Trends 2022 CEE amid the war in Ukraine
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GLOBSEC
Trends
2022
CEE amid
the war
in Ukraine www.globsec.org
1“GLOBSEC Trends
show us what people think,
highlight the differences
between countries, and
provide the context of how
the data evolve over time. But
most importantly, they raise
awareness and help us defend
our democratic information
space.”
Ivan Korčok,
Minister of Foreign and European Affairs
of the Slovak Republic
GLOBSEC Trends 2022Countries
surveyed Contents
GLOBSEC Trends 2022 CEE amid the war in Ukraine
“The 2022
Executive GLOBSEC Trends report
offers a timely and interesting
summary
Estonia
snapshot of Central and Eastern
Europeans’ perceptions on key
& key findings issues pertaining to foreign,
Latvia defence and security policy.
9 Country highlights As such, it is a useful reference
12 How to proceed? for scholars and policy-makers
alike.”
Lithuania
Benedetta Berti-Alberti, Head, Policy Planning,
Office of the Secretary General,
Geopolitics
NATO
Poland
14 East-West
20
26
European Union
NATO
Democracy
Czechia 32 Strategic partners
Slovakia & leaders 72 Satisfaction with the
governance system
78 Support for democracy
War in 82 Conspiracy theories
& polarising narratives
Ukraine
Romania
Hungary
86 Media trust
For full
credits and
53 Who is responsible? Authors
methodology
please see
page 90.
56 Perceptions Dominika Hajdu, Policy Director
of Ukraine Jana Kazaz, Research Fellow
Bulgaria Katarína Klingová, Senior Research Fellow
59 Image of Russia Michal Kortiš, Junior Research Fellow
and Vladimir Putin
Centre for Democracy & Resilience
64 International response GLOBSEC
GLOBSEC Trends 2022 5Executive consider
Russia to
summary be the
aggressor
Russia is now considered a threat to national
security by a majority in the region – underscoring
a major shift from prior reports. The favourability
ratings of Vladimir Putin similarly have declined to
record lows.
The invasion of Ukraine, including its
Key
unsettling brutality, has served as a
reminder to Europe that peace is a rather
fragile affair. The developments have been
findings feel part
particularly disconcerting for Central and
Eastern European countries that previously
experienced both Russian occupation and
of the West
aggression. The conflict, however, has also
strengthened solidarity in the region and
elicited a sense of relief that the countries
Central
are no longer “stuck” between different
spheres of influence. The polling data
for this report, which was collected amid EU and NATO backing has increased slightly over
and Eastern
Russia’s ongoing atrocities in Ukraine, the past year - 4 in 5 CEE respondents now want
measured robust and rising support to be part of Western structures and perceive
for the West and the Western model of them as guarantors of security and territorial
Europeans
governance. CEE societies broadly identify integrity.
Russia as the aggressor and a threat to the
approve
security of both the region and the world.
While a majority in the region are able
see the of president
to distinguish between right and wrong,
there are some alarming gaps. This is
particularly true in countries that have
US as more Volodymyr
seen pervasive (pro-)Kremlin propaganda
go unchallenged for years. The distorted
view of certain segments of populations
important Zelensky
towards events in Ukraine, combined with
potential economic hardship ahead, could
leave these vulnerable groups as potential
targets for populist and autocratic leaders.
Cynical political figures, in this vein, may
seek to exploit fear and frustration for their The perception that the US is a strategic partner Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky,
own political benefit. has soared by 10 percentage points since 2021 - perceived favourably by 2/3 of the region’s
Washington is now viewed as a key ally in NATO population, is four times more popular than
As the matters in Europe are becoming by 3/4 of respondents in the CEE region. Vladimir Putin.
rather “black and white”, so is this report.
While there are nuances and differences
across countries, these are our key findings.
6 Executive summary GLOBSEC Trends 2022 7lack
Country highlights
Bulgaria Czechia Hungary
awareness Support for staying in the EU Respondents in Hungary are
of China
in Czechia has increased by the least supportive of Ukraine’s
Least 13 percentage points over the efforts to join the EU and NATO
pro-Western past year and now stands at
80%.
from the region. Only 23% back
Ukraine joining either or both
country organisations while 63% would
prefer that Ukraine becomes a
in the region
Most CEE societies demonstrate minimal
awareness concerning possible threats coming neutral country.
from China. In five countries, a fifth of the
population could not indicate whether the Russia is perceived as a
Chinese regime could be a source of inspiration security threat by 45% in
for their country or not. Hungary. Perceptions that
disagree
Russia is a strategic partner,
meanwhile, were unaffected by
the war - around 35% identify
over
Russia as a strategic partner,
are more
the same figure as in 2021.
Ukraine’s
1/5 of respondents sees
satisfied
China as a strategic partner
of Hungary and perceive Xi
integration
Jinping positively. Yet 48% of
From
with
Hungarians had never heard
Eurosceptics of him or were unsure how to
respond to the question.
to Eurofans
democracy
Bulgaria exhibits the least Euro-
CEE countries are split over whether Ukraine Atlantic orientation among
should become part of the EU and/or NATO or surveyed countries. It is the
remain neutral. only country where support Minor
changes
for leaving the Alliance has Czechs also remain
Satisfaction with how democracy works, slightly increased over the past year enthusiastic about their
increased everywhere except Romania. Openness
to autocratic leaders, however, remains strong.
(38% now wish to exit NATO). relations with Germany - 74%
perceive Berlin as a strategic
in attitudes
prefer
Despite the invasion of Ukraine, partner, while Czechia is the
57% of Bulgarians still do not only country in the region
consider Russia to be a security where Olaf Scholz is viewed
economic
threat to the country and 30% favourably by a majority.
believe
consider Russia to be the most
important strategic partner. Awareness of Chinese
over military conspiracy
influence is strong in Czechia.
Emmanuel Macron stands 50% of Czechs perceive China
out as the only world leader as a security threat, the highest
response
viewed favourably, at nearly number in the region.
theories
60% approval, by a majority of
Bulgarians. 68% of respondents are Satisfaction with democracy,
satisfied with how democracy since 2020, has increased by
Bulgarians also remain works in their country, a 9 percentage points to reach
While there is broad support for sanctions vulnerable to conspiracy 21-percentage point increase 54%. This comes despite the
and efforts to decrease the region’s energy Key conspiracy theories that undermine trust in theories – 54% of respondents, since 2020. Czechia is further decline in the quality of the
dependence on Russia, a majority also oppose democratic governance still resonate, finding on average, believed three one of three surveyed countries country’s democracy according
sending NATO troops to Ukraine. support from around 30-50% of CEE respondents. conspiracy narratives where a majority (58%) trusts to numerous international
concerning democracy. the media. indexes.
