U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions - February 4, 2021
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U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan:
Frequently Asked Questions
February 4, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R46670SUMMARY
R46670
U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan:
February 4, 2021
Frequently Asked Questions Clayton Thomas,
In 2021, a year that will mark the twentieth anniversary of the entry of U.S. troops into Coordinator
Afghanistan, U.S. forces there are at the lowest level since 2001 due to the Trump Section Research Manager
Administration’s reduction of U.S. forces to 2,500 and its conditional commitment to the
Taliban to withdraw fully by April 2021. Members of Congress have expressed a range Cory R. Gill
of views about the drawdown and are likely to continue to closely scrutinize the Analyst in Foreign Affairs
drawdown’s impact on a range of U.S. policy interests.
Tyler F. Hacker
The mission of U.S. forces in Afghanistan has evolved considerably since 2001, when Analyst in Defense
the United States initiated military action against Al Qaeda and the Taliban government Logistics
that protected the group in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks. Changes in
security conditions in the country and in U.S. policy have prompted changes to Kathleen J. McInnis
international force levels, with a gradual increase over the course of the George W. Bush Specialist in International
Administration due to growing Taliban strength (over 30,000 U.S. troops by 2008); an Security
Obama Administration troop “surge” to blunt Taliban momentum that peaked in 2011
with nearly 100,000 U.S. troops and ended on schedule in 2014 (around 10,000 U.S. Heidi M. Peters
forces by 2015); and a smaller increase in U.S. troops under the Trump Administration Analyst in U.S. Defense
(to around 15,000 U.S. forces in 2018) to buttress Afghan forces before withdrawals in Acquisition Policy
line with a U.S. commitment to the Taliban to remove all U.S. and international forces
by the end of April 2021.
U.S. commanders state that the reduction of U.S. troops to 2,500 will not result in any major changes to the two
complementary U.S. missions in Afghanistan, namely counterterrorism and training, advising, and assisting
Afghan forces. However, some have implied that the troop level might result in adjustments to U.S. operations
and limits to U.S. options. It may also affect partner country forces (which now outnumber U.S. forces) and their
ability to continue their training mission. The February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement also commits the United
States to withdrawing from Afghanistan all “private security contractors,” which have played an important role in
U.S. operations. The drawdown also has implications for U.S. physical assets in the country and the considerable
U.S. diplomatic presence at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.
The drawdown came at a politically sensitive time in Afghanistan, with Taliban and Afghan government
representatives engaged in direct negotiations even as the conflict continues unabated. Many Afghans appear to
view the U.S. troop drawdown warily, given fears that the drawdown could lead to a Taliban military resurgence,
though some Afghan officials have downplayed the effect that U.S. withdrawals have on their own forces’
capabilities. The Taliban have welcomed the drawdown and implied that they may reengage in attacks on
international forces (from which the group has reportedly refrained since early 2020) if forces are not withdrawn
by the April 2021 date in the U.S.-Taliban agreement. U.S. officials speak often of a “conditional” withdrawal, but
have given conflicting accounts of whether the U.S. withdrawal is contingent upon, or otherwise related to, the
Taliban’s talks with the Afghan government or the outcome of such talks. Fragile intra-Afghan talks may go on
for some time as Afghans negotiate contentious issues including a ceasefire and the future of the Afghan state.
Experts have laid out a number of approaches that the Biden Administration, which is reportedly conducting a
review of the U.S.-Taliban agreement and broader U.S. Afghanistan policy, might take in light of the U.S. troop
drawdown. These include withdrawing all U.S. forces by April 2021 as scheduled, pausing or reversing the
withdrawal pending certain Taliban actions, and indefinitely supporting Afghan forces. This report will be updated
to reflect related developments or new considerations. For background on Afghanistan and the U.S. presence
there, see CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief, by Clayton Thomas.
Congressional Research ServiceU.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions
Contents
Background: When and why did the United States deploy military forces to
Afghanistan? What are the current missions of U.S. forces? ................................................. 1
When and why did the most recent drawdown begin? .............................................................. 3
How might the drawdown affect the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan? ............................ 4
How do U.S. force levels relate to U.S. objectives in Afghanistan? ......................................... 6
What is the status of other international forces in Afghanistan and how have U.S.
