Turkey's soft power in the Balkans reaching its limits Ekrem Eddy GÜZELDERE Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow, Turkey Programme
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Turkey’s soft power in the Balkans reaching its limits
TURKEY PROGRAMME
Ekrem Eddy GÜZELDERE
Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow, Turkey Programme,
ELIAMEP
July 2021
Policy Paper #75/2021
ELIAMEP | Policy Paper #72/2021
Turkey’s soft power in the Balkans reaching its limits
Copyright © 2021 | All Rights Reserved
HELLENIC FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN & FOREIGN POLICY (ELIAMEP)
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ELIAMEP offers a forum for debate on international and European issues. Its non-partisan character supports the right to free and
well-documented discourse. ELIAMEP publications aim to contribute to scholarly knowledge and to provide policy relevant analyses. As such,
they solely represent the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Foundation.
Ekrem Eddy GÜZELDERE
Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow, Turkey Programme, ELIAMEP
• Turkey’s rising influence in the Balkans is directly linked to the stuck EU enlargement
Summary process, of which all Western Balkan countries are a part, but are currently placed by the
EU in an undefined waiting room.
• The architect of Turkey's Balkan approach was Ahmet Davutoğlu. Therefore 2016 was a
turning point, when Davutoğlu stepped down and foreign policy in the aftermath became
more Erdoğan-centred and economy driven.
• Erdogan’s personalized policy approach is not limited to Muslim politicians, but the
general rule of Turkey’s bilateral relations in the region.
• Islamic brotherhoods and sects, especially the Gülen movement, became active in the
Balkans long before the Turkish state institutions. Since 2004, state institutions like TIKA,
Yunus Emre and Diyanet have become pillars of Turkey's soft power approach.
• Since the failed coup attempt in July 2016, the fight against the Gülen movement and its
institutions in the Balkans have become a priority for Turkish diplomacy.
• Most Balkan governments resisted Turkish pressure to close-down Gülen-affiliated
institutions or extradite members of the sect. As a consequence, Turkey's intelligence
agency resorted in abducting Gülen members to Turkey.
• Economic relations, trade and investments increased with all Balkan countries, but from
a very low starting point.
• Because soft power activities and increased economic cooperation have not led to the
desired results, military and defense cooperation have gained prominence, as they would,
in the mid- and long-term, create economic dependencies, through which more political
pressure could be built.
• Turkey could help Balkan countries in the first wave of the pandemic with medical
equipment, but couldn’t help with vaccines, because it has not yet produced its own
vaccines. Therefore, Russia and China could better raise their profile, the EU’s stance was
interpreted as “vaccine nationalism” and contributed to the already bad image of the EU.
• The future orientation of the Balkans will be largely determined in Brussels and EU
capitals. A credible offer by the EU towards accession, would maybe decrease Turkey's
direct influence there, but could lead to a group of new EU members, which could serve
as Turkey’s allies within the bloc.Policy Paper #75/2021 p. 3
Turkey’s soft power in the Balkans reaching its limits
Introduction
Since the 1990s, Turkey has been rediscovering the Balkans, which were largely ignored
for the first seventy years of the Republic. This is in sharp contrast to the Ottoman Empire,
which was to a significant part (also) a Balkan empire. The Ottomans ruled over much of
what is now the Western Balkans for five centuries. a period, which left important traces
and the biggest local Muslim population in Europe. Relations have been intensifying,
especially under the reign of the AKP since 2002. For its first fourteen years in power, the
“Recent
developments over central person to shape Turkey’s foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoğlu, had a peculiar interest
the influence of in the Balkans, especially in the Muslim communities, and tried to install Turkey as a
third parties in the mediator, donor, big brother and cultural magnet. Despite the focus in recent years on
Balkans are developments in Syria and the broader Middle East, the Balkans still play an important
directly linked to role in Turkey’s new foreign policy of trying to become a regional power using a
the stuck EU
personalized foreign policy, soft power, economy and trade to gain more influence.
