Willing and able? EU defence in 2020 - Daniel Keohane and Tomas Valasek H - Centre for European ...
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EU2020 essay
Willing and able?
EU defence in 2020
★
Daniel Keohane
and Tomas Valasekabout the CER
The Centre for European Reform is a think-tank devoted to improving the quality of the debate on
the European Union. It is a forum for people with ideas from Britain and across the continent to
discuss the many political, economic and social challenges facing Europe. It seeks to work with
similar bodies in other European countries, North America and elsewhere in the world.
Willing and
The CER is pro-European but not uncritical. It regards European integration as largely beneficial
but recognises that in many respects the Union does not work well. The CER therefore aims to
promote new ideas for reforming the European Union. able?
EU defence in 2020
Director: CHARLES GRANT
ADVISORY BOARD
PERCY BARNEVIK........................................ Board member, General Motors and Former Chairman, AstraZeneca
ANTONIO BORGES..................................................................................................... Former Dean of INSEAD
NICK BUTLER (CHAIR)...................... Director, Centre for Energy Security & Sustainable Development, Cambridge
IAIN CONN ................................... Group Managing Director and Chief Executive, Refining & Marketing, BP p.l.c.
LORD DAHRENDORF .......................... Former Warden of St Antony’s College, Oxford & European Commissioner
VERNON ELLIS............................................................................................ International Chairman, Accenture
RICHARD HAASS.................................................................................. President, Council on Foreign Relations
LORD HANNAY.................................................................................... Former Ambassador to the UN & the EU
LORD HASKINS .......................................................................................... Former Chairman, Northern Foods
FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG................................................ Senior Adviser, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
LORD KERR............................... Chairman, Imperial College London and Deputy Chairman, Royal Dutch Shell plc
CAIO KOCH-WESER................................................................................ Vice Chairman, Deutsche Bank Group
FIORELLA KOSTORIS PADOA SCHIOPPA............................................... Professor, La Sapienza University, Rome
RICHARD LAMBERT........................................................ Director General, The Confederation of British Industry
PASCAL LAMY......................................................... Director General, WTO and Former European Commissioner
DAVID MARSH.......................................................................................... Chairman, London & Oxford Group
DOMINIQUE MOÏSI................................................ Senior Adviser, Institut Français des Relations Internationales
JOHN MONKS.............................................................. General Secretary, European Trade Union Confederation
BARONESS PAULINE NEVILLE-JONES......................... National Security Adviser to the leader of the oppposition
CHRISTINE OCKRENT...................................................................................... Editor in chief, France Télévision
STUART POPHAM............................................................................................. Senior Partner, Clifford Chance
WANDA RAPACZYNSKI....................................................... Former President of Management Board, Agora SA
LORD ROBERTSON............................ Deputy Chairman, Cable and Wireless and Former Secretary General, NATO
KORI SCHAKE................................................................................................ Senior Policy Advisor, McCain 08
Daniel Keohane and
LORD SIMON ........................................................... Former Minister for Trade and Competitiveness in Europe
PETER SUTHERLAND....................................................... Chairman, BP p.l.c. and Goldman Sachs International
Tomas Valasek
LORD TURNER ....................................................................... Non-executive Director, Standard Chartered PLC
ANTÓNIO VITORINO...................................................................................... Former European Commissioner
Published by the Centre for European Reform (CER), 14 Great College Street, London, SW1P 3RX
Telephone +44 20 7233 1199, Facsimile +44 20 7233 1117, info@cer.org.uk, www.cer.org.uk
© CER JUNE 2008 ★ ISBN 978 1 901229 84 4ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Contents
Daniel Keohane is a research fellow at the EU Institute for Security
Studies. He was previously a senior research fellow at the Centre for
European Reform, and a research associate at the Institute for
National Strategic Studies, National Defence University in Washington
DC. His previous CER publications include ‘The EU and counter- About the authors
terrorism’, May 2005; (as co-author) ‘A European way of war’, May
2004; and ‘The EU and armaments co-operation’, December 2002. Authors’ acknowledgements
Tomas Valasek is director of foreign policy and defence at the Centre 1 Introduction 1
for European Reform. He previously worked as policy director and
head of the security and defence policy at the Slovak Ministry of 2 EU defence in 2020 5
Defence. His previous CER publications include ‘France, NATO and
3 The EU, NATO and the US in 2020 17
European defence’, May 2008; ‘The roadmap to better EU-NATO
relations’, December 2007; and (as co-author) ‘Preparing for the 4 European military capabilities 25
multipolar world: European foreign and security policy in 2020’,
December 2007. 5 Conclusion: Three things the EU should do now 41
AUTHORS’ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Daniel Keohane would like to thank Sophie de Vaucorbeil for her help
with research, and Giovanni Grevi for his useful feedback. Tomas
Valasek would like to thank his colleagues at the CER for their
comments on earlier drafts, especially Bobo Lo and Charles Grant,
and to Kate Meakins for design and layout. The views expressed
within and any errors are, of course, the authors’ alone.
We are grateful to the German Marshall Fund of the United States for
supporting this publication.
★
Copyright of this publication is held by the Centre for European Reform. You may not copy, reproduce, republish
or circulate in any way the content from this publication except for your own personal and non-commercial use.
Any other use requires the prior written permission of the Centre for European Reform.1 Introduction
What is EU defence? In principle, defence forms only one part of the
European Union’s foreign and security policy. This policy uses a wide
range of tools from diplomats and development workers to judges
and police, and – when necessary – soldiers. The EU works on the
assumption that terrorism or collapsing states cannot be tackled
using only military means. The European Union’s broad approach to
international security is more similar to that of the United Nations
than to NATO, which has a much narrower approach. The alliance
mainly uses military resources, although it 1 House of Commons Hansard
strives to work with non-military debates, response by Desmond
organisations. As the British defence Browne MP to parliamentary
minister, Des Browne, put it: “Working with question from Liam Fox MP,
January 21st 2008,
our EU partners comprehensively, we have http://www.publications.
an opportunity to bring to bear capabilities parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/
that NATO does not have and is unlikely cmhansrd/cm080121/
ever to have.”1 debtext/80121-0002.htm.
