The influence of Western Balkans external actors in
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The influence of
external actors in the
Western Balkans
A map of geopolitical players
www.kas.deImpressum Contact: Florian C. Feyerabend Desk Officer for Southeast Europe/Western Balkans European and International Cooperation Europe/North America team Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. Phone: +49 30 26996-3539 E-mail: florian.feyerabend@kas.de Published by: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. 2018, Sankt Augustin/Berlin Maps: kartoxjm, fotolia Design: yellow too, Pasiek Horntrich GbR Typesetting: Janine Höhle, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. Diese Publikation ist/DThe text of this publication is published under a Creative Commons license: “Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 international” (CC BY-SA 4.0), https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by-sa/4.0/legalcode. ISBN 978-3-95721-471-3
Contents
Introduction: The role of external actors in the Western Balkans 4
Albania 9
Bosnia and Herzegovina 14
Kosovo 17
Croatia 21
Macedonia 25
Romania 29
Serbia and Montenegro 32
The geopolitical context 39
3Introduction:
The role of external actors
in the Western Balkans
by Dr Lars Hänsel and Florian C. Feyerabend
Dear readers,
A spectre haunts the Western Balkans – the spec- consists of reports from our representatives in the
tre of geopolitics. Once again, the region is at risk various countries involved. Along with the non-EU
of becoming a geostrategic chessboard for exter- countries in the Western Balkans, this study also
nal actors. Warnings are increasingly being voiced considers the situation in Croatia and Romania.
in Brussels and other Western capitals, as well as
in the region itself. Russia, China, Turkey and the One thing is clear: the integration of the Western
Gulf States are ramping up their political, eco- Balkans into Euro-Atlantic and European struc-
nomic and cultural influence in this enclave within tures is already well advanced, with close ties and
the European Union – with a variety of resources, interdependencies. Apart from Serbia, which is
intentions and interests. In many cases, they nevertheless actively participating in the Partner-
are filling a gap that the United States has left ship for Peace programme, all states in the region
because of its ongoing shift of geostrategic focus, are either aspiring to join NATO or are already
and which the European community has so far members of the Alliance. A full 73% of the region’s
failed to adequately address. The West, and here foreign trade is with EU states; European coun-
primarily the EU, is no longer unchallenged as the tries are the main investors in the region; with the
dominant force in the Western Balkans, and Brus- exception of Kosovo, the citizens of all countries
sels’ enlargement policy based on conditionality enjoy visa-free travel to the EU; and the govern-
seems to be reaching its limits as an instrument. ments of all six non-EU Western Balkan countries
are actively working towards membership of the
As a result, a sober assessment of the current sit- European Union. The EU and Europe’s heads of
uation is urgently needed. How do politicians, gov- state and government have repeatedly reaffirmed
ernments and civil society in the Western Balkans the accession promises that they made in Thessa-
view the influence of the United States, Russia, loniki in 2003.
China, Turkey and the Gulf States? What are their
perceptions based on? What is the function and However, since the last accession – Croatia – in
role of these external actors? What are their inten- 2013, the goal of EU membership for the candi-
tions and interests, and what resources do they date countries has moved further away. Unfor-
have at their disposal? Where do their motivations tunately, reforms in the Western Balkan states
complement European and Euro-Atlantic concerns are progressing more slowly than expected, and
and interests, and where are they in conflict or the EU is also occupied with internal challenges
harbour the potential for conflict? This publication such as populism and Euroscepticism, shaping
looks closely at these issues and makes a sub- the future of the monetary union, coping with the
stantial contribution to the German debate on the migration crisis and implementing Brexit. It seems
role of external powers in the Balkans. The study to be suffering from a general sense of “enlarge-
4Introduction
ment fatigue”. President of the European Com- that has been involved in the Western Balkans
mission Jean-Claude Juncker was simply stating since the 19th century and has developed histor-
the obvious when, at the beginning of his term ical relations with the states of the region. How-
of office, he announced there would be no more ever, today Russia is unable to offer the Western
accessions until 2019. However, this was gener- Balkan states convincing alternatives to European
ally understood as a shift away from the policy of and Euro-Atlantic integration. The material cir-
enlargement and as a manifestation of “enlarge- cumstances are also strikingly disproportionate
ment fatigue”. to public perception and its political influence.
Russia does not play a significant economic role in
The EU’s approach to the region has been one of the Western Balkans: only 6.6% of foreign direct
friendly indifference. These developments and investment in the region comes from Russia and
statements have and will continue to have conse- Russia’s share of regional foreign trade is 3.9%
quences. The EU’s reputation has suffered among for exports and 5.3% for imports. However, the
the peoples of Southeast Europe. A representative region is dependent on Russia for its energy sup-
survey recently carried out in the Western Balkans ply, though this dependence is waning.
