THE EFFECTS OF THE US-CHINA TRADE WAR AND TRUMPONOMICS
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Forum Scientiae Oeconomia • Volume 7 (2019) • No. 1
The effects of the US-China
trade war and Trumponomics
Olaniyi Evans
ABSTRACT DOI: 10.23762/FSO_VOL7_NO1_3
Trumponomics describes the economic policies of U.S.
President Donald Trump and has an “America-first” ap-
proach. The Trump administration risks creating a more
fragmented global economy, and has started the biggest
global trade war to date. The various sides are still on ten-
terhooks and threatening to impose additional tariffs worth
hundreds of billions of dollars. Using deadweight loss (also
known as excess burden or allocative inefficiency) and
Harberger’s triangle, this study shows that the trade war is
devastating not just for the US and China, but for the entire
global economy: (i) the prices of items that directly affect
consumers’ welfare will rise; (ii) firms will face extra costs for
exports; (iii) investors will become more nervous; (iv) some
investors will diversify into Bitcoin and other cryptocurren-
cies; (v) the trade war could turn into a currency war; (vi)
even developed countries could be hit by the trade war; and
(vii) tariffs applied on developing countries’ exports would
rise steeply. In a trade war, everyone may lose. Olaniyi Evans
e-mail: oevans@pau.edu.ng
KEY WORDS School of Management and
Trumponomics, US-China trade war, consumers, stocks, Social Sciences, Pan Atlantic University,
cryptocurrency, Brexit. Lagos, Nigeria
Introduction
A trade war is an economic conflict that jobs from foreign competition (Coughlin et
results from extreme protectionism where al., 2000).
countries raise or create tariffs (or other In 2017 and 2018, President Donald
trade barriers) against each other in retali- Trump embarked on a protectionist cam-
ation to trade barriers created by the other paign in an attempt to bring manufacturing
party. A consequence of a misapprehen- jobs back to the United States from other
sion of the benefits of free trade, trade wars nations such as China where such jobs
can be instigated if one country perceives have been outsourced (Costinot, 2009;
another country’s trading practices to be Zoellick, 2017). He imposed a new import
unfair (Krugman, 2016; Zoellick, 2017). It duty on 818 goods from China totalling $34
can therefore result from a protectionist billion. China retaliated in kind, imposing
stance. Protectionism restricts interna- a 25% duty on the import of U.S. goods,
tional trade, though most often the general also totalling $34 billion.
intent is to protect local businesses and The advantages and disadvantages
of such protectionism are the subject of
A tariff is a tax imposed on imported goods and
services. fierce debate which has a long history
Paper received: 27 November 2018 • Paper revised: 12 February 2019 • Paper accepted: 20 February 201948 Forum Scientiae Oeconomia • Volume 7 (2019) • No. 1
in political economy and world politics (2017), Jakupec (2017), Locke (2017) and
(Findlay, 2017; George, 2017; Irwin, 2017; Jakupec (2018).
Alden 2018). Standard economic theory Trumponomics takes an “America-first”
highlights the adverse effects of trade pro- approach; by doing so, it risks creating a
tectionism (Draper, 2017; Fong, 2017; Zis- more polarised global economy. In fact,
simos, 2017; Weingast, 2018). Critics argue it has triggered the biggest global trade
that protectionism can lead to increases in war by imposing a new import duty on 818
the price of domestic manufactured goods goods from China totalling $34 billion. Chi-
as well as slow economic growth and na has retaliated in kind, imposing a 25%
cultural exchange down. However, propo- duty on the import of U.S. goods, also to-
nents argue that the free trade principle talling $34 billion. The Trump administration
that trade is mutually beneficial for coun- has also extended the trade war to Canada
tries. They also claim that protectionism, in (which has imposed tariffs on $12.8 billion
conjunction with well-crafted policies, can worth of US goods in return), the EU (which
provide competitive advantages and gen- has enforced tariffs on $7.2 billion of US
erate more jobs (Costinot, 2009; Abboushi, products in return), and Russia (which has
2010). also enforced 25-40% additional duties on
However, it is difficult to uncover any the import of American products). In 2018,
widely accepted ramifications and effects President Donald Trump threatened signifi-
of the US-China trade war from this debate. cant tariffs on Chinese goods, including as
Thus it is not clear what the effects and much as $500 billion on products includ-
implications of the US-China trade war are ing steel and soy. He has also threatened
likely to be. This study fills the gap, identi- to pull the U.S. out of the World Trade Or-
fying the effects of the US-China trade war ganisation (WTO). The Trump administra-
on consumers, firms, stocks, cryptocur- tion and the affected countries are still on
rency, and both developed and developing tenterhooks and threatening to impose ad-
countries. The layout of this article is as fol- ditional tariffs worth hundreds of billions of
lows: the next section discusses Trumpo- dollars.
