Towards mutually beneficial EU-West African migration cooperation?
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CRU Policy Brief
NOVEMBER 2020
Towards mutually beneficial
EU-West African migration
cooperation?
Leonie Jegen, Johannes Claes & Omar N. Cham
Assessing EU policy trends and their
implications for migration cooperation
This policy brief assesses the extent to which policy trends in the EU external
migration governance framework, as put forward in the New Pact on Migration and
Asylum and the new EU Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027, match the
Union’s commitment to building a mutually beneficial partnership with third countries.
This question will be assessed by drawing on EU migration cooperation with West
African states. It finds that the rhetoric of a mutually beneficial relationship and
a paradigm shift is not demonstrated in the New Pact. The analysis of the budget
further highlights that migration funding has a prominent place within the new
proposed long-term EU budget and seems to consolidate the approach adopted in
recent years rather than signaling a paradigm shift.
Introduction
This policy brief assesses the extent to The commitment towards building a
which policy trends in the EU external mutually beneficial partnership was
migration governance framework, as put expressed in the EU Africa Strategy
forward in the New Pact on Migration adopted earlier this year. The strategy
and Asylum and the new EU Multiannual stated that cooperation on migration would
Financial Framework for 2021-2027, match be shaped by a ‘balanced, coherent and
the Union’s commitment to building a comprehensive approach to migration,
mutually beneficial partnership with third guided by the principles of solidarity,
countries.1 This question will be assessed partnership and shared responsibility and
by drawing on EU migration cooperation based on the respect of human rights and
with West African states. international law’2. In a similar vein, the
1 We would like to thank Dr. Franzisca Zanker 2 European Commission. 2020. Joint Communication
and Prof. Dr. Sergio Carrera for their comments to the European Parliament and the Council
on earlier versions of this brief. All errors remain Towards a Comprehensive Strategy with Africa.
our own. p. 15.CRU Policy Brief
communication on the New Pact stressed led to a paradox that marks West African
that it signals a ‘change of paradigm’ in migration policy making. On the one hand,
regard to cooperation with third states, EU and West African states’ interests
with the aim of ‘deepening, broadening diverge strongly on many issues related to
and consolidating the trust already built’. migration, most importantly on questions of
According to the New Pact, partnerships return and readmission. On the other hand,
with third countries could deliver ‘mutual most national migration and institution
benefits’3. building in the region is driven by European
financial and technical support.
West African states are central to EU
external migration cooperation. Following Against this backdrop, this policy brief
the launch of the 2016 New Partnership will first assess the domestic and regional
Framework (NPF),4 four out of five priority stakes for West African countries in the
countries for EU migration cooperation were emerging policy trends inherent in EU
in West Africa. The importance granted to external migration policy. It will show
West African countries stems from European that the rhetoric of a mutually beneficial
interest in enhancing cooperation on return relationship and a paradigm shift is not
and readmission5 as well as the high number demonstrated in the actual policy content.
of irregular arrivals from West African While the stakes of migration cooperation
countries.6 remain high for West African states,
non-cooperation is more costly, due to
The EU’s external dimension has centred enhanced conditionality. Further, continuing
around restrictive and preventive measures. with an approach tackling root causes
Restrictive measures entail, for example, risks curtailing ownership of development
projects focused on fighting smuggling, processes. A limited commitment to legal
building border capacity and cooperating pathways reflects the fact that a key
on return. Preventive measures include demand from West African actors continues
development projects aimed at tackling to be granted only marginal importance.
the root causes of migration as well as Lastly, analysis of the new budget shows
building migration governance in third that migration funding has a prominent
states. At a more fundamental level this has place within the new proposed long-term
EU budget and seems to consolidate the
approach adopted in recent years rather
than signalling a paradigm shift.
3 European Commission. 2020. Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Policy trends and consequences
Committee and the Committee of the Regiona on
a New Pact on Migration and Asylum. p. 17. for West African states
4 West African countries’ importance in the field
of migration had already been reflected in the
EU’s first comprehensive framework to govern The political stakes of migration
migration cooperation with third countries, cooperation at domestic, regional and
the 2005 Global Approach to Mobility (GAM). international levels are crucial when
See Vives, L. 2017. ‘The European Union–West assessing the potential of West African
African Sea Border: Anti-Immigration Strategies states to establish mutually beneficial
and Territoriality’, European Urban and Regional relations with the EU. This section discusses
Studies, 24:2, p. 209–24; Casas-Cortes, M., the political and social stakes of four key
Cobarrubias, S., Pickles, J. 2013. ‘Re-Bordering the policy trends derived from the New Pact
Neighbourhood: Europe’s Emerging Geographies
on Asylum and Migration and the budget
of Non-Accession Integration’, European Urban and
proposals currently under discussion.
Regional Studies, 20:1. p. 37–58.
