The Purge of Hyon Yong-chol and Risk Factors of the Kim Jong-un Regime
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The Purge of Hyon
Yong-chol and Risk
Factors of the Kim
Jong-un Regime
2015. 5. 13. | CO 15-10
Cho Han-bum
(Senior Research Fellow, Unification Policy Studies Division)
On April 30, 2015, Hyun Yong-chol, Minister of People’s Armed Forces, was
executed for treason charges. Other high-level officials close to Kim Jong-un, Ma
Won-chun, Director at the National Defense Commission (NDC) Designing
Department, Pyon In-son, Director of operations in the Korean People’s Army
(KPA), and Han Kwang-sang, a Director at the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP)
Finance Department were also purportedly executed. Kim Jong-un’s visit to
Moscow, once a fait accompli, was cancelled. Due to this fact, doubts have been
raised over the power base of Kim Jong-un regime which was assumed to be
relatively stable recently.
Kim Jong-un’s Non-Attendance at the Russia’s Victory Day
Celebrations
Kim Jong-un did not attend Russia’s Victory Day celebration in May. Since
Russia’s invitation to Kim Jong-un was announced, his visit to Moscow was highly
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expected and this was almost a fait accompli. Particularly, Russia’s high-level officials
consistently mentioned the possibility of Kim Jong-un’s visit to Moscow. The fact that the
third year of his reign passed without any peculiar events increased the possibility of Kim
Jong-un’s visit. A few incidents supposedly indicated that the Kim Jong-un has firmly
established his power base: purge of Ri Yong-ho, the Chief of General Staff of KPA, and
Jang Sung-taek, once known as the second man; the decisions of demotion and promotion
of officials and close aides; and the ceaseless executions of high-level officials. Food shortages
were not witnessed, and the economy was stabilizing as there were signs of economy thriving
in certain regions including Pyongyang. Some analyzed that the Kim Jong-un, with solid
power base in hand, has strengthened diplomatic efforts based on the fact that the recent
diplomatic activities of foreign minister Ri Su-yong and Chairman of the Supreme People’s
Assembly Presidium Kim Yong-nam’s participation in the Bandung Conference. Hence, there
were speculations that Kim Jong-un may even participate in the Beijing’s Victory Day
celebrations after his Moscow visit in May. When the Russian spokesperson announced that
Kim Jong-un called off his trip to Russia, some suggested the possibility of the severing
DPRK-Russia relations. These claims were backed by issue of escorting Kim Jong-un and
differences in opinions on arms transfer. However, both North Korea and Russia needs to
improve the bilateral relations. North Korea has to improve relations with Russia to overcome
the international sanctions, the stalemate in inter-Korean relations, and the cooling relations
with China. Russia should cooperate with North Korea for the development of Far East and
Siberia, one of the core priorities of the Putin government. It is unlikely that Kim Jong-un
did not fly to Russia just because of the differences in opinions.
Russia may not have fully believed in Kim Jong-un’s visit to Moscow in the first place.
A few weeks ago, when mentioning the possibility of Kim Jong-un’s attendance to the event
in Moscow, Russian Ambassador to South Korea Alexander Timonin used the term
“probably.” It was probably Russia playing the media to save its face under the circumstances
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where major countries in the West declined Moscow’s invitation due to the crisis in Ukraine.
In fact, North Korea had never shown official signs of acceptance to Russia’s invitation.
Kremlin stated that the decision to not attend the event was “related to North Korea’s internal
affairs.” This may denote that Kim Jong-un still cannot leave Pyongyang in peace.
Instability of the Kim Jong-un Regime
Despite many assessments that the Kim Jong-un regime is stable, instability exists in the
political and economic realm, and it has even deteriorated in some aspects. In politics, the
frequent demotion, promotion, and execution of officials cannot serve as a proof for Kim
Jong-un’s rule with an iron fist. Historically, these events have unfolded in the final days
of a regime, symbolizing the vulnerability of the power base. In stable regimes, it is
unnecessary to promote or demote positions of close officials, as it rather becomes a
mechanism that weakens spontaneous loyalty.
The incessant bloody purges of high-level officials cause more serious problems. Kim Jong-un
executed 17 in 2012, 10 in 2013, 41 in 2014, and already killed 15 high-level officials.
Many of them were removed because they raised diverging views on Kim Jong-un’s directives.
