STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 - Key Developments in Global Affairs - Center for Security Studies
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Center for Security Studies
STRATEGIC
TRENDS 2021
Key Developments in Global Affairs
Editors: Brian G. Carlson, Oliver Thränert
Series Editor: Andreas Wenger
Authors: Brian G. Carlson, Julian Kamasa, Linda Maduz,
Niklas Masuhr, Lisa Watanabe
CSS
ETH Zurich
STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021: Brian G. Carlson, Oliver Thränert Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland This publication covers events up to 1 April 2021. © 2021, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich Images © by Reuters ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-76-9
CHAPTER 3
Turkey’s New Outlook: Power Projection
in the Middle East and Beyond
Niklas Masuhr
Turkey’s military operations in 2020 and beyond lie at the intersection of a
more activist and autonomous foreign policy, the continuous mutation of the
country’s guiding ideologies, increased autocracy at home, and an expedition-
ary military machine 25 years in the making. Trends and shifts in both the
short and long terms, from changing government coalitions in Turkey to the
Syrian civil war, help to explain the erstwhile Kemalist Republic’s accelerated
transformation, both internationally and domestically, as well as its likely
strategic implications.
A Turkish soldier walks next to a Turkish military vehicle during a joint US-Turkey patrol, near
Tel Abyad, Syria, September 8, 2019. Rodi Said / Reuters
53ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
Turkish military operations through- While interventions in Libya, Syria,
out 2020 came as a shock to many and in the Nagorno-Karabakh war
Western policymakers and commen- rely on similar tools and operation-
tators, both in terms of their political al preferences, the politico-strategic
audacity and their aggressive nature. drivers behind them are anything
In particular, its armed forces’ use of but uniform. Turkey’s military inter-
Unmanned Aerial (Combat) Vehi- ventions in all three theaters notably
cles (UAV/UCAV) made headlines featured the use of UCAVs, but its
far beyond the usual bubble of mil- objectives in Syria, Libya, and the
itary technology watchers. Beyond Southern Caucasus were quite differ-
the battlefields of Syria, Libya, and ent in each case. The Syrian civil war
the Caucasus, President Recep Tayy- naturally has a direct impact on Tur-
ip Erdogan’s increasing assertiveness key’s own national security and deter-
in foreign policy and heavy-handed- mines its relations with regional and
ness at home have long invited dip- extra-regional powers, most notably
lomatic frustration and pensive anal- the US and Russia. Importantly, the
yses in NATO countries. Indeed, the Syrian war also prompted renewed
very trustworthiness and reliability of concerns in Turkey over the Kurdish
Ankara as a NATO member has been conflict. Operations in Libya reflect
questioned. both the ideological makeup of Tur-
key’s current governing coalition and
Many facets of Turkey’s recent behav- the country’s policies to ensure ener-
ior have simmered for years, even de- gy security. Support for Azerbaijan
cades, and have only now reached full against Armenia over Nagorno-Kara-
maturation. In domestic politics, the bakh, meanwhile, was similarly driv-
ruling AK Party’s soft Islamism has en by ideological support and energy
merged with ethno-nationalist cur- security as well as Turkey’s ambiguous
rents. In the military sphere, mean- relationship with Russia. While Mos-
while, important force design deci- cow has acquiesced to direct Turkish
sions made decades ago ensure that and Turkish-supported military ac-
Erdogan has the capacity to project tion in all three theaters, the results
power as he sees fit. These develop- in each case likely would have played
ments intersect with a destabilized in- out much differently if Russia had not
ternational environment that permits, done so. This lenience appears to be
and perhaps even advantages, the driven mostly by Moscow’s desire to
overt use of military force that Turkey further weaken the already strained
undertook in 2020. bonds between Ankara and its NATO
54T U R K E Y ’ S N E W O UT LO O K
allies in the West. Taken together, all The fall of the Soviet Union, howev-
three areas of operation showcase not er, fundamentally changed Turkey’s
only Turkey’s current assertiveness, strategic environment. Within Turkish
but also the multi-vectored drivers of security policy circles, the two main
this trend and how the country seeks internal opponents to Kemalism, sep-
to position itself in an increasingly un- aratism (meaning Kurdish resistance)
certain security environment. and Islamism, replaced the Red Army
at the top of the threat list. Against Is-
Kemalist Past and Recent Shifts lamist forces, the military set up mon-
There is no straight line between itoring mechanisms in order to collect
the rise of the Islamist Justice and intelligence, ban non-secular parties if
Development Party (AKP) to pow- necessary, and prevent the circumven-
er and Turkey’s current approach to tion of the Kemalist canon – even in
international engagement. The de- the face of Islamist movements gath-
velopments that have led here can ering steam among the electorate. By
be viewed through the prism of civ- the mid-1990s, an Islamist-influenced
il-military relations and changes in coalition government, headed by the
the state-endorsed doctrine in three Welfare Party, was in power. In 1997,
phases: pre-2002 military dominance, the military intervened and overturned
the AKP’s struggle to roll back that the government, eventually banning
dominance culminating in the failed the Welfare Party. This, however,
coup attempt in July 2016, and, lastly, merely delayed the rise of some of its
the reintegration of military elites by members, among them Erdogan him-
way of ideological realignments inside self, who successfully regrouped as the
Turkey. Justice and Development (AK) Party.
During the first phase, until the elec- In 2002, the AKP swept national pol-
tion of the conservative AKP in 2002, itics in a landslide victory at the gen-
the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) eral election. From the beginning, the
served as the guardrails of Atatürk’s Islamist party was hindered by the
Kemalist vision. Turkey joined NATO military, setting the tone for a con-
in 1952; inter-military links with the flictual relationship that culminated in
US were especially pronounced until the attempted coup on 15 July 2016.
and beyond the end of the Cold War. These two events serve as bookends for
The corollary of anchoring Turkey to the second period under observation.