5 Zanker, F. 2019. ‘Challenges in EU-African Migration
The trends include:
Cooperation: West African Perspectives on Forced
Return’, Kiel: MEDAM. – further consolidation of the ‘root
6 Nationality of arrival to Greece, Italy and Spain causes approach’ and the question of
– monthly – Jan to Dec 2016, UNHCR. ownership over development priorities
2CRU Policy Brief
– stronger mandates for EU involvement African migration is intra-regional11 and
in migration control operations “in third most border zones are marked by frequent
states” and West African concerns over intercommunal cross-border mobility.12
sovereignty and the decreasing scope to The mismatch of European migration
which policies can be adapted to realities programming with realities on the ground
on the ground has often resulted in projects having
– the enhanced use of return conditionality adverse and unintended effects. In Niger, for
and the high social and political costs of instance, the EU supported implementation
return cooperation for West African states of the 2015 anti-smuggling law, which led
– the insufficient commitment to safe and to an upset in the political economy in the
legal pathways, a key concern of West north of the country. This resulted in not
African governments. only short-term economic losses for those
involved in the transport of migrants but
Overall, migration in the West African context also negative economic effects on the wider
is, as opposed to the European context, economy of the north, creating concerns
not generally considered a politicised issue over regional stability.13 In addition, such
nor a political priority.7 Instead, mobility policies have led to more dangerous routes
and migration constitute a normal part of for migrants and more extortion at border
life in many West African societies8 and crossings, in effect creating an environment
are governed by both formal and informal in which protection of migrants and respect
rules.9 Some West African states, such as for their human rights is hard to uphold.14
Senegal and Nigeria, have enshrined the Lastly, the negative effects of some EU
right to migrate in their constitutions.10 migration programming have put a strain on
At regional level, the Economic Community regional integration, a key driver of economic
of West African States (ECOWAS) and the development in the region.15
West African Economic and Monetary Union
(WAEMU) establish and partially implement European–West African migration
the rights to movement, residence and cooperation is unlikely to be mutually
establishment. A large proportion of West beneficial without consideration of such
11 Adepoju, A. 2009. ‘Migration Management in West
Africa within the Context of ECOWAS Protocol
7 Lücke, M., Diez, O., Jegen, L., Zanker, F. 2020. on Free Movement of Persons and the Common
European and African Perspectives on Asylum and Approach on Migration: Challenges and Prospects’,
Migration Policy: Seeking Common Ground, Kiel: Regional challenges of West African migration:
MEDAM.; Jegen, L., Zanker, F., Arhin-Sam, K., African and European Perspectives, Paris: OECD.
Bisong, A. 2020. Free Movement in West Africa: p. 17-47.
Juxtapositions and Divergent Interests, Kiel: 12 Jegen, L., Zanker, F., Arhin-Sam, K., Bisong, A.
MEDAM.; Adam, I., Trauner, K., Jegen, L., Roos, C. 2020. Free Movement in West Africa: Juxtapositions
2019. West African Interests in (EU) Migration Policy, and Divergent Interests, Kiel: MEDAM.
Brugge: UNU-CRIS. 13 Molenaar, F., Ursu, A., Ayouba Tinni, B.,
8 Lücke, M., Diez, O., Jegen, L., Zanker, F. 2020. Hoffmann, A., Meester, J. 2017. A line in the Sand:
European and African Perspectives on Asylum Roadmap for sustainable migration management in
and Migration Policy: Seeking Common Ground, Agadez, The Hague: Clingendael Institute.
Kiel: MEDAM. 14 OHCHR. 2018. End of mission statement of the
9 Jegen, L., Zanker, F., Arhin-Sam, K., Bisong, A. UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of
2020. Free Movement in West Africa: Juxtapositions migrants, Felipe González Morales, on his visit to
and Divergent Interests, Kiel: MEDAM. Niger (1-8 October).
10 Arhin-Sam, K. 2019. The Political Economy of 15 Jegen, L. 2020. The Political Economy of Migration
Migration Governance in Nigeria, Freiburg: MEDAM, Governance in Senegal, Freiburg: MEDAM, Arnold
Arnold Bergstraesser Institute and Mercator Bergstraesser Institute and Mercator Foundation.;
Foundation.; Jegen, L. 2020. The Political Economy Cleas, J., Schmauder, A. 2020. When the Dust
of Migration Governance in Senegal, Freiburg: Settles, Economic and governance repercussions
MEDAM, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute and of migration policies in Niger’s north, The Hague:
Mercator Foundation. Clingendael Institute.
3CRU Policy Brief
local realities, and political and social stakes. according to which the primary objective of
When examining recent policy proposals, EU development cooperation must be the
several trends become apparent that put reduction of poverty (Article 208 TFEU).18
into question the extent to which proposals Applied in a context of aid dependency, root
on the table effectively constitute the causes projects have in the past borne the
announced paradigm shift leading to the potential to employ aid conditionality. In Niger
‘deepening, broadening and consolidating’ for example, external donors constituted a
of trust. major source of the total state budget in 2016,
when EU member states contributed 25% of
the state budget and 20% was covered by
Trend 1: Further institutionalisa- other external support.19 On the one hand,
tion of the root causes approach the European Union Trust Fund (EUTF) is
an additional funding opportunity often
perceived as a potential income source;
Addressing the root causes of migration will on the other hand, the political nature of
remain a key component of the EU’s external EUTF funding has been decried by West
migration programming, as reflected in the African government officials.20 In Senegal,
New Pact, which states that development for example, concerns over an implicit return
assistance will ‘help people feel that their agenda and sovereignty temporarily stalled a
future lies at home’.16 The root causes project to modernise biometric databases.21
approach is equally present in the external In a context of economic asymmetries,
migration dimensions of the new Multiannual using development aid to further European
Financial Framework (MFF). As the last migration priorities carries the risk of reducing
section of this brief will outline in more detail, ownership over development priorities and
10% of the EU’s external action is expected inserting policy priorities that do not resonate
to be dedicated to migration programming, with key challenges on the ground.
