The next phase in Aotearoa New Zealand's COVID-19 response: a tight suppression strategy may be the best option
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editorial The next phase in Aotearoa New Zealand’s COVID-19 response: a tight suppression strategy may be the best option Michael G Baker, Amanda Kvalsvig, Sue Crengle, Matire Harwood, Collin Tukuitonga, Bryan Betty, John Bonning, Nick Wilson I n this editorial, we consider the implica- (Figure 2). Elimination included much tions of the New Zealand Government’s stronger border management (quarantine shift away from a national COVID-19 and testing) to prevent importation of cases; elimination strategy. This is a critical stage testing and contact tracing, so cases could in managing the pandemic, with major be isolated and contacts quarantined; and uncertainties and difficult trade-offs. We an alert level system to guide measures to argue that the response should continue eliminate community transmission.2,3 The to be shaped by key principles: notably, initial, national COVID-19 wave was success- science-informed strategic leadership; a fully eliminated by May 2020.4,5 Subsequent Tiriti and equity focus; use of the precau- outbreaks in Auckland were managed tionary principle; and the need to create in a similar way, sometimes using rapid, legacy benefits for our healthcare and public intense circuit-breaker lockdowns to regain health systems. These principles support elimination. critical actions to get Aotearoa New Zealand Accumulating evidence suggests that through the next phase of the pandemic in elimination is probably the optimal initial the best possible shape from a combined response to an emerging pandemic disease health, equity, wellbeing and economic per- of moderate or greater severity, at least spective. These actions include applying a until vaccines and disease-modifying agents “tight suppression” strategy; rapidly closing are available.6 The elimination strategy the remaining immunity gaps; strengthening has performed exceptionally well for New public health and social measures, including Zealand, giving us the lowest COVID-19 contact tracing, border management and mortality in the OECD, a significant increase mask use; and adapting the primary care in life expectancy,7 a relatively high and hospital system to safely manage large degree of personal freedom for much of numbers of people presenting with illness the pandemic period and relatively good from COVID-19. economic performance.8 The first major upgrade of the elimi- The elimination phase nation strategy was the Reconnecting The first COVID-19 case was identified New Zealanders to the World strategy in New Zealand in late February 2020, and released on 12 August 2021,9 which case numbers rose rapidly in the following proposed a carefully managed increase month (Figure 1). New Zealand initially in inbound travel to New Zealand while followed the mitigation strategy that was continuing with elimination. It implied core to its influenza pandemic plan.1 A a more comprehensive revision of the major departure was rapidly switching to pandemic strategy in early 2022. an elimination strategy in late March 2020 8 NZMJ 26 November 2021, Vol 134 No 1546 ISSN 1175-8716 © NZMA www.nzma.org.nz/journal
editorial Figure 1: Epidemic curve for diagnosed COVID-19 cases in New Zealand, distinguishing cases infected overseas (blue = history of recent overseas travel) from locally acquired cases (red). 9 NZMJ 26 November 2021, Vol 134 No 1546 ISSN 1175-8716 © NZMA www.nzma.org.nz/journal
editorial Zealand also introduced a range of vaccine The apparent shift to a suppression mandates for occupational groups and strategy will soon introduce a mandate preventing On 4 October 2021, the Prime Minister unvaccinated people from entering a wide for the first time indicated New Zealand range of indoor social settings, such as gyms, would transition away from the elimi- restaurants and hairdressers (the COVID-19 nation strategy. The new approach was not Protection Framework, or “traffic light formally announced or defined but could be system”).12 classified as a suppression strategy (Figure At the time of writing, New Zealand 2). This change was precipitated by a Delta- is typically experiencing around 150 to variant outbreak first detected on 17 August 200 new COVID-19 cases a day, mainly 2021 in Auckland (Figure 1). This outbreak in Auckland. Spread from Auckland to proved too difficult to stamp out using the other regions has been occurring but at a methods that effectively eliminated previous low level. Consequently, some of us have outbreaks arising from border control argued for continuing with suppression in failures.10 Auckland while maintaining an elimination It appears the goal of the new policy strategy for the rest New Zealand, which settings is to control rather than eliminate would require maintaining strong boundary SARS-CoV-2 (Figure 2). A positive feature of controls around Auckland.13 these settings is that they suggest a “tight suppression” approach, as opposed to loose Principles to guide the ongoing suppression or mitigation policies used pandemic response by countries like the United Kingdom and There is a series of key principles that Sweden. Another positive feature is the can help inform Aotearoa New Zealand’s continuation of many public health and pandemic response, some of which have social measures, including restrictions on been articulated in government plans.14 New Zealand’s external borders and active contact tracing to keep case numbers low. Science-informed strategic However, there has been little promotion of leadership masks and improvements to indoor venti- One of the strongest lessons from the lation in public spaces, despite the strong pandemic response comes from the demon- evidence base for these measures.11 New strated benefits of combining effective Figure 2: Major strategic choices for managing a pandemic (albeit not including the exclusion strategy successfully used by some Pacific Island nations). 10 NZMJ 26 November 2021, Vol 134 No 1546 ISSN 1175-8716 © NZMA www.nzma.org.nz/journal
