The Responsibility to Protect: A Cosmopolitan Argument for the Duty of Humanitarian Intervention

The Responsibility to Protect: A Cosmopolitan Argument for the Duty of
Humanitarian Intervention

                                                            Karina Sangha | University of Victoria

Abstract. This article examines the Responsibility to Protect and the ethical foundations upon which it stands. It
relies on cosmopolitan ethics to establish the existence of universal moral principles that apply to all humanity.
Furthermore, it establishes that universal human rights impose universal moral duties, which states, through the
proverbial social contract, are obligated to fulfill. Should a state fail to protect the basic rights of its citizens, it is
in violation of the social contract, and given the existence of universal moral principles, it then falls on the
international community to protect its fellow humanity.

Résumé. Cet article examine la responsabilité de protéger et les fondements éthiques sur lesquels elle se trouve.
Elle s’appuie l’éthique cosmopolite à établir l’existence des principes moraux universels qui s’appliquent à toute
l’humanité. Par ailleurs, il établit que les droits humains universels imposent des devoirs moraux universels, qui
stipule, à travers le contrat social proverbial, sont tenus de remplir. Si un état ne parvient pas à protéger les droits
fondamentaux de ses citoyens, il est en violation du contrat social, et étant donné l’existence des principes
moraux universels, il tombe alors sur la communauté internationale pour protéger leurs compatriotes.

    Political developments over the last few decades have raised a number of
important issues in international ethics, not the least of which is the permissibility
of humanitarian intervention, referring to taking coercive action against a
government in order to prevent or halt widespread human suffering that it has
caused or permitted within its own borders. Intervening into the affairs of a
sovereign state for purposes relating to human security has been controversial both
when it has occurred, as was the case in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and also
when it has failed to occur, as was the case in Rwanda (International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001). Although the norms of state
sovereignty and non-intervention upon which the international system was built
would seem to advise against intervention, these norms now operate in tension
with the increasing interdependence among states and a growing concern in the
international community for the protection of supposed universal human rights.
Insofar as this tension calls into question the very basis of the international system,
exploring when, if ever, humanitarian intervention is warranted is of considerable
importance.
    As evidenced by the formation of the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty, the importance of this difficult question has not escaped the
international community. Formed in September of 2000 under the sponsorship of
the Canadian government and charged with investigating the permissibility of
humanitarian intervention, the Commission argued that if a sovereign state fails to

Expressions
Winter / Hiver 2012 (January / Janvier)
© 2012 Canadian Political Science Students’ Association / Association des Étudiant(e)s de Science Politique
Canadienne

2	
   	
                                  	
                            Karina Sangha

uphold the fundamental rights of its population, it becomes the responsibility of the
international community to intervene (ICISS, 2001). Encapsulated in the principle
of the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P),” the Commission’s argument was novel.
Intervening into the affairs of sovereign states to uphold human rights was not
deemed a right, but rather, a responsibility.
    At least on the surface, the introduction of the R2P under the leadership of the
Canadian government would seem to represent another positive development in the
area of human rights protection. However, regardless of its seeming value, the R2P
raises a number of fundamental ethical questions. Most significantly, although it
may seem honourable to hold that such a responsibility exists, is there an ethical
basis for it? That is, can it be established that a state has a moral duty to protect
non-citizens beyond its borders through humanitarian intervention?
    Over the past couple of decades, the focus of political theory has undergone a
notable shift, moving away from ethical issues primarily within the domestic realm
to issues of global justice. While realist perspectives remain popular, emphasizing
the pursuit of national interests and the inapplicability of morality in the
international sphere, cosmopolitanism, understood as a universalistic moral theory
that stresses the rights and interconnectedness of humanity, emerges as a concept
of central importance to the contemporary study of international ethics (Vernon,
2010). It is on the basis of this recent development in political theory that one can
account for a state’s ethical duty to protect foreign citizens through humanitarian
intervention. Ultimately, as premised upon the main tenets of the cosmopolitan
ethical perspective, in instances of widespread human suffering caused by the
neglect, breakdown, or abuse of sovereign power, it is the moral responsibility of
foreign states to respond accordingly, intervening into the affairs of the state in
question when doing so is proportionate to the suffering occurring and likely to
succeed in practice.
    Before proceeding to account for this duty in greater detail, it would seem
fruitful to first clarify what is meant by the term “humanitarian intervention.” As
indicated above, for our purposes, humanitarian intervention refers to coercive
action by an outside party into the jurisdiction of a state or independent political
community (Caney, 2005). A few elements of this definition are worthy of note.
First, according to this characterization, intervention encompasses both military
and non-military forms of coercion. Many definitions focus solely on the former;
however, military action is not the only means of coercion at the disposal of the
state, nor is it the most effective or appropriate in all situations. Although this
paper will focus primarily on the use of military force for humanitarian purposes,
deeming this to be the most extreme form of intervention and, thus, necessitating
the greatest amount of support, it is important to note that the term also