In practice, the European security and defence policy (ESDP) is a
crisis management policy, helping to prevent conflict and re-build
societies emerging from war. Since its first peacekeeping operation in
2003, the EU has completed or is carrying out around 20 ESDP
missions. They have been relatively small in size; the largest was a
7,000-strong peacekeeping operation in Bosnia (which now numbers
2,500). But the smaller missions – like the one that prevented ethnic
conflict in Macedonia – have been among the most useful.
Their complexity and range has been interesting, too. The EU has
helped reform the Congolese army and the Georgian judicial system;
train Afghan and Iraqi police forces; monitor the Rafah border2 Willing and able? EU defence in 2020 Introduction 3
3
Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni
crossing in Gaza; and oversee the implementation of a peace neighbourhood mean that the EU’s already
Grevi, ‘The new global puzzle –
agreement in Aceh in Indonesia. challenging security agenda could be more what world for the EU in
difficult by 2020, and new risks will surely 2025?’, European Union
Demand for EU action is growing. In February 2008, EU emerge (see chapter two).3 Institute for Security Studies,
governments ordered 1,800 police, judges and customs officials to October 2006.
Kosovo, where they are to operate alongside 16,000 NATO Second, the EU will increasingly have to assume roles previously
peacekeepers, to help prevent a return to violence in that country. played in and around Europe by the United States. The US is thinly
They also started deploying a peacekeeping force to Eastern Chad, stretched by the demands of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the
which will be composed of 3,700 soldiers. Later in 2008 the EU will medium term it will not be as willing as in the past to take on new
help to reform the Guinea Bissau army and police forces. military responsibilities.4 When and if it does, these are unlikely to
focus on Europe or its neighbourhood. US 4 See Kori Schake, ‘The US
For all these notable achievements, the EU has not yet carried out a military priorities these days are not in the elections and Europe: The com-
military operation on anything like the scale of the NATO operation Balkans or North Africa, but in Asia and ing crisis of high expectations’,
CER essay, November 2007.
in Afghanistan or the UN mission in Congo. For instance, NATO is the Middle East.
leading 43,000 soldiers in Afghanistan, some of whom are fighting
in extremely dangerous conditions, while the UN has 16,600 While no future security challenge can be resolved by force alone, on
peacekeepers in Congo. It may be that the EU does not need to carry occasion EU governments may need to deploy robust armed forces.
out military operations of a similar size and nature to the UN or For instance, the experience of multinational peacekeeping in places
NATO. Perhaps it will continue concentrating mainly on smaller such as Afghanistan, Lebanon and Somalia has shown that well-
humanitarian and state-building operations for many years to come, intentioned missions can quickly turn into situations that resemble
for which there is already considerable demand. But looking to war-fighting. Or the EU may need to intervene in a nearby country
2020, this assumption seems risky for at least two reasons. with a large-scale force to separate sides in a civil war, or to prevent
a humanitarian crisis. If it were really necessary, would the EU be
2
European Council, ‘A secure First, the world in and around Europe prepared to fight? No one knows, since the EU has not yet carried
Europe in a better world – may well be a more dangerous place by out combat missions.
European Security Strategy’, 2020. The threats identified in the
December 12th 2003.
European security strategy (ESS), a And even if the EU governments were 5 European Defence Agency,
document agreed by EU governments in 2003, remain unresolved.2 willing to fight, would they be able? The ‘European - United States
The risk of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has EU-27 governments collectively spend defence expenditure in 2006’,
probably increased, as has the demand for interventions on behalf of S200 billion on defence.5 But despite these European Defence Agency,
December 21st 2007,
human rights (as in Darfur). The possibility of ethnically-motivated hefty financial resources, Europeans do not http://www.eda.europa.eu/.
violence remains high (in Kosovo, but also Bosnia and elsewhere). have nearly enough soldiers with the
Other challenges have become more salient since 2003 (climate necessary skills. The EU-27 governments have close to 2 million
change, energy security) while some old ones, prematurely consigned personnel in their armed forces, but they can barely deploy and
to history, have returned (a nationalist Russia). An unstable mix of sustain 100,000 soldiers around the globe. Many of the rest are
demographic, economic and political pressures in Europe’s inexperienced draftees.4 Willing and able? EU defence in 2020
Eurosceptics will scoff at the idea of a more assertive EU defence 2 EU defence in 2020
policy. When not accusing EU defence of being an anti-NATO plot,
they tend to say that Europeans lack the resources, and the will to
fight without the Americans. Conversely, another group of
Europeans fear that EU foreign policy is already becoming
‘militarised’. They do not want the EU to fight, and would prefer
that soldiers carried out nothing more than peacekeeping missions – Under what conditions and where should EU governments be
if they must be used at all. But both eurosceptics and europacifists prepared to use their armed forces in 2020? Europe should be worried
are missing the point. about the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), failing
states, terrorism and the possible re-emergence of major wars between
Europeans will increasingly have to take more responsibility for states by 2020. In fact it already is. The European security strategy
their own security, as they are doing in Bosnia. They will also outlines five key threats to European security: terrorism; proliferation
increasingly be asked to intervene to protect refugees, as they are of WMD; regional conflicts; state failure; and organised crime. The
doing in Chad. They will probably frequently be asked to keep the 2003 ESS did not predict a major inter-state war involving European
peace in difficult places, like the Israeli-Lebanese border, where governments. But since then, a resurgent, nationalist Russia has
Europeans lead a UN operation. European governments will threatened to point nuclear missiles at EU member-states, has used
probably have to carry out many more autonomous military military force against one neighbour, Georgia, and questioned the
operations in the future, especially in their turbulent neighbourhood. territoral integrity of another, Ukraine. So the spectre of state-to-state
And sometimes those missions may not only involve peacekeeping, conflict needs to be considered too. The ESS also says that the EU
but also fighting. If they wish to meet these growing demands on cannot afford to be myopic – what happens in North Korea and
their defence policy in a more effective way by 2020, EU South Asia is of direct relevance to the EU.
governments have little choice: they are condemned to co-operate.
