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chapter 10
The Sewol Ferry Disaster in Korea and Maritime
Safety Management
i Introduction
The sinking of the Sewol ferry on 16 April 2014 was the deadliest peacetime
maritime accident in Korea since 1970.1 In the aftermath, the Korean govern-
ment established an agenda committed to advancing maritime safety stan-
dards, safety management governance, practices, and institutions as well as
to enhancing public awareness of maritime safety. Despite such commitment,
challenges remain.
For Korea, which has a good safety record and a modern maritime safety
infrastructure, the 2014 ferry disaster was a shock that affected the country as
a whole. Many critics argued that the ferry accident was the outcome of rapid
economic development, referred to as ‘compressed growth,’ where the poverty-
stricken country in the 1950s and 1960s has risen to one of the world’s most
developed countries in a few decades. They maintain that the country has sac-
rificed safety for rapid economic development.
This chapter explores what caused this type of ferry accident and identifies
the lessons learned from the disaster and the challenges that exist to ensure
the maritime safety of passenger ships to prevent such disasters in the future.
ii The Sinking of the Sewol Ferry
Overview2
On 16 April 2014, the Sewol ferry, a 6,825-ton, roll-on roll-off passenger ship,
with 476 passengers and crew on board, was en route to Jeju Island when it
sank off the coast of Jindo Island, southwest of Korea. The passengers included
1 On 12 December 1970, the Namyoung ferry with 338 passengers on board en route to Busan
from Jeju Island capsized off the coast of Yeosu in the southern part of Korea, leaving 326
people dead.
2 The description of the sinking of the Sewol ferry is based on the Safety Investigation Re-
port, released by the Korea Maritime Safety Tribunal (kmst) on 9 December 2014. The kmst
probed into the ferry accident through a special investigative team for eight months. The
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345 high school students on a field trip, 14 teachers, 104 general passengers and
33 crew members. The accident resulted in 295 dead, nine missing, and 172
rescued.
The ship departed from the Incheon Port around 21:00 on 15 April, after ex-
periencing a two-hour delay due to a thick fog, which made visibility less than
1 km. The ferry arrived at Maengol Strait off the Jindo Island around 08:27 on
16 April. The weather conditions there were wind speed of 4–7 m/sec, waves of
0.5 m high, and good visibility. Passing through the Maengol Strait3 at 18 knots,
the ferry, loaded with 2142.7 tons of cargo, began to list sharply to the left when
it made a left turn around 08:49 and capsized around 10:25.
Causes of the Disaster
The Korea Maritime Safety Tribunal (kmst) explored the causes of the sink-
ing of the Sewol ferry. The Prosecution Service4 and the Board of Audit and
Inspection conducted investigations to determine the causes in the context of
criminal prosecution and administrative charges.5
The followings are the findings of these agencies: First, unseaworthiness as
a result of modifications to the ferry; overloading of cargo; and drainage of
required ballast water were identified as the causes of the sinking. The ves-
sel, built and commissioned in Japan in 1994, was purchased by Chunghaejin
Marine Co. in 2012. Before the Sewol ferry was placed in service in Korea, the
ferry’s upper decks were renovated, adding scores of cabins capable of carrying
an additional 114 passengers and an art gallery.6
kmst says that it has concluded the safety investigation report by interviewing 53 people,
including crew, and by conducting spot inspections and simulations.
3 The Maengol Strait is a narrow channel with 4.5 km of width between Jindo Island and
Maengol Island. The current speed in the channel is up to 6 knots, the second highest in
Korea after Uldolmok Channel in the vicinity.
4 The Prosecution Service released the result of investigation on the Sewol ferry’s sinking on
6 October 2014. According to the Prosecution Service, it has conducted extensive investiga-
tions on the ferry’s sinking, using three special investigation teams at the regional prosecu-
tion services. The focus of their investigation were on five areas: causes of the Sewol ferry’s
sinking and violation of crew’s responsibilities; negligence in management and supervision
of ship safety; corruption of the owner of Chunghaejin Marine Company and his family;
irregularities of the shipping community; violation of responsibilities in rescue operations.
The Prosecution Report is available at http://www.spo.go.kr/spo/notice/press/press.jsp.
5 Bureau of Audit and Inspection material (in Korean) is available at .
6 kmst, Report (n 2), p. 10.