        	
  

The Responsibility to Protect                                                          3	
  

encompasses more minor forms of coercion, including such things as trade
embargoes and economic sanctions (Caney, 2005).

    Second, unlike others, this definition does not limit intervention to cases where
action is taken against the wishes of the target state. While this is often the case,
there is no reason to narrow the definition to only include these instances. In fact, it
may be the case that citizens of the target state, rebels or otherwise, or even the
government, call upon foreigners for outside intervention (Caney, 2005).
    Finally, this definition avoids speaking of intervention in a completely statist
fashion, recognizing that interventions may be carried out by or into non-state
entities (Caney, 2005). This point is valuable since it takes note of past
interventions which have been carried out by international institutions, economic
enterprises, or even religious institutions into political communities that were not
formally recognized as states, such as Somalia (Caney, 2005). More importantly,
however, this non-statist approach is significant in light of how it complements a
cosmopolitan ethic. Emphasizing the commonality of humanity and eschewing
national limitations, it is arguable that the cosmopolitan would like to avoid
speaking of intervention in purely statist terms, leaving it open for individuals to
organize together outside of state jurisdiction to protect the universal human rights
that transcend political institutions and national boundaries.
    Having explored and accounted for this definition, we may now proceed with
the argument at hand, beginning by establishing the fundamental basis of ethical
cosmopolitanism: moral universalism.

Moral Universalism

Before proceeding to a more direct account of the principles of cosmopolitanism,
we must first establish the premise upon which this ethical theory operates, namely
that there exist universally valid moral values that apply equally to all persons. Not
only does the generality of the cosmopolitan ethic have its base in a universal
conception of the good, but any productive ethical discussion must also operate on
this assumption. After all, it is only within a context of universal morality that
ethical discussions make sense; without a reference point, a commonly held set of
principles, ethical discussions simply become crossed monologues with no position
emerging as correct (Dimock & Tucker, 2004). Moreover, from a practical
perspective, if there are no universal moral principles, then states cannot
meaningfully critique the conduct of other states. In this sense, intervention would
risk the charge of moral imperialism as states sought to uphold values that may or
may not be shared outside their borders. These concerns must be discarded from
the outset.

   	
  