However, Europe cannot cope with all the potential threats facing
the world, nor should it aspire to. The US, similarly, does not plan
to intervene in every conflict around the world, and even if it wanted
to, it would not have the resources to act. As Frederick the Great
told his generals “to defend everything is to defend nothing”. If the
EU is to be effective in the future, it will need a clear sense of its
security priorities, and what it is prepared to do. It is much easier to
predict what the EU will not do. For example, the EU will not fight
wars in East Asia.
The EU should be most concerned about future developments in its
common neighbourhood with Russia, and in the broader Middle
East (including North Africa). By 2020, sub-Saharan Africa will be
increasingly important too, not only for humanitarian reasons, but6 Willing and able? EU defence in 2020 EU defence in 2020 7
also because it supplies energy to meet Europe’s growing demand, mid-1990s has tended to favour EU defence over NATO,
and because its poverty breeds terrorism. As the ESS puts it: “even continues to contribute more personnel and money into NATO
in an era of globalisation, geography is still important”. Enlargement than ESDP. 6 By 2020, this is likely to 6 Leo Michel, ‘Sarko’s window of
brings the EU closer to the arc of instability that runs around its change somewhat. The trend in Europe opportunity’, European Voice,
is towards more common operations at June 28 2007.
th
eastern, south-eastern and southern flanks. Romania and Bulgaria
joined the Union in 2007, while Croatia, Turkey and other countries the expense of national ones (because of costs and higher
of the Western Balkans may enter in the coming decades. The EU legitimacy) and, where common operations are concerned,
will therefore have many weak and malfunctioning states close to its towards more EU missions at the expense of NATO (in part
borders. It is bound to become more involved in countries such as because NATO is keen to shift responsibility for some of its
Belarus, Georgia and Moldova. Across the Atlantic, the US will operations to the EU). But non-EU missions will remain a part of
remain focused on countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and the mix.
North Korea, and potential conflicts such as China-Taiwan and
India-Pakistan. Washington will be reluctant to become too involved ★ Europe’s neighbourhood with Russia
in conflicts around the EU’s eastern and southern flanks.
Russia’s own trajectory may take it into some form of a
The EU will need to develop a more effective set of policies for confrontation with the West by 2020. Over the past several years,
stabilising North Africa, the Balkans and the countries that lie the Putin government has behaved with increasing hostility to the
between its eastern border and Russia. Many of these policies will United States and, to a lesser extent, Europe. Russia’s current
involve trade, aid and political dialogue. But the EU’s strategy for its mindset can probably best be described as 19th century great power
neighbourhood will also have to include a military component. nationalism. Observers differ on whether this aggressive
Europeans should not expect the US to put out fires in their own nationalism is meant for domestic political audiences, or whether
backyard. After all, the principal rationale for the Anglo-French Russia really has an appetite for confrontation in the future (but
initiative at St Malo in 1998 – which begat the European security history shows that one often leads to the other). Equally, it is
and defence policy – was to improve on the EU’s poor performance unclear whether Russia’s tough rhetoric to 7 Christopher Langton et al,
in coping with the Balkan crises of the 1990s. the West masks weakness or strength. ‘The military balance 2007’,
While Russia spends more on defence International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2007.
The EU’s efforts to tackle conflicts in its hinterland may require (almost $60 billion) than Britain or
more than ‘mere’ peacekeeping. For example, if the delicate situation France,7 its military is largely unreformed since the Soviet days, and
in Kosovo turned into a civil war someday, the EU should be ready Russian military sources themselves say much of the equipment is
to intervene with forces that could separate the warring factions. In in a very poor shape. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov
such situations the British soldiers might be fighting alongside those said in February 2008 that Russia’s fleet of military transport planes
from France, Germany, Italy and Spain, but not necessarily with is so old that none may be flying by 2015.8 8 RFE/RL Newsline, Vol.12, No
American troops. It is possible that Russia is sounding tough 39. Part I, February 27th 2008
as a defensive move, to forestall what it http://www.rferl.org/newsline/
2008/02/270208/asp.
Many European countries will continue to take part in operations may see as European or US challenges to
under the UN or NATO. Even France, whose diplomacy since the the post-Putin regime.8 Willing and able? EU defence in 2020 EU defence in 2020 9
What is clear is that ‘Putinism’ in one shape or another, and its resurgence could therefore put an onus on the EU to harmonise its
associated foreign policy, is set to stay for a while, possibly until military plans, standards and hardware with NATO, to avoid
2020. The Russian military, though having wasted much – possibly duplication of resources.
most – of the new funds Putin put in the defence budget, will grow
stronger nonetheless. And both the EU and Russia would like to be ★ The Middle East
the dominant influence on the neighbourhood countries between
9 Charles Grant with Tomas
them. As Charles Grant wrote, Moscow By 2020 the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian
Valasek, ‘Preparing for the “will see itself as competing … against the territories may have advanced to the point of producing an
multipolar world:
EU (and the US) in the Southern Caucasus independent Palestinian state. The probability of this happening is
European foreign and security
policy in 2020’, CER essay, and in the countries that lie between itself impossible to assess. After so many false starts, neither the Israeli
December 2007. and the EU”.9 nor Palestinian leaders seem to believe in the possibility of peace
with much conviction. The international community, too, has been
For the EU, this rivalry is likely to be more political than suffering from ‘Middle East fatigue’. But the conflict continues to
military. Should Moscow overtly undermine the independence of radicalise Muslims across the world, and as such it impacts on
countries like Georgia or Ukraine, the European Union would security globally. So periodically new attempts at peace appear, like
probably respond by freezing relations, not by using military the US-organised Annapolis conference in 2007.