partners reacted to the U.S drawdown and commitment to withdrawal?............................... 7
How have Afghans, including the Taliban, reacted to the drawdown? ..................................... 9
How might the drawdown affect Afghan forces and the Afghan government? ........................ 9
How is the drawdown related to ongoing intra-Afghan talks? ................................................. 11
How have Members of Congress reacted to the withdrawal commitment and
subsequent drawdown? ........................................................................................................ 12
What is the status of U.S. contractors in Afghanistan? ........................................................... 14
What will happen to DOD materiel and other physical assets in the country? ....................... 15
What is the future of the U.S. diplomatic presence in Afghanistan?....................................... 16
What are the security implications for the U.S. Embassy and diplomatic personnel? ............ 18
How do the drawdown and withdrawal commitment compare to possible historical
analogues? ............................................................................................................................ 19
What views has President Biden expressed about U.S. policy in Afghanistan? ..................... 24
What policies/actions might the Biden Administration pursue in light of the
drawdown? ........................................................................................................................... 25
What questions might Congress consider when debating U.S. policy in Afghanistan? .......... 27
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 29
Congressional Research ServiceU.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions Background: When and why did the United States deploy military forces to Afghanistan? What are the current missions of U.S. forces? U.S. military forces have been in Afghanistan since 2001, making it one of the longest continuous military conflicts in which the United States has fought. U.S. forces were originally focused primarily on counterterrorism, but the U.S. military mission evolved to include supporting and defending the new Afghan government and training its nascent military forces. On September 11, 2001, operatives of the international terrorist organization Al Qaeda (AQ) conducted a series of terrorist attacks in the United States that killed nearly 3,000 people. Al Qaeda, which had previously struck U.S. targets both in the United States and abroad, and its leader Osama bin Laden, were based in Afghanistan, a legacy of the group’s roots in the anti- Soviet insurgency of the 1980s. Afghanistan in 2001 was ruled by the Taliban, a fundamentalist Sunni Islamist group that originated in the country’s majority ethnic Pashtun south and east and emerged out of Afghanistan’s post-Soviet civil war to take over most of the country by 1996. The Taliban offered sanctuary to Bin Laden and his followers after they were expelled from Sudan in 1996. The Taliban and Al Qaeda established what was later described as a mutually beneficial “alliance” whereby Al Qaeda provided financial and armed support to the Taliban in exchange for freedom of movement in Afghanistan. Over 10,000 AQ fighters may have trained at AQ camps in Afghanistan.1 In a nationwide address before a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over AQ leaders, permanently close terrorist training camps, and give the U.S. access to such camps, adding that the Taliban “must hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.”2 Taliban leaders refused, citing Bin Laden’s status as their guest.3 Pursuant to an authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) enacted on September 18, 2001 (P.L. 107-40), U.S. military action began on October 7, 2001, with airstrikes on Taliban targets throughout the country and close air support to anti-Taliban forces in northern Afghanistan. Limited numbers of U.S. Army Special Forces, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary forces, and some conventional ground forces began deploying in Afghanistan less than two weeks later.4 By November 13, the Taliban evacuated Kabul, which was soon retaken by those Afghan forces (known as the Northern Alliance). As U.S.-backed Afghan forces drew closer to the southern city of Kandahar, birthplace of the Taliban movement and home of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, Taliban leaders reportedly offered terms of surrender, including an amnesty for Taliban fighters who would lay down their arms. U.S. officials rejected such an amnesty and while many Taliban fighters and leaders were killed or captured by U.S. or Afghan forces, others (including Mullah Omar) sought shelter in remote or rural parts of Afghanistan or escaped to Pakistan. In December 2001, Afghan delegates convened in Germany by the United Nations selected Hamid Karzai to serve as head of an interim national government, marking the beginning of post- Taliban governance. The creation of the new Afghan government also represented the beginning 1 “The 9/11 Commission Report,” July 2004, pp. 66-67. 2 “Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation,” Washington Post, September 20, 2001. 3 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Penguin Press, 2018), pp. 69. 4 For more on the first year of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, see Walter L. Perry and David Kassing, “Toppling the Taliban: Air-Ground Operations in Afghanistan, October 2001-June 2002,” RAND Corporation, 2015. Congressional Research Service 1
U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions of a major new mission set for U.S. forces and their international partners: helping defend and develop that government and its nascent military. Karzai attended the January 2002 State of the Union address where President Bush previewed this expanded mission, saying that the United States and Afghanistan were “allies against terror” and that “we will be partners in rebuilding that country.”5 Congress supported the Bush Administration in this approach, authorizing and appropriating funds for more expansive U.S. military and civilian assistance missions (e.g. via the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, 2002 P.L. 107-327). U.S. officials declared an end to major combat operations in Afghanistan on May 1, 2003, though then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that “pockets of resistance in certain parts of the country remain.”6 By 2005, scattered Taliban forces had already begun to regroup in the Pashtun heartland of eastern and southern Afghanistan, as well as across the border in Pakistan, where many observers suspected that Pakistan’s security and intelligence services were tolerating, if not actively support them.7 The Taliban described continuing U.S. and coalition military operations in Afghanistan as a military occupation and characterized their Afghan government adversaries as puppets of foreign powers.8 In response to growing Taliban activity, the United States gradually increased forces to around 30,000 by the end of the George W. Bush Administration. Under the Obama Administration, the United States and its partners further increased international force levels, which peaked at over 130,000 (of which around 100,000 were U.S. troops) in 2010-11, but set a goal to end combat operations by the end of 2014. Though that “surge” was arguably successful in weakening Taliban advances, by 2010 the Obama Administration came to assess that the conflict would not be resolved by military means alone.9 Preliminary U.S.-Taliban negotiations were constrained by U.S. policy to require the inclusion of the Afghan government, with which the Taliban refused to meet, in any settlement.10 As international force levels were reduced in advance of the scheduled 2014 transition, NATO began gradually transferring security duties to Afghan forces starting in 2011. Afghan forces assumed full responsibility for security nationwide at the end of 2014 with the end of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the start of the noncombat Resolute Support Mission (RSM) that began on January 1, 2015. In addition to training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces as part of RSM, U.S. troops in Afghanistan also conduct counterterrorism operations; these two “complementary missions” comprise Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. The legal framework for U.S. operations in Afghanistan remains the 2001 AUMF, over which there is considerable debate in Congress. In the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260), Congress made available just over $3 billion in support for Afghan forces (the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, ASFF), down over a billion from the amount appropriated in FY2020, in addition to billions in Overseas Contingency Operations funding for U.S. military operations. Since FY2001, the United States has spent over 5 “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” White House (archived), January 29, 2002. 6 “Rumsfeld: Major combat over in Afghanistan,” CNN, May 1, 2003. 7 See, for example, Matt Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents,” Crisis States Research Centre, June 2010. 8 See Matthew Calvin, “The Use of English-Language Internet Propaganda by the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 2007-2010,” Electronic Theses and Dissertations, June 2011, available at https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/108; Thomas Ruttig, “How Tribal are the Taliban?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2010. 9 Rod Nordland, “Troop ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan Ends with Mixed Results,” New York Times, September 21, 2012. 10 Evan MacAskill and Simon Tisdall, “White House shifts Afghanistan strategy towards talks with Taliban,” Guardian, July 19, 2010. Congressional Research Service 2
U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions
$141 billion for reconstruction efforts and related activities (including military assistance), and
over $720 billion to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.11
As the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan has fallen to a number not seen since 2001, some
have reflected on the circumstances under which U.S. forces entered the country and the
subsequent evolution of U.S. policy. Some maintain that the United States and its international
partners have achieved significant and meaningful gains in Afghanistan, namely fostering a
democratic U.S. ally and counterterrorism partner in a difficult region.12 Others disagree, seeing
the expansion of U.S. mission sets (and investment of personnel and resources) after 2001 as an
error. In a December 2020 visit to Afghanistan, former Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher
Miller (who previously served in Afghanistan as early as 2001) said
I always felt it was a huge strategic error by expanding the war. I thought the war was for
special operations, small footprint. And I just personally thought, if we were smart
strategically, Afghanistan would always have a special operations force... I think we would
have had a different outcome if we had maintained what we were doing then. 13
When and why did the most recent drawdown begin?
