UKRAINE: FIVE YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF DIGNITY - NATO Parliamentary Assembly
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COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY (CDS) Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance (CDSDG) UKRAINE: FIVE YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF DIGNITY Draft Report by Jane CORDY (Canada) Rapporteur 072 CDSDG 19 E rev.1 | Original: English | 22 April 2019 Until this document has been adopted by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security, it only represents the views of the Rapporteur.
072 CDSDG 19 E rev.1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 2
THE SECURITY SITUATION IN UKRAINE ............................................................................ 3
A. ONGOING AGGRESSION IN DONBAS ........................................................................ 3
B. RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN THE KERCH STRAIT ...................................................... 4
C. THE SITUATION IN OCCUPIED CRIMEA .................................................................... 6
UKRAINIAN REFORMS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES .......................................... 7
A. OVERVIEW OF THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN UKRAINE ....................................... 7
B. DEFENCE AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM .......................................................... 8
C. RULE OF LAW .............................................................................................................. 9
D. ECONOMIC REFORMS .............................................................................................. 10
E. CIVIL SOCIETY, MEDIA, EDUCATION, AND RELIGION ............................................ 13
CONCLUSIONS: SUPPORTING UKRAINE’S EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION ............... 14
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................... 16072 CDSDG 19 E rev.1
INTRODUCTION
1. When, in November 2013, then President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign the
long-awaited Association Agreement with the European Union, he set off a chain of events that had
profound ramifications not only for Ukraine, but also for regional and international security. The fierce
pro-European revolution – dubbed “The Euro-Maidan” or “The Revolution of Dignity”1 – and the
subsequent Russian aggression against Ukraine have divided the Euro-Atlantic security landscape
into pre and post-2014 eras.
2. The Euro-Maidan was, in many ways, different from the “Orange Revolution” in 2004, the first
attempt by the Ukrainians to break out of the post-Soviet grey zone. Under “Orange” leaders, Ukraine
remained a deeply divided country whose European aspirations were clearly reversible. By 2010,
the “Orange” period was over as the country once again elected Viktor Yanukovych as president,
who oversaw a corrupt and increasingly authoritarian regime. Conversely, the second pro-European
revolution of 2013-2014 was marked by a far greater determination of the Ukrainian citizens to
fundamentally transform their country. The violent response by the Yanukovych regime and the
unabashed military invasion of eastern Ukraine by Russia have only consolidated the Ukrainian
nation in this determination. For the bulk of the Ukrainian society, including in the regions previously
considered “pro-Russian, the path towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration no longer has a
viable alternative. With an enormous delay, Ukraine has finally embarked on a path opted for by
other Central and Eastern European countries more than two decades ago.
3. Five years after the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine still faces tremendous challenges both in
protecting its sovereignty in the face of the ongoing Russian aggression and in fulfilling its
commitments towards reform and, ultimately, towards a fairer and more prosperous Ukraine. It is
clear that there is frustration and disappointment among the population. Yet, as the country holds
both presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019, it is also clear that Ukraine’s strategic
geopolitical choice towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration has been made and will not
change in the foreseeable future. The newly elected President, Volodymyr Zelensky, expressed his
support for Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership (UAWire, 2019)2.
4. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly remains a steadfast champion of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic
aspirations and has expressed its support and solidarity in numerous reports, resolutions and
statements. This draft report aims to reaffirm the Assembly’s commitment to the territorial integrity
of Ukraine and its European integration. At the same time, the draft report reasserts the Assembly’s
position that the reform process in Ukraine should not lose pace, especially when it comes to the
rule of law and the fight against corruption. The draft report discusses ongoing security challenges
in Ukraine, takes stock of the country’s achievements and remaining challenges in various reform
areas, and proposes ideas on how the Euro-Atlantic community could better assist Ukraine in its
transformation and integration process.
1 Euro-Maidan and the Revolution of Dignity are used interchangeably throughout this draft report.
2 During the electoral campaign, Mr Zelensky emphasised the need to better explain the benefits of NATO
membership to the population in eastern Ukraine and suggested holding a referendum on the matter.
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THE SECURITY SITUATION IN UKRAINE
A. ONGOING AGGRESSION IN DONBAS
5. Despite the signing of the Minsk II accord3 in February 2015, violence in eastern Ukraine
continues and has already claimed almost 13,000 lives, including more than 3,000 civilians and the
298 passengers of the MH17 airliner downed, as concluded by the Dutch investigation, by
Russian-backed illegal military groups. Up to 30,000 have been wounded and 1.5 million have fled
to other regions of Ukraine (RFE/RL, February 2019). In January-March 2019, the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE)’s Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) recorded more
than 80,000 ceasefire violations as well as the deployment of hundreds of weapon systems forbidden
by Minsk II. The SMM has also faced restrictions on its freedom of movement while attempting to
fulfil its mandate. The overwhelming majority of the ceasefire violations, the illegal deployments and
movement restrictions are committed by Russian-backed illegal military groups in the areas not
controlled by the Ukrainian government (OSCE SMM, 2019). Crucially, the SMM is prevented from
effectively monitoring the border between these areas and the Russian Federation, which allows
Moscow to send personnel and military equipment to the occupied areas of Ukraine. Moreover,
Russian forces and Russian-backed illegal military groups regularly target the SMM’s surveillance
drones and video surveillance cameras in the conflict area.
6. Talks within the ‘Normandy Format’ and ‘Trilateral Contact Group’ formats have failed to
produce tangible results. While Ukraine adopted a law on the "special status" of some areas of
Donbas in 2014, transferring more economic and administrative powers to local communities in
these areas, as well as offering amnesty to Russian-backed militants, Russia has failed to withdraw
its troops and equipment from the occupied territories 4 and has violated the ceasefire terms.