one priority of which will be tackling the root
causes of irregular migration and forced
displacement. Trend 2: Stronger mandates
for EU involvement in migration
The consolidation of the root causes
approach raises the question of local control operations in West Africa
ownership of development priorities, as
enshrined in the Sustainable Developments The New Pact consolidates the trend of
Goals (SDGs). Numerous studies have reinforcing the operational mandates
pointed to lack of ownership at local of European actors in third countries.
level in areas where EU-funded migration This includes an emphasis on strengthening
programming has been in place over the direct on-the-ground involvement by
last few years.17 This contributes to the European police officers in anti-smuggling
risk of undermining a development agenda investigations through both Joint Investigative
16 European Commission. 2020. Communication 18 Bisong, A. 2020. The impact of EU external migration
from the Commission to the European Parliament, policies on sustainable development: A review of the
the Council, the European Economic and Social evidence from West, North and the Horn of Africa,
Committee and the Committee Of the Regions on Brussels, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Caritas
a new Pact on Migration and Asylum, September. Europe, p. 3.
p. 20. 19 EEAS. 2016. Niger and the EU, May.
17 Jegen, L., Zanker, F. 2019. European dominance of 20 Adam, I., Trauner, F., Jegen, L., Roos, C. 2020.
migration policy in Niger “On a fait les filles avant ‘West African interests in (EU) migration policy.
la mère”, Kiel: MEDAM.;Raty, T., Shilhav, R. 2020. Balancing domestic priorities with external
The EU Trust Fund for Africa: Trapped between incentives’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,
Aid Policy and Migration Politics, Nairobi: Oxfam.; p. 1-18.
Guerry, O., Stocchier, A. 2020. Partnership or 21 Jegen, L. 2019. The Political Economy of Migration
Conditionality: Monitoring the Migration Compacts Governance in Niger, Freiburg: Arnold Bergstraesser
and EU Trust Fund for Africa, Brussels: CONCORD. Institute.
4CRU Policy Brief
Teams as well as Common Operational Similar concerns by other West African
Partnerships. Joint Investigative Teams states are likely to arise if these legal reforms
(JITs) have been working in Niger since become a central element of cooperation.
2017 and allow for direct involvement of Additionally, the planned Frontex involvement
European police officers in human smuggling in reintegration may contribute to the image
investigations.22 Meanwhile, the role of of external actors taking over tasks of West
European police officers under Common African ministries – and being self-serving.27
Operational Partnerships, as set up in
Senegal in 2018, is more indirect, as they
officially hold only a supporting role.23 In Trend 3: Institutionalising
this regard it is noteworthy that a Frontex conditionality to increase
Status Agreement that would extend the
operational mandate of the European Border return leverage
and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) under the
ongoing Frontex mission Hera, has been Return has long been a problematic issue
the subject of negotiation between the EU between West African states and the EU.28
and Senegal since 2018.24 Additionally, the Negative and positive incentives and aid
EBCG is expected to play a bigger role in conditionality have been used as leverage
reintegration, as will be further refined in by the EU in migration cooperation with
the forthcoming strategy for voluntary return West Africa. While the general emphasis on
and reintegration. conditionality is not new – first attempts to
introduce conditionality date back to the late
Expanding the operational mandates of 1990s29 – the New Pact proposes for the first
European actors on the ground could time to institutionalise the approach.
diminish the scope for policies to be adapted
to local contexts by West African actors. The New Pact reiterates a form of direct
Research has shown that in a context where conditionality via annual visa assessments
formal and informal rules govern mobility, carried out by the European Commission
legal reforms such as Niger’s 2015 law on in line with the EU Visa Code. By means
migrant smuggling will be reinterpreted by of this assessment, the Commission can
actors on the ground.25 Further, in Senegal, ‘propose to apply restrictive visa measures
setting up Common Operational Partnerships and, in case of good cooperation, propose
led to significant concerns over sovereignty.26 favourable visa measures’.30 In addition,
27 Trauner, F., Jegen, L., Adam, I. and Roos, C. 2019.
22 Euro EUTF. 2017. Création d’une Equipe Conjointe The International Organization for Migration in West
d’Investigation (ECI) Pour La Lutte Contre Les Africa: Why its role is getting more contested, Brugge:
Réseaux Criminels Liés à l’immigration Irrégulière, UNU-CRIS.
La Traite Des Êtres Humains et Le Trafic Des 28 Adam, I., Trauner, K., Jegen, L., Roos, C. 2019.
