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SWP Journal Review NO. 1 FEBRUARY 2019 Introduction European Defence – Debates in and about Poland and France Think Tank Publications 2017/2018 Lena Strauß and Nicolas Lux In 2017, the foreign and defence ministers of almost all EU countries decided to estab- lish a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) for European Union defence policy. The debates at think tanks in EU Member States about this initiative show that expec- tations regarding a European defence architecture diverge widely and focus on very different issues. This is especially true for Poland and France. In Poland, European defence policy is primarily understood as a form of collective defence against Russia which needs to be integrated into the NATO framework. For France, on the other hand, risks to its very own security and that of Europe come primarily from its south- ern neighbours. This is why Paris attaches particular importance to the development of military intervention capabilities. These differing preferences of Germany’s two largest and most important neighbouring countries are reflected clearly in the scien- tific analyses and comments by European think tanks on questions of European arma- ments policy and the further integration of European defence policy. A look at the debates in European think official statement (note: scientific classifi- tank publications on the Common Defence cations of PESCO and comments on this and Security Policy (CDSP) reveals that the initiative can be found in the list of Publi- preferences of EU Member States in this cations Reviewed and in Further Reading policy area vary widely. The differences at the end of this Journal Review). The become particularly visible when the ben- differences in PESCO’s assessment are efits of the new Permanent Structured particularly evident if one looks at a selec- Cooperation (PESCO), which 25 EU Member tion of think tank publications published States signed up to in 2017, are discussed since 2017 that mainly focus on the atti- in the field of security and defence. Within tudes of France and Poland towards this the framework of PESCO, the participating process. In particular, many analyses states should, among other things, “develop come from these two – but also other – jointly defence capabilities, [...] enhance the countries refer directly to the divergent operational readiness and contribution of defence policy interests of the other EU their armed forces”, as stated in the EU’s member.
The aim of this Journal Review is to European fragmentation in this policy area.
compare the different problem perceptions, According to Gotkowska, the differences in
interests and policy recommendations in the strategic culture of EU Member States
publications with regard to Poland and could even widen, in particular between
France, and to classify them into the Euro- key players within the Union, including
pean discourse on defence policy. The France, Germany and Poland. While Paris
publications examined here were selected localises threats to its own and European
according to two criteria: Firstly, analyses security interests in North Africa, Warsaw
and comments written by researchers from focuses on securing Europe’s eastern flank,
French and Polish think tanks were chosen which extends from the Baltic Sea through
and complemented by publications from Poland to Romania. The author diagnoses
think tankers from other EU Member States an over-focusing on PESCO and an EU tip-
in order to include an internal and external toeing away from the transatlantic alliance.
perspective on the debates taking place. She suggests that this development weakens
Secondly, publications were included that the credibility of NATO’s military deter-
looked into the new developments in Euro- rence from Russia and, thus, poses a threat
pean defence policy that have occurred to Poland’s security interests. For example,
since 2017. These include publicly available the debate that often takes place among
policy briefs, analyses and comments. The European experts about US disengagement
following sections on discussions relating from Europe and NATO structures, which is
to Poland and France also address EU insti- based primarily on the rhetoric of US Presi-
tutional factors and integration aspects, dent Trump, is in fact misleading. Only this
as well as their defence and armaments talk of a potential US departure, which
dimensions. Most of the articles discussed would require an intensified European
here have dealt with these broader issues. defence policy on the part of Western EU
Member States, could possibly trigger an
actual withdrawal of the US from Europe.
Poland: The NATO Alliance This discourse has, therefore, been met
as a First Priority with great scepticism – not only in Poland,
but also in the states along NATO’s eastern
The Polish debate reveals a distanced rela- flank and in the remaining Visegrád Group
tionship to an increasingly integrated EU countries (V4): the Czech Republic, Hungary
defence policy. and Slovakia.