Moreover, Russian proxies have directly violated Minsk II by holding so-called ‘presidential’ and
‘parliamentary’ elections in the regions not controlled by the Ukrainian government in November
2018. Minsk II clearly stipulates the requirement to hold local elections in accordance with Ukrainian
law. Furthermore, since December 2017 there has been no progress regarding the exchange of
hostages and unlawfully detained persons (including the prominent Ukrainian filmmaker
Oleg Sentsov), as Moscow continues to reject Ukrainian proposals. In April 2019, Russian President
Vladimir Putin announced the decision to fast-track Russian citizenship for residents of the occupied
territories in eastern Ukraine, a move condemned by Ukraine and its Western partners as an attack
on Ukrainian sovereignty.
7. The lack of progress in the Minsk talks and Moscow’s continuing disregard for its obligations
under the Minsk II accord are the cause of much frustration in Ukraine, where Minsk II is increasingly
3 Minsk II – officially the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements – is a
13-point ceasefire agreement. The terms of the Minsk II Agreement include: a ceasefire, the withdrawal
of heavy weaponry by both sides, the release and exchange of all hostages and unlawfully detained
persons, constitutional reform on decentralisation in Ukraine, the withdrawal of foreign fighters, the
granting of amnesty, the monitoring of the ceasefire and withdrawal, local elections in Donetsk and
Luhansk (the Donbas) in accordance with OSCE standards and monitored by OSCE’s Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), humanitarian assistance, economic development,
and the restoration of full Ukrainian control over its border with Russia throughout the conflict zone. In
addition, Minsk II established four specialised working groups with a view to implementing the military,
political, economic, and humanitarian clauses between the Ukrainian government and the separatist
regions of Luhansk and Donetsk. The implementation of Minsk II is overseen by its four signatories –
France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia (known as the Contact Group on Ukraine and sometimes
referred to as the “Normandy Format”) – and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine,
which has about 800 unarmed monitors. In parallel, negotiations are also taking place in the format of
the Trilateral Contact Group that involves Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE as moderator.
4 According to Kyiv, Russian-backed military formations in Donbas have some 35,000 troops and
496 main battle tanks. About 2,100 members of the Russian military are reportedly present in the areas
not controlled by the Ukrainian government.
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unpopular. A number of proposals are being put forward, including expanding the ‘Normandy Format’
to include the United States and the United Kingdom. The latest plan was proposed by Martin Sajdik,
Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in the Trilateral Contact Group on
Ukraine. The plan suggests the involvement of the United Nations, which, together with the OSCE,
would set up a transitional administration in the areas not controlled by the Ukrainian government
and hold local elections, while the EU would set up an agency for the reconstruction of the Donbas.
The plan is largely in line with Minsk II, but it will depend on whether or not Kyiv and Moscow would
be able to agree to the modalities, such as the size of the UN/OSCE mission, the ability for displaced
persons to participate in local elections, and the ability of Ukraine to regain control of its side of the
border with Russia in Donbas (Khylko, 2019). Significant breakthroughs in the Minsk process appear
to be unlikely in the foreseeable future, especially as Russian President Vladimir Putin has
suggested effectively suspending the talks during the election period in Ukraine.
8. Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation in the occupied part of Donbas remains dire. The local
economy has collapsed, prices for goods are higher than in the rest of Ukraine, and there is a severe
shortage of medical personnel and supplies. Corruption and organised crime are flourishing.
Indiscriminate shelling periodically disrupts the provision of services such as water and electricity.
More than 1 million crossings between Kyiv-controlled and occupied territories are registered every
month as people are forced to travel long distances in order to receive their pensions and visit family
members. Yet, conditions at checkpoints, especially from the eastern side, are difficult, particularly
for elderly people, children, pregnant women, and people with disabilities, who have to wait in long
queues in harsh weather conditions. While Russia bears the responsibility for causing this
humanitarian crisis in the Donbas, Kyiv has yet to develop a coherent and ambitious strategy to
address the humanitarian challenges in the region and reach out to the population in the occupied
territories.
B. RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN THE KERCH STRAIT
9. In 2018, Russia opened a new front in its aggression against Ukraine. Following the illegal
construction of the Kerch bridge connecting Crimea with Russia’s Krasnodar region, Russia has
gained control over access to the Sea of Azov, with implications for two major Ukrainian ports,
Mariupol and Berdyansk. Despite repeated warnings and pleas by Ukrainian representatives, the
international community failed to exert meaningful pressure on Russia and to prevent the bridge from
being built.
10. On 25 November 2018, Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) coast guard ships attacked
and seized three Ukrainian naval vessels (two Ukrainian gunboats and a tug) as they approached
the Kerch Strait on their way back from the Black Sea port of Odessa to Mariupol. Russia’s actions
violated the international law of the sea as well as a 2003 Russia-Ukraine treaty which provides for
freedom of navigation in the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov. Nevertheless, the Russian FSB coast
guard denied right of passage to these three Ukrainian vessels, accused them of breaching Russian
territorial waters in Crimea (which the international community overwhelmingly recognises as
Ukrainian territory), pursued them as they attempted to return to Odessa, rammed them, and opened
fire, eventually capturing 24 Ukrainian sailors and injuring six people.
11. This incident marked the first instance of a direct and undisguised attack by Russian forces on
Ukrainian forces. The actions by Russian forces represented a dangerous escalation of the broader
Russian-Ukrainian conflict and prompted Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko to impose
temporary martial law in eastern Ukraine. Russia’s blatant violation of international law was strongly
condemned by the international community, including the NATO PA. Its President Madeleine Moon
stated, on 26 November 2018, that “seizure of Ukrainian vessels is a provocative step which seems
to be a deliberate escalation of tension in the region” and called on Moscow “to release the Ukrainian
vessels it has seized in the Kerch Strait and to cease hindering Ukraine from exercising its right to
free navigation in the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov.”
