The Pashtun Question in Pakistan - Iqbal Singh Sevea - U T H
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A SI A S
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South Asia Scan
The Pashtun
Question in Pakistan
Iqbal Singh Sevea
1South Asia Scan
23
South Asia Scan
The Pashtun Question in Pakistan
Iqbal Singh Sevea
Issue No. 10
January 2021
1About the Institute of South Asian Studies
The Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) is dedicated to research on
contemporary South Asia.
It was established in July 2004 as an autonomous research institute at the
National University of Singapore. The establishment of ISAS reflects the
increasing economic and political importance of South Asia, and the strong
historical links between South Asia and Southeast Asia.
The Institute seeks to promote understanding of this vital region of
the world, and to communicate knowledge and insights about it to
policymakers, the business community, academia and civil society, in
Singapore and beyond.
May be cited as:
Iqbal Singh Sevea
The Pashtun Question in Pakistan
South Asia Scan, Issue No. 10
(Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, January 2021).
©2021 Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in
any form, for any reason or by any means, whether re-drawn, enlarged
or otherwise altered, without the prior permission in writing from the
copyright owner except in case of brief quotations embodied in articles
and reviews.
The author bear full responsibility for the facts cited and opinions
expressed in this publication, which do not necessarily reflect those of the
Institute.
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2Contents
Page
Executive Summary 4
Introduction 6
The Pashtuns of Pakistan 11
Governing and Regulating the Pashtuns 17
Pashtunistan, Marginalisation and Militancy 21
New Dynamics: The Pashtun Tahafuz Movement 30
Conclusion 37
About the Author 39
About South Asia Scan 40
Past Issues 41
3Executive Summary
Since 2018, the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (Pashtun Protection Movement)
[PTM] has organised a number of rallies, marches and dharnas (sit-ins)
in which tens of thousands of protesters have participated. The PTM is a
loosely organised movement that positions itself as a body fighting to end
alleged military harassment and official discrimination against the Pashtuns
in Pakistan, and for the constitutional rights of the community. The PTM
also challenges the Taliban militants active in Pashtun areas, who it argues
have been propped up by the Pakistani military. Undergirding these protests
and demands is the long-standing issue of the socio-political position of the
Pashtuns in Pakistan and disquiet within sections of the community with the
forms of regulation and governance implemented in Pashtun territories.
The emergence of the PTM has ushered in a new dynamic into Pashtun
politics. While there have been various movements demanding Pashtun
autonomy and secession since the birth of Pakistan, none of these were able
to generate a mass following. The PTM’s ability to mobilise the masses –
despite heavy censorship and security crackdown – also distinguishes it out
from similar movements in Balochistan and Sindh. Moreover, the organisation
is disrupting the mechanisms that the establishment has employed to stifle
dissent in areas such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. In particular, the movement is challenging
the sources of ‘traditional’ authority that have been propped up by the state
and the corresponding networks of patronage employed to regulate Pashtun
areas. The PTM has also shifted the focus of Pashtun politics away from
the question of provincial reorganisation towards issues of constitutional
rights. Furthermore, its use of new media has posed a challenge to the
establishment’s powers of censorship. The extensive use of new media also
reflects the PTM’s appeal amongst new demographic groups – the youth and,
significantly, women.
The organisational structure and methods of the PTM may well serve
as a model for other protest movements. Indeed, the fact that the PTM
moves beyond a solely ethno-nationalism platform and speaks in terms of
constitutional rights may open the space for collaboration between the PTM
and other groups, like the Baloch, who also claim to be fighting for their
socio-political rights. What is clear at the moment is that the mass support
the PTM enjoys has alerted established political parties to the need to engage
with it. The fact that the PTM is currently in discussions with the newly-
formed opposition coalition, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM),
and has drawn support from parties like the Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party
4(PMAP) demonstrates a recognition of its potential influence. It may also
provide the PTM with a voice in regional and central politics. While it has not
joined the PDM, the PTM has supported its call for the ouster of the Imran
Khan government. Thus, the Pashtun question in Pakistan may come to be
inextricably linked to the battle between a seemingly united opposition on the
one hand and the incumbent government that currently enjoys the support of
the military on the other.
This South Asia Scan examines the factors that have led to the marginalisation
of sections of the Pashtun community and the recent re-emergence of
Pashtun political mobilisation. It also surveys opposition amongst some
sections of the Pashtun community to being a part of Pakistan in 1947 and the
subsequent emergence of demands for a separate Pashtunistan. It then traces
the rise of the PTM and draws attention to key aspects of the movement and
its potential impact on domestic politics in Pakistan.
5Introduction
On 20 September 2020, thousands of Pashtuns gathered at Wana in South
Waziristan, Pakistan, to protest against what they described as military
oppression and official discrimination against the Pashtuns in Pakistan. In
particular, they called for the military to be held accountable for extra-judicial
disappearances of Pashtuns in the name of anti-terrorism campaigns and for
the Pashtuns of the ‘tribal areas’, which were formerly part of the FATA, to be
granted full political rights. The protestors also expressed fear that the military
was allowing sections of the Taliban to re-establish their presence in North
and South Waziristan. This protest is but one of many mass rallies, marches
and dharnas that have been led by the PTM over the past two years. The PTM
is a loosely organised movement that emerged in January 2018. It positions
itself as a body fighting to end military harassment and official discrimination
against the Pashtuns, and for the constitutional rights of the community.
Undergirding these protests and demands is the long-standing issue of the
socio-political position of the Pashtuns in Pakistan and disquiet within sections
of the community with the forms of regulation and governance implemented
in Pashtun territories by the Pakistani establishment. These rallies and
marches, which are tellingly described by the PTM and its supporters as ‘Long
Marches’, model themselves upon and appropriate the symbolism attached to
the non-violent struggle for freedom from British imperialism led by the much
revered Pashtun leader, Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988). Indeed, the leader
of the PTM, Manzoor Pashteen, is widely likened to Abdul Ghaffar Khan.1 The
comparisons with Abdul Ghaffar Khan are particularly interesting given that
Abdul Ghaffar Khan had opposed the demand for Pakistan but continued
to fight for the socio-political rights and autonomy of the Pashtuns after the
emergence of the independent state of Pakistan.