as part of the Balkan Barometer provides cause
for concern. 28% of those surveyed no longer Viewed as a whole, Southeast Europe is only a
want to join the EU and only 42% believe seeking sideshow in Moscow’s strategic thinking, albeit
EU membership is a positive step. The EU clearly one that should not be underestimated: Rus-
has an image and credibility problem, and it has sia’s foreign and security policy priorities are the
to take some of the blame. In this context, and in so-called “near abroad” (ближнее зарубежье), the
view of the unresolved economic and social prob- Middle East and relations with the United States
lems facing the Balkan states, governments and (and the West as a whole). Russia, on the other
society as a whole are turning their gaze east- hand, regards the Western Balkans as an arena in
wards to external actors such as Russia, China, which it can achieve significant effects with rela-
Turkey and the Gulf States. tively few resources, predominantly through “soft”
methods and intelligence, with the aim of distract-
At least to some extent, Russia’s annexation of ing, weakening and dividing the Western commu-
the Crimea in March 2014 and the migration cri- nity of states. While the Kremlin is seeking to pre-
sis of summer 2015 restored the West’s interest vent “encirclement” (from the Russian perspective)
in the Western Balkans in terms of foreign policy. in the “near abroad”, along with the restoration of
This particularly found its expression in the Berlin Russia’s sphere of influence, and in the process
Process, initiated by Chancellor Angela Merkel in taking advantage of alternative integration mod-
2014, and the EU’s recent Strategy for the Western els such as the Eurasian Union and the Collective
Balkans, which reaffirms a credible prospect of Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), its policy in
enlargement, underlines conditionality and indi- the Western Balkans is one of “disrupter”. In the
cates 2025 as a possible accession date for Serbia absence of a clear, long-term and constructive
and Montenegro. In this way, the EU is keeping strategy, it is primarily destructive and focused
the prospect of accession alive and meeting the on creating instability. With the skilful use of tac-
challenges posed by external actors by sending tics, sometimes covert, sometimes open, Russia is
out important political signals. seizing every opportunity to exploit the fragility of
political systems and intergovernmental relations
However, any assessment of how external actors to its own advantage. It is achieving this by culti-
are increasing their influence and the factors vating “pan-Slavic friendship among nations” and
involved is characterised by ambivalence and an Orthodox faith community, through gesture
heterogeneity. From a Western perspective, the politics, supporting certain parties and political
least ambiguous factor is classifying and evaluat- groups, and targeted PR via the Moscow-friendly
ing the role and intentions of the Russian Fed- media. In this way, it is blurring the boundaries to
eration. Moscow is a traditional external player propaganda and disinformation. The failed coup
5Introduction
in Montenegro on 16 October 2016 highlighted with European players – provide a vital impetus
the fact that Russia does not shy away from diver- for economic modernisation, competitiveness,
sionary tactics, conspiracy and sabotage. Experts economic growth and connectivity in the region.
believe the Western Balkans is already an arena In addition, Beijing appears to be a “stabiliser”
for hybrid warfare between the West and Russia. and hence an apparent ally of the EU, since China
supports the states’ integration into European
As far as China is concerned, just a few years ago structures, and its long-term investment in the
the “Middle Kingdom” was largely invisible and of region means that, unlike other external actors,
little significance as a player in the Balkans. This it is not in its economic and strategic interests
only changed with the announcement and launch to destabilise the Balkans, a region that is often
of the One Belt, One Road Initiative (OBOR), the described as a “powder keg”. On the other hand,
ambitious international investment strategy pre- there are fears in Washington, Brussels and Ber-
sented to the public by President Xi Jinping in lin that China’s economic engagement may not
September 2013 that will create a new Silk Road be as innocent as it initially appears, and that it
between China and its European markets, and may one day lead to the People’s Republic exert-
the 16+1 (CEEC) initiative for cooperation with the ing more political influence. There are still ques-
countries of Central and Southeast Europe, which tion marks hanging over China’s long-term goals
was launched in 2012. The Western Balkans play and intentions. Because, along with stability, the
a key geostrategic role here, as the Chinese view focus of the EU is on promoting democracy, the
the region as a gateway to the European Union market economy and good governance. China’s
market and as a land bridge between the Chi- economic practices, on the other hand, often fail
nese-owned port of Piraeus and Central Europe. to meet European standards, threaten to under-
Against this backdrop, Beijing has begun to mine EU conditionality and regulatory standards,
increase bilateral trade with the countries of the and increase the region’s overall susceptibility to
region and is investing in developing the transport corruption. The acceptance of Chinese loans for
and energy infrastructure and in certain strate- major infrastructure projects, mostly provided
gic industries in the Western Balkans. At the 16+1 by the China Exim Bank, also threatens to create
summit held in Budapest in November 2017, Bei- financial dependency and imbalance. In the long
jing promised additional financial aid to the tune run, Beijing’s growing economic power could also
of US$3 billion for investment and development lead to an increase in political influence. The EU is
projects in the region. As a result, there are few already divided when it comes to China, and this
reservations about China in the Western Balkan provides it with yet another challenge.
states, which are some of the economically weak-
est countries in Europe and therefore dependent Turkey is a traditional external player in South-
on what seem to be favourable financing oppor- east Europe, and over the last 20 years its foreign
tunities and direct investment. In absolute terms policy has rediscovered the Western Balkans.
and relative to other actors such as the EU, the Until the Balkan Wars of 1912/1913, the “Sublime
volume of trade is still small, but there is a note- Porte” ruled the region for centuries. Under the
worthy trend: China’s exports to Albania, Bosnia name Rumelia, the region was an integral part of
and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire. It was only after the end of
Serbia more than doubled between 2004 and the Cold War that Turkey once again became a
2014, while imports increased more than seven- serious player on the map of the Western Bal-
fold over the same period. kans with its support for the Bosniaks and later
the Kosovo Albanians during the Balkan Wars of
Europe and Germany take an ambivalent view of the late 20th century. When the AKP took power,
China’s role. Alternative financing options, signifi- Ankara’s focus shifted to its western neighbours in
cant investment in the economically weak West- the course of the “zero problems with the neigh-
ern Balkans and the implementation of infra- bours” policy proclaimed by its former foreign
structure projects – albeit in clear competition policy mastermind Ahmet Davutoglu. Turkey’s
6Introduction
involvement attracts a range of opinions. While fight and supplying humanitarian aid. When the
Ankara – itself a NATO member and (still) a can- wars ended, many religious foundations became
didate for EU membership – officially supports actively involved in constructing mosques, schools
the Euro-Atlantic and European integration of the and spreading a Wahabi interpretation of Islam
Western Balkan states, it is also pursuing an inde- that was not part of the Balkan tradition. This also
pendent “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy with the involved links to transnational Islamic terrorism,
aim of creating its own sphere of interest. In addi- both to Al Qaeda and, more recently, the so-called
tion to economic activities, Ankara’s resources are Islamic state (IS). One consequence of this is that
mainly poured into trade, banking, construction, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina have one
telecommunications and critical infrastructure of the highest proportions of “foreign fighters”
(e.g. Prishtina, Skopje, Ohrid and Zagreb airports), in Europe compared to their total population.
with a primary focus on soft power and the cul- Today, the influence of the Gulf States is no lon-
tural and religious ties that have grown over the ger limited to the religious and cultural sphere.