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12. NATO members have – in a strong display of solidarity – condemned “Russia's unjustified use
of military force against Ukrainian ships and naval personnel”, which they see as part of the larger
pattern of Russian aggressive actions in the region, including “ongoing and wide-ranging military
build-up in Crimea”. In April 2019, NATO Foreign Ministers adopted a new package of measures to
improve NATO’s situational awareness in the Black Sea region and strengthen support for NATO
partners Georgia and Ukraine. These measures were taken as part of NATO’s tailored Forward
Presence – the Alliance’s ongoing effort to reassure regional Allies and partners on NATO’s
southeastern flank. At the beginning of 2019, one of NATO’s naval groups – some 20 vessels of
Standing NATO Maritime Group Two – took part in large multi-national Sea Shield exercise in the
Black Sea. A US missile destroyer, USS Donald Cook, and two NATO frigates, Canada’s HMCS
Toronto and the Spanish ESPS Santa Maria, visited the Ukrainian port of Odessa at the beginning
of 2019 (Naval Today, 2019).
13. In response to the Kerch incident, the EU imposed asset freezes and travel bans on
eight Russian officials, bringing the number of those sanctioned by the EU in relation to the crisis in
Ukraine to 170 persons and 44 entities. The United States sanctioned four members of Russia's
FSB as well as six defence companies operating in Crimea. Canada imposed sanctions on
114 persons and 15 entities, and Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland stated that "Canada
and its allies are unwavering in [their] support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Russia's provocations in the Kerch Strait and its illegal and ongoing occupation of Crimea will not go
unchecked" (DW, 2019).
14. Nevertheless, at the time of writing, 24 Ukrainian sailors remained in Russian captivity waiting
for trial in the detention centres of Lefortovo and Matrosskaya Tishina in Moscow. The Ukrainian
vessels have also yet to be returned. Russia has opened the Kerch Strait for commercial shipping.
However, due to the structure of the bridge, ships taller than 33 meters cannot pass through the
strait. Canadian newspaper The Globe and Mail reports that, due to physical restrictions imposed by
Russia in the Kerch Strait, shipping from Ukrainian Sea of Azov ports has fallen by approximately
25% (Lourie, 2018).
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C. THE SITUATION IN OCCUPIED CRIMEA
15. This Committee has reported at length about the serious human rights violations that have
been taking place in Crimea since the illegal occupation and annexation of the peninsula in early
2014. Ongoing human rights and humanitarian concerns include suppression of dissent, restriction
of the right to public assembly, eradication of independent media, infringement of due process and
fair trial rights, confiscation of property without compensation, enforced disappearances, deprivation
of liberty, sexual violence, torture, and murders. Recently, international human rights organisations
such as Freedom House and Human Rights Watch have reported that those opposed to Russian
occupation continued to face harassment, arrest, and imprisonment for their peaceful activities
(Freedom House, 2019; HRW, 2019). Crimean residents were given Russian citizenship and
compelled to relinquish their Ukrainian citizenship or face penalties such as the loss of job and
property rights. In the space of ten months from late 2017 to mid-2018, the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights documented 81 cases involving credible allegations
of human rights violations and abuses in Crimea (OHCHR, 2018). In December 2018, the UN
General Assembly passed a resolution calling on Russia to stop violating human rights in Crimea,
revoke all discriminatory legislation, and hold those responsible for the violations accountable.
16. While all residents of Crimea are denied full political rights, Crimean Tatars and ethnic
Ukrainians face greater persecution5. The representative body of the Crimean Tatar people, the
Mejlis, closed in 2014 and was officially outlawed in 2016 for “the use of propaganda and hatred
toward Russia [and] inciting ethnic nationalism”. Several of the Mejlis’ leaders were later arrested
and sentenced on separatism and extremism charges, while others, such as Refat Chubarov and
Mustafa Dzhemilev, were banned from entering Crimea. In December 2018, four Crimean Tatars
received lengthy prison sentences on alleged terrorism charges, while in March 2019, 23 Crimean
Tatar activists were arrested on suspicion of participating in a “terrorist organisation”. Russia ignores
the 2017 decision of the International Court of Justice calling on Russia to “refrain from maintaining
or imposing limitations on the ability of the Crimean Tatar community to conserve its representative
institutions, including the Mejlis.” An estimated 20,000 Crimean Tatars have fled because of Russia’s
occupation of Crimea. Crimean Tatars continue to be disproportionately affected by police raids and
prosecuted under terrorism-related offences (OHCHR, 2017).
17. Ukrainian political parties are banned on the territory of Crimea. According to the Crimean
Human Rights Group, there is not a single school left in Crimea where all classes are taught in
Ukrainian6, while the number of classes taught in Ukrainian in mixed-language schools has been
reduced significantly (UNIAN, 2019). Most parishes of the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church
have been closed in Crimea, and the remaining ones are facing eviction on the formal basis of failing
to re-register under the new Russian legislation (RFE/RL, March 2019).
5 Throughout its history, Crimea has been an intersection of different civilisations, particularly Greek and
Turkic. For centuries, a Turkic Tatar population constituted the majority of the peninsula’s inhabitants.
Crimea became a part of the Russian empire only at the end of the 18th century. The Tatars still
constituted a significant share of the region’s population up until the end of World War II, when the Soviet
government began to deport large groups of ethnic Tatars to Central Asia as punishment for alleged
collaboration with German forces. In 1954, under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, Moscow
transferred the Crimean Oblast to Ukraine on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of Cossack Ukraine
becoming a part of Russia. With the independence of Ukraine, the Tatars started to repatriate back to
their homeland and on the eve of annexation constituted 14% of the population. The Tatar population
overwhelmingly supported Crimea’s status as an autonomous part of Ukraine. According to the 2001
census, ethnic Russians made up 58% of Crimea’s population, followed by ethnic Ukrainians with 24%.