force. Nevertheless, the EU should be ready to put troops into
places like Moldova or Nagorno Karabakh, where the resolution If by 2020 the peace process yields an independent Palestinian
of frozen conflicts may necessitate the deployment of a state, Israel may request international peacekeepers to be
peacekeeping force. The EU will also have a strong role to play deployed on its borders. If so, the EU should be ready to send a
reforming the armed forces of countries in the belt between the combined military and police force. Its job would be to prevent
EU and Russia. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine will continue to weapons smuggling, and to stop rocket attacks on Israel. The EU
need European money and expertise as they seek to reshape already runs an operation at the Rafah border crossing
Soviet-era militaries into lighter, expeditionary forces capable (currently suspended because of the violence in Gaza), which
of dealing with regional conflicts. monitors the traffic between Egypt and Gaza. European soldiers
are also leading the UN peacekeeping mission on the Israeli-
As for Russia itself, there is little, if any, military role for the EU. Lebanese border.
If the Europeans felt the need for military planning and operations
with regard to Russia, they would probably prefer to act By 2020, the Middle East may have several new nuclear powers. If
individually or through NATO rather than through the EU. But Iran acquires the capacity to build a nuclear weapon, which appears
the EU would feel the impact nevertheless. If Russia were to to be its objective, it will likely prompt others in the region to follow
threaten Europe, some EU member-states would prioritise NATO suit. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for instance, do not want Iran (a non-
commitments over EU ones. This matters because defence budgets Arab country) to become the regional superpower.
are stretched extremely thin. If governments devoted more
resources to NATO territorial defence, they would have less But with each new nuclear power in the Middle East, the possibility
available for EU peacekeeping missions. Russia’s military of a nuclear weapon ending up in the hands of terrorists increases.10 Willing and able? EU defence in 2020 11
Europe therefore will likely still be patrolling the sea passages from ★ Oil, gas and Africa
the Middle East to Europe, to intercept shipments of WMD or their
component parts. The EU member-states are already doing so The European Commission says that by 2020 the EU will be
through the international ‘proliferation security initiative’, which the importing at least 70 per cent of the oil and gas it will consume.12
US set up in 2003. Because the United States will probably want to Russia, North and West Africa as well as 12 European Commission,
keep up its military presence in the seas around the Middle East, the Middle East will supply almost all of ‘A European strategy for
Europeans are likely to run their contributions either as a direct co- these imports. Gas will be the most sustainable, competitive and
operation with the US or through NATO, rather than through the sought-after commodity between now and secure energy’, March 8th 2006.
EU. However, if the US needed the Europeans to take sole 2020, and while Russia provides most of Europe’s supplies for
responsibility for Mediterranean patrols in the future, they should be now, by 2020 gas-rich Algeria is set to emerge as a key supplier,
prepared to do so. One member of the European Parliament – and and join oil-exporting Nigeria as one of Europe’s most important
former head of UN forces in Bosnia – Phillipe Morillon has energy providers.
proposed that the EU should set itself “the medium-term objective
10
European Parliament, of providing support, with a European or By 2020 the EU could be faced with the need to intervene militarily
‘Draft report on the new even a Euro-Mediterranean fleet, for the to protect these energy sources. Already, Nigeria’s oil fields and
European security and defence US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, until pipelines are regularly attacked by local forces hostile to the
architecture’, February 5th 2003. possibly taking over from it if the Nigerian government. The government has trouble projecting
Americans so requested.”10 authority throughout its territory, including places like the Niger
delta where some of the most important oil fields lie. So Western
In 2020, the EU might also be more involved in Iraq than it is today energy firms operating in the country have resorted to hiring large
(it is currently training Iraqi police, judges and prison officers). private security forces to protect their assets.
The EU-27 and the European Commission have pledged S14.2
billion worth of financial assistance to Iraq since 2003 (including Algeria, an important gas source, has suffered a series of major
grants, debt relief and loans). After years of seemingly endless terrorist attacks. Foreigners as well as pipelines have been
violence, the US in 2008 had more success in pacifying Iraq. But to targeted. In one such attack, on December 11th 2007, a double car
build on these improvements Iraq will need more police and bomb attack killed over 30 people, including 17 employees of the
military trainers, and possibly more combat troops. So the EU United Nations.
needs to think again about its future strategy for Iraq. As Richard
11 Richard Gowan, ‘The EU and Gowan of the US Center on International Will the EU assume responsibility for helping to protect energy
Iraq: Starting to find a strategy?’, Co-operation has pointed out: “You can supplies with force? It is bound to be a controversial question
European Council on Foreign pull out of Iraq, but you can’t make the because the EU would certainly be accused of trading blood for oil.
Relations, January 26th 2008. problem go away.”11 If Iraq failed as a And that is a politically powerful charge, one that could discourage
state, it would destabilise the Middle East and greatly complicate governments from sending troops. Many EU member-states are
the EU’s relationship with key countries such as Iran and Turkey. So reluctant to put militaries in any line of fire (see below). So Europe
the EU may have to send more troops and trainers to Iraq in the will probably focus on strengthening local security forces rather
coming years. than deploying soldiers itself.12 Willing and able? EU defence in 2020 EU defence in 2020 13
To a large degree the same principle holds true for EU humanitarian (see chapter four). Critics of EU defence policy point to the
interventions in Africa. Although the EU has deployed peacekeepers ‘cosmetic’ nature of some current EU missions, such as the 2006
to protect refugees in Chad, it has prioritised building up African deployment to Congo. They argue that the German-led force,
military and police forces. This takes the form of expert advice, while intervening at one point to protect a presidential candidate
financial assistance, equipment transfers or logistical help, such as (and a few European diplomats) from crowd violence, in general
lending transport planes. For example, the EU has supplied stayed far from harm’s way. The mission was more about
equipment and expertise to the African Union peacekeeping “European form than African substance, comforting rhetoric than
operation in Darfur. It has conducted three security sector reform relevant action”, Jean-Yves Haine and 14 Jean-Yves Haine and Bastian
missions in Congo to help strengthen the country’s military and Bastian Giegerich concluded.14 Likewise, Giegerich, ‘In Congo, a cosmetic
police, and it is about to do the same in Guinea Bissau. The EU has US scholar and former senior State EU operation’, International
Department official, Kori Schake, has Herald Tribune, June 12 2006.