the West was that it withdrew from During this period, the AKP and its
the wider Middle East.1 allies wrested control of the state and
55ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
societal institutions from the TSK, even contingency plans leading to a coup,
as instability rose throughout Turkey’s referred to as “Sledgehammer.”2 While
neighborhood after the outbreak of the ultra-nationalist officers and civilian al-
Arab Spring in 2011. In terms of the lies were certainly opposed to the AKP
country’s broader foreign policy and government and had proven their pro-
strategic outlook, the new government pensity for intervening in politics, the
sought to capitalize on the pivotal posi- vast judicial proceedings also caught
tion afforded to it by straddling Europe left-of-center journalists in its nets.3
and Asia. Under the so-called Strate-
gic Depth doctrine, Ahmet Davuto- Externally, a string of events after
glu, a political scientist-turned-diplo- 2010 put the Erdogan government
mat-turned-politician, formalized the into “survival mode.” The first exter-
idea that Turkey possessed a natural nal event and the ignition for much
sphere of influence not only in terms of what followed was the eruption
of geography but also by virtue of his- of the Arab Spring. Erdogan at first
toric linkages throughout the region as sought to ride its wave by present-
the heir to the Ottoman Empire. These ing himself as patron and partner to
ideas formed the basis for ‘neo-Ot- moderate Islamist forces, many of
tomanism’, which would replace Ke- which were national organizations of
malism as the state ideology. Part and the Muslim Brotherhood. This ap-
parcel of this construct was the dic- proach, however, meant that Turkey
tum of “zero problems” with Turkey’s was overtly at loggerheads with more
neighbors, as Davutoglu in his capacity secular regimes. In Egypt, a military
as Turkey’s foreign minister sought to coup aborted the attempt to create an
position the country as a pivotal power Islamic republic.4 The shockwaves of
drawing its political capital from diplo- the Arab Spring also reached Istan-
matic relations. bul itself, and in 2013 the city was
rocked by a series of liberal protests
The AKP and its then-allies in the re- at Gezi Park directed against the ever
ligious Gülen movement proved quite increasing autocracy of the AKP. The
successful in rolling back military in- response was a major crackdown on
fluence, mainly through a series of tri- left-of-center opposition and a stifling
als from 2007 onward that exhibited of critical media and the judiciary.
questionable adherence to the rule of Across the border, the destabilization
law. Prosecutors alleged the existence of Syria and Iraq and the expansion
of an ultra-nationalist network (“Er- of the Islamic State (IS) resulted in a
genekon”) and the existence of military long-term zone of instability.
56T U R K E Y ’ S N E W O UT LO O K
Perhaps the most significant catalyst essence, ethno-nationalist paradigms
for Erdogan’s transformation of the were imported into the state canon
country, however, was the 15 July even before the coup attempt oc-
2016 coup attempt, undertaken by a curred. In 2018, the AKP entered into
coalition of disgruntled TSK officers. a coalition with the far-right Nation-
After the attempt was suppressed, loy- alist Movement Party (MHP), which
alists carried out further purges of the holds even more hostile views towards
military, judiciary, media, and opposi- the Kurds, Armenia, and the Western
tion. In total, 130,000 public servants world. Since then, the vision of Tur-
were dismissed, including teachers key as a major power in the Ottoman
and academics, and almost 80,000 Empire’s former borders has remained
suspects were formally arrested on but has been complemented by the
grounds of supposed links with Kurd- willingness to use military force in
ish elements and the Gülen network, this perceived sphere of influence.8
which had turned from ally to domes- Two decades of TSK force develop-
tic enemy.5 As one might expect, the ment dovetail with these aspirations.
purges within the military targeted
those individuals encultured in NATO In 2016, Erdogan listed a number of
and US military contexts. Leaked US regional defense precepts that benign
State Department cables revealed that media would dub the “Erdogan doc-
even by the early 2000s, these “Atlan- trine.” Its main tenets, notably a pol-
ticists” were on the backfoot against icy of proactive incursions into neigh-
“Eurasianists” who preferred the boring countries to pre-empt attacks
AKP’s neo-Ottoman vision of Turkey against Turkey, have roots that extend
as a pivotal, autonomous power.6 as far back as the 1990s. In fact, con-
temporary operations under this guise
The failed coup also serves as the closely mirror those undertaken in the
starting point for the third and cur- 1990s, though of course now enhanced
rent phase of civil-military relations. by additional military capabilities.
While the military was institutionally
defanged, elements of the old guard’s During the military modernization
nationalism have been re-introduced campaign of the 1990s, Turkey’s
and play an important role in foreign forces were not simply symmetrically
policy formulation. This shift meant modernized across the board. Rath-
that Davutoglu’s neo-Ottomanism er, specific elements geared towards a
has been superseded by what some particular way of war were upgraded.
have called “Turkish Gaullism.”7 In Namely, investments and acquisitions
57ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
were made to develop a robust recon- Syria: Overthrowing Assad
naissance-strike complex enabled by Ankara’s policies during the first five
systems such as rocket artillery, UAVs, years of the conflict were publicly
and airborne tankers. In essence, the justified along moral lines based on
ability to conduct strikes into enemy Turkey as a champion of democrati-
territory was emphasized, as were mo- zation, with Russia and Iran playing
bile and flexible mechanized forma- the roles of counter-revolutionary
tions. However, the Cold War high- enforcers. In this narrative, the US
lighted the vulnerability to Western and NATO were viewed as fickle at
arms embargoes and convinced Turk- best and treacherous at worst.9 The
ish planners to build an autonomous Assad regime’s crackdown in the
arms industry capable of producing the summer of 2011 forced Turkey to
necessary platforms, systems, and spare choose between support for the dic-
parts. These domestic developments tator and the credibility of the Turk-
intersected with external events, espe- ish/AKP model of soft, bottom-up
cially the dynamics of the Syrian civil Islamism in the wider Arab world, a
war and its Kurdish dimension. Opera- key tenet in Davutoglu’s neo-Otto-
tions in Syria, Libya, and the Southern man program.
Caucasus illustrate how the third phase
of civil-military relations shapes Tur- In this period of enforcing regime
key’s power projection in the region. change, Turkey permitted and sup-
ported the formation of organized
Syria quite naturally presents the most Syrian opposition and the founding
important theater for Turkey’s secu- of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) on its
rity policy. Operations in Libya and territory in November 2011. Simul-
Nagorno-Karabakh are results of the taneously to Qatar and Saudi Arabia
domestic political shift in 2016, but (but without coordinating with ei-
Ankara involved itself in its neigh- ther), Ankara also supported radical
bor’s civil war from the very beginning Islamist groups of credible combat
in 2011. One month after the coup, effectiveness in the region such as
Turkish tanks entering Syria marked al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra and
the Syrian dimension of Turkey’s “new precursor elements of IS.10 Turkish
look” as a more aggressive actor. Turk- action effectively strengthened the
ish involvement in Syria was also a Islamic State group, mostly due to
crucial driver of Ankara’s alienation its preference for toppling Assad and
from Washington and its increasing, if preventing the emergence of a Kurd-
ambiguous, alignment with Moscow. ish-controlled quasi-state.
