The Abuse System: Is It Possible the Normative Definition of Corruption?

The Abuse System:
                    Is It Possible the Normative Definition of Corruption?
                                                                                          Ali Murat AYDIN

                          “Eat, o masters eat, this rule of appetite is yours,
                             Eat until you are fed up, sneeze and crack!”
                                  Tevfik Fikret1 (Han-ı Yağma, 1912)

INTRODUCTION

What’s corruption? Is it a plague, which the modern state and public order are leading to, which
should be avoided for democracy to function properly? Or is it a machine oil that is necessary
for the rotation of the wheels, which provides the movement of political systems with clogged
bureaucracies? On the contrary, is it an internalized gangrene that has always existed since the
beginning of history, could not been invented, disrupts the rules of morality that hold society
together.
Thinkers with philosophical traces based on mixed constitutional and positive law such as
Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle have identified corruption with the deviance of the
administrative unit from virtue and ethics. Philosophers, such as Carl Friedrich, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, John Locke, who pointed out that the person has rights from the nature, criticized
this macro approach. Their problem is that under which circumstances, a person with public
power can deviate from the moral and virtuous traditions. Rousseau argues that Thomas
Hobbes' "homo homini lupus" does not represent the person in the nature but the person in the
degenerated society, and that this competitive and destructive attitude is the basic feature of
modern society (Bagce, 2009: 109). According to Rousseau, people have turned into "hungry
wolves who want to swallow only human beings," which, in contrast to Hobbes' idea, is not in
a nature situation, but a distorted society that "tastes human meat once and tastes other food
with grief" (Rousseau, 2008: 9). In his understanding of public administration, the citizen within
the political system does not corrupt the political system. The political system is corrupted and
attracts citizens.
James C. Scott defines corruption as a departure from the behavior of a person with a certain
set of standards. The question to be asked here must be what this behavior is (Heidenheimer,
2002: 67). If the way of behavior is to remove the existing society / a group belonging to it / a

1
 Tevfik Fikret (December 24, 1867 – August 19, 1915), an Ottoman educator and poet who is considered the
founder of the modern school of Turkish poetry. The poem "Han-i Yağma" is a work written by Fikret to criticize
the acts of corruption of his period.

value belonging to it, that is, the society itself, it removes the possibility that the
misappropriation of public interest can be assessed as corruption (Heidenheimer, 2002: 42-54).
The reason for this is that the critique of the concept of public opinion or public opinion, which
values judgments are formed by means of questioning, is made by moral understanding
(Michael Johnston, 2006: 42). Who is the public opinion? Are the citizens who have been hurt
by the secret contract that triggered the abuse? Elite or sub-classes? Opponents or political party
supporters? Who and how does public opinion constitute? Today's social scientists are to spread
the concept of public opinion in democracies as far as possible from the principle of "general
interest" of the society and keeping the target group as wide as possible, considering the same
principle.
Corruption, in its most basic sense, is the use of a certain public power by the public authority
for the sake of an individual or a zeal (Mény, 1992: 10-11), contrary to public interest. There
must be four situations for corruption to exist:
   i.   Violation of laws or norms created for public benefit for personal benefit.
  ii.   A trade-off relationship between political, social and economic parties, based on secrecy
        principle.
 iii.   Recognition of privilege in a specific person or group, in public services or in political
        decision-making mechanisms.
 iv.    There is a material interest relationship between the parties making the exchange.
There is a parallel relationship between the invention of corruption and the invention of the
modern state. The social reaction to irregular use of public good, publicly owned power in
outside the public sector, has shaped the methods of combating against corruption from past to
present. When we look at the pre-modern social, economic and political structure, we are
talking about a system based on bribery, gratuity and patronage (W. D. Rubinstein, 1983: 68).
Indeed, since corruption is defined as a moral problem as structurally, we can come closer to
the notion of 'culture' diversity, which evolutionist modernization theory often refers to when
imagining the West as non-Western. The reason for this situation is that it is entirely about
modern state and citizen relations.
In Turkish political history from Republic to democracy, neither for our society nor for the
political actors’ corruption cases did not appear as cases that appeared for the first time.
Misconduct was not perceived by the society as a crisis which undermines the concept of ethics
and which should therefore be solved immediately. The reason of this is affairist tradition that
existed since the first period of Republic. Affairism is a word stemmed from "affairisme" in
French, which means "someone who constantly protects his/her own interest, profiteer, and
trickster" (ORAN, 2001: 246). Information provided on affairism in the book "Turkish Foreign
Policy, Facts, Documents and Interpretations from War of Independence Until Today Volume
I: 1919-1980" edited by Baskın Oran, sheds light on the relationship between corruption and
the political structure of newly established republic:
“This word was coined in Turkey in the 1920s and was inspired by the name of the İş Bankası, which is translated
into French as Banque d’Affaires (…) When the Türkiye İş Bankası was founded, a number of politicians
converged on the bank to use their influential positions to secure loans and other benefits by acting as the
representatives of entrepreneurs and/or foreign business circles (…) As a result, the regime’s policies of

supporting local capitalists resulted not in nationalizing the bourgeoisie as intended but in giving a Levantine
aura to Ankara and to the deputies who operated in this environment. Affairism (in Turkey which has transformed
its economic model into statism after the 1929 crisis) was also effective after 1930s and eventually cause the
resignation of Prime Minister Ismet Inonu in 1937, who defended the establishment of important sectors by the
state (...)".