6 Even before the occupation, the overwhelming majority of schoolchildren – about 90% – in Crimea
received education in Russian. Thus, the myth that Russian-speakers were somehow oppressed in
Crimea before 2014 is unfounded.
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UKRAINIAN REFORMS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES
A. OVERVIEW OF THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN UKRAINE
18. During the last five years, the political scene in Ukraine has transformed from a battleground
between pro-European North-West and pro-Russian South-East regions of Ukraine into a complex
and fluid matrix of multiple political groups, nearly all with pro-Western agendas. The Party of
Regions, that ruled in 2010-2014, now rebranded as the Opposition Bloc, received 40 seats in the
450-seat parliament (Verkhovna Rada)7 in the 2014 elections. Although viewed as pro-Russian and
anti-NATO, the Opposition Bloc also considers Crimea to be a part of Ukraine.
19. The largest political groupings in the current Rada are the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, the Peoples
Front party8, Yulia Tymoshenko’s Fatherland party, and the Self-Reliance party, with its basis in
western Ukraine. The ideological differences between these parties are limited as they all claim to
represent the Euromaidan and support EU and NATO integration. Since 2016, Fatherland and
Self-Reliance have stood in opposition to then President Poroshenko and Volodymyr Groysman’s
government, but both supported the adoption of strategic documents, including the constitutional
changes identifying membership in the EU and NATO as the strategic goal for Ukraine9.
20. The ideology of the Radical Party, which won 22 seats in the parliament in 2014 and initially
supported the new government before retreating into the opposition in 2015, is harder to determine.
Its leader Oleh Lyashko is sometimes referred to as a nationalist, but the party mostly adheres to
schools of thought associated with left-wing populism. While the Kremlin’s narrative about the
‘neo-Nazi regime in Kyiv’ is exaggerated, extreme nationalist views and groups have been granted
legitimacy in the wider Ukrainian society since 2014 and are seeking to impose their political and
cultural views (Likhachev, 2018). However, polling data indicates that far-right groups have no real
chance of being elected during the 2019 elections (Likhachev, 2018).
21. Overall, the party system in Ukraine is far from consolidated and can be expected to undergo
the dramatic rise of new parties and the disappearance of old ones. Ukrainian voters notoriously
distrust politicians: opinion surveys rarely show more than 20% support for any of the major parties
or political figures. Except for Leonid Kuchma, no Ukrainian President has been re-elected for a
second term so far. The sudden rise of TV producer and actor Volodymyr Zelensky, who received
an astonishing 73% of votes in the second round of the 2019 presidential elections, clearly
demonstrates the disappointment of voters in the traditional political establishment.
22. The system of checks and balances continues to evolve as well. In the last 15 years, Ukraine
moved back and forth from presidential to parliamentary-presidential systems. Since 2014, the latter
is formally in place in Ukraine, granting significant powers to the Prime Minister and the Verkhovna
Rada. Constitutionally, the President has the lead in the defence and security domain; he appoints
foreign affairs and defence ministers, heads of security services and the prosecutor general, inter
alia. Other areas are mainly the government’s responsibility. Arseniy Yatsenyuk and his cabinet of
reformers enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy in their decisions. By replacing Mr Yatsenyuk
with his own political ally Volodymyr Groysman in 2016, President Poroshenko has expanded his
influence over the executive branch, shifting the centre of power towards the presidency. However,
the current Prime Minister remains a strong political figure. Regardless of the election of a new
president, the Groysman cabinet would, constitutionally, remain in place, as long as it enjoys
parliamentary support.
7 Of 450, 27 seats are vacant due to the occupation of Ukrainian territories.
8 Notable leaders include former Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, speaker of the Rada Andriy Parubiy,
and the powerful Interior Minister Arsen Avakov.
9 According to most opinion surveys, about 40-45% of Ukrainians – or about 60% of those who said they
would come to vote – support Ukraine’s NATO membership, a remarkable increase compared to public
attitudes prior to 2014.
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23. By 2019, Ukraine had accumulated an impressive record of holding largely free and
competitive elections that, with the exception of certain backsliding during the Yanukovych rule, were
assessed positively by international observers, including by the NATO PA. According to an
International Election Observation Mission, the 2019 presidential election in Ukraine was
“competitive and held with respect for fundamental freedoms”. Michal Szczerba, head of the
NATO PA election observation delegation, qualified the voting as “free choice by free people.
Ukrainians demonstrated their strong commitment to democratic and Euro-Atlantic values.” The legal
electoral framework of Ukraine is largely sound, and steps were taken to amend campaign-finance
legislation to address concerns voiced by the ODIHR and the Council of Europe’s Group of States
against Corruption (GRECO). Public funding for political parties has been established, limits placed
on private donations, public reporting requirements expanded, and oversight by the National Agency
for the Prevention of Corruption has been introduced. The International Election Observation Mission
noted, however, that Ukraine needs to better ensure the implementation of the electoral legal
framework and to address problems such as the misuse of administrative resources for campaign
purposes (IEOM, 2019).
B. DEFENCE AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
24. In 2014, the Ukrainian armed forces were alarmingly unfit to cope with foreign invasion. Of
some 150,000 servicemen (down from nearly 1 million in 1991), only one 6,000-strong brigade was
fully capable of carrying out combat operations. Stopping the advancement of Russian troops and
Russian-backed military groups in eastern Ukraine was achieved, to a large degree, by Ukrainian
volunteer movements.
25. By 2019, the situation has improved dramatically. Ukraine’s armed forces consist of
250,000 troops with better planning, command and control, training, and equipment. Despite
economic hardship, defence spending has grown from less than USD 2 billion to more than 3 billion
(Bielieskov, 2019). Western countries have provided tangible support, supplying both non-lethal and
lethal defence equipment, most notably the US Javelin anti-tank missiles and launchers. In March
2019, Canada announced it would extend its 200-strong military training mission in Ukraine, which
was deployed in 2015, for another three years to help improve and build the capability and capacity
of Ukraine’s defence and security forces. Canada’s training mission is part of a larger Multinational
Joint Commission that also involves the United States, the United Kingdom, Lithuania, Poland,
Denmark, and Sweden (RFE/RL, 18 mars 2019).