enlargement
process, of which However, Turkey needed to acknowledge that this approach has its limits, and the
all Western Balkan pandemic didn’t help in boosting Turkey’s image either, due to the lack of a Turkish
countries are a vaccination program. A lesson that Turkey seems to draw from this experience, which is
part.” similar to what happened in the Middle East, is that soft power is just not enough to
influence politics, as exemplified in the low response from Balkan leaders in terms of
closing down Gülen-affiliated institutions or extradite members of the organization. That
is why much more importance has been oriented towards an accelerated military and
defense sector cooperation, which aims at creating long-term dependencies of Balkan
countries, which then could be influenced more effectively.
Stuck EU enlargement process = opportunities for new players
“Western Balkan
leaders could, if Recent developments over the influence of third parties in the Balkans are directly linked
EU accession does to the stuck EU enlargement process, of which all Western Balkan countries are a part.
not speed up, turn,
for example, When Jean Claude Juncker declared on 15 July 2014 that the “EU needs to take a break
towards Turkey from enlargement”, it soon became evident that it would be a much longer break than the
and away from the initially proposed 5 years. Several factors during the past 15 years diverted the EU’s
EU.” attention from the Western Balkans, from the financial crisis (2008), to refugees (2015)
and recently Brexit and the East-Med. Bieber and Tzifakis therefore argue that “the West
has increasingly followed a hands-off approach towards the Western Balkans … it is the
Euro-Atlantic allies rather than the Western Balkans that have been drifting away from
their partnership” (Bieber/Tzifakis 2019: 9). For Alida Vračić this situation created a
“power vacuum” (Vračić 2016: 5), which several other players have been trying to fill,
Turkey being one of them. The other main competitors are Russia, China and the UAE.
For the Western Balkan leaders this means a “balancing act between EU accession … quick
and simple investments from China and the steady helping hands of Turkey and Russia”
(Hake/ Radzyner 2019: 13). Western Balkan leaders could, if EU accession does not speed
“If the EU were up, turn, for example, towards Turkey and away from the EU or, on the contrary, refrain
again more from giving the EU the impression that they are close to Turkey (ibid.: 13-14).
committed, making
accession in a mid- The EU has realized the possibility of the Balkans drifting away. In April 2018, French
term future president Macron said in the European Parliament: “I don’t want a Balkans that turns
credible, it would
be much harder for
toward Turkey or Russia, but I don’t want a Europe that, functioning with difficulty at 28
outside powers to and tomorrow as 27, would decide that we can continue to gallop off, to be tomorrow 30
increase their or 32, with the same rules.” This “but” in the sentence, however, lays out the EU’s
political clout.” dilemma. It wants the Balkan countries close, but it doesn’t want them joining the EU any
time soon. However, the status quo will play out in favor of other countries, TurkeyPolicy Paper #75/2021 p. 4
Turkey’s soft power in the Balkans reaching its limits
included, which don’t ask for democratic standards. If the EU were again more committed,
making accession in a mid-term future credible, it would be much harder for outside
powers to increase their political clout.
“Until the early
1990s, Turkey Turkey rediscovering former Ottoman Lands
didn’t show any
particular interest
Until the early 1990s, Turkey didn’t show any particular interest in the Balkans, not even
in the Balkans, not
even in the Muslim in the Muslim communities. This changed with the war in the former Yugoslavia, where
communities.” solidarity with Bosnian Muslims played an important role in raising awareness of the
historic bonds between Turkey and the Balkans (populations).