Affairist tradition continued after the multi-party system and it caused the clientelist, patronage
and nepotistic relations in terms of applying the political ground to public administration in
Turkey to take root.
Some Decisions of Supreme Court:
When we examine some Supreme Court files of the Constitutional Court, we have a chance to
understand the draft of this traditionalism.
    a) 1964 Barley Case: Former Minister of Trade of the Constituent Assembly, Mehmet
       Baydur was referred to Supreme Court due to his decision in favor of the buyer and
       against the profit of Treasury for the sales of barley. (Acquitted) (Constitutional Court,
       1965. 1).
    b) 1981 Hilmi Isguzar Case: Minister of Trade in the 42nd Government of Turkey, Hilmi
       İsguzar with the claims of receiving bribe, giving bribe, mediating for bribery,
       misconduct, lay down on duty (...) and fraud in official documents. (Five years’ penal
       servitude, four years and eight months’ imprisonment, five million two hundred and
       fifty-one thousand six hundred liras heavy fine, deprived from official duties for good)
       (Constitutional Court, 1982).
    c) 1982 Tuncay Mataraci Case: Minister of Customs and Monopoly in the 42nd
       Government of Turkey, Tuncay Mataraci, with the claims of receiving bribe, giving
       bribe, taking part in these crimes, to help the perpetrator use the bribe money,
       misconduct and enthuse others to commit this crime is sentenced to 36 years’ penal
       servitude, 787,386,166 liras heavy fine, deprived from official duties for good and to
       give his driving license back for six years. (Constitutional Court, 1982: 8).
    d) 2004 Yasar Topcu Case: Former Minister of Public Works and Settlement under
       Motherland Party (ANAP), Yasar Topcu was sent to Supreme Court with the claim of
       scheme to rig bids on tender. The final judgment for this case was delayed in accordance
       with the free on bail law (Constitutional Court, 2006).

Cases of which the examples are given above are mentioned to shortly summarize the types of
corruptions in Turkey into which the highest level of politicians were involved. By this way,
we will have the chance to categorize the existing exploitation types in Turkish public
administration. When we examine these cases, we observe that the public actor uses his or her
power which stems from the public to protect his or her personal interest in favor of the private
interest group (the corrupter) by accepting bribe and is corrupted. These cases indicate the
existence of a machinery corruption network that helped bribery, nepotism, patronage relations
to become endemic within the system. Judging from experiences of corruption cases in Turkey,
we understand that the form of corruption which constitutes the internal dynamics of the
mechanical corruption, mentioned above, pointed at patronage relationships. Struggle against
corruption appears as a political maneuver used by one of the political fractions against another

one's interests; therefore, corruption could not be perceived as a problem to struggle in a
democratic way. The definitions and limitations of corruption are clearly indicated in current
political science studies (Meny, 1992: 232).

2017 the Perception Corruption Index of Transparency International shows that more than two-
thirds of countries over 180 ranked were rested less than 50 points which is the success rate for
fight against corruption (ITA, 2017). This number brings to mind the question, why the
methods of fight against corruption are insufficient? Could there be a set of intended but
unrealized expectations (Hirschman, 2014: 18)?

When we’re taking into consideration the methods of combating corruption, which is
universally defined by an essential positive law, it cannot be a sound evaluation method to claim
that corruption has increased or decreased over the years in any country. The motivation for the
emergence of abuse cases may not be due to statistical acceleration of corruption, but rather to
the discussion of the function of measures taken against corruption and assumed to be effective.
Indeed, Transparency International also publishes the annual corruption perception index based
on the quality and quantity of the above-mentioned methods of struggle (ITA, 2015: 1). Then
there is a question to mind: Why is the predicate observed when there is a tendency towards the
subject?

In the functioning of political systems, overcoming obstacles that create problems for the
system is regarded as a normal phenomenon in the political history of the world in terms of the
functionalist point of view. For instance, Montesquieu implied the separation of powers in the
republic system and argued that such a measure might be taken in order to protect the pluralist
structure of this system (Ağaoğulları, M. A., 2016: 560). Obviously, when a conceptual problem
is encountered, it is necessary to analyze the problem well. In this case, as the definition of
corruption and its damages on democracy are well known; it is compulsory to analyze and
categorize it in order to contribute for the solution of problem. Effects of corruption on society
in Turkey have been analyzed in the studies of TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Etudes
Foundation2), and IHD (Human Rights Association3); but we see that categorization of
corruption is not academically conducted yet (Berkman, 1982: 56).

When we consider what we have mentioned above, where can we look for the origin of the
struggle with corruption? Can we discover the origin of the struggle methods created up to this
time in the conceptual definition of corruption? In other words, can we establish a link between
the definition of corruption and the effectiveness of anti-corruption methods?

Does the definition of corruption in universal consent, which we have spoken at the beginning
of the article, fully reflect the modernist point of view of corruption? If so, why do the anti-
corruption reports bring a negative picture to us? We can therefore argue that one way of
explaining this inefficiency would be to examine the conceptual definition of corruption.

2
  Please refer to. Satisfaction from Services, Patronage Relations and Reform in Local and Central
Administrations in Turkey (2000, TESEV reports) and Reasons of Corruption from the Business Sector
Perspective and Suggestions to Prevent (2003; TESEV reports)
3
  Please refer to. Evaluations on 2012 Report on Violations of Human Rights (2013, IHD reports).

Today, when we look at published reports on corruption, we can observe that the approach to
the issue is undoubtedly shaped around the universal principles and modernization approach
(see Mény, Heidenheimer, Huntington, ITA, U4 Corruption etc.). We can say that this approach
is influenced by the philosophy of enlightenment. So, what kind of interaction exists between
the modern definition of corruption and the natural rights, the product of enlightenment? It is
hoped that the rate of this interaction will be given in response to the question of inefficiency
of the methods of struggle, expected to be achieved as a result of the work.