8 Executive summary GLOBSEC Trends 2022 9Country highlights
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia
Estonia boasts one of the Lithuanians are clear on the Polish respondents Romania is the only country Slovak support for NATO saw a
highest levels of satisfaction geopolitical orientation of their measured up as the most in the region where backing modest 9% percentage point
with democracy in the Trust country - 57% would prefer ardent supporters of NATO for a Western geopolitical uptick to 72%. While more than
in NATO
region, reaching two thirds their country to align with the membership in the region, with orientation decreased - 70% espouse backing for both
of the population. This is also West and 88% support EU and 95% keen towards staying. from 43% to 27% over the NATO and the EU, 51% still
reflected in relatively high NATO membership. These past year. 12% were unsure believe that geopolitically their
levels of trust towards the figures put them among the how the country should be country belongs “somewhere
country’s armed forces (76%), top in the region. geopolitically positioned. in-between” the East and the
president (72%) and media West.
(52%). Awareness concerning Russian
aggression is also robust in the Although Russia is perceived as
country – 83% consider Russia Moving a threat by 62% of respondents,
to the East
to be a threat to their security 37% still see the country as one
Satisfied with and 89% perceive Vladimir of the most important strategic
democracy
Putin unfavourably. partners of Slovakia.
The public also holds rather Slovakia remains among the
sceptical views towards China. most vulnerable countries
43% believe that China poses a to conspiracy theories in the
security threat to their country region, with 54% subscribing to
and 46% consider Taiwan to various conspiracy theories.
be independent. Many are
NATO enjoys widespread still undecided, however, More of
trust in Latvia. Support for
membership increased from
concerning whether China
poses a threat to the security the US, less
72% to 79% over the past year
and 79% also believe that NATO
of their country (22%) or their
values and identity (28%).
of Germany
membership reduces the risk An alarming 22% of
that a foreign nation will attack respondents believe that Russia
them. The US also cemented its had the right to invade Ukraine
Despite strong awareness status as the most important and 26% think that the West
of Russia’s threats, only 24% Negative perceptions of Xi strategic partner for Poles - was responsible for the war by
perceive China as a security Jinping increased from 19% 73% see Washington this way, a provoking Russia.
threat to their country, with a year ago to 31% today. But 19 percentage points increase
22% unsure. 38% were unsure whether since 2021. Meanwhile, the Romania is also the only
Taiwan should be considered relative importance of Germany surveyed country where
This ambivalence came
through on a range of topics:
an independent country, part of
China or a disputed territory.
in the eyes of the public
plummeted from 48% in 2021
satisfaction with democracy
decreased (from 30% to 23%). Vulnerable
25% do not know if liberal to 27% in 2022. Openness to an authoritarian
and
Strong threatened
democracy threatens their Satisfaction with how leader, at 60%, also remains
values and identity, 15% do democracy works has Poles also indicate the greatest highest in the region.
not know if their country
geopolitically belongs to the
increased by 22 percentage
points since 2020 to 58% today position willingness in the region to
support Ukraine, with 88% As far as security threats are
East or West and 11% declined
to say whether the country
and is the second highest in
the region. Preferences for an
on China backing further sanctions
against Russia even at the price
concerned, Romanians give the
benefit of the doubt to Beijing, The Slovak public continues to
should stay or leave the EU. autocratic leader, meanwhile, of higher cost of products. with 73% not recognising see threats all around them. An
declined from 54% to 35%. China as a security threat to average of 48% of respondents
On the other hand, they were Lithuania also marked the Distrust towards the standard their country. This represents a consider the US, Western
more unequivocal regarding Latvia ranks as one of only highest increase in support media in Poland ranks among 37-percentage point increase societies, liberal democracy
Ukraine’s future – 56% would three countries in the region for democracy as a system of the highest in the region, with compared to 2020 - 51% “did and/or migrants to be threats
welcome Ukraine in the EU and/ where more people trust the government over the past year only 34% of Poles declaring not know” or were undecided to their security and/or values
or NATO. media than distrust it. – from 70% to 79%. trust in them. at that time. and identity.
10 Country highlights GLOBSEC Trends 2022 11How to 2Address
social policy
5Step up fight
against Russian
8Learn from
your mistakes
proceed concerns propaganda Having permitted the Russian malign influence
to flourish without appropriate counter measures
now?
Soaring inflation across Europe must be Most EU states, amid the conflict, have adopted for years, Europe must now do better with
addressed to sustain support for sanctions. measures to combat Russian information China. Intensive strategic communication, the
Social policies should complement sanctions and operations. But the effectiveness of these delineation of red lines on critical infrastructure,
efforts to build resilience towards foreign malign actions must be constantly re-evaluated and the and open communication on Chinese influence
influence, including cynical efforts aimed at measures adjusted accordingly in a context where in the region and human rights violations in China
exploiting Europe’s energy dependence. buy-in to the Kremlin’s narratives is rampant are all integral.
throughout significant subsets of the population.
There is a further need to experiment with novel
more systematic and offensive measures. These
Do not allow Use strategic
steps should include additional EU-wide actions
1 9
Keep up strong
and support of independent journalism in the CEE
support for 3
communication
region and Russia.
Ukraine to fade and united EU as the first line of
away The rising support of the CEE region for EU 6Promote more defence
accurate image
membership is a response, to some extent, to
the bloc’s unity and action vis-à-vis Russian
of Russia
While a majority of respondents now espouse aggression. The EU should use its renewed status Malign domestic and foreign actors are filling
broad support for Ukraine, it is paramount that as a normative power to pursue a more principled, the void left by communication shortcomings of
societies not forget the lessons learned and revert tougher stance towards democratic backsliding, both national public institutions and international
to prior beliefs. It is important, therefore, that both inside and outside of its borders, alongside organisations such as the EU and NATO. The
intensive communication efforts about the war, assertive strategic communication. In countries with traditionally stronger pro- effective strategic communication of public
including its causes and consequences, continue Russian sentiment, the current shift in perceptions institutions will require an increase in both
until the conflict reaches a final resolution. regarding Russia should be utilised to rid certain personal and technical capabilities as a first step.
segments of the population of their romantic and Success will also be contingent on societies
nostalgic feelings towards Russia, the beliefs that becoming better informed and resilient.
