THE AGE OF NATIONALISM - THE WESTPHALIAN ERA, FAR FROM DEAD
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Number 127 • Sept / Oct 2013 • $8.95
Rajan Menon Asia’s Fluid Future
Jacob Heilbrunn Reassessing Norman Angell
Aram Bakshian Jr. The Turkish Conundrum
Conrad Black The Long View of FDR
www.nationalinterest.org Robert W. Merry Foreign-Policy Default
THE AGE OF NATIONALISM
THE WESTPHALIAN ERA,
FAR FROM DEAD,
IS MOVING INTO A
POWERFUL
NEW PHASE
by Paul R. Pillar
Number 127 . September/October 2013
The Realist
5 America’s Default Foreign Policy by Robert W. Merry
President Obama’s recent decision to arm the Syrian rebels reflects the reality that humanitarian
interventionism has become official Washington’s default position on foreign-policy issues. But America’s
leaders are out of step with public opinion, which is both more nationalistic and less supportive of foreign
interventions. This suggests that elites of both parties are due for a political reckoning.
Articles
9 The Age of Nationalism by Paul R. Pillar
We are living in the nationalist era. The emergence of the nation-state is the defining reality of our time,
surpassing in significance all the recent preoccupations over civilizational clash, globalization, history’s end
and great-power polarity. Nationalism drives many of today’s most salient conflicts, and any U.S. strategy
must take into account the powerful sentiments of peoples and governments around the globe.
20 Asia’s Looming Power Shift by Rajan Menon
The strategic choices of three states are transforming Asia. China, India and Japan have diverse strengths and
weaknesses, and along with their neighbors they are all jockeying for power and influence. Meanwhile, the
region’s lack of agreement on a common course and its shortage of effective institutions mean that tensions
are likely to increase and major problems will continue to go unaddressed.
34 The Case for Norman Angell by Jacob Heilbrunn
After the Great War made a mockery of Norman Angell’s 1910 thesis that economic interdependence had
made conflict obsolete, his name became a virtual synonym for naive utopianism. Yet this assessment ignores
Angell’s later career, in which he shed some of his old beliefs and came to value the importance of power in
global affairs—even as his intellectual descendants today continue to cling to his early illusions.
Images Corbis: pages 10, 12, 15, 16, 19, 23, 26, 31, 38, 41, 46, 48, 51, 54, 59, 62, 68, 71, 75, 80, 85;
Getty: pages 6, 35, 87; iStockPhoto: pages 91, 94
43 The Deepening Chaos in Sinai by Daniel Byman and Khaled Elgindy
The instability in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula represents one of the most dangerous crises in the Middle East.
The security vacuum there has allowed terrorists and criminals to expand their operations, use the area as
a launching pad for attacks on Israel, and smuggle weapons and goods into Gaza. This complicates Egypt’s
already-troubled transition and raises the likelihood of renewed conflict between Israel and Hamas.
56 Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk by Aram Bakshian Jr.
For nearly a century, modern Turkey has been dominated by the legacy of its founder, Mustafa Kemal,
known to history as Kemal Ataturk. Ataturk was a man of iron will who dragged his countrymen into the
twentieth century. Now Ataturk’s achievement is at risk, challenged by a rising Islamist tide led by Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, who has centralized power, jailed journalists and sought to craft an idealized version of the
country’s Ottoman-Islamic past.
Reviews & Essays
66 Roosevelt and His Diplomatic Pawns by Conrad Black
In 1940 and 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt pursued a masterful strategy to bring the United States into World
War II without appearing to want to do so. Michael Fullilove chronicles the actions of Roosevelt and five
of his envoys during this period. His work is a fair and well-researched history, but ultimately it assigns too
much importance to the men around Roosevelt and not enough to fdr himself.
77 Tracing China’s Long Game Plan by Jacqueline Newmyer Deal
For decades, many Western observers have assumed that as China rose it would also liberalize and become
a more “responsible” global actor. Orville Schell and John Delury’s book skillfully explains why they were
wrong. Their account of the lives and thinking of Chinese elites over the past two centuries demonstrates
that China is concerned first and foremost with its own wealth and power and is only interested in Western
ideas to the extent that they can contribute toward those goals.
89 The Limits of U.S. Financial Warfare by Michael Scheuer
The Treasury Department is at war. Former Bush administration official Juan Zarate recounts how he
and his allies used an array of financial tools to combat rogue regimes, terrorist organizations, mafias and
drug cartels. Their tactical victories are impressive. But the country’s broader policy of constant overseas
intervention is severely damaging America’s security and interests.
Published by
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The Realist
America’s Default will have a significant impact on the Syrian
civil war. It would be insulting to suggest
Foreign Policy the president believes such a thing.
Perhaps, one might speculate further,
Obama wanted to bolster the military
By Robert W. Merry position of those insurgents committed to
a relatively open and pluralist nation, as
opposed to the radical Islamist elements
P
resident Obama’s June 13 decision driven by jihadist passions and the dream
to send light weapons and ammuni- of a theocratic nation, like Afghanistan
tion to Syrian rebels reflects a funda- before 9/11. But this doesn’t make sense,
mental reality in the dialectic of American either. Many analysts believe the war’s
foreign policy. Within this administration jihadist groups—including Al Nusra Front,
and indeed throughout official Washing- affiliated with Al Qaeda—are substantially
ton, humanitarian interventionism is the stronger militarily than the secular rebels. It
inevitable default position for policy makers seems dubious that U.S. aid can be kept out
and political insiders. There is no intellec- of jihadist hands.
tual counterweight emanating from either Perhaps there is a political desire to align
party that poses a significant challenge to government policy with public opinion.