nomics and the US-China trade war; Sec- With the imposition of tariffs, the Trump
tion 2 describes the theory of deadweight administration hopes to reduce the large
loss and Harberger’s Triangle in relation US trade deficit with China as well as to
to the US-China trade war; and Section 3 impel China to make key adjustments to its
presents the implications of the US-China economic policies, including reducing ex-
trade war. The last section contains the isting tariffs and limiting the alleged theft of
conclusion to the paper. US intellectual property by Chinese firms.
The Trump administration seeks to use
1. Trumponomics and the trade negotiations to massage its elector-
US-China Trade War ate’s concerns over the lost manufactur-
Trumponomics describes the economic ing industries of the US rust belt and the
policies of U.S. President Donald Trump for perception that China’s trade practices are
restructuring trade deals, cutting personal “not fair” and threaten the US in high-tech
and corporate taxes, and introducing large sectors. While much focus has been on
fiscal stimulus measures focused on infra- tariffs on steel and other heavy industrial
structure and defence. For further details
The WTO is the only global impartial organisa-
of the appurtenances and technicalities of
tion which regulates trade among the 164 coun-
Trumponomics, see Ruccio (2017), Ghosh tries that belong to it.The effects of the US-China trade war and Trumponomics 49
goods, the US tariffs also target a range of Perelman, 2011; Sřrensen, 2011; Harberger
high-tech industries, particularly where the and Just, 2012; Wang and Chen, 2012). In
Chinese are likely to become leaders in the the case of tariffs, the amount of the tariff
next decade. This has further led credence drives a wedge between what consum-
to the argument that, in recent times, the ers pay and what producers receive, and
rise of China and other vibrant emerging the size of the wedge is equivalent to the
economies has posed huge competition deadweight loss from the tariff (Figure 1).
for the US and other developed econo- The area denoted by the triangle arises
mies, with uneven patterns of winners and from the fact that the intersection of the
losers within them (Rugman and Li, 2007; demand and supply curves is cut short
Hsiang, 2016; Lee and Schwartz, 2016; so that the producer and consumer sur-
Rugman, 2016). pluses are also cut short. The loss of such
un-recouped surplus is the deadweight
2. Theoretical framework loss. Economists such as James Tobin
2.1. Deadweight loss and Harberg- have argued that triangles do not have a
er’s Triangle significant effect on the economy, but oth-
Deadweight loss (also known as excess ers such as Martin Feldstein have argued
burden or allocative inefficiency) is the that, on the contrary, they can significantly
loss of economic efficiency that occurs affect long-term economic trends by spin-
when equilibrium for a good/service is not ning the trend downwards and magnifying
achieved (such that optimal or allocative losses in the long run (Tobin, 1977; Feld-
efficiency is not achieved). It is the loss stein, 1999; Fletcher, 2011; Spulber, 2015;
of welfare, social surplus or utility for con- Blinder, 2016; Rösl and Tödter, 2017).
sumers/producers due to reasons such
as tariffs, subsidies, taxes, price ceilings/ 2.2. Application to the US-China
floors, externalities and monopoly pric- trade war
ing (Coughlin, 2010; Dixon and Rimmer, The Harberger’s triangle or tariff wedge
2010; Irwin, 2010; Porcher, 2014). For tar- is the deviation from the equilibrium price/
iffs, deadweight loss is the excess burden quantity as a result of tariff imposition. Put
created due to a loss of benefit to partici- differently, the Harberger’s triangle or tar-
pants in trade, which can be consumers, iff wedge is the difference between what
producers or the government. If a tariff is consumers pay and what producers re-
imposed on a firm for each unit of the good ceive (net of tariff) from a transaction. The
it imports, the new equilibrium price will be first round of tariffs on $34 billion worth of
higher (Chen and Ma, 2012). Therefore, Chinese imports means that the price for
some of the burden is passed on to the the American buyers is greater than the
consumer, and this leads to a reduction in price for the Chinese sellers. With such
trade on both sides. The loss in welfare is tariffs, consumers pay more than they did
attributable to a shift to less efficient mar- before, and suppliers receive less for the
ket outcomes which lead to wastage or the good than they did before. Represented by
underutilisation of resources. the shaded Harberger triangle in Figure 1,
Harberger’s triangle, attributed to Arnold the deadweight loss created by the tariff
Harberger, can be used to study the dead- is equal to
weight loss (as measured on a demand (1)
and supply curve) created by government
intervention in a market (Magee, 2011;50 Forum Scientiae Oeconomia • Volume 7 (2019) • No. 1
Figure 1. Harberger’s Triangle for the US-China Trade War
Source: Own elaboration.