The converting of emotions into concrete policies happened in the early 2000s. The
architect of the AKP’s foreign policy from the beginning in the early 2000s until 2016 was
Ahmet Davutoğlu, who laid out his foreign policy vision in the book “Strategic Depth”,
published in 2001. Davutoğlu deals with the Balkans exclusively in two chapters, which
comprise roughly 35 pages. He stressed therein the importance and effective usage of
religion in relations between Turkey and Balkan countries. “The basis of Turkey’s political
influence in the Balkans is the Ottoman remnants, the Muslim communities. […] At first
Turkey’s natural allies are the two countries with Muslim majority [BiH and Albania]. The
“The converting of
emotions into
will to turn this common historic accumulation into a natural alliance has now emerged”
concrete policies (Davutoğlu 2001: 123). Without an active Balkan policy, Turkey would lose its influence to
happened in the Greece and Russia, who would use their Orthodox and Orthodox Slavic affinities
early 2000s.” respectively. Back then, neither China nor Gulf countries were a significant factor.1 The
importance of the Balkans for Turkey was, at the time, also reflected in its diplomatic
corps. During these years, as Öztürk and Akgönül argue, “some of the most active and
promising diplomats of the Turkish Foreign Ministry were employed at the Turkish
embassy in Serbia” (Öztürk/Akgönül 2020: 230).
“For Turkey’s
Balkan policy, 2016 For Turkey’s Balkan policy, 2016 was a turning point. Davutoğlu stepped down as prime
was a turning minister and, in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016, Turkey stepped
point. Davutoğlu up its efforts against the Gülen movement, which was/is especially present and strong in
stepped down as the Balkan countries.
prime minister
and, in the
aftermath of the
failed coup Personalized foreign policy
attempt of 15 July
2016, Turkey
With Davutoğlu leaving office, foreign policy became more Erdoğan-centred and
stepped up its
efforts against the economy-driven. Certainly this is also a consequence of the presidential system, in place
Gülen movement.” since the summer of 2018, which places the president at the centre of all decision making.
Personal ties to political leaders have replaced institutional links (see Aydıntaşbaş 2019:
14). Lami argued that “Erdoğan’s personal relations with Vucic [Serbia], Thaçi [Kosovo],
Bosnian leader Bakir Izetbegovic, and Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama form the
backbone of the newest phase of Turkey’s outreach in the Western Balkans”. The Muslim
politicians in particular make their affection for Erdoğan public and follow a strategy of a
“diplomacy of turning up”, as coined by Aydıntaşbaş. These leaders know that “Erdoğan
wants the respect that he feels he does not receive from EU leaders” (Aydıntaşbaş: 16).
When the new Istanbul airport was inaugurated in late 2018, no Western European
politicians were present, but the leaders of Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Bosnia and
1
For a discussion of Davutoğlu’s Balkan ideas and policies see Think tank Populari, A Political Romance: Relations between Turkey
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, May 2014, http://populari.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/politicka_romansa_turska_bih_EN.pdf, pages 21-24 in particular.Policy Paper #75/2021 p. 5
Turkey’s soft power in the Balkans reaching its limits
Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Serbia were. Whereas many Western political leaders and
“With Davutoğlu media have criticized Turkey’s authoritarian tendencies, these are not openly objected by
leaving office, Western Balkan leaders.
foreign policy
became more
Erdoğan-centred However, this personalized policy approach is not limited to the Muslim politicians. As
and economy- Rasidagic and Hesova point out, “Erdoğan’s diplomatic activity has been most successful
driven.” where least expected – in Serbia, a country long considered to have a highly negative view
of Turkey – because the Prime Minister and then President of Turkey has strategically
pursued personal relationships with every Serbian president since 2010.”
(Rašidagić/Hesova 2020: 104). Besides economic pragmatism, both countries pursue a
foreign policy that is as independent as possible, with broad-based relations to reduce
dependencies. This policy practiced in both countries can be an additional driver of this
unusual rapprochement.
“The Muslim
politicians in
particular make
their affection for Soft power and its limits
Erdoğan public and
follow a strategy Soft power played an important role in Davutoğlu’s strategy of intensifying relations. For
of a “diplomacy of Rašidagić/Hesova, Turkey focused its soft power strategy especially on Balkan Muslims
turning up”.” and on four main areas: religious institutions, Islamic history, education, and media and
popular culture (see ibid.: 105).