The first part of study will examine the categorizations of corruption with two different
approaches, one from an American and the second from a French political scientist. It will be
useful to mention the categorization of corruption by American political scientist Arnold
Heidenheimer as white, grey and black by referring to social perception; and the categorization
done by French political scientist Yves Mény by a qualitative method into marginal and
systematic forms in order to compare two separate corruption systems. The above-mentioned
two political scientists, in their corruption studies, come forward because they define the actors
of the causal concept. With two typologies of addressing structural and looked at the
relationship between these nested actors in the world, to analyze the samples we come across
instances of corruption situation arises. Another important point that makes these two
typologies important is that their work is based on a modernist perspective. The analysis of the
actors of corruption can lead us to find the subjects that need to be included in the conceptual
definition. By this means, there is a door for scientific discussion of the concept beyond power
relations.

Second part of the study will examine the one critical corruption file experienced in 1990s and
2000s through the methodological studies mentioned above. The file is the Turkbank case
which reveals the relations among mafia- private sector and government, documented by
Supreme Court proceedings. Importance of this file is its characteristic of containing all types
of existing corruptions in the literature. This file contains the systematical, marginal, black and
gray corruption types; and it will contribute to show the actors of corruption by a practical
perspective. Thanks to the people and institutions that are the subject of the Turkbank case, the
relationship between conceptually processed actors in typologies will be reflected in the real
life. Possible shortfalls in the definition of corruption will be observed through this case. Also,
these examples also indicate us how the exploitation has turned into political weapons among
the political party leaders. The methodology followed in this research fitted on the information
obtained from case files, proceedings, corruption surveys conducted by the civil society
organizations back in time, reports of investigation committees established within Turkish
Grand National Assembly, newspaper archives and the notes taken by the journalists who have
witnessed the events and eventually turned into published books.

In the conclusion part of the study, the findings to be obtained from the analyzed typologies
and the comparison with the Turkbank case will be compared with the subjects included in the
definition of corruption originating from the positive law. Finally, it is anticipated that natural
rights will fill the shortcomings expected from this comparison. Each problematic in this study
will, in defining us corruption, present the missing causes to the reader. Who knows that this

may be possible to make a more comprehensive definition of the concept in future studies
(though not pretentious).

METHODOLOGY
Two typologies will be discussed in the study will be applied to Turkbank case that occurred in
1998, in Turkey. Mény typology is derived from France, while Heidenheimer typology is
derived from the United States examples. The Turkbank case is of a quality that can be applied
to the Mény and Heidenheimer typologies. First, the administrative structure of Turkey is based
on the French model of administrative law (Atılgan, G. ve Aytekin, A., 2015). On the other
hand, in the Cold War environment, Turkey's governments with the goal of achieving the level
of contemporary civilization, have developed close relations with the United States on the West
Block (Heper, M. 2015). Thus, Turkey's political culture (in which host their opponents and
although engendered though) has been in the Americanization trend (Atılgan, G. ve Aytekin,
A., 2015). When the corrupted-corrupter relationship is considered, we can express that the
factors constituting both typology showed similarities with Turkey. The Turkbank case, which
is the subject of the study, was especially chosen. This is due to the fact that the Mény typology
was created in 1992 and the Heidenheimer typology in 1989. Taking into account the political-
socio-economic structure of the mentioned period, an example that does not belong to the 1990s
will differ from the socio-economic factors that make up the typologies. The chosen corruption
case corresponds to a scandal involving administrative-political actors in the possession of
public power, in accordance with the actor structure of the typologies (corrupted-corrupter).
There are two reasons for this. The first reason is that the typologies in question are based on
corruption cases where French and American administrative-political actors are involved. The
second reason is due to the fact that corruption is not a measurable term because of the principle
of confidentiality (Padioleau, 1982), which is the essence of corruption. If you ask a question
of whether you have committed corruption to a person, you will probably get a no response.
Therefore, the point of view of corruption can be measured. The reasons, outcomes, factors of
this viewpoint can be determined, compared and analyzed. In that case, the corruption case to
which the typologies can be applied can be determined by referring to the Press-Supreme Court
Decisions-Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) minutes. The corruption scandals,
which are so important to carry the value of subhead in the press, are, naturally, often involved
by politicians and bureaucrats. The case of Turkbank shows a quality that will meet the
scientific concerns that are being tried to pay attention to. First of all, the examination of this
scandal which has been reflected to the press, the minutes of the Supreme Court and the Grand
National Assembly of Turkey will be carried out by the case analysis method. Through this
method, the actors of the scandal (corrupter-corrupted-secret contract-elites-public opinion-
actor hierarchy) will be tried to be determined according to the typologies. In the second stage,
the nature of the case, the reaction of the public opinion, the punishments of the actors, the
political-economic-social reflections of the case will be tried to be determined by the content
analysis method. In the last stage, the findings will be tried to be reflected in the types of
corruption of typologies by comparative method.

In the final part of the study, the definition of corruption with corruption actors, which is
expected to be identified, will be tried to be classified by comparative method. It will be
attempted to observe how much the classification obtained reflects the degree of natural rights,
comparatively, in the definition of corruption.