For example, when America imposes a tariffs will have wider effects on consum-
new import duty on China, the tariff drives ers, sellers and the global economy.
a ‘wedge’ between the price American con-
sumers pay and the price Chinese sellers 3.1. Consumers
receive. The difference between the price Firms are likely to pass on the additional
that consumers pay and the price that sell- costs of imposed tariffs to consumers by
ers receive is equivalent to the size of the raising prices. The prices of items that
per-unit tariff. In line with the law of supply directly affect consumers’ welfare, such
and demand, as the price paid by consum- as food, prescription drugs and foreign
ers increases, and the price received by holidays, will therefore rise. Unlike stocks,
sellers decreases, the quantity that each prices would rise over a period of months
wishes to trade will decrease. rather than immediately, demonstrating the
After the tariff is imposed, a new equi- time it may take before consumers begin to
librium is reached where consumers pay feel the effects of the trade war. However, in
more and the quantity traded falls. With spite of expectations, these tariffs may not
such tariffs, the equilibrium price is P*, bring manufacturing jobs back. Any jobs
where the difference between the buyer’s created in industries protected by tariffs
(Pc) and seller’s prices (Ps) equals the val- would be offset by those lost in industries
ue of the tariff (Figure 1). The total of the that make use of these products and which
shaded triangular region is the Harberger’s would face rising costs, and due to export
triangle which represents the magnitude of sectors being hit by retaliatory tariffs.
the loss of welfare. While the top shaded
triangle represents the loss of welfare to
3.2. Businesses
It should be noted that the longer the
consumers (the demand side), the lower
trade war continues, the likelier firms are
shaded triangle represents the loss of wel-
to get hurt. American businesses have
fare to sellers (the supply side).
reported increased prices as a result of
3. Implications the tariffs, compelling them to make hard
In line with the deadweight loss in the choices such as laying off workers or de-
Harberger’s triangle, tariffs and counter- laying expansion plans. Many companiesThe effects of the US-China trade war and Trumponomics 51
will shift production overseas to circum- base noticeably more nervous, which may
navigate the tariffs because they may not worsen as the trade war continues.
want to absorb extra costs for exports
(e.g. Harley-Davidson). Cases like Harley- 3.4. Cryptocurrency
Davidson have shown that Trumponomics Recent history has shown that crypto-
does indeed have weaknesses. It may be currencies blossom when countries battle
difficult for the US to resolve trade deficits uncertain economic times. For example,
bilaterally, especially with China. A lot of Chinese switched to cryptocurrencies
US companies have moved their produc- when their national currency, the yuan,
tion to China; they operate within complex was devalued. Similarly, in 2016, Bitcoin
international networks and protection will experienced a significant increase during
not bring them back to the US. The trade Brexit. As the US takes on more countries
war could still extend into areas that have on a trade war, the value of national curren-
not been considered. For example, it could cies will likely decline, including US dollars,
extend into bureaucratic hurdles for com- and investors will look for alternate ways to
panies operating abroad, and interference store their wealth. Traditionally, investors
in the licensing process. have stored their wealth in precious met-
Similarly, a growing number of Chinese als such as gold and silver, but their ac-
companies are adopting crafty ways to quisition and storage are complicated and
evade higher tariffs on their exports to the expensive. Cryptocurrencies offer the best
US. They remove the “Made in China” label alternative.
by shifting production to countries such as Cryptocurrencies are digital currencies
Mexico, Serbia and Vietnam. For example, in which encryption techniques are used to
Hl Corp, a Shenzhen-listed bike parts mak- control the units of currency and verify the
er, has moved production to Vietnam. transfer of funds, functioning independ-
ently of a central bank. Cryptocurrencies
3.3. Stocks and Investors such as bitcoin provide an outlet for wealth
Investors generally loathe any sign of that is beyond restriction and confiscation.
protectionism in global markets. For exam- Though cryptocurrencies are volatile, some
ple, U.S. stocks declined, with the Dow fall- investors with appetite for risk may diver-
ing more than 200 points immediately, after sify into Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies.