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According to the findings of kmst, the modification made the ship top-
heavy, moving the ferry’s center of buoyancy 51 cm upward, which made it
more prone to capsizing.7 When the Korea Register (kr), a non-profit vessel
classification agency responsible for the inspection of a redesign of the ferry’s
body8 approved the modification, it set stability limits for the ferry respecting
the maximum cargo weight that it could carry, and on the minimum amount
of ballast needed when fully loaded. More specifically, the limits set after the
modification were that the maximum weight of cargo was 987 tons, a reduc-
tion of 1,450 tons from the original cargo capacity, and the amount of ballast
needed was 1,703 tons, an increase of 1,333 tons from the original design.9
It was found that the Sewol ferry was loaded with 2,142 tons of cargo and
with 1,375.8 tons of ballast water.10 The Prosecution Service accused the com-
pany of deliberately draining of the ferry’s ballast water to load more cargo.11
The prosecution also discovered that the overloading of the Sewol ferry had
been a common practice and the redesign of the ferry to carry more cargo were
a way to address the worsening financial problems of the Chunghaejin Marine
Co. The Prosecution Service indicated that the financial problem had been
brought about by constant embezzlement and fraud by the owner of the Sewol
ferry company and his family, starting in 2005.12
Second, poor lashing of vehicles and badly tied-down containers were
blamed for the sharp tilting of the ferry. The poorly lashed and improperly se-
cured 80 vehicles and 1,100 tons of shipping containers fell to one side, and
this led the ferry to tilt sharply by 30 degrees, which made it impossible to
set right once again.13 The Prosecution Service, citing the results of simulation
conducted by a research team at Seoul National University, found that if cargos
had been properly secured, the ferry would have tilted less than 10 degrees.14
Third, the poor steering by the vessel navigators who made a sharp turn
without considering the stability of the Sewol ferry is problematic. The Pros-
ecution Service discovered that when passing through the Maengol Channel,
the spot of the sinking, the captain was not present on the bridge, and he had
neglected his duty to steer through the narrow and risky waterway. Instead he
7 Ibid.
8 Art. 15, The Ship Safety Act; The modification of a ship requiring government approval is
limited to the length, width, depth, and purpose of a ship.
9 kmst, Report (n 2), p. 10.
10 The Prosecution Service (n 4), p. 5.
11 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
12 Ibid., pp. 6 & 17.
13 Ibid., p. 6.
14 Ibid., p. 7.
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arranged for a 25-year-old third mate to make her first navigation through the
channel from Incheon to the Jeju Island. The third mate and the helmsman
made a sharp right turn, ignoring a recommendation not to make sharp turns
due to the ferry’s instability.15
According to the kmst report, the captain and the third mate officer were
aware of the stability issues of the ferry as a result of the modifications. It was
found that the former captain of the ferry Sewol had advised crews not to make
sudden turns greater than 5 degrees at once.16
The kmst Report also found that the captain and crew members were poor-
ly trained for emergency situations, which resulted in their fleeing the vessel
when the ferry started to capsize without taking actions to protect the pas-
sengers.17 When the ferry continued to tilt, they repeatedly directed the pas-
sengers to ‘stay inside the ship.’18
The captain and crew were all arrested and charged. The captain and three
senior crew members, including the first and second mates and a chief engi-
neer, were convicted of murder through willful negligence.19 The prosecutors
asked that the captain receive the death penalty. The rest of the crew mem-
bers were charged with killing or injuring the passengers by leaving them at
risk.20
In a trial on 11 November 2014, the captain was acquitted of murder. The
judge ruled that the prosecution had failed to prove the murder charge. In-
stead the captain was convicted of failing to take the steps required to save
passengers in an emergency.21 The captain was sentenced to 36 years in prison
for deserting his ship and passengers in the fatal crisis. The judge ruled that
the captain ‘abandoned his passengers, knowing that they were waiting for in-
structions from the crew and that if they were not evacuated, their lives would
be at risk.’22
15 kmst (n 3), p. 90.
16 Ibid, p. 29.
17 Ibid, pp. 93–95.
18 Ibid, p. 3.
19 The Prosecution Service, supra note 4, p. 8.; The chief engineer was convicted of murder
on the charge of willful negligence for abandoning two seriously injured cooks whom he
could have saved.
20 Ibid.
21 ‘Captain Gets 36 Years for Deserting Korean Ferry,’ The New York Times, 11 November 2014,
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/south-korea-ferry-captain.
html.