26. Having set membership in NATO as a strategic goal, Ukraine has since 2014 redoubled its
efforts to reform its defence and security sector in line with NATO standards. NATO is an essential
partner in this process, through numerous mechanisms and programmes, most notably the 2016
Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine, which includes ten Trust Funds. In the
framework of CAP, NATO provides strategic-level advice as well as 40 tailored support measures.
In 2019, Ukraine plans to participate in 35 NATO-related exercises. Despite the armed conflict on its
eastern border, Ukraine continues to contribute to NATO-led operations, including in Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and the Mediterranean. Ukraine also contributes to the NATO Response Force,
providing important capabilities such as strategic airlift.
27. In July 2018, then President Poroshenko signed the Law of Ukraine on National Security. This
legislation is consistent with Western principles and provides a framework for enhancing the
Ukrainian Armed Forces’ interoperability with NATO. Crucially, the law provides for the establishment
of a Rada special committee with wide oversight powers over the defence and security sector. Other
measures in the defence and security sector reform package include the revision of state secrecy
requirements, increasing transparency of the defence procurement system, and the reform of
Ukraine’s overly powerful state security service. Overall, NATO officials note a marked improvement
of Ukraine’s recent efforts to implement the Annual National Programme (ANP), a document that
defines the range and pace of reform for Ukraine’s further rapprochement with NATO. It is a welcome
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change compared with the situation prior to 2017, when NATO was reportedly dissatisfied with
Ukraine’s implementation of its obligations under the ANP (UNIAN, 2018).
28. That said, the reform of Ukraine’s defence and security sector is far from over and a number
of serious challenges remain. The legislative changes and formal adoption of Western norms have
yet to translate into a profound mindset change and the abandonment of the Soviet legacy,
corruption and paternalism. The Rada has also failed to adopt important reform legislation related to
military ranks and new military service regulations. The implementation of the reform of the Security
Service of Ukraine (SBU) – to transform it into a classical special service that protects state
sovereignty rather than the interests of those in power – is likely to face entrenched resistance. Also
worrying is the fact that the SBU will retain the power to “gather […] counterintelligence to protect
the economic security of Ukraine”. This could allow the SBU to continue to be used as a tool by
special business interests (Roslycky and Tregub, 2018). Finally, corruption remains an acute
problem in Ukraine’s defence and security sector. According to Ukraine’s prosecutor general, since
2014, some 480 criminal proceedings have been launched to investigate alleged violations by
Ukroboronprom, a conglomerate of state-owned defence industry enterprises (UNIAN, 7 mars 2019).
In February 2019, investigative journalists disclosed a scheme, leading to top officials in the National
Security and Defense Council, to smuggle parts of military equipment from Russia and sell them to
state defence enterprises at inflated prices. President Poroshenko reacted by proposing reforms,
including putting representatives from NATO member states in the supervisory board of
Ukroboronprom.
29. In sum, the years 2019-2020 will be crucial in advancing Ukraine’s defence and security reform
agenda. While remarkable progress has been made since 2014, there is a serious risk that Ukraine
might fail to meet its strategic goal set out in 2016 to fully meet NATO standards and interoperability
criteria by the end of 2020.
C. RULE OF LAW
30. Rampant corruption and a weak judiciary are considered to be acute challenges for Ukraine,
significantly hampering its European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Prior to 2014, Ukraine was ranked
144 out of 177 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. In 2018, it
placed 120th out of 180 countries. In 2017, Ukraine was ranked 101st out of 109 countries for judicial
independence by the Index of Public Integrity.
31. The current President and the Rada moved to strengthen the judiciary’s independence and
then tried to replace the judges associated with the old corrupt system. A new Supreme Court was
formed in 2016-2017, which reduced the four levels of justice to three. Over 2,000 judges voluntarily
left their positions. However, the appointment process for the new judges suffered from accusations
of a lack of transparency. When the Public Integrity Council (PIC), a consultative body made of
human rights activists, academic lawyers, and journalists, objected to 25 potential appointees to the
Supreme Court in 2017, the High Council of Justice ignored its recommendations. There is little sign
that the new Supreme Court will be different culturally from its forerunner. On the other hand, in
2018, the parliament approved key constitutional and political reforms to curb political influence
within the court system and boost professionalism among judicial appointees.
32. The post-2014 authorities established the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the
Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor (SAPO), which could be potent weapons in the fight against
corruption. However, SAPO has come under heavy criticism after NABU charged the Special
Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Nazar Kholodnitsky with witness tampering and warning multiple
suspects of property searches. By contrast, NABU has retained its reputation as a relatively clean
organisation. Yet, by September 2018, of the 644 cases that NABU had charged, only 21 resulted
in convictions (European Commission, 2018). The courts of first instance have been delaying or
blocking these cases’ development. No high-level official has been convicted of corruption so far.
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33. The lack of a fair and functioning judiciary makes the establishment of the High Anti-Corruption
Court (HACC) critical to Ukraine’s reform efforts. As entrenched interests control the appointment of
judges to the courts, the establishment of an independent HACC is essential to complete the chain
of independent anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine. After much political resistance and delay, the
law establishing the HACC was adopted in June 2018. President Poroshenko, however, tried to
postpone the law’s entry into effect, which finally occurred in March 2019. HACC judges were
appointed in April 2019.