However, Islamic brotherhoods and sects became active in the Balkans long before the
state and its institutions became a major player in that field. The Gülen movement had
the greatest presence, already beginning to operate foundations, schools, dormitories in
“Erdoğan’s the 1990s and later also universities. The schools were a magnet for the local Muslim elites
diplomatic activity
in particular and many leading politicians sent their children to one of these schools. The
has been most
successful where Turkish Islamic brotherhoods presented their religious understanding and traditions as
least expected – in somewhat similar and in harmony with local traditions, in contrast to other Muslim players
Serbia, a country like Saudi Arabia with a different tradition.
long considered to
have a highly The state only started actively using its “religious diplomacy” some 10 years later. Since
negative view of 2004, TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency) has become an important soft
Turkey.”
power tool in the Western Balkans, financing the restoration of mainly religious Islamic
buildings, giving Turkey’s efforts to preserve the Muslim heritage an unprecedented
visibility. In 2007, the cultural Yunus Emre Institute, offering Turkish classes for foreigners,
was founded and quickly set up branches in the Balkans. However, so far, Turkish language
classes have remained poorly attended (Aydıntaşbaş 2019: 18).
“Islamic
Until 2009, the Diyanet had a very limited influence on and role in the selection of
brotherhoods and
sects became scholarships for studies in Turkey. In 2009, the Diyanet was developed into “a centre of
active in the religious power and was made directly responsible to the prime minister” (Öktem 2012:
Balkans long 31). The Diyanet and its Foundation have further intensified their activities since 2012, but
before the state “only in North Macedonia and Albania Diyanet has [it] been represented on a consultancy
and its institutions level since the beginning of 2000s” (Öztürk/Akgönül 2020: 228). Alongside these state
became a major
efforts, the AKP also engaged businesses close to the party in private educational
player in that
field.” entrepreneurship, resulting in the establishment of the International University of
Sarajevo in 2004 and the International Balkan University in Skopje in 2006.Policy Paper #75/2021 p. 6
Turkey’s soft power in the Balkans reaching its limits
Fight against Gülen since 2016 a priority
“Turkish diplomats
confirm that
government When the relations between the AKP and the Gülen movement turned sour in Turkey
directives instruct around 2011 and a war over power and influence started, this confrontation was quickly
them to prioritise also exported abroad. However, only after the failed coup attempt, as Aydıntaşbaş wrote,
the pursuit of “Turkish diplomats confirm that government directives instruct them to prioritise the
Gülenists in pursuit of Gülenists in Western Balkans countries” (Aydıntaşbaş 2019: 9).
Western Balkans
countries.”
However, this fight had only limited success. Even if President Erdoğan argued that the
Gülenists should be considered a terrorist organization, “the head of Islamic scholars, ra’is
al-ulame, Husein Kavazovic, the Grand Mufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina, declared that the
Gülenist organizations should not be seen as a real threat, since the Gülenist schools in
Bosnia operate under local laws” (Öztürk/Akgönül 2020: 235).
This confrontation also affected the relations on the ground with local Islamic
communities, because according to Öztürk and Gözaydın, “Diyanet began to categorize
“Since the Balkan the Islamic groups in the Western Balkans as either pro-Turkish state or pro-Gülenist”
governments (Öztürk and Gözaydın, 2018). Those placed in the latter camp, such as the Muslim
didn’t cooperate as Community of Albania, had their financial support cut.
Turkey wished,
especially
concerning the
extradition of Secret Service “kidnapping” Gülenists
Gülenists, Turkey’s
intelligence agency Since the Balkan governments didn’t cooperate as Turkey wished, especially concerning
MIT intensified its
the extradition of Gülenists, Turkey’s intelligence agency MIT intensified its efforts to
efforts to forcibly
return Turkish forcibly return Turkish citizens to Turkey. In the Balkans, the most debated case was in
citizens to Kosovo, where in March 2018 six Gülenists were taken to Turkey without the knowledge
Turkey.” of then prime minister Haradinaj, who afterwards dismissed the interior minister and
intelligence leadership. Relatives of the men described the deportation as a “kidnapping.”