Yet, despite the tens of thousands of Pashtuns who have partaken in such
protests, the ‘Long Marches’ and the demands being raised by the protesters
have largely not been covered by the media in Pakistan. This is due to
the powerful role that the military is allegedly playing in censoring media
1. See, for instance, Aurangzib Khan, “Manzoor Pashteen: Leading the Fringe to the Center”,
Herald, 19 February 2019. https://herald.dawn.com/news/1398800. Accessed on 13 October
2020.
6coverage.2 Furthermore, the military controls access to the tribal areas –
where many of the protests have taken place – and is accused of shuttling in
journalists and officials on sanitised tours of the region.3 The military is also
accused of using violence to stamp out the protests and selectively deploying
aspects of the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance and Anti-Terrorism Act
to arrest individuals associated with the PTM and/or partaking in the protests.
For instance, the PTM accuses the military of killing 13 protesters when
soldiers opened fire on peaceful protesters on 29 April 2019 in Kharqamar,
North Waziristan.4
On its part, the Pakistani establishment accuses the PTM of being a proxy
of Afghanistan and India. It is alleged that the PTM is being propped up to
destabilise Pakistan. The former chief spokesperson for the Pakistani military,
Major General Asif Ghafoor, echoed this official narrative when he described
the PTM as a movement that was being manipulated by the “enemies of
Pakistan”.5 The establishment also presents the PTM as a movement that
poses a law and order problem, and accuses it of fermenting violence against
the state. In the wake of the above-mentioned incident at Kharqamar, for
instance, various leaders of the PTM were arrested under charges of attacking
a military checkpoint and initiating the skirmishes that left 13 protesters and
one soldier dead.6 The official narrative from the military presented the PTM
2. The media coverage of the Pakistani elections of 2018 provides important insights into
allegations that the military directly censors media coverage. In the lead up to the elections,
news outlets such as GEO TV and Dawn complained that their coverage of the elections was
being curtailed. The management of Dawn, Pakistan’s largest English language daily, stated
that the circulation of its paper was restricted in the wake of it having covered an interview
with Nawaz Sharif in which he was widely seen as being openly critical of the military. In a
report released on 23 July 2018, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan substantiated
these allegations. The report stated that the Commission’s investigations revealed that
“[s]ales and distribution agents have corroborated the Dawn management’s complaint of
unlawful interference with the distribution of their newspaper … in at least 20 targeted cities
and towns.” The report also found that GEO TV’s coverage was disrupted on a number of
occasions. In addition to this, journalists and media houses were found to have received “press
advice” detailing issues that they should not report on. See http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/
curbs-on-freedom-of-expression-in-pakistan-summary-of-hrcp-fact-finding-exercise/. Accessed
on 13 October 2020.
3. Madiha Afzal, “Why is Pakistan’s military repressing a huge, non-violent Pashtun movement?”,
Brookings Institute, 7 February 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2020/02/07/why-is-pakistans-military-repressing-a-huge-nonviolent-pashtun-protest-
movement/. Accessed on 9 February 2020.
4. “As Death Toll Rises, Pashtun Lawmaker Calls for Waziristan Protest”, Gandhara, 27 May
2019. https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/pakistan-as-death-toll-rises-pashtun-lawmaker-calls-for-
waziristan-protest/29965861.html. Accessed on 29 May 2019.
5. Major General Asif Ghafoor’s press conference, 4 June 2018. https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=BtLiJC IrYPM. Accessed on 5 June 2018.
6. Farooq Awan, “PTM Mob Attacks Army Checkpost in Waziristan”, Daily Times, 27 May 2019.
https://dailytimes.com.pk/401480/ptm-mob-attacks-army-checkpost-in-waziristan/. Accessed
on 27 May 2019.
7as running amok7 and instigating public disturbances with a view towards
exerting pressure to secure the release of arrested “terrorists”.8 Ali Wazir and
Mohsin Dawar, two leading figures of the PTM, were detained and charged
for leading the attack and firing on the checkpoint. It is worth noting here that
on 14 October 2020, the state officially dropped the charges against the two.9
Over the past two years, a number of those partaking in PTM protests have
been arrested under charges of sedition and terrorism. Notably, Gulalai Ismail,
a prominent human rights activist and member of the PTM, fled Pakistan after
being charged under the Anti-Terrorism Act for making “anti-state” statements
and “hate speeches”.10 Pashteen has himself been detained under charges
of sedition for allegedly questioning the creation of Pakistan, challenging its
sovereignty and, more generally, making derogatory statements about the
country.11
Tensions between sections of the Pashtun community and the state of
Pakistan are not new. As this South Asia Scan will demonstrate, demands for
the creation of an autonomous province incorporating the Pashtuns of the
tribal areas, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as the North-West Frontier
Province) and parts of Balochistan, and even secession, have been made by
some Pashtuns since the emergence of Pakistan. These have taken multiple
forms – from the non-violent strategies of Abdul Ghaffar Khan to the militant
campaigns launched by the Faqir of Ipi against the Pakistani state. There are,
however, new dimensions to the mass protests that have been witnessed over
the past two years. The military is now being directly and publicly criticised.
This is clearly reflected in the fact that a popular slogan used by the PTM and
its supporters is “ye jo deshat gardi hai, is ke peeche vardi hai” (the uniform
is behind this terrorism).12 This slogan is, of course, a play on a popular song
celebrating the contributions of the Pakistani military to the state: “ye jo jurat
mandi hai, is ke peeche vardi hai” (the uniform is the cause of this courage).
7. Sultan M Hali, “PTM Running Amok”, Pakistan Today, 30 May 2019. https://www.
pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/05/30/ptm-running-amok/. Accessed on 1 June 2019.
8. “PTM’s Ali Wazir handed over to CTD”, The Nation, 28 May 2019. https://nation.com.pk/28-
May-2019/ptm-s-ali-wazir-handed-over-to-ctd. Accessed 28 May 2019.