34. One of Ukraine’s most notable successes in combating corruption has been reform in the
public procurement processes. Under President Yanukovych, kickbacks related to procurement
contracts reportedly reached 30-50% of the procured amounts. The success of reforms in this sector
can be largely attributed to ProZorro, a digitised public procurement system, developed after
Euromaidan by activists at Transparency International Ukraine along with stock exchange traders,
digital marketing experts, investment bankers, and other members of Ukraine’s civil society.
ProZorro is a single database that holds all tender information and uploads it to seven privately
operated systems – each with a different interface but identical information. From 1st April 2016
onwards, state purchases and businesses were required to use this system for all state purchases,
although they could use the platform of their choice. The use of ProZorro has significantly cut down
on the level of corruption and kickbacks in the public procurement process. It is estimated that as of
late 2018, ProZorro saved approximately UAH 51 billion (approximately USD 2 billion) in state
procurement expenditures (Lough and Dubrovskiy, 2018).
35. However, there is room for further reform in the public procurement domain. Government
spending needs to be better audited, antitrust policies should be strengthened to prevent collusion
in procurement tenders, and special conditions that only a few companies can satisfy the need to be
banned, to name a few. Nevertheless, in the space of three years, ProZorro has been a stunning
success in reducing corruption in public procurement. In April 2018, an electronic healthcare system,
eHealth, was launched, sparking hopes that this might lead to a reduction of corruption in Ukraine’s
healthcare sector. Furthermore, a new single automated electronic VAT-refund registry system is
currently in place, limiting the space for corruption in processing individual VAT refund requests
(Miklos, 2018).
D. ECONOMIC REFORMS
36. Ukraine is among Europe’s poorest countries. Unlike its Central and Eastern European
neighbours, it failed to embark on serious economic reforms in the 1990s. As a result, Poland’s GDP
is now three times larger than that of Ukraine, although in 1992 both economies were roughly equal
in size. Therefore, economic reform is essential for the future of the Ukrainian state. One of the most
significant achievements of the pro-European government was Ukraine’s fiscal and macroeconomic
stabilisation. Following the turbulence of Euromaidan and Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine, the
country experienced a contraction in GDP by more than 16% in 2014-2015. By February 2015, the
Hryvnia had lost 70% of its value against the Euro and inflation was 46%. Foreign trade had shrunk
dramatically, and the banking system was on the brink of default (Moshes and Nizhnikau, 2018).
Many Ukrainians left the country to seek employment in the EU – currently, about 1 million Ukrainians
are believed to be working in Poland.
37. In this situation, the government, backed by IMF support programmes, managed to achieve
macroeconomic stability thanks to a combination of a flexible exchange rate policy, strict fiscal and
monetary policy, and energy sector reform. Economic growth resumed in 2016, inflation is easing
and the Hryvnia strengthening, and foreign exchange reserves have more than tripled from 2015
lows. Fiscal and current-account deficits have been cut, spending has been reduced, tax reform and
debt restructuring efforts have been initiated, and the health of the banking system has improved
(Ash et al., 2017). The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine announced that the
shadow economy (e.g. black market transactions and undeclared work) had shrunk from about ½ to
about 1/3 of the total economic activities. According to the World Bank's Doing Business survey,
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Ukraine ranked 76th in 2018, up from 142nd in 2010. For the last three years, the economy has grown
about 2-3% annually.
38. Ukraine’s overdependence on Russia as a trade partner and energy supplier was damaging
to the country’s economic sectors and lowered its companies’ competitiveness on the global market.
Substantial progress in this regard must be acknowledged. In 2012, trade with Russia accounted for
25.7% of Ukraine’s total trade. In 2016, this number had declined to 11.6%. In the first half of 2018,
Ukraine’s export to the EU was worth USD 9.8 billion – five times more than to Russia (Ukrinform,
2018).
39. Ukraine’s access to the EU single market grew all the more critical when trade with Russia
decreased considerably in 2014. Ukraine signed the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement/Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (AA-DCFTA) in March 2014; it fully came into effect in
September 2017. In recent years, the EU has become Ukraine's largest trade partner by far,
representing 42% of total Ukrainian external trade (European Commission, 2018). The AA-DCFTA
is one of the strongest incentives for Ukraine to undertake state and economic reform. While it does
not explicitly offer Ukraine a path to membership in the EU, it offers Ukraine a privileged relationship
with the aim of integrating Ukraine’s economy into the EU single market. This includes policy and
regulatory convergence across a range of sectors such as judicial reform, energy sector reform,
public procurement, decentralisation and anti-corruption measures. Reformers hope that instating
EU-style regulations and standards will transform Ukraine’s political and economic landscape.
However, they face an uphill battle. Implementing the AA-DCFTA and its associated reforms is
hindered by entrenched special interests, a system of rent-seeking, and economic difficulties which
are of course aggravated by Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine.
40. Some of Ukraine’s greatest reform successes have been in the energy sector. In an analysis
by the US Energy Information Administration, Ukraine’s economy was found to be two to three times
as energy intensive as its neighbours, including Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Energy
inefficiency is a drag on state budgets and finances. Furthermore, prior to 2015, Ukraine imported
most of its gas from Russia despite its own natural supplies. A deeply corrupt rent-seeking system
in the energy sector, where oligarchs thrived on incomes derived from government subsidies and
regulations, created losses in the tens of billions of US dollars for the state. Naftogaz, the
state-owned gas supply, had a deficit of 5.7% of state GDP in 2014. The government covered these
deficits with subsidies, draining already depleted public finances. For years, this process enriched
oligarchs in both Russia and Ukraine, discouraged energy efficiency, penalised national gas
production domestically, and created a cycle of dependency on Russian gas.