22 Ibid.
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The others were found guilty of similar charges. The first and the second
mates were sentenced to 20 and 15 years in prison, respectively.23 Eleven crew
members of lower rank were sentenced to five to 10 years in prison for shirking
their duty to save passengers.24 In a subsequent appeal on 28 April 2015, the
captain was found guilty of murder and sentenced to life in prison.25
Disaster Response
Concerning vessel traffic services in Korea, the Maritime Safety Act, the imple-
mentation of Chapter 5, Safety of Navigation of the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea (solas) Convention,26 directed that the Vessel Traf-
fic Services (vts) are provided in the Special Areas for Maritime Safety and
heavy traffic areas off the coasts.27 The purposes of vts are to provide informa-
tion to prevent marine accidents such as collision and grounding; to enhance
the efficiency of port management; and to provide advice, recommendations,
and directions for maritime safety.28
At the time of the Sewol ferry disaster, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries
(mof) had responsibility for the port vts, while the Korea Coast Guard (kcg)
had responsibility for the coastal vts.
The Jindo Coastal vts, one of three coastal vts centers and the one in charge
of the waters where the Sewol ferry sank, was monitoring the movement of the
Sewol ferry on a voluntary reporting basis. When the Sewol ferry began to tilt,
the crew first called for help, contacting the Jeju Port vts around 08:55 on 16
April.29 The distress call was relayed to the Jindo vts via the situation room of
the Mokpo District Coast Guard, which is in charge of these waters.
Contacting the Sewol ferry, the Jindo vts kept advising the crew members
to ‘give directions for the passengers to put on life jackets’ and to ‘determine
quickly the evacuation of passengers on the captain’s discretion.’30 The Jindo
vts directed vessels in the vicinity on the radio to ‘render assistance to rescue
operations.’31 When the crew reported to the Jindo vts that they were not able
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 ‘Sewol Ferry Captain Jailed for Murder of 304 passengers,’ cnn, 28 April 2015, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/28/asia/sewol-ferry-captain-jailed-murder/.
26 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1184 u.n.t.s. 2.
27 Art. 36, The Maritime Safety Act.
28 Art. 12, The Presidential Decree of the Maritime Safety Act.
29 kmst (n 2), p. 51.
30 Ibid., p. 53.
31 Ibid.
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to confirm how much the ferry was flooded, and that the ferry had listed by 60
degrees to the left, they evacuated, leaving passengers inside.32 Thirteen coast
guard officers at the Jindo vts Center were convicted of negligence and the
forgery of communication records.33
The kcg is, in accordance with the Maritime Distress and Rescue Act, the
lead agency responsible for search and rescue operations for marine incidents.
Depending on the scale of maritime distress, central, regional, and district
rescue headquarters are established in accordance with the organizational
structure of the kcg.34 Their missions are to command, control and coordi-
nate rescue activities by agencies from both public and private sectors.
When the Sewol ferry accident was reported to the kcg headquarters, the
Central Rescue Coordination Headquarters was activated under the control
of the commandant of the kcg. The regional and district rescue headquarters
were also activated.
kcg rescue forces included the 122 Rescue Team, named after the emer-
gency maritime distress call 122. These teams exist in all 17 district coast guard
stations. Also activated was a Special Rescue Team at the South Sea Regional
Command, which specializes in deep-sea rescue operations. The kcg has four
Maritime Commando Units in the regional commands, composed of rescue
officers mostly from navy special forces. They are primarily responsible for
maritime anti-terrorism.
The rescue forces were joined by the rescue forces of the navy and civilian
rescuers. A coast guard vessel, the 100-ton ship, Ship 123, was on routine surveil-
lance duty 13.7 nm away from the accident, and was dispatched to rescue the
passengers on the Sewol ferry. Three helicopters on duty in the vicinity were
also dispatched to rescue the passengers on the ferry.
The captain of Ship 123 was designated as an on-scene commander (osc),
in charge of the rescue operation. In collaboration with fishing boats, they res-
cued 172 passengers mostly on the deck of the sinking ferry.
The captain of Ship 123 testified at the National Assembly Inquiry that when
the vessel arrived on the scene, the Sewol ferry was tilting by 50 degrees.35 The
captain of Ship 123 was charged with the botched rescue effort that wasted pre-
cious time and delayed the evacuation of people from the vessel. The captain
32 Ibid., p. 54.
33 The Prosecution Service (n 4), p. 12.
34 Art. 5, The Distress and Rescue Act.
35 ‘The Captain of the Coast Guard Ship 123 Says Those Who Asked for Rescue Were Rescued,’
(translated by author) Yonhap News, 16 October 2014, available at http://www.yonhap-
news.co.kr/bulletin/2014/10/16/0200000000AKR20141016136200001.HTML?input=1179m.