4	
   	
                                   	
                            Karina Sangha

    To be sure, although universalism argues for the existence of universal values,
this is not to imply that all values are universal. While agreeing that some values
are universal, leading universalists insist that other ethical norms may differ
according to culture (Barry, 2001; Scanlon, 1998). However, this is not to be
confused with cultural relativism, the antithesis of universalism, which holds that
there is not a single set of universal moral principles, but rather, many ethical
systems, each tied to the values of its respective community (Dimock & Tucker,
2004). In addition to the difficulties associated with finding out which elements of
one’s culture are of moral significance, cultural relativism is quite incoherent
(Caney, 2005). If the relativist holds relativism to be universally true, then
relativism is self-defeating. If he or she holds relativism to be relatively true, then
one need not accept it. Either way, the theory is conceptually flawed.
    Nonetheless, although this critique may defeat relativism, it does not establish a
case for universalism as viable alternative, necessitating a second argument.
Termed by Simon Caney as the “General Argument for Moral Universalism,” this
argument proceeds as follows: (1) there are valid moral principles; (2) moral
principles that pertain to one person apply to all individuals who share morally
relevant properties; (3) human beings share morally relevant properties; (4)
therefore, there are some universal moral principles (Caney, 2005). To be sure, the
first and third premises of this argument require further support. Although, in
regards to the first, few will deny the existence of moral principles altogether, the
question of how one can defend some principles as valid and condemn others still
needs to be accounted for (Caney, 2005). In line with Caney (2005), it seems that
John Rawls (1971) may present the best methodology for doing this, arguing that
valid moral principles emerge from a process of “reflective equilibrium” wherein
one tests one’s moral judgments against moral theories and adjusts both
accordingly until they cohere. Though perhaps difficult to implement in practice,
this methodology has the potential to produce moral principles based on thorough
moral reasoning.
    In regards to the third premise, although seemingly controversial, the claim that
humans are similar in morally relevant ways need not be difficult to establish. In a
very general sense, human beings all have the same basic needs, desire the same
goods, and strive to achieve the same ends (Caney, 2005). For example, all human
beings require food and water to survive, are susceptible to disease, and strive to
achieve a long life, complete with companionship and freedom (Caney, 2005).
Humans may differ strongly at the level of the particular, but this does not prevent
them from having basic common traits that are arguably of moral significance,
particularly in the area of human rights.
    Ultimately, though not entirely conclusive, it is arguable that there are universal
moral principles that apply in the international realm. To be sure, all we have

        	
  

The Responsibility to Protect                                                           5	
  

established thus far is that there are universal moral values; we have yet to specify
what these values are. For our purposes, the universal values to be emphasized are
human rights, though it is important to note that moral values do not always take
this form. The specification of these rights will be developed in greater detail
below. For now, let it suffice that there are universal moral values that apply
equally to all human beings. Indeed, this is one of the central components of
ethical cosmopolitanism, the tenets of which we will now examine in more detail.

A Cosmopolitan Argument for a Responsibility to Protect

As indicated above, grounded in a sense of moral universalism, cosmopolitanism
recognizes the equal moral status of individual human beings. An especially useful
characterization of cosmopolitanism is proposed by Thomas Pogge (1994), who
outlines three elements shared by all cosmopolitan positions: individualism,
referring to the fact that the units of moral concerns are individual human beings;
universality, meaning that every human being is of equal concern; and generality,
referring to the fact that this status of human beings is global – that is, all human
beings are units of ultimate concern for everyone. In essence, by recognizing a
universal morality that applies equally to all human beings, cosmopolitanism
stretches the duties of common humanity beyond the domestic realm and into the
international sphere, posing a strong challenge to national allegiance and the
principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty.
    With this in mind, it should come as little surprise that cosmopolitanism has
been used to support the idea of the R2P and various other principles that promote
humanitarian intervention. Since the duty of respecting the universal and equal
moral status of human beings transcends national borders, it would seem to follow
that states are required to take action on behalf of their citizens to uphold the moral
interests of human beings in other countries.
    For the sake of convenience, this argument can be broken down into four
general premises that seem to be shared, in one form or another, by nearly all
cosmopolitans. Drawing on the work of Caney (2005), these premises are as
follows: (1) All human beings have basic human rights that are worthy of respect;
(2) The state and related political institutions only have value so long as they
respect and uphold their members’ rights; (3) The rights of human beings, in turn,
impose duties on others; and (4) It is possible for humanitarian interventions to be
successful in achieving their ultimate goals. Let us now examine each of these
premises in greater detail.