PART I: IS IT POSSIBLE TO RECOGNIZE CORRUPTION?
Existence of corruption marks the signs of a social and political discomfort. The appearance of
corruption shows us that the values in the system have weakened or there are some conflicts
among these values. If corruption becomes powerful, this will result with a perception that the
old values were replaced by the new ones. Strengthening of exploitation causes certain
segments of citizens to believe that public services are not equally distributed. According to
different forms it has, corruption is related with the top-ranking public officials or, on the
contrary, with a certain interest group located within a society. The typologies created by
Heidenheimer and Mény are legitimized on this base.
The classic definition of corruption has three actors and one scene. These are the use of
corrupted, corrupter, concealed contracts and public power in the face of material / moral gains
for a group of interests. Empirical research on the subject has attempted to understand the source
of motivation for the illegal behavior of corrupted and corrupter actors (see TESEV: 2003 and
TESEV: 2000). In interviews with people involved in corruption incidents, there are many
socio-economic-political reasons for corruption typologies. The common point of these reasons
is that each of the actors thinks they have the right to take such behavior when placing the abuse
treaty. This movement of the individual who has been linked with the constitutional rights and
duties of the congregation is contrary to the principle of equality in the context of positive law.
It would not be wrong to look for the intrinsic motivators in natural law that this deceptive
behavior, which is contrary to the law, is adopted as "right".
If being equal before the law is a right that comes from nature, why does the corrupter citizen
need to be favored? The phenomenon that disrupts this equilibrium is the political institution
that has become a profession in representative democracies where the equality guaranteed by
law. Within the positive law, the citizen who has signed a contract with the state has the
political, social and economic rights in respect of the taxes he has paid and the duties he has
fulfilled. According to John Locke, the political participation, being in political activity in order
to govern the state, getting into the national parliament through democratic representation,
turning the image of politicians into a profession in society (Ağaoğulları, 2016: 498). According
to Locke, the parliament only convenes when the law is needed (Heywood, 2016: 59). In as
much as for Locke, if the parliament is permanent, lawmakers may engage their personal
interests in legislative activity, but if they break up after making the law, a fair political system
will be established because they will not be involved in the implementation of the law (Bennett,
1979: 73). So, it turns out that corrupted-corrupter actors in the general definition of corruption
cannot have definite identity in public-private co-ordination. If we take the Lockean approach,
there is no hierarchy in the nature of corruption. The parties have an equity arising from their
different interests. The corrupted-corrupter is sometimes a politician-public official-citizen-

private interest group, but sometimes it can become a private interest group-citizen-public
officer-politician (see Table 1).

                            Table 1: Components of the corruption

In fact, both corrupted and corrupter can come from the same group of actors. In the Watergate
scandal, president Nixon has taken on both corrupted and corrupter roles when he was putting
pressure on Justice Secretary Elliot Richardson to discharge the prosecutor Archivald Cox, who
was conducting the investigation. Nixon used his public service to misuse for his own career
plan. For this reason, when dealing with corruption, it must be carefully emphasized that the
concept takes an endemic position within politics. The state of corruption, which is excluded as
"Evil" and whose every criticism is open, can be invisible when it comes to political supra-
identity. As a matter of fact, the sub-identity effect of this situation is in the form of violating
the principle of equality which is the soul of the law. The fact that this right which is arising
from natural law is hurt by the legislator (the main advocates of constitutional rights) provides
a critical view of the definition of universal corruption in terms of definition-actor restructuring.
According to Locke, the social contract is not the union of the individuals under the constraints
of the political institutions against the worst (Ağaoğulları, 2016: 487). Such a form of hypotactic
contract does not fit the lifestyle of a person arising from natural law (Ibid, p. 494). The
concealed contract model, which also exists in the relation of corrupted public power with the
private interest, has a dependent nature (Mény and Porta, 1992: 18-19). The reason for this is
that the social contract, as we have quoted from Rousseau above, is the trigger for the corruption
itself. The corruption, in this case, disrupts the natural order, leading to the dissolution of the
collective instinct that completes the existence of man.
We tried to discuss the actors of corruption and their interactions with each other in terms of
philosophy. In that case, we can analyze the reflection of these actors in real life, which we try
to frame theoretically. At this point, Mény and Heidenheimer typologies come into play.

A) Colorful Corruption
Arnold Heidenheimer has strongly underlined the perception of political corruption in public
conscious by concentrating on the reciprocity of social relations:
"Political relationship is very similar to social relationship. But the political relationship has
a more special characteristic. Differences which might occur in the perception of public
conscience of this special characteristic might make the classification of corruption harder.
When the public interest is open for a general discussion corruption and social interaction
networks might become more complicated in this form of perception. If the civil or public actor
which is subject to corruption or understood as "corrupt" transforms the public interest into a
solid interest relation; it will be harder for the society to correctly evaluate the actions of these
people who are referred as corrupt (Heidenheimer, 1989)."
In order to solve this difficulty, Heidenheimer separates the actors who perceive this corruption
into two. First group is the one that includes intellectuals, politicians, people with high level of
economic welfare; and the second group is the general structure that consists the perspective of
society in all issues. Three types of exploitations can be counted according to corruption
perception of these sides:
    i)      Black Corruption: The corruption cases that occur are those issues which might
            damage the existing system, which should be handled with extreme care by the
            general structure and the elite classes; and those should not be discussed
            (Heidenheimer, 1989).
    ii)     White Corruption: It is the opposite of black corruption. As the general structure
            argues that the violations are wrong; elite class states that the issue is exaggerated
            and public interest is supervised in the mentioned file. Actors who take part in the
            corruption announce that some whining radicals have misinterpreted this action
            where public interest is supervised. In general, results of such cases either remain
            unsolved or people involved in corruption save themselves with a tiny penalty
            (Heidenheimer, 1989).
    iii)    Gray Corruption: General structure and elite class are divided among themselves
            to judge the events. Facing with a scandal, the attitudes of both groups towards the
            scandal are various. As a result of the arguments, the file which is subject of
            corruption is discussed until a middle-of-the-way is found from the concept of
            ethics. This type of corruption is named either as "whitish" or "blackish". When the
            financing forms of political parties in democracies are examined, we usually face
            with such type of corruption argumentations. Donation campaigns which are not
            supported by the general structure but perceived as white by the elite group have a
            pale-gray ton; and when the scandals that could be experienced in cash flow occur
            one after another; we observe that corruption starts to turn black (Heidenheimer,
            1989).
Instead of all these categorization efforts, when it is the social perception, Heidenheimer
typology is within an existing indetermination. The reason of this is that the transitions for the
definition of colors are very fragile. Can a method of improving this fragility be developed?
Again, can we show courage to define the individual motivation that causes this fragility as

