Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Operation INFEKTION
Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS
Disinformation Campaign
Thomas Boghardt
The practice of intelligence dif- weaken the USSR’s opponents—
fered considerably between East first and foremost the “main
and West during the Cold War. enemy” (glavny protivnik), the
Western intelligence services were United States—and to create a
most commonly tasked with gath- favorable environment for
ering information, but their advancing Moscow’s views and
international objectives
“
Soviet bloc counterparts placed
much greater emphasis on decep- worldwide.
tion operations to influence
Our friends in Moscow opinions or actions of individu- This is the story of one such mea-
call it ‘dezinformatsiya.’ als and governments. 2 sure—a campaign to implicate
Our enemies in America the United States in the emer-
call it ‘active measures,’ These “active measures” (aktiv- gence of the AIDS pandemic that
inyye meropriatia, as the Soviets appeared in the early 1980s. The
and I, dear friends, call it
called them) included manipula- story both illustrates the nature of
‘my favorite pastime.’ Soviet and communist bloc disin-
tion and media control, written
and oral disinformation, use of formation programs and
”
—Col. Rolf Wagenbreth,
director of Department X (dis-
information) of East German
foreign communist parties and
front organizations, clandestine
radio broadcasting, manipula-
tion of the economy, kidnappings,
paramilitary operations, and sup-
demonstrates the potential long-
term consequences.
Editor’s Note: This article was the
recipient of an Annual Studies in
foreign intelligence 1 port of guerrilla groups and Intelligence Award in 2009. The
terrorist organizations. Under references to end notes seen in
Joseph Stalin, active measures this text are included only in the
also included political article’s .PDF versions posted in
assassinations. 3 The basic goal of the Studies in Intelligence collec-
Soviet active measures was to tion in www.cia.gov.
Organizational Basics Directorate (foreign intelli-
gence) was expected to spend 25
The KGB’s Service A was the percent of his time conceiving
unit tasked with conducting and implementing them. 4 But
active measures, and numerous active measures were well inte-
KGB residencies abroad were grated into Soviet policy and
assigned officers dealing exclu- involved virtually every ele-
sively with them. Moreover, ment of the Soviet party and
each officer of the First Chief
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the
authors. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US gov-
ernment endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 1The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth
Deteriorating East-West relations formed the backdrop to Mos-
cow’s decision to embark on an aggressive active measures of Germany was merely an
campaign. incarnation of the Third Reich. 8
In conducting disinformation
state structure, not only the Moscow’s “total” approach to campaigns, Soviet bloc intelli-
KGB. influence and deception opera- gence had to be mindful of the
tions contrasted starkly with concerns, fears, and expecta-
Active measures specialists the American concept of covert tions of their target audience.
used newspapers, radio sta- action, which was carried out As Ladislav Bittman, deputy
tions, embassies, and other offi- by a single agency—the CIA— chief of the Czechoslovak intel-
cial institutions for whose budget for such opera- ligence service’s disinformation
implementation and diffusion. tions made up a fraction of its department from 1964 to 1966,
Services allied to the Soviets, overall expenditure and paled pointed out: in order to succeed
such as East Germany’s Minis- in comparison to what the Sovi- “every disinformation message
try for State Security (MfS), ets spent on active measures. 7 must at least partially corre-
were frequently enlisted as spond to reality or generally
well. In 1980, a conservative Disinformation (dezinfor- accepted views.” 9
CIA estimate put the annual matsiya) was a particularly
cost of Soviet active measures effective weapon in the armory
at $3 billion. 6 of Soviet bloc active measures. The AIDS Campaign’s
The term dezinformatsiya Backdrop and Origins
denoted a variety of techniques
A Note about Intelligence and activities to purvey false or Deteriorating East-West rela-
Sources misleading information that tions formed the backdrop to
Soviet bloc active measures spe- Moscow’s decision to embark on
With the end of the Cold War, an aggressive active measures
cialists sought to leak into the
former Soviet and East German campaign in the 1980s. The
intelligence officers confirmed
foreign media. From the West-
ern perspective, disinformation Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
their services’ sponsorship of the
was a politically motivated lie, in 1979 ended what was left of
AIDS disinformation campaign.
In 1990, the German TV news but Soviet bloc propagandists détente, and the newly elected
magazine Panorama featured an believed their disinformation US president, Ronald Reagan,
anonymous former intelligence campaigns merely highlighted adopted a hard line against the
officer—probably Günter greater truths by exposing the USSR. At his first press confer-
Bohnsack—who revealed his ence, Reagan declared: “They
department’s participation in the
real nature of capitalism.
[the Soviets] reserve unto them-
campaign. Later that year,
For example, the KGB began selves the right to commit any
Bohnsack and a fellow retired
intelligence officer published more spreading rumors about FBI crime, to lie, to cheat in order to
details of their department’s activ- and CIA involvement in the attain [world revolution].”
ities against the West, including assassination of President John
the AIDS disinformation F. Kennedy because the Soviets In short order, the new presi-
campaign. 5 And in 1992, SVR earnestly believed the US mili- dent increased the defense bud-
(Russian foreign intelligence)
tary-industrial complex was get by 10 percent, suspended
director Yevgeny Primakov con- arms reduction talks, and rein-
firmed the KGB’s participation.
involved in Kennedy’s murder.