This results in the loss of “early warning signals” in the Kim Jong-un regime. The high-level
officials will not address other opinions on Kim Jong-un’s unreasonable directives and risky
policies. These phenomena will damage the regime’s power base. Also, it will be difficult
to test the loyalty of high-level officials as the frequent personnel changes occur. Eventually,
the bond among the power elites will probably fade.
The active economic activities observed in parts of North Korea including Pyongyang could
be a temporary illusion. Led by the final service sector such as consumer goods, service,
and real estate, the informal marketization in North Korea is a temporary measure to overcome
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the limits of state rations. However, it demonstrates clear limitations by the fact that changes
in the labor, finance, and capital goods sectors remain hardly unseen. Despite the market
activities being rejuvenated by the informalization after the currency reform in 2009, the
North Korean authorities have faced problems in increasing budget revenues, which was
collected in the form of taxation and quasi-taxation in the past. The lives of vulnerable groups
–
have aggravated due to the government business collusion structure where the rich get richer
and the poor get poorer. According to a survey on North Korean defectors, the proportion
of people with no official wages from the workplace was 25.7 percent in 2011 and 25.2
percent in 2012 and hiked in 2013 with 51.9 percent. Furthermore, the proportion of people
with no income including informal income has risen from 17.1 percent (2011), and 16.5
percent (2012) to 24.1 percent (2013). Last April, the UN announced that 70 percent of
the North Korean population suffers from food shortage. While the progressing informal
marketization has created an affluent class, the majority of North Koreans have their lives
exacerbated, and the state finds itself in a difficult position to increase its budget income.
Pyongyang also faces challenges in the trade with the outside world. The DPRK-China trade
accounts for 90 percent of total North Korean trade, and coal takes 40 percent of North
Korea’s export to China. Last year, North Korea’s export to China was diminished, the human
exchanges between North Korea and China reduced by more than 20 percent in Dandong
where the 80 percent of bilateral trade supplies pass. Particularly, North Korea’s coal export
to China recorded USD 1.13 billion, 18 percent less than the previous year. Since the decline
was based on structural reasons such as the fall in international coal price, China’s economic
slowdown, and tightened environmental regulations, it is not likely to recover in the short
term. The recently rejuvenated DPRK-Russia trade volume did not even reach USD 100
million, which is an insignificant amount compared to DPRK-China trade volume, USD 6.5
billion. The remittances of migrant workers – estimated around 60,000 – are the major
sources of North Korea’s soft currency earnings, amassing hundreds of millions of dollars.
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However, the North Korean authorities are facing financial pressures by the large wage
reduction in North Korean lumberjacks in Russia – the majority in total number of North
Korean migrant workers – due to the plummeting value of Russian ruble, followed by the
plunged oil price.
Kim Jong-un’s Power Base: Ministry of State Security and KWP Organization
and Guidance Department
The so-called “rule by insignia” of repeating the promotion and demotion of high-level
officials is the main characteristic of Kim Jong-un’s rule. Yun Tong-hyun, vice minister of
People’s Armed Forces, was demoted to Lieutenant General last April, experiencing promotion
and demotion six times for the last three years. Known as the mastermind for sinking of
ROKS Cheonan and hacking of Sony Pictures, Kim Yong-chol, Director of the Reconnaissance
General Bureau, had his rank changed several times since his promotion to General of the
Army in April 2012 – from General of the Army to Lieutenant General, to General of
the Army again, to Colonel General. Pak Chong-chon, KPA Vice Chief of Staff, was promoted
from Lieutenant General to Colonel General, then demoted to Major General. It is hard to
find officials who did not experience demotion such as the executed officials Hyon Yong-chol
and Ri Yong-ho. “Rule by insignia” has centered around the military. Paradoxically, this
proves that Kim Jong-un is not in full control of the army.
Conversely, the two organs maintaining public security in North Korea - Ministry of State
Security (MSS) and KWP Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) - have not had
their leaders changed since Kim Jong-un came into office. With Kim Won-hong as the
Minister, the MSS lies at the core of North Korean internal control as the major intelligence
unit. Kim Won-hong has not had his position changed while figures in the top elite such
as Jang Sung-taek and Ri Yong-ho have been executed or demoted. Especially, the MSS
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managed the process of the Jang Sung-taek purge.