4Leverage had previously benefitted Russian narratives in
public discussions. Russia’s actions and internal
popularity issues should be depicted in a more accurate
manner.
of NATO 10Keep investing
in critical
NATO should leverage its improved image
in the region to engage in more intensive Do not lose
7
thinking
communication with citizens of CEE member
states, especially those who professed lower CEE, Germany Despite public opinion shifts, the acceptance of
pro-NATO sentiment in the past. The presence
of NATO soldiers on the ground and military disinformation and conspiracy theories remains
German leadership needs to take a more decisive high. Invest into critical thinking and digital
cooperation could both revive discussions
and assertive stance through both its rhetoric skills across all age groups and, as well as into
concerning security and the value of NATO in
and actions to resume its role as one of the EU’s debunking and pre-bunking activities throughout
promoting peace and prosperity. Peer-to-peer
leaders. This approach would also enhance society. For that to happen, in many countries,
stories can particularly humanise the Alliance and
the recognition and favourability of German education needs to undergo reform.
underline the value of membership.
Chancellor Olaf Scholz who is still rather unknown
in the region.
12 Recommendations GLOBSEC Trends 2022 13East
44%
in CEE want to
be part of the
-West
West.
Re-evaluation
of strategic
partners
in progress
The notion that Central and Eastern Europe stands
as a “bridge” between East and West has long been
a prevailing identity trope in the region. The war
in Ukraine, however, has compelled societies to
re-evaluate their strategic partners and even their
general geopolitical orientation. In all analysed
countries, apart from Romania, there is a discernible
shift in opinion away from the preference of
being “somewhere-in-between” to a rather more
unequivocal backing of a Western geopolitical
orientation. CEE countries, amid the war in Ukraine,
have also become leading voices in calling for both
EU and NATO action.
14 East-West GLOBSEC Trends 2022 15There has recently been considerable discussion The support
about the geopolitical and civilisational positioning for the West
of your country. Would you like your country to be in Czechia has
part of the West, part of the East, or somewhere in increased by
between? 23%.
West Somwhere in between East
2022 2021 2022 2021 2022 2021
Lithuania 57% 47% 28% 39% 3%*
Czechia 56% 33% 38% 58% 2%*
Estonia 54% 44% 29% 36% 2%*
* Percentages
have not changed
Poland 51% 46% 35% 43% 1%* over the past year
by more than 2
percentage
points.
Latvia 49% 39% 43% 53% 2%*
Hungary 38% 32% 53% 59% 2%*
11%
Slovakia 34% 26% 51% 55%
13%
Bulgaria 34% 27% 47% 54% 12%*
Romania 43% 27% 37% 46% 6% 24%
16 East-West GLOBSEC Trends 2022 17Outliers
Against the
backdrop
Romania is a clear regional outlier –
almost 1/4 of respondents favour an
of war in
Eastern geopolitical orientation - almost
the same percentage as the preference
for the Western one. Meanwhile, 12%
Ukraine,
in Romania “do not know” where
they stand on Romania’s preferred
geopolitical and civilisation position.
15% of
Similar levels of indecisiveness are
apparent among Estonians (15%) and
Lithuanians and Poles (12%).
Estonians
and 12% of
In 4 of 9
countries Lithuanians,
a majority wants Poles and
to be part of
the West. Romanians
We are the are unsure
West now where they
stand on the
44% of Central and Eastern Europeans
express support for their countries geopolitical
adopting a Western geopolitical
orientation. The seven percentage and
civilisation
points increase across the region
measured over the past year marks the
orientations
largest since our polling began on this
question in 2016. In 5 of 9 countries
of their
now, more respondents prefer a
Western geopolitical orientation than
countries.
the “in-between” “Central-Western”
approach of needing to define one’s
own path.1
18 East-West 19European
The EU garners continued robust
support across the Central and Eastern
European region. On average, 80%
of respondents would vote to stay
Union
in the EU, underscoring the fact that
EU membership has become rather
entrenched in the region. This fervent
backing is undergirded by a renewed
united front against the backdrop of
the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The
EU has stood up to the aggressor -
unanimously adopting sanctions and
other measures to weaken the Russian
economy and hinder propaganda
Continued
efforts.
robust support
across the
region
80%
in CEE would
vote to stay
in the EU.
20 European Union GLOBSEC Trends 2022 21The graph only
Imagine, that the following weekend, there will be a visualises changes
in countries that
referendum in your country on its membership in the experienced shifts
over 5% in public
EU. How would you vote – for your country to stay in opinion.
the EU or leave the EU?
Stay 2022 Stay 2021 Leave 2022 Leave 2021
Lithuania 88% 80% 6% Stay or leave? Shifts in
support for EU
Support for EU membership
has reached historical highs
membership
Poland 88% 8%
in the region. The backing over the years
for staying in the EU has
increased, since 2021, by 14
percentage points in Czechia, Czechia
8 percentage points in
Lithuania and 7 percentage 80%
Hungary 85% 78% 9% 15% points in Hungary.
69% 68% 66%
The increased support for
54%
staying in the EU in the
past year can be viewed
Latvia 84% 10% as a reaction to two crises
of the past couple years –
COVID-19 pandemic and the
war in Ukraine - when the EU
membership proved to be
Czechia 80% 66% 18% 27% rather advantageous.
Czechs, though conventionally 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
more Eurosceptic, have
expressed record support
Slovakia 77% 20% for EU membership. This
development is perhaps also
Hungary
connected to the new, strongly
pro-European government at
the helm and the upcoming 85%
Romania 75% 21% second Czech Presidency of 81% 82%
78%
75%
the Council of the European
Union. Czechia’s shift leaves
Bulgaria as the now most
Eurosceptic country. Hungary,
Estonia 74% 16% for its part, also saw higher
support for EU membership
following a decline the prior
year and despite Orbán’s
continued propagation of
Bulgaria 70% 17% 23% narratives against the EU.2
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
22 European Union GLOBSEC Trends 2022 23We see you, Madam President
Those who consider the European Union to be
a threat to their identity and values: While Ursula von der Leyen remains one of the least known
leaders across researched countries (surpassed only by Chinese
2022 2020 President Xi Jinping and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz), her
name recognition has improved over the past year by a notable
13 percentage points. It appears that her leadership during the
COVID-19 pandemic, push for an ambitious recovery plan, and
recent unifying role in responding to Russia has made her both
Bulgaria 20% 31%
more recognisable and popular.