centuries and that are now being systematically Arab countries are increasingly making economic
expanded. investments, particularly in tourism, construction
(e.g. Belgrade Waterfront), agriculture, aviation
While Moscow sees itself as a patron of pan- (Air Serbia) and military technology, and are also
Slavism, Ankara has so far stressed its role as a providing loans and generous development aid.
protector of Muslims in the Balkans and has cul- This investment is not restricted to the Muslim
tivated special relations with the predominantly countries of the Western Balkans. Like China, the
Muslim states of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina Gulf States see the Western Balkans as a gate-
and Kosovo, the Muslim communities in Macedo- way to the EU market, and – also like China – the
nia, Montenegro and Serbian Sandžak, and the lack of transparency when it comes to trade and
ethnic political parties of Muslim communities. procurement with the Gulf States also increases
Ankara was long regarded as a model of Muslim the region’s susceptibility to corruption. The pro-
democracy, development and government with motion of radical Islamic ideas and support for
ties to the West. However, the political develop- jihadist networks on the part of non-state actors
ments in Turkey in the wake of the failed coup of weakens the resilience of Muslim societies and
July 2016 mean that Ankara’s democratic radiance poses a threat to the security of Europe, and
has been largely extinguished. Now, in certain hence Germany.
quarters, Turkey is joining Russia and China as
an attractive model of authoritarian rule. Turkey The situation is therefore quite differentiated:
has also expanded its diplomatic and economic there are close ties and dependencies between
activities in non-Muslim countries of the Western all the Western Balkan states and Euro-Atlan-
Balkans, as is underlined by its recent signing of a tic and European structures. In addition, trade
free trade agreement with Serbia. For many years, and investment in the region is dominated by EU
the West viewed Turkey as a stabilising force, but states. However, in parallel, external actors are
today in many respects it is the West’s competitor gaining influence in this enclave within the Euro-
in the Balkans, and its intentions are not always pean Union. Of course, not all their actions should
clear. be viewed as a risk to the countries’ resilience or
indeed as illegitimate. But Germany and the EU
Taken all together, the Gulf States – primarily need to keep a close watch on the situation and
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar be proactive in addressing these challenges.
and Kuwait – represent a relatively new player in
the Western Balkans. Their involvement can be The aim of this report is to look closely at the
traced back to their support for Muslims (Bos- activities of external actors in the Western Balkans
niaks, Albanians) during the Yugoslav wars of the and to describe their function and role, intentions
1990s, when they helped their Muslim breth- and interests, and the resources at their disposal.
ren by smuggling arms, sending volunteers to It also considers local and regional perceptions
7Introduction
and sensitivities and evaluates the involvement
of these external actors from a European and
German perspective. This report forms part of
our wide range of activities and projects that aim
to support democracy and the rule of law, the
integration of the Western Balkan states into the
European Union and promote dialogue on foreign
and security policy issues in Germany.
We hope you will find it a stimulating and
thought-provoking read.
Dr Lars Hänsel
Head of the Europe/North America Team
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.
Florian C. Feyerabend
Desk Officer for Southeast Europe/
Western Balkans
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.
84.
Albania
by Walter Glos
Euro-Atlantic and European integration The US plays a dominant role in Albania’s politi-
cal decisions and all of Albania’s political parties
Albania is a full member of NATO (2009), a candi- compete for American support. The US exerts
date for EU membership (2014) and expects EU huge influence over the country’s political and
accession negotiations to open next year. The Sta- public life. US ambassadors are afforded the
bilisation and Association Agreement entered into same prestige as governors. The US is seen as a
force in 2009 and Albanian citizens have enjoyed defender of Albanian nationalist interests, par-
visa-free entry to the EU since 2010. The accession ticularly for Albanians in Kosovo. In the document
process is progressing slowly, particularly in the on the National Security Strategy (2014-2019),
areas of fighting corruption, organised crime and relations with the US as a strategic partner are
the full implementation of judicial reform. Accord- viewed as a fundamental factor in consolidating
ing to the results of the latest OSCE/ODIHR report, the democracy, peace, development and integra-
parliamentary elections in 2017 made minimal tion processes of the country and region. The two
progress compared to the elections of 2013 and countries have signed 27 agreements and trea-
2015. The Albanian people would like the EU to ties. President George W. Bush’s visit to Tirana in
allow accession negotiations to begin, with over 2007 was viewed as the culmination of relations
90% of Albanian citizens in favour of their country between the two countries. The US supports Alba-
joining the EU. Albania has been a member of the nia’s accession to the EU, the democratic process
Islamic Conference since 1992 and a member of and the development of the rule of law.
the Council of Europe since 1995.
The Russian Federation has no influence on
political decisions in Albania, and official coop-
What is the function and role of exter- eration is minimal. There has been no exchange
nal actors? of top-level delegations between the two coun-
tries for years and Albania has not yet signed the
The main players with influence in Albania are the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Russia.
EU, the US and the countries of the region – Italy, Domestic influence at a non-political level is grow-
Greece and Turkey. On a broader level, there are ing compared to 10 years ago, mainly through
other interested parties, such as Russia, China and social media and Russian language courses, which
the Arab states. According to Albania’s National are offered free of charge by Russia. To date,
Security Strategy Paper (2014-2019), the EU and none of the main political parties have made any
the US are its main strategic partners; Russia is positive statements about Russia. Russia’s indirect
seen as a threat, while Italy, Greece and Turkey influence in Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro,
are viewed as strategic partners in the region. where Albanians live, also has an impact on Tira-
na’s attention and critical attitude towards Russia.
Albania has maintained special and very close In Albania, Russia is perceived as the traditional
relations with the United States since 1991, par- protector of the Orthodox Slavs. Russian support
ticularly on the core issues of democracy, the for Serbia sometimes clouds relations. The Rus-
rule of law, human rights, terrorism and security. sian government is critical of Albanian policy and
9Albania
Albania’s role in the region. Russia aims to weaken The United Arab Emirates financed the construc-
Albania’s role and likes to fuel arguments that tion of a new airport in Kukes, on the border with
Albania is a poodle of the US and the EU. Russia Kosovo. High-level talks have taken place with
was very critical of Albania’s position on the sanc- Qatar over recent years (the last two Albanian
tions imposed on Moscow by the EU in 2015. presidents, two prime ministers and other minis-
ters have visited Doha).