9. Sirajjudin, “KP government withdraws Kharqamar case against PTM leaders, others”, Dawn, 14
October 2020.
10. “Anti-state speeches: PTM Activist Gulalai’s name blacklisted”, Dunya News, 27 May 2019.
https://dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/493419-Anti-state-speeches-PTM-activist-Gulalai-Ismail-
blacklisted. Accessed on 1 June 2019.
11. “Pakistani rights activist arrested on charges of sedition, protests threatened”, Reuters, 28
January 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-arrest-activist-idUSKBN1ZQ22R.
Accessed on 28 January 2020.
12. See, for instance, a video of Manzoor Pashteen leading a gathering in repeating “ye jo
deshat gardi hai, is ke peeche vardi hai”, YouTube, 20 April 2018. https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=xHkL9PU7o9k. Accessed on 11 November 2020.
8The PTM is also threatening, for the first time, to galvanise Pashtuns from
across tribes and socio-economic backgrounds in the name of Pashtun
political rights. Till now, the fractured nature of the Pashtun community and
the state’s ability to allay opposition through patronage and detention have
prevented figures like Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Faqir of Ipi from being able
to give shape to a mass movement in the name of Pashtun rights. Notably,
on the one hand, the Pakistani state was able to prevent Abdul Ghaffar Khan
from developing such a mass movement by detaining him and co-opting
other leaders. On the other hand, those who had taken to militant struggle
like the Faqir of Ipi did not have a broad support base. The PTM protests are
also attracting new demographic groups, in particular the youth and women.
The public participation of women in mass protests, both as leaders and
supporters, coupled with their active support for the PTM on social media, is
promising to reshape social structures and strictures. Moreover, the political
mobilisation of the youth and women is destabilising the three-pronged
approach taken by both the colonial state and Pakistan to limit political
participation to the maliks (tribal leaders); entrench the tribe as the primary
socio-political unit; and legitimise the jirga (council of elders) as the primary
source of decision making. The PTM is seeking to expand political participation
and also substantially reshape the political landscape by destabilising existing
networks of state patronage, legitimacy and co-option.
The implications of this fragmentation of authority are discussed in greater
detail below. Suffice it to note here that the attempt to govern large swathes
of the Pashtun areas bordering Afghanistan through the maliks led to the
cementing of the latter’s position and the system of tribal authority through
state patronage. The PTM poses a threat to this system of regulation. At the
same time, the PTM is challenging, on the one hand, political parties such as
the Awami National Party (ANP) and the PMAP, which have long claimed to
represent Pashtun interests, and, on the other, national political parties like
the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam and Pakistan Muslim
League (Nawaz), which have a presence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The political
equation in Pashtun areas may also be impacted by the fact that the PTM is
participating in ongoing conversations with the recently launched opposition
coalition, the PDM. The PDM is aiming to bring various political parties
together with a view to toppling the Imran Khan-led PTI government. This may
provide the PTM with a much-needed voice at the centre; something that it
has lacked thus far.
9This South Asia Scan examines the factors that have led to the marginalisation
of sections of the Pashtun community in Pakistan and the recent
re-emergence of Pashtun political mobilisation in opposition to the state.
As a means of providing the broader context, this Scan begins by tracing the
forms of regulation and governance implemented both by the colonial state
and Pakistan in Pashtun areas. It will be shown that assumptions about the
nature of the Pashtuns and geo-strategic interests resulted in novel forms of
political regulation being implemented in the tribal areas. These areas were
not fully incorporated into the governmental framework of British India.
Likewise, in Pakistan, full constitutional and political rights were not extended
to these areas. Furthermore, both the colonial state and Pakistan sought to
govern the tribal areas by entrenching traditional leaders and imposing a
paternalistic system. Thus, the current political protests are as much against
the state as they are against officially sanctioned forms of socio-political
authority within the community. This Scan also surveys opposition amongst
some sections of the Pashtun community to being a part of Pakistan in
1947 and the subsequent emergence of demands for a separate Pashtun
province and homeland, Pashtunistan. It then traces the rise of the PTM and
draws attention to key aspects of the movement and its potential impact on
domestic politics in Pakistan.
10The Pashtuns of Pakistan
The Pashtuns are an ethnic group that chiefly resides in parts of north-west
Pakistan, and south and eastern Afghanistan. Provisional results from the
census conducted in 2017 indicated that there are more than 33 million
Pashtuns in Pakistan.13 It is worth noting here that Pakistan had not conducted
a state-wide survey between 1998 and 2017 largely due to concerns that such
an exercise may exacerbate regional and ethnic contestations, as statistics are
integral to the distribution of state resources to individual provinces. Given the
dominance of the province of Punjab and the Punjabis in Pakistan, a number
of provinces and ethnic groups have complained that their numbers have been
consistently underreported. The official results of the 2017 census exercise
have not been released due in part to concerns raised by Pashtun and Sindhi
leaders over the apparent over-estimation of Punjab’s population vis-à-vis
other provinces. The figure of 33 million has been disputed by Pashtun leaders
who feel that it under-represents the numbers of the community and view the
process of enumeration itself as an official tool to entrench the domination of
Punjab over other states. They assert that the census of 2017 had not taken
into account the number of Pashtuns who had been displaced by military
operations against militants and moved to cities in Punjab and Sindh.14 Despite
the controversies surrounding the figures in the 2017 census, we can glean
from it and various other estimates that the Pashtuns constitute the second
largest ethnic group in Pakistan and make up at least 16 per cent of the
country’s population.
Geographically speaking, the Pashtuns are an ethnic group that is divided by
the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This border is often referred
to as the Durand Line as it was a demarcation negotiated in 1893 between
the colonial diplomat, Henry Mortimer Durand (1850-1924), and the Afghan
amir (ruler) Abdul Rahman (1844-1901). The primary aim of the line was
to delineate the spheres of influence of the British in India and the Afghan
amir. Pakistan inherited the boundary when it emerged as an independent
country in 1947. Afghanistan does not, however, recognise the legitimacy of
this border. Afghanistan’s former president, Hamid Karzai, stated in 2017 that
13. See Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan. http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/
population-census. Accessed on 23 October 2020.