"desire"? Can we accept the assumption that on the road to corruption, the three passions
(jealousy, pride and greed) that are the means of desires can be corrupting motives? When we
take the hypothesis one step forward, we can think that the constitutional contract, representing
the control mechanism, is a balancing feature of these passions. However, we observe that the
existence of a constitution is not sufficient to prevent corruption cases that arise in today's
positive law models. It may then be possible to talk about another way of preserving the concept
of political virtue, helping to balance our instinctive desires. This method is to collide the
passion with passion, as Albert Hirschman says (Hirschman A., 2014: 40). Hirchman has come
up for discussion the views of the seventeenth-century moralists on social well-being through
this collision. If the balancing of passions with passions is the arrival of social well-being; by
which concept do, we need to explain this balance? The name of this concept is personal interest
(Hirschman A., 2014: 47). The factor that hinders a politician from corrupt action is his interest
to be re-elected in further elections. The politician is obliged to act for the benefit of the society
and to show that he/she protects the political virtue in order to gain the trust of the society. After
trying to introduce a solution of the color paradox in the Heidenheimer typology, we can move
to the typology of Mény.
    B) Exploitation Machine
The corruption categorization conducted by Yves Mény mentions a corruption network that
ranges between a narrow scope one into an entrenched structure (Mény, 1992: 293). Meny’s
typology characterizes corruption as qualitative. The author compares corruption with a
production machine. This machine can design a single product and also can make collective
production. In some cases, that machine is specifically designed for the production of this
product. Even if one screw of it dysfunctions, the machine can be separated into its parts. In
order to categorize corruption, first the actors machine provides interest have to be defined well.
Actors with interest can either be an individual or a group. We can reduce corruption into three
groups:
Individual and Coincidental Corruption: Actor who is involved in corruption uses his/her
public authority for the interests of a certain interest group in return for a payment.
Structural Corruption: Structural corruption occurs in a certain public service or in a public
organization. For instance; a department of a local government is a type of corruption in which
a group of public actors are involved.
Corruption Network: It is the corruption form to which both private and public sectors are
involved. All of the actors in bureaucracy and private sector use their power for the interest of
a political party instead of public interest. When we continue with the same example, in fact
the whole factory is allocated for corruption.
We can name the first exploitation as a type of "city toll corruption". Public employee in a
favorable position grants privilege to an interest group in return for money. This is generally
observed in developing countries or in former Soviet socialist republics. Public services in these
countries function within a certain deadlock. The only way to accelerate this slowdown in
bureaucracy is bribe. We should not forget that this corruption type is named "marginal". When
we compare the prices paid and services received in return with other corruption types; we can

say that these are considered as little. Therefore, it is not correct to consider the whole
bureaucratic-political structure responsible for any type of corruption investigations named
misconduct. The ethical values of a whole system cannot be blamed for the mistakes of one
person.
When compared with marginal corruption, structural or organized corruption is a type of
corruption of which the account is hard to keep in terms of material and non-material interest
relations. We cannot mention the actor involved in corruption anymore. There are one or more
individuals and interest groups involved. There is a gang or several gangs infiltrated into the
public system. A group of people might overlook the crime in return for money (the overlook
of police and their officers to the drug traffic in their regions in return for hush money). Another
group might permit the entrance of embargoed products into the country through bribe. Police
force might neglect an entertainment club where gambling is implemented in return for money
(this is usually tribute) and the officers might also be aware of this. Considering the damage, it
causes on the competitive conditions in free market economy; private sector is the group that
stands against structural corruption and pressures the public scrutiny institutions to deal with
this issue (TESEV, 2003: 132).
Another issue that should be known while examining the structural corruption is to learn who
is corrupting and who gets corrupted. The problems in making the distinction might cause
unnecessary prolonging of legal investigations and even deadlock. Another aspect that deepens
the dimension of structural corruption is the mutual equal compatibleness between the
corrupting and corrupted parties. In some cases, blackmail from one group to another is
witnessed. This might cause tensions between the parties of corruption and the existing secret
agreement might end. In fact, in order to accept the reality of structural corruption,
determination of mutual compatibleness between both parties is necessary. Mutual
compatibleness indicates an "agency corruption", not a simple "city toll corruption" as in
marginal corruption. This "agency corruption" which puts the structural corruption into practice
indicates us that corrupting groups has very well internalized the public functioning. The
obligation to use blackmail against the corrupted by the corrupting is therefore removed as it
knows the ways of communication with the public actor. Now there is a gang, an organization,
a company within the public; to which the corrupted is a partner of. The owner of the idea is
collaborating with the executer now to do a profitable business. The legitimate way for the
corrupting to establish a secret partnership with the corrupted depends on establishing a close
friendship with the public actor. I believe it is important to provide some examples at this point
in order to eliminate the confusion:
-      One of my very good friends has an important problem about his company that needs to
be solved respected officer, manager etc.
-     I wanted to make a favor to a family friend, and I need your help respected officer,
manager etc.
-       Our Friend X wants to use his connections to help your appointment for the Y position
in the institution respected officer; but we need to fix this deadlock first etc.