Czechia 22% 45% The greater awareness of the Commission President, that said, has
translated into a rise in both positive and negative opinions of her.
The average increase in favourable attitudes, however, outpace
Estonia 17% 22% negative perceptions by two to one. Positive sentiment towards
von der Leyen increased in all surveyed countries (by 8 percentage
points compared to 2021), with the most pronounced upward
Hungary 24% movement observed in Czechia.
The graph only
Latvia 9% 17%
22%,
visualises changes
in countries that
experienced shifts
Those who perceive Ursula
Lithuania 9% 16% over 5% in public
opinion.
von der Leyen, the President
of the European Commission,
Poland 15%
positively:
Romania 26% 2022 2021 on average,
do not know
what to think
Slovakia 30% 35%
Bulgaria 38% 44%
Czechia 39% 61% of or had
EU less of a threat
Estonia 43% 51% never heard
” Alongside increasing support for of Ursula von
“[The EU] has been EU membership, there has been a
corresponding drop across CEE in the
Hungary 42% 44%
der Leyen,
trying to help us, but number of people labelling the EU as a
we fail to appreciate
threat to their identity and values - from
26% in 2020 to 19% in 2022. The most
Latvia 42% 50%
a drop from
this.”
pronounced decline of 23 percentage
points occurred in Czechia, which
Lithuania 52% 57%
the 35%
figure the
dovetails with growing Czech support for
the EU more generally. Poland 48% 55%
year prior.
(landscape architect, 42 years, Romania)
Romania 34% 45%
Response collected during the focus group discussions in
March 2021 in Romania to the following prompt: “What is
Slovakia 44% 47%
the first you imagine when we say the EU?”
24 European Union GLOBSEC Trends 2022 25NATO
Regional
support for NATO
Growing
membership is
now at 79%.
support for
NATO across
the region
NATO membership and
the security guarantees
it provides have never
been as relevant as
they are now and the
growing support for
NATO across all countries
confirms that CEE
societies understand
these implications of
regional and global
developments. NATO
membership backing
now averages 79%, with
all countries, apart from
Bulgaria, also sharing
the awareness of being
under a threat due to
Russian aggression and
looking up to NATO
as guarantor of their
security and territorial
integrity.
26 NATO GLOBSEC Trends 2022 27* Percentages
Imagine, that the following weekend, there will be a Positive trend
have not changed
over the past year
referendum in your country on its membership in the in Slovakia
by more than 2
percentage
NATO. How would you vote – for your country to stay
points.
in the NATO or leave the NATO? Slovak support for NATO has
experienced a steady rise since
Stay 2022 Stay 2021 Leave 2022 Leave 2021 2018. Further improvements over
the past year are likely linked to
the current conflict in Ukraine. The
multi-year change in trajectory,
however, is also probably associated
Bulgaria 54% 50% 25% 38% with the change in government that
occurred in 2020. The more open
leadership style of the Minister
of Defence and the armed forces
consistently communicating the
18%
Czechia 87% 72% importance of NATO for Slovakia
10% have also been paramount. However,
with one quarter of respondents still
wanting to leave NATO amid intense
Deviation information operations promoting
Estonia 72% 70% 19%* these views, the battle for hearts
and minds, to this end, is not over.
Bulgaria appears to be a
regional outlier on NATO with
the opposition to Alliance
Hungary 85% 80%
10% membership increasing by
13 percentage points over a
Support for NATO
7%
year. This decline in support membership over
leaves the population evenly
divided between backers of
the past 5 years
19% membership and those either
Latvia 79% 72% opposed to it or holding no
72%
13% 63%
opinion on the subject. The 61%
56%
finding goes against the grain
50%
and realpolitik situation - even
traditionally neutral countries
Lithuania 88% 84% 5% including Sweden and Finland
want to join NATO following the
Russian invasion of Ukraine.
5%
Poland 95% 89%
2%
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
19%
Romania 80% 77%
16%
Slovak support
25%
for NATO has
Slovakia 72% 63%
23% increased by
22 percentage
points since 2018.
28 NATO GLOBSEC Trends 2022 29Only
Confidence in NATO The graph only
lower than support Trust in armed forces 3 visualises changes
in countries that
for membership experienced shifts
28%
2022 2021 over 5% in public
opinion.
While CEE societies espouse robust
support for NATO membership, they
are generally more sceptical that this Czechia 87%
membership will deter attacks from
in CEE
foreign adversaries. Bulgaria and Latvia
were the only two surveyed countries Estonia 76%
where responses on the questions of
support
NATO membership and confidence on the
security matter mirrored one another. It Poland 75%
appears, consequently, that even some
NATO
backers of NATO membership doubt the
veracity of the commitments of member Latvia 75%
states to come and protect them if their
countries
country were invaded.
Lithuania 70%
sending own
Romania 61% 73%
Respondents
agreeing that
troops to
Hungary 61% 70%
“My country’s
Ukraine.
membership in Slovakia 56% 75%
NATO makes it less
likely that a foreign Bulgaria 40% 58%
nation will attack
us.”
Trust in own armed forces
Poland 88%
” In 8 of 9 countries, a majority trust the armed forces of their
Latvia 79% “NATO is protection, along with
our soldiers contributing,.. own country, whereas in 5 of 9, the trust exceeds 70%. A lack of
I believe that if anything would confidence in the armed forces is particularly striking in Bulgaria
Czechia 79%
happen, NATO, all its member at 40% (a 18 percentage point decline from 2021). While the
states, will really come together decrease in trust in 4 of 9 countries is a striking finding at times
Hungary 75% of war it may be explained by scepticism towards the combat
and help.”
readiness of troops and the capacity of the militaries to defend
Lithuania 74% their respective countries.
(housewife, 23 years, Czechia)
Estonia 70%
With 67%, armed forces
Romania 62% Response collected during the
focus group discussions in March
Slovakia 62%
2021 in Czechia to the following
prompt: “What is the first you are the most trusted
Bulgaria 50%
imagine when we say NATO?”
institution in CEE.
30 NATO GLOBSEC Trends 2022 31Strategic
partners
& leaders
CEE 65% of CEE
respondents
countries
perceive Russia
as a threat to their
country’s
rely on the US
security.
for protection The invasion of Ukraine also impacted
Central and Eastern European
perceptions regarding the most
important strategic partners for their
countries. These attitudes have likely
been influenced by a confluence of
factors, but the war dynamic and
insecurity, have spotlighted the fact
that CEE countries rely on the US for
protection against possible aggression
and economic downturn.