14. See, for instance, Izhar Ullah, “Census 2017: FATA lawmakers dispute census count”, The
Express Tribune, 26 August 2017. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1491331/census-2017-fata-
lawmakers-dispute-census-count. Accessed on 2 August 2020. Also see Bushra Gohar, “There
were nearly 2 million registered IDPs from North Waziristan alone. How can FATA’s population
be just 5 million? Fudged figures?”, 26 August 2017, 1:20 pm. Tweet.
11“Afghanistan hasn’t and will not recognize the Durand Line.”15 Likewise, Ashraf
Ghani, the current president of Afghanistan, has condemned the attempts
by Pakistan to build a fence along the border as an “undeclared war of
aggression”.16 The Durand Line and Afghanistan’s dispute with of its legitimacy
have resulted in the Pashtuns often seeing themselves as a community whose
‘original’ homeland was illegally divided. In Afghanistan, the Pashtuns are
the largest ethnic group and have long held the reigns of political power. This
explains, in part, why Afghanistan has ideologically and politically supported
Pashtun causes in Pakistan.
The Pashtuns of Pakistan primarily reside in the province of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and the tribal areas, which were formerly part of the FATA.
The FATA had been a vestige from the colonial period. The British had
carved out a number of ‘tribal areas’ or ‘agencies’ in areas that today fall in
northwest Pakistan. These included Khyber, Orakzai, North Waziristan and
South Waziristan. Colonial ethnographic assumptions of the tribal nature of
the Pashtuns, coupled with their strategic interests of developing a buffer
between India and Afghanistan, led to these tribal areas being regulated
by a distinct legal and political framework – one that was apparently more
akin to the governance of tribal societies. This model of governance was
essentially maintained by Pakistan until 2018 when the areas of the FATA
were formally incorporated into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. There are also a
sizeable number of Pashtuns concentrated in the north-eastern part of the
province of Balochistan. It is estimated that they constitute 38 per cent of
Balochistan’s population. In addition to this, according to figures provided
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there are 1,425,603
registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan.17 The bulk of these are Pashtuns and
many of them have been born in Pakistan to parents who fled the unrest in
Afghanistan.
The Pashtuns are generally described as a distinct ethnic group bounded
by a shared ancestry, culture and homeland, structured along tribal lines.
Amin Saikal has described the Pashtuns as the classic example of an “ethnic-
based nation”. Drawing upon Anthony Smith’s definition of the ‘ethnie’, he
argues that the Pashtuns constitute an ethnic group that shares “a collective
proper name, a presumed common ancestry, shared historical memories,
15. Naveed Siddiqui, “Afghanistan will never recognize the Durand Line: Hamid Karzai”, Dawn, 5
March 2017. https://www.dawn.com/news/1318594. Accessed on 4 June 2018.
16. Ismail Dilawar and Kamran Haider, “The Fence Driving a Wedge Between Pakistan
and Afghanistan”, Bloomberg, 1 November 2017. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-10-31/the-fence-driving-awedge-between-pakistan-and-afghanistan. Accessed
on 20 October 2020.
17. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Fact Sheet: Pakistan (31 August 2020).
12one or more differencing elements of common culture, an association with
a specific ‘homeland’ and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the
population.”18 In addition, Pashtun tribes are widely said to be held together
by their adherence to a shared religion – Islam – and commitment to a ‘tribal
code’. The Pashtunwali, which is founded upon the notions of nang (honour),
melmatsya (hospitality) and badal19 (reciprocity), lays stress on the need for
decisions to be made by the jirga.20 The Pashtunwali is presented as a fixed
– and archaic – code that determines the behaviour of the Pashtuns. Despite
the problematic nature of the term ‘tribe’, the category continues to be used
by observers to describe Pashtun socio-political organisation and has long
informed official approaches towards the regulation and governance of the
Pashtuns.
Crucially, the use of the term ‘tribe’21 and the image of an ethnic group
bound together by a traditional unchanging social code give rise to images
of a self-contained community that maintains a distance from official state
institutions. With regard to the Pashtuns, the use of the term ‘tribe’ also
carries implications of untamed, fiercely independent and restive groups that
potentially pose a threat to central state authority. Since 11 September 2001,
policymakers, security analysts, commentators and popular writers alike have
extensively spoken about the Pashtuns in terms of tribal structures, tribal
codes and their propensity to indulge in violence. Indeed, the term ‘tribe’ has
been used in ways that signify both the cause of the troubles in Pakistan and
Afghanistan, and the cure. In the case of the former, the Pashtuns are seen as
restive and fiercely independent. In the latter perspective, the tribes are seen
as the solution to political and religious turmoil. This is clearly exemplified by
United States (US) Army Major Jim Grant who argued that its policy relating to
the Pashtuns in Afghanistan needed to focus not on individuals but on tribal
groups, as the socio-political structure of the Pashtuns was essentially distinct
from western notions of citizenship and individual rights.22
Such presentations reflect the lasting impact of the writings of British colonial
officials and scholars. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, British colonial
scholars and administrators produced a sizeable number of works on the
18. Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Question of Pashtun Nationalism?”, Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 30 (2010), pp. 5-17.
19. Badal is often mistranslated as revenge. It actually signifies a complex notion of reciprocity.
20. See, for instance, discussion in Abubakar Siddique, The Pashtun Questions: The Unresolved Key
to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan (London: Hurst & Company, 2014).
21. A B M Mafeje, ‘Tribalism’, Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (New York: Oxford
University Press, New York, 1993).
22. Jim Grant, One Tribe at a Time: The Book that Changed the War in Afghanistan (New York:
Black Irish Entertainment, 2014).