this powerful idea that America must act Wrong again. A Gallup poll shortly after
to salve the wounds of humanity wher- the president’s announcement showed
ever suffering is intense and prospects for 54 percent of respondents opposed the
a democratic emergence are even remotely president’s arms initiative, while 37 percent
promising. approved. A Pew Research Center poll
This reality emerges in sharp relief when released at about the same time showed that
one attempts to find the reasoning behind fully 70 percent of respondents opposed
the president’s Syria decision through a the idea of the United States and its allies
process of elimination. Perhaps, one might sending arms to Syrian rebels. The Pew
speculate, the president decided the time survey also indicated that large majorities
finally had come to turn the tide of war of Americans believe the U.S. military is
decisively in favor of the antigovernment stretched too thin and doubt that Syria’s
insurgents and against the regime of Syrian rebel groups would govern any better than
president Bashar al-Assad. But, no, that the Assad regime.
can’t be the driver because nobody believes So the decision can’t be explained by
Obama’s modest flow of military assistance politics, nor by a desire to favor more
secular rebel groups, nor by any realistic
Robert W. Merry, author of several books strategic aims in the region. That leaves the
on American history and foreign policy, is the default explanation—that Obama turned
outgoing editor of The National Interest. to humanitarian interventionism because
The Realist September/October 2013 5
that is the foundational foreign-policy Nationalists usually ask a fundamental
philosophy of his party and goes largely question when foreign adventures are
unchallenged from any serious Washington proposed—whether the national interest
precincts. It also seems justifies the expenditure
to be Obama’s own of American blood on
philosophy. As he said behalf of this or that
in explaining his 2011 military initiative (or
military initiative in this or that action that
Libya, U.S. forbearance could lead to military
in the face of events initiatives). The fate of
there “would have been other peoples struggling
a betrayal of who we around the globe,
are.” however heartrending,
The president’s default doesn’t usually figure
decision on Syria raises large in nationalist
two questions: Why did considerations. The fate
Obama feel a need to put of America is the key.
up a pretense of trying This grates on many
to influence events there within the Democratic
when in fact his actions elite, who formulated
will have little or no a doctrine during the
impact on the unfolding 1990s Balkans crisis that
tragedy? And why is favored humanitarian
today’s foreign-policy considerations for
discourse so bereft of overseas actions over
any serious intellectual counterforce to the nationalist considerations. The rights and
prevailing humanitarian ethos? well-being of the world’s people superseded
Partial answers to both questions can for many the rights and well-being of the
be found in the same phenomenon— American populace. Indeed, as writer Robert
the decline in nationalist sentiment D. Kaplan has observed, the liberal embrace
within the Democratic elite. The natural of universal principles as foreign-policy
counterargument to humanitarian guidance “leads to a pacifist strain . . . when
interventionism is nationalism, the idea it comes to defending our hard-core national
that America as a nation must concern itself interests, and an aggressive strain when it
first and foremost with its own interests and comes to defending human rights.”
imperatives; must look after its own citizens This is pure Wilsonism. “I hope and
as a top priority; and must avoid global believe,” declared Woodrow Wilson
adventures that could damage the country’s in a speech before Congress in which he
public fisc or undermine its security. admonished Americans to embrace U.S.
6 The National Interest The Realist
Why did Obama feel a need to put up a pretense of
trying to influence events in Syria when in fact his actions
will have little or no impact on the unfolding tragedy?
involvement in World War I, “that I am David Rothkopf sees that too, and that’s
in effect speaking for liberals and friends why he rails so viciously against American
of humanity in every nation. . . . I would nationalism. Rothkopf, ceo and editor at
fain believe that I am speaking for the silent large of Foreign Policy magazine, personifies
mass of mankind everywhere.” When the t h e D a v o s - c u l t u re , h u m a n i t a r i a n -
United States later entered the war, Wilson interventionist sensibility of our time,
bragged that his country was not motivated which wishes to obliterate the last vestiges
by any national interest. “What we demand of what he calls “Westphalian nation-
in this war,” he stated, “is nothing peculiar state nonsense.” Writing in Foreign Policy,
to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit Rothkopf laments that his country is among
and safe to live in.” those that “celebrate individuality to a
This Wilsonian humanitarianism now is fault.” Its “market ideology”—more Charles
the bedrock philosophy of the Democratic Darwin than Adam Smith, as he puts it—
Party to such an extent that even President dismisses those who fall behind as “merely
Obama, who harbors an instinctive part of nature’s grand equation.” Having
skittishness over the risks in interventionist erected this caricature of a heartless nation,
adventurism, feels a need to placate it with Rothkopf indelicately gives it a name—
meaningless action on Syria. Although “frontier fuck-you-ism”—and suggests even
the matter was debated heatedly within those of his fellow countrymen who don’t
the administration, the default position embrace it in domestic affairs certainly do
prevailed. so abroad. The result is our “narcissistic,
Which raises a question: Where is today’s head-in-the-sand nation-statism,” which “is
Henry Cabot Lodge? Lodge, a senator from putting us at risk.”