Respect for Universal Human Rights

   	
  

6	
   	
                                    	
                             Karina Sangha

At this point, we have argued for the existence of universal values and, by
extension, the universal moral status of human beings; however, we have yet to
explicitly specify the nature of these universal principles. As insinuated above, for
our purposes, the moral values previously referred to take the form of universal
human rights. Although not embraced by all cosmopolitans, the idea of human
rights is common among scholars who subscribe to this theory (Caney, 2005). As
the defining moral status that unites all of humanity, these rights are of paramount
importance to the theory of cosmopolitanism and, above all, necessitate respect.
    In essence, individual rights bestow certain privileges upon those to whom they
belong and, in turn, bind other individuals to respect and/or uphold such rights, an
idea that will be explored in greater detail below. A human right is a right that an
individual enjoys by virtue of being human. They are general and basic rights
shared by all human beings, rights demanded by humanity on all of humanity
(Luban, 1985). Closely tied to the previous discussions of universalism, these
rights are premised upon the morally relevant characteristics that are shared by all
of humanity, of which the equal vulnerability to suffer is likely the most notable
(Lu, 2006). Each person has an equal moral status as a human being, and justice
requires that such a status be treated with respect. However, such insights are
insufficient in and of themselves. One must provide an account of which elements
of humanity are worthy of respect and, consequently, which specific rights human
beings have as human beings in order for this premise of the cosmopolitan
argument to stand.
    The argument to be presented here is a version of what Caney (2005) terms the
“well-being based argument." Noting that human rights must be informed by
individual interests, the most significant of which is the interest in leading a
fulfilling life, arguments of this form hold that individual interests are best satisfied
through a system of political and civil rights (Caney, 2005). Put differently,
individuals have a primary interest in well-being, in leading the “good life,” which
can be broken down into various, more specific interests, of which the interests in
life, bodily integrity, and companionship are arguably the most significant
(Nussbaum, 2002). Such interests translate directly into rights, such as the right not
to be killed or physically harmed and the right to freedom of association, civil and
political rights that form the basis of most liberal-democratic societies. It may be
argued that not all individuals have an interest in such things, since, for example,
people wilfully seek out pain, but this kind of argument can be met by maintaining
that people have a right not to suffer involuntary afflictions of harm (Caney, 2005;
Nussbaum, 2002). The distinction to be made here is between what an individual
freely chooses and what is forced upon him or her due to coercive circumstances.
Above all, individuals have the right to lead a life of their own choosing.

        	
  

The Responsibility to Protect                                                         7	
  

    Indeed, this contention touches on something of great importance to the idea of
human rights. Although the particular rights indicated above are significant,
perhaps the most important right of all is the right to exercise one’s autonomy, to
take charge of one’s life and exercise personal freedom. To deprive individuals of
this right is arguably equivalent to denying them their personhood. Indeed, as
articulated by notable scholars like Immanuel Kant, the ability to be autonomous is
what makes an individual human; rational autonomy represents the moral
commonality among humans and, as such, serves as the basis for the broader set of
human rights (Dimock & Tucker, 2004, 142).
    Another notable thinker who places emphasis on autonomy and liberty as a
primary means through which the good life is to be achieved is John Stuart Mill.
For Mill, in most cases, individuals are the best at discerning what is in their own
interests and what will contribute to their full development (Mill, 2008). So long as
an individual’s actions do not directly impact others, he or she is to be left alone,
left to explore and lead a fulfilling life of his or her own choosing, free from
paternalistic interference (Mill, 2008). In this sense, human autonomy emerges as
the most significant human right.
    It would seem important to clarify at this point that, although autonomy is
arguably the most significant human right, it is built upon and depends on the
satisfaction of the most basic human rights, including those pertaining to
nourishment, shelter, physical safety, and bodily health. After all, without the
fulfillment of these basic needs, it simply does not make sense to speak of
autonomy in any meaningful sense. As indicated above, individuals may choose to
engage in practices we may deem harmful or improper, such as self-mutilation or
self-imposed starvation, but in order for such actions to constitute a proper exercise
of one’s right to autonomy, one must be able to freely choose to engage in such
practices, as opposed to being coerced into them due to existing circumstances.
Thus, although being able to freely act in such a way as to achieve a fulfilling life
of one’s choosing is arguably the most important human right, this is not to
discount the importance of the most basic human rights, without which freedom
and autonomy are not possible.
    Having made the case for respecting universal human rights, it should be noted
that there are numerous critiques that have been raised against such rights, the most
significant of which argues that the concept of human rights is culturally
insensitive. That is, some scholars argue that the idea of human rights and similar
universal moral principles are imperialistic and interfere with the ability of cultures
to be self-determining (Caney, 2005). In this sense, critics would seem to be
pointing to a possible contradiction within the cosmopolitan argument presented
thus far. By imposing the right of autonomy on all individuals, this argument