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was found guilty of professional negligence and sentenced to four years in
prison. He was also charged with falsely reporting that he had broadcast an
evacuation order through loudspeakers.36
iii Passenger Ship Transport and Status of Marine Accidents
Overview of Global Passenger Ship Accidents
Ferries are the safest form of transportation in North America and Europe.
However, they are often the agents of catastrophe in some developing coun-
tries. Over past decades, there have been numerous incidents in which hun-
dreds have died. In the first few years of the 21st century, there have been, on
average, over 1,000 fatalities annually.37
Table 10.1 shows the status of the worst passenger ship accidents worldwide,
primarily ferries, since 2000. Most notable is that the deadliest incidents over
the past decade, involving hundreds to thousands of fatalities, have occurred
in developing countries in Southeast Asia and Africa. Among them, Bangla-
desh, Philippines and Indonesia are ranked as the most vulnerable countries
for ferry accidents in Asia. These countries are each composed of archipelagic
islands and rivers where ferry transport is a major mode of transport for much
of the population. In Bangladesh, a nation of 130 million people living on a
coastal river delta interspersed with 250 north–south rivers, approximately
20,000 ferries provide two distinctive types of transport service: (1) river cross-
ing and (2) long-distance travel. The latter is more likely to be involved in a
catastrophic accident.38
Between 2000 and 2004, more than 4,000 people globally, mostly from devel-
oping countries, died in ferry accidents. As illustrated in Table 10.1, this trend
appears to have continued despite endeavors to prevent ferry disasters and re-
duce fatalities.
When it comes to the causes of disastrous ferry accidents, major contrib-
uting factors include the poor quality of vessels, overcrowding, sudden haz-
ardous weather, and the human factor.39 Most accidents are caused by the
interaction of several contributing factors, none of which would be fatal on
36 ‘South Korea Coast Guard Captain Jailed over Sewol Ferry Rescue Bid,’ bbc News,21 April
2014, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31412680.
37 Catherine T. Lawson & Roberta E. Weisbrod, ‘Ferry Transport: The Realm of Responsibil-
ity for Ferry Disasters in Developing Countries’ (2005) 8(4) Journal of Transportation, p. 17.
38 Ibid., p. 22.
39 ‘How Safe Are Ferries?,’ Discovery News, 18 April 2014, available at http://news.discovery.
com/human/how-safe-are-ferries-140418.htm.
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Table 10.1 Status of fatal passenger ship accidents worldwide since 2000*
No. Ship Country Type Date Location Fatality Cause
1 Le Joola Senegal Ferry 9.26.2002 Off coast of 1,863 Overloading
Gambia
2 Spice Zanzibar Ferry 9.10.2011 Zanzibar 1,570 Overloading
Islander i Channel
3 Al-Salam Egypt Ferry 2.03.2006 Red Sea 1,093 Fire, design
Boccaccio 98 flaw
4 Princess of Philippine Ferry 6.21.2008 Off Mandalika 814 Stormy
Stars Island weather
5 Nasreen i Bangladesh Ferry 7.08.2003 Meghna River 530 Strong current
6 Salahuddin 2 Bangladesh Ferry 5.03.2002 Meghna River 469 N/A
7 Senopati Indonesia Ferry 12.30.2006 Off Mandalika 404 Stormy
Nusantara Island weather
8 Rabaul Papua New Ferry 2.02.2012 Solomon Sea 321 Large waves
Queen Guinea
9 km Terati Indonesia Ferry 7.10.2011 Makassar Strait 280 Stormy
Prima weather
10 Bulgaria Russia Cruise 7.10.2011 Volga River 122 Stormy
weather
11 Thomas of Philippine Ferry 8.16.2013
Off coast of 120 Overcrowding
Aquinas Cebu
12 Samson Madagascar Ferry 3.07.2004 Off coast of 111 Stormy
Madagascar weather
13 Princess Tonga Ferry 7.07.2009 Off coast of 74 Unseaworthi-
Ashika Tonga ness
14 Coco-4 Bangladesh Ferry 11.28.2009 Near Bhola 56 Swamped
Island
15 Costa Italy Cruise 1.13.2012 Off Isola Del 32 Grounding
Concordia Giglio
Note: *The Sewol ferry is not listed.
their own. According to a report to the World Ferry Safety Association, human
error was a cause in most of the ferry accidents between 2000 and 2014 (up to
60% to 86%,40 depending on how human error is defined).
40 Abigail Golden, ‘Ferry Fatalities: Statistics and Causation of Major Accidents 2000–2014,’
available at http://www.ferrysafety.org/news.htm.