China has focused mainly on increasing its
economic cooperation with Albania. After Sta- In the 2014 National Security Strategy, Turkey is
lin’s death and the end of the close partner- considered a strategic partner, together with Italy
ship between the Soviet Union and the People’s and Greece. Turkey is Albania’s fourth-largest for-
Republic of Albania, Albania looked for a new ally eign investor. In 2016, its investments amounted
– and found it in China. Between 1968 and 1976, to more than 4% of GDP. Turkey maintains his-
Sino-Albanian relations were particularly strong in torical relations with Albania because of its Otto-
the economic sphere. However, with the gradual man heritage and has always sought to make the
opening-up of China, this partnership also came most of these traditional ties for its presence in
to an abrupt end when diplomatic relations were the country and its influence on foreign policy
broken off in 1978. Cooperation between Alba- and religious affairs. It supports institutions, foun-
nia and China has been growing once again since dations, projects and investments, particularly
2001, mainly but not exclusively in the economic those with a religious background, including the
and infrastructure sectors. This is largely taking construction of the largest mosque in Albania (in
place within the framework of the 16+1 cooper- Tirana). In the political and business spheres, its
ation launched by China and the One Belt, One aims to compete with Greek and Italian interests
Road project. There have been high-level visits in the country. Turkey’s President Erdogan has
between the two countries (ministers and deputy cultivated personal relations with all of Albania’s
prime ministers). China has taken over two of the prime ministers. Turkey has a wide range of pri-
largest investments in Albania: the only interna- vate investments in Albania, including banks and
tional airport in Tirana/Rinas and the largest oil production facilities, and there are 12 town-twin-
company, Bankers Petroleum. It is also active in ning agreements between Albanian and Turkish
the IT, energy and sea freight industries. The Alba- cities.
nian government has extended several invitations
to China to take over some of the country’s largest
infrastructure projects. The main political parties What are the actors’ long-term goals
all take a positive attitude towards China. China’s and interests?
cultural influence is also growing slightly. In 2013
a Confucius Institute was established at the Uni- For the USA, the priority is Albania’s democratic
versity of Tirana and in 2017 at the University of stability and political role in the region. As a full
Durres. These institutes disseminate Chinese lan- member of NATO, Albania has sent soldiers to
guage and culture. China views Albania as “its nec- missions in Iraq and Afghanistan at the request
essary partner in Europe”. of the United States and it supports every Amer-
ican position on security issues. Albania and the
The influence of the Gulf States in Albania is two- Albanian people are considered to be the most
fold: economic and religious. The last ten years pro-American of all the Balkan states. The main
have seen an exchange of high-level visits (pres- focus of the US is on strengthening the judicial
idents, heads of parliament), particularly with system in order to contain the threat posed by
Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. After organised crime and drug smuggling. It is also
the fall of communism, the Gulf States concen- keeping a close eye on potential extremist Islamic
trated on establishing religious institutions, partly groups in Albania. In the economic area, the US
in competition with Turkey. The Gulf States have has an interest in the TAP natural gas pipeline and
invested massively in infrastructure and tourism. other major regional projects. Despite this, trade
10Albania
between the two countries is at a relatively low sentatives, etc.) visit Albania every year. The Voice
level. of America radio station has considerable public
impact in Albania.
Russia is trying to restore the relations that it
had with Albania in the period from 1948-1961. It Russia makes the most of its historic connec-
primarily views the whole of the Balkans from a tions from the communist era and cultivates con-
geopolitical perspective. It is doing what it can to tacts with the generation of Albanians who were
minimise US influence and is opposed to Albania educated in the Soviet Union at that time. It also
becoming a member of the EU. However, Russia exploits its strong relations with Serbia to exert
cannot offer Albania any realistic, attractive alter- influence in the region, including Albania. Moscow
natives because it has little influence on Albania’s is investing in education and culture and has vis-
economy and energy policy. ibly increased its presence in the media through
regular weekly broadcasts and contributions in
China is primarily pursuing long-term economic Albanian.
goals in Albania and the Western Balkans. This
sub region represents an important corridor in China is using Albania’s interest in investment to
Beijing’s new Silk Road (One Belt, One Road pro- increase its economic involvement in Albania and
ject) and China is therefore concentrating its the region. It has also expanded its cultural activ-
investment on infrastructure projects. Unlike Rus- ities and increased visits by official delegations,
sia, China is not opposed to Albania joining the with government delegations from both sides
EU, as this means stability and market integration. making regular annual trips.
The Gulf States are interested in increasing their The Gulf States are using religious groups and
religious influence, as the majority of Albani- their economic potential to increase their religious
ans are Muslims and Albania is a member of the and economic influence in the region. Through
Islamic Conference. Otherwise, they are mainly religious and humanitarian foundations, they
interested in economic investment in the south- have built hundreds of religious institutions, espe-
ern coastal area. cially in rural areas. There are confirmed cases
of communities falling under the influence of
Turkey is keen to increase its political, economic, extremist ideas.
religious and cultural presence. Turkey assumes
that Albania is pursuing its political course and Turkey is using historical and cultural links to
sees itself as the defender of the Albanians revive its influence in Albania and the region.
against the Greek and Slavic “peril”. Ankara is employing political, diplomatic, educa-
tional, cultural, religious and economic methods
to achieve this aim. Turkey maintains universities
What resources do the external actors and a network of schools, foundations, etc. It also
have at their disposal? invites numerous Albanian delegations to visit
Turkey every year. In 2017, Turkey signed a con-
The US exerts a great deal of influence through tract to build the new airport in Vlora in southern
the government and its programmes, especially Albania.