   	
  

8	
   	
                                   	
                            Karina Sangha

would seem to be denying individuals and cultures the autonomy it claims to want
to uphold.
     However, such a critique would seem to be a mischaracterization of the
preceding argument. One of the main benefits of the theory of human rights that
has been presented is that it allows individuals to lead their lives however they see
fit. Autonomy is not being imposed upon them; indeed, insofar as autonomy refers
to the rational implementation of one’s will, it is impossible to impose it on
someone. Individuals are free to use their right to autonomy however they so
choose, even if it means deferring to others. The theory of human rights that has
been presented places no emphasis on how individuals are to live and, in fact,
leaves a great deal of room for cultural differentiation within such universal
principles.
     Having effectively argued for the existence of and requisite respect for
universal human rights, let us now turn to the question of the duties associated with
such rights, beginning first with the duties of the state and related political
institutions.

The Instrumental Value of Political Institutions

Contrary to much of the standard discourse in international relations,
cosmopolitanism charges that political institutions like the state are only valuable
insofar as they serve particular ends, the most significant of which is respecting the
human rights of their citizens. This is the primary duty of the state, the reason for
its establishment. The state has no intrinsic value and is deserving of legitimate
recognition in the international realm only if it lives up to its obligations in the
proverbial social contract entered into by its citizens.
     Indeed, one need only examine basic social contract theory, which has been
developed and expanded upon for centuries, to see the purely instrumental value of
the state. Drawing on the ideas of John Locke (1988), the state is established by
individuals in the state of nature for the purposes of upholding their equal moral
status, a status that, in line with cosmopolitanism, is attributed to them as human
beings by virtue of a natural law. For Locke (1988), a rights-theorist, such a moral
status takes the form of inalienable human rights, rights that cannot be infringed
upon by others by virtue of the natural law. Although such a natural law exists
outside of the state, the inconvenience associated with the lack of an impartial third
party in the state of nature to orchestrate the execution of this law motivates
individuals to establish the state by way of a metaphorical social contract (Locke,
1988). In this sense, individual rights precede the state, and it is their protection
that necessitates the state’s existence.

        	
  

The Responsibility to Protect                                                         9	
  