When President Donald Trump came into office in January 2017, approximately 11,000 U.S.
troops were reportedly in Afghanistan, with U.S. force levels having declined from their 2009-
2011 high point of approximately 100,000 U.S. troops.14 In June 2017, President Trump delegated
to then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis the authority to set force levels, reportedly limited to
around 3,500 additional troops; Secretary Mattis signed orders to deploy them in September
2017.15 Those additional forces (all of which were dedicated to NATO-led RSM) arrived in
Afghanistan within months, putting the total number of U.S. troops in the country at 14,000-
15,000 by the end of 2017.16
By mid-2018, President Trump was reportedly frustrated with the lack of military progress
against the Taliban, and he ordered formal and direct U.S.-Taliban talks without Afghan
government participation for the first time. As those talks developed under Special Representative
for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, President Trump continued to express
frustration with the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan and a desire to withdraw U.S. forces,
saying in August 2019 that he wanted to do so “as quickly as we can.”17 U.S. force levels began
11 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress,” October 30,
2020. Both of these figures appear to be in nominal dollar terms.
12 For a wide range of views on the U.S. project in Afghanistan, see CRS Report R46197, The Washington Post’s
“Afghanistan Papers” and U.S. Policy: Main Points and Possible Questions for Congress, by Clayton Thomas.
13 Patrick Tucker, “Acting SecDef Miller Visits Troops in Afghanistan,” DefenseOne, December 22, 2020.
14 While the level was publicly reported at 8,400, media outlets reported in August 2017 that the figure was actually
around 11,000 on any given day due to units rotating in and out of theater. See Gordon Lubold and Nancy Youssef,
“U.S. Has More Troops in Afghanistan Than Publicly Disclosed,” Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2017. See also CRS
Report R44116, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007-2018, by Heidi M.
Peters and Sofia Plagakis.
15 Tara Copp, “Mattis signs orders to send about 3,500 more US troops to Afghanistan,” Military Times, Sept. 11, 2017.
16 Dan Lamothe, “Trump added troops in Afghanistan. But NATO is still short of meeting its goal,” Washington Post,
November 9, 2017; Greg Jaffe and Missy Ryan, “Up to 1,000 more U.S. troops could be headed to Afghanistan this
spring,” Washington Post, January 21, 2018. As of September 30, 2017, the total number of active duty and reserve
forces in Afghanistan was 15,298. Defense Manpower Data Center, Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/Agency
by State/Country Quarterly Report, September 2017.
17 Kevin Baron, “Trump Says US Troops Shouldn’t be ‘Policemen’ in Afghanistan. So Why Are They There?”
DefenseOne, July 22, 2019; “Trump Wants to Get Out Of Afghanistan ‘As Quickly As He Can,’” Tolo News, August 1,
Congressional Research Service 3U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions to descend in 2019: at an October 9, 2019, news conference, General Austin S. Miller, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said that the number of U.S. forces had been gradually reduced by 2,000 over the past year, to between 12,000 and 13,000.18 In February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a formal agreement in which the United States committed to withdrawing all of its troops, contractors, and nondiplomatic civilian personnel from Afghanistan, with a drawdown in military forces to 8,600 by mid-July 2020 and a complete withdrawal by the end of April 2021. In return, the Taliban committed to prevent any groups, including Al Qaeda, from threatening the United States or its allies by not allowing those groups to reside, train, or fundraise in Afghanistan. The U.S. withdrawal commitment was not conditioned explicitly on progress in intra-Afghan talks, but U.S. officials have suggested that U.S. forces would not be obliged to withdrawal if talks collapsed. Throughout 2020, although U.S. officials stated that the Taliban were not in full compliance with the agreement, U.S. force levels continued to drop, reaching 8,600 a month ahead of the mid-July 2020 deadline in the U.S.-Taliban accord.19 Confusion about the United States’ future military posture grew in October 2020 due to contradictory visions expressed by senior Administration officials, including President Trump’s tweet that, “We should have the small remaining number of our BRAVE Men and Women serving in Afghanistan home by Christmas!”20 On November 17, 2020, then-Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller announced, “we will implement President Trump’s orders to continue our repositioning of forces from” Afghanistan, and that 2,500 U.S. forces would remain in Afghanistan by January 15, 2021. Acting Secretary Miller characterized the drawdown (announced alongside a similar reduction of U.S. forces from Iraq) as “consistent with our established plans and strategic objectives,” and said it “does not equate to a change in U.S. policy or objectives.”21 On January 15, 2021, Acting Secretary Miller confirmed that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan had reached 2,500.22 The Biden Administration reportedly is conducting a review of the U.S.-Taliban agreement and broader U.S. Afghanistan policy, and might take action to endorse or amend the U.S. troop drawdown (see below).23 How might the drawdown affect the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan? Many observers question the extent to which the U.S. can perform both the training and counterterrorism missions within specified troop limits with acceptable risk levels. The Afghanistan Study Group, for example, maintains that: 2019. 18 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Mujib Mashal, “U.S. Is Quietly Reducing Its Troop Force in Afghanistan,” New York Times, October 21, 2019. 19 Kylie Atwood and Ryan Browne, “US troop drawdown in Afghanistan running ahead of schedule,” CNN, April 30, 2020; “Taliban not living up to its commitments, U.S. Defense Secretary says,” Reuters, May 5, 2020; Robert Burns, “US General: Taliban Not Yet Met Conditions for US Withdrawal,” Associated Press, June 10, 2020. 20 “U.S. troops in Afghanistan should be ‘home by Christmas’: Trump,” Reuters, October 7, 2020. 21 “Acting Secretary Miller Announces Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq,” Department of Defense, Nov. 17, 2020. 22 “Statement by Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller on Force Levels in Afghanistan,” Department of Defense January 15, 2021. 23 “Biden Administration to review Taliban deal,” Al Jazeera, January 23, 2021. Congressional Research Service 4
U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions
A precipitous U.S. withdrawal is likely to exacerbate the conflict, provoking a wider civil
war. Expert consultations indicated that around 4,500 troops are required to secure U.S.
