 -0.33
(-1.73) (-1.31) (0.26) (-2.38) (-3.66) (-1.65) (-1.42)
Human 1.1*
development (2.14)
Regime 0.00004
durability (0.01)
Democracy 0.0004
(0.03)
Post- 0.029
Communist (0.18)
countries
Political 0.122**
quality (3.73)
Trust 0.21
(0.33)
Ethnic -0.353
fragmentation (-0.89)
Religious 0.812**
fragmentation (2.85)
International 0.295
trade (log) (1.84)
INGO density, 0.0002
2003 (1.39)
Constant 2.462*** 3.233*** 3.241*** 3.058*** 3.331*** 3.2*** 1.994**
(6.57) (23.9) (16.81) (15.55) (28.68) (36.31) (2.93)
N 36 39 38 37 38 38 38
R2 0.3071 0.2196 0.24 0.3752 0.4910 0.2394 0.2811
F-Test 4.24* 1.94 2.28** 8.01*** 10.54*** 2.55 4.72**
Variance 1.18 1.31 1.06 1.17 1.42 1.08 1.02
Inflation
Factor
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
21Figure 1. Scores for Index of Civil Society’s Strength by Region
Western Europe
Asia-Pacific
Post-Communist Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
Latin America
Mediterranean & Middle East
2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
Strength of Civil Society
Source: Civicus
22Annex:
Annex 1. Country Scores on Index of Civil Society’s Strength
Country Score
Argentina 3.1
Azerbaijan 2.2
Bolivia 3.5
Bulgaria 3.3
Chile 4.1
China 2.8
Croatia 3.6
Cyprus (southern part) 3.2
Czech Republic 4.0
Ecuador 2.6
Egypt 2.7
Fiji 3.1
Georgia 3.1
Germany 4.3
Greece 3.0
Guatemala 3.0
Honduras 3.1
Indonesia 3.6
Italy 3.9
Lebanon 3.4
Macedonia 3.6
Mongolia 2.9
Montenegro 3.0
Nepal 3.3
Netherlands 4.2
Poland 3.3
Romania 3.2
Russia 2.6
Serbia 2.9
Sierra Leone 2.8
Slovenia 3.3
South Korea 3.9
Togo 2.4
Turkey 2.2
Uganda 3.7
Ukraine 3.6
Uruguay 2.9
Vietnam 3.3
23Annex 2. Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP per capita 38 4496.41 6399.49 167.54 25567.49
Human 36 0.747 0.15 0.273 0.942
development
Regime 39 13.23 15.52 0 56
durability
Democracy 38 6 5.26 -7 10
Post- 39 0.33 0.48 0 1
Communist
countries
Political 35 0.67 3.42 -4.46 9
quality
Trust 38 0.275 0.16 0.08 0.87
Ethnic 28 0.3 0.29 0 0.84
fragmentation
Religious 37 0.43 0.22 0.005 0.8
fragmentation
Aid per capita 34 32.39 24.9 -1.95 86.97
Trade 38 71.05 28.18 22.81 143.31
INGO Density 38 237.08 351.39 1.9 1851.9
24Annex 3. Additional Models
8 9 10 11
Socioeconomic Fragmentation Fragmentation International
modernization in non- in democracies aid
(per capita democracies
income)
Western Europe 0.258
(0.78)
Middle East -0.485 -0.258 -0.516** -0.337
(-1.95) (-1.08) (-3.6) (-1.49)
GDP per capita (log) 0.134
(2.03)
Religious fragmentation 0.278 1.393***
(0.44) (6.25)
Aid per capita (log) 0.058
(0.78)
Constant 2.272*** 2.903*** 2.897*** 3.028***
(4.8) (8.34) (25.97) (11.4)
N 38 11 26 33
R2 0.3066 0.0944 0.4969 0.0850
F-Test 4.64** ---- 22.71*** 1.3
Variance Inflation Factor 1.46 1.23 1.00 1.00
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