     According to Locke (1988), the social contract establishes a fiduciary
relationship between the people and their government. That is, the people never
surrender power; it is merely loaned by way of a fiduciary trust to the government
and continues to exist only so long as it is exercised for the good of the people. To
be sure, such a fiduciary duty on the part of the state is typically not the product of
an actual contract, but rather, the result of community, norms, and political
structures that have developed with time (Walzer, 1985a). The state as it exists
now derives its power from the continued consent of the people within it. The state
exists for their own purposes and protection, motivating the existence of the
principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. These rights are not intrinsic
to the state itself, nor are they unconditional. Sovereignty is not a license for the
state to do whatever it wants, but rather, is bestowed upon the state as a stamp of
legitimacy and as a sign of respect for the autonomy of the people who live within
it. As per the fiduciary agreement, the state and its associated rights exist only so
long as individual rights are protected. If the state fails to uphold the rights of its
citizens, the contract has been violated. Power reverts back to the people and, as
will be developed below, it becomes the duty of foreign states to take appropriate
action against the violating government.
     While, in theory, this argument may seem appealing, the practical question of
how to determine when a state has violated its fiduciary duty to its people remains
open. For some, the legitimacy of the state is to be judged based on whether or not
it maintains the explicit consent of its people. Although this may suffice for liberal
democratic states, it is arguable that many individuals throughout the world do not
consent to their governments in any meaningful way, making consent an
insufficient method by which to judge state legitimacy (Beitz, 1979). A seemingly
viable alternative is to subject the state to a Rawlsian hypothetical contract (Mapel,
1992). One ought to imagine that, in deciding as to the viability of the state,
individuals are provided with enough information to make a rational choice, but
not enough information to take advantage of their special circumstances in the
matter (Mapel, 1992; Rawls, 1971). That is, individuals are not informed as to
what their particular position will be in the state, such that they could either be
very well off or they could be the poorest of the poor. Operating behind this “veil
of ignorance” typically allows for just decisions to emerge (Rawls, 1971). If
individuals are unable to consent to such a state stripped of their own prejudices, it
is not viable.
     In addition to this practical concern, questions concerning the degree of a state
violation are also warranted. That is, if the state’s improper conduct only affects
one or a small number of people, does state legitimacy remain, thereby precluding
the possibility for intervention? Although it may seem extreme, if we are to accept
the cosmopolitan claims of common humanity, then even violations against one

   	
  

10	
   	
                                   	
                            Karina Sangha

person must not be exempt from external critique (Lu, 2006). To be sure, this is not
to imply that the unjust killing of a single citizen in a given state should warrant a
full-scale military intervention. Rather, national leaders must keep the idea of
proportionality in mind, shaping their coercive actions against foreign governments
in such a way that balances the acts done by those governments.
    Ultimately, the state only has value and only maintains the right to sovereignty
so long as it protects the rights of its citizens, which is the primary purpose for its
existence. Should it violate the social contract upon which its existence is based,
foreign governments are free to intervene to protect the citizens in need. Indeed,
such humanitarian intervention is not a right, but a duty.

The Duties of Humanity to all of Humanity

As stated above during our discussion of universal human rights, rights are not
merely entitlements that individuals possess. Rather, they require others to see to
their fulfillment and, thus, directly impose duties on others. In this sense, not only
do human rights transcend borders, but so too do the duties to uphold them. Thus,
when a state fails to protect or directly violates the rights of its own citizens, it is
the duty of foreign states, as the collective representatives of their citizens’ duties
abroad, to intervene and protect the human beings at risk.
     Such a claim of universal duties is often viewed as anathema to nationalists
who maintain that persons have special obligations to their fellow citizens because,
as members of the same state and parties to the same social contract, they
participate in a system of cooperation (Caney, 2005). However, even if this is true,
there is nothing to imply that such special obligations cannot co-exist with one’s
duties to humanity in general. Indeed, according to Richard Vernon, this position is
ethically reconcilable. The reason we can have special duties to our fellow citizens,
above and beyond those we have to humanity at large, is because foreigners, in
principle, are also in a position to enjoy the benefits of civil society (Vernon,
2010). That is, they too can achieve the contexts through which such special duties
arise. However, as this is often not the case in practice, individuals in a legitimate
civil society are only free to enjoy the benefits of said society if they can fulfill
their duties to those who are victims of failed or abusive states (Vernon, 2010). So
long as one is prepared to fulfill one’s universal duties, maintaining special duties
to one’s fellow citizens in light of occupying the same civil society would seem
ethically justifiable.
     Although, thus far, we have dealt with many potential criticisms to the
argument at hand, one of the most significant critiques holds that humanitarian
intervention is a violation of the autonomy of the political community into which it
is launched (Walzer, 1985b). In this sense, there would seem to be a contradiction

         	
  