editorial political and scientific leadership. This have significant impacts,22 such as when success was shown when New Zealand infectious diseases like COVID-19 emerge. switched its response from the established It is important to recognise and be explicit pandemic mitigation approach to an elim- about these unknowns. We do not know ination strategy. Given the ongoing need the impact of endemic SARS-CoV-2 infection to meet new challenges in the pandemic on morbidity and mortality, even in a response, it would be timely to institu- highly vaccinated population. An under- tionalise an improved set of processes for lying assumption by some appears to be decision-making that foster use of evidence, that SARS-CoV-2 infection will inevitably innovation, consensus decision-making, become endemic, and that this infection continuous quality improvement and trans- will be relatively benign once population parency.15,16 These processes could include: immunity is widespread, as was eventually convening a cross-party parliamentary seen following the 1918 H1N1 influenza group along the lines of the Epidemic pandemic.23 There is evidence that this Response Committee;17 forming a high-level assumption may be overly optimistic. The science strategy rōpū (council) to provide post-acute effects of SARS-CoV-2 infection (so the multidisciplinary expertise needed called “long-COVID”) appear to be far more for complex emergencies; and developing common and severe than for influenza.24 a well-resourced COVID-19 research and For example, there is the possibility of development strategy. life-course impacts in the child population through effects on the developing brain.25 Having a Tiriti and equity focus If that is found to be the case, then this A major lesson from the pandemic pathogen may belong in the same category response is the overwhelming importance as measles and polio, which create such a of health equity. There is a long history burden of illness that they justify efforts for of infectious diseases18 and pandemics19 progressive elimination.26 27 being patterned by inequalities in Aotearoa New Zealand. COVID-19 is unfortunately One of the biggest unknowns is about the no exception. Most COVID-19 cases are in future evolution of SARS-CoV-2 “variants Māori and Pacific peoples (71% in the Delta- of concern,” which may be more vaccine variant outbreak at the time of writing).20 The resistant, more infectious and even more markedly lower rates of vaccination in Māori lethal.28 The best way to stem SARS-CoV-2 illustrate what happens when Māori input is evolution is to rapidly suppress trans- not adequately sought or ignored, and how mission of this virus to very low levels long-standing inequities in social determi- across the globe, which is technically nants drive health outcomes. The lack of feasible but difficult to implement given engagement with the appropriate people, inequities with vaccine supply, public especially in Auckland, ultimately derailed health infrastructure and coordination. control efforts and contributed to the On the positive side, improved vaccines current outbreak not being eliminated.21 Key (and vaccine schedules) and disease-mod- responses need to align with the principles ifying treatments are providing tools to of equity, tino rangatiratanga, partnership reduce both the frequency and conse- and active protection. More fundamentally, quence of infection. They may even provide there is a need to identify opportunities to the ability to entirely interrupt trans- strengthen and resource Māori and Pacific mission or make this a trivial infection, or leadership of the pandemic response. both. Creation of the Māori Health Authority will Given this changing landscape, it will provide a pathway to institutionalise this be essential to periodically review our goal—but this is in the longer term. strategic direction and policy settings to ensure our response is optimal. It would be Application of the precautionary unwise to take any option off the table. For principle example, there may be circumstances in The precautionary principle expresses the the future where a nationwide return to the need to take a cautious approach in situa- elimination strategy, and even global eradi- tions of high uncertainty where decisions cation, might become optimal.29 11 NZMJ 26 November 2021, Vol 134 No 1546 ISSN 1175-8716 © NZMA www.nzma.org.nz/journal
editorial strategy. Tight suppression could extend Creating legacy benefits from to elimination outside of Auckland until at investment in the response least the end of January 2022. This mixed It is imperative that we gain as many regional approach would increase the time legacy benefits as we can from our huge available for the next key action: closing investment in the pandemic response. We the remaining immunity gaps. A critical are now almost two years into the pandemic, decision that will also increase the time and it is time to move beyond the crisis available to raise vaccine coverage is careful phase and establish more mature systems management of the regional border around that can undertake robust risk assessment Auckland when it "opens" on 15 December, and react swiftly to emerging population allowing Aucklanders to travel widely health threats. One test is whether the deci- across New Zealand. The