58T U R K E Y ’ S N E W O UT LO O K
By 2015, it was clear this low-cost a ceasefire. The Syrian civil war and
approach had failed: Assad was still its dynamics, however, reignited ten-
in power, and stabilized thanks to a sions. With the exception of certain
massive joint Iranian/Hezbollah proxy Iraqi special operations forces, Syrian
campaign and Moscow’s intervention. Kurdish (YPG/YPJ12) units and the
However, Turkey’s attempts at regime PKK had been virtually the only mil-
change from a presumably safe dis- itary units able to stem the tide of the
tance also failed because of the mis- IS onslaught into Syria and Iraq – sig-
calculations inherent in the approach. nificantly boosting their international
Two events that would have precipitat- reputation as a result. In 2014 and
ed regime collapse, namely en masse 2015, Kurdish-led forces had held
defections from the Syrian Arab Army out in the besieged city of Kobane,
(SAA) or a NATO air campaign, did supported from the air by the count-
not materialize, contrary to Turkey’s er-IS coalition, while Ankara refused
expectations. In the latter case, the to support the Kurdish holdout on its
White House’s infamous “Red Line” border. Turkey’s refusal to assist the
declarations surely contributed to Tur- fighters, and a series of Islamic State
key’s assumptions.11 After threatening bomb attacks that targeted members
military action if Assad were to use of the Kurdish opposition, reignited
chemical weapons, President Obama the PKK’s insurgency inside Turkey
failed to follow through, thereby un- after the flagging peace process broke
dercutting the US position on Syria down in 2015. Erdogan was quick
and failing to deter subsequent use of to pivot from peacemaking efforts
chemical weapons by Assad. to warnings that the Kurds were the
major threat facing Turkey – some-
In addition, events on the ground in what foreshadowing the return of the
Syria meant that Turkish attention ethno-nationalist over the neo-Ot-
shifted from Assad back to Kurd- toman paradigm that would later be
ish influence as the major perceived formalized.
threat even before the coup attempt
occurred. As recently as 2013, Erdo- In the chaos of the civil war, YPG and
gan had attempted to negotiate di- its allies carved out zones of effective
rectly with the imprisoned leader of control in northwestern Syria around
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Afrin City and controlled most of the
Abdullah Öcalan, to peacefully end country’s rural northeast and east.
or mitigate the Turkish-Kurdish con- The decision by the United States and
flict. Both sides had, in fact, agreed to its NATO allies to work with the YPG
59ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1 and its local allies as their preferred response, and would be followed up ground component in counter-IS op- by three more major offensive cam- erations was a source of consternation paigns by the spring of 2020, two of for Ankara. The prospect of a con- which were aimed at Kurds. tiguous Syrian Kurdish quasi-state, straddling borders and receiving ex- Syria: Adjustment of ternal support, constituted the worst Ends and Means possible result of the Syrian civil war Euphrates Shield is principally the in Turkey’s eyes. Operation Euphrates operational result of an adjustment Shield in August 2016 was Turkey’s of aims and investment: Whereas 60
T U R K E Y ’ S N E W O UT LO O K
previously Ankara had pursued a low- groups defending the besieged city
cost, maximalist approach, now both of Aleppo that would fall to the SAA
sides of the equation were adjusted. in December – a tacit acceptance of
The operation was, furthermore, tight- spheres of influence.17
ly linked with the unsuccessful coup
attempt that had occurred only one Russia’s established military domi-
month earlier. For one, TSK leader- nance in Syria and growing disen-
ship had opposed deploying ground chantment with the Obama admin-
forces into Syria for over a year13 and, istration compelled Erdogan to seek
secondly, the offensive proved the rapprochement with Russia. Turkey
Turkish military’s continued readiness increasingly viewed the US as an in-
and operational ability in the wake of trusive rival due to its support for the
post-coup purges. It also serves as the YPG/YPJ, whereas Turkey could work
inciting incident for the current expe- with Moscow once it had dropped the
ditionary political and military con- priority of toppling Assad. The tepid
figuration observed in Syria and later reaction of Turkey’s Western allies to
theaters.14 the coup attempt was in clear contrast
to its swift condemnation by Russia.
The operation’s objective was to cre- Even during the previous, “idealistic”
ate a secure zone on Syrian soil and period of Turkey’s Syrian policies, the
to prevent the SDF from connecting Obama administration’s refusal to
their northeastern territories to Syria’s turn its airstrikes against Assad and its
northwestern Afrin province and cre- support for Kurdish elements on the
ate a “corridor of terror,” in Ankara’s ground had soured relations consider-
parlance. In order to launch the oper- ably. In 2015, various Kurdish, Arab,
ation, the Turkish government estab- Assyrian, and other armed groups had
lished the parameters of engagement organized under the umbrella of the
with Washington and Moscow – but Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) –
proceeded to exceed the limits agreed even if YPG units formed the opera-
with the US.15 By ensuring Russian tional core and leadership.
acquiescence, Turkey established itself
as an additional state actor in the civil Ankara’s priority of containing the
war, securing a stake in Syria’s future YPG’s influence became even clearer
and establishing a precedent for what in subsequent operations after 2016.