41. By drastically reducing the sale of Russian gas in Ukraine 10 , the government removed
significant opportunity for corruption. Since 2014, transparency has improved, and subsidies have
been lowered significantly. By 2016, Naftogaz registered profits for the first time in five years, and it
has since become a net contributor to the state budget (Antonenko et al., 2018). However, recently,
reform has stalled in this sector. In 2017, citing government interference in modernisation efforts, the
independent directors of the Naftogaz supervisory board resigned. In 2017, Ukraine also failed to
meet its commitment with the IMF to raise gas prices further. Little progress has been made in
unbundling — separating production from transmission and supply of gas. Oligarchs who extracted
substantial rents from the gas market and energy sector have delayed and postponed essential
reforms.
42. Critical to Ukraine’s economy is the transit role the country plays for Russian energy exports
to the European gas markets. Of the 193 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas that Gazprom pumped
westward in 2017, nearly 40% went through Ukraine (Cohen, 2018). The country’s role as a transit
country for supplies of oil and gas from Russia to Europe is critical to Ukraine for two reasons: first,
10 According to Naftogaz, from 2014 to 2015, natural gas from Russia decreased from 74% to 37% of total
Ukrainian imports, while natural gas imports from Europe increased from 26% to 63%.
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because transit revenues provide about USD 2-3 billion to the Ukrainian economy annually; and
second, because this role gives Ukraine leverage over the Russian energy sector – acting as a form
of insurance against Russian energy bullying.
43. However, once completed, the Nordstream II gas pipeline from Russia to Germany in the Baltic
Sea and the TurkStream Pipeline in the Black Sea would allow Russia to completely bypass Ukraine.
The United States and a number of NATO Allies have voiced opposition to these projects.
Nevertheless, the pipelines are expected to be completed by the end of 2019 or the beginning of
2020. One positive development in this regard has been the adoption of legislation by the European
Parliament that would subject projects such as Nordstream II to European energy legislation,
including the unbundling requirement, which would make it more difficult for Moscow to use energy
as a foreign policy weapon. Moreover, the European Commission is involved in the Ukrainian-
Russian negotiations over a new long-term gas contract to replace the current one, which expires at
the end of 2019. The Commission insists that a significant amount of the Russian gas transiting to
Europe would travel through Ukraine.
44. There are several areas, however, where Ukrainian economic and social reforms have been
less successful. For example, Ukraine’s oversized sector of public enterprises requires significant
reform. There are approximately 3,400 state-owned enterprises (SOE) in Ukraine and over
11,000 communal enterprises – their total revenue accounting for approximately 20% of GDP.
Reportedly, only half these SOEs are operational and only a third report profit. In many of the
profitable SOEs, cash flows have been embezzled by their managers (Lough and Dubrovskiy, 2018).
These managers – de facto unofficial owners – have an active interest in preventing privatisation,
which would require them to invest their own money in the companies rather than having the state
do it for free. In January 2018, the Rada passed legislation to strengthen privatisation and
transparency in order to meet the IMF requirements for financial assistance.
45. The World Bank labelled Ukraine’s pension system as “broken” and stated that, without reform,
the average pension benefit would have fallen to under 20% of the average wage, and pension costs
could have increased to 14% of GDP, thus imposing a heavy burden on state finances (World Bank,
2019). In 2017, Ukraine adopted the Pension Reform Law, which “helped bolster the average
pension benefit to above 27% of the average wage […] while pension costs have been maintained
at about 10% GDP” (World Bank, 2019). Ukraine will need to address the questions of the retirement
age and contribution rates as well as the issue of special preferences for certain professions such
as the police, army, and civil service (Ash et al., 2017). However, these efforts are strongly opposed
by populists within the Rada. For Ukraine to truly reform its pension system, it will need to increase
the number of contributors by reducing informal power structures in the economy. This will require
broader, fundamental reforms in the economy overall.
46. Once called the breadbasket of Europe, Ukraine’s agricultural sector has incredible potential.
While Ukraine’s grain yields are currently lower than those in Western Europe by a third or more,
experts calculate that they could easily reach that standard given the right support. The World Bank
calculates the value of Ukraine’s land would triple if farmland sales were to be permitted. However,
Ukraine’s agriculture sector is significantly hampered by the moratorium on the sale of agricultural
land, which is in place since 2001 and was extended again in December 2018. Despite the original
intention, the prohibition of land sales failed to prevent the concentration of land in the hands of a
limited number of agricultural companies through lease agreements. Vested interests in the large
leasehold farming system are preventing the much-needed reforms.
47. Many of the above-mentioned reform initiatives in Ukraine face the same underlying problem:
the implementation of the adopted reform legislation is often incomplete due to the low quality of
mid-level and local bureaucracy. Public administration remains largely inefficient and lacks a proper
administrative culture. However, some positive steps have been taken in recent years to remedy the
situation, including the creation of a centralised, transparent, and merit-based recruitment system
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via a dedicated web-platform (career.gov.ua). According to the European Commission, between
October 2017 and September 2018, close to 24,000 applications were received using this system
for approximately 1,010 positions published (European Commission, 2018).
48. Another welcome attempt to improve the quality of governance is decentralisation and the
empowerment of local authorities. Ukraine’s heavily centralised political system from 1991 onwards
created problems regarding political representation at the regional and local levels and public
accountability. It has also created issues regarding the financing of regional and local initiatives and
effective public spending. The decentralisation reforms that were introduced following Euromaidan
have begun to raise local government authority and tax-raising measures. Many of these authorities
now have larger budgets than their predecessors and are using this to invest in local infrastructure,
healthcare, and schools. In 2015, the monetary volume of local budgets increased by 42% as
compared to 2014 and, in 2016, local revenues increased an additional 49% (Hanushchak,
Sydorchuk, and Umland, 2017). In order to deal with Ukraine’s 11,000 weak and poor municipalities,
Ukraine passed a law in 2015 to allow for the voluntary consolidation of existing communities into
bigger units. As of 2017, 400 new amalgamated communities had been formed. For example, in the
Vinnytsia region, which was comprised of 800 municipalities, only 50 will remain (Ash et al., 2017).