through USAID and the implementation of judi-
cial reform. It plays a dominant role in matters of
security, defence, democracy and human rights. Economic relations
Following the constitutional changes in Albania in
2016, American experts have been afforded broad Albania has economic ties with a great many
access in the fight against organised crime and countries. For example, Greece’s financial crisis
corruption. Five or six high-level delegations (con- has reduced Greek influence in Albania, while
gressmen, senators, Department of State repre- economic stagnation in Albania has led it to turn
11Albania
to cheap Turkish and Chinese markets. Some The European Union has a great deal of influence
major international corporations have sold their in Albania. The majority of Albanians are in favour
property to other countries (e.g. Tirana Airport of joining the EU, so the EU plays a major role
changed hands from Germany to China). Accord- and has strong influence on the country’s political
ing to the Albanian Institute for Statistics, foreign life. All the parties are pro-EU and every declara-
investment in 2016 is as follows: tion or stance taken by the EU has an impact on
Tirana’s political agenda. Germany is very active
In 2016 China was the third-largest trading part- in Albania in the area of development policy and
ner after Italy and Germany at US$409.61 mil- plays an important role. The Albanians have an
lion; Turkey and Greece were neck-and-neck at affinity with Germany, so they are keen to gain its
$368.02 million, while the USA occupied 9th place support. Italy is present in every area of life and
at $87.83 million. Russia ranked 10th at $87.79 so exerts a constant influence on Albania. Italy
million, Saudi Arabia 51st at $5.43 million, fol- is its most important partner with an export and
lowed by the United Arab Emirates at $5.36 mil- import volume that is 3 to 3.5 times larger than
lion; Qatar came 61st at $2.62 million. that of Germany and 20 to 22 times larger than its
trading volume with the USA. Albanians feel close
In 2016, Italy was the largest trading partner with ties to Italy, much more so than with Greece or its
an import volume of €2.274 million, followed by other neighbours to the east.
Germany at €460 million and China at €438 mil-
lion. Greece came fourth with a total value of €427 Russia acts as a counterweight to the American
million, followed by Turkey at €364 million. The presence in Albania but has no discernible influ-
USA followed with €93 million, followed by Russia ence on its politics. In their political speeches,
at €82 million. The United Arab Emirates ranked Albania’s leaders have become increasingly bold
45th, Saudi Arabia 60th, Qatar 62nd and Kuwait in their criticism of Russia. They also try to avoid
114th. events or political occasions organised by Russia.
China and the Arab countries do not play an
Which actors can be classified as oppo- influential role and are unable to act as a potential
nents, and which as like-minded? counterweight to the US and EU. They recognise
the influence exerted by the US and EU in Albania
The US and EU are on one side, with Russia and and are therefore viewed as countries that have
Turkey on the other. All Albanian politicians are no potential influence on Albania.
inclined to maintain close ties with the USA. In
2017, the leaders of the main political parties, Turkey is an important player in Albania. It is
Prime Minister Edi Rama (Socialist Party), opposi- using religion and its historic ties to expand its
tion leader Lulzim Basha (Democratic Party) and influence in Albania. Greece and Albania are still
former party leader of the Socialist Movement dealing with some outstanding issues relating to
for Integration (now President) Ilir Meta, spent past policies. In this respect, Greece is trying to
around €1 million on lobbying in the USA in order demonstrate its power by putting pressure on
to increase its prestige in the Trump administra- Albanian emigrants in Greece. Moreover, Greece
tion. All three supported the presidential cam- is the only EU Member State to share a border
paigns of both Bill and Hillary Clinton, but in the with Albania. The Greek minority in Albania is still
wake of Trump’s victory they are now vying for his an important influencing factor.
support. Like the EU, Albania voted against the
resolution on Jerusalem. This was the first time
that Albania has ever formally voted against the
US. For the majority of Albanians, this vote did not
affect the country’s pro-American stance.
12Albania
Current events that have an impact on
the influence of external actors
Albania currently enjoys excellent relations with its
neighbours. It has particularly active relations with
Serbia and Macedonia, very good relations with
Kosovo, Montenegro and Italy and is on the thresh-
old of a new friendship agreement with Greece.
A potential problem for the future could be Tur-
key’s growing influence in Albania, as well as the
benefits that Turkey and Russia could derive from
placing hurdles in Albania’s path to joining the EU.
Turkey has been pressurising Albania to arrest
or extradite some Gülen supporters and to close
a number of Gülen schools, but these demands
have been indirectly refused.
Over recent years there has been an increase in
migration to the EU (mainly economic migrants
and skilled workers) and a drift towards extrem-
ism. In its relations with Greece, the Cham issue
remains unresolved. This relates to Albanian
inhabitants who were expelled from Greece
en masse after the Second World War and who
are still fighting for their rights (e.g. property in
Greece).
Despite the trend described above, there are
no serious signs of a real longer-term orienta-
tion towards Turkey, Russia, China or the Gulf
States. The EU and US will remain Albania’s key
political partners.
134.
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
by Dr Karsten Dümmel
Euro-Atlantic and European integration What is the function and role of
external actors? Which actors can be
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a NATO acces- described as opponents, and which as
sion candidate, but its Membership Action Plan like-minded?
(MAP) awaits activation pending the registra-
tion of military installations and stocks. NATO Since the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 and
membership negotiations have been repeatedly its military intervention in the 1990s, the United
blocked, derailed or suspended by the govern- States has had special responsibility for the state
ment of Republika Srpska (RS). A Stabilisation and of BiH. It is one of the guarantors of the country’s
Association Agreement was signed with the EU in relative stability. The USA’s “friend or foe” attitude
2015. An application for EU membership was then towards former military opponents has changed
submitted in February 2016, but candidate status little since 1995. For example, the SDS party,
remains a distant prospect. which was co-founded by Serbian leader Radovan
Karadžić, has since been reformed and is close
The questionnaire that the European Commission to the EPP. However, until recently it was on the
provides to countries seeking candidate status was USA’s list of Specially Designated Nationals and
only completed in mid-January 2018 after numer- Blocked Persons and was politically ignored. Its
ous delays – almost six months behind schedule. ability to reform was not acknowledged and it was
Now more than 3,500 responses have to be trans- kept out of political decisions and development
lated into English before the questionnaire can be processes. The American Embassy and USAID
sent back to Brussels. The statements of the new gather information via KAS contacts in the SDS
Austrian government are worrying and contrary and indirectly “accompany” some of the SDS’s pro-
to the interests of the EU. Vice-Chancellor Strache, jects through KAS. However, since autumn 2017,
who maintains close relations with the RS and its the US has begun to make its own direct contacts.
president, Milorad Dodik, has recently – once again One year before the general elections in BiH, this
– declared that the state of Bosnia and Herzego- suggests a change of strategy. The United States
vina has no right to exist. He has repeatedly called is mainly interested in maintaining security and
for the RS to be independent of BiH. However, the stability in the region and reducing/preventing the
current Bulgarian Presidency of the EU Council has spread of Russian influence and radical Islam. To
made the integration of the Western Balkan states achieve this, the United States has hard and soft
a high priority. power resources at its disposal. It has military
infrastructure on the ground thanks to its com-
mand of the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo, and
it can also exert indirect influence through IMF
loans. USAID is one of the country’s main donors.