interests under current conditions and at an acceptable level of risk. This number allows
for training, advising, and assisting Afghan defense forces; supporting allied forces;
conducting counterterrorism operations; and securing our embassy—all of which are
critical to our interests. Based on this input, there is increased risk to the mission and the
force associated with the current confirmed level of 2,500 troops. In conjunction with its
initial review of the situation in Afghanistan, the Biden administration will need to
determine appropriate troop levels based on its priorities and risk management.24
U.S. officials have insisted that the reduction of troops to 2,500 will not result in any major
changes to the two complementary U.S. missions in Afghanistan: counterterrorism and training,
advising, and assisting Afghan forces. However, some officials have implied that the troop level
order by President Trump was not ideal from their perspective and might result in some
adjustments to U.S. operations and limits to U.S. options.
In a mid-December 2020 interview, General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Commander of U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM), said of the 2,500-troop level, “We believe that is a practical way
forward. Might not be where you want to be. But I think it is a practical way forward, I think is
something that’s very defensible.”25 Later that month, he said a U.S. troop level of 2,500 “gives
us the ability to do [counterterrorism] operations when we need to do it. It gives us the ability to
protect ourselves, and it gives us the ability to reach out with focused advise and assist to our
Afghan partners where they need it.”26 However, he conceded, “We will not be as robust as we
were in the past. That’s a fact and we recognize that.” U.S. officials have not stated publicly to
what extent troop withdrawals were concentrated among those operating under one mission
versus the other.
Limitations may also manifest themselves geographically; one media account described former
Acting Secretary Miller as saying that the United States will be able to provide training at the
corps level in the north but perhaps not in the south. Miller did say that the United States would
maintain “the ability to project to what we refer to as ‘points of need,’ which are lower than the
corps level.”27
Other circumstances may mitigate the impact of the drawdown on U.S. missions. The drawdown
of U.S. forces to 2,500 may have limited effects on the training mission. The steady drawdown of
U.S. forces since the post-2017 high of approximately 15,000 already has reduced the number of
U.S. trainers working with Afghan partners, especially at lower levels of the Afghan military.
Moreover, U.S. commanders have limited face-to-face advising to mission-essential
circumstances since the beginning of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic early
in 2020.28 U.S. forces have assessed that COVID-19-mandated remote training activities, held via
email, videoconferencing, text messaging, and other platforms, are still effective, if less so than
in-person training.29
24 United States Institute for Peace, Afghanistan Study Group Final Report, February 2021, p. 15-16.
25 “General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. Defense One Interview with Katie Bo Williams,” U.S. Central Command,
December 10, 2020.
26 “Gen McKenzie and Luis Martinez On The Record Interview,” U.S. Central Command, December 22, 2020.
27 Katie Bo Williams, “Milley Meets with Taliban in Fragile Peace Negotiations,” Defense One, December 17, 2020.
28 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress,” October 30,
2020, pg. 78.
29 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress,” January 30,
2021, p. 57.