Migrants, June. West African Interests in (EU) Migration Policy,
23 European Commission. 2018. Partenariat Brugge: UNU-CRIS.; Mouthaan, M. 2019. ‘Unpacking
Opérationnel Conjoint (POC) de lutte contre Domestic Preferences in the Policy-“Receiving”
l’immigration irrégulière, la traite et le trafic de State: The EU’s Migration Cooperation with Senegal
migrants au Sénégal. and Ghana’, Comparative Migration Studies, 7:1. p. 35.
24 Frontex. 2020. Annual Report on the Practical 29 Cortinovis, R., Conte, C. 2018. Migration-Related
Application of Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 Conditionality in EU External Funding, Brussels:
Establishing Rules for the Surveillance of the RESOMA.
External Sea Borders in the Context of Operational 30 Note: For countries which already hold visa free
Cooperation Coordinated by Frontex, February. entry to the Schengen zone, the new Pact foresees
25 Raineri, L. 2018. ‘Human Smuggling across the introduction of a visa suspension mechanism
Niger: State-Sponsored Protection Rackets and in case of high rates of ‘visa abuse’. European
Contradictory Security Imperatives’, The Journal of Commission. 2020. Communication from the
Modern African Studies, 56:1. p. 63–86. Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
26 Jegen, L. 2020. The Political Economy of Migration the European Economic and Social Committee and
Governance in Senegal, Freiburg: MEDAM, Arnold the Committee of the Regiona on a New Pact on
Bergstraesser Institute and Mercator Foundation. Migration and Asylum. p. 21.
5CRU Policy Brief
building on previous proposals31 the Pact The strengthened return conditionality,
and its proposed Asylum and Migration if applied, is likely to result in more pressure
Management Regulation (RAMM) on West African governments to meet
proposes a mechanism that will foster European return interests and carries the
leverage applied through the integration of risk of growing informalisation of return
diverse policy areas in European migration cooperation, diminished trust in governments
diplomacy. This proposed mechanism and adverse effects on household incomes.
will include a Commission analysis which
could suggest measures towards a specific The growing pressure paired with the
third country in case of insufficient return high political and social stakes of return
cooperation. The measures allow for an may lead to a growing informalisation of
overall consideration of the Union’s relations return agreements. This means that they
with the country concerned, and they will are concluded beyond the scrutiny of
be implemented upon agreement between parliaments – both in Europe and West
the Commission and the Council.32 This is Africa – and often remain opaque to the
very much congruent with the proposed wider public.34 Indeed, West African actors
regulation for a new Neighbourhood, stressed that informal agreements constitute
Development and International Cooperation a means to navigate conflicting domestic and
Instrument (NDICI) which explicitly points international agendas.35 The trend towards
to the need to maximise synergies and informalisation of such agreements could
apply the necessary leverage through the result in less accountability and legitimacy
external funding instrument. Additionally, of West African governments. For example,
the regulation to establish the Asylum and return cooperation in The Gambia has been
Migration Fund (AMIF) further cements a topic with serious political implications.
the importance granted to applying Following the democratic transition in 2017,
conditionality. Its potential as a political development assistance became crucial
tool is clearly elaborated: ‘It is clear that support for the government and more than
the adoption of measures and the pooling doubled in 2017. Shortly afterwards, the EU
of resources at EU level will increase and The Gambia concluded a non-binding
significantly the leverage that the EU needs ‘good practice’ agreement on forced returns.
to persuade third countries to engage with The way returns have been carried out under
it on those migration related issues that are the agreement has since been politically
primarily in the interest of the EU and the contested and has negatively affected the
Member States.’33 legitimacy of the government.36
31 European Commission. 2015. European Agenda
on Migration, May; European Commission. 2016. relations towards third states vary significantly and
Commission Announces New Migration Partnership are in many cases crucial to achieving readmission
Framework: Reinforced Cooperation with Third interest. On the other hand, it is questionable
Countries to Better Manage Migration. whether those European states with good relations
32 European Commission. 2020. Proposal for a with West African countries would be willing to
regulation of the European Parliament and of the execute ‘return sponsorship schemes’.
Council on Asylum and Migration Management and 34 Cassarino, J. 2007. ‘Informalising Readmission
amending Council Directive (EC) 2003/109 and the Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood’,
proposed Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Asylum and The International Spectator, 42:2. p. 179–96.
Migration Fund], September. Art. 7, Para. 3-4. 35 Adam, I., Trauner, F., Jegen, L., Roos, C. 2020.
33 More implicitly, conditionality will be strengthened ‘West African interests in (EU) migration policy.
through the proposed ‘return sponsorship’. Balancing domestic priorities with external
This mechanism will allow EU member states to incentives’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,
execute deportations on behalf of each other. p. 1-18.
This, according to the proposed RAMM, entails 36 Altrogge, J., Zanker, F. 2019. The Political Economy
leading return negotiations with third states, of Migration Governance in the Gambia, Freiburg:
obtaining valid identification documents as well MEDAM.; Jegen, L., Zanker, F., Arhin-Sam, K.,
as organising practical arrangement on return. Bisong, A. 2020. Free Movement in West Africa:
Such an approach has the potential to significantly Juxtapositions and Divergent Interests, Kiel:
enhance leverage of European actors, as bilateral MEDAM.