14Bosnia and Herzegovina
The US and EU have similar objectives with regard Honour) is also causing a stir at the moment, and
to BiH and should therefore be regarded as like- it is also said to have connections with Russia. It is
minded. Shortly before President Obama left ostensibly a humanitarian organisation, but of late
office in January 2017, his administration imposed its public appearances have featured nationalist
sanctions on the RS president, Milorad Dodik. He symbols and military equipment. Its proximity to
was once supported by the US as a “reformer and Milorad Dodik is undisputed, and experts suspect
hope for the future”. Dodik’s hopes that the sanc- that it is a paramilitary unit set up by Dodik him-
tions would be lifted when Trump took office were self. Opposition forces in the RS fear that he could
soon dashed. It seems unlikely that the situation use this group to intimidate political opponents
will change in the near future. However, the EU during the upcoming elections. There is evidence
has been unable to impose sanctions on Dodik. that individual members of this group have con-
nections to the Russian military.
The Russian Federation exerts influence on the
government and society of RS via Serbia, but also So far, China has played no particular role in BiH.
directly. This influence is often overestimated in Although China is expanding its trade volume with
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) the Balkan countries as part of the One Belt, One
and by the rest of the world. Like Turkey, Russia Road Initiative, it is doing this to a much lesser
is represented in the energy and banking sectors. extent than in Serbia, for example. It is not pos-
The two nations also have religious ties that have sible to discern any long-term, country-specific
grown up over the centuries through the Ortho- goals and interests with regard to BiH. China is
dox Church. Russia also advises the RS govern- increasingly investing in power generation from
ment and trains and equips its police and paramil- coal-fired power plants. It can be assumed that it
itary units. Russian advisors helped to draft a law is deliberately creating commodity dependencies.
on NGOs for the RS. Russia’s UN veto on decisions
against the RS taken by the Peace Implementation Overall, the influence of the Gulf States is
Council (PIC) and on genocide claims against the increasing steadily. Like Turkey, the Gulf States
Bosniaks have prevented the country from mak- supported BiH during the Balkan Wars. This
ing progress on reconciliation. The Russian Feder- led to an influx of weapons and Islamic fight-
ation’s agenda includes consolidating its sphere of ers (Wahabis, Salafis) with religious views that
influence and disrupting Western interests. Russia are alien to the indigenous Muslim community
is trying to achieve this goal by supporting Ser- in BiH. The Gulf States are strongly and conspic-
bian interests in the country. Moscow is opposed uously represented in the FBiH in the areas of
to both EU and NATO membership. In addition, religion, culture, economy (medium-sized busi-
Moscow is creating dependencies in the area of nesses), tourism (visa-free entry) and consump-
energy supply and lending in the RS. tion. As has happened in many African countries
in the past, they have endowed mosques and
The Russian Federation is an opponent of the funded religious and cultural institutions in BiH
United States and the EU and often appears to be (schools, kindergartens, cultural centres, sports
acting in conjunction with Serbia, particularly with fields, libraries, and museums). BiH is regarded
regard to relations with Republika Srpska. The as a bridgehead and access route to Europe.
president of the RS, Milorad Dodik, is considered Alongside economic interests, the Gulf States
to be Moscow’s ally and Putin’s friend. Moscow are primarily interested in gaining influence in
indirectly supported the RS government in the ref- religious and cultural life. Their main resources
erendum on the unconstitutional Independence are financial, and they use them specifically to
Day of the RS in September 2015. Indirect sup- buy up choice pieces of land and to infiltrate
port can also be expected for another unconsti- the economy. In terms of religious orientation,
tutional referendum on independence by the RS, they are pushing for their strict Islamic values
which the RS government under Dodik flirts with to be more deeply embedded in everyday life
on a regular basis. The Srbska Čast group (Serbian (state religion, alcohol ban, veiling, polygamy, no
15Bosnia and Herzegovina
women’s rights, etc.). However, their influence is are rejected by Muslims living in BiH (mass cir-
sometimes overestimated in Western countries cumcision of boys in sports stadiums, etc.). Due
and Croatia. Especially in Croatia, but also in Aus- to Turkey’s unconditional support for the govern-
tria, there is a strong political campaign against ment of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Islamic influences in the FBiH. A recent publication (RBiH) and for the Muslim population during the
by the Austrian Integration Fund included an arti- 1992-1995 war, Muslims and Muslim elements
cle entitled Islam auf dem Balkan – ein historischer in government take a less critical view of Turkey
Überblick bis hin zur Gegenwart [Islam in the Balkans than other nations. Serbs and Croats in BiH and
– A historical view up to the present day]. It is full of in the mother countries use Turkey’s strong influ-
lies and half-truths and was strongly criticised by ence as an opportunity to warn against “being
experts in the field. In fact, large sections of the alienated in our own country”, “indoctrination”
Bosniak population are sceptical of or opposed to and the “increasing Islamisation of BiH” (especially
the Gulf States’ strict interpretation of Islam. FBiH). This often reveals traditional resentments.