Justyna Gotkowska of the Polish Centre Marcin Terlikowski of the Polish Insti-
for Eastern Studies (OSW) could not find tute of International Affairs (PISM) looks
almost any helpful approaches in recent more positively at European security and
EU defence policy initiatives, such as defence policy. He emphasises the political
PESCO, that might actually further advance importance of PESCO but, at the same time,
the European integration process. She criticises tendencies of exclusion of the
concludes that PESCO is not an appropriate states of Central and Eastern Europe with
EU response to new global and regional weaker defence industries. As a result,
challenges in security policy, as PESCO con- he writes, European security and defence
tains the unsolved strategic contradiction policy risks becoming an elitist, Western
between the preferences of Germany and European project. He recommends that
those of France. While Berlin pursues an Warsaw instead focus on transatlantic
inclusive and integrative policy approach relations and NATO as well as on closing
to defence issues, France’s priorities are Europe’s military capacity gaps by partici-
more in favour of an exclusive and mili- pating in PESCO projects. For Poland, it is of
tarily effective EU defence policy. If expec- fundamental strategic importance to avoid
tations of PESCO to promote integration do duplicating EU and NATO structures and
not materialise, the likely result is further that PESCO remains inclusive and binding
SWP Journal Review 1
February 2019
2at the same time. Warsaw should, there- to trading on the European arms market,
fore, press for PESCO projects to be closely this could represent a risk to its state-domi-
coordinated with NATO planning processes nated domestic defence industry. Never-
and make use of the opportunities which theless, Zaborowski argues that the Polish
certain PESCO projects might offer, such as government must recognise and exploit
improving military mobility. These plans opportunities for deeper European defence
coincide with NATO’s complementary goal integration. He suggests that a greater com-
of strengthening Poland’s territorial and mitment to European defence policy could
alliance defence capabilities. benefit Poland to a further extent given
In a publication for the European Coun- that the EU is currently very critical of War-
cil on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Marcin saw in other areas of politics, notably the
Zaborowski highlights Polish interests on rule of law and intra-European solidarity.
armaments and defence issues. Zaborowski Karolina Muti of the Italian Istituto
identifies a number of problems confront- Affari Internazionali (IAI), also identifies
ing Warsaw that counteract deepening Poland as the missing link in a European
European integration in this area: Former defence and armaments structure. Muti
Polish governments, and also the current asserts that Warsaw primarily sees itself
one, have relied almost exclusively on the as a loyal transatlantic partner, giving full
US and the US defence industry to equip priority to its relations with the US as a
their country’s armed forces since the end protecting power and to the US defence
of the Cold War. This would explain the industry. Muti perceives the US’s growing
lack of integration in the Polish defence unreliability as particularly problematic and
industry compared to other European coun- believes Warsaw should respond with a
tries. However, he writes that this should clear policy of rapprochement with the EU
be viewed in an increasingly problematic and its Member States. Poland will not only
environment in which the European secu- benefit materially and financially from effec-
rity architecture is facing major challenges tive and substantial participation in the dif-
stemming from aggressive Russian foreign ferent PESCO projects, but will also be able
policy, an unstable alliance with the US and to increase political credibility at EU level.
a fast-approaching Brexit. Zaborowski also Warsaw would then be able to take on the
sees the Polish defence sector as increasing- promising role of acting like a bridge be-
ly in need of structural reform, since it is tween the different strategic interests of
predominantly state-owned and grappling Western and Eastern Europe. Realigning its
with major efficiency and cost issues. He focus on EU partners would also give Poland
suggests that these deficits are exacerbated the opportunity to modernise its military re-
by Warsaw’s lack of a long-term strategy on sources (industry and armaments). Although
armaments issues. Its unquestioned pref- Muti accepts the fear expressed by many in
erence for US defence providers too often Poland that initiatives such as PESCO could
actually undermines Polish interests, as lead to the undesired duplication of struc-
there has been no knowledge transfer from tures that already exist within NATO, she
which Polish industry could have benefitted believes that the risk of this happening could
from over the long term. Also, the Polish be averted if Warsaw were to embrace a
government has so far generally awarded policy of broad and active participation.
its arms contracts without considering
issues of compatibility with other EU part-
ners. This also isolates Poland within its France: Reform Ambitions inside
preferred regional framework, the V4 group, and outside the EU Framework
whose other member states have already
benefitted from a diversified European Analyses of think tanks looking at France’s
arms market in many ways. If, however, preferences and perceptions on defence and
Warsaw were to become more amenable armaments policy primarily deal with Presi-
SWP Journal Review 1
February 2019
3dent Emmanuel Macron, who has been in balance on European conflicts of interest
power since 2017, and his lofty ambitions and assume leadership roles to successfully
for European policy reform. However, in manage the balancing act between remain-
doing so, they come across some contradic- ing loyal to NATO, their own national pri-
tions they outline in their research publi- orities and the sometimes conflicting prior-
cations. ities at the European level.