The list is extendible. The common speaker of these sentences is a corrupting person with the
task of mediation. This person knows the legal functioning very well within this institution;
also tells the public officer that the job to be conducted by the corrupted is legitimate. Therefore,
structural corruption is a type of corruption which is very hard to be determined. Even the
corrupted may not realize that he/she is violating the laws with this network of close relations.
The most important factor that distinguishes the "corruption network" from the structural and
marginal corruption is that this type of close relations network is not required at all. Now we
can talk about a "blackmail corruption". The money collected by political parties via non-
transparent ways under the name of "donations" in order to use for their political campaigns
might not be considered as appropriate by some political circles. But, as the collected amount
increases, the attitude against it will decrease. Once you accept this inappropriateness, you are
one of the gear on the machinery now. There is no need for city toll corruption or agency
corruption anymore. The way to convince your inclusion to the corrupted system is now
changed as "blackmail corruption". Therefore, there are 4 main lines that distinguish the
corruption network as named by Mény from other corruption types:
a) The mandatory existence of the politicians within the existing network;
b) Main direction where the collected donations will be transferred to;
c) The tense element of the donation to be transferred (the possible danger for the collapse of
system due to rejection);
d) Open or closed blackmail that would sicken the political actors.
For instance; imagine a communist party in Soviet Union within a bipolar world. Any resources
which are transferred to the party, donations collected by illegal ways, the "partisan payments"
will definitely be transmitted to the upper management of the party in order to prevent any
individual objections. This clearly indicates us that the power on the top has assured the
corruption network. As it is well understood, the existence of this top-to-down corrupted system
is faced with the danger of collapse against the weakness or objection of any of the parts. If
more politicians are included to this vicious cycle (especially those politicians considered as
honest by the public opinion), then the system will continue to operate without any serious
damages. The political and economic order which appeared now is a system where partisanship,
party interests and intra-party-political solidarity is considered as above than the morals and
ethical norms. Keeping the intra-party silence for the continuation of this corrupted connection
is not enough always: the economic interest groups that will donate the party should be the
sympathizers of it just like the party members and veterans (Oktay, 2003: 175). This is not a
coincidental sympathy. Donators are not bought to be the fuel oil of that machine. That fuel oil
is donated for the machine. How can we explain this state of devotion to the political party?
Before all, economic interest group has a relation of interest with the politician who has a
strategic position at the higher ranks of decision-making process. Politician has the goal to use
the interest group financially for the divine interest of his/her political party. And the
entrepreneur has to accept the demands of the public actor unconditionally for its own economic
benefits (e.g. winning a public tender). Therefore; the best way to overcome any obstacles is to
become a member of the political party, devotion to the party, being the best friend of the party

leader or the government leader or being a party sympathizer. This economic support provided
in a secret way is named as "revolution tax" in some countries and regions.
The final part of corruption network is the "silence oath". This is an indispensable condition for
the protection of illegal interest relation. Everyone should know what is going on but no one
will speak about it. Economic and political parties are following the approach of "scratching
each other's back", thereby eliminating any stance against the systematical corruption. Any
screw or nail that prevents the proper working of the machinery or turning of the gear will be
"wiped out" of the system. In other words, it will be silenced as the silence oath predicts. This
corruption network which is ossified and spread to the whole body is internalized by the public
opinion, intellectual circles and almost all segments of the society. Such a system would
continue with its existing gears until it collapses. The end of system will come along with the
objections of these economic and political interest group which do not receive any share from
this profit.
A link can be established between Locke's "consensus hypothesis" and "the individual involved
in non-consensual network of corruption" which Mény mentions. The individual who Locke
mentions is also the approach to a moral characterization: X person is born freely. It is wrong
for the ruler to impose an obligation on X, from a social contract, without the X's consent. In
this case, X's right to resist this imposition is the right thing to come from natural law. X may
not recognize the authority of the manager until he/she consents. Although the "free born
individual" attribution is a moral personalization, it never goes away from the field of simple
contract theory. This moral content is the best moral theory that arises from the simple truths
of X, which is called natural law (Waldron, 2003: 187). The non-consensual existence of order,
originating from positive law, causes X to become corrupted or corrupter (or even both) actor.

PART II: TURKBANK TENDER: THE TALE OF A BLACK AND WHITE
-"Turkbank Belongs to Korkmaz Yigit" (Milliyet, 05.08.1998: 9),
-"The Cancellation of Turk Ticaret's Sale is on the Agenda" (Milliyet, 27.08.1998: 10),
-"Turkbank will be solved in Court" (Milliyet, 15.10.1998: 1),
-"Resolution for Turkbank" (Milliyet, 17.10.1998: 18),
-"Supreme Court Warning" (Milliyet, 01.11.1998: 18),
-"Korkmaz Yigit is Under Custody" (Milliyet, 10.11.1998: 3),
-"Double Motion of Censure for Yilmaz" (Milliyet, 12.11.1998: 18),
-"Government Has Actually Ended" (Milliyet, 20.11.1998: 1),
-"Supreme Court Deal" (Milliyet, 10.05.1999 18-19),
-"Yilmaz Acquitted" (Milliyet, 23.06.2000: 22),
-"To the Supreme Court with Every Step" (Milliyet, 19.07.2003: 12),
-"Motion Censure for Yilmaz and Taner in the Parliament" (Milliyet, 20.11.2003: 22).