Massachusetts and chairman of the Senate Rothkopf is a smart guy, and he seems to
Foreign Relations Committee when Wilson perceive that this “Westphalian nation-state
sought to get America into the League of nonsense” he decries poses, potentially, the
Nations, went after Wilson and his League only serious intellectual counterweight to
with a vengeance. His weapon: American the humanitarian interventionism that has
nationalism. “I must think of the United captured the Democratic Party. No doubt he
States first,” he declared on the Senate also perceives that, while there is no longer
floor in August 1919. “I have loved but any serious debate on the matter within
one flag, and I cannot share that devotion his elite circles or even in today’s normal
and give affection to the mongrel banner political discourse, nationalist sentiment
invented for a league.” Lodge didn’t oppose remains robust and lively among ordinary
American interventionism in principle, only Americans going about their daily routines
when it was untethered from U.S. national and endeavors. That must be why he turns
interests. He saw clearly that Wilsonism in so pugilistic when discussing the matter.
its purest form and American nationalism That’s understandable. History tells
are antithetical. us that when elite thinking opens a wide
The Realist September/October 2013 7
gap between national policy and popular which he develops with plenty of analytical
sentiment, a reckoning usually is in the rigor, that we actually are living in a global
works. The Democrats’ default position on age of nationalism, in which fealty to the
foreign policy may not be subject to any nation-state is driving world events to a
serious counterweight now, but that doesn’t far greater extent than many American
mean one can’t emerge. intellectuals are willing to recognize. He
Meanwhile, over in the Republican sees this as a compelling political sentiment
Party, the default territory is held by in America just as it is in other regions.
neoconservatives, who harbor the same And author Rajan Menon, who teaches
affinity for foreign adventurism but for at the City College of New York/City
different reasons. And, with the exception University of New York, sees nationalism
of Kentucky senator Rand Paul, even as a significant geopolitical force in his
those in the gop who don’t embrace the survey, also in this issue, of the future of
neocon label refrain from questioning the Asia.
neocon position with any force. Thus, So nationalism is not dead, either here
the Republican elite too faces a rank and or abroad, and it seems likely to reemerge
file increasingly uncomfortable with its in America’s future as a counterweight to
interventionist notions. That means it that humanitarian interventionism that has
probably also faces an eventual political so thoroughly captured the Democratic
reckoning. Party and political discourse in general. The
Indeed, Georgetown’s Paul R. Pillar, in question is when—and what kind of crisis
this issue’s cover article, posits the view, in U.S. foreign adventurism will trigger it. n
8 The National Interest The RealistThe Age of Nationalism
By Paul R. Pillar
T
he urge to apply era-defining la- no one formula seemed to catch on.
bels to global affairs is strong and Then, with the terrorist attacks
enduring. A label and a few easy- of September 2001, after which the
to-understand attributes associated with it administration of George W. Bush declared
can impart a reassuring simplicity to what a global “war on terror,” many thought we
is actually a complex and often-intractable finally had a new defining theme. Some saw
reality. While the disadvantages of era label- in this struggle nothing less than a looming
ing, including oversimplification, are prob- “World War IV,” to be waged against radical
ably as great as the advantages, the practice Islam (with the Cold War viewed as the
is here to stay. third world war after the two hot global
In d e e d , A m e r i c a n a n a l y s t s a n d conflicts of the twentieth century). This
commentators have struggled with this era- notion persists in many minds, but neither
defining business ever since the collapse of terrorism nor radical Islam provides a valid
the Soviet Union and of Communism in basis for understanding and characterizing
Eastern Europe. The Cold War between current international affairs as a whole.
the United States and the ussr was such Terrorism is only a tactic, and one that has
a dominant backdrop for U.S. foreign been around for millennia. Radical Islamists
policy for so long that it overshadowed are a fringe of a larger phenomenon
every attempt to characterize international in world politics, hardly of sufficient
affairs in any other terms during those worldwide weight to reshape global affairs.
years. The strength of the Cold War Hence, much of this reasoning represents
paradigm was demonstrated during the in large part an overreaction to a single
first decade after the Cold War, when terrorist incident.
the defining term most often heard was And therein lies a problem with the
“the post–Cold War era.” That inherently era-defining enterprise. Most such efforts
unsatisfying nomenclature described what use too short a time frame and attempt
the era wasn’t but not what it was. Some to extract too broad a theme from single
attempted to encapsulate the times some episodes, such as the breakup of the Soviet
other way, usually with an emphasis on Union or Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks on
economically oriented nonstate actors, but American soil. But an understanding of the
present requires that we look much further
Paul R. Pillar is a contributing editor at into the past, not to stretch the time frame
The National Interest. He is also a nonresident of various eras but rather to get a sufficient
senior fellow at the Brookings Institution sweep of political, social and technological
and a nonresident senior fellow at Georgetown developments to truly understand how the
University’s Center for Security Studies. present has flowed from what came before.
The Age of Nationalism September/October 2013 9together have generated an added layer of
muddle. Some of the ideas about World
War IV, for example, reflect the concept of
clashing civilizations developed by the late
Samuel P. Huntington, who argued that
among the many dimensions of civiliza-
tions, as he defined them, the most im-
portant is religion. Huntington was on to
something, as demonstrated by the role of
religion in many armed conflicts, large and
small, in recent times. Yet there is plenty
of evidence to support the chief legitimate
criticism of Huntington’s concept, which is
that there is at least as much conflict within
civilizations as between them. We are seeing
that in spades today with conflicts within
Islam, one of Huntington’s civilizations.