32 Strategic partners & leaders GLOBSEC Trends 2022 33Strategic Average responses to: Which of the following
countries are the most important strategic partners
partners
of your country today? Pick maximum two.
2022 2021
Respondents
could choose from
a randomised
selection of 6
countries included
in the chart.
Return of the US,
decline of Germany
The escalation of the armed The US UK
conflict in Europe, following
decades of relative peace
caught up with
especially for small countries in Germany. 14%
22%
the CEE region, has revived the
need for the US as a strong security Russia
guarantor and the most important
strategic partner. This intensified
16%
sentiment was possible to observe
in 7 of 9 surveyed countries. A re- 24%
orientation towards the US may
be linked to the corresponding
perceived lack of action on the part Germany
of Germany. Only 47% now classify
Berlin among their countries’ 47%
most important strategic partners, US 54%
while the figure had previously
stood at 54%. In 6 of 9 countries, 46%
the perceptions of Germany as a 36%
strategic partner declined, while
in Czechia, Bulgaria and Hungary
the position of Germany was France
reconfirmed with the increase in China
support. 15%
The indecisiveness of Germany towards the Kremlin in the 14% 9%
immediate aftermath of the invasion and the lack of strong
leadership resonated among CEE respondents, as also 11%
demonstrated in perceptions of Olaf Scholz (see page 42).
In a result, the US now matches Germany in perceptions of
strategic importance.
34 Strategic partners & leaders Globsec Trends
GLOBSEC Trends2022
2022 35Perceptions of the US, Germany and Russia
as strategic partners4 The war
2022 2021 2022 2021
cannot
erase it
The US Germany Russia all
In 8 of 9 countries the Russian invasion
of Ukraine has led to a decrease in
perceptions that Russia represents
Bulgaria 21% 27% 50% 57% 30% 45%
the most important strategic
partner. The many years of extensive
propaganda campaigns, influence
operations and cultural ties, however,
Czechia 25% 41% 69% 74% 6% 14% have proven especially difficult to
completely erase in some countries
including Estonia and Latvia (with their
relatively significant Russian minority
populations) and Bulgaria and Slovakia.
Estonia 49% 55% 38% 49% 14% 21% Hungary’s refusal to support Ukraine
and the takeover of the Kremlin war
propaganda by leading political figures
can be linked to the widespread
perception that Russia is an important
Hungary 13%* 50% 58% 35%* strategic partner.5
Latvia 36% 44% 48% 58% 15% 27%
* Percentages
have not changed
over the past year
by more than 2
percentage
Lithuania 53% 61% 49% 58% 6% 8% points.
Poland 54% 73% 27% 48% 2% 8%
Romania 47% 75% 19% 42% 3% 13% 1/3 in Bulgaria,
Hungary and
Slovakia see
Slovakia 17% 29% 56% 64% 37% 47% Russia as a
strategic partner.
36 Strategic partners & leaders GLOBSEC Trends 2022 37Those who agree that
the US is their ally and
traditional partner within
In 7/9
NATO.
countries the
perception
of the US
Poland 93%
being a
Czechia 86%
strategic
Lithuania 84%
partner
Latvia 82%
Estonia 72%
Hungary 70%
increased,
Romania 70%
while it
Slovakia 63%
stayed the
Bulgaria 53%
same in
Hungary and
US still an ally
declined in
”
Bulgaria.
An average of 75% of respondents across all surveyed
“On papers, we’re partners and we’ll stay countries identify the US as an ally and traditional
that way because we’re important pawns. partner within NATO. This pattern is less apparent,
The problem is that pawns are always however, in Bulgaria and Slovakia (53% and 63%
sacrificed first.” respectively) than in other countries. The lack of belief
in the US as an ally could be connected to the image
(acquisition analyst, 34 years, Romania) of the US as an “aggressor”, a position voiced by
respondents in polling conducted in 2020.6 The mixed
result in Slovakia could further be the product of an
intensive smear campaign and mobilisation efforts by
Response collected during the focus opposition parties during the adoption of the Defence
group discussions in March 2021 in Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between the US and
Czechia to the following prompt: “What Slovakia at the beginning of 2022.7
is the first you imagine when we say the
US?”
38 Strategic partners & leaders 39Threat Knowing
the enemy
in 2020 regarding potential threats stated
an opinion this time. This clarification of
perception
positions, no matter the results, indicates
that the conflict might be clearing up grey
zones and ambiguities.
With the invasion of Ukraine, the
perception of Russia as a threat has
increased in all 6 countries in which To read more about perceptions
GLOBSEC had polled the question in 2020. of Vladimir Putin and Russia, please
There are, however, notable differences see page 59.
between countries. While a majority of
respondents think that Russia poses a
The unprovoked invasion and atrocities conducted by Russian significant threat to their country in 7
soldiers against Ukrainian civilians also impacted threat of 9 countries, Bulgaria stands out as a
perceptions in the region. For many Central and Eastern regional outlier, with 57% believing that
Russia poses no threat to their country. The
Europeans who in the past years harboured doubts about their conflict, however, has spurred Romanians
countries’ friends and foes, the war in Ukraine, to this end, has and Bulgarians to make up their minds on
the matter – around 40% who held no view
represented a genuine and unsettling wakeup call.
Those who Russia China US
believe Russia,
China or the
US present Bulgaria 3% 33% 3% 12% 16% 33%
a security
threat to their Czechia 43% 84% 50% 15% 30%
country.
2022 2020 Estonia 68% 24% 18%
Hungary 25% 45% 21% 13% 18%
The graph only
shows data for 2020 Latvia 64% 18% 13%
in countries where
shifts in perceptions
were greater than
5%. Lithuania 83% 43% 9%
Poland 68% 90% 34% 43% 6%
Romania 30% 58% 13% 20% 14%
Slovakia 20% 62% 23% 29% 39%
40 Strategic partners & leaders GLOBSEC Trends 2022 41The face-off With 44%
holding favourable
Vladimir
Putin
views of the new German
Chancellor, Olaf Scholz Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky now garners more than
The war in Ukraine has impacted perceptions of numerous lags the popularity of his four times greater popularity than his
global political leaders. Societies are now generally more likely predecessor, Angela Merkel, opponent Vladimir Putin. A majority of
to recognise the names of leaders and hold an opinion on them. by 17 percentage points Central and Eastern Europeans hold
negative views towards Putin following
In 2021, 24% of Central and Eastern Europeans “did not know“ among Central and Eastern the invasion of Ukraine.
or had “never heard of” Joe Biden and 35% the same regarding Europeans. A further 31%
Ursula von der Leyen. These leaders are now recognised, “do not know” or have
respectively, by an additional 14 and 13 percentage points. “never heard of him”. Volodymyr
Zelensky
Regional average of those who viewed a In 7 of 9 countries, a majority perceives
particular world leader positively.