Congressional Research Service 5U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions Additionally, Acting Secretary Miller implied that U.S. air support, which many view as critical for sustaining the Afghan military, will remain a part of the U.S. presence: “Our competitive advantage as the United States military is our control of the air and I think we can do a lot in this regard, even if we don’t have a large physical presence on the ground.”30 How the now-reduced U.S. presence and projected U.S. withdrawal might impact Afghan forces and their battle against the Taliban is explored below. How do U.S. force levels relate to U.S. objectives in Afghanistan? U.S. officials have identified preventing attacks on the United States by terrorists based in Afghanistan, and supporting the Afghan government as a partner in that effort, as the key objectives of U.S. policy there. Experts differ in their assessment of how the presence, or withdrawal, of U.S. forces might support or undermine those objectives. The U.S. military experience in Afghanistan has been described as irregular warfare, defined by the DOD as a “violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population.”31 While the overwhelming and effective use of military force is usually considered necessary in conventional conflict, in irregular wars the military might arguably play a more subordinate role in supporting the political and diplomatic elements of national power. Some view these non-military tools as more influential, which may lead them to advocate for a prompt U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan. Alternatively, the timing and nature of withdrawal from a theater, factors over which the United States and its coalition partners have significant control, can also be tools in advancing U.S. and coalition objectives.32 For example, leveraging the withdrawal of a coalition can incentivize parties to a conflict to work together to minimize the risk of a security vacuum once the multinational forces leave. Conversely, a poorly planned or timed departure might risk leaving in place elements that might become longer-term strategic challenges. In the case of Afghanistan, some experts assess that the prospect of full U.S. withdrawal has prompted greater concession from the Afghan government than from the Taliban.33 More broadly, defining and measuring success in irregular campaigns is a challenge for military and civilian leaders alike, in large part due to the often-amorphous and non-military nature of the campaigns’ objectives. Seizing and occupying terrain is arguably a more straightforward military objective than, say, building legitimacy and local popular support for a centralized government or eliminating terrorist safe havens. Assessing the extent to which additional effort, forces, or resources might be required depends on a clear understanding of the established criteria for determining success. Some key issues for Congress, therefore, are to what extent current withdrawal plans advance those objectives, and how withdrawal affects American interests. 30 Tucker, op. cit. 31 Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, December 2020. 32 Kathleen J. McInnis, How and Why States Defect from Contemporary Military Coalitions (Palgrave, 2019). 33 James B. Cunningham, et al., “The way forward in Afghanistan: How Biden can achieve sustainable peace and US security,” Atlantic Council, January 13, 2021. Congressional Research Service 6
U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions What is the status of other international forces in Afghanistan and how have U.S. partners reacted to the U.S drawdown and commitment to withdrawal? International troops from U.S. allies and partners have been deployed alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan since 2001 under the command of two successive NATO-led training missions: the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF, 2003-2014) and Resolute Support Mission (RSM, 2015-present). Whereas the ISAF mission reached a high of about 130,000 troops and sought to provide security throughout Afghanistan, RSM has been carried out by fewer than 20,000 troops under a more limited mandate focused solely on training. According to NATO, RSM forces provide training, advice, and assistance to develop the capabilities of Afghan military forces (particularly the air force and special forces) as well as the civilian institutions that oversee them.34 Some NATO allies and partners drew down their forces in Afghanistan in conjunction with the U.S. drawdown, but the exact figure has often been unclear in recent months: a NATO table breaking down troop contributions by country dated June 2020 shows 15,937 troops, including 8,000 U.S. personnel.35 After the United States, the largest troop-contributing nations as of June 2020 were Germany (1,300), the United Kingdom (950), Italy (895), Georgia (860), and Romania (738). On November 23, 2020, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that there were “less than 11,000 troops in the train and advice mission.”36 In the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, the United States committed to withdrawing all allied and coalition partner forces, in addition to its own. No U.S. partners have separately confirmed an intention to draw down their own forces in line with the U.S. to reach full withdrawal by April 2021, per the U.S-Taliban agreement. British Defense Minister Ben Wallace said that he “expected” that if the United States drew down its troops “at some stage,” the United Kingdom would do so as well.37 German officials have expressed concern about the pacing of the U.S. drawdown and conditionality attached to U.S. withdrawal commitment to the Taliban, with Foreign Minister Heiko Maas warning that a “rash exit” from Afghanistan would create additional hurdles for the fragile intra-Afghan negotiations.38 Maas and other German officials have stated their belief that the condition for a military withdrawal should be progress in those negotiations. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg has also voiced caution, saying that while there are risks to staying, “if we leave, we risk Afghanistan once again becoming a safe haven for international terrorists, and the loss of the gains made with such sacrifice.”39 Stoltenberg also emphasized the importance of intra-alliance coordination: 34 “NATO-Afghanistan Relations,” NATO, December 2020. Available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/ assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/2012-backgrounder-afghanistan-e.pdf. 35 “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures,” August 2020. Available at https://www.nato.int/ nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/6/pdf/2020-06-RSM-Placemat.pdf. 36 “Adapting NATO for 2030 and Beyond,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), November 23, 2020. 37 “UK will likely follow the U.S. in cutting Afghanistan troops, minister says,” Reuters, November 19, 2020. 38 Nina Werkhauser and Sandra Petersmann, “German government opposes Donald Trump’s Afghan troop withdrawal,” Deutsche Welle, November 19, 2020. 39 Online press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, NATO, December 1, 2020. Congressional Research Service 7
U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions
We need to assess whether the conditions for leaving are met, together. We need to make
these decisions together. And as we have said many times in NATO: we went into
Afghanistan together, we should make decisions on adjustments of a presence there
together, and when the time is right we should leave together, but then in a coordinated and
orderly way.40
U.S. officials often cite the higher number of total NATO and other partner country forces in
Afghanistan to argue that current missions can continue with reduced U.S. troop presence.
However, a full U.S. withdrawal would likely disrupt partner country forces’ abilities to continue
their training mission in several ways. First, any deterioration in security conditions resulting
from the U.S. drawdown could spur international partners to withdraw as well; German Defense
Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said after the U.S. drawdown announcement that
“however things develop, our soldiers’ safety is the top priority.”41
Also, the United States provides allies with key logistical support, without which other
international forces may find operating more difficult. A German defense ministry spokesperson
said after the U.S. drawdown was announced, “We are of course trying to find out…what this
means in concrete terms for capabilities on the ground because …[the United States] has a
significant role to play in capabilities that are necessary to sustain” the German troop presence.42
Secretary Stoltenberg said in November 2020 that NATO military officials have confirmed with
U.S. counterparts that “they will maintain enablers as the support, especially aviation support
helicopter, support fixed wing and rotary wing support to the NATO missions” as the United
States draws down to 2,500 troops. He added that the alliance would assess at its February 2021
defense ministerial meeting whether the conditions have been met for a full withdrawal by April
as envisioned in the U.S.-Taliban agreement.43
More broadly, some argue that U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has implications for U.S.
partner relationships and global standing. Many allied states around the world, including
members of NATO as well as South Korea and Japan, host U.S. forces on their territories partly in
order to enhance their own stability and security while simultaneously enabling the United States
to react rapidly to changing geopolitical circumstances. Many closely watch U.S. global troop
movements with an eye to understanding their implications for U.S. strategy overall, and whether
American commitments will hold into the future. The Afghanistan Study Group contended in its
February 2020 final report that the
outcome of the U.S. and NATO missions in Afghanistan will impact the willingness of
allies to support our endeavors in the future. How the mission in Afghanistan ends will
impact U.S. global leadership and influence. Retaining the confidence of allies is always
vital to national security, as is giving adversaries no reason to suspect that America might
be weak or irresolute.44
Under this assumption, the Afghanistan Study Group emphasized the importance of U.S.
coordination with allies: “A unilateral withdrawal that does not involve consultation and
agreement with them will undermine our credibility as a partner.” Some, including a “Red Team”
within the Afghanistan Study Group, suggest that a U.S. withdrawal could bolster U.S. influence,
40 Interview with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, NATO, November 22, 2020.
41 Werkhauser and Petersmann, op. cit.
42 Hans von der Burchard, “Germany expresses ‘serious concern’ over US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan,”
Politico, November 18, 2020.