More generally, ask any group of
reasonably well-informed observers to
name the principal characteristics of the
current global system, and you are likely
to get agreement on a few essentials. The
By looking far back into history, we can United States is still the preeminent military
see in the past two decades the long-in- power. China is the most conspicuous
coming consequences of that phenomenon and important rising power, with its
known as nationalism but now in full and strength manifesting itself so far more
unfettered form. It took three and a half on the economic than the military front.
centuries for the basic components—the Demographic trends underlie decline in
sovereign state, popular attachment to the Russia and Japan. And so forth. All true,
state and worldwide spread of this popular but the essentials do not add up to a single,
attachment—to emerge in full force. It took clear, era-defining concept.
two centuries to shake off the occluding The polarity of the international
and delaying effects of empire and of Left- system—the number of major powers or
Right competition that culminated in the blocs of powers that have disproportionate
dominating East-West conflict known as the weight in world affairs—is a favorite
Cold War. The ingredients of nationalism basis for trying to distinguish one era
may be centuries old, but the combined from another. A generation of students of
result, viewed globally, is new. We are living international relations has been taught that
today in the nationalist era. the world of the Cold War was bipolar and
the world since the Cold War is something
T his reality of our time has been ob-
scured in recent years by the intellec-
tual struggles of the early post–Cold War
else. Exactly what that something else is,
however, has been a matter of disagreement.
Some say we live in a unipolar world,
period to define the era and then by the with the United States being the single pole.
impact of the 9/11 attacks on the American What commentator Charles Krauthammer
consciousness. In some instances, the two termed the “unipolar moment” in 1990
10 The National Interest The Age of NationalismThe emergence of the nation-state is the defining reality of our time,
surpassing in significance all the preoccupations over civilizational
clash, globalization, history’s end and great-power polarity.
continues in some eyes as much more “nonpolarity,” in which power is diffused
than a moment. This view is held not among many different state and nonstate
only by those who share Krauthammer’s actors. This idea, along with ongoing
neoconservative objectives but also by disagreements among others about how
analysts who look at how far the United many poles the current international
States is still ahead of all other countries, system has, suggests that the whole concept
based on several measures of strength. An of polarity doesn’t really help define the
alternative concept is multipolarity, with current era of global affairs. One problem is
different possible formulations of who the multiplicity of dimensions by which to
exactly, besides the United States, qualifies measure national power and thus to assess
as a pole. China surely is one, and another who qualifies as a major power. Another
is the European Union—which contains is that a large portion of what matters,
most of what were once the great powers in and what is troubling or challenging, in
an earlier period of multipolarity and whose world affairs today does not have much to
economy today, considered as a unit, is the do with the number, relative strength or
world’s largest. relationships of major powers, important as
Some focus on a duopoly of China and they are. Haass’s idea of nonpolarity reflects
the United States, with talk of a G-2 as this reality, but like “the post–Cold War
being more important than the G-8 or era,” it says more about what today’s world
G-20. Even with this focus, how should isn’t than about what it is.
one characterize the relationship of the
Big Two, which cannot simply be equated
with the U.S.-Soviet relationship during
the Cold War? Harvard Law School’s Noah
A ll this debate over how best to define
our time brings us back to the nation-
state. Over the entire history of human or-
Feldman suggests the term “Cool War” ganization, from bands of hunter-gatherers
to capture both a traditional struggle for to the international institutions of today,
power and deep economic interdependence. its emergence is one of the most impor-
Clever, though probably not catchy enough tant developments of humankind. Those
to come into general use. In any event, international-relations courses that drill into
this and other possible descriptions of the students the concept of Cold War bipolarity
U.S.-Chinese relationship—which does also teach them that the modern nation-
not have the kind of globally preoccupying state was born in the mid-seventeenth cen-
impact, including proxy wars in far-flung tury. The birth certificate was the Peace of
places, that the Cold War did—do little to Westphalia of 1648, which marked the end
characterize contemporary world affairs as of the religion-driven Thirty Years’ War and
a whole. codified the concept of state sovereignty.
Richard Haass, president of the Council What is sometimes called the Westphalian
on Foreign Relations, advances another system is reflected in the clean lines drawn
option by saying that we live in a time of between states on today’s world map.
The Age of Nationalism September/October 2013 11During the first century and a half of that made politically possible by a strong sense
system in Europe, it provided the board of loyalty and attachment of the general
on which monarchs and their ministers population to its nation-state—a sense
competed in a multiplayer chess game. that had been missing during the earlier
This was classical European balance- monarchical chess game. The combination
of-power politics, history’s most pristine of the Westphalian state and popular,
example of multipolarity in action, in emotional identification with it produced
which the number and relative strength true nationalism, in which both statehood
of major powers mattered much more (actual or aspirational) and mass sentiment
than ideologies or internal politics. Rulers based on the nation are the key ingredients.
formed alliances, occasionally fought The full impact of nationalism on world
restrained wars with small armies, and affairs and even European affairs would be
otherwise maneuvered to try to add more delayed, however, by other developments.
land and people to their realms. The masses One was the force of empire. Napoleon
were not players in this game other than as Bonaparte’s attempt at empire was short
part of the booty that occasionally was won lived, but Russian, Prussian and Austrian
by one ruler and lost by another. power expanded to subsume much of
This elegant game was upset by the Europe, while the Ottomans clung to earlier
French Revolution, in which the masses conquests in the southeastern part of the
first made themselves heard in a big way. Continent. State sovereignty was divorced
They did so not only in internal affairs from many nationalities other than the
but also in conflicts between France and few that were at the top of an imperial
the other European powers, with the heap. Many others were repressed or
levy en masse becoming for the first time divided, such as the Poles, or co-opted, such
a major part of international wars and as the Magyars in what became the dual
the increasingly large armies that would monarchy of Austria-Hungary.
fight them. Large citizen armies, even if Although this remained the political
formally an output of conscription, were structure of Europe into the twentieth
12 The National Interest The Age of Nationalismcentury, other processes were percolating establish closer ties with Western Europe.