13history and culture of the Pashtuns. The confrontation between the British
and the Russian Empire in Central Asia, popularly known as “The Great Game”,
spurred the former to bolster the boundaries around India by “settling”
the “tribally inhabited regions” between British territories in India and the
territories of the Afghan amir. The aim was to demarcate these regions as the
de facto Indian frontier and pay Pashtun communities allowances to ensure
the safety of the frontier.23 British and Russian strategic and diplomatic jostling
had sparked the first of a series of wars between the British and the forces
of the Afghan amir in 1839. Following this, the British sought to map and
collect ethnographical information about the “tribally inhabited regions” and
expand roads and telegraph lines to these areas. While the latter ensured the
movement of information and soldiers, the former provided the British with
information on how best to govern and regulate relations with the Pashtuns.
The genesis of the image of the restive, independent and tribal Pashtun can
be traced to the writings of the East India Company official, Mountstuart
Elphinstone (1779-1859). In 1809, Elphinstone was the first British envoy to
the Afghan court. He also wrote a number of works on the Pashtuns that have
been credited with pioneering ethnographical work on the community. In his
highly influential Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and its Dependencies in
Persia, Tartary and India, he described the Pashtuns as a people whose socio-
political life centred upon the tribe.24 He further postulated that the tribes
were largely isolated from one another and that they fiercely asserted their
independence from any central authority. Thus, the power of the sovereign
often did not extend onto the individual tribes.25 It is important to note here
that Elphinstone essentially based his depictions of the tribal nature of the
Pashtuns on his understanding of the clans in Scotland.26 Concomitant with
such ethnographic works was the emergence of colonial theorisations of race
and racial characteristics. The writings of a number of colonial scholars and
officials spoke in terms of ingrained racial traits and mapped these onto the
body. For instance, figures like Robert Orme (1728-1801) had argued that
dietary conditions and race had resulted in certain communities in South Asia
being masculine and capable of engaging in warfare.27 In this binary of ‘martial
23. For a detailed discussion, see Sana Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan
Borderland (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 1-33.
24. Mountstuart Elphinstone, Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and its Dependencies in Persia,
Tartary and India (Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, London, 1815), pp. 148-159.
25. Ibid., pp. 158-179.
26. Discussed by Nivi Manchanda, “The Imperial Sociology of the ‘Tribe’ in Afghanistan”,
Millenium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 46 (2), pp. 169-173.
27. See, for instance, Robert Orme, A History of Military Transactions of the British Nation in
Indostan (London; John Nourse, 1763).
14races’ and ‘non-martial races’, the Pashtuns were listed as a community that
had inherited martial characteristics. They were, however, it was claimed,
undisciplined.
Such depictions have detracted from an understanding of the complex ethno-
linguistic communities that came to be labelled under the rubric Pashtun.
The people who inhabited the region from Kandahar to the Peshawar valley
were not a pure and distinct race but a complex population of pastoralists,
farmers and local notables integrated into local and imperial hierarchies of
political, social and economic power and status.28 Far from being an isolated
genealogical group, Pashtuns had circulated within imperial and merchant
networks connected by Silk Road pathways, Persian and North Indian trade
routes and Indian Ocean sea lanes, for a thousand years.29 The elites were
integrated into the wider Persian cosmopolis that stretched from Persia and
Central Asia to Southern India.30
Indeed, it was only in the 18th century that a broadly defined Afghan/Pashtun
identity developed. This occurred when a variant of the Pashto language
came to be adopted for official purposes by the elites in place of Persian.
However, far from being a marker of homogeneity, the term Afghan would
encapsulate regional dialects and variations of the Pashto language, differing
interpretations of Islam, varying notions of authority and an array of socio-
political and economic arrangements. The first attempt to shape a broad
‘Afghan’ identity by proposing a common genealogy of the community,
stretching back to a Companion of the Prophet Muhammad, called Qays
‘Abdur Rashid Afghan and narrating tales of the past glories of the ‘Afghans’,
was the 17th century manuscript, Tarik-i Khan Jahani (The Khan Jahan’s
History).31 Significantly, the term used in the text is Afghan and not Pashtun.
It is also worth noting here that this manuscript was actually written for
diasporic Pashtuns who had settled in central India and would only reach the
Pashtuns of the frontier regions in the 19th century.32 In fact, the Pashtun/
28. For a more detailed discussion, see Robert Nichols, “Reclaiming the Past: The Tawarikh-i
Hafiz Rahmat Khani and Pashtun Historiography” in Nile Green (ed.), Afghan History
Through Afghan Eyes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) and “Pashtuns”, Oxford
Research Encyclopaedia: Asian History, pp. 1-24. https://oxfordrecom.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/
asianhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277727-e-
181?rskey=E1opqG. Accessed on 1 August 2020.
29. Ibid.
30. See Rustam Ali Bijnori, An Eighteenth Century History of North India: An Account of the
Rise & Fall of the Rohilla Chiefs in Janbhasha, Iqtidar Husain Siddiqui (ed.) (Delhi: Manohar
Publications, 2005).
31. For an insightful discussion on the Tarik-i Khan Jahani, see Green, op. cit.
32. Ibid.
15Afghan identity developed within and in line with the heterogeneity of the
people who resided in the areas between Kandahar and the Peshawar valley.
Some scholars have suggested that the Pashtunwali was developed and
adopted as a means to bind these heterogeneous groups.33
33. Fredrik Barth, Political Leadership among Swat Pathans (London: Athlone Press, 1959) and
Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference (Boston, MA:
Little Brown, 1969).
16Governing and Regulating the Pashtuns
The assumptions and generalisations on the Pashtuns discussed in the
previous section had important administrative and military implications.
Colonial officials drew upon the above described ethnographical studies to
propose the best way to administer the community. Sir George Campbell
(1824-1892), who served as the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, which was
the political and economic centre of colonial India at that point, for instance,
argued that because the Pashtuns were a “turbulent” people “bred from
infancy to the use of arms” who have a “passion for independence” and “are
intolerant of … any form of rule”, the British should not attempt to formally
incorporate them into the British empire.34 He went on to assert that if they
had been like the people of the hill tracts of Kashmir, Kangra, Shimla, Kumaon
or Nepal, he would have advocated incorporation into the empire. Instead, a
system of informal alliances was preferable.