Volodymyr Zelensky positively.
The impact of the Kremlin’s war
propaganda, disinformation narratives
2022 2021 2022 2021 and smear campaign, however, are
taking their toll in numerous countries
including Bulgaria, Slovakia and
Hungary8. A total of 50%, 42% and 40%
Volodymyr Vladimir
66% 15% 35% in these three countries, respectively,
Zelensky Putin view Zelensky negatively.
Emmanuel
Macron
61% 53% 17% 23%
Xi
Jinping
Joe
Biden
A notable Substantial coverage provided to
Boris
57% 44%
35% of CEE
the war has contributed to greater
Johnson awareness concerning Joe Biden and
respondents the policies of his administration. Only
have still never 10% of respondents hold no opinion
heard of Xi regarding Biden, 14 percentage points
Joe Jinping.
53% less than in 2021. While Joe Biden
Biden managed to maintain his favourability
rating of 53% in surveyed countries,
more respondents (36%) also perceive
him negatively compared to 2021.
Ursula There has been a measurable rise in
50% 42%
von der Leyen negative perceptions towards the US
president in 7 of 9 countries and the
regional average has increased by 10
percentage points.
Olaf
44%
Scholz
42 Strategic partners & leaders GLOBSEC Trends 2022 43China Chinese regime could be an inspiration for
my country
Agree Do not know
More than
With the world’s attention now turned towards the Russian invasion 28% one-fifth of
of Ukraine, China has found itself temporarily side-lined from respondents in
public discussions in Central and Eastern Europe. As the pandemic Bulgaria, Hungary,
gradually cedes its position in the spotlight, China’s relations with Slovakia and Romania
see the Chinese
the region are no longer seen through the prism of mask diplomacy regime as an
and vaccines - bilateral issues rather have been placed centre 24%
inspiration.
stage. A few examples, among numerous others, include Lithuania’s
diplomatic row with Beijing following the opening of Taiwan’s de 22% 22%
facto embassy in Vilnius9, Hungary’s internal disagreement on the 23% 21% 21%
construction of a Chinese Fudan University campus in Budapest10
and the Estonian, Lithuanian and Slovak diplomatic boycott of the
2022 Olympic games11. Against this backdrop, the public can be 21%
18%
expected to develop more specific opinions (positive or negative)
regarding Beijing.
China’s regime still
attractive for many Those agreeing that the
Chinese government
The continued appeal of the Chinese
regime is apparent across the region, an
threatens their identity
alarming pattern that points to the persistent and values.
susceptibility of the region to authoritarian
modes of government. According to 9%
GLOBSEC’s prior research, CEE citizens 8%
often associate the CCP regime with Czechia 45%
effective governance and laud its economic
performance and record on developing Lithuania 41%
infrastructure.12 Many also approve of the
Poland 35% 8% 8%
“cleanliness” and “orderliness” found in
China, a sentiment perhaps carried over 7%
from the CEE region’s communist past. These Slovakia 28% 6%
6%
considerations, however, paper over the costs
Estonia 21% 5%
of such “order”.
Attitudes towards the communist era could Romania 18%
also explain public opinion in the two
Hungary 17%
evident outliers (Poland and Czechia). These
two countries both simultaneously share a 1%
Latvia 12%
pronounced distaste towards the Chinese
regime and the most fervent enthusiasm
Bulgaria 8% Bulgaria Romania Hungary Slovakia Estonia Latvia Czechia Lihuania Poland
regarding the transition to multiparty systems
and market economies in the CEE region13.
44 Strategic partners & leaders GLOBSEC Trends 2022 4561%
Two different perspectives
Dragon
towards autocratic actors
does of CEE
In 6 of 9 countries, the foreign malign influence of China still
goes largely unnoticed, with a majority not viewing Beijing as a
not
security threat. This lack of awareness towards Chinese influence
respondents
operations in the region was spotlighted by the Vulnerability
Index15 and continues to represent a significant security
sleep
vulnerability. The problem could grow if the resilience building
do not
activities of EU and NATO member countries become solely
preoccupied with the Kremlin’s malign influence operations and
expansionist policies.
The perception of
perceive
Also, despite increased efforts by the Baltic states to raise
awareness about the foreign malign influence of China16, 22% of
China as a strategic
China as
respondents in Estonia and Lithuania do not know whether China
partner remained poses a threat to their country.
about the same as
a security
the prior year in
most of the analysed
countries. Only 9%
of respondents in the
CEE region perceive threat to their
China as the most
important strategic
partner with Hungary
country.
representing an outlier
In 4/6
– with 21% perceiving
China as important.14
countries,
”
“[China] is by far the most dangerous
fewer people
country in the world. Not only in
military terms, but primarily via its
economy, it can accomplish more
identified
than other countries via employment
of armed forces. China is slowly
taking over and controlling the
China as a
world’s economy.”
(repairman, 55, Czechia)
Response collected during the focus
threat in 2022
than in 2020.
group discussions in March 2021 in
Czechia to the following prompt:
“What is the first you imagine when
we say the China?”
46 Strategic partners & leaders 47Do you consider Taiwan to be
Part of China Independent country Disputed country Do not know
13%
25%
Taiwan a divisive
issue for CEE
With military tensions between Beijing
and Taipei reaching a 40-year high in late
202117, questions concerning Taiwan’s
sovereignty and fears of Chinese attacks
returned to the international agenda once
again. While a robust majority of CEE
citizens express concerns about human
Only 8%
rights abuses in China18, this sentiment does
not automatically translate into support
for Taiwan’s position vis-à-vis China. The
” CEE region is rather divided on the issue.