currently proposed sion-making processes and infrastructure controls will miss many infected people, as we have developed for this response are they only require vaccination or testing.35 By sufficiently versatile for future threats, comparison, even the reduced requirements including evolution of the current pandemic for travel into New Zealand from overseas and multiple emerging infectious disease that will start in January 2022 still require threats that require a similarly vigorous far more controls (vaccination, pre-travel response.30,31 The proposed measures in the test, test on arrival, one-week self-isolation, COVID-19 Protection Framework are not post-isolation test) for a traveller who flexible enough to protect New Zealanders may have a similar or lower level of risk against outbreaks of non-COVID infectious compared with a traveller from Auckland.36 diseases (eg, influenza or meningococcal To maintain even some consistency in risk disease) that are likely to occur once border management, the government needs to set restrictions are loosened and may have the requirement for travel out of Auckland atypical epidemiology and severity.31 The at a much higher level (a minimum would time to begin planning and rehearsing for be full vaccination for those who are eligible the next pandemic is now.32 plus fully tested for all, including children The reforms proposed by the new Pae Ora down to two years of age). (Healthy Futures) Bill provide an overdue opportunity to create a national public Rapidly close remaining immunity health service that is fit for purpose. Estab- gaps lishing a dedicated national public health Disease modelling and international agency could consolidate New Zealand’s experience indicate that creating and main- capacity to deliver a consistently high- taining uniformly high COVID-19 immunity quality and sustainable pandemic response, is the most important requirement for along with other disease prevention and minimising the population health impact of control services across the country and for COVID-19 with a suppression strategy. New all its citizens. Such an agency would have Zealand has extremely low rates of “natural an additional valuable role in supporting immunity” compared with other countries, the pandemic response in the Pacific region. so we are very reliant on vaccine-induced Finally, in the ongoing resource-constrained immunity. Firstly, we need to achieve high environment, there has never been a better vaccine coverage—that is, as close to 100% time to Choose Wisely33 for rational and as possible for the total population. This equitable34 healthcare resource stewardship. is because the dominant Delta variant is highly infectious and, as with previous coro- Key actions that need to be taken navirus vaccines, the currently available now COVID-19 vaccines are not able to create Applying these principles supports a “sterilising immunity” (where people are number of immediate actions as part of highly protected from becoming infected the pandemic response, all of which are and infecting others, as is the case with underway to varying degrees. measles vaccine). Secondly, this coverage needs to be high across all population Adopt a tight suppression strategy groups, and protecting those who have a We argue that the uncertain public higher risk of infection or adverse outcomes health impacts of the pandemic necessitate must be a focus. This is not presently the a relatively cautious, tight suppression case in New Zealand, where coverage is 12 NZMJ 26 November 2021, Vol 134 No 1546 ISSN 1175-8716 © NZMA www.nzma.org.nz/journal
editorial around 20% lower for Māori (albeit this gap a new national testing strategy to provide is declining).37 Thirdly, we need to extend better protection for high-risk groups as coverage to young children. Currently in New Zealand transitions to the COVID-19 New Zealand, vaccination is limited to Protection Framework. This strategy will children 12 years of age and older, but include a new telehealth case investigation several international jurisdictions, including service, increased PCR testing capacity and the United States, Canada and Israel, are wider use of rapid antigen testing and sali- now vaccinating the 5–11-year age group, va-based PCR testing.43 with over three million first doses admin- istered. Finally, we need to address waning Retain border entry controls Border management is less critical with a vaccine immunity over time by providing suppression strategy in comparison to elim- “booster” doses six months after the first ination, and re-designing border controls two doses (which may in fact be just part of is now necessary to free-up rooms in MIQ the primary vaccine course38), and also in facilities for isolating cases who can’t isolate future years. These COVID-19 booster doses at home. Nevertheless, border controls will could potentially be combined with seasonal still help reduce the overall case load, espe- influenza vaccination. cially in regions outside of Auckland. Even Strengthen public health and social the reduced requirements for travel into measures New Zealand from overseas that will start Although vaccination will certainly in January 2022 still require a minimum of reduce case numbers and severity of illness, full vaccination, multiple tests and one-week it is insufficient to prevent all COVID-19 self-isolation.36 Tight border management illness. To limit SARS-CoV-2 transmission, may also need to be reinstated in the future we need to continue upgrading our public to prevent importation of more virulent health and social measures. Many of these SARS-CoV-2 variants. measures are familiar from the elimination Strengthen primary healthcare