has been called “cooperative competi- While the TSK’s armed occupation of
tion” with Russia.16 In addition, Tur- the SDF-controlled majority Kurdish
key quietly withdrew support from Afrin enclave in early 2018 was more
61ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
or less accepted by the US, its broad- a Russian Su-24 attack aircraft, caus-
front incursion into Kurdish territory ing a major diplomatic crisis. Russia
in October 2019 showcased the de- in response imposed a series of eco-
gree to which Washington and Ankara nomic sanctions, targeted at Turkey’s
had been on a collision course. These export, construction, and tourism sec-
events also underlined Turkey’s swing tors. However, the sanctions were not
towards Russia in a variety of ways. designed to be extensive, as Moscow
When SDF forces retreated in front sought to minimize negative reper-
of the Turkish army and its proxies in cussions for Russia, and consequently
2019, they agreed on a compromise they did not inflict massive damage on
with Assad and his Russian backers. In the Turkish economy. For this reason,
effect, this meant that SAA troops en- Moscow also did not threaten to re-
tered SDF-held territories to deter fur- duce or cease deliveries of natural gas
ther TSK advances. The US position in to Turkey, its second-largest foreign
Syria, meanwhile, was concomitantly consumer, despite Ankara depending
weakened due to its apparent inability on Moscow for 56 per cent of its sup-
to manage its relations with the SDF ply.18 Ankara formally apologized for
and Turkey. It also propelled Putin and the downing of the Russian aircraft
Erdogan to sign an agreement in So- and endorsed the Russian-driven As-
chi during the same month, agreeing tana process to discuss Syria’s political
to joint patrols along Syria’s northern future. As mentioned above, Euphra-
border and deconfliction measures to tes Shield operationalized the new
be undertaken in the western province reality of Turkey’s acceptance of the
of Idlib. This settlement with Russia to status quo – Assad remaining in pow-
some degree neutralized or at least mit- er – and the new consultative if still
igated the perceived threat emanating competitive relationship with Russia
from SDF’s control of border cross- regarding Syria. Two military devel-
ings. In many ways, this turnaround is opments showcased this shift partic-
remarkable, as Russo-Turkish relations ularly clearly: Turkey’s acquisition of
had been at a low as recently as 2015. Russian S-400 air defense systems, ig-
noring significant US resistance to this
From its main airbase in Khmeimim, action, and its 2020 aerial offensive
Latakia province, the Russian Air against Assad’s SAA in Idlib province.
Force started to conduct bombing
campaigns against the opposition in By February 2020, Ankara had long
September 2015. However, in Novem- abandoned the idea of toppling As-
ber a Turkish F-16 fighter shot down sad, but the TSK conducted a series of
62T U R K E Y ’ S N E W O UT LO O K
drone and artillery strikes against the pressure on this perimeter, they were
SAA that month that crippled its forc- also conducted in retaliation for a
es in Idlib province on Syria’s north- Russian air strike that killed 33 TSK
western border with Turkey. Civilian soldiers. The fact that it was the SAA
refugees, along with Turkish-backed that was punished through UCAVs
rebel groups and jihadist elements and precision artillery, and not Rus-
(organized within the Nusra-successor sian forces, reflects the nature of coop-
HTS) had been pressed into a shrink- erative competition between Ankara
ing perimeter slightly larger than Lux- and Moscow. With Assad being iced
embourg and only three-quarters the out of the Sochi format, the diplo-
size of Rhode Island. While the Turk- matic vehicle that manages deconflic-
ish strikes (referred to as Operation tion in Idlib, Russia and Turkey have
Spring Shield) were intended to relieve been able to send military signals to
63ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
each other over his head. Spring Shield Erdogan’s relationship with Moscow
was a manifestation of the current mo- appears similarly asymmetrical.
dus operandi between the two powers.
These dynamics would be replicated Securing the Libyan Bridgehead
later in Libya and to some extent in While the application of military force
Nagorno-Karabakh. inside Syria is not too surprising giv-
en the state’s role in Turkey’s security,
While Spring Shield proved the po- the military campaign in Libya arose
tency of the TSK’s modern recon- largely due to Turkish nationalists’ vi-
naissance-strike complex, it did not sion of the country’s regional posture
prove strategically decisive, as it failed and their resurgent influence within
to push the line of contact back sig- the security apparatus. While Ankara
nificantly from the Turkish border.19 has sought to influence the political
Yet, as suggested above, the operation and military balance in Libya ever
proved useful in demonstrating that since the overthrow of Muammar
Russia and Turkey were able to wage Gaddafi in 2011, it only overtly in-
proxy warfare across a very limited tervened in the civil war in late 2019.
space without coming to blows direct- In November of that year, the Turkish
ly. To some extent, this is surely the re- government signed a Memorandum
sult of Russia’s militarily and politically of Understanding (MoU) codifying
entrenched position inside the coun- the Turkish interpretation of maritime
try. Euphrates Shield in 2016 did buy claims with Libya’s internationally
Turkey a seat at the table regarding the recognized Government of National
future of Syria and provided Turkey Accord (GNA), based in the capital
with some degree of leverage over Rus- Tripoli. In exchange for recognition
sia. However, this influence appears to of Turkish maritime claims, Ankara
be confined to Syrian territory itself promised to stabilize the GNA’s pre-
and, even more narrowly, the zone carious military situation in a separate
of contact between Turkish and Rus- MoU – and duly delivered. In doing
sian-backed forces. Russia sits much so, the TSK joined a long list of ex-
more comfortably and has the ability ternal actors that are pursuing various
to increase pressure on Turkey at will degrees of overlapping and competing
through the expendable instrument goals in the North African country.