th
also set up a ‘peace facility’ worth S250 million to finance
peacekeeping operations managed by the African Union and other described the small-scale missions 15 Kori Schake, ‘An American
sub-regional organisations. undertaken by the EU so far as “luxury eulogy for European defence.’
indulgences” because they are neither Anne Deighton and Victor
central to Europe’s security, nor sufficient Mauer, ‘Securing Europe?
Will the EU fight wars?
to solve the problems in those crisis areas. Implementing the European
security strategy’, Zürcher
The EU has shown that it can act outside Europe. As outlined above, Therefore the EU has “actually increased Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik
it will probably have to deploy military forces abroad frequently in the scepticism about its seriousness of Nr. 77 (Zurich contributions to
future. Furthermore, the EU is working hard to improve its mix of purpose rather than built a foundation for security policy), Center for
military and non-military resources – such as police, judges and aid more complex and more demanding Security Studies, Switzerland,
2006.
workers – for coping with crises. This makes sense since all undertakings”.15
international security problems require a combination of policy
responses. The reforms contained in the Lisbon treaty would help the The critics are right: the use of force has been largely absent from
EU to further develop its holistic approach to international security. EU thinking on foreign and security policy to date. For this reason
13
The Lisbon treaty would The treaty – in limbo after Ireland voted the authors of the European security strategy found it hard in 2003
create a European external against it in a referendum in June 2008 – to say anything clear on the subject. They concluded somewhat
action service, by merging those would merge some of the diplomatic and vaguely that “with the new threats the first line of defence will often
parts of the Council of the military power of the member-states with be abroad”, and the EU should “develop a strategic culture that
European Union that deal with
foreign policy with the European
the vast development assistance, state- fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention”.
Commission’s directorate-general building and reconstruction resources of the
for external relations. European Commission.13 The European defence community has debated ever since the
strategy’s release whether ‘robust’ also means ‘using force’. Future
But will the EU ever do more than peacekeeping? To date, the events may settle the question for them. If the need arises, for
member-states have been very reluctant to send the EU into a example, to counter WMD proliferation in the Middle East, the
war. It has become a cliché that Europe lacks the military likelihood is that the US would lead such missions. If the
capabilities and the will to conduct large-scale combat operations Americans chose to be supported by an international military14 Willing and able? EU defence in 2020 EU defence in 2020 15
coalition, NATO would probably be the lead institution. But if the get involved in operations in Africa. His remark seems outdated,
US were preoccupied with other security concerns in the world even ironic, now that Germany has led an EU operation in Congo
(like North Korea), and if the Europeans were faced with a in 2006. But his general point holds true. The public will not always
compelling terrorist or WMD threat in an area such as North be aware why EU missions in faraway places are important. If
16 The Presidency Conclusions Africa, they might have no other option disaster struck during an EU operation, 18 Richard Gowan, ‘Is the EU
from the Thessaloniki European but to act alone. EU governments have and there were a number of casualties, the ready to take casualties?’, The
commitment of those governments Globalist, September 15 2006,
th
Council, June 19th-20th 2003, say: committed themselves to use force to
“The European Council endorses stop WMD proliferation. The EU’s http://www.theglobalist.com/Story
involved would be severely tested.18 Id.aspx?StoryId=5080.
the....declaration.…on non-
proliferation of weapons of mass
WMD strategy, agreed by EU
destruction adopted by General governments at the Thessaloniki summit However, the responsibility for fighting – if the EU resorts to force
Affairs Council on June 16th in June 2003, says that coercive measures – would at any rate be spread unevenly. Some countries like France
2003”. This declaration mentions can be used – as a last resort – for and the UK are simply more willing to fight and more capable of
“as a last resort, coercive preserving international non- doing so. They would probably lead any high-intensity operations,
measures in accordance with the 16
UN charter”.
proliferation regimes. since they account for half of EU defence spending, have the most
advanced military capabilities, and have the most experience of
The difficulty is that EU governments have very different military leading high-intensity missions. Aside from contributing to various
strengths, and diverse attitudes towards the use of military force. military coalitions, Britain and France have acted alone. Britain sent
Lawrence Freedman of King’s College London has argued that these troops to Sierra Leone in 2000, while France deployed soldiers to the
differences mean that the EU would produce a dysfunctional Côte d’Ivoire in 2002.
military doctrine – a necessary requirement before using force – if it
17 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Can the tried to create one.17 Since the EU is now The countries most willing and able to use force should lead a
EU develop an effective military conducting peacekeeping operations, debate in the EU on when the European Union should fight wars.
doctrine?’, in ‘A European way of elements of an EU military doctrine for That is not to suggest that the EU should be in the business of
war’, CER pamphlet, May 2004. future missions are bound to emerge from waging imperialistic campaigns, like Britain and France in the 19th
these experiences. But peacekeeping is not the same as war-fighting. century. The EU is not a super-state with its own zones of interest.