In addition to economic interests, Turkey pursues
The Gulf States all act separately and do not seem a neo-Ottoman policy of securing and restoring its
to have any joint strategies. By financing construc- former sphere of influence in BiH. The strengthen-
tion projects and sending ever-growing numbers ing of (political) Islam represents an important cul-
of tourists, the Gulf States are gradually bringing tural/religious component in this respect. In addi-
visible changes in urban and rural areas (such tion to soft power resources (religion, entertain-
as the sight of fully-veiled women, an influx of ment industry, TV), Turkey’s economic resources
60,000-80,000 tourists in Sarajevo between June are a key element for exerting its influence. It is
and August, changing street and business names, investing in business and infrastructure and heav-
advertising in Arabic and other Arabic street ily subsidising tourism in Turkey. Turkey also has
signs). close relations with the Muslim Bosniak commu-
nity, and it gains influence through its close ties
For decades, Turkey has called BiH “its country”. with the EPP partner party and ruling SDA party.
In reality, however, Turkey is more active in the
entity of the FBiH (banks, motorways, petrol sta- Turkey knows other Islamic states are at its side,
tions, economy) than in the RS. During the “Bos- but it is also in competition with the Gulf States,
nian Spring” in February 2014, when workers went particularly in the religious area. The SDA and in
on strike and mass demonstrations were held particular Bakir Izetbegovic as party chairman and
in 18 cities of the FBiH, Turkey was immediately member of the BiH presidency are regarded as
asked for help by the Muslim member of the pres- allies of the AKP and President Erdogan. During
idency. After its failed military coup in July 2016, a public address in Sarajevo in January 2018, the
Turkey sought the assistance of fellow Muslims Deputy Secretary General of the AKP described BiH
in FBiH ministries to investigate supporters of the as “the future Anatolia of Europe”. The AKP plans
Gülen movement in BiH and apply political pres- to open offices abroad in various countries in 2018,
sure to have them “removed” from schools and including BiH. This is justified by the AKP’s vision,
universities. Private universities were closed down which does not limit itself to domestic policy.
and professors dismissed – we can only specu-
late whether this was as a direct consequence.
Turkish students and lecturers in BiH have talked
openly to the rapporteur about being unable to
travel to Turkey for fear of being arrested. The
presidents of Turkey (Erdogan) and BiH (Izetbe-
govic) are personal friends. Turkey is trying to
use culture and religion to exert an influence on
society and the orientation of Islam in BiH. It is
having a degree of success, but certain elements
164.
Kosovo
by Johannes D. Rey
Euro-Atlantic and European integration citizens. Since the launch of EULEX in 2008, the
United States has also provided personnel for this
The European Union has always supported Koso- mission – for the first time as part of an EU CSDP
vo’s progress on its European journey. The signing mission. The US government has invested some
of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) $2 billion in Kosovo since 1999 and is currently
in 2015 and its entry into force in 2016 have been building an expensive new embassy, due to open
key steps in this direction. To support necessary in 2018.
reforms, the EU is providing the Western Balkans
and Turkey with pre-accession assistance of €11.7 The embassy is particularly committed to improv-
billion for the period 2014-2020. Of this amount, ing the rule of law and good governance, tai-
€645.5 million has been allocated to Kosovo. lored to the needs of citizens, and to sustaina-
ble economic growth that promotes the stabil-
Two EU missions are currently operating in Kosovo: ity of Kosovo and its European integration. The
the Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) and the Office of embassy also wants Kosovo to make a positive
the European Union/EU Special Representative in contribution to regional stability through a statu-
Kosovo (EUSR). The EULEX mission in Kosovo is one tory restructuring of the security sector, measures
of the largest EU Common Security and Defence to combat violent extremism, the promotion of
Policy (CSDP) missions. On 27 October 2015, the EU minority rights and integration into Euro-Atlantic
and Kosovo signed the SAA in Strasbourg. Mem- structures. The government of Kosovo and the US
bership of international organisations remains one government’s Millennium Challenge Corporation
of the priorities of the government, which is seek- (MCC) have signed a $49 million threshold pro-
ing full membership of the UN. gramme to boost economic growth and reduce
poverty.
Kosovo’s national security is closely linked to
regional and Euro-Atlantic security. Kosovo’s inde- Within the framework of KFOR, which currently
pendence is recognised by 114 states (including 23 involves 30 countries and more than 4,600 troops,
EU states and three permanent members of the around 650 US military are currently stationed in
UN Security Council). The European Commission’s the Balkans. According to US Secretary of Defence
new strategy for the Western Balkans could allow a James Mattis, the US presence in Kosovo will con-
gradual accession of some countries in the region. tinue until the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) can be
given the mandate to ensure internal security and
territorial defence. Such a change would require
What is the function and role of exter- parliament to pass a constitutional amendment.
nal actors?
The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, which
Since 1999, the United States has made contin- began in 2010, is accompanied by the EU and
gents available to NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). directly supported by the US. These talks estab-
KFOR’s task is to maintain safety and protection lished a new arbitration paradigm in which the
and to guarantee freedom of movement for all United States continues to support both sides
17Kosovo
and help them move towards a full normalisation EU and ultimately bring the country closer to NATO.
of relations. In this context, it is unlikely that Russia will withdraw
its veto against Kosovo’s UN membership.
The aim of the USA’s support is to enter into a
strategic partnership with Kosovo. A bilateral Kosovo has legitimate concerns that Russia rep-
state partner programme with the Iowa National resents a serious security threat, as it could mili-
Guard, a subdivision of the US National Guard, tarise the Serbian army. This concern seems jus-
was launched in 2011. The long-term goal of the tified in view of the fact that the Russian-Serbian
programme is a broadly established partnership Humanitarian Centre has recently been estab-
with the KSF through support for regional security lished in the southern Serbian city of Niš, less than
and cooperation. The United States also supports 100 km from Prishtina. In Kosovo, this centre is
Kosovo in the fight against violent extremism and viewed solely as a Russian military presence to
welcomes its efforts to mitigate the threat posed counterbalance KFOR. It has led to calls for a per-
by foreign terrorists and other radicalised individu- manent US military presence in Kosovo in order to
als through joint activities and counter-messaging. deter Russia and maintain stability.
The Balkans are of great strategic importance for Political relations between Kosovo and Turkey are
Russia, particularly as a transport hub and infra- determined by a range of geopolitical, economic
structure location for the supply of gas and oil to and socio-historical factors. The large community
Europe. As a UN member with the power of veto of Turkish citizens who have their roots in Kosovo
and with its historical interest in the Balkans, Rus- and the ethnic minority of Turks in Kosovo play an
sia is an important player among those countries important role in this respect.
who refuse to recognise Kosovo’s independence.