The OGD sits at the core in overseeing personnel management in the party, the military,
the cabinet, and other state organs. When Kim Jong-il emerged as the successor of the regime,
he was the Director of OGD., Ex-deputy director of the OGD Ri Je-gang was a member
of the OGD back then, and had worked with Kim Jong-il. Then, they led the charge against
Jang Sung-taek on the basis of his personal life and factionalist behaviors. Once, the OGD
was in conflicting rivalry with the Jang Sung-taek-led cabinet. But after Kim Jong-il fell
with brain tumor, power promptly shifted to Jang Sung-taek affiliates. When Ri Je-gang died
in a car accident and his affiliates were purged, there were rumors circulating in North Korea
that this was “a work of Jang Sung-taek.” When Kim Jong-un came to power, Jo Yon-jun,
Ri Je-gang’s aide, was designated as the Director of the OGD and he has maintained his
position since. Jo Yon-jun is known to be the one who orchestrated the purge of Jang
Sung-taek. Also, after the purge, he reinstated the OGD officials who were demoted earlier.
It is important to note that Hwang Pyong-so, the ascending KPA General Political Department
Director after Kim Jong-un’s inauguration, worked with Jo Yon-jun in the OGD.
Even under Kim Jong-un’s capricious “rule by insignia,” the fact that OGD and MSS avoided
any purges hints at the magnitude of the two organs as the core foundations of Kim Jong-un’s
“politics by public security.” However, the ruling method relying on public security organs
are structurally vulnerable in the situation where the economic and political insecurity remain.
Predecessor Kim Jong-il was able to pass through the times of Arduous March – the worst
crisis for North Korean regime – owes to the fact that he had firmly controlled the military.
He capitalized on “songun (military-first) politics” and gained loyalty by giving the military
various economic privileges and management rights of businesses. It requires a considerable
amount of time to completely dominate the military and it might even fail. Unlike his father,
Kim Jong-un is exposed to risks as he only utilizes “sticks” when he has not fully dominated
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the military. It is early to judge that the Kim Jong-un regime has stably enrooted with the
two public security organs at its base.
Prospects for Kim Jong-un Regime’s Crisis
Romania’s Ceauşescu and his wife were executed 12 days after the public uprising. The
regime collapse was dramatic considering the fact that there were no precursors of instability
such as power struggle and coup d’état in the final years of Ceauşescu. When the open
rally in Bucharest in December 1989 transformed into anti-Ceauşescu demonstrations,
Ceauşescu ordered to shoot the protestors. The military refused to follow the order and the
core supporters of Ceauşescu such as secret and security services conflicted with the military,
but were defeated. The public security agencies that wielded absolute power under the
Ceauşescu regime stood powerless against the physical force of Romanian military. Such
a case has implications for the North Korean regime.
As the factors of instability continues to hover over the military and political realm, the
roots of Kim Jong-un regime seems rather weak. In particular, Kim Jong-un failed to fully
control the military, and the regime faces difficulty in securing necessary external resources
due to the cooling relations with Beijing and the long-stalling inter-Korean relations.
Pyongyang’s Economic Development Zone project – the project that the North Korean
authorities have pursued in order to attract foreign investment – is shady because of the
international sanctions and the international community’s lack of trust in North Korea. The
progress in informal marketization appears to be of no help to increase state revenue.
Especially, the hardships of vulnerable groups have intensified, and the government business –
collusion structure where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer has formed the basis
of social conflict. The trend of influx of foreign ideas and the 2.5 million cell phones creates
a different landscape from the past.
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As for the case of Kim Jong-il, he was able to raise trustworthy figures – especially the
firm grip on the military - and secure administrative capabilities through the long-term power
seizure process and succession lessons. These abilities worked as the foundation for
overcoming the regime’s crisis such as Arduous March. In contrast, Kim Jong-un never had
this opportunity and the power succession period was very short. The continuing bloody
purges have inclination to weaken the bond among the power elites, and the domination
of the military, in particular, is dubious. Hence, in case of sudden factors in North Korea
such as a coincidental public uprising, it is highly likely that Kim Jong-un will encounter
shortcomings in effectively responding to these events unlike his predecessor. In all, the future
of Kim Jong-un regime is uncertain. ⓒKINU 2015
※ The views expressed in this paper are entirely that of the author and are not to be construed
as representing those of the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU).
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