Offensive operations bring up unique and difficult questions: how The public in Europe would not support that kind of EU defence
many dead soldiers will the various countries tolerate? And how policy either.19 Rather the ‘war-fighting’ debate should be about if
many civilian deaths are acceptable? The risk that the 27 and under which circumstances the EU 19 Eurobarometer polls
governments would disagree and thus produce a dysfunctional EU would have to use high-intensity military usually show high support for
doctrine is high. forces when intervening in another country EU defence policy per se, but
– for example to separate warring factions it is questionable how many
Europeans actually know what
Also, even if the EU had a military doctrine, member-states would in a civil war, or, in extremis, to stop the the EU is contributing to
not necessarily share the same commitment to participate in EU proliferation of WMD. global security.
operations. The former German defence minister, Volker Rühe,
infamously remarked in the mid-1990s that the EU should not try Thinking about robust EU operations is important for three reasons.
to “re-invent the Afrika Korps”, meaning that the EU should not First, Europe’s neighbourhood might become more unstable in the16 Willing and able? EU defence in 2020
coming years, and the EU may be forced to act. If EU governments are 3 The EU, NATO and the US in
to manage future shocks, they should be prepared to discuss the full
range of potential military responses. Second, it makes sound military
2020
sense to be prepared for the worst. Even on relatively benign
peacekeeping missions, there is always a chance that soldiers may
come under attack and they need to be equipped and trained for such
eventualities. Third, the point of EU defence policy should not be to
improve ‘brand Europe’, or to generate a feel-good factor among There is no doubt that the EU and NATO will change considerably
European bureaucrats. 20 If EU governments really do plan to by 2020. Both organisations will be coping with a new set of
contribute more to international security, then they cannot avoid challenges to global security. Also, the membership of both
20
Jean-Yves Haine and Bastian discussing the use of force – or using force organisations might grow in the future. The EU may have 30 or
Giegerich, ‘In Congo, a cosmetic when the circumstances absolutely require more members by 2020, including Turkey. NATO could include
EU operation’, International the EU to do so. non-transatlantic countries like Australia or Japan. New members
Herald Tribune, June 12 2006.
th
would change both the strategic focus and internal politics of the EU
and NATO.
The future of NATO
NATO has found it difficult to adjust to the post-Cold War world.
It has survived by expanding into new types of missions (like
protecting human rights in Kosovo) and new regions (like
Afghanistan). However, the alliance is running short on useable
military forces, and allies are unwilling to underwrite new missions.
The Afghanistan operation in particular has shown allied solidarity
to be weak. Germany and France21 have been largely ignoring calls
from the US, Canada, UK and the 21 France announced in April
Netherlands to come to their help in 2008 that it would send 700
Afghanistan’s south, where the fighting has additional troops to Afghanistan
– but not to the volatile south.
been at its most intense.
Another contentious issue between the allies is the informal
division of labour, in which the US fights wars and Europeans
send in peacekeepers to sort out the aftermath. The arrangement
leads many Europeans to suspect that the US is using NATO
missions as a means for getting European troops to serve18 Willing and able? EU defence in 2020 The EU, NATO and the US in 2020 19
American strategic interests.22 They point to the example of There may also be future threats that would revive NATO’s role in
Afghanistan, where European governments complain they have defending Europe, as opposed to intervening elsewhere. If Iran
22
William Pfaff, ‘A growing rift’, little influence over US policy in the developed inter-continental missiles with nuclear warheads, the
International Herald Tribune, country, despite providing thousands of organisation would surely move to build missile defences. Since
February 11th 2008. peacekeepers. This division of labour is NATO has already conducted studies in this area it would make
23
The Times has even suggested not sustainable. The US needs to do a sense for the allies to develop their missile defences together.
that NATO needs to be better job sharing control over missions Likewise a more aggressive Russia may help to re-energise NATO’s
re-designed into two groups of where Europeans are heavily involved. territorial defence role. One point of friction could be the Arctic,
members: “The first tier countries
And EU member-states need greater and its mineral resources. In 2007 Russia claimed control over a
would provide, and decide when
to deploy, properly equipped and military power, to counter US assertions large part of the Arctic, arguing that it is a part of the Russian
operationally compatible fighting that Europe should be left out of landmass and that under international law it belongs to Moscow.
forces. Those unable or unwilling political decisions because, with few
to fight would make up a NATO exceptions (the British, French and the Russia’s claim to a large part of the Arctic challenges the territory
second tier, concentrating on aid
Dutch), it tends to bring very little useful and mineral resources of European countries themselves, particularly
and nation-building” (‘NATO II’,
The Times, February 8th 2008). military force to the table.23 Denmark and Norway (not an EU member-state but a NATO ally,
as well as an active participant in Europe’s security and defence
Between now and 2020, NATO will act in those prospective policy). The size of the Arctic’s oil reserves is unclear but one US
scenarios where neither the EU nor the US want to act alone geological survey estimates them to be around 50 billion barrels of
(because they need additional force or legitimacy). This is oil or, as one analyst put it, “the equivalent 24 Dave Cohen, ‘An oil & gas
assuming that the US does not succumb to the temptation to of a small Persian Gulf state in the North Shangri-la in the Arctic?’,
form ‘coalitions of the willing’. But Iraq has shown such Atlantic”.24 By 2020, the legal status of the ASPO-USA/Energy bulletin,
Arctic’s resources may still be uncertain. October 10 2007.
th
coalitions to be too fragile (the vast majority of coalition forces
left within three years, leaving the US practically alone with a Countries around it are likely to try to create ‘facts on the ground’
small UK force), and they do nothing to legitimise the mission in like Russia did, when it planted a flag on the seabed underneath the
the eyes of the world. One possible scenario in which the North Pole. Denmark and Norway (as well as Canada and the US)
Americans and Europeans might conduct high-intensity military could enhance their military presence in the region, increasing the
operations together would be a collapsing Pakistan. Suppose possibility of skirmishes with Russian forces.