Likewise, East German intelli- stated work on MX missiles and
Over the next years, the European
gence routinely floated disinfor- B-1 bombers. The Reagan
and the North American media
repeatedly reported on Soviet bloc mation depicting West German administration’s hawkish
intelligence sponsorship of the politicians as former Nazis, stance, in turn, stoked Soviet
AIDS conspiracy theory. Archival because, from East Berlin’s per- paranoia, especially after Yuri
sources, interviews, and other spective, the Federal Republic Andropov’s election as general
material were used in this article secretary of the Communist
as well.
2 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth
Party of the Soviet Union in
The Soviet Active Measures Process
1982. A former KGB chairman,
Andropov was intelligent and Center gives strategic go-ahead for a disinformation campaign.
well-versed in foreign affairs, Ideas would be generated by residency officers assigned to read local press,
but he was also a hardliner books, and magazines for material that could be used for disinformation
with a proclivity for conspiracy purposes. 12
theories, a trait perhaps exacer- Center would evaluate the ideas. According to a senior East European intel-
bated by his terminal illness. ligence officer who defected in 1968,
During his short reign, Individual suggestions for special operations [active measures] which
came from stations abroad were submitted for preliminary assess-
Andropov became convinced ment.…the majority of the suggestions were discarded in the first stage
that the United States planned of the selection process, leaving only those whose conception corre-
sponded with our long-range plans and whose projected consequences
for nuclear war, and KGB resi- suggested positive results. The suggestions were then transmitted to a
dencies in Western capitals panel…where the author of the proposal faced many questions and
were instructed to look for signs much criticism in an attempt to uncover any weakness. The composition
of the critical board varied from case to case although several Depart-
of a first strike. In keeping with ment D employees and experts on particular regions were permanent
Andropov’s hostility toward the members. Further supplemented and polished, the proposal was then
submitted to the intelligence chief for approval. 13
Reagan administration, the
KGB’s First Chief Directorate Still at the Center, preparation involved disinformation specialists writing
on 30 September 1982 in their native language, approvals by managers, and translation.
instructed its residencies in the Targeting followed. The Center typically sought to launch a story outside
United States to counterattack the Soviet bloc-controlled press to conceal Moscow’s hand. This was done
Washington’s aggressive stance frequently through anonymous letters and newspaper articles in the
with active measures. 10 Third World. 14
Once published abroad, the Soviet media might pick up and further prop-
Soviet active measures agate the item by referring to its non-Soviet source.
worked best when pre-existing
plans fit neatly into political- Types of Active Measures
cultural environments and spe- According to the defector, two types of active measures existed:
cific events. 11 In this case, Mos-
The first category includes operations initiated and designed within
cow had long realized that KGB ranks and usually employs such traditional disinformation tech-
chemical and biological war- niques as forgeries or agents of influence. The KGB conducts hundreds
of these categories every year even though their impact is rather
fare was of great concern to limited. 15
Western publics and could be
exploited for disinformation Such single pieces of disinformation were not reinforced by additional prop-
agation efforts.
purposes. During the Korean
War, the Chinese and North The second type was the result of a strategic decision at the top of the Soviet
Koreans had broadcast “confes- active measures pyramid and directly approved by the Politburo. Campaigns
sions” of captured American were usually planned to last several years and encompassed many elements
pilots about the alleged US use of the Soviet state, including the International Information Department
(IID), which directed official press organs, such as TASS, Novosti, and Radio
of germ warfare. 17 During the Moscow; and the International Department (ID), responsible for liaison with
Vietnam War, the KGB circu- foreign communist parties, international communist front organizations,
lated a forged letter purporting and clandestine radios.
to come from Gordon Goldstein
The KGB, ID, and IID would cooperate closely in executing a particular cam-
of the US Office of Naval paign with the means available to each—the KGB’s Service A, responsible
Research. First published in the for forgeries and spreading rumors (“black propaganda”), the IID’s press
Bombay Free Press Journal in organs for official stories (“white propaganda”), the ID for clandestine radio
1968, the letter “revealed” the broadcasts and the use of international front organizations (“gray
existence of American bacterio- propaganda”). 16
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 3The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth
In their conspiracy-driven world view, it was plausible to as-
sume that AIDS was indeed the result of US biological warfare was indeed the result of US bio-
experiments. logical warfare experiments.
But ultimately, the true origins
of AIDS were of secondary
logical warfare weapons in Viet- response to the discoveries importance. 23 According to
nam and Thailand. 18 opened the door to rumors. 20 Yevgeny Primakov, at the time
The emergence of the mysteri- the first deputy chairman of the
Moreover, Americans had ous illness so soon after revela- Soviet Peace Committee, a for-
shown themselves politically tions about US biological eign propaganda front organi-
sensitive to the behavior of warfare experiments therefore zation, the KGB conducted the
their own government. In the provided Soviet active mea- AIDS disinformation campaign
1970s, a spate of press and con- sures specialists an opening to to expose the “perfidious” work
gressional investigations publi- exploit. of US