of Assad’s SAA. While rapprochement
with Putin was a logical consequence The GNA has been locked in civil
of US support for the YPG and its war with Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Na-
opaque policies on intervention, tional Army (LNA), a consortium of
64T U R K E Y ’ S N E W O UT LO O K
militias and mercenaries that has co- case specifically the UAE and Egypt,
alesced around a core of former regime as well as safeguarding economic in-
troops, since 2014.20 The LNA has terests inside the country, mostly
been supported materially and militar- bound up in the construction sec-
ily by the UAE, as well as politically by tor. The AKP’s coalition with the na-
Egypt and France, and is increasing- tionalists in the MHP, however, has
ly reliant on Russian private military folded personnel and ideas from the
companies, such as the now-infamous formerly dominant Kemalist military
Wagner Group that has entrenched it- brain trust into official government
self in the Libyan conflict. In terms of policy, and Libya happens to play a
interests, the UAE are driven by their key role in the current government’s
version of domino theory, fearing aspirations. The ideological set of be-
Muslim Brotherhood-style bottom-up liefs most responsible for the move
Islamism creeping closer to the Gulf, into Libya is a 2006 pronouncement
whereas its local ally Russia has broad- by then-Rear Admiral Cem Gürdeniz
er and more diffuse aims, including to of Turkey’s “Blue Homeland” (Mavi
accommodate Turkey somewhat in or- Vatan), which claims a wide exclusive
der to weaken NATO cohesion.21 zone of influence around Turkey’s
shores.23 Erdogan’s ideological pivot is
Turkey’s interest in Libya is not new, exemplified by how Gürdeniz, purged
but the domestic political shift in Tur- and arrested in the Sledgehammer tri-
key has also manifested itself in the als, has now become a major author
Libyan theater. In the years immedi- of Turkey’s regional posture. Mavi
ately after the overthrow of Gadda- Vatan has become the maritime ele-
fi, Turkey had mostly been involved ment of the ruling coalition’s drive
through its support for Islamist forc- for global relevance through regional
es inside the country, in line with its dominance and underpins the expan-
priority of proselytizing the AKP’s sion of Turkey’s naval power projec-
model throughout the region. This tion capabilities. Ankara’s attachment
extended to support for ideologically to the GNA, and its internationally
aligned groups, reportedly including recognized status in particular, stems
those responsible for the 2012 attacks from its conflict with Greece, the Re-
on US diplomatic and intelligence public of Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt
facilities in Benghazi.22 Secondary over competing interpretations of ex-
motivations for the intervention may clusive economic zones in the Eastern
have included countering and impos- Mediterranean and the gas drilling
ing costs upon regional rivals, in this rights that come with them. While its
65ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
rivals have locked shields through the supplies, but rather in the idea that
EastMed Gas Forum (EMGF), coor- Turkey cannot accept exclusion from
dinating their efforts, the GNA is the any spheres of influence, especially
only state actor recognizing Ankara’s as the long-simmering conflict with
interpretation. Greece lies at the heart of the issue,
both geographically and metaphori-
At first glance, the reasons for Turkey’s cally.24 Confronting Greece in partic-
confrontational stance, as well as its ular over competing interpretations
willingness to engage in a proxy war of national sovereignty of course also
abroad, appear to be tied to interests acts as a cause célèbre, especially among
over carbohydrate exploitation. After Erdogan’s nationalist-Eurasianist allies
all, Turkey imported 72 per cent of its in the military and MHP.
energy in 2018. It has also sought to
substitute deliveries from its occasional Libya thus presents both a political
cooperative regional rivals Russia and and military bridgehead for Turkish
Iran with gas from its ally Azerbaijan. exploitation efforts necessary to break
However, these priorities only go so far out of the perceived containment im-
in explaining Ankara’s willingness to posed by its neighbors. In broader
engage in a militarized tug-of-war with regional strategic terms, this aim has
Greece and France, which deployed na- been viewed as an element of the piv-
val forces in support of Athens in early ot that has been observed since 2016
2020, in the Eastern Mediterranean. regarding Syria, where Ankara moved
There have – as of early 2021 – not away from attempting to export Tur-
been significant finds of natural gas in key’s soft Islamist model by toppling
the exclusive economic zones claimed Assad. In geographic terms, this shift
by Turkey and agreed to by the Tripoli constitutes a reframing of Turkey’s
government. Ankara instead appears to strategic areas of concern – a narrow-
be motivated by its new desire to es- ing of priorities onto the Kurdish issue
tablish itself as a major regional power regarding Syria and the wider Middle
and global actor, as well as its disen- East and an elevation of the Eastern
chantment with Europe and the US. Mediterranean. This also carries with
With the latter’s disengagement from it an emphasis on Turkey’s growing
the wider region, Turkey seeks to assert navy, which has not only been used
itself into pivotal positions and make to support combat operations in Lib-
itself indispensable. In other words, ya but has also escorted Turkish ex-
Turkey’s principal problem with the ploration vessels and intimidated Eu-
EMGF lies not in claims over gas ropean and Israeli ones.25 It also has
66T U R K E Y ’ S N E W O UT LO O K
been used to escort arms shipments coast, where the front lines appear to
into Libya in contravention of the have settled into a stalemate following
UN arms embargo – which the EU’s a Russo-Turkish announcement in
IRINI mission seeks to enforce. Most May 2020. From here, the assessment
incendiary in this regard was a spring becomes less clear-cut. Turkey has
2020 incident in which TSK frigates raised the stakes by significantly con-
radar-locked a French naval vessel.26 tributing to a theater-wide arms race
between the warring Libyan factions.
While Ankara insists on the legitima- In 2014, most external supplies con-
cy of its intervention, Tripoli only ac- sisted of infantry weapons, including
ceded to the twin memoranda when shoulder-launched air defense systems
the LNA was about to break into the (MANPADs) at the upper end, but
capital, after Turkish diplomats had since then the conflict has been fought
agitated for a maritime demarcation by UCAVs, attack helicopters, modern
deal for over a year. As such, the GNA anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs),
reluctantly put itself at Ankara’s mer- and mobile air defense systems such
cy and likely should be considered as Pantsir-S1.27 In addition, around
fully reliant militarily on Turkey’s 10,000 foreign mercenaries have
support. The Tripoli government had flocked to the country’s battlefields,
been under significant pressure from including the SNA and nominally pri-
the LNA. Turkey’s January 2020 de- vate Russian forces. Most notable in
ployment, based around UCAVs and this regard is surely Russia’s Wagner
Syrian National Army (SNA, formerly Group, which has not only supplied
FSA) fighters used as a mercenary ex- advisors and specialist frontline forces,
peditionary force, was able to reverse but also maintains and operates MiG-
the momentum – despite Haftar be- 29 and Su-24 fighter and attack air-
ing supported operationally by UAE craft, in addition to having established
manned and unmanned aviation and a fixed command and control infra-
Russian mercenaries. structure. On the eastern side, Wagner
contractors have reportedly built ma-
While Turkey managed to stabilize jor fortifications and trenches along a
the GNA’s military position, its in- 280-kilometer line between Sirte and
tervention can hardly be viewed as an al-Jufrah airbase in the desert – quite
unqualified success. Ankara and its literally entrenching the current polit-
allies’ forces managed to counter-at- ical and military status quo. On top
tack and drive the LNA back to Sirte, of these military developments, the
in the center of Libya’s Mediterranean GNA dissolved in early 2021 to be
67ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
replaced by a Government of National The success of the efforts that Ankara
Unity (GNU) that seeks to re-unify the has undertaken in pursuit of securing
country – even if, as of April 2021, it is a bridgehead in the Maghreb is very
unclear how the military and political much dependent on broader pro-
divide of the country can be overcome cesses still to be resolved. While the
if external actors have invested so heav- Libyan theater does not constitute
ily militarily. a major drain on the TSK’s resourc-
es, Turkey risks overextension in the
At present, both Ankara and Moscow political sphere by its bullish stance
appear to have achieved favorable con- towards European NATO allies. In
ditions, in particular at the expense of such a calculation, a strategic assess-
the LNA and UAE, as well as the Trip- ment of Libyan operations could only
oli government, which is at the mercy be seriously undertaken once the gas
of its protectors. That being said, it is exploration feud with the EMGF has
unclear how exactly these dynamics been settled one way or the other.