6CRU Policy Brief
For West African states, remittances help Besides these stakes related to
to reduce poverty, as they significantly return, consolidating the so-called
contribute to the livelihoods of many comprehensive approach to migration
households. Remittances are thus and its institutionalisation through yearly
important elements in discussions on Commission evaluations results in return
return conditionality.37 In some West African interests dominating relations to third
countries, for example Senegal and Nigeria, countries. Enhancing EU-West African
personal remittances outweigh overseas migration cooperation on European terms
development assistance as a contribution bears the risk of failing to take West African
to GDP.38 In Senegal, remittance flows political and social stakes into account
have proven to be less volatile in times of and leaves little room for a truly mutually
economic downturn than Foreign Direct beneficial partnership.
Investment and export revenues.39 This
shows the sensitivity of successful return
conditionality both on a societal and political Trend 4: A strengthened
level. On a societal level, forced return often commitment to safe and
means losing an important income source.
On a political level, this question has become legal pathways?
a sensitive issue in, for example, The Gambia
and during the electoral period in Senegal.40 The New Pact puts forward a commitment
As summarised by a Nigerian civil society to the opening of safe and legal pathways,
actor quoted by Arhim-Sam,41 ‘bringing many stating that this could go hand in hand with
Nigerians back without anything to offer a reduction of irregular migration to Europe.
them may lead to a social crisis, a rise in It proposes the launch of a Talent Partnership
crime, and a social breakdown and sense of that would provide a framework to combine
the government siding with the EU’. EU and member states tools on labour
migration. The Talent Partnership aims to,
first, contribute to better matching migration
from third states with EU labour and skills
needs and, second, to more strategically
37 Clemens, M. 2014. ‘Does Development Reduce engage with partner countries on migration.
Migration?’, International Handbook on Migration Additionally, the New Pact stresses the
and Economic Development, ed. Lucas, R. importance of finalising the EU Blue Card
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. p. 152-85. Directive in order to facilitate high-skilled
38 Numbers for 2017 as quoted in Zanker, F., migration.
Altrogge, J., Arhin-Sam, K. and Jegen, L. 2020.
Challenges in EU-African Migration Cooperation: While the opening of legal pathways
West African Perspectives on Forced Return.
has been a key demand of West African
Freiburg: MEDAM.
governments,42 the extent to which
39 Cisse, F. 2011. ‘Senegal’, Remittance Markets in
Africa, ed. Mohapatra, S., Dilip, R. Washington:
current proposals take this demand into
The International Bank for Reconstruction and consideration remains insufficient as such
Development. pathways imply a strong focus on labour
40 Mouthaan, M. 2019. ‘Unpacking Domestic market needs. Member states’ projects, such
Preferences in the Policy-“Receiving” State: as Spanish attempts to open legal pathways
The EU’s Migration Cooperation with Senegal in 2016 and 2019 to Senegalese citizens, have
and Ghana’, Comparative Migration Studies, 7:1.; often not made it beyond their pilot phase.
Jegen, L. 2020. The Political Economy of Migration Further, projects like the Nigerian-German
Governance in Senegal, Freiburg: MEDAM, Arnold Centre for Jobs, Migration and Reintegration
Bergstraesser Institute and Mercator Foundation.;
Altrogge, J. and Zanker, F. 2019. The Political
Economy of Migration Governance in the Gambia,
Freiburg, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute. 42 Adam, I., Trauner, F., Jegen, L., Roos, C. 2020.
41 Arhin-Sam, K. 2019. The Political Economy of ‘West African interests in (EU) migration policy.
Migration Governance in Nigeria, Freiburg: Balancing domestic priorities with external
MEDAM, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute and incentives’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,
Mercator Foundation. p. 1-18.
7CRU Policy Brief
that offers training to access the German A first observation is that the amount set
job market – despite the chances of aside for external migration programming
accessing the job market being zero to none is very high and funds can be sourced
– result in a sense of ‘unfilled promise’.43 from a wide variety of funding instruments.
Marginalising West African governments’ Migration is set to become an institutionalised
demands for legal migration in future policy priority for EU external action, funded
cooperation reflects the dominance of primarily through the new Neighbourhood,
European interests in migration cooperation Development and International Cooperation
and further puts into question the possibility Instrument (NDICI). The NDICI is a newly
of working towards mutually beneficial created funding mechanism that combines
migration cooperation. several external funding instruments, with the
ambition of streamlining funding on external
Drawing on the policies outlined in the affairs.44 The amount agreed upon for NDICI
New Pact on Asylum and Migration there during the July Council negotiations is €79.46
are few indications that a paradigm shift billion. While budgetary details about the
towards mutually beneficial migration exact breakdown of spending under NDICI
cooperation is likely to occur in the coming are not yet known, insights into funding
years. The next section will examine the priorities can be drawn based on the prior
budgetary proposals currently on the table Commission proposal. The instrument will
and how far they leave scope for such have a geographic component, a thematic
a shift to take place. component and a rapid response component.