As Colborne and Edwards argue, “Turkey may not be a friend the Balkan state can afford
to lose. Alongside being a strong advocate for its international recognition and eventual
accession to the European Union and NATO, Turkey also has considerable economic clout
there.” It therefore seems as if the reaction in Kosovo and other Balkan states is to
“punish” those directly involved, but without endangering the good bilateral relations.
“…the reaction in International diplomatic support, trade and investments outweigh rule of law principles.
Kosovo and other Globally, kidnapping Gülenists has become a widely used method. The Turkish justice
Balkan states is to minister said in 2019 that 107 alleged Gülenists had been brought back to Turkey from
“punish” those
abroad. This practice poses a dilemma for the Balkan governments participating in the EU
directly involved,
but without membership negotiation process; either bow to Turkey in contravention of the law,
endangering the because both for the closure of legally operating schools and the extradition of foreign
good bilateral citizens there is no locally acknowledged “crime”, or resist the pressure and thus
relations. antagonize Ankara. Notably, unlike in many Central Asian and African states, most Balkan
International governments have resisted Erdoğan’s pressure. This is a big disappointment for Turkey,
diplomatic
especially from allies with very close personal bonds. Concerning the extraditions, Nate
support, trade and
investments Schenkkan, Director of Research Strategy at Freedom House, argued that “the message is
outweigh rule of that Turkey makes its own rules and will carve out its own space according to its own
law principles.” preferences no matter what international norms or laws might say — just like the great
powers do.”
Since the main field of activity of the Gülen movement was its schools, Turkey is promoting
the schools of the Maarif Foundation to take over the Gülen schools abroad.2 Currently
2
In 2018 Turkey’s supreme court ratified a decision to transfer all Gülen-linked schools in Turkey to Maarif.Policy Paper #75/2021 p. 7
Turkey’s soft power in the Balkans reaching its limits
these number 340. However, the lion’s share of these schools are in Pakistan (77) and
“…unlike in many Afghanistan (46), followed by Mali with 21. In the Balkans there are 6 schools in Albania,
Central Asian and 4 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 8 in Kosovo, 5 in North Macedonia, 3 in Hungary, and 7 in
African states,
most Balkan
Romania. Recently, the budget of the Maarif Foundation was significantly increased by
governments have presidential decree. Its annual budget is now 1.23 billion lira, or about 140 million euros.
resisted Erdoğan’s This money will come from the general budget of the Education Ministry.
pressure.”
As in other parts of the world, Turkish soap operas became popular throughout the
Balkans.3 Vračić counted that in BiH there were “2,235 minutes of programming on only
one TV channel a week (which is exactly a day and a half every week of soap operas)”
(Vračić 2016: 14). For Vračić the soap operas helped to improve the image of Turkey and
the Turks, showing modern, hard-working, urban people.
“Since the main
field of activity of
Economy = Pragmatism
the Gülen
movement was its Even if the Western Balkan states are not particularly interesting from an economic
schools, Turkey is perspective, with small populations and a low purchasing power, they have become a
promoting the playing field for regional and global economic power houses. For some, the proximity to
schools of the the EU is attractive, for others it is a transit for their raw materials or goods. Among these
Maarif Foundation
to take over the
third players, Turkey has the clear “advantage of geographical proximity, which allows for
Gülen schools a reduction in transportation costs, as well as an existing similarity in consumption habits”
abroad.” (Hake/Radzyner 2019: 6).
Contrary to the soft power efforts by Turkey, the economic relations follow “no clear
cultural logic but are instead highly pragmatic” (Rašidagić/Hesova 2020: 114). Turkey has
signed free trade agreements with all Western Balkan countries. Economic pragmatism
“Contrary to the means that the main economic partners are not the Muslim majority states, but the EU
soft power efforts members Romania, Greece and Bulgaria, which account for more than 80 percent of
by Turkey, the Turkish investment in the Balkans. This certainly also relates to the fact that these
economic relations countries are the most developed economies and the biggest markets. Among the non-EU
follow “no clear states, there are three main Turkish success stories in economic terms: Albania, Kosovo
cultural logic but and Serbia, the latter being its largest trading partner in the Western Balkans since 2019.
are instead highly
pragmatic”.”