translate into the GNU’s stated task Until then, Turkey has opened a flank
of forming a unified government and that comes with vulnerabilities. For
how Turkey and Russia might leverage one, a permanent presence and com-
their military positions for political mitment to the GNA and its succes-
advances inside the new government. sor elements on the ground permits
Erdogan’s government, meanwhile, Russia to potentially put pressure on
continues its confrontational course Turkey, even for gains related to other
with the EU and its NATO partners, theaters or political issues. While its
whose responses have been compli- local allies are dependent on Turkish
cated by both France and Italy, which support and protection, Ankara also
support different sides of the Libyan depends on the semi-legal status con-
Civil War. That being said, while Tur- ferred to its operation provided by
key has again showcased its willingness the November 2019 MoUs. Perhaps
to accommodate Russia at the expense most significantly, however, the Er-
of the West and its local allies, its po- dogan government’s confrontational
sition in Libya is perhaps fairly vulner- course towards Europeans, in particu-
able due to how intimately it is tied lar France, might come back to haunt
to the Tripoli government’s legitima- Ankara if the Eurasianists’ promises
cy and Ankara’s wider Mediterranean fail to materialize. While Turkey has
ambitions. Some suggest that Turkey proven in Libya that it can “work
is in the process of overextending its with” Russia, just as it did in Syria and
footprint beyond its political means.28 subsequently in Nagorno-Karabakh,
68T U R K E Y ’ S N E W O UT LO O K
it has to be noted that Moscow’s le- French, Russian, and US leadership.
nience is at least partially based on However, frustrations at the lack of
weakening ties between Turkey and progress contributed to Baku’s deci-
the West. Whether this is a sustainable sion to attempt a military solution.30
foundation for years to come remains
to be seen. At first glance, the issue of Na-
gorno-Karabakh might appear as
Two States, One Military Doctrine a partial Russo-Turkish proxy war,
Turkey’s energetic diplomatic and mil- as the former is allied with Arme-
itary support for Azerbaijan in the fall nia through the Collective Security
2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh to Treaty Organization (CSTO). At the
some extent mirrors the ideological same time, Turkey and Azerbaijan’s
shift of 2016. However, while the cur- warm relations and the slogan “two
rent configuration of Erdogan’s leader- states, one nation” showcase Anka-
ship cadre has indeed proven decisive, ra’s preferences clearly. But just as in
the ground for Turkey’s support in the Syria since 2016 and in Libya, the re-
war had been prepared for almost a de- ality is more complex, and it can be
cade. As recently as 2011, Turkey had argued that Moscow and Ankara are
pressured Baku not to re-open conflict acting more in concert than against
over Azerbaijan’s breakaway region, each other. Russian acquiescence to
where tensions have simmered since the Azerbaijani offensive likely results
1994. In fact, Davutoglu had previ- from its government’s disdain for Ar-
ously even sought to normalize rela- menian Prime Minister Nikol Pashin-
tions with Armenia, only to have his yan and his pro-Western leanings. In
efforts successfully torpedoed by Turk- effect, Turkey and Azerbaijan acted as
ish nationalist circles, the Azerbaijani Russia’s muscle in sending a message
government’s protests, and resistance to the region, beyond Armenia, that
amongst Armenians. As a result of Russian power could also manifest it-
this failed normalization experiment, self through acquiescence to external
links with Baku were strengthened threats.31 This line of thinking was
and the military dimension of the indeed shown by Yevgeniy Prigozhin,
Strategic Partnership and Mutual As- oligarch and head of the conglomer-
sistance Treaty gradually reinforced.29 ate that the Wagner Group is attached
Wider diplomatic efforts to defuse to, who – speaking most likely as a
and ultimately resolve the issue of Na- proxy for Moscow – effectively de-
gorno-Karabakh are anchored with- scribed Pashinyan and his 2018 Vel-
in the OSCE’s Minsk Group under vet Revolution as a CIA project and
69ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
only drew a red line at Armenia’s bor- prohibitively costly, both militarily
ders, purposefully excluding the terri- and politically. The Four-Day War of
tory of Nagorno-Karabakh.32 2016, in which both sides deployed
heavy weapons in a limited capacity
Turkey’s motives for the engagement had shown, however, that an Arme-
were multifaceted, though more direct nian victory was not guaranteed. This
than in Libya. For one, oil-rich Azer- experience encouraged Baku to go for-
baijan serves as a major supplier of en- ward on 27 September 2020. This was
ergy resources to Turkey, and SOCAR, a calculation that ultimately proved
Azerbaijan’s state-owned petroleum successful, when to the surprise of
and gas company, is the biggest single virtually all commentators, Azerbai-
foreign investor in the Turkish econ- jani forces achieved a clear battlefield
omy. Second, increasing its footprint victory in six weeks by threatening
in the Caucasus would provide useful to move on to the regional capital of
leverage over Russia in other, more Stepanakert. Of greatest significance,
relevant, theaters. Lastly, hostility to- however, were not only deliveries of
wards Armenia is of great importance Turkish UCAVs but also the degree to
to the ultra-nationalist MHP and its which the TSK had exported its exper-
main constituency. Baku itself, mean- tise in utilizing a modern, drone-en-
while, was likely driven by a wave of abled reconnaissance-strike complex.