Decentralisation also has a national security dimension: greater empowerment of local communities
might make it politically easier to reintegrate occupied territories in eastern Ukraine.
E. CIVIL SOCIETY, MEDIA, EDUCATION, AND RELIGION
49. The Revolution of Dignity was, to a great extent, a revolution of Ukraine’s vibrant civil society.
It was started and fuelled by the mobilisation of citizens. While prominent civil society activists were
elected to the parliament in 2014, the top political positions were occupied by more experienced
politicians and the revolution failed to bring a new cadre of political leaders to the fore. The electoral
success of Mr Zelensky can be regarded as a belated response to the failure to refresh Ukraine’s
political elite.
50. Ukraine’s civil society scene remains vibrant and plays a crucial role in encouraging the
government to pursue reforms, tackle corruption, and enhance transparency. However, NGOs are
still weak outside of Kyiv and some other big cities. They are also forced to rely on foreign funding.
The decision to require anticorruption activists to declare their assets was heavily criticised by
institutions such as the Venice Commission and the OSCE. Anticorruption activists often face
threats, smear campaigns, and even physical attacks. In a notable case, in July 2018, a prominent
Ukrainian anti-corruption activist, Kateryna Handzyuk, who was investigating police and political
corruption in a Black Sea port of Kherson, suffered critical injuries from a sulphuric acid attack and
died from these wounds three months later, which led to public outcry.
51. The government is also not doing enough to tackle hate speech and intolerance against LGBT
and other minorities. Far-right groups such as the National Corps and National Militia, while lacking
any meaningful electoral support, are nevertheless active on the streets, occasionally clashing with
police. The US State Department’s Ukraine 2018 Report on Human Rights listed a number of violent
incidents against ethnic minorities, the LGBT community, and political opponents involving
“nationalist hate groups”. Despite these problems, civil society in Ukraine appears strong enough to
provide a high degree of reassurance against the possibility of democratic backsliding.
52. ODIHR characterises Ukraine’s media environment as diverse on both the national and
regional levels. Most Ukrainians still receive their news from television, where political debates are
frequent and include a wide spectrum of political views. However, all major TV networks and online
news portals are owned by a handful of oligarchs, including Rinat Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoyskiy,
Viktor Pinchuk, Dmytro Firtash, and Petro Poroshenko himself. Mr Akhmetov and Mr Firtash had
close ties to the Yanukovich regime, but their outlets have adapted to the new political realities.
Some media networks are heavily biased – for instance, channels associated with Mr Kolomoyskiy
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are extremely critical of Mr Poroshenko, and vice versa. Media associated with Mr Pinchuk is
regarded as inclusive and neutral. On the positive side, Ukraine has adopted the requirement to
disclose the ownership of media outlets, which makes media more transparent.
53. ODIHR notes that the safety of Ukrainian journalists remains a concern as they face violence
and intimidation. In one notable case, Ukrainian journalists working with Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty’s Schemes anti-corruption programme were subjected to assault, slander, and harassment
by government officials.
54. In 2018, Ukraine adopted a new education law, mandating that Ukrainian be used as the
primary language of instruction in secondary schools by 2020. The decision was heavily criticised
by neighbours, including Romania, Poland, Russia, and particularly Hungary. Budapest, concerned
that the new law will lead to the assimilation of the Hungarian minority in Western Ukraine, has
blocked meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Commission above the level of ambassadors. Budapest
insists that progress on Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration will not be possible until Kyiv changes the
law. Ukrainian officials argue that children need to understand the state’s majority language to fully
participate in society and point out that the law does not prohibit education in minority languages as
separate classes.
55. The Venice Commission has presented its opinion, in which it stressed that “it is a legitimate
and commendable aim for states to promote the strengthening of the state language.” However, the
Venice Commission expressed concern about the scope and pace of the reform, which could
“amount to a disproportionate interference with the existing rights of persons belonging to national
minorities.” The Commission recommended Ukraine make amendments to the law to guarantee a
sufficient proportion of education in minority languages at the primary and secondary levels as well
as to provide more time for gradual reform. During her visit to Budapest, NATO Deputy Secretary
General Rose Gottemoeller noted that “Allies have acted in solidarity with Hungary when it comes
to Ukraine’s Law on Education. In the Brussels Declaration and in the assessment of Ukraine’s
Annual Programme, all Allies urge Ukraine to fully implement the recommendations of the Venice
Commission”. Ukraine has taken note of the international reaction and, in April 2019, the parliament
postponed the implementation of the law until 2023.
56. In 2018-2019, Ukraine made a significant step towards reducing Russia’s indirect influence on
the Ukrainian population by achieving the separation of its Orthodox Church from Moscow’s
jurisdiction. In January 2019, Bartholomew I, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, signed the
document (or tomos) that officially granted autocephaly (self-governorship) to the Orthodox Church
of Ukraine. By March 2019, the majority of some 600 Orthodox parishes in Ukraine switched from
the Moscow Patriarchate to the independent Ukrainian Church (UNIAN, 19 mars 2019). Moscow
denies the legitimacy of the tomos, and some high-ranking Russian clerics even warned of potential
violence if the separation were to go ahead.
CONCLUSIONS: SUPPORTING UKRAINE’S EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION
57. Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity was more than a rejection of Russia and a fight for
Europeanisation. At its core, Euromaidan was a revolution sparked by domestic corruption,
demanding just and fair politics, society, and economy. The internal reforms the revolution called for
are as essential to Ukraine’s survival as they are in resisting external Russian interference. And
indeed, the two go hand in hand; if Ukraine is to resist Russian pressures in its political, military,
economic, and media sectors, then it must have healthy and transparent institutional frameworks
with a correspondingly robust civil society.
58. Ukraine has made significant strides since the revolution. Following the illegal occupation and
annexation of Crimea immediately after the 2014 revolution, the country was able to withstand
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