43 “Adapting NATO for 2030 and Beyond,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), November 23, 2020.
44 “Afghanistan Study Group Final Report,” United States Institute of Peace, February 2021.
Congressional Research Service 8U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions because “by reinforcing an unsuccessful counterinsurgency in landlocked Asia—despite having to contend with a new set of global and regional challenges—the United States allows its credibility and some of its capacity to gradually bleed away.”45 How have Afghans, including the Taliban, reacted to the drawdown? Press reports suggest many Afghans view the U.S. troop drawdown warily, given fears that the drawdown could lead to a Taliban military resurgence, though Afghan officials generally maintain that Afghan forces will be able to defend themselves regardless of U.S. troop levels. Pro-government Afghans and those who have benefitted from the socio-political reforms of the past two decades, particularly women and Afghans in urban areas, have reacted to the U.S. drawdown and commitment to withdrawal with anxiety and concern that the drawdown portends a Taliban return to power that will curtail their rights and freedoms.46 For their part, Afghan government officials have generally downplayed the effect that U.S. withdrawals have on their own forces’ capabilities.47 In the days after the most recent U.S. drawdown announcement, Afghan Defense Minister Asadullah Khalid said that he did not “see any clear indication that the U.S. or NATO forces will fully withdraw [from] the country,” and stated that only 4% of operations require U.S. air support.48 Other Afghan officials are less sanguine, suggesting that a U.S. force level reduction to 2,500 will have a disruptive impact on the Afghan military and its ability to keep the Taliban at bay in key parts of the country.49 For their part, the Taliban, who attribute the war to the presence of international forces, have welcomed the U.S. drawdown announcement, with one representative describing it as a “good step.”50 A Taliban spokesman stated in February 2021 that the group has “a legal right to free its homeland from the presence of occupying forces with every lawful means necessary” and that “if some discard the Doha accord … history has proven that the Afghan Mujahid nation can valiantly defend its values, soil, homeland and rights.”51 How might the drawdown affect Afghan forces and the Afghan government? The drawdown could affect the Afghan government and its ongoing fight against the Taliban in two separate but interrelated ways, each of which is difficult to quantify. Most directly, the 45 Ibid. 46 Sune Engel Rasmussen and Ehsanullah Amiri, “Afghanistan Braces for the Worst as U.S. Troop Withdrawal Accelerates,” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2020; Diaa Hadid and Tom Bowman, “People in the Afghan capital Kabul are uneasy about U.S. troop drawdown,” NPR, December 16, 2020. 47 See “Afghan President Says Possible U.S. Troop Withdrawal Won’t Affect Security,” RFE/RL, December 21, 2018; Rebecca Blumenstein and Mujib Mashal, “Afghanistan is Ready for Major U.S. Troop Reduction, Ghani Says,” New York Times, January 23, 2020. 48 Anthony Capaccio and Jonathan Stearns, “NATO Chief Warns Trump’s Afghanistan Troop Cuts Risk Terrorism,” Bloomberg, November 17, 2020. 49 Phillip Walter Wellman, “Premature US exit could embolden terrorists, Afghans say,” Stars and Stripes, November 17, 2020; Thomas Gibbons-Neff et al., “U.S. Troops Are Packing Up, Ready or Not,” New York Times, Nov. 17, 2020. 50 “Taliban hails US troop drawdown from Afghanistan as ‘good step,’” France 24, November 18, 2020. 51 “Remarks by spokesman of Islamic Emirate concerning statement.by representatives of some countries,” Voice of Jihad, February 1, 2021. Available at https://alemarahenglish.net/?p=42271. Congressional Research Service 9
U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions drawdown, by reducing the number of U.S. personnel available to train, advise, and accompany Afghan forces, could negatively impact those forces’ capabilities. Additionally, the U.S. drawdown, as a step toward the full withdrawal of U.S. forces, could accelerate long-standing centrifugal forces in the fragile Afghan state if powerbrokers increasingly take matters into their own hands. In terms of how the U.S. drawdown may affect Afghan forces’ capabilities, much depends on the extent to which the NATO-led training mission can continue without interruption. As noted above, U.S. military officials maintain that training activities can continue (pointing to the larger NATO presence), though SIGAR reports that trainers will be working at the ministry and corps levels, citing statements from General Miller.52 Many of the U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan (including the Army’s Security Force Assistance Brigades) as part of the Trump Administration’s increase in force levels provided support at the battalion (or kandak) level; it appears unlikely a reduced U.S. force would maintain that kind of lower level tactical support. Some also have warned that a complete U.S. withdrawal could damage the morale of Afghan forces, which is reportedly already fragile.53 Some U.S. policy tools might counter any potentially detrimental consequence of the drawdown or eventual withdrawal on Afghan forces. Continued provision of U.S. air support (discussed above) to Afghan forces until or after withdrawal may have an outsized positive influence on Afghan forces in the field.54 It arguably may counterbalance the tactical impact of any reduction in U.S. training for Afghan forces after the drawdown. Continued U.S. financial support also may be instrumental in keeping Afghan forces in the field against the Taliban. In January 2018, President Ghani said, “[W]e will not be able to support our army for six months without U.S. [financial] support.”55 Still, a full U.S. military withdrawal could affect the level and types of security assistance the United States may provide to Afghanistan. Beyond the immediate effects on U.S. missions in support of Afghan forces, the U.S. military drawdown may have second- or third- order effects on the Afghan polity, especially when it comes to perceptions of U.S. intentions and of the impact of the U.S. drawdown on Afghan capabilities, and the resulting calculations that Afghans make. Some Afghans (including those who remember the complex, multi-sided civil war of the 1990s) have suggested that their communities (and, often, their associated militias) may pursue more independent courses of action in the event that the Afghan government is unable to provide security in the context of the U.S drawdown and withdrawal. For example, in late December 2020, the former governor of Balkh Province and widely viewed powerbroker Atta Mohamad Noor warned, “If the government does not pay attention to areas lacking security, then we must take action and we don’t care if they call us militia,” adding, “If you cannot improve the security situation, then let us do something.”56 52 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress,” January 30, 2021, p. 56. 