The Responsibility to Protect                                                        11	
  

in the cosmopolitan argument: it places emphasis on the fundamental human right
to autonomy to justify an act that, itself, violates such autonomy. On this view, it is
the choice of individuals as to whether or not they want to rebel against their
government in the event that it breaches the social contract; it is the people who are
free to fight against their illegitimate government, not foreigners (Walzer, 1985a).
In this sense, this view would seem to see our universal duties to human beings as
primarily negative, involving non-interference, not seemingly paternalistic
interventions.
    In response to such a critique, it is important to note that, as indicated by our
earlier definition of humanitarian intervention, there is no reason to assume that all
humanitarian interventions must be carried out without the consent of the
individuals in need of protection. In this sense, interventions could simply be the
result of citizens exercising their autonomous will to ask for outside assistance.
Moreover, even if consent is not given, this need not imply that the interventions
launched will operate separately from the individuals concerned. In fact, especially
in instances of military intervention, collaboration with local citizens is of the
utmost importance. Efforts to rebuild a state and restore order necessitate the input
and consent of domestic citizens in order for such efforts to be successful.
    More importantly, however, as discussed above, the right to autonomy does not
stand alone, but rather, is built upon and requires the satisfaction of more basic
human rights for it to be successfully exercised. Without basic goods, the provision
of which is typically lacking in failed state situations, speaking of protecting the
autonomy of a political community seems irrelevant (Walzer, 1985a). What good
is protecting the autonomy of individuals who can barely survive? Although
freedom and autonomy are arguably the most important human rights, without the
fulfillment of basic human needs, their meaningful exercise is simply not possible.
    In this sense, then, in instances of state failure, it is the positive duty of
humanity to come to the aid of those in need, delegating such a responsibility to
their respective governments. However, even if the preceding line of reasoning
stands, the argument can easily be discounted if it can be shown that acts of
humanitarian intervention will never succeed. Let us now explore such a
contention in more detail.

Humanitarian Intervention in Practice: Chances of Success

The final premise of this argument is probably the most significant, for even if the
logical reasoning presented thus far withstands critique, it is useless to argue for
such a duty if it cannot be successfully implemented in practice. After all, one
cannot have an ethical duty that one cannot reasonably carry out. In this sense, the
duty of states to engage in human intervention for the purposes of protecting

   	
  

12	
   	
                                  	
                             Karina Sangha

universal human rights can only stand if it is possible for such interventions to be
successful (Caney, 2005).
     Humanity has witnessed many seemingly failed interventions, particularly of
the military sort. In addition to large numbers of casualties on both sides, many
interventions have failed to restore any semblance of order and have often made
matters worse (Caney, 2005). In fact, one need only recall the United Nations
intervention into Somalia in the early 1990s to see the damage that can be wrought
by humanitarian intervention. Citing various problems, including a lack of
knowledge about the state in question, widespread resistance by domestic
populations, the failure to establish viable institutions, and unacceptable motives,
critics charge that interventions can never be truly successful (Caney, 2005).
However, while these problems may have been widespread in humanitarian
interventions of the past, they are by no means systemic.
     Indeed, it is not beyond the realm of possibility for a state to launch a military
intervention into a state plagued by human strife with good intentions, especially if
it is demanded to do so by its population, an occurrence that may increase in the
future in light of an increasingly globalized and interconnected world. Nor is it
unforeseeable that a state may possess good intelligence of the area into which it is
entering. It is also not only possible, but as indicated above, advisable for
intervening states to work with domestic populations to ensure that viable
institutions are established, thereby ensuring long-term stability and stemming
domestic resistance. These conditions may not hold true in all, or even in many,
situations, especially if one embraces the realist argument that states are primarily
concerned with pursuing their national interests and rarely act with a sense of
morality. However, this does not mean that such conditions will never be fulfilled.
     In addition, perhaps our means of evaluating humanitarian interventions is
currently skewed, such that even if these conditions cannot be satisfied and
humanitarian interventions cannot be definitively successful, this does not mean
they should not still be pursued. As pointed out by Simon Caney, when examining
the success or failure of an intervention, it is important to compare it to other
options, most significantly, non-intervention (Caney, 2005). In this sense, even if
an intervention fails to completely remedy a situation, if it has aided in the
protection of human rights to a greater degree than could have been achieved by
simply not acting, then perhaps it should be viewed as a success. Although it may
not be a success in absolute terms, insofar as it achieves better results than any
other forms of action, it would seem implausible to deem it a failure (Caney,
2005).
     To be sure, these arguments are tentative at best and, thus, warrant further
exploration. Nonetheless, for now, let it suffice to say that although humanitarian
interventions have not always been successful in absolute terms, this should not be