that would add to the strength of future He advocated humanitarian exceptions
nationalism. The historian E. H. Carr, to state sovereignty—a posture that today
in a short book entitled Nationalism and is called the “responsibility to protect”
After, describes some of these, which he doctrine. And he foreshadowed Huntington
calls the “socialization of the nation.” in talking about civilizations as “great
Relevant trends during the last third of multinational units in which power will be
the nineteenth century, seen especially concentrated.”
in Germany, included extension of the On his basic prognosis for nationalism,
franchise and an increased economic role however, Carr was badly mistaken. Given
of the state. Together, these factors further his firm conviction that the end of World
increased the sense among ordinary citizens War II would mark the end “of the old
not only that their primary loyalty belonged fissiparous nationalism, of the ideology of
to their own nation-state but also that the small nation as the ultimate political
their own fortunes were wrapped up with and economic unit,” it seems reasonable
the nation-state’s fortunes. These trends to suspect he would be taken aback in
continued into the great nationalism-fueled our time to see nations as small as Kosovo
European bloodletting known as World gaining independence. And he would
War I. be chagrined to find that in his native
That war did not reverse the increase Britain, even though it did get closer to
in nationalism, and not only because the Continent in the postwar years, there
revanchism left from the war was at least as is more talk today about getting out of
strong as revulsion over the bloodshed. Carr Europe than about getting more deeply in.
points to a couple of other reasons: autarkic
policies that further identified citizens’
economic prospects with those of only their
own state and not others; and the large
T he full extent to which strong and in-
exorable nationalism would prove Carr
wrong would not become visible until after
increase in the number of European nation- a couple of other developments. One was
states as empires were broken up. There was decolonization in the less developed world,
plenty of nationalist sentiment left to fuel a which peaked around 1960 but contin-
second round of carnage two decades later. ued well after that. This process has added
Carr wrote during the closing days of that new nation-states whose numbers dwarf
World War II bloodletting. Showing tinges the new European states that were created
of the Marxism that would characterize after World War I and that Carr identified
some of his later work, he believed that as part of what propelled nationalism in the
after this war nationalism would finally interwar years. The Westphalian state has
subside—hence the “and after” part of his been sold successfully worldwide, despite its
title. Some of his predictions turned out to made-in-Europe label.
be rather good. He expected that advances The other development harks back again
in military technology, especially air power, to the French Revolution, which began two
would render national frontiers strategically centuries in which competition between
less significant than before. He anticipated ideologies of the Left and the Right was
the establishment of multiple regional a dominant theme of global politics and
organizations and what would become conflict. Between the fall of the Bastille
United Nations peacekeeping forces. He in 1789 and the fall of the Berlin Wall
foresaw that Great Britain would have to in 1989, Left-Right conflict had many
The Age of Nationalism September/October 2013 13manifestations, from the Holy Alliance and national republics of the Soviet Union,
Three Emperors’ League on the right to which became the biggest recent class of
the Comintern and Socialist International entrants into the Westphalian club.
on the left. Whatever the exact form it And so we see the emergence of the
took, the Left-Right dimension was so nation-state as the defining reality of our
dominant for so long—more than half the time, surpassing in significance all the
lifetime of the modern nation-state—that recent preoccupations over civilizational
it preempted, disguised or diverted much clash, globalization, history’s end and great-
of what would have been consequences of power polarity. Indeed, it could be argued
the growth of nation-states and popular that the age of nationalism actually is a
attachment to them. Left-Right conflict product of the human condition.
intruded in significant ways even in the That the nation-state should be the
nationalism-fueled conflict of the first part primary focus of loyalties and conflicts
of the twentieth century, exemplified by the flows directly from human nature and
Bolsheviks’ quick relinquishment at Brest- how it evolved. Possession (or hoped-for
Litovsk of large amounts of the Russian possession) of a well-defined patch of the
empire to get out of World War I and by earth’s surface is a manifestation of the
the role that fear of Communism played in “territorial imperative” that author and
the rise of European fascism. screenwriter Robert Ardrey popularized
The final phase of these two centuries in a book of that name almost fifty years
was the Cold War, in which competition ago and that is a dominant trait of many
between the Left and the Right became species most closely related to humans.
competition between East and West. This Attachment to a nationality whose home is
phase, too, delayed or disguised many of the more or less coterminous with that patch
consequences of nationalism, subordinating is also a deeply rooted, birds-of-a-feather
them to the East-West conflict. Suppression trait. Once established, a nation-state adds
of German nationalism, for example, institutional imperatives to the biological
was inextricably linked to the West’s and evolutionary ones to make it even more
confrontation with the East, as rearmament the focus of attention. The state becomes
of West Germany was permitted only the source of both obligations and, as
within the context of the Western alliance’s Carr notes of the late nineteenth century,
integrated military command. Britain’s benefits. National myths, which help to
willingness to tiptoe into European achieve cohesion and cement loyalty within
integration, as a founding member of the nationalities, often exacerbate suspicions
Western Union Defence Organization in and resentment between nationalities;
1948, was all about the need for cohesion in think, for example, of how some Serbian
the West to stand up to a new Soviet threat. national mythology centers on memories
Soviet domination of Eastern Europe of a military defeat by the Turks more
also delayed completion of the process, than seven centuries ago. Perhaps nation-
begun at Versailles after World War I, of states, including small ones, are not, as Carr
giving postimperial European nationalities puts it, the “ultimate” type of economic
their own states. It was only after that and political unit, but it should not be
domination ended that Germany was made surprising that the intense attachments to
whole and the southern Slavs of Yugoslavia them that constitute nationalism underlie
and northern Slavs of Czechoslovakia got a large proportion of the policies, conflicts
their own states. As did, of course, the and problems prevalent in today’s world.