This section explores the structures put in place by both the colonial state
and the state of Pakistan to regulate and govern the Pashtuns. Apart from
demarcating a swathe of Pashtun tribal areas into their sphere of influence
with the drawing of the Durand Line, the British also incorporated a large
number of Pashtuns when they annexed the province of Punjab in 1849.
At that time, Punjab included sizeable parts of the areas populated by the
Pashtuns; these included the valley of Peshawar. It will be shown that the
Pashtuns were essentially divided into two groups – the settled and the tribal.
A separate province – North-West Frontier Province – was carved out for the
former and they were integrated into the colonial state’s administrative and
political framework. The latter were, however, regulated under a separate
system. This has resulted in the marginalisation of a broad section of the
Pashtuns of the area. It is no surprise that the latter areas are at the heart of
the recent Pashtun protests.
As noted above, colonial consolidation in British India and strategic
manoeuvring during the Great Game resulted in attempts by the British to
demarcate the boundary between British India and the domains of the Afghan
amir. The British viewed the highland areas stretching from the south of the
terrains of the Maharaja of Kashmir through Khyber to South Waziristan as
the natural frontier of India. This was largely based around the assumption
that the Pashtun tribes living in these areas were isolated groups that had
remained autonomous from any political authority. However, far from being
34. George Campbell, Afghan Frontier: The Substance of a Speech Not Delivered (London: Edward
Stanford, 1879), p. 2.
17autonomous, the highland Pashtun groups had long established ties of service,
tribute and patronage with the Afghan polity. A number of them had received
allowances from and paid revenue to the Afghan amir.35 These relationships
are clearly reflected, for instance, in the relations between the Afghan amir
and the Khan of Lalpura, a dominant leader of the Mohmand tribe who held
extensive lands east of Kunar. While colonial officials and ethnographers
described the Mohmands as an independent tribe, more sophisticated
research has shown that Lalpura was granted the status of a small state by
the amir in return for carrying out stipulated duties. These included collecting
taxes from a set number of villages and tolls from the Khyber Pass on behalf of
the amir as well as providing military service when necessary.36
The assumption that the highland tribes were isolated, independent and had
always been autonomous from the Afghan polity lay at the heart of colonial
attempts to demarcate a border. However, it caused consternation to the
Afghan amir who asserted his claims over these groups and laid the basis
for the ongoing border dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The link
between colonial ethnography and cartography was further evidenced by the
fact that Durand, who was tasked with negotiating a border with the Afghan
amir, insisted that the border must take into consideration the integrity of
individual tribes. Hence, tribal genealogies that had been drawn up were
consulted to demarcate the extent of areas settled by members of particular
tribes.37 On his part, the amir insisted that the British did not understand the
terrain and pushed back on the idea of demarcating areas along tribal lines.
Eventually, the amir, who had only recently come to power with the support
of the British, had little choice but to accept the border proposed by Durand.
Thus, in 1893, the British and the Afghan state agreed to the Durand Line as a
border demarcation. In line with this, the Afghan state accepted that it had no
claims on Pashtun areas such as Waziristan and Chitral which now fell in the
British sphere of influence.
After the demarcation of the Durand Line, the colonial state turned its
attention to developing mechanisms to regulate the Pashtuns of British India.
The Pashtuns were essentially divided into two groups – those residing in
the settled districts of the province of Punjab and those in the ‘autonomous
tribal areas’ along the Durand Line. The tribal area was divided into agencies
– Khyber, Kurram, Malakand, North Waziristan and South Waziristan, which
35. For a more detailed analysis, see Christine Noelle-Karimi, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-
Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Dost Muhammad Khan (1826-1863), (London: Routledge,
1997).
36. Haroon, op. cit, pp. 14-17.
37. Ibid., pp.16-25.
18were to be indirectly ruled. It is important to note that such a demarcation of
a separate tribal Pashtun region was not a depiction of a pre-existing political
landscape but an instrument of change and regulation. It was essentially a
sociological division – one grounded in the assumption that the nature of
the highland community was inherently different from that of the Pashtun
peasantry of the agricultural areas in Punjab.38 Subsequently, in 1901, the
Pashtun areas that were part of the province of Punjab – namely, the districts
of Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Hazara, Kohat and Peshawar – were carved out
into a separate province, the North-West Frontier Province.
The colonial state claimed to put in place a system of governance that
was suited to the nature and socio-political structure of the Pashtuns. This
involved reinforcing the centrality and autonomy of the tribe; emphasising
the authority of tribal leaders; and putting in place a paternalistic system of
regulation. Essentially, legal and political institutions that were implemented
in other parts of British India were not introduced in the tribal areas. Also,
the tribal areas were not incorporated into the federal framework developed
in British India. Instead of having a governor or even the basic rudiments of
a representative system, the tribal areas were governed by a Political Agent
who was vested with unlimited powers over governance, judgement and
punishment. To aid him in regulating the tribes, the Political Agent worked
with the maliks. Thus, this system of governance effectively served to fix
and entrench the position of the maliks. The colonial authorities used tribal
genealogies to identify tribal leaders and allocated large allowances to them.
Not only did the maliks now gain unmatched economic resources, but their
claims to leadership were also fixed in perpetuity.
The paternalistic form of regulation and the lack of a system of representation
or recourse for the people are best reflected in the legal system implemented
to govern the Pashtuns. In 1901, the colonial state introduced the Frontier
Crimes Regulation (FCR). The FCR was part of a series of draconian laws
implemented in the Pashtun areas on the assumption that they were lawless
tribesmen who were prone to crime and fanaticism.39 The FCR allowed for
collective punishment to be meted out to the tribes under the ‘collective
responsibility clause’. It also denied the accused the rights to appeal, a wakeel
(lawyer) and daleel (argument). Furthermore, the FCR enabled the authorities
to detain individuals for up to three years without charges.40
38. Ibid., pp. 21-30.
39. Mark Condos, “License to Kill: The Murderous Outrages Act and the rule of law in Colonial
India, 1867-1925”, Modern Asian Studies, 50, 2, 2016, pp. 479-517.