that an Islamabad government started to lose control of the
country, and the prospect of extremists acquiring nuclear By 2020, however, NATO will also further evolve from a strictly
weapons became real. Under such circumstances, US and military alliance to one playing a broader political role as well. It
European ground forces could conceivably seek to intervene to already does: by asking the candidates for membership to reform
restore order in that large country. Instability could also affect their militaries and their political systems, NATO has helped to
key large countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, or Congo. transform much of Central and Eastern Europe. The enlargement
All these cases would require large multinational deployments, process continues: in 2008, NATO invited two more countries,
perhaps led by NATO. Albania and Croatia, to join.20 The EU, NATO and the US in 2020 21
EU-NATO relations
encouraging their members to acquire much of the same types of
Both the EU and NATO would benefit from working closely equipment, such as transport and tanker aircraft and precision-
together on a range of security issues, from counter-terrorism to guided munitions. They should also co-ordinate their military
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Ideally, the two plans to avoid competition for member-states’ soldiers. For
institutions would co-ordinate much more closely: the EU example, if instability in Europe’s neighbourhood required the
countries should be able to switch seamlessly between acting EU to intervene more often, then EU governments would probably
through NATO or acting under the EU flag. That would require be less willing to send their soldiers on NATO missions elsewhere
EU and NATO member-states to use the same military standards around the world. A situation could even require Europeans to
for all their equipment and procedures (the EU already uses most, pull troops out of NATO missions, such as the current
but not all, NATO standards). The two organisations should fully Afghanistan operation, which could have major implications for
co-ordinate their roles in helping the member-states improve their transatlantic relations.
25 See Tomas Valasek, ‘France,
military capabilities, and occasionally
NATO and European defence’, pool their resources into standby rapid- All this will require greater dialogue between the EU and NATO.
CER policy brief, May 2008.
reaction forces.25 They should also be Since his election in May 2007, President Sarkozy of France has
discussing strategy, so that they have a common understanding of dramatically changed the context of EU-NATO relations. This is
the day’s issues. because he unexpectedly announced in August 2007 that France
might return to NATO’s integrated military structure – from which
Unfortunately, EU-NATO co-operation is currently limited to joint General de Gaulle withdrew France in 1966.
operations – of which there is just one, in Bosnia – and military
capabilities. This is mainly because of a dispute between Turkey (in The change in French attitudes towards NATO has since been
NATO but not the EU) and Cyprus (in the EU but not NATO). As matched by a change in US views of EU defence. The US has
a result, Brussels’ two security organisations do not discuss many sometimes been hesitant about a military role for the EU, for fear
subjects, such as Afghanistan, Darfur and Iraq. Presently, there are that it would undermine NATO. But over time, it has accepted
a number of political obstacles to deeper co-operation, which is a that an effective EU defence policy is in the US interest. Victoria
shame, since they could do a lot of things to help each other. For Nuland, the US ambassador to NATO, told an audience in Paris
instance, Afghanistan needs more police, judges, engineers and that the Bush administration supported a strong EU defence
26
Daniel Keohane, ‘Unblocking development advisers – resources policy. She said: “I am here today in Paris to say that we agree
EU-NATO co-operation’, CER available to the EU but not to NATO with France – Europe needs, the United States needs, NATO
bulletin, June/July 2006. (although the EU has deployed 160 police needs, the democratic world needs – a stronger, more capable
to Afghanistan).26 European defence capacity. An ESDP 27 Ambassador Victoria Nuland,
with only soft power is not enough.”27 Speech to Press Club and
But there are other longer-term challenges facing the EU-NATO On the back of President Sarkozy’s AmCham, Paris,
proposals and the change in US attitudes, February 22 2008.
nd
relationship. Both the EU and NATO find it hard to get their
members to provide the military capabilities that they need. So the hope is that the EU and NATO can find more effective ways
they should ensure that if faced with future shortfalls they do not of working together in the future, given that many of their
compete to use the same equipment. The two organisations are agendas overlap.22 The EU, NATO and the US in 2020 23
EU-US co-operation
and NATO to find ways of complementing each other’s efforts
Another important factor will be the development of EU-US when their security agendas overlapped.
relations in the future, especially on security issues. For subjects
such as counter-terrorism, the EU-US framework makes more sense The shift of economic and political power 30
On current trends, in 2020, the
than EU-NATO (since the Atlantic alliance has no say over its from west to east means that the West may US, China and the EU will each
have a little under 20 per cent of
member-states’ laws or police co-operation). The EU, on the other look for ways to shore up its weakening
global GDP, while India will have
hand, does much in that domain. power vis-à-vis China, India and other almost 10 per cent and Japan
rising powers. 30 For many western about 5 per cent (Figures quoted
EU justice and interior ministers meet regularly to pass laws and countries, stronger European-US co- in Charles Grant with Katinka
to agree common policies for police and judicial co-operation (as operation is the most sensible answer, and Barysch, ‘Can Europe and China
do their foreign and defence counterparts for their policy areas). there is no shortage of proposals on how shape the new world order?’, CER
pamphlet, May 2008).
The EU is the only organisation in which European governments this co-operation should be organised. A
can collectively ‘join up’ the counter-terrorism parts of their law recent report written by five former allied 31 Gen Dr Klaus Naumann and
enforcement, border control, immigration, foreign and defence chiefs-of-staff proposes that the US, NATO others, ‘Towards a grand strategy
28
Daniel Keohane, ‘The EU and policies. 28 Furthermore, the US has and the EU establish a permanent co- for an uncertain world, renewing
counter-terrorism’, CER working signed agreements with the EU on ordinating body.31 The French academic, transatlantic partnership’,
paper, May 2005. Noaber Foundation, 2007,
sharing passenger data, screening François Heisbourg, has proposed that the http://www.csis.org/
shipping cargoes and procedures for extraditing terrorist suspects. EU and the US set up their own secretariat media/csis/events/080110_grand_
A nascent co-operation between the US Department of Homeland to co-ordinate the full range of policy areas strategy.pdf.
Security and the EU institutions is already in place. The EU and that concern the two sides, including trade
32 François Heisbourg, ‘The
the US should develop these types of foreign policy, border, justice and aid as well as international security.32
European security strategy is not a
and policing co-operation further. France’s former prime minister, Edouard security strategy’, A European way
Balladur, has even suggested that Europe of war, CER pamphlet, May 2004.