In his contribution to an anthology by Jean-Dominique Giuliani, Chairman of
the Institut de Recherche Stratégique et the Fondation Robert Schuman, comment-
de l’École Militaire (IRSEM) in Paris, Pierre ed on the high expectations in Parisian
Haroche highlights the “geostrategic defence and security policy circles for a
dilemma” he believes EU Member States “powerful Europe” in a policy paper published
face. The dominant threat perceptions in by the research institute in May 2018. How-
Poland are thoroughly incompatible with ever, those striving for such a Europe
those of France. He writes that Poland is should not only look at EU structures, but
spellbound by fears of Russia on the eastern also at decidedly military formats outside
European flank, whereas France is turning EU institutions. Giuliani sees the establish-
its full gaze to Europe’s southern flank ment of PESCO as an, albeit late, “awaken-
because it fears increasing migration pres- ing” of Europe. Franco-German relations,
sure from Africa. The two countries not to which Giuliani attaches great importance
only define their national security interests in his comments, are vital for forthcoming
differently, but also have completely differ- developments in the field of European
ent defence policies as a result. According defence policy. However, as the author goes
to Haroche, other factors that add to the on to point out, compromises enforced by
divergence in security interests between Germany because of its preference for
Poland and France and have a lasting im- PESCO to be as inclusive and integrative as
pact on the European defence debate in- possible have prompted the French to look
clude the election of Donald Trump, stricter for defence cooperation projects outside EU
fiscal discipline in the EU since the finan- structures as well, one of which is the Euro-
cial and government debt crises, threats pean Intervention Initiative (EI2), announced
from terrorism, the migration crisis, Rus- by Macron in his Sorbonne speech in Sep-
sia’s aggressive self-assertion on the inter- tember 2017. The EI2 enabled France to
national stage and the impending with- better represent its security interests in
drawal of the UK from the EU. But Haroche the southern neighbourhood. According
views the complexity of current security to Giuliani, the EI2 format will also make
risks as an opportunity for progress on it possible to further integrate the UK into
European defence policy and further sug- a European security architecture – even
gests that it represents a good basis for after Brexit. However, the different per-
PESCO to act as an integrative element. The ceptions of the security situation and the
European geostrategic dilemma could be disparate strategic orientation of foreign
resolved if the divergent interests were to and security policy among the EU Member
be evened out and the different priorities States remain a key issue. The realisation
mutually recognised, i.e. if the EU states of a common “strategic culture” in Europe,
were to achieve a ‘transactional solidarity’. which is indispensable for France, would
He suggests that the conditions for achiev- thus be made even more difficult.
ing this were also present at the military Barbara Kunz from the Institut Français
level where different capabilities were des Relations Internationales (ifri) in Paris
required for crisis operations in the South expresses her mixed expectations of Euro-
and for NATO’s military presence in the pean defence policy in an article for the
East. As a result, France and Poland, al- German Marshall Fund (GMF). Like Haroche
though at opposite ends of the defence and Giuliani, she too paints a picture of a
policy spectrum, could act as a counter- European defence policy in crisis having to
SWP Journal Review 1
February 2019
4assert itself against a background of the than with (most) other European partners.
US under Trump, looming Brexit and the However, the integration and institutionali-
migration debate. Kunz mentions three sation of European defence (and arms) policy
factors that could cause the required Ger- would be a more attractive option for Paris
man and French engines of change to if it wanted to throw more political capital
‘stall’: the East-South debate, the debate on behind its own interests and be awarded a
Europe’s strategic autonomy and the state greater leadership role on European defence
of transatlantic relations. She argues that issues in the future. But, to do so, France
Germany and France are pursuing different would have to refrain from making uni-
priorities in all areas, despite having a lateral (ad hoc) decisions on defence issues.
similar assessment of the situation. France
would not shy away from unilateral action,
if no option for action at the European level Conclusion
was available. However, Paris usually tries
afterwards to embed its approach in multi- In summary, it can be stated that the obser-
lateral European formats. The German vations on the future of European defence
method is less targeted and strategically policy contained in the above think tank
unambitious, as Kunz asserts. However, this publications, which focus on Poland and
approach is usually met with incomprehen- France, vary considerably. This also applies
sion and irritation from the French side. generally to those observations concerned
But, ultimately, Kunz continues, the two with the general challenges and potential
driving forces in the EU need to agree on structural changes of EU defence policy.
a bilateral level in order to avoid further That the European defence debate is simul-
divergence within the Union. At the same taneously shaped by domestic, integration
time, however, there is a need for more and security policy issues, makes it difficult
intensive and expanded strategic discussion for researchers to analyse the complex
on how to deal with NATO and other for- motivations and options for action of EU
mats outside EU structures (including the Member States participating in PESCO.
EI2) and how their respective national However, a review of the above publica-
interests and priorities could be recognised tions also shows that portrayals of today’s
to ensure that PESCO can be jointly im- most pressing problems and crises are
plemented for long-term success. largely the same.