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Of particular note is the stark contrast in the number of fatalities from ferry
accidents between underdeveloped countries and highly developed countries.
The u.s. ferry system, for example, which transports 200 million passengers
annually, has had virtually no fatalities between 1904’s General Slocom ferry
incident41 and 2003’s Staten Island ferry incident.42
The international community has, through the International Maritime
Organization (imo), developed measures respecting the safety of large pas-
senger ships, primarily cruise ships and passenger ferries. This culminated in
the adoption of a series of amendments to the solas Convention in Decem-
ber 2006, which entered into force in July 2010.43 The guiding philosophy of the
amendments is based on the dual premise in the design of future passenger
ships. One is that the regulatory framework should place more emphasis on
the prevention of casualties from occurring. The other is that passenger ships
should be designed for improved survivability so that in the event of an inci-
dent, people can stay on board as the ship proceeds to port.44
The safety requirements of the solas Convention do not apply to ferries
that operate inland or solely domestic routes.45 The imo has also recognized
the need to focus on the ferries which do not come under the solas Con-
vention and is working on the development of standards for non-convention
vessels. In January 2006, the imo signed an mou with Interferry, a shipping
association representing the ferry industry worldwide, to cooperate toward
enhancing the safety of non-convention ferries. The aim of the mou was to
reduce fatalities by 90%, and Bangladesh was selected as a pilot country to
identify potential solutions to increase ferry safety.46
Participants from both the government and the private sector agreed to ac-
tions to provide worldwide ferry operations through global co-operation47 in
41 The ps General Slocum was a passenger ship built in 1891. She operated in the New York
City area as an excursion steamer for the next 13 years. On 15 June, the General Slocum
caught fire and sank in the East River of New York City. An estimated 1,021 of 1,342 people
onboard died.
42 On 15 October 2003, the Staten Island ferry, with 1,500 passengers onboard, crashed full-
speed into a concrete pier at the St. George Terminal in New York. Eleven people were
killed and 165 injured.
43 International Maritime Organization, ‘Safety of Ro-ro ferries,’ available at http://www
.imo.org/OurWork/Safety/Regulations/Pages/RO-ROFerries.aspx.
44 Ibid.
45 solas Convention (n 26).
46 Ibid.
47 ship-technology·com, ‘Taking Action on Ferry Safety,’ 2 October 2014, available at http://
www.ship-technology.com/features/featuretaking-action-on-ferry-safety-4379066/.
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October 2013 by adopting the Nanjing Plan at the second regional meeting on
the operational safety of domestic ferries held in Nanjing, China.48
The agreed-upon actions include inviting governments to develop appro-
priate regulations; reviewing and updating laws as well as keeping up with
technological advancements and new imo instruments; promoting a safety
culture among stakeholders; ensuring that ship owners and operators develop
and implement safety management systems; facilitating the provision of aids
to navigation, including Vessel Traffic Services; and encouraging ship designers
and builders to seek better technical solutions for ferry construction, such as
sink resistance and equipment to facilitate search and rescue.
Passenger Ship Accidents in Korea
Maritime accidents in Korea can usefully be compared with those in Japan.
Table 10.2 shows the number of marine accidents in both Korea and Japan
in recent years. The statistics indicate that, in Korea, there have been 10,155
marine accidents with 1,282 fatalities from 2008 through 2014, averaging
1,455 marine accidents each year and 183 fatalities annually. Passenger ship ac-
cidents, including accidents caused primarily by ferries, account for 2.2% of
the marine accidents nationwide. In Japan there have been 8,064 marine ac-
cidents during the same period, averaging 1,152 marine accidents annually, of
which passenger ship accidents account for 6.5%, with 75 accidents annually
on average. The number of fatalities between 2009 and 2012 totals 240 people,
averaging 60 fatalities annually.
Compared with Japan, Korea appears to be more prone to fatal marine
accidents, with a higher number of accidents and a higher rate of fatalities.
Concerning passenger ship accidents, Korea has had fewer passenger ship ac-
cidents, with 228 accidents, as opposed to 525 accidents in Japan in the same
period. However it does not necessarily indicate that Japan is more likely to
have passenger vessel accidents, because Japan consists of several thousand
islands and an extensive network of ferry routes to connect each island. The
disparity in the numbers of passengers carried by both domestic and interna-
tional passenger ships in the two countries supports the argument. In Japan,
87 million people were carried by 2,272 passenger ships in 2010, as opposed to
17 million people carried by 224 passenger ships in Korea.