40. Willard M Berry, Aspects of the Frontier Crimes Regulation in Pakistan (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1966).
19Upon its formation in 1947, the independent state of Pakistan chose to
continue the system of governance and regulation that the colonial state had
implemented in the tribal areas. The tribal areas were grouped together as
the FATA and administered directly by the federal government of Pakistan.
The continuities with the colonial system are clear from the fact that the
FATA was excluded from the constitution of Pakistan. The governance of
the region remained in the hands of the Political Agents, who, like their
colonial counterparts, held extensive powers. These Political Agents were
now appointed by and reported to the President of Pakistan. The system also
continued to vest immense authority in the hands of the maliks who were
recognised by the state as the natural custodians of customs and social order. In
fact, the state of Pakistan continued the practice of paying an allowance to the
maliks. In addition, the jirga was officially recognised as the supreme authority
and sole legitimate decision-making body within the tribe. Until 1997, the
maliks were the only ones who could vote. While universal adult franchise was
finally granted in 1997, political parties remained prohibited till 2003.
The FCR continued to be implemented in the FATA until 2018 when the region
was merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The continuation of the colonial
system in the FATA stymied the socio-political and economic development
of the region and contributed to the marginalisation of the Pashtuns in
Pakistan. The impact that it had on Pashtun political mobilisation is discussed
in detail below. Suffice it to note here that since 1947, a number of Pashtun
figures had called for the abolishment of the FCR and reform of the socio-
political structure. They argued that the FCR and the structure of governance
implemented in the FATA resulted in extremely low rates of literacy, high rates
of corruption and a lack of economic development. There were also demands
amongst some sections of the Pashtun leadership for the merger of the FATA
with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In 2018, the Pakistani authorities finally agreed
to integrate the FATA into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In line with this, the FCR was
rescinded and, in its place, the FATA Interim Governance Regulation of 2018
was passed. This regulation essentially lays out how the FATA will be regulated
in the two-year interim period till its full merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Key facets of the regulation include replacing the Political Agent with a
Deputy Commissioner whose powers are more in line with the constitution
of Pakistan and the reorganisation of the tribal areas into districts. However,
the regulation is less clear when it comes to issues related to the judiciary and
has left an element of uncertainty on the future of the areas that are part of
the FATA. For instance, there are no details on the future role of the Supreme
Court as a body of adjudication and the Deputy Commissioner continues to
hold an extraordinary amount of powers.
20Pashtunistan, Marginalisation and Militancy
The prominent Pashtun leader, Khan Abdul Wali Khan (1917-2006), pithily
reflected both the complex identities inhabited by individuals in Pakistan and
the challenge confronting the state in integrating various ethnic groups into a
national community when he asserted that he has “been a Pashtun for four
thousand years, a Muslim for 1,300 years and a Pakistani for just over forty.”41
This section examines the factors that have contributed towards Pashtun
marginalisation in Pakistan and the emergence of the demand for
Pashtunistan. It first looks at the opposition amongst some sections of the
Pashtun community to joining Pakistan in 1947. It then analyses the rise of
demands for the creation of Pashtunistan and the rise of militancy. Lastly, it
examines concerns amongst the Pashtuns from the tribal areas and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa over their social, political and economic marginalisation in
Pakistan.
Upon the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, the regions in which the Pashtuns
resided generally showed little enthusiasm for the new state. The Muslim
League, which was at the forefront of the demand for Pakistan in 1946, had a
weak institutional presence and limited influence in the North-West Frontier
Province. This is reflected in the fact that in the provincial elections of 1946,
the Muslim League only managed to win 17 seats while the Indian National
Congress won 30.42 The opposition to the Muslim League and the demand
for Pakistan were spearheaded by Abdul Ghaffar Khan. In 1929, he had
established the Khudai Khidmatgars, a social reform and political organisation
that was committed to using non-violent means of protesting against the
colonial authorities.43 Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Khudai Khidmatgars played
an important role in politicising the Pashtun ethnic identity. It has already
been noted above that far from being a homogeneous political community,
the Pashtuns were divided along familial and socio-economic lines. Thus,
both Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Khudai Khidmatgars were essentially
attempting to build a Pashtun political front and define Pashtun political
interests. Such a politicisation of the Pashtun consciousness was linked to a
celebration of Pashtun culture and an opposition against the Punjabis and
Punjabi domination.44 Three issues were central to Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the
41. Quoted in Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2009), p. 1.
42. At this stage, the Muslim League’s support in the North-West Frontier Province was largely
limited to the urban pockets and non-Pashtun communities.
43. Mukulika Banerjee, The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition and Memory in the North-West Frontier
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011).
44. Talbot, op. cit., pp. 83-86.
21Khudai Khidmatgars’ political programme: non-violent struggle for freedom;
Hindu-Muslim unity; and the assertion of Pashtun rights in a future political
framework.
On its part, the Muslim League reached out to and attracted the large
landholders and canvassed on the need to maintain Muslim unity. The appeal
to coalesce around a broad religious identity did not make much headway. The
Muslim League was, however, successful in winning over a number of the large
landholders. The fact that Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Congress provincial
government had encouraged the non-payment of rents by tenant farmers as
a source of civil disobedience against the colonial authorities had alienated
the larger landholders. In addition, the Muslim League assured the tribes that
the future state of Pakistan would maintain the allowances that the colonial
state paid them and that Pakistan had “no desire whatsoever to interfere, in
any way, with the traditional independence of the Tribal Areas.”45 The leader of
the Muslim League and the first Governor-General of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali
Jinnah (1876-1948), assured “internal freedom” to the tribes in exchange for
pledges of loyalty to the new state of Pakistan.46
When the Cabinet Mission was dispatched from Britain to India in March
1946 to work out a plan for decolonisation, there was no political consensus
amongst the Pashtuns in support of the demand for Pakistan. In fact, there
was uncertainty with regard to how the Tribal Areas, given that the region
did not have full provincial status, would be apportioned in the forthcoming
constitutional debates. Olaf Caroe, who was the Governor of the North-West
Frontier Province between 1946 and 1947 – the period during which the
question of Partition was being discussed both at the centre and the provinces
– recorded that in his conversations with the Afridi and Shinwari tribes in
March 1947, he found the tribes were generally ambivalent to the question of
potentially joining India or Pakistan. He further asserted that if they were put
into a position of having to decide their political future solely on the basis of
their religious affiliation, they would opt to join Afghanistan.47 The leaders of
the Afridis reportedly told Caroe that they will neither deal with the Congress
nor the Muslim League but “may deal with a government representing both
sides” and that they “own the Khyber Pass and will bargain on that basis.”48
45. Quoted in Haroon, op. cit., p. 176.
46. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Speeches and Statements
as Governor General of Pakistan 1947-1948 (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, Directorate of Films and Publications, 1989), p. 239.