But this also means that in the other countries, Turkey is not (yet) a major trading partner.
In BiH, which is the main recipient of “cultural investment” through TIKA, Turkey in 2020
only ranked sixth among trading partners.
Bilateral trade volume increased, but from a very low starting point
“Economic
pragmatism means Overall trade has developed quickly, but from a very low starting point when the AKP took
that the main office. In 2002, trade between the Western Balkans and Turkey stood at about 435 million
economic partners dollars; by 2016 this rose to 3 billion dollars and in the first nine months of 2019, this
are not the Muslim
jumped to almost 10 billion USD. According to numbers of the Exporters Assembly (TIM),
majority states.”
in the first 10 months of 2020, 10.2 billion dollars in exports were realized to Albania, BiH,
Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Greece. In 2019
this number was slightly more than 11 billion. The decline of 7.5 percent, according to TIM,
was due to the pandemic. However, to two countries, Serbia and Kosovo, the exports even
3
Long article about the businessman behind the export of Turkish soap operas: Benny Ziffer, The Jewish Businessman Wielding
Turkey’s Soft Power on the World's TV Screens, 31 March 2021, Haaretz, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-
news/.premium.MAGAZINE-the-jewish-businessman-wielding-turkey-s-soft-power-on-the-world-s-tv-screens-1.9670248Policy Paper #75/2021 p. 8
Turkey’s soft power in the Balkans reaching its limits
increased during the pandemic, to Serbia by more than 5 percent to almost 800 million
USD.
“Overall trade has
developed quickly,
but from a very
low starting point
when the AKP took
office.”
“The difference
with the non-EU
economic In October 2020 the European Commission presented “An Economic and Investment Plan
competitors is that
the EU attaches to for the Western Balkans”, offering “to spur a long term recovery – backed by a green and
it a strong digital transition.” The Commission proposed mobilising up to 9 billion Euros of IPA III
conditionality.” funding for the period 2021-2027 to support economic convergence with the EU. The
difference with the non-EU economic competitors is that the EU attaches to it a strong
conditionality, e.g. requiring a “strong commitment from the Western Balkans to
implementing fundamental reforms” (page 2). Or, “boosting investment and economic
growth will therefore only be possible if the Western Balkans firmly commit to and
implement fundamental reforms in line with European values (page 4). That is, in a
nutshell, the big difference with Turkey, China and Russia. If the Balkan countries esteem
that what they could get from the EU is not worth the effort, then the weight of the
authoritarian players will increase. Even then, their economic share will be small
“If the Balkan compared to the EU-27, as seen in the table, but these heightened economic relations
countries esteem
could lead also to more political cooperation and long-term dependencies. Something the
that what they
could get from the EU should try to avoid.
EU is not worth the
effort, then the
weight of the Military cooperation to create dependency: from soft to hard(er)
authoritarian
players will power
increase.”
The soft power activities and increased economic cooperation have not led to the desired
results. This is another parallel to the Middle East, where in the early 2000s Turkey
invested a lot in soft power, but saw its limits during the Arab Spring. Even with excellent
personal relations with the political leadership, with increased economic relations, with
cultural centres and restorations, language courses and half the population watching
Turkish series, the leverage on political decisions remains very limited. For this reason,
very recently, military and defense cooperation have gained prominence, as they would,
in the mid- and long-term, create economic dependencies, through which more political
pressure could be built.Policy Paper #75/2021 p. 9
Turkey’s soft power in the Balkans reaching its limits
“The soft power In an article in late 2020, BIRN wrote that in 2019, “Turkey recorded a 34.6 per cent
activities and increase in military exports to $2.74 billion. The country has set itself a target of $10 billion
increased economic by 2023.” For military experts, Turkey has two advantages. It is not reluctant to share its
cooperation have
not led to the
technology and its products, e.g. drones are relatively cheap and therefore more
desired results.” affordable for the less wealthy Balkan countries. These arms sales would complete the
training of soldiers from Balkan countries, which has been ongoing since the 1990s and is
especially developed with Albania and BiH. “Turkey has new ambitions in the Balkans for
improving its defence cooperation … Ankara wants to sell new weapons and sign several
agreements with the countries in the region to create a dependency on its products.”