It is important to note in terms of fatalities, the number of people dead or
missing in marine accidents in Korea is much higher than Japan between 2009
and 2012, averaging 150 and 160 people annually. This is also demonstrated in
the statistics of fatalities per accident, for which Korea recorded 15 fatalities
48 imo, ‘The Nanjing Plan,’ available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/TechnicalCoopera
tion/TCActivities/Documents/NANJING%20PLAN.pdf.
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per accident in last seven years, as opposed to five for the four years between
2009 and 2012 in Japan. This can be explained either by Korea being more
prone to large-scale marine incidents or that the responses to accidents have
not been as effective as in Japan.
Notably, the number of marine accidents in Korea in 2013 dropped signifi-
cantly to 1,093, approximately 500 cases fewer than the average annual mari-
time accidents for previous years, which had recorded over 1,500 cases per year.
This can be credited to ‘The Project to Reduce Marine Accidents by 30%,’ of
the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries and the Korea Coast Guard. The project
has focused on the prevention of marine accidents, of which fishing boats and
small ships of less than 100 tons accounted for approximately 66% and 71.1%
of maritime accidents, respectively.49
Table 10.2 Status of marine accidents in Korea and Japan
Year Korea Japan
Number of Fatalities (%)* Number of Fatalities (%)
marine accidents marine accidents
(passenger ship) (passenger ship)
2008 948(21)*** 116(12) 873(59) N/A
2009 1,815(17) 148(8) 1,522(62) 59(4)
2010 1,617(22) 170(11) 1,334(79) 52(4)
2011 1,809(22) 158(9) 1,126(68) 65(6)
2012 1,573(33) 122(8) 1,115(99) 64(6)
2013 1,093(39) 101(9) 1,084(103) N/A
2014 1,330(74) 467(35) 1,010(55) N/A
Total 10,185(228) 1,282(13) 8,064(525) 240(5)**
Source: Adapted from the Korea Maritime Safety Tribunal, and from the
Japan Transport Safety Board and the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Communications
Note: *This indicates the ratio of fatalities per marine accident.
**The figures are counted with only the numbers of casualties available in the period between
2009 and 2012.
***The upsurge in marine accidents in 2009 in Korea and Japan alike is believed to be due to
a wider coverage of marine accident statistics, rather than a rapid increase in marine
accidents.
49 The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Korea, ‘The Implementation Plan for
Maritime Safety 2014’(translated by author), p. 8.
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iv Governing the Safety of Passenger Ships in Korea
Licensing
The Shipping Act requires that the operators of passenger ships have a license,
varying with the types of shipping services offered, from the Ministry of Oceans
and Fisheries.50 The Chenghaejin Marine Co., in March 2013, had acquired
from the Incheon Regional Oceans and Fisheries Administration a license
for a domestic passenger liner service entitling it to operate two ferries on a
route between Incheon and Jeju. Vessels purchased overseas are exempt from
a newly built vessel inspection, and instead are subject to a special inspection
carried out by the Korean Register (kr) in accordance with Art. 60 of the Vessel
Safety Act, which provides that vessel inspections are outsourced to a public
corporation.51 The Sewol ferry, purchased in Japan in 2012, was inspected by kr
in February 2013 before being placed in service in February 2013.
Safety Management System
The safety requirements of the International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea (solas Convention) apply to only the passenger ships engaged in inter-
national voyages.52 Accordingly, passenger ships are not subject to the safety
management system to be adopted by states pursuant to the International
Safety Management Code (ism Code), which obliges every company to devel-
op, implement, and maintain a safety management system.53
Korea has the Vessel Safety Act and the Maritime Safety Law; the latter
implements the requirements of the solas Convention, including the ism
Code. Safety standards for domestic passenger ships are regulated by the Ship-
ping Act, under which the task of safety management of passenger ships had
been outsourced to the Korea Shipping Association (ksa),54 a cooperative as-
sociation of domestic shipping companies established in 1949 to promote the
shipping industry.
The shipping management regulations under the Shipping Act are quite
similar to the safety requirements in the Vessel Safety Act. However, they differ
concerning the responsibilities and authorities of a captain and a ship owner.