In a policy brief also published by the The analysis of the prevailing discourse
GMF, Alice Pannier assigns France the in Poland makes it clear that the debates in
important position of a mediator. She the Eastern and Central European EU Mem-
writes that it is up to France to strengthen ber States differ greatly from those in West-
its strong security and defence links with ern Europe, drawing on the example of
the UK in the future European security France in this case. The Polish assessment
architecture after Brexit. In addition, Paris of joint defence efforts is more critical and
must prioritise EU initiatives in this area detached – an observation that applies to
over other unilateral and bilateral projects, all the articles discussed. This scepticism is
since this is the only way for the EU to prevalent despite Warsaw benefitting politi-
develop and pursue a coherent and con- cally from the new initiatives in many
sistent approach. According to Pannier, the ways, both at national and European level.
area of tension in which France finds itself Despite these reservations, the Polish gov-
is determined not only by relations with ernment announced at the end of 2018
NATO, ad hoc intervention formats and that it intended to participate in the second
PESCO, but also by the close bilateral and, round of PESCO projects, albeit only to a
therefore, potentially risky arms coopera- limited extent. Terlikowski and Muti, in
tion with the UK. On a strategic level, there particular, have pointed out that the imple-
may be greater convergence with London mentation of PESCO gives Poland the oppor-
SWP Journal Review 1
February 2019
5tunity to assume the role of an important from France and Poland if it takes on this
mediator, acting, on the one hand, between function (see analyses by Gotkowska and
Western and Eastern EU Member States Kunz), because its neighbours to the east
and, on the other hand, as an advocate of and west have repeatedly said they consider
meaningful complementarity between EU the Bundeswehr’s resources inadequate and
and NATO requirements – with Warsaw Germany’s reluctance to engage in crisis
certainly advocating the primacy of the management casts doubt on the credibility
latter. of German promises. It is not only the
All the authors cited here, who have authors of the articles discussed here who
looked at France’s defence interests, agree believe Berlin should become more involved
that Paris would be well advised to act in in defence issues and, therefore, assume
a less isolated manner and instead seek a more responsibility. German researchers,
joint approach with Germany and Poland, such as Major and Mölling (2017, see Fur-
in order to make PESCO a successful proj- ther Reading), come to similar conclusions.
ect. However, this presupposes a common What this means for PESCO is that, in
strategy across the EU which would have developing a European “strategic culture”,
to reflect a balance between all of Europe’s Germany runs the risk of neglecting its own
overarching geostrategic interests. As the interests if it does not proactively contrib-
above articles have made clear, the French ute to shaping this defence policy initiative.
government has a number of options avail- The absence of a common strategic approach
able to shape its defence policy. It can is seen by most authors as problematic for
choose between bilateral agreements on the further development of a pan-European
arms projects as well as political and mili- defence policy. Similar views are shared by
tary cooperation formats. Paris has revealed other European ‘think tankers’ researching
its preference for bilateral and ad hoc for- PESCO. In addition to the strategy issue,
mats that do not necessarily have to be part Blockmans (2018, see Further Reading), for
of the EU framework. This could open up example, sees further challenges for PESCO
new opportunities to integrate the UK into that policymakers will have to resolve in
a future European security and defence the near future. These include compelling
architecture, an aspect most writers include and binding rules on the implementation
in their observations in the run-up to Brexit of the PESCO framework in and for the par-
slated for 29 March 2019. ticipating states, agreeing on ambitious
Summarising the analyses and comments goals whilst maintaining an inclusive and
discussed, France sees itself as a driving force integrative approach, and ensuring PESCO
in the development of a European defence is compatible with other defence structures
policy, but is not afraid to potentially irri- in Europe. If these issues remain unresolved,
tate other Member States with its discourse the success of PESCO could be in jeopardy,
on strategic autonomy of the EU and the especially if current trends in Warsaw
EI2 initiative it has promoted. (strong US focus) and Paris (tendency to-
These presented analyses of France’s wards unilateral ad hoc formats) intensify.
motives and Poland’s criticism and ambi- The literature referred to in this Journal
valent behaviour on matters of European Review of the European defence debate not
defence policy should be carefully noted in only highlights policy recommendations
Berlin. Germany should be looking to take that directly affect Warsaw and Paris, but
charge of the task of balancing the diverg- also expresses, either implicitly or explicitly,
ing geostrategic interests between the East the authors’ concrete expectations of Ber-
and the West of the EU, thereby bringing lin. Against the background of the current
its own interests into the debate. In other policy and research debates, the Federal
words, Berlin should increasingly take on Government must ultimately ask itself what
the role of mediator itself. However, Ger- kind of defence policy does Berlin want for
many will have to reckon with criticism Germany – and also Europe –, and how
SWP Journal Review 1
February 2019
6might the vision of a ‘European Defence Terlikowski, Marcin. PeSCo: The Polish Per-
Union’ and a ‘European Army’ – both of spective. ARES Policy Paper no. 32. Paris:
which still require legal and political under- Armament Industry European Research
pinning (cf. Wolfstädter 2018, see Further Group (ARES), October 2018.