strategy. However, activation of lockdowns (stay-at-home orders) is less likely with services and support for cases in the a suppression strategy, where there is a community greater tolerance for transmission than The primary healthcare system and there is with elimination. We may need community support services need to to retain localised lockdowns for situa- increase their capacity to manage large tions where cases threaten to overwhelm numbers of people with mild to moderate healthcare services, or if new, more-vir- COVID-19 infection safely in the community. ulent variants emerge. Effective prevention Strengthen hospital services of transmission in schools requires high The need to assess and manage more uptake of masks and optimising indoor seriously ill COVID-19 patients in hospital ventilation to prevent spread by inha- emergency departments, wards and lation.39–41 It would be useful to develop a ICUs will increase. This is a concern, as nationwide mask strategy to ensure high use the healthcare system had limited surge of appropriate masks in all settings where capacity prior to the pandemic, due to this would reduce the risk of SARS-CoV-2 heavy demands, resource and work- transmission.41 It will also be useful to inte- force constraints. Ultimately, the current grate the use of rapid antigen testing into healthcare system reform, as outlined in the supporting infection-control actions.42 new Pae Ora (Healthy Futures) Bill, aims to Strengthen and adapt contact tracing strengthen the capacity and performance of Testing, contact tracing, case isolation the healthcare system in total. and quarantine of contacts are all essential Ensure effective public components of COVID-19 suppression. These communication measures need to be strengthened so they The highly effective communication can manage the potentially large numbers of the elimination strategy was critical of cases that may arise following the switch to its successful implementation. Since from elimination to suppression. The the transition away from elimination government has recently announcement was announced on 4 October, and the 13 NZMJ 26 November 2021, Vol 134 No 1546 ISSN 1175-8716 © NZMA www.nzma.org.nz/journal
editorial proposal of the “steps system” and the wellbeing and economic outcomes through following “traffic light system,” there has the initial phase of the pandemic. The been less clarity and consistency around transition away from elimination will be the pandemic strategy and how it will be challenging. Outcomes are likely to be achieved. It would be useful to consider optimised by taking a tight suppression ways to ensure clear communication about approach, minimising immunity gaps and the current aims of the pandemic strategy using public health and social measures and their rationale. Such communication to protect populations that are more is particularly important for communities vulnerable to infection and adverse where English is a second language, notably outcomes of infection. All investments in some Pacific peoples. the response should be assessed according to their legacy benefit as well as their Conclusion immediate value. In this new phase of the New Zealand’s COVID-19 elimination response, science-informed strategic lead- strategy was highly successful, having ership and a commitment to equity are more maintained positive public health, equity, important than ever. Competing interests: Nil. Acknowledgements: This work was based in the Covid-19 Research Group (CoSearch) at the University of Otago, Wellington which receives funding support from the Health Research Council of NZ (20/1066). The epidemic curve was produced by Andy Anglemyer, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Preventive and Social Medicine, University of Otago, Dunedin. Author information: Michael Baker: Professor of Public Health, Director of CoSearch, Department of Public Health, University of Otago, Wellington. Amanda Kvalsvig: Senior Research Fellow, Co-Director of CoSearch, Department of Public Health, University of Otago Wellington. Sue Crengle: Professor in Māori Health, Department of Preventive and Social Medicine, University of Otago, Dunedin; Specialist General Practitioner, Invercargill Matire Harwood: Associate Professor, Department of General Practice and Primary Care, University of Auckland; Specialist General Practitioner, Papakura Marae Health Clinic, Auckland Collin Tukuitonga: Associate Dean (Pacific) and Associate Professor of Public Health, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, University of Auckland Bryan Betty: Medical Director of the Royal New Zealand College of General Practitioners; Specialist General Practitioner, Cannons Creek , East Porirua John Bonning: FACEM, Emergency Physician Waikato Hospital; Chair of the Council of Medical Colleges of Aotearoa NZ; Immediate Past president ACEM. Nick Wilson: Professor of Public Health, BODE3 Programme, Department of Public Health, University of Otago, Wellington Corresponding author: Professor Michael Baker, Department of Public Health, University of Otago, Box 7343, Wellington 6242, New Zealand; 0064 (0)21 355 056 michael.baker@otago.ac.nz URL: www.nzma.org.nz/journal-articles/the-next-phase-in-aotearoa- new-zealands-covid-19-response-tight-suppression-may-be-optimal- for-health-equity-and-wellbeing-in-the-months-ahead REFERENCES 1. Ministry of Health. framework for action 2. Baker M, Kvalsvig A, Verrall New Zealand Influenza (2nd edition). Wellington: AJ, et al. New Zealand’s Pandemic Plan: A Ministry of Health, 2017. elimination strategy for 14 NZMJ 26 November 2021, Vol 134 No 1546 ISSN 1175-8716 © NZMA www.nzma.org.nz/journal
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