Under the supervision of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries and the Ko-
rea Coast Guard, the ksa was responsible for the safe operation of p assenger
50 Art. 4, The Shipping Act.
51 Art.7, The Vessel Safety Act.
52 Art. 3, solas Convention (n 26).
53 Ibid., International Safety Management Code, Part A(1.3).
54 Arts. 21 & 22, The Shipping Act.
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ships engaged on domestic voyages. The responsibilities of ksa inspectors
cover a wide range of safety checks, including adequate safety education
for operators, the existence of safety officers in passenger ship companies
and safety reporting, weather, and ship’s departure and arrival. Most impor-
tantly, the ksa was to monitor that passenger ships are not overcrowded or
overloaded.55
It has long been argued that the ksa should not monitor safety because it
may have conflicts of interest. In the aftermath of the Sewol ferry accident,
the task of safety checks in passenger ships was transferred to the Korea Ship
Safety Technology Authority,56 a public corporation responsible for ship in-
spections and surveys.
Disaster Response
The Disaster Response Act provides the legal framework for responding to
natural or social disasters in Korea. Under the act, the Minister of the Ministry
of Public Safety and Security (mpss), a ministry created in the aftermath of
the Sewol ferry disaster, is responsible for coordinating the tasks of disaster
response and safety management by central and local governments.
The Disaster Management Act states that when a large-scale disaster is de-
clared, the Central Disaster Response Headquarters (cdrh) is established at
the mpss under the control of the minister.57 If a response to a large-scale di-
saster at the national level is necessary, the prime minister will be in charge
of the cdrh. The large-scale disaster is defined as a disaster that inflicts enor-
mous damage on life or property, or is a disaster with far-reaching social or
economic consequences.58
The minister of the mpss is responsible for coordinating response and re-
covery operations for a large-scale disaster by all the agencies concerned. The
minister is also authorized to ask for financial measures and administrative
supports of the agencies concerned.
Operational Maritime Safety
The management of maritime traffic, such as maintenance of waterways, aids
to navigation, and vessel traffic management, is provided primarily by the
Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries. This differs from countries like the United
55 Art. 15.8, The Regulation of the Shipping Act.
56 Art. 22, The Shipping Act.
57 Art. 14, The Disaster Management Act Art. 14.
58 Art. 13, The Presidential Decree of the Disaster Management Act.
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States and Japan, in which these services are carried out mostly by their coast
guards. It has been a long-held position by the Korea Coast Guard that the
vts responsibility be unified into a single agency, principally the kcg, as in
the case in the United States and Japan. In the aftermath of the Sewol ferry
accident, the tasks of vts, both port and coastal, have been incorporated into
the mpss, to which kcg currently belongs.
Restructuring of the Korea Coast Guard
The kcg has been unique, in terms of its duty and organization. Unlike other
coast guards in the u.s. and Japan, the kcg is a ‘police type’ coast guard. While
typical coast guards are primarily committed to search and rescue and mari-
time safety and security, kcg’s duties have included some police missions such
as criminal investigations and intelligence.59 This uniqueness comes from its
organizational history. The kcg had been part of the National Police since its
creation in 1953. When the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (mof) was creat-
ed in 1996, the kcg separated from the National Police Agency and was placed
under mof as a central government agency.
In the presidential announcement of May 2014, President Park called the
Korea Coast Guard’s Sewol ferry rescue operations a failure, noting that ‘if it
had tried to rescue people more swiftly and more actively right after the ac-
cident, it could have greatly reduced the casualties.’60 She further said that
‘the Korea Coast Guard has been committed to criminal investigation and
its organizational growth since its inauguration, neglecting search and rescue
works.’61
As part of the plans to reorganize governmental organization to respond
to disasters more efficiently, the kcg was restructured, splitting its duties into
the National Police Agency and the mpss. The mpss incorporates the tasks of
disaster management from other government agencies and the duties of the
kcg. The restructuring will result in the kcg focusing more on search and res-
cue, with the previous criminal investigation and intelligence functions trans-
ferred to the National Police Agency.
59 Other than search and rescue, kcg’s missions include law enforcement, protection of
marine resources, anti-maritime terrorism, integrity of maritime domains, maritime traf-
fic service, national defense, oil pollution response, etc.
60 The Presidential Announcement (translated by author), 19 May, 2014, available at http://
news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/05/19/2014051900809.html.
61 Ibid.
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Maritime Safety Standards and Penalties
The Korean government has strengthened maritime safety by amending
some maritime laws closely related to the safety of passenger ships.62 The
amendment of the Shipping Act includes (1) reducing the age limit of passen-
ger ships from 30 years to 25 years; (2) imposing strict liability for a ship owner
responsible for a large-scale accident; (3) increasing fines for those who vio-
late safety regulations; (4) transferring the oversight on the safety of passen-
ger ships from the industry to a public corporation; (5) establishing electric
ticketing to ensure proper management of passengers and cargo; (6) requir-
ing the designation of personnel responsible for the safety management in a
ship company; (7) creating a five-year plan to modernize passenger ships in
Korea.