the Trump administration imposed duties As the trade war hits more countries with
on Chinese goods. Fears of a global trade economic instability, cryptocurrencies are
war dragged equity prices down, with all set to increase.
of Wall Street’s major indexes recording
declines. The Dow Jones Industrial Aver- 3.5. Currency war
age fell by 84.83 points to 25,090.48, while The trade war could turn into a cur-
the broader S&P 500 Index fell by 0.1% to rency war, as theoretically and practically,
2,779.42, with the bulk of its primary sectors cheaper currency may be a potential way
booking losses. Industries tied to primary to offset import tariffs (Biswas and Sen-
goods led the decline. The VIX fear index gupta, 2015; Chow, 2017; Vashneya and
went below 12 on a scale of 1-100, where Gupta, 2017). For example, the yuan has
20 is the historic average. Within this time, weakened lately against the dollar. The de-
stocks on all the major US indexes have valuation of the yuan could be the first sign
been adversely affected. Indeed, the trade that the ongoing trade war may descend
war is making a large part of the investor into a currency war. However, it is an open52 Forum Scientiae Oeconomia • Volume 7 (2019) • No. 1
question whether it is a conscious policy and development around the globe. More-
move (China has a semi-managed cur- over, developing countries are likely to face
rency). Since devaluation makes exports higher tariff barriers which may be unfa-
cheaper and more competitive against for- vourable to export-oriented growth. Some
eign manufacturers, allowing the national of the growth miracles, including Japan
currency to weaken will soften the blow and South Korea, were driven by increased
of tariffs on the economy, ceteris paribus. exports to developed countries.
Conversely, it will make foreign products
more expensive, reinforcing the effects of Conclusions
the tariffs. Using deadweight loss (also known as
excess burden or allocative inefficiency)
3.6. Developed countries and Harberger’s triangle, this study has
Even developed economies could be shown that the US-China Trade war could
particularly affected in such a case. For ex- have boomerang effects and various im-
ample, Britain is a relatively open economy, plications. Firms are likely to pass on the
advocating for an open global trade or- additional costs of imposed tariffs to con-
der (Ojo, 2016; Oliver and Williams, 2016). sumers by raising the price of items that
A weakened rules-based world trade directly affect consumers’ welfare such as
system would be damaging for Britain. A food, prescription drugs and foreign holi-
change to a more protectionist world order days. However, contrary to some expec-
would be challenging for the UK, inde- tations, the imposed tariffs may not bring
pendent of the EU (Pabst, 2016). Currently manufacturing jobs back.
Britain is party to preferential trading ar- Many companies will move their pro-
rangements with the EU and 50 other part- duction overseas to circumnavigate tariffs
ners. The UK is more specialised in terms because they may not want to absorb ex-
of services, but trade negotiations have tra costs for exports. The trade war could
become increasingly complicated, partic- even extend into bureaucratic hurdles for
ularly when it comes to services, focusing companies operating abroad, and inter-
on harmonising standards and regulations fere with licensing. The trade war could
rather than merely reducing tariffs. It may make investors more nervous, which may
be difficult for a medium-sized country like worsen as the trade war continues, and
the UK to negotiate favourable trade deals could turn into a currency war, reinforcing
in a fragmented world trade order beyond the effects of the tariffs.
the EU and with other countries. Developed economies could be partic-
ularly affected by the trade war (e.g., the
3.7. Developing countries UK). It may be difficult for a country like the
According to an old African proverb,
UK to negotiate favourable trade deals in
“When elephants fight, it is the grass that
a fragmented world trade order. Develop-
suffers.” The same is true for the US-Chi-
ing countries will also be hard hit as tariffs
na trade war: developing countries will
applied to their exports would rise steeply,
be among the hardest hit as, on average,
thus undermining growth and develop-
tariffs applied to their exports would rise
ment around the globe. Moreover, they are
steeply. A trade war would be a severe
likely to face higher tariff barriers which
blow to the world’s poorest countries, as it
may spell doom for their export-oriented
would compromise the fragile global eco-
growth.
nomic recovery, thus undermining growthThe effects of the US-China trade war and Trumponomics 53
However, it must be noted that restric- consumers, firms, stocks, cryptocurrency,
tions on global trade might be an opportu- in both developed and developing coun-
nity for developing countries to fall back on tries, in various settings and using different
domestic sectors and develop high-tech methodologies. Such detailed empirical
industries. This may provide protection for investigation would be highly interesting
domestic entrepreneurs and investors and and promising.
thus the impetus to expand production,
learning by doing, giving domestic firms
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