The geographic component is by far the
largest part of NDICI; it contains over 75% of
The EU budget for external the total NDICI budget as per the Commission
migration programming proposal. Sub-Saharan Africa will receive the
largest part of the geographic funds, with the
most recent Commission proposal reserving
Having outlined the policy trends, a 47% for the region.45 The Commission has
closer consideration of the latest budget indicated that 10% of NDICI, including
proposals shows how the pillars of the all three components, is expected to be
EU’s external migration cooperation are dedicated to migration programming, covering
further consolidated through its proposed root causes and forced displacement, and
funding infrastructure, and how concerns strengthening migration governance. Based
for a balanced and mutual beneficial on the July agreement this would translate to
partnership derive from this. The European nearly €8bn reserved for migration spending
Commission put forward a revised proposal under NDICI alone.
for its new long-term budget in May 2020.
An agreement at Council level in July fixed In addition to NDICI, several EU internal
total spending for 2021-2027 at €1,074.3 funding instruments with a specific migration
billion. The proposal is currently under focus will be able to implement programmes
discussion and is expected to be formally outside the EU borders. The Integrated
adopted by the end of 2020. From an Border Management Fund (IBMF) for
analysis of the proposed 2021-2027 instance, budgeted at €5.5bn, as well as
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMIF),
several observations can be made on where budgeted at €8.7bn are both open to
and how the EU intends to set aside funds
for migration programming in its budget.
44 The NDICI instrument will shelter the former EDF,
ENI, DCI, EIDHR, IcSP, PI, and Guarantee Fund.
Continuing to operate separately from this new
mega instrument will be the IPA, CFSP, humanitarian
aid, OCTs and EINs.
43 Arhin-Sam, K. 2019. The Political Economy of 45 The exact percentage breakdown of the July
Migration Governance in Nigeria, Freiburg: budget agreement is not yet known. Calculations
MEDAM, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute and are therefore based on the May 2020 Commission
Mercator Foundation. p. 29. proposal.
8CRU Policy Brief
External dimension
of EU migration
programming
NDICI
€79.46 bn
10%
% unknown % unknown % unknown External programming
ISF Internal programming
€8.7 bn
IBMF
€8.7 bn
AMIF
€8.7 bn
external programming in third countries.46 northward mobility and are unlikely to take
Worth mentioning as well is the Internal into account the concerns of third countries,
Security Fund (ISF), budgeted at €2.5bn, as outlined in the first part of this brief.
which is primarily geared towards tackling
organised crime and security threats. A second observation is the flexibility built
The fund’s proposal includes an external into funding instruments. Funds in the
component geared towards tackling migrant EU budget that can be used for external
smuggling.47 There are thus a variety of migration programming include large
funding instruments available to implement amounts of non-allocated funds that can
programming in third countries. be used in a flexible manner. NDICI for
instance holds a €3bn ‘global challenges’
The combination of external and internal header that remains largely unspecified
funds for external migration programming and can be used for, among other things,
carries the risk of blurring foreign and migration programming. This is on top of
domestic policy objectives, which raises the fund’s €4bn rapid response pillar, which
questions in regard to policy coherence.48 is inherently flexible in nature and could be
Domestic considerations driven by migration used for so-called migration emergencies.
control prerogatives have the potential to But flexibility is apparent not only in the
dominate EU foreign policy and development NDICI; internal funds open to third country
priorities that are based, at least on paper, programming showcase a similar tendency
on eradicating poverty and fostering stability towards non-allocated, and thus adjustable,
and respect for human rights. Such longer- funding. Forty percent of AMIF, IBMF
term objectives do not resonate well with and ISF funds are sheltered in so-called
a shorter-term ambition of restricting ‘thematic facilities’ which provide flexible
funding for emerging priorities as opposed
to the remaining 60% channelled to fixed
46 The extent to which these funding instruments national programmes.49 Flexible funding is
can be used externally is not clarified in their not inherently problematic. It represents
proposed regulations. a willingness to be able to respond to
47 ISF funding has in the past been used to provide emerging issues that are impossible to
assistance to the Libyan Coast Guard. foresee in a budget with a 7-year horizon.
48 Bisong, A., 2020. The impact of EU external
migration policies on sustainable development:
A review of the evidence from West, North and the
Horn of Africa, Brussels, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 49 Knoll, A., Veron, P. 2019. Migration and the next EU
and Caritas Europe. long-term budget, Maastricht, ECDPM.
9CRU Policy Brief
This type of funding does, however, come available to IcSP at its inception.52 Once again,
with a challenge: funds might be directed to streamlining several instruments into one
issues receiving the most political attention, larger instrument is not a problem as such.
for example migration, at the expense of It does risk, however, certain policy areas
other policy priorities. becoming less visible and ultimately less well
funded while they remain rhetorically high on
It is in this regard that a third observation can the EU’s external action agenda.