“[China is] an ideal partner! There The staunchest support for Taiwanese
of Latvians
are things we export to China, not independence can be found in Czechia,
to mention what we import. Almost Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia.
everything is bought from China. We
21%
perceive
can partner in many things because
they have technology and know-how
from all over the world.”
the Chinese
41%
(security guard, 58 years, Bulgaria)
Response collected during the focus
regime as
a source of
group discussions in March 2021 in
Bulgaria to the following prompt: Respondents considering Taiwan 59%
“Is China rather a partner for your
an independent country
inspiration for
country or not?” 49%
46%
42%
37% 38%
35%
their country
31% 31%
compared to
17% in 2021. Bulgaria Romania Hungary Poland Latvia Slovakia Lithuania Estonia Czechia
48 GLOBSEC Trends 2022 49Geopolitics
overview
Russia Stay
“The 2022 report
as a or leave
threat NATO?
shows strong support
for NATO and a clear
reaffirmation of the
centrality of the
transatlantic bond Do you think Russia presents a Now, please, imagine, that the
79% to European security security threat to your country?* following weekend, there will be
of Central and defence.” a referendum in your country on
and Eastern Benedetta Berti-Alberti, Head, Policy Planning,
Yes No
its membership in the NATO. How
would you vote – for your country
Europeans Office of the Secretary General,
to stay in the NATO or leave the
NATO
Poland 90% 8%
support NATO NATO?*
membership. Czechia 84% 15% Stay Leave
Lithuania 83% 11% Poland 95% 2%
Estonia 68% 24% Lithuania 88% 5%
Latvia 64% 30% 87% 10%
The US
Czechia
Slovakia 62% 36% Hungary 85% 7%
as a strategic
Romania 58% 37% Romania 80% 16%
Hungary 45% 48% 79% 13%
partner
Latvia
Bulgaria 33% 57% Estonia 72% 19%
Slovakia 72% 23%
Those who consider the US one of the two key strategic
partners for their country *remaining Bulgaria 50% 38%
percentages account
to those who refused
to or did not know
Romania 75% Poland 73% Lithuania 61% how to respond
Estonia 55% Latvia 44% Czechia 41%
Slovakia 29% Bulgaria 21%
Hungary 13%
50 Quick overview GLOBSEC Trends 2022 51War in
An understanding of the persistent use of
perceptions towards information operations
the war among Central in some countries has
and Eastern Europeans clouded the vision of
Ukraine
and their perspectives certain segments of the
on Ukraine provides an population.
insight into both the
region’s strengths and
vulnerabilities. While an
overwhelming majority
is clear on the villain and
victim in the conflict,
62% in CEE believe
Majority
that by fighting against
the Russian invasion,
Ukraine is also fighting
of CEE
for democracy in
Europe.
is clear on
who the
villain is
52 War in Ukraine GLOBSEC Trends 2022 55Who is
responsible?
A majority in every country, apart from Hungary, identifies Russia as the party responsible for the conflict in
Ukraine. Bulgaria and Slovakia, however, are also closely divided, with half believing disinformation about the war.
The most resolute beliefs were measured in Poland, Czechia and Lithuania. Meanwhile, attitudes in Estonia and
Latvia might be influenced by the fact that the two countries encompass large Russian-speaking minorities more
inclined to consume Russian news sources. Uncertainty about culpability – respondents indicating that they “do
not know” or refusing to answer the question - was higher in Bulgaria and Lithuania (both 12%), and Hungary and
Latvia (both 16%).
Which of these statements do you agree Ukraine
with the most? that oppressed
Russian-speaking
Russia that invaded Ukraine West that provoked Russia part of population
Poland 87% 5% 2%
Czechia 78% 10% 5%
Lithuania 74% 9% 5%
Estonia 68% 15% 9%
Romania 63% 26% 6%
Latvia 61% 14% 9%
Slovakia 51% 28% 16%
Bulgaria 50% 26% 12%
Hungary 48% 19% 18%
52 War in Ukraine GLOBSEC Trends 2022 53-54Perceptions Do you consider Ukraine to be…20
of Ukraine An independent
country
Puppet
of the West
Part
of Russia
The future path of Ukraine currently remains uncertain and
contingent on numerous factors. While Ukraine’s citizens and
Poland
87% 6% 2%
leaders will play a fundamental role in determining the post-conflict
course of the country, other actors will be consequential too. Kyiv’s
foreign policy direction – whether it includes applications for EU
Czechia
and/or NATO membership or the decision to remain neutral - will 87% 7% 5%
require robust support and backing from EU and NATO members.
The helping hand extended by Central and Eastern Europe,
which has itself been victim to Russian (or Soviet) aggression and
Lithuania
occupation in the past, will particularly continue to play a key role 73% 13% 2%
in the process. Public opinion suggests that Ukraine will indeed be
able to rely on its Western neighbours.
Latvia
72% 20% 2%
Ukraine is a
Fighting for us sovereign country
Estonia
The majority of CEE countries recognise the importance of the war
fought on the region’s borders. The chart below shows the percentage
69% 24% 1%
A majority considers Ukraine to be an
of those who agree that: “By fighting against the Russian invasion,
Ukraine is also fighting for democracy in Europe.” independent and sovereign country across
CEE. Bulgaria, where many believe Ukraine
to be either a puppet of the West or a
Slovakia
part of Russia, is the one exception. This
Poland 83% 61% 23% 13%
general consensus underlines the fact that
the Kremlin has failed to manipulate large
Lithuania 82% segments of the population to believe its
narrative denying Ukrainian statehood.19
Romania
Czechia 81% The storyline that Ukraine is merely a
Western puppet, nevertheless, finds
58% 25% 9%
Estonia 65% resonance among 20-35% of respondents
in 6 countries. This dynamic is shaped
Latvia 61% by the stronger Kremlin influence in
Hungary
countries like Bulgaria and Slovakia where
Slovakia 51%
considerable parts of the population even 58% 24% 8%
consider Ukraine to be part of Russia
Bulgaria 46%
and the more pronounced resonance of
anti-Western narratives in countries like
Hungary 44%
Bulgaria
Hungary and Romania.
45% 35% 12%
Romania 43%
56 War in Ukraine GLOBSEC Trends 2022 57Should Ukraine be/become...13
a member of the EU or NATO or both a neutral country Image of Russia
The original wording of the question included five options from which respondents could only choose one
answer: a) A member of the EU; b) A member of NATO; c) A member of both EU and NATO; d) A neutral
country; e) In the Russian sphere of influence.
and Vladimir Putin
Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin was one of the
Poland 78% 15%
most well-liked international leaders in some countries of the
CEE region.21 The image of Putin as a protector of traditional
Lithuania 65% 25% values and the national identities of (small) countries against a
decadent liberal West has resonated with many Central and Eastern
Czechia 57% 38% Europeans, a finding confirmed by focus groups discussions
conducted in 2021. Vladimir Putin and Russia have been perceived
Estonia 56% 33% by many as “pillars of stability” in an otherwise tumultuous
world.22 This favourable image was particularly evident in Bulgaria
Latvia 54% 32% and Slovakia – narratives that foreground the cooperation and
closeness of “Slavic countries” strongly resonated23 in these two
Romania 51% 40%
countries and have been promoted by the Kremlin and various
domestic actors.24
Slovakia 40% 47%
Bulgaria 29% 47%
”
Hungary 23% 63% “Only Putin from the politicians
I know. Thanks to him, there has
been no war here for a long time.