47. Quoted in Haroon, op. cit., p. 176.
48. George E Jones, “Indian ‘Redshirts’ Go Into Peshawar; Frontier City Quiet but Tense - Afridi
Tribesmen Block Road in Khyber Pass”, The New York Times, 20 March 1947. Accessed on 13
April 2020.
22However, the acceptance by the Congress of the plan to partition India
proved to be a pivotal development. It was now decided that there would
be a referendum in the provinces asking people to vote on joining India or
Pakistan. Abdul Ghaffar Khan then called for the creation of Pashtunistan – a
separate political entity for the Pashtuns.49 When the option of Pashtunistan
was not included in the referendum, Abdul Ghaffar Khan called on his
supporters to boycott the referendum.50 As a result, the voter turnout for the
referendum was only 55.5 per cent with most voters opting for Pakistan. It is
also imperative to note that this referendum was only held in the North-West
Frontier Province; the Pashtuns of the Tribal Areas did not get a chance to
vote.
Upon the formation of Pakistan, Jinnah assured “internal freedom” to the
Tribal Areas in exchange for pledges of loyalty to the new state of Pakistan.51
As noted above, the new state of Pakistan essentially continued the colonial
approach towards governing the Pashtun areas. The Tribal Areas were now
reconstituted as the FATA and the regulatory norms and legal framework
developed by the colonial state were retained.
Given the post-colonial realities, Abdul Ghaffar Khan would now focus upon
calling for political re-organisation of the Pashtun areas and official recognition
of Pashtun socio-cultural rights. He now called for the formation of a separate
province for the Pashtuns. This province, which was to be called Pashtunistan,
was to include the FATA, the North-West Frontier Province and Pashtun areas
of Baluchistan. He spelt out his new political vision of Pashtunistan in a speech
in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in Karachi, Sindh, on 5 March 1948
where he stated:
“What does Pathanistan mean? I will tell you just now. You see,
that the people inhabiting this Province are called Sindhis and the
name of their country is Sind. Similarly, the Punjab or Bengal is
the land of the Punjabees or Bengalees. In the same way, there
is the North-West Frontier. We are one people and ours is a land.
Within Pakistan we also want that the mere mentioning of the
49. See Safoora Arbab, ‘Nonviolence, Pukhtunwali and Decolonization: Abdul Ghaffar Khan and
the Khuda’I Khidmatgar Politics of Friendship’ in Ali Usman Qasmi (ed.), Muslims Against the
Muslim League: Critiques of the Idea of Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2018), pp. 220-254.
50. For a detailed study of Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s political manouevering during this period, see
Erland Jansson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The Nationalist Movements in the North-West
Frontier Province, 1937-47 (Uppsala: Historiska Institutionen vid Uppsala Universitet, 1981).
51. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Speeches and Statements
as Governor General of Pakistan 1947-1948 (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, Directorate of Films and Publications, 1989), p. 239.
23name of the country should convey to the people that it is the
land of Pakhtoon. … We want Pakhtoonistan and want to see all
the Pathans on this side of the Durand Line joined and united
together in Pakhtoonistan.”52
This assertion of Pashtun unity was made in response to his concerns over
the socio-economic and political marginalisation of the Pashtuns in Pakistan.
The political and economic dominance of the Punjabis, coupled with the fact
that Urdu was declared as the national language of Pakistan in 1948, led Abdul
Ghaffar Khan to assert the importance of provincial autonomy and the rights
of linguistic groups.
It is worth noting here that Urdu was promoted as a national language as it
was seen as a language that would lessen the threat of provincialism in the
new state. Languages like Bengali, Pashto and Punjabi, which were spoken by
large segments of the population but associated firmly with specific regions,
were seen as posing a threat to the cohesion of the newly formed state.
Unlike languages like Sindhi and Punjabi, Urdu was not associated with any
region or province. In fact, Urdu was the native language of a small minority
of Pakistan’s population. According to the census report of 1951, only some
3.4 per cent of Pakistan’s population spoke Urdu as their native language.53
Furthermore, Urdu was controversially associated with the Muslims of the
Indian subcontinent and presented as being intrinsically linked to ‘Islamic
culture’.54 Both of these points are clearly reflected in a speech made by Jinnah
in support of the new state’s language policy at the Dacca University on 24
March 1948. Jinnah stated:
“Our enemies, among whom I regret to say, there are still some
Muslims, have set about actively encouraging provincialism in
the hope of weakening Pakistan and thereby facilitating the
reabsorption of this Province into the Indian Dominion. … Let
me restate my views on the question of a State language for
Pakistan … only one lingua franca, that is, the language for inter-
communication between the various provinces of the State, and
that language should be Urdu and cannot be any other. The State
52. Mehrunnisa Ali (ed.), Pak-Afghan Discord: A Historical Perspective: Documents, 1855-1979
(Karachi: University of Karachi, 1990), p. 121.
53. Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia University Press,
1972), p. 12.
54. For communalisation of these languages and socio-political mobilisation, see Christopher
King, “The Hindi-Urdu Controversy of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh and Communal
Consciousness”, Journal of South Asian Literature, 13 (1/4), pp. 111-120; and Francis Robinson,
Separatism Among Indian Muslims (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 69-80.
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