“For military
experts, Turkey The pandemic constituted a solidarity test, which the EU lost (so far)
has two
advantages. It is
The pandemic hit the Balkans hard. The local health systems were ill-prepared to confront
not reluctant to
share its such a crisis, with a lack of specialized medical workers and equipment. Since domestically
technology and its it was impossible to produce the needed medical equipment, Balkan countries looked for
products, e.g. help abroad, “Yet at this crucial juncture, the EU limited its exports of medical equipment
drones are outside of the bloc.” This was certainly due to the fact that this equipment was also scarce
relatively cheap.” in the EU, but it left a sour taste with local political leaders, as Serbia’s President Vucic said
on 15 March 2020, when declaring a state of emergency: “European solidarity does not
exist. That was a fairy-tale on paper. I have sent a special letter to the only ones who can
help, and that is China.” And it was not only China which was ready to jump; in the early
phase of the pandemic Russian, Hungarian, UAE and Turkish planes also arrived at airports
throughout the Balkans, often welcomed with special ceremonies and well-covered in the
local press. For Büyük “aid-sending countries aim to gain increased public support by
playing to a nationalist and imperial discourse that rests on the argument that they were
“The pandemic hit
powerful enough to help where the EU wasn’t.” Later the EU also sent aid, but this help
the Balkans hard.
The local health was much less appreciated and less celebrated than the other donations.
systems were ill-
prepared to In the first wave of the pandemic, Turkey was quick to help out. Already on 11 March 2020,
confront such a the first medical aid was sent to Bulgaria. In April and May medical supplies were sent to
crisis, with a lack Albania, Serbia, BiH, Montenegro, Kosovo and North Macedonia.
of specialized
medical workers
and equipment.”
With vaccination starting in late 2020 things changed, because the number of countries
that can produce and send vaccines is much more limited than in relation to medical
equipment. Whereas the EU’s position was interpreted as “vaccine nationalism”, China
and Russia practiced “vaccine diplomacy.” Serbia, in particular, was willing to cooperate
with anyone able to deliver vaccines, which resulted in vaccines from the EU, China and
Russia. Russian and Chinese companies have also been more willing than their Western
counterparts to strike licensing deals to partly or fully produce Covid-19 vaccines
“Serbia’s President
Vucic said: themselves. This, then, is not only short term aid: “If you're becoming a manufacturer of
“European a Chinese or Russian vaccine, that's a long term partnership.” In February 2021, Serbia was
solidarity does not given preliminary approval to start manufacturing the Sputnik V vaccine as well, and has
exist. That was a said production will begin in mid-May.
fairy-tale on
paper.”