Reading) – still be realised despite the cur- Zaborowski, Marcin. Poland and European
rent differences that persist among EU Defence Integration. Policy Brief. London:
Member States. European Council on Foreign Relations,
January 2018.
Publications Reviewed
Further Reading © Stiftung Wissenschaft
Giuliani, Jean-Dominique. “Defence: und Politik, 2019
Europe’s Awakening.” In Defence: Europe’s Bendiek, Annegret, Ronja Kempin and All rights reserved
Awakening, ed. Jean-Dominique Giuliani, Nicolai von Ondarza. Qualified Majority
This Journal Review reflects
Arnaud Danjean, François Grossetête and Voting and Flexible Integration for a More
the authors’ views.
Thierry Tardy, Policy Paper, European Effective CFSP?. SWP Comment 25/2018.
Issues, no. 474, 5–12. Paris: Fondation Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, The online version of this
Robert Schuman, 22 May 2018. June 2018. publication contains func-
Gotkowska, Justyna. The Trouble with PESCO: Blockmans, Steven. “The EU’s Modular tioning links to other SWP
texts and other relevant
The Mirages of European Defence. Point of Approach to Defence Integration: An
sources.
View no. 69. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Inclusive, Ambitious and Legally Binding
Studies (OSW), February 2018. PESCO?.” In Common Market Law Review SWP Journal Reviews are
Haroche, Pierre. “France, Poland and the 55, no. 6 (2018): 1782–1826. subject to internal peer
Relaunch of EU Defence Cooperation.” In De France, Olivier, Claudia Major and review, fact-checking and
France and Poland: Facing the Evolution of the Paola Sartori. How to Make PeSCo a Success. copy-editing. For further
information on our quality
Security Environment, ed. Barbara Jankow- ARES Policy Paper no. 21. Paris: ARES,
control procedures, please
ski and Amélie Zima, 77–84. Issue 59. September 2017. visit the SWP website:
Paris: Institut de Recherche Stratégique Fiott, Daniel, Antonio Missiroli and https://www.swp-berlin.org/
et de l’École Militaire (IRSEM), July 2018. Thierry Tardy. Permanent Structured en/about-swp/quality-
Kunz, Barbara. The Three Dimensions of Cooperation: What’s in a Name? Chaillot management-for-swp-
publications/
Europe’s Defense Debate. Policy Brief no. 024. Paper no. 142. Paris: European Union
Washington, D.C.: The German Marshall Institute for Security Studies, November SWP
Fund of the United States (GMF), 2018. 2017. Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Muti, Karolina. Poland: The Missing Link Major, Claudia and Christian Mölling. Politik
in European Defence. IAI Commentaries “Was genau heißt ‘neue Verantwor- German Institute for
no. 48. Rome: Istituto Affari Inter- tung’?”. In Internationale Politik 72, no. 2 International and
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nazionali (IAI), September 2018. (March/April 2017): 89–97.
Pannier, Alice. France’s Defense Partnerships Wolfstädter, Laura Maria. “‘Europäische Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
and the Dilemmas of Brexit. Policy Brief Verteidigungsunion’: Versuch einer recht- 10719 Berlin
no. 022. Washington, D.C.: GMF, 2018. lichen Einordnung.” Blog Post. Berlin: Telephone +49 30 880 07-0
Terlikowski, Marcin. PESCO and Cohesion of Jacques Delors Institut, 1 August 2018. Fax +49 30 880 07-100
www.swp-berlin.org
European Defence Policy. Bulletin no. 112
swp@swp-berlin.org
(1052). Warsaw: The Polish Institute of
International Affairs (PISM), 17 Novem- ISSN (Print) 2628-0256
ber 2017. ISSN (Online) 2628-0264
Terlikowski, Marcin. PESCO: First Projects and doi: 10.18449/2019JR01
the Search for (a Real) Breakthrough. Bulletin
Translation by Martin Haynes
no. 65 (1136). Warsaw: PISM, 8 May 2018.
(English version of SWP-
Lena Strauß, M.A. is a Research Assistant in SWP’s International Security Division. Zeitschriftenschau 1/2019)
Nicolas Lux, M.A. is Programme Manager at SWP’s Brussels office.
SWP Journal Review 1
February 2019
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