14 The National Interest The Age of NationalismN ationalism infuses and drives many
of the most salient and active con-
frontations around the globe. The object of
previously undeveloped as China, modern
mass communications have expanded
the exposure and perspective of millions
the Obama administration’s foreign-policy from village or district to the nation as a
pivot—East Asia and the western Pacific— whole. In general, modern electronic
is a prime example. The most visible con- communications enhance the symbols and
flicts there largely take the classic nationalist affinities of a nation (as well as the powers
form of territorial disputes. This is chief- of a national government) more than they
ly true of unresolved differences between do those of a tribe or subnational region.
China and its neighbors over islands in the The role of nationalism is just as apparent
East and South China Seas and over the on the non-Chinese side of those East Asian
land border in the Himalayas with India. territorial disputes. In Japan, the resurgent
Some of the disputes involve economic in- nationalism that is identified most often
terests such as hoped-for undersea hydro- with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reflects
carbons, but all of them involve more
visceral sentiments of competing na-
tionalities, exhibiting their individual
territorial imperatives, that a given
piece of real estate is historically and
rightfully theirs.
Nationalism in China, as in most
other nations, is a combination of
natural sentiment bubbling up
from below and exploitation of that
sentiment from above. President Xi
Jinping voices nationalist themes,
and needs to voice them, not only
to preserve national unity but also to
sustain political support for necessary
reforms and to claim legitimacy for
the regime now that Communist
ideology no longer does the trick.
China, which owes its growth and
prosperity to its three-decade
capitalist trek, epitomizes how the
receding of the great Left-Right
struggle of the past has opened the
way to more unreserved expressions
of nationalism.
China also illustrates how some of
the globalizing forces such as border-
hopping information technology, which the broader yearning of an exceptionally
often have been seen as eroding the role homogeneous population that has taken
of the nation-state, can actually enhance decades to find a capacity for the kind
that role and increase popular identification of assertiveness that was crushed by the
with the nation. In a country as large and disaster of World War II. In Vietnam, the
The Age of Nationalism September/October 2013 15nationalism that the United States failed that have warred often in the past. But a
to recognize as its actual adversary during reassertion of nationalism is a major
the Vietnam War, when it was obsessed part of the European Union’s current
with Communist ideology, is now expressed troubles, in ways that go beyond the
so clearly and strongly that even the economic issues conventionally viewed as
most obtuse could not miss it. Amid the the main problems. Efforts to deal with
disputes over islands in the South China debt problems in the euro zone have been
Sea, demonstrators in the streets of Hanoi plagued as much by national stereotypes, in
shout, “Down with the henchmen of which northern Europeans see southerners
China.” The Vietnamese regime knows that as lazy and southerners see the northerners
as arrogant, as they have by the technical
problems of having a common monetary
policy without a common fiscal policy. The
growing strength of nation-based sentiment
in Europe shows up in many endeavors that
are still organized along national lines, from
soccer tournaments to the Eurovision Song
Contest.
Britain’s shaky involvement with
European integration illustrates some of
the larger trends involved. When Britain
was first negotiating for entry into what was
then the European Economic Community,
most of the issues were narrowly defined
economic ones, such as what would happen
to imports of butter from New Zealand.
Today the issue of Britain’s relationship with
the Continent is addressed in broader terms
centered on the meaning and importance
of British nationality. This trend coincides
with the rise of the United Kingdom
Independence Party (ukip), which calls
for British withdrawal from the European
Union. Prime Minister David Cameron
suppressing rather than identifying with once dismissed the party as “a bunch of
such feelings toward China would risk fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists,” but
turning the demonstrations squarely against the ukip’s electoral success—it garnered a
the government. quarter of the vote in local council elections
The magnificent supranational this May—has forced opponents to take
experiment in Europe is an obvious it seriously. The Cameron government’s
challenge to the proposition that toughened stance on immigration and
identification with the nation-state is the commitment to hold a referendum on
dominant pattern in world politics today. British membership in the eu are some of
That experiment has indeed solidified an the results.
apparently irreversible shift in which war Cameron also has agreed with Scottish
is now unthinkable between some states nationalists to hold a referendum on
16 The National Interest The Age of Nationalismindependence. This is an example of how transition successfully from a provincial the transfer of some powers from national Communist Party boss to a national leader capitals to Brussels, far from diminishing with a secure hold on power. nationalist sentiment, has provided a The ussr’s principal successor state, supranational umbrella under which some Russia, has exhibited a surge of nationalism nationalities, especially ones unhappy with since the Communist regime’s dissolution. the arrangements within their current The process partly parallels the one states, have become more assertive. These in China, in which the old Communist include Flemings and Catalonians as well as ideology could no longer serve as a unifier Scots. and legitimizer. But in Russia there is also However successful the European popular anger over economic dislocation experiment will ultimately be economically and the lack of growth, as well as perceived and in forever banishing intra-European threats to ethnic Russians from minorities war, it has far to go in establishing a sense that are still part of the Russian Federation. of continent-wide identity that can displace The term “Russian nationalist” is thus national identities grounded in language most closely associated with a xenophobic and culture. Even greater cultural and and extreme-right sensibility, although the linguistic commonality may, as the example nationalist resurgence in Russia extends far of Latin America suggests, be insufficient to beyond that. overshadow the histories and identities of Some of the intensified Russian nation-states. The Liberator, Simón Bolívar, nationalism has in effect been exported thought a shared Hispanic culture could be in the form of migrants to Israel. The the basis for a region-wide federation, but migrants shared with all Soviet citizens it was not to be. Today the Andean country the illiberal and undemocratic political named after Bolívar does not even have culture of the Communist era, along with full diplomatic relations with its neighbor racially tinged attitudes toward nationalities Chile, due to a territorial dispute left over of the Caucasus. But Russian Jews did from a nineteenth-century war. not have their own national republic to Africa continues to be a monument to cling to when the union broke up. Today, the strength of the nation-state as a point immigrants from Russia constitute one of of reference and object of competition, no the most fervidly nationalist segments of matter how arbitrarily drawn its boundaries Israel’s population. or deficient its central governments’ The region surrounding Israel would control over their territories. The secession appear to constitute another challenge to of South Sudan was a rare exception to a the idea of the dominance of nationalism, continent-wide resistance to tampering with given the conspicuous attention to religion the colonial boundaries left by European rather than nationality and especially to powers. A similar pattern has prevailed what is commonly perceived as a region- since the breakup of the Soviet Union in wide conflict between Sunni and Shia. That Central Asia, where arbitrary boundaries are attention is a reminder that no one way of the product of Stalin’s divide-and-rule line labeling the world explains everything, and drawing. The arbitrariness underlies some religious conflict certainly explains a lot in intrastate ethnic tensions such as those the Middle East. Many of the recent and between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, but nationalist ongoing conflicts in that region, however, themes also have helped such figures as can properly be characterized, at least in Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan to part, as struggles to liberate nation-states The Age of Nationalism September/October 2013 17
The United States exhibits as much nationalism as anyone
else—even though Americans do not call it nationalism.