These headings and subheadings from Milliyet newspaper reflect the chronological sample of
a multi-dimensional corruption file in which numerous top-rank politicians, business world and
organized crime members were involved; named as Turkbank case in Turkey’s political history.
According to the Supreme Court proceedings accessed from the website of Constitutional Court
under the name "Decision of Ahmet Mesut Yilmaz and Gunes Taner" numbered 2006/3, the
case has arrived at Supreme Court as follows:
"The report prepared by Parliament Investigation Committee established by TGNA on
09.12.2003 with the decision number 790 and 9/5-6 Main Number is dated 25.06.2004, and
numbered E:A.01.01.GEC.9/5,6- 143, K:8 is committed in the 114th Proceeding of TGNA
General Council on 13.07.2004 and the Prime Minister of that period and former Minister of
State were put on trial in the Supreme Court on the grounds that "both names have realized all
the organizations to establish a media order under their control during the Turkbank tender
process, making of tender and establishing the price; thereby aiming for political interests, and,
that they have provided the transfer of Genc TV for free to Kamuran Cortuk in
acknowledgement for his mediation during the tender (Constitutional Court, 2006: 164)”.
National Security Council was met on February 28, 1997 and announced that Welfare Party
was at the center of religious powers. The army commanders have stated that they were making
a complaint of the policies of 54th Refah-Yol coalition government against the principles of
secular republic (Milliyet, 01.03.1997: 1). Prime Minister Erbakan has offered his resignation
to the President Suleyman Demirel on June 18, 1997 (Milliyet, 19.06.1997: 1). On July 12,
1997, 55th government with the coalition of MP-Democratic Leftist Party and Democrat
Turkey Party have received the vote of confidence in the parliament and started its duty with
Mesut Yilmaz as the Prime Minister (Milliyet, 13.07.1997: 1).
On August 4, 1998 Turkbank, which was a state economic enterprise was transferred to the
famous and strengthening businessman of the time, Korkmaz Yigit, in return for 600 million
dollars. In the following days, Republican People's Party Icel Deputy Fikri Saglar has claimed
that there were some irregularities in Turkbank tender (Milliyet, 14.10.1998: 1). According to
Saglar, other businessmen who have offered a bid in the tender were threatened by Alaaddin
Cakici to withdraw from the tender in favor of Korkmaz Yigit. The interesting part was that the
threatened businessmen have denunciated to the Prosecutor's Office; and the Security General
Directorate has informed the prime minister and the minister of state who organized the tender,
Gunes Taner. Tender was realized while the complaints were known. With the appearance of
recordings of correspondence between Alaaddin Cakici and Korkmaz Yigit were revealed,
Korkmaz Yigit was arrested. Saving Deposits Insurance Fund has decided to stop the sale of
Turkbank to Korkmaz Yigit. The motion of no confidence submitted by RPP in November 1998
against the 55th Government in Parliament was accepted. Government was overthrown on
November 19, 1998. The Commission of Investigating the Corruptions in TGNA has met in
June 2000 and they have decided that Ahmet Mesut Yilmaz and Gunes Taner were not in
connection with the organized crime with their votes 4 against 5. It has been decided that
Korkmaz Yigit has committed all the irregularities in the sale of Turkbank by himself (Sarlak
and Baki, 2007: 15). This decision was the first rendezvous in Turkbank scandal and the top-
ranking politicians in the government were cleaned from the corruption claims. These

developments occurred before the public opinion between the years of 1998-2000; and they
remind us of a tradition coming from Turkey's past. The existing corruption file, which is
covered in this article, has been used as the political tool of an opposition party with its
evidences and reactions it caused within the society. With the overthrow of 55th Government,
the file was almost forgotten; and the existing decisiveness to deal with the dark relations has
been lost in 2000s. Wiping out the corruption, which has penetrated into Turkey’s democratic
system, has not been the primary goal.
Turkey has entered the new century with a brand new political structure. The coalition
governments’ decade with all the political turmoil was ended. In 2002 general elections, Justice
and Development Party came to power unilaterally. In 2003, Commission for the Investigation
of Irregularities in TGNA has put Turkbank file back on the agenda. After four months of work,
Commission has stated its opinion to the Parliament; saying that Mesut Yilmaz and Gunes
Taner had to be referred to Supreme Court. The trial of two politicians at the Supreme Court
was decided in the voting at TGNA on July 13, 2004 (Official Gazette, July 17, 2004).
Two different resolutions were provided at TGNA for Mesut Yilmaz and Gunes Taner. First
resolution was prepared by JDP Istanbul Deputy Huseyin Besli and signed by 59 deputies.
According to this; Mesut Yilmaz and Gunes Taner were accused with scheme to rig bids on
tender, covering the usage of threatening in the tender and misconduct (Constitutional Court,
2006: 168-171). Second resolution was prepared by RPP Samsun Deputy Haluk Koc and signed
by 55 deputies. RPP stated that the existing exploitation was basically only about hiding the
report prepared by Security General Directorate which contained the elements of threat
occurred during the tender process and the two politicians should be on trial at Supreme Court
for this reason (Constitutional Court, 2006: 171-172).
Supreme Court consisted of the members of Constitutional Court and the decision on Mesut
Yilmaz and Gunes Taner was as follows:
"(...) After evaluating the evidences on the file, as the actions of the accused accord with article
240 of Turkish Penal Code No.765, because they were executed before April 23, 1999 and as
the crime of misconduct is not included to the out of scope crimes listed in clause 5, article 1 of
the Law numbered 4616 dated 21.12.2000; THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL IS
DELAYED (...) in accordance with clause 4 added to Article 1 of Law No. 4616 with the law
No. 4758 (Constitutional Court: 332)”.
This file is a first for the political history of Turkey, and it found the former prime minister and
state minister guilty. And their punishments were suspended unless they are involved in any
other crime, in accordance with European Union adjustment laws.
Turkbank file is a complete form of black corruption when we consider the form of approach
by media, by civil society organizations and political actors in democratic system; and as the
existing corruption findings have caused discrepancy in a great segment of the society. The
idea that Prime Minister who is at the top of political system and a State Minister who is very
close to him are connected with the leader of organized crime has caused an unforgiveable
reaction in the society. Thus, the way how the 55th Government was overthrown and Yilmaz