be made. In contrast to the many references
to migration, other topics receive much less This brings us to the fourth and last
attention in EU external action budgets. observation, which relates to the question
In the case of NDICI, sheltering a wide of oversight. A welcome change in the
variety of funding instruments under one new budget is that the European Parliament
streamlined instrument built on pillars of root will have oversight over external funds, the
causes and securitised approaches raises lack of which was a source of contention
the question of prioritisation.50 Most notably, throughout the last budgetary cycle.53
the Human Rights Instrument (EIDHR) will Under the current plans, however, oversight
cease to exist in the next budgetary cycle for internal funding mechanisms will
and human rights programming will now be principally lie with internal Committees in
integrated into the thematic component of the EP (such as, for instance, the Committee
NDICI. While exact numbers are not known on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home
at this stage, earlier proposals suggest Affairs), whereas oversight over NDICI is
that human rights issues will see a modest likely to lie mainly within the Committee on
decline in funding compared to the previous Foreign Affairs (AFET) and the Committee
MFF.51 This means that human rights issues on Development (DEVE). Overseeing
lose their prominence within the overall programming in third countries financed
external action of the EU and become less through internal funding instruments thus
visible and slightly less funded. In a similar risks fragmenting the scrutiny of external
fashion, the Instrument contributing to migration policies as a whole.
Stability and Peace (IcSP) will cease to exist
as a standalone instrument and will instead While budgetary discussions are still ongoing
be absorbed into the thematic component of these observations show a picture in which
NDICI, where the funding allocated to it will the amount of funding available to migration is
be significantly lower than the funding made very high, and comes from a range of funding
instruments that have a high level of flexibility
built into them. This budgetary setup again
puts the feasibility of a paradigm shift into
question. It rather demonstrates an ambition
to further consolidate an external migration
50 For further reading on the concerns about
governance based more on continuity of its
prioritisation and concerns about overbudgeting
on migration matters in the new MFF see ECRE.
2019. Outspending on migration? ECRE’s analysis
and recommendations on funding for migration 52 Funding for stability and peace under NDICI’s
outside the EU to inform the negotiations of the next thematic component is in the current, non-definitive
EU multi-annual financial framework 2021-2027, version of the MFF projected at €1 bn whereas
May.; CONCORD. 2019. Recommendations on funding for IcSP in 2014 was fixed at €2.3 bn.
the NDICI migration spending target, September.; See European Parliament. 2020. Proposal for a
Berger, A. 2019. The Nexus between Migration and regulation of the EP and the Council establishing
Development in EU External Action: No Quick Fix, the neighbourhood, development and international
Ixelles: Institute for European Studies. cooperation instrument, September.; European
51 In the original Commission proposal, 21% of the Commission. 2014. Regulation (EU) no 230/2014
thematic envelope are dedicated to human rights, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
which, extrapolated to the numbers that were 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing
released following the July 2020 summit – where to stability and peace, March.
€ 6.3 was allocated to the thematic envelope would 53 The EUTF for instance operated largely without
mean € 1.323 billion for the period 2021-2027. oversight. See Kipp, D. 2018. From Exception
The period 2014-2020 saw € 1.332 billion dedicated to Rule – the EU Trust Fund for Africa, Berlin:
to human rights. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
10CRU Policy Brief
policies of the past few years rather than on internal and external funding mechanisms, and
seeking the mutually beneficial relationship it that the EU works towards a more towards a
advances rhetorically. sustainable migration policy.
Conclusion Recommendations
This policy brief shows that in the case of – Safeguard credibility as an international
West African states, recent EU policy and cooperation partner: The involvement
budgetary proposals fall short on m atching of the internal financing instruments in EU
the EU rhetoric of moving towards a external policy and the failure to include
mutually beneficial partnership in the field a strong human rights priority in relevant
of migration cooperation. Instead, recent funding instruments both risk damaging
developments indicate a continuation and the EU's reputation as a credible partner
consolidation of policies that have shaped in the long term. First, the involvement
EU external migration governance in recent of internal financing instruments, and
years. The policy trends outlined in the first therefore domestic policy considerations,
part of this brief have shown that current in the EU’s external migration policy risks a
thinking is geared more towards consolida- reprioritisation of foreign policy goals. This
tion than the publicly announced paradigm might lead to a diminished attractiveness
shift. Notably, consolidation of the root of the EU as a partner in the long term.
causes approach and a greater role for the A domestic agenda that runs EU foreign
EU in migration control operations in third policy objectives such as peace, stability
countries both signal that Brussels will con- and good governance should not be able
tinue to call the shots in terms of priority to consistently take a dominant position.
setting, with little lessons learned from Second, in the context of human rights
adverse effects of, or local concerns about, being under strain in many key regions
EU policies over the last years. The explicit of EU programming it is noteworthy that
leverage enshrined in policy documents, as the corresponding budget sees a modest
well as the questionable commitment to safe decline in funding on human rights issues.
and legal pathways, signal a similar tendency. Past evaluations of external EU financing
Such leverage seems very much enshrined in instruments pointed to the potential trade-
budgetary proposals currently on the table, off between human rights considerations
which reserve significant funding for migra- and the migration-security nexus,
tion programming in third countries that can highlighting the need to prioritise migrant
be used flexibly and of which the setup in rights in future programming. In order to
terms of oversight is yet to be clarified. mitigate the risk of credibility loss, migration
programming, particularly programmes with
Overall, there is little indication that a a strong security dimension, should include
paradigm shift is likely to occur in the permanent or periodic monitoring of their
coming years. A failure to rethink this human rights compliance.