anti-Armenian sentiment in the wake The amount of operational input that
of clashes that occurred in the summer Turkish officers had in Azerbaijan’s
of 2020 in conjunction with an eco- campaign is not known publicly, but
nomic slump. it was likely significant.34
As such, the Azerbaijani government, Still, Russia’s apparent unassailable
headed by its autocratic president Il- position in the Southern Caucasus
ham Aliyev, likely identified a window puts into question how much Turkey
of opportunity. Previously, most West- actually gained in the conflict. While
ern commentators had assumed that, Turkish nationalists regard the Azer-
as in the 1990s, superior Armenian baijani campaign as a success and the
forces would be able to hold their posi- oil-rich country is indebted to Turkey,
tions in mountainous terrain, enabling it is questionable how much leverage
a successful counter-offensive.33 An- over Moscow was actually gained. The
other assumption was that Armenia’s ceasefire that ended open hostilities on
air defense and territorial advantages 9 November was a trilateral agreement
would make an Azerbaijani assault between Russia and the two former
70T U R K E Y ’ S N E W O UT LO O K
Soviet Republics. Neither Turkey nor government coalition feels it has to
the OSCE’s Minsk Group played a continually stoke the flames of aggres-
diplomatic role. Moscow thus demon- sive ethno-nationalism for domestic
strated regional superiority by ending and ideological reasons. Regardless,
the war on its own terms – having been and while both complexes were cer-
happy to acquiesce to the decimation tainly at play, the war’s perceived suc-
of Armenian and Karabakh forces and cess might create an unrealistic bench-
the resultant loss of territory. As a result mark for the utility of military force
of the ceasefire, Russian peacekeepers – especially if Ankara was motivated
have been deployed to guard the bor- primarily by ideological reasons.
ders of what is left of Armenian Na-
gorno-Karabakh, with Azerbaijan re- Implications
claiming almost two-thirds of its area. As has become apparent, the political
cocktail that created the current iter-
Moscow was able to quickly and de- ation of Turkey’s foreign policy ori-
cisively impose red lines and deploy entation did not magically appear in
airborne forces as peacekeepers. Re- 2020, but has simmered at least since
flecting back on Prigozhin’s statements the AKP’s accession to power in 2002
regarding Armenia, this to some extent and in many ways precedes it. While
mirrors the Idlib scenario in which Erdogan first sought to defang the
Moscow sat back while its proxy suf- military institutionally and roll back
fered casualties, only to step in later. the secular old guard, this group has
In another parallel, Turkey and Russia re-emerged somewhat as a force fa-
effectively conspired to ice out Western voring an assertive, anti-Western eth-
influences from the region, as neither no-nationalism. What is new, how-
the US, the EU, nor the Minsk Group ever, is a military force designed for
played a significant role in ending the the type of operations that the ruling
conflict. What is not known so far is to coalition requires to pursue its goals,
what extent Baku will have to pay for namely fairly rapid, low-cost power
Turkish assistance in the war and how projection activities in both Turkey’s
its relationship with Russia is affected neighborhood and beyond.
by aligning so closely with Erdogan.
Ultimately, it cannot be conclusively This gives Ankara the flexibility re-
stated whether Ankara was driven more quired to insert itself militarily into
by the desire to protect its economic theaters of critical relevance to its ri-
health and energy supplies by ingrati- vals: Turkey has impinged upon the
ating itself with Aliyev or whether the perceived backyards of the European
71ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1 A New Robotic Way of War? Perhaps the most publicized feature of Turkey’s military campaigns were glossy aerial recordings taken mostly by Turkish-made ANKA-S and TB2 UCAVs that ravaged the Syrian Arab Army and Karabakh-Armenian forces, respectively. A second element that caught the international eye was the deployment of SNA fighters to Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh as an expeditionary force outside Syria, in the latter case reportedly at brigade strength. The creation of a largely strategically autonomous arms industry providing a modern reconnaissance-strike complex is certainly not without operational and even strategic value. In Turkey’s case, the autonomy of its forces means it is virtually invulnerable to sanctions. However, beyond the notion that attrition on the battlefield failed to achieve politico-strategic success in any of the three theaters, Turkish military actions have not even been unequivocally successful on the tactical level. • In Syria, the TSK’s Operation Spring Shield crippled Assad’s forces and destroyed large quantities of armored fighting vehicles, artillery pieces and, most significantly, Russian-made air defense systems, especially of the Pantsir-S1 variety. Similar drone feeds emerged from Libya that seemed to suggest Turkey had found a way to overcome the dreaded Russian air defense. However, it should be noted that the SAA’s overall performance has not been of particularly high quality, whether directed against Turkish drone strikes or those strikes conducted by NATO forces or the Israeli Air Force during years prior – a result of inferior export versions and lack of training and ability on the part of SAA crews. Air defense and electronic warfare systems controlled by Russia’s own military are likely much more capable, even against low-flying UCAVs and loitering munitions. As a case in point, electronic warfare systems at Russia’s Gyumri base in Armenia reportedly brought down numerous TB2s when they had crossed the border and approached the base’s perimeter. • Meanwhile, Turkish drones reportedly achieved much less favorable attrition rates against the LNA’s forces in Libya. This is compounded by the fact that currently the TB2 drone (as opposed to the heavier ANKA-S) can only be operated by line-of-sight guidance and is consequently dependent on ground stations and signal repeaters. As a result, their offensive value in particular would be much lower in a more expansive and fluid battlefield. • The Armenian and Karabakh forces were certainly not designed to counter an enemy equipped with modern UCAVs and loitering munitions. Even so, while the impact of these systems should not be discounted, it has to be noted that Azerbaijani special operations forces still had to fight arduously through the mountains to take the vital town of Shushi on Stepanakert’s only supply route to Armenia, effectively winning the war. As with Spring Shield, had Russia decided to step in and come to its nominal ally’s rescue, the campaign would likely have ended in a much less favorable outcome for Turkey. • Lastly, while the use of the SNA is a convenient way for Ankara to avoid sending non-special forces infantry into harm’s way, it has to be noted that their use comes with strings attached. For one, their performance in each Turkish incursion into Syria has been less than satisfactory militarily. Secondly, they present a rather large problem in terms of political optics: The expeditionary use of mercenary forces that have been credibly accused of looting and war crimes in the past is likely not helpful to Turkey’s regional image in the long run. 72
T U R K E Y ’ S N E W O UT LO O K
Union in Libya and the Eastern Med- relations between multiple Arab coun-
iterranean and of Russia in the South tries and Israel in the waning months
Caucasus. The TSK has been an effec- of the Trump administration and the
tive tool in gaining leverage in these announced resumption of multilateral
areas and in securing Turkey’s position formats by the White House, Turkey
as pivotal and perhaps even indispens- likely cannot afford to continue on
able in the international sphere. As has its present course of alienating neigh-
been argued above, none of the 2020 bors.35 The two most significant stum-
operations have achieved far-reach- bling blocks to at least a more concil-
ing successes, mostly due to Moscow iatory relationship with the US are
holding superior cards in each theater. surely questions regarding US support
Paradoxically, however, here also lies for the YPG and Turkey’s acquisition
a problem in the anti-Western course of S-400 systems. President Biden
charted by the nationalists and Eur- might also be more inclined to use
asianists: The more Turkey distances economic sanctions against Turkey
itself from the US and Europe, the less than his predecessor was.