Russia has a traditionally close friendship with Turkey actively participated in NATO’s intervention
Serbia and is interested in maintaining its polit- and Kosovo’s liberation in 1999, was involved in
ical and economic influence in the Balkans. As a post-war reconstruction and offered its support
result, it opposes Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of to numerous bilateral and multilateral platforms.
independence and the integration of the Balkan It was one of the first countries to recognise Koso-
states into the EU and NATO. vo’s independence on 18 February 2008. Since
the establishment of diplomatic relations upon
Russia has been active on the Kosovo issue since the opening of the Kosovo Embassy in Ankara,
the 1990s and is well represented by its diplo- there have been numerous visits by high-ranking
matic liaison office in Prishtina as part of the UN officials. Between 2008 and 2016 alone, 44 agree-
mission, which acts as a branch of the Russian ments and other decisions on bilateral coopera-
embassy in Belgrade. Russia’s economic interests tion were signed.
in the region revolve around its complex Balkan
policy. At the Balkan Energy Cooperation Summit Since 2008, when the Kosovar-Turkish Chamber of
in Zagreb in 2007, President Putin presented Rus- Commerce began its work, €327 million of Turkish
sia’s plans to supply Russian gas via Macedonia to investment has flowed into Kosovo. This makes
Kosovo, Albania and southern Serbia. Turkey the country’s fifth-largest foreign investor,
after Germany, Switzerland, Austria and the UK.
President Putin has repeatedly compared Kosovo Some 800 Turkish companies are registered in
to Crimea. Kosovo’s membership of the UN will Kosovo, of which about 200 are currently active.
probably eventually be negotiated as a dispute Over the last few years, Kosovo has imported
between Russia and the West in the UN Security goods in excess of €288 million from Turkey, while
Council – instead of resolving it via the EU-sup- its exports to Turkey have amounted to around €8
ported dialogue with Belgrade. Russia fears that million. Turkish companies, together with inter-
the signing of an agreement between Kosovo and national partners, have won some of the largest
Serbia would accelerate Serbia’s accession to the tenders. The contract for the construction of a
18Kosovo
motorway link between Kosovo and Albania (at a are their fellow Muslims, but for others, Turkish
cost of one billion euros) and between Prishtina investments are harbingers of a planned “recon-
and Skopje (around 600 million euros) went to an quest”.
American-Turkish consortium. In 2010, the Turk-
ish-French association Limak-Aéroport de Lyon Turkey’s two main economic and cultural currents,
received the concession for Adem Jashari inter- controlled by President Erdogan and his former
national airport in Prishtina for 20 years, with ally Fethullah Gülen, are also having an impact
an investment commitment of over 100 million in the Balkans. Economic experts and journalists
euros. In 2012, the Turkish Limak-Çalik consor- in Kosovo differ in their views on investments by
tium privatised the state power grid (purchase these two elements. They both support a great
price €26.3 million). Numerous Turkish banks many schools in Kosovo (the exact number could
such as Calik Holding (BTK and KEDS), Newco not be confirmed by KAS sources). After the coup
Balkan, Turkish Sparbank (TEB), and Ish Bank (İş in Turkey, President Erdogan called on the Kosovo
Bankası) have successfully established themselves authorities to close all schools supported by
in Kosovo. Gülen, but his demand has been refused.
The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency Of all the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia exerts the
(TIKA) has been active in Kosovo since 2004. greatest influence in Kosovo, although other
According to the embassy in Ankara, around 1,600 states such as Qatar and the United Arab Emir-
young people from Kosovo are studying in Turkey. ates also have an influence. The Kingdom of
The majority of these are endowed with schol- Saudi Arabia was one of the first states to recog-
arships from the Turkish government or Turkish nise Kosovo’s independence and supports it to
businessmen with roots in Kosovo. this day. Diplomatic relations were established
In December 2009, the KSF signed an agreement on 7 August 2009. Kosovo opened its embassy in
with the Turkish armed forces for a broad cooper- Riyadh in May 2010, and Saudi Arabia’s embassy
ation that would include training Kosovan forces in Tirana is responsible for Kosovo.
in Turkish military academies. There is also con-
tact and collaboration in other areas such as cul- At the 36th session of the Council of Foreign Min-
ture, sport, art and archives. isters at the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation
(OIC) held in Damascus on 25 May 2009, 57 states
Turkey’s investments in Kosovo are often criti- adopted a resolution noting Kosovo’s declara-
cised by intellectuals, politicians and the media, tion of independence, strengthening the role of
who question Turkey’s motives and are concerned the UN in Kosovo and reaffirming the great inter-
about Kosovo’s political and cultural orientation. est of the OIC in the situation of Muslims in the
From Kosovo’s perspective, Turkey is a trading Balkans. Kosovo’s cooperation with the OIC was
partner and supporter of independence, whereas also welcomed and the international community
from the Turkish perspective the Balkans is a geo- was called upon to continue supporting Kosovo’s
political area where it can exert its influence – with economy. Saudi Arabia played a key role and it
Kosovo as its centre. Kosovo’s religious identity was reported that an earlier draft resolution had
emerged during Ottoman rule, so Islam in Kosovo called for the OIC to recognise Kosovo, but that it
largely coincides with Islam as practised in Turkey. was rejected by certain member states, including
So far this is not a major issue in Kosovo, but the Syria, Egypt and Azerbaijan.
fact that Turkey’s policy is strongly influenced by
religious factors is also reflected to some extent Saudi Arabia has invested particularly heavily in
in its foreign policy. When President Recep Tayyip rebuilding the schools, polyclinics and mosques
Erdogan visited Prishtina in 2013, he even went that were destroyed during the war in Kosovo.
so far as to say: “Remember, Turkey is Kosovo Both countries have majority Muslim populations.
and Kosovo is Turkey”, which caused concern to The traditional form of Islam in Kosovo is the
the majority of Kosovans. For some, the Turks Hanafi school, described as predominantly liberal
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