More generally, the EU and the US should at some point start and the US should form one union because
33
discussing global issues with each other. Charles Grant and Mark “history is starting to be made without the John Vinocur, ‘A Union of the
Leonard have pointed out that NATO is not the place where West, and perhaps one day it will be made West? Balladur says it's time’,
International Herald Tribune,
Europeans or Americans want to talk about big strategic questions. against it”.33 January 7th 2008.
None of the existing transatlantic institutions allows for high-level
strategic discussions on important subjects such as democracy in
29
Charles Grant and Mark the Middle East or the rise of China.29
Leonard, ‘What new transatlantic The close EU-US co-operation on the
institutions?’, CER bulletin, Iranian nuclear issue points to the way
April/May 2005.
forward: a deepening of the EU-US
strategic dialogue on security. This would help avoid transatlantic
misunderstandings on key questions of threats and responses. A
deepening of EU-US co-operation would also encourage the EU4 European military capabilities
Ultimately, the quality of the US-European relationship, and the
ability of EU countries to provide for their own defence, will depend
on Europe acquiring the right kind of weapons and expertise for
tomorrow’s conflicts.
How exactly wars will be fought in 2020 is not easy to predict.
Defence ministries will certainly employ new types of technology.
The Pentagon, for example, is developing laser weapons,
miniature robotics and hydrogen fuel cells that would power ships
and aircraft much more efficiently than diesel or petrol. Some
European governments lead the world in 34 The French, for example, have
certain technologies with potential conducted experiments with
transferring energy from satellite
military application.34 But on the whole, to satellite using laser beams.
European governments lack the resources This could help to keep military
to adopt the whole range of US satellites longer in orbit or to
technological ambitions. At the same make them more manoeuvrable.
time, Europe cannot afford to fall too far 35
‘Annual report to Congress:
behind the new developments lest it be Military power of the People’s
overtaken by today’s developing Republic of China’, US
countries. Advanced technologies are Department of Defence, 2008.
spreading around the globe. China for http://www.defenselink.mil/
instance, is building and deploying pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report
_08.pdf.
navigation and reconnaissance satellites
at a rate of 15 per year.35
In particular, satellites and information and communication
networks will become increasingly important. They are already
fully integrated into US military practice. Whereas coalition forces
used 21 satellites during the 1991 Gulf War, the number climbed to26 Willing and able? EU defence in 2020 European military capabilities 27
36 over 50 satellites for the 2003 Iraq war.36
All figures taken from Michael as the US.38 European governments should 38 NATO news, ‘NATO agrees
O’Hanlon, ‘Neither star wars While the Pentagon used less than 1,000 continue developing their own, more on missile defence way forward’,
precision-guided missiles in the 1999
nor sanctuary: Constraining the limited, missile defences, and find ways of NATO, June 14th 2007,
military uses of space’, Kosovo conflict, US forces launched over plugging them into the US system. And, as http://www.nato.int/docu/update/
Brookings Institution Press, 2007/06-june/e0614a.html.
5,000 such weapons in Afghanistan in discussed below, the EU may want to
2004.
2001, and over 6,000 in the 2003 Iraq consider building early-warning satellites, which provide crucial
war. European countries, too, are increasingly moving into information on launches of enemy missiles.
satellite-guided ammunition. Precision bombing protects the
soldier (because one needs to make fewer sorties into enemy
A programme for military reform
territory to destroy a target) and helps to protect civilians in
conflict zones (because militaries can hit targets with less damage European governments, with few exceptions, have been slow to
to surrounding areas). reform their armies. All EU member-states – some with more success
than others – are moving away from heavy, large forces built for the
Another crucial technological issue will be the use of unmanned defence of the home territory towards lighter, more mobile militaries
aerial vehicles (UAVs). Currently, armed forces mainly use these better suited for international deployments. Europe’s armies are also
pilotless aircraft to survey battlefields. But like any aircraft, the making better use of new technologies. But if Europe wishes to
UAVs can be configured for attack. The Americans are increasingly continue to fight alongside the Americans, or to conduct a wide
equipping their UAVs with missiles, and the UK has bought several range of missions alone, the reforms need to go much deeper.
such aircraft too. In the future, unmanned aircraft will to some European countries that have fallen behind the rest of the continent
extent replace manned fighter jets like the Eurofighter and Rafale, (like the new member-states of Central Europe) need to work
since UAVs allow air forces to strike equally precisely without especially hard to keep up with the continent’s leaders (like the
putting pilots at risk. Netherlands or the UK).
37 Anthony Seaboyer and Oliver The spread of missile technology could There are grounds for cautious optimism. The EU recognises
Thränert, ‘What missile transform the nature of future warfare. military reform as an absolute precondition for meeting its security
proliferation means for Europe’,Western intelligence services estimate that aims. Both the EU and NATO are urging their member-states
Survival, Summer 2006. Iran and North Korea will have inter- towards reform by issuing collective reform targets, and
continental missiles by 2020.37 The two countries could thus strike monitoring progress in meeting them. The process of military
at targets in Europe. A direct attack is not likely, although it remains reform in Europe continues, albeit at a tortuously slow pace. EU
a sobering possibility. But countries with long-range missiles will member-states have not met their initial ‘headline goal’ – a list of
probably try to deter EU governments from intervening in other military capabilities that EU governments agreed to acquire by
countries. If Europe wants to retain its relative freedom to carry out 2003, and on current trends they probably will not meet the
military operations abroad it should invest in some form of missile revised 2010 goal either.
defence. Most EU governments signed a NATO communiqué in
June 2007, which calls on the alliance to explore how American But with each new mission the EU launches, the task of military
missile defence bases in Europe could protect the continent as well reform becomes more evident. Europe’s military operations to dateYou can also read