and Gunes sent to Supreme Court is a clear example that the public opinion oppressed for a
judicial decision to punish these illegal relations.
What type of a corruption categorization can we make for this relationship between the
corrupting and corrupted that occurred in the end of 1990s and ended with overthrow of a
government? There is an interest group consisted of a businessman and the leader of an
organized crime group. There is a mediator, an agency or an arbitrator (Kamuran Cortuk). And
the third person has acquired Genc TV for free in return for providing the opportunity of
establishing a secret agreement between the corrupting and the corrupted. When we look at the
corrupted group, we see a Prime Minister and a State Minister. Although the report of Police
was known about the tender and threat, Korkmaz Yigit has won the tender. Although the tender
was closed, Prime Minister and Korkmaz Yigit have discussed the price of sale. When we
examine all this data, we see that there are several individuals and a single institution; and
Turkbank file is one of the best examples of structural corruption.

CONCLUSION
The concept of ethics is not a divine word. On the contrary, it is one of the most keystones of
the countries which are publicly owned, procreator of public concept, conducted as form of
republic. Without the Republic, it would be an acute assumption to speak of malpractice,
degeneration, corruption.
Governments have always faced challenges in fighting corruption. The reason for this is that
society's view of corruption differs from society to society. For example, bribery is regarded as
a crime in the global context, while in Africa, in the Middle East or in developing countries, the
nepotism, a person with a high position to recognize what he or she is working with, have a
respected qualification by society (Berkman, 1983: 56).
Countries which achieve their postcolonial independence, which are developing or which have
a chronic lower place in the corruption perception indexes, have common points in socio-
political sense. In the context of the citizen-constitution, a significant part of the legitimized
part of the normative system has not been formed by its internal political dynamics (Huntington,
1968: 7). When we’re talking about these countries, we can talk about a structure of the society
that transfers the existing foreign legal systems from outside, under the name of universality, to
their own legal understandings (Ibid, p. 7). For such a society, it would be wrong to assume that
the legal framework fully reflects the political authority / public relation (Ibid, p. 7). So, in the
context of ethics, we can speak of a contradiction between formal and informal morality that
the republic has brought with it. This contradiction shows us the existence of moral corruption.
This is a reflected dualism in the transition from feudal to modern society. As a result of this
dualism, we observe that the political authority cannot integrate republican ethics into the
natural structure of the society. As the antibiotics are effective against viruses in postmodern
society; because of the above-mentioned reasons, at that point so legal deterrence is against
corruption. Societies like this are the societies in which the concepts of virtue, ethics and honor
take place in the duality. Citizens of these communities will not refrain from developing ways
of survival that will legitimize corrupt behavior against treatment methods.

Corruption derives from uncorrupt politics (Nye, 1967: 425-427), as Joseph Nye points out in
his article "Corruption and Political Development" of American Political Science Review No.
61. All universally existing definitions of abuse, all its typologies, come from the corrupted
political system. It should not be forgotten that there are bays, rivers, forests and fruit gardens
that have been untouched for some time in the place of the units of the industrial or
modernization centers. In this case, without exploring the economic, political and social factors
that pollute the uncorrupt, it would be relatively insufficient, even far away from being
scientific, to define a concept that has already become endemic in the system. The starting point
of political philosophy to search for an uncorrupt system began to change after Machiavelli's
definition of the republic as the popular sovereignty, as the concept of 'public' is involved in.
(Öztürk, 2013: 14). The abusiveness, which is the tool of corruption, has found its definition in
the modern constitution, in the light of positive law. Under the view that fight against corruption
is not successful, is it possible to find the basis of moral abuse in the discipline of natural law,
as the criticism of the definition of the concept rests on it? Inspired by Weber, what has been
regarded as immorality has transformed into oil that is used to turn rusty wheels? Moreover,
analyzing the deficiencies of positive law and ignorance in drawing the boundaries of
corruption in the natural law spectrum will enable the researchers who are working in this field
to observe the methodology in the empirical or theoretical context to develop in their approach
to the issue.
In this article, we have argued that corruption needs a new definition. We tried to justify the
inadequacy of methods to systemize actors that are subject to corruption and the struggle with
it which positive law is defined. In natural law, which is the source of positive law, we have
tried to create a scheme that leads to corruption and reveals the actors of corruption. In the
philosophical views of John Locke, the most important thinker of natural law, we sought to find
the social, economic and political causes of the interaction between the actors of corruption.
When we finally come to the conclusion, we can tell that we have found an answer to all the
problematics that the article is aiming for. Except for one ... A new definition of corruption ...
Is it possible? The definition of corruption, its place in positive law, in fact, deserves to be an
another article topic in itself. Now, in the categorization we will do, we will not be able to reveal
a clear definition of corruption. However, from the principles of natural law, it seems possible
to bring a new perspective to the definition of the concept. Besides in the first part of our article,
we have tried to take advantage of the Mény and Heidenheimer typologies to put the actors of
corruption and their metamorphic relationships with each other into a system. On the other
hand, we verified a case study in the second part. We had the opportunity to test this case study,
comparatively, in both typologies. The result we have is carrying the findings that can justify
the hypothesis of "components of corruption" claimed in the first chapter. These findings may
include items that can be used in the construction of a new corruption system. The construction
of a new system can give us the opportunity to test the natural law principles that we are trying
to answer, the goal of a new definition. However, the question of the possibility of a new system
that can be constructed from these findings, just as the conceptual definition problematic, can
only be the topic of an another article. Consequently, there is a possibility to introduce a new
point of view in order to define the concept, starting from the principles of natural law. The
sources of natural law are divine inspiration, moral sense and intellect (Vergara F., 2006: 125-