         	
  

The Responsibility to Protect                                                       13	
  

used to discount the duty argued for thus far. Not only are past problems arguably
not systemic to intervention, but, if viewed in relative terms, interventions need not
be viewed as complete failures. At the end of the day, perhaps simply assuaging
suffering among our fellow human beings is enough to deem an intervention a
success.

Conclusion

In essence, drawing on the ethical perspective of cosmopolitanism, it seems
reasonable to hold that, in instances of state failure, foreign states have a moral
duty to protect non-citizens beyond their borders through humanitarian
intervention. Given the existence of universal human rights which, in turn, impose
universal moral duties on humanity, if a state fails to protect the rights of its
citizens, the primary purpose for which it was established, then this responsibility
falls on other states, which serve as the collective representation of their citizens.
Of course, despite its merit, the preceding argument is quite tentative, especially in
regards to the potential successes of humanitarian intervention. However, this is
arguably the case for many of the arguments surrounding the issue, indicating a
need for further research and discussion. In the mean time, Canada should be
commended for taking a leading role in opening up the idea of humanitarian
intervention to discussion. In an increasingly globalized world, wherein borders are
becoming increasingly permeable, the question of humanitarian intervention will
undoubtedly continue to grow in significance well into the future.

References

Barry, B. (2001). Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of
    Multiculturalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Beitz, C. (1979). Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton:
    Princeton University Press.
Caney, S. (2005). Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory. Oxford:
    Oxford University Press.
Dimock, S. & Tucker, C. (2004). Applied Ethics: Reflective Moral Reasoning.
    Toronto: Thomson Nelson.
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001). The
    Responsibility to Protect. Retrieved from ICISS website: http://www.iciss
    .ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf
Locke, J. Two Treatises of Government. New York: Cambridge University Press,
    1988.

   	
  

14	
   	
                                	
                           Karina Sangha

Lu, C. (2006). Just and Unjust Interventions in World Politics: Public and Private.
   New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Luban, D. (1985). Just war and human rights. In Beitz, C. R., Cohen, M., Scanlon,
   T., Simmons, A.J. (Eds.), International ethics: A philosophy and public affairs
   reader (pp. 195-216). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mapel, D. R. (1992). The Contractarian Tradition and International Ethics. In
   Nardin, T., Mapel, D.R. (Eds.). Traditions of International Ethics (pp. 180-
   200). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mill, J. S. (2008). On Liberty. In Gray, J. (Ed.). On Liberty and Other Essays (pp.
   5-128). New York: Oxford University Press.
Nussbaum, M. (2002). Capabilities and Human Rights. In de Greiff, P., Cronin, C.
   (Eds.), Global Justice and Transnational Politics: Essays on the Moral and
   Political Challenges of Globalization (pp. 117-49). Cambridge, MA: MIT
   Press.
Pogge, T. W. (1994). Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty. In Brown, C. (Ed.),
   Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives (pp. 89-122). London:
   Routledge.
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
   University Press.
Vernon, R. (2010). Cosmopolitan Regard: Political Membership and Global
   Justice. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Walzer, M. (1985a). The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics. In
   Beitz, C. R., Cohen, M., Scanlon, T., Simmons, A. J. (Eds.), International
   Ethics: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader (pp. 217-237). Princeton:
   Princeton University Press.
Walzer, M. (1985b). The Rights of Political Communities. In Beitz, C. R., Cohen,
   M., Scanlon, T., Simmons, A.J. (Eds.), International Ethics: A Philosophy and
   Public Affairs Reader (pp. 165-194). Princeton: Princeton University Press.