He refused to be vexed by various
American provocations — military
actions already during Obama’s
Be neutral or be with us? [administration]. And he resisted
with prudence and calmness.”
When it comes to the future of Ukraine, CEE countries are less
10% in (teacher, 56 years old, Slovakia)
united. In 6 of 9 countries, a majority of respondents would Bulgaria and
fervently welcome Ukraine to be part of either the EU and/or NATO.
In 3 countries, meanwhile, more people would prefer Ukraine to
Slovakia believe
stay neutral. When it comes to membership preferences, some Ukraine should be Responses collected during focus
group discussions in March 2021 in
respondents want to see Ukraine join both the EU and NATO
(average 31%), fewer prefer Ukraine to solely accede to the EU
under the Russian Slovakia in response to the following
(average 14%) and fewer still NATO (5%). sphere of prompt: “Name a person or leader
who offers real solutions to today’s
influence. problems, whether in our country or
A concerning 10% in Bulgaria and Slovakia believe Ukraine should beyond.”
be under the Russian sphere of influence. In other CEE countries,
similar attitudes were voiced by only 1-5% of respondents.
58 War in Ukraine GLOBSEC Trends 2022 59The fall Share of those who view Vladimir Putin positively:
of the 2022 2021
mighty
Months into the invasion
of Ukraine that has been 70%
universally condemned
in the West, Putin now
stands out as the most
negatively viewed
international leader in the
region. A majority, in fact, 55%
perceives the Russian
president negatively in
every surveyed country
including Bulgaria,
despite the fact that
An
42%
respondents in that 40%
country were disinclined
overwhelming
towards identifying
Russia as a threat to their
78%
country. 31%
30%
29%
24% 24%
of Central
22%
19%
and Eastern
16%
13% 14%
12%
Europeans
perceive
6%
4%
2%
Vladimir Putin
negatively.
Poland Czechia Lithuania Latvia Romania Hungary Estonia Slovakia Bulgaria
60 GLOBSEC Trends 2022 61Country vs. leader Russia will not stop in Ukraine, it will invade other
81% in European countries as well.
Those who perceive Vladimir Putin negatively
Those who perceive Russia as a threat the CEE Agree Disagree
region
96%
think that Bulgaria 21% 64%
Poland
90% Russia
had no
Czechia 45% 49%
Czechia
95%
right to Estonia 47% 37%
84%
invade Hungary 23% 67%
89%
Ukraine. Latvia 32% 55%
Lithuania
83%
Lithuania 38% 32%
80% In all surveyed countries,
Romania majorities hold Poland 60% 31%
58%
unfavourable views of
Vladimir Putin. And in Romania 34% 55%
72% 7 of 9 countries, most
Latvia believe that Russia poses Slovakia 41% 55%
64%
a threat to their countries.
The CEE respondents
71% also broadly identify the
Slovakia
62%
Russian government as Cautious
a threat to their identity optimism
and values (in addition
71% to being a threat to their Respondents tended to be slightly
Hungary
45%
security) – majorities sceptical that Russia’s territorial
share this view in Poland, expansionist policies would extend beyond
Ukraine – majorities in 5 of 9 countries
Lithuania, Czechia, see invasions of other European countries
68% Estonia and Slovakia. unlikely. These views are perhaps shaped
Estonia by fears of further conflict with Moscow
68% and the deterrence effect of NATO
membership. Poles, undergirded by their
own historical experiences related to
Russian ambitions, are regional outliers on
60%
the matter.
Bulgaria
33%
62 War in Ukraine GLOBSEC Trends 2022 63Majorities
International
Overwhelming support
in 7/9
for sanctions
response
Most CEE countries have been front and centre in advocating
for sanctions against Russia, and the citizens have been aligned
countries
with their leaders in this respect. A majority in 7 of 9 countries
express their support for the strongest possible sanctions even
for the price of economic hardship. Bulgaria and Hungary, as
with other topics, are regional outliers. Public opinion in Bulgaria
on this question is perhaps influenced by concerns about the are willing
to sanction
relatively lower living standards that will magnify the effects of
The CEE countries are among the staunchest backers of Ukraine’s any sanctions on significant segments of the population. While
only 32% of Central and Eastern Europeans currently indicate
Russia
efforts to drive out the Russian invasion through both diplomatic opposition, at present, to sanctions, if these voices are ignored,
and military support.25 Estonia, Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia it could lead to greater social polarisation and democratic
lead the rankings on military assistance (adjusted for GDP),26
even if it
backsliding in the region. The public pulse should further be
constantly re-evaluated given that attitudes could change
while the region expelled dozens of Russian diplomats and
means
dramatically as the situation evolves.28
carried out numerous measures to curb the influence of Russian
war propaganda27. All Ukraine’s neighbours have also welcomed
hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees fleeing Russian
Those who agree with the they must
endure
aggression.
statement: EU countries should
Ready to
impose the strongest possible
sanctions on Russia to stop it increased
transition away 70% across the CEE from waging further conflict economic
region believe their even if it means the price of
As of March 2022, populations in all nine
surveyed countries (70% on average)
countries should fuel or other products increase hardship.
agreed that their country “should decrease
in my country.
their energy dependency on Russia”. Polish reduce their energy
dependence on
support for resource diversification stood
at 95%, while support for this transition is
Russia.
more modest in Hungary and Slovakia with
Poland 88%
53% of respondents in the two countries
backing lowering their energy dependence
on Russia. Czechia 78%
Lithuania 70%
Estonia 65%
Respondents agreeing with the statement: Our
country should decrease energy dependence on Latvia 61%
Russia. Romania 61%
Slovakia 50%
95% 84% 77% 73% 70% 70% 55% 53% 53% Hungary 43%
Bulgaria 38%
Poland Czechia Lithuania Romania Latvia Estonia Bulgaria Hungary Slovakia
64 War in Ukraine GLOBSEC Trends 2022 65You can also read