53 Brian Glyn Williams and Javed Rezayee, “The perils of a US troop drawdown to the Afghan army and tribes,” The Hill, November 28, 2020; Gibbons-Neff et al., op. cit.; Kathy Gannon, “US troop withdrawal will be serious blow to Afghan forces’ morale, generals say,” Associated Press, December 21, 2018. 54 Susannah George, “The Taliban is on the offensive. Keeping the militants at bay: U.S. airstrikes, even as bases close and troops leave,” Washington Post, November 21, 2020. 55 Anwar Iqbal, “Afghan Army to Collapse in Six Months Without US Help: Ghani,” Dawn, January 18, 2018. 56 “Atta Noor threatens to ‘take action’ against security situation,” Ariana News, December 24, 2020. Congressional Research Service 10
U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions Fractures between the central government and local powerbrokers are likely to break down along ethnic lines; Noor and others are associated with the Northern Alliance, which comprised mostly Tajiks and other ethnic minorities from northern Afghanistan and fought the majority-Pashtun Taliban in the 1990s.57 Some who oppose the Afghan government’s talks with the Taliban have proposed reestablishing the Northern Alliance under a new name.58 Members of Afghanistan’s only majority Shia ethnic group, the Hazaras, have long faced Taliban persecution and may also look to protect their communities via extralegal means; as one Hazara leader said in a recent media account, “If America leaves, the Hazaras have no choice but to take up weapons.”59 How is the drawdown related to ongoing intra-Afghan talks? U.S. officials have given conflicting accounts of whether the U.S. withdrawal is contingent upon, or otherwise related to, the Taliban holding talks with Kabul or the outcome of such talks. In a February 29 2020, briefing ahead of the U.S.-Taliban agreement signing, one unnamed senior U.S. official said, “if the political settlement fails, if the talks fail, there is nothing that obliges the United States to withdraw troops,” while another said, “the withdrawal timeline is related to counterterrorism, not political outcomes.”60 The deputy U.S. negotiator Molly Phee said on February 18, 2020, “We will not prejudge the outcome of intra-Afghan negotiations, but we are prepared to support whatever consensus the Afghans are able to reach about their future political and governing arrangements.”61 On September 11, 2020, Afghan government and Taliban representatives met in Doha, Qatar, to begin the first formal intra-Afghan talks to end the war. It remains unclear what kind of security and political arrangements could satisfy both Kabul and the Taliban to the extent that the latter abandons its armed struggle. Many Afghans, especially women, who remember Taliban rule and oppose the group’s policies and beliefs, remain wary.62 Those Afghans doubt the Taliban’s trustworthiness and express concern that, in the absence of U.S. military pressure, the group will have little incentive to either remain in talks or comply with the terms of any agreement reached with Kabul.63 The Taliban denied involvement in the January 2021 assassination of female supreme court judges in Kabul and other recent targeted attacks, but the United States and other nations released a joint statement on January 31, 2021, charging that “the Taliban bears responsibility for the majority of this targeted violence.”64 Some Afghan officials reportedly 57 Siddhant Kishore, “Rallying old friends: Adapting to an evolving Afghan threatre,” Observer Research Foundation, January 7, 2021. 58 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Fatima Faizi, “In Proud Corners of Afghanistan, New Calls for Autonomy,” New York Times, September 28, 2020. 59 Rasmussen and Amiri, op. cit. 60 “Briefing with Senior Administration Officials on Next Steps Toward an Agreement on Bringing Peace to Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of State, February 29, 2020. 61 Molly Phee, remarks at “Ending Our Endless War in Afghanistan,” United States Institute of Peace, February 18, 2020. 62 Pamela Constable, “The Return of a Taliban Government? Afghanistan Talks Raise Once-Unthinkable Question,” Washington Post, January 29, 2019. 63 “Afghans voice fears that the U.S. is undercutting them in deal with the Taliban,” Washington Post, August 17, 2019. 64 Ayaz Gul, “Gunmen Assassinate 2 Female Afghan Judges in Kabul,” VOA, January 17, 2021; “Statement on Continuation of Assassinations, Kidnapping, and Destruction of Vital Infrastructure,” U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan, January 31, 2021. Congressional Research Service 11
U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions suspect the Taliban of trying to “run out the clock on the withdrawal of American troops,” remaining in negotiations long enough to secure a full U.S. withdrawal.65 A December 2019 survey reported that a “significant majority” of Afghans were both aware of (77%) and strongly or somewhat supported (89%) efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the Taliban, while opposing the group itself.66 Nearly 80% of respondents in a November 2020 survey said that they were strongly or somewhat optimistic that talks would lead to a “lasting peace,” though over a quarter expect the Taliban to defeat the Afghan government if talks fail.67 At least some Afghans support “peace at any cost” given the decades of conflict through which the country has suffered.68 How have Members of Congress reacted to the withdrawal commitment and subsequent drawdown? While the congressional reaction to the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement was diverse but relatively limited, reaction to the Trump Administration’s November 2020 withdrawal announcement was more extensive.69 Some Members welcomed the announcement or did so with reservations, while others expressed concerns or opposed it outright. Additionally, Congress enacted restrictions on the President’s ability to reduce troops in Afghanistan below certain levels in the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-283); President Trump waived