approach is likely to lead to further negative
impacts of EU migration programming in – Ensure development projects reach
third states and may in the longer term their long- and short-term objectives:
result in the EU becoming an increasingly The EU’s development policies should
unattractive partner. In view of a more be designed to meet its international
strained geopolitical context, it is necessary commitments including local ownership
that the EU safeguards its credibility as under the Agenda 2030,54 its own ‘Leave
an international cooperation partner and
its foreign policy as able to meet complex
challenges beyond migration. Policy makers 54 Such as SDG 8.8 – migrant workers, women
should use the new budgetary cycle as an migrants; SDG 10.7 – facilitate orderly, safe,
opportunity to tackle these concerns and regular and responsible migration and mobility
should ensure that development projects of people, including through implementation of
reach their long- and short-term objectives, planned and well-managed migration policies;
that there is adequate oversight of both SDG 10.c – remittances; SDG 17.18 – data monitoring.
11CRU Policy Brief
no one behind principle’ as enshrined will be involved in carrying out the
in the 2017 European Consensus on external dimension of EU migration
Development, and its commitment policies; that will require oversight
to poverty eradication as enshrined to be designed in such a way that
in Article 208 TFEU. In addition, the it can be carried out in a coherent
concerns of West African states, and comprehensive manner. In other
should be taken seriously. Additionally, words, the fragmentation of funding
regional migration and mobility realities instruments should not lead to
offer an entry point for programming, fragmented oversight. In those cases
and incorporating feedback from where internal funding instruments
past implementers55 needs serious are used in third countries, this
consideration. Otherwise projects risk should be done within the overall
losing local buy in, which is crucial foreign policy objectives and should
to achieve long- and short-term be able to be evaluated as such by
objectives. European Parliament Committees with
a foreign policy remit, such as DEVE
– Build holistic relations with third and AFET. Ideally, one Committee
countries to be able to meet complex will have the lead in overseeing all
challenges beyond migration: The external migration programming, in
political and social stakes of forced return particular evaluating whether such
and readmission for West African states programming is compliant with
are high. Political stakes include risks of commitments underpinning EU external
losing democratic accountability through action, regardless of whether such
the informalisation of return agreements programming originates from internal or
and an associated loss of a government’s external funding instruments.
legitimacy in the eyes of the population.
Following an approach in which other – Work towards a sustainable
policy domains are subordinated to migration cooperation beyond the
EU return interests carries a high risk crisis mode: The commitment to safe
of undermining EU foreign affairs and legal pathways as enshrined in
policy towards West African states and the New Pact constitutes an important
curtailing the legitimacy of the EU as stepping stone towards migration
an international actor. A more balanced cooperation that works for European
approach that takes the return-related and West African governments as
concerns of West African states seriously well as migrants. However, as shown
would therefore be beneficial for both the in this policy brief, labour migration
EU and its partner countries. channels proposed under the Pact are
likely to benefit only small sections of
– Ensure appropriate oversight the West African population. Hence
of both internal and external their potential to offer alternatives to
funding mechanisms when used so-called irregular migration remains
in third countries. The integration of limited. The opening of legal pathways is
development funds under parliamentary crucial in working towards sustainable
scrutiny is a welcome step towards migration management, as without an
more oversight and transparency into enhanced political commitment to legal
EU spending on external migration labour migration, EU migration policy
programming. However, different will continue to prioritise its efforts
Directorate-Generals of the European against irregular migration, the very
Commission, both internal and external, problem it creates.
55 See for instance Fernandez-Duran, C., Febles
Carmona, E. 2020. Human mobility and resilience
in the Sahel: challenges and opportunities,
Brussels: OXFAM.
12About the Clingendael Institute
Clingendael – the Netherlands Institute of International Relations –
is a leading think tank and academy on international affairs.
Through our analyses, training and public debate we aim to inspire
and equip governments, businesses, and civil society in order to
contribute to a secure, sustainable and just world.
www.clingendael.org/cru @clingendaelorg
cru@clingendael.org The Clingendael Institute
+31 70 324 53 84 The Clingendael Institute
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About the authors
Leonie Jegen is a PhD Candidate at the Amsterdam Institute for
Social Science Research (AISSR), University of Amsterdam. Her research
focuses on the reform of the Senegalese smuggling of migrants policy
and more generally externalization of migration control. Previously,
she worked on several research projects on European influence on
West African migration governance.
Johannes Claes is a Research Fellow with Clingendael’s Conflict
Research Unit. His research focuses on migration in the Sahel and
West Africa and on the impacts of migration policies on local dynamics.
He was previously based in Niger and Senegal where he worked for
humanitarian organisations.
Omar N. Cham, originally from The Gambia, is a Ph.D. Candidate in the
Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences and Solvay Business School,
VUB. His PhD research focuses on the politics of return migration in
The Gambia. Omar’s research seeks to explore how cooperation on
forced return migration between The Gambia and the EU changed
with transition to democracy in 2016. Omar holds a master’s degree in
Social Policy and Social Services from Istanbul University, a master’s
degree in Management from the VUB, and a bachelor’s degree (Hons)
in Development Studies from the University of The Gambia.You can also read