The amendment of the Seafarer’s Law includes (1) establishing the master’s
responsibility to ensure the stability of a ship and proper storage of cargo, and
adequate equipment and personnel; and to report the result of such checks to
the ship owner; (2) requiring the captain to be in command of the vessel in ar-
eas of frequent occurrence of accident; (3) clarifying the master’s duty to take
actions necessary to save passengers and cargos in case of emergency and not
to leave a vessel until protective measures are completed; and (4) increasing
the penalty for masters who leave a ship in an emergency without completing
life-saving actions or other necessary measures.
The amendment of the Vessel Safety Act includes (1) the prevention of
modifying a ship after a newly built ship inspection without a permit from
the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries; (2) and preventing any official who has
worked as a ship inspector within five years of retirement from taking a job of
inspector less than two years after retirement.
Recognizing that a cause of the Sewol ferry disaster was a collusive link
between the shipping industry and government regulators, the Korean govern-
ment has engaged in steps to break close ties between industries and govern-
ment bureaucrats.63 As a step to this end, the Civil Servant Ethics Law was
62 See Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries press release, ‘Passing the National Assembly of the
Follow-up Measure Bills of the Sewol Ferry’ (translated by author), 10 December, 2014.
63 President Park noted in the May 2014 Presidential Announcement, supra note 60, that ‘if
safety regulations were properly complied with, this disaster would have not occurred’
and ‘The Shipping Association, a lobby for the industry, was in charge of inspecting the
safety of ships, and retiring government officials took jobs at the association.’ ‘It is obvi-
ous that so long as such collusive ties exist, safety management will not be adequately
implemented.’
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revised to expand the employment restriction of retiring government officials
from two years to three years and to broaden the scope of job relevance to gov-
ernment positions, through which job opportunities are restricted.
v Further Challenges to Maritime Safety
In addition to a package of maritime safety measures implemented by the
Korean government, a number of further steps based on the lessons from the
Sewol disaster are suggested.
As discussed above, the pursuit of rapid economic growth has dominated
Korean society. The value of safety was often neglected. It is essential to pro-
mote ‘a culture of safety first’ to prevent further maritime disasters. Institution-
ally, more stringent standards should be employed to ensure maritime safety.
The trend of deregulation and government outsourcing helped maritime safe-
ty regulations become lax. Some regulations governing maritime safety stan-
dards have been abolished or deregulated. For example, the modification of
passenger ships was left out of government approval.
It is necessary for the government to take a greater responsibility in edu-
cating, training, and certifying crew and captains within the small-scale pas-
senger ship industry. To this end, a public academy that specializes in the
qualification of shipping crews of domestic and international passenger ships
should be created. The academy also should be responsible for the inspection
for crews in service.
In the wake of the Sewol ferry disaster, it was found that some in the Korea
Coast Guard were not properly trained and lacked the appropriate equipment
to rescue passengers onboard a large passenger ship that was tilting or capsiz-
ing. It was also found that the coast guard was not able to cope with a massive
maritime disaster due to limited resources, mobility, access, and equipment.
To bolster the rescue capability of the kcg, capacity-building tailored to ad-
vanced rescue and equipment is essential. Such a rescue capacity cannot not
be achieved without a close partnership with the civil sector. As part of these
efforts, the establishment of reserve rescue units, composed of civilian divers
on a regional basis, should be considered. Their mission would be to assist the
coast guard in the event of a maritime accident or to carry out rescue work on
their own.
In a massive disaster, a unified command is essential to ensure response and
recovery in a prompt and orderly manner. At the initial stage of the Sewol disas-
ter, the response was not well coordinated and managed among the relevant
government agencies. To avoid such a lack of coordination, a unified c ommand
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across government agencies should be established. Moreover, response offi-
cials should be prepared through training, exercises, and actual experience.
vi Conclusion
The causes of the Sewol ferry disaster are a combination of human error, insti-
tutional and legal deficiencies, the greed of the ship owner, a lack of seaman-
ship by the captain and crew, lax safety regulations, a lack of rescue capability,
and the collusive ties between the industry and bureaucrats.
The disaster has had a profound impact on the Korean society. Shocked by
a catastrophe which was thought not to be possible in a developed, sophisti-
cated nation, the country has engaged in developing a comprehensive package
of measures to ensure maritime safety. Along with these safety measures, a
culture of ‘safety first,’ above all, should be entrenched in daily life, and more
emphasis should be placed on proactive measures to prevent and reduce mari-
time accidents.
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