Russia needs to accommodate Ankara.
If Western-Turkish relations were to These dynamics will, to some extent,
break down even further, it is unclear increasingly burden Europe, particu-
what would stop Russia from apply- larly in light of the Eastern Mediter-
ing pressure across secondary theaters ranean confrontation. While Greece,
or even in Syria. In such a scenario, backed up by France, is willing to an-
bridgeheads could quickly turn into swer military pressures in kind, a uni-
exposed flanks. fied European position is unlikely to
emerge. NATO, as a result, will have
This also means that the Biden ad- to play a key role in keeping lines of
ministration’s cold stance towards communication open and to soften
Erdogan – neither Secretary of State (or blunt) the edges of Ankara’s an-
Antony Blinken nor President Biden ti-Western rhetoric and actions. In
bothered to reach out to their counter- some ways, it already does so, as the
parts directly for weeks – and its likely Hellenic Armed Forces and the TSK
selective engagement with the region run deconfliction measures regarding
are not necessarily good news for Er- the Aegean struggle through NATO.36
dogan’s government. Already in De- Beyond NATO, Europe appears ill-
cember 2020, Erdogan moderated his equipped to deal with a more muscu-
tone vis-à-vis the US and Israel. Partic- lar Turkey that is willing and able to
ularly in view of the normalization of resort to military force. Here the main
73ST RAT EG I C T R EN DS 2 0 2 1
areas of contention are the Eastern region. However, the ideological tint
Mediterranean and related issues: Lib- in Turkey’s foreign policy might be-
ya, the political dispute over Turkey’s come a liability down the road, de-
occupation of Northern Cyprus, mari- spite the institutional marginalization
time demarcation zones, and migration of the TSK. At some stage, the heated
in the Mediterranean region. Further rhetoric runs the risk of outrunning
on the horizon, the question of Syrian the TSK’s military capabilities or
reconstruction arises, including the re- what Erdogan and his advisors con-
spective roles of Europe and Turkey. sider acceptable risk. In other words,
operations such as those conducted
Ankara’s military posture has afforded in 2020 risk establishing precedents
it direct levers “on the ground” that that military campaigns can be un-
European powers lack, especially in dertaken quickly and cheaply. How-
Syria and Libya. With the exception of ever, while the resumption of hostili-
France, whose president has dispatched ties with Armenia would certainly be
naval assets into the Aegean to back up popular with the MHP and its ideo-
Greece, it is questionable to what ex- logical allies, as would operations
tent other European powers are will- against Kurds or a further distancing
ing and able to push back actively and from the West, the calculation would
pursue regional interests. In this way, change quite dramatically once Mos-
the war in Nagorno-Karabakh must cow decides not to acquiesce.
be a cautionary tale to Europeans (and
the US): Due to Turkish and Azerbai-
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jani willingness to pursue military op- National Security Culture and the Military in
tions, the Minsk Format has effectively Turkey,” Journal of International Affairs 54:1
(2000), pp. 199 – 216.
been rendered obsolete – and with it,
France’s role in its mediation. 2 Günter Seufert, Überdehnt sich die Bewegung
von Fethullah Gülen? Eine türkische Religions-
gemeinde als nationaler und internationaler Ak-
Presently, Ankara attempts to run an teur, (Berlin: German Institute for International
and Security Affairs (SWP), 2013), pp. 16 – 17.
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balancing game in its neighborhood 3 Dani Rodrik, “Ergenekon and Sledgeham-
mer: Building or Undermining the Rule of
by seeking to apply and release pres- Law,” Turkish Politics Quarterly 10:1 (2011),
sure across multiple theaters and fo- pp. 99 – 110.
rums. The sheer ability and (equally 4 Lars Haugom, “Turkish Foreign Policy Under
important) willingness to resort to Erdogan: A Change in International Orien-
tation?”, Comparative Strategy 28:3 (2019),
military force swiftly can be consid- pp. 206 – 223.
ered a great advantage in an unstable
74T U R K E Y ’ S N E W O UT LO O K
5 “A Look at Turkey’s Post-Coup Crackdown,” 19 Jennifer Cafarella et al., Turkey Commits to Idlib
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6 Leela Jacinto, “Turkey’s Post-Coup Purge
and Erdogan’s Private Army,” Foreign Policy, 20 Jalel Harchaoui / Mohamed-Essaid Lazib,
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Virginia Tech Publishing, 2019), p. 4.
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21 Jalel Harchaoui, “The Pendulum: How Russia
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22 Aaron Stein, “Turkey’s Proxy War in Syria,”
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Middle East Policy 24:1 (2017), pp. 36 – 47. 25 Günter Seufert, Turkey Shifts Focus of its Foreign
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29 Daria Isachenko, Turkey–Russia Partnership
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11.12.2020. Affairs (SWP), 2020), p. 2.
17 Christopher Phillips, Eyes Bigger than Stomachs, 30 Cindy Wittke, “Bergkarabach,” Russland-Analy-
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18 Idil Bilgic-Alpasan et al., “Economic Implica- 31 Daria Isachenko, “Türkei, Russland und
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32 Isachenko, Turkey–Russia Partnership, p. 3.
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