According to Dimitar Bechev, “for China, it’s a golden opportunity to embarrass the EU
and the West more broadly.” For the Balkans, China is also the best option to tease the
EU, as Vuksanovic from the Belgrade Center for Security Policy explained: “It is also a way
to provoke and leverage the EU to do more. The China factor is an important way to extract
as much as you can from Beijing, but also to potentially motivate the Europeans to do
more.”Policy Paper #75/2021 p. 10
Turkey’s soft power in the Balkans reaching its limits
This has not happened so far. For Kristof Bender, Balkan expert at the European Stability
Initiative, the EU’s standing in the Balkans has suffered a further blow:
“Whereas the EU’s
position was
interpreted as “Including the Western Balkans in the EU vaccine rollout would
‘vaccine have been a strong signal that the EU cares. The EU’s own
nationalism’,
China and Russia troubles in purchasing vaccines made this impossible. In the
practiced ‘vaccine meantime, Serbia has purchased vaccines from Russia and
diplomacy’.” China, and now boasts the highest vaccination rate in
continental Europe. While every vaccination is good and helps
saving lives, the fact that the EU could provide practically no help
so far is a clear defeat for the EU. Its credibility and leverage in
the region, already low due to the stalled EU accession process,
has taken a further serious blow.”4
However, Turkey is not the main profiteer, as Alida Vračić argues:
“The pandemic has certainly put Turkey in the backseat in
“According to comparison with Russia and China, which offered free
Dimitar Bechev: vaccination that has been organized in Belgrade. Turkey has
“for China, it’s a
golden opportunity been much less present.”5
to embarrass the
EU and the West
more broadly.” On 20 April, the EU announced that the six non-EU Balkans countries will receive 651,000
vaccine doses between May and August. Austria’s foreign minister Schallenberg, who will
coordinate the EU vaccines, commented that “As the European Union, we are sending out
a clear signal that we are not just navel-gazing, that we are looking beyond the horizon,
and that it is quite clear to us that we ourselves will only be safe when our closest
neighbors are safe as well.” If that's not too late and too little to improve the tattered
image.
Turkish vaccines on the way, but probably too late for the Balkans
“Turkey could use Turkey is in the backseat as it cannot offer its own vaccine diplomacy because it hasn’t yet
these national developed its own vaccine and started the process late. In mid-March 2021 there were 7
vaccines for Turkish vaccination programs (and 10 drug programs). The most advanced one, led by
African and/or Kayseri’s Erciyes University, started phase 1 in November 2020 and phase 2 in February
Asian countries 2021, which ended on 9 April. At the end of April, the third phase began. But this also
which have not yet
started their
means that, at the earliest, the vaccine might reach the market in fall 2021, since the
vaccination fastest production so far lasted 11 months. By then, there could be more than 50 vaccines
programs.” on the marked (currently 4), since in March 2021, there were 21 in phase 3 and 28 in phase
2. Without giving details on the how, a team at the TÜBİTAK Marmara Research Centre
states that it will have a vaccine on the market by June, even if the first phase was only
planned to begin in March. Therefore this might be too late to have a big impact in the
Western Balkans, with the EU also stepping in at a certain point when there will be an
abundance of vaccines. However, Turkey could use these national vaccines for African
and/or Asian countries which have not yet started their vaccination programs.
4
E-mail answer to the author on 7 April 2021.
5
E-mail answer to the author on 11 April 2021.Policy Paper #75/2021 p. 11
Turkey’s soft power in the Balkans reaching its limits
Conclusion
“The lesson Turkey
learnt from twenty
years of intensive Over the past two decades Turkey’s influence in the Balkans has increased on all fronts,
engagement is that from politics to the economy, culture to military cooperation. However, more influence
soft power has its doesn’t mean it is a dominant player. With few exceptions, Turkey’s economic standing,
limits.” its influence on decision makers and cultural attractiveness, remain small. The pandemic
has not helped Turkey to improve its standing. While the EU was late to help both with
medical equipment and vaccines, the real profiteers were China and Russia, which
“The future managed to send their vaccines to the Balkans, while Turkey was too late in the production
orientation of the of its own vaccines. The lesson Turkey learnt from twenty years of intensive engagement
non-EU Balkan is that soft power has its limits. Therefore, it is to be expected that policies creating mid-
countries will and long-term dependencies will continue, such as the defense cooperation already
depend on third initiated.
players, which
disappointed the
accession countries The future orientation of the non-EU Balkan countries will depend on third players like
by placing them in China, Russia and Turkey, but much more on the EU, which disappointed the accession
an undefined countries by placing them in an undefined waiting room. A credible offer by the EU would
waiting room.” not only realign the Balkans closer to the EU and its standards, but also serve Turkey’s
long-term goal of having more allies, or at least non-hostile countries, within the EU.
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