More often it is termed “American exceptionalism.”
from the yoke of particular clans, ruling fact that the messy dissolution of empires
families or religious sects, or from the is now mostly behind us. But he names
influence of foreign powers. That certainly one major, conflict-ridden regional excep-
is true, for example, of the wars in Iraq tion—the Middle East—where an empire is
and Syria. Nationality has trumped religion troubled but not yet dissolved, by which he
when the two have directly conflicted, as means the American empire.
when Iraqi Shia fought for Sunni-controlled Troubled empire or not, the United States
Iraq during the eight-year war against Shia exhibits as much nationalism as anyone
Iran. Identification with individual nation- else—even though Americans do not call
states has been more durable even than it nationalism. More often it is termed
region-wide “Arab nationalism,” including “American exceptionalism,” which carries
the Arab nationalism of Pan-Arabism’s the connotation not just of assertion of
leading champion, Gamal Abdel Nasser, national identity and values but also of
whose political union between Egypt and being something bigger and better than
Syria was short lived. The boundary lines anyone else’s nationalism. Exceptionalism is
drawn during World War I by Mark Sykes what the citizens of a superpower get to call
and Francois Georges-Picot have lasted, their own nationalism.
just like the colonial boundaries in Africa. The United States also is part of
The leading challenge to those lines, in the worldwide trend of increased and
northern Iraq, has come from the biggest intensified nationalism during the
unrealized nationalist aspiration left over past quarter century. Politically, this has
from the post–World War I treaties: that partly taken the form of one of the two
of the Kurds. Likewise, the most salient major U.S. parties moving away from the
long-running conflict with the broadest internationalism and realism of Eisenhower
repercussions in the Middle East is a clash and Nixon in favor of a foreign policy of
between two nationalist ambitions: those of neoconservatism, the most muscular
Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. expression of American exceptionalism. A
perceptive analyst of American nationalism,
T he fact that nationalism in the Middle
East has not yet gotten completely out
from the shadow of religious conflict, as
Anatol Lieven, suggests that this party
can now most appropriately be called the
American Nationalist Party. The trends
nation-states in Europe did in the seven- involved are not limited to one side of
teenth century, is part of a larger regional the political spectrum, however; they are
historical lag in which the Middle East also reflected in prevailing American habits and
has been slower to get out from the shadow attitudes ranging from the wearing of flag
of empire. Historian Niall Ferguson, ex- pins on lapels to unquestioningly imputing
plaining why the twenty-first century is goodness to a wide range of U.S. actions
likely to be less bloody in most of the world overseas simply because it is the United
than the twentieth, cites as one reason the States that is doing them.
18 The National Interest The Age of NationalismThe intensity of American nationalism points to the chief prescriptive implications of living in the nationalist era, which come under the heading of knowing oneself. Americans should understand how much their own first inclinations for interacting with the rest of the world stem from the same kind of nationalist urges that underlie inclinations in other countries, however much the American version is portrayed differently by affixing the label of exceptionalism. They should bear in mind that first inclinations and urges are not always in the best interest of the nation that is the object of their affection and attachment. U.S. policy makers should be continually conscious of how U.S. actions may step on someone else’s nationalist sentiments, eliciting the sort of counteractions that almost always are elicited when competing nationalist perspectives confront each other. In assessing sundry problems overseas the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where a two- and how to deal with them, one of the state solution appears increasingly out of first questions that should be asked is how reach but where a one-state formula seems a problem reflects nationalist sensibilities inconsistent with the strong nationalist and ambitions, of masses as well as elites, in aspirations of both sides. other countries. The resulting perspective No single model of the world can generate is more apt to yield sound, policy-relevant an all-purpose grand strategy. But the best insights than is a vision of transnational fit for the nationalist era is a pragmatic contests between good and evil, between realism that takes as the basic ingredient of moderates and extremists, or between global affairs the sometimes conflicting and democrats and autocrats. Sometimes the sometimes parallel interests of individual policy implication may be for the United nation-states—while recognizing the States to do less; other times it may be to power that can be generated by nationalist do more—as perhaps, for example, with sentiments within nation-states. n The Age of Nationalism September/October 2013 19
Asia’s Looming Power Shift
By Rajan Menon
C
artographical conceptions of Asia dermine long-standing analytical frame-
obscure what, in strategic terms, works and policies.