those restrictions in January 2021. Members who have expressed support for the drawdown and withdrawal generally contend that the U.S. military presence cannot bring about an intra-Afghan settlement to end the conflict and that the ability of that military presence to achieve U.S. interests is limited. Citing those and other arguments, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith described the drawdown as “the right policy decision.”70 Other Members welcome the drawdown as a step toward the full withdrawal of U.S. troops: in a letter to then-Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller, Senator Josh Hawley argued that the United States had demonstrated sufficient counterterrorism capabilities to justify an expeditious full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, characterizing what he called the “broader nation-building mission” as a “mistake.”71 On the other hand, some Members advocate for an eventual U.S. withdrawal, but criticize the Trump Administration’s motivations, methods, or timing, particularly emphasizing the potential effects on security conditions and intra-Afghan negotiations. Senator Tim Kaine argued that the “haphazard nature of President Trump’s decision will harm our national security and jeopardize countless American [and] Afghan” lives.72 Senator Chris Murphy expressed his support for a 65 Mujib Mashal, “Violent attacks plague Afghanistan as peace talks in Doha slow,” New York Times, September 19, 2020. 66 The Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2019: A Survey of the Afghan People,” released December 3, 2019. 67 “The Afghan People’s Peace Perception Survey: Third Survey,” Institute of War and Peace Studies, November 2020. Available at https://iwps.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/English-3th-Peace-Perception-Survey-IWPS-2020.pdf. 68 Susannah George and Sharif Hassan, “Faced with the prospect of formal peace talks, Afghans consider what they’re willing to concede,” Washington Post, June 7, 2020. 69 “Acting Secretary Miller Announces Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq,” Department of Defense, Nov. 17, 2020. 70 “Smith Statement on Afghanistan Troop Drawdown,” House Armed Services Committee, November 17, 2020. 71 “Hawley Praises President Trump’s Plan to Bring Troops Home from Afghanistan,” Office of Senator Josh Hawley, November 17, 2020. 72 “Kaine Statement on Trump Decision to Withdraw Troops from Afghanistan and Iraq,” Office of Senator Tim Kaine, Congressional Research Service 12
U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions “swift and orderly drawdown of U.S. forces” but contended the decision was made without sufficient consultation with allies and that the “Afghan government is currently engaged in sensitive negotiations with the Taliban over the future status of the country’s political and social order, and we should use our leverage to help them get the best deal possible.”73 House Oversight and Reform National Security Subcommittee Chairman Steven Lynch argued in a letter to Acting Secretary Miller and then-Secretary of State Pompeo that drawing down U.S. forces could have serious consequences for U.S. interests, and requested that they provide documentation of Taliban compliance with the February 2020 agreement as well as executive branch communications regarding the drawdown decision.74 Other Members have emphasized the importance of conditionality: Senator Lindsey Graham, for example, said that a “drawdown to 2,500 counter-terrorism forces may be sufficient but should be conditions-based, to protect America’s interests.”75 Similarly, in floor remarks, then-Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell praised President Trump’s Afghanistan policy, saying “[t]hat same successful approach should continue until the conditions for the long-term defeat” of terrorist groups are achieved.76 He also warned, “A rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan now would hurt our allies and delight the people who wish us harm,” comparing a “premature American exit” to the 2011 withdrawal from Iraq and the “humiliating American departure from Saigon in 1975.”77 Finally, some Members expressed opposition to the drawdown announcement: Senator Mitt Romney called on the Trump Administration to reverse what he called a “politically-motivated decision,” saying that “conditions for withdrawal [from Afghanistan] have not been met.”78 Senator Ben Sasse said, “this weak retreat is not grounded in reality and will make the world a more dangerous place.”79 House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Michael McCaul called on the Trump Administration to “ensure a residual force is maintained for the foreseeable future to protect U.S. national and homeland security interests and to help secure peace in Afghanistan.”80 Beyond Member statements, Congress also passed legislation containing provisions directly related to U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan. Section 1215 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) prohibits the use of funds to reduce U.S. forces in Afghanistan below the level as of enactment or 2,000 (whichever is lesser) until the Secretary of Defense submits a report that includes, among other points, an assessment of the effects of U.S. troop reductions on counterterrorism, Afghan military capabilities, the NATO-led training mission, and other U.S. policy priorities. Section 1215 also allows the President to waive the reporting requirement with the submission of a written determination that such a waiver is in U.S. national security interests with a “detailed November 17, 2020. 73 “Murphy Statement On Troop Withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq,” Office of Senator Chris Murphy, November 17, 2020. 74 Letter from Chairman Stephen Lynch to Secretary of State Pompeo and Acting Secretary of Defense Miller, November 17, 2020. 75 “Graham on Afghanistan Drawdown,” Office of Senator Lindsey Graham, November 17, 2020. 76 “Premature Afghanistan Exit Would Jeopardize Trump Administration’s Record of Success,” Office of Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, November 16, 2020. 77 Ibid. 78 “Romney Statement on Proposed Troop Withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq,” Office of Senator Mitt Romney, November 17, 2020. 79 “Sasse Statement on Retreat from Middle East,” Office of Ben Sasse, November 17, 2020. 80 “McCaul Statement on Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs Committee Republicans, November 16, 2020. Congressional Research Service 13
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