is a “Greater Asia.” It stretches These looming changes cannot be
from eastern Iran through Central Asia fully understood through the prism of
and South Asia to Indonesia, and from the the grand theories devised to depict the
Aleutian Islands to Australia, encompass- post–Cold War world, including the
ing the Russian Far East, China, Japan, three most prominent ones: the “Clash of
the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia. Civilizations”; the “End of History”; and
It is connected by multifarious transac- globalization. All three, underpinned by
tions, cooperative and adversarial, resulting reductionism and historicism, miss the
from flows of trade and investment, energy manifold, complex and contradictory forces
pipelines, nationalities that spill across of- shaping Greater Asia.
ficial borders, historical legacies that shape Samuel P. Huntington’s perception
present perceptions, and shifting power ra- of persistent civilizational clash missed
tios, within and among states. This is not a the reality that in Greater Asia states,
closed system; after all, many Greater Asian not civilizations, remain the principal
states are closely tied to the United States, wellsprings of change. True, something
a non-Asian Pacific state whose prowess akin to civilizational conflict is visible in
enables it to shape power balances and po- Afghanistan, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Iran,
litical and military outcomes across the re- Sri Lanka, China, the Philippines, Pakistan
gion. Yet America will face unprecedented and Malaysia. But, while it may threaten
changes in the distribution of power in the cohesion of such countries, it has not
Greater Asia’s eastern theater and disrup- integrated them into any civilizational
tions in the western theater, as domestic blocs. In Asia, the effects of culture and
constraints—economic and political—cur- religion are fissiparous rather than
tail its choices. That, in turn, will neces- integrative and will remain so.
sitate strategic reassessments by states in the There is no Hindu civilization capable of
region, particularly those that have relied mobilizing Asian loyalties and resources and
on American protection. All this will un- aligning states’ policies to India’s benefit.
Within India, Hindu nationalism—
Rajan Menon is the Anne and Bernard Spitzer Cassandras’ cries notwithstanding—has
Professor of Political Science at the City College failed to overcome the abiding appeal
of New York/City University of New York, a of secularism among the countr y’s
nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council founding doctrines. Though imperfect
and the author, most recently, of The End of in practice, secularism has more purchase
Alliances (Oxford University Press, 2007). in Indian politics than ideologies based
20 The National Interest Asia’s Looming Power Shifton religion and remains the signature of Asia, Asia’s non-Indian Hindus would find the Congress Party, India’s only national their prospects imperiled, not advanced, political organization. Partly because of by becoming associated with a religion- its association with the North’s “Hindu based political movement led by gargantuan heartland,” the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya India. Furthermore it would be self- Janata Party (bjp)—previously the Bharatiya defeating for India to adopt a civilizational Jana Sangh—has shallow roots in southern strategy at a time when it will need allies to India, the locus of much of the country’s counterbalance a rising China. innovation and high economic growth, A Sinic civilizational bloc is equally and has failed to capture the national implausible. Confucianism’s transnational imagination. Only twice (in 1977–1980 allure will not match the emotional pull and 1999–2004) has the bjp formed a of nationalism, particularly in Japan and multiyear national government. Singly or Vietnam, still influenced by their conflict- through coalitions, the Congress Party has laden history with China. Moreover, dominated India’s national politics. a campaign by China to organize a Han India’s 170 million Muslims, nearly as civilizational coalition would antagonize its numerous as their Pakistani coreligionists, minorities, particularly the Tibetans and represent another barrier to Huntington’s Uighurs, but also the Hui, whose rising view of a Hindu civilization. It’s hard to nationalism already poses problems. China’s imagine a bigger threat to India’s future minority nationalities constitute less than than millions of Muslim citizens so fearful 10 percent of China’s population, but of ascendant Hindu chauvinism that they they inhabit more than half its landmass. can overcome differences of language, Progress in education and economic regionalism and theological pluralism development has strengthened anti-Han within their faith. But no such Hindu nationalism, not weakened it through nationalism has gained sufficient traction assimilation. Tibetans have been engaged in the country to raise such fears among in serial self-immolations (119 since 2009) Muslims. Hindutva—the inchoate ideology and riots; bombings and demonstrations that conflates Indian and Hindu—has have erupted in the autonomous region never attained significant influence. Gujarat of Xinjiang, the Uighurs’ homeland and State’s chief minister, Narendra Modi, a bjp site of bountiful energy deposits. Tibet and luminary and aspiring prime minister, has Xinjiang are remote from China’s eastern been undermined by his association with a power centers. Tibet borders four countries, 2002 anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat. And including China’s preeminent Asian rival, various other militant Hindu movements— India. Xinjiang borders eight. Geography among them the Rashtriya Swayamsevak and ethnicity conspire to compound the Sangh and the Shiv Sena—have never challenge of maintaining the state’s control. gained national followings. The Chinese leadership can contain Even weaker is the transnational potential restive minorities through repression and of Hinduism, a capacious creed with an co-option, but changes in the surrounding array of deities, doctrines and rituals that region could make it harder. New states is further fractured by differences rooted have risen in the Turkic Muslim regions in region, caste, class and language. While of Central Asia once ruled by Russia; this Hindu communities exist in Malaysia area neighbors Xinjiang and constitutes a and Singapore and Hinduism’s imprint is kindred cultural zone. Separatist Uighurs evident in Bali and elsewhere in Southeast also can seek succor in an unstable Asia’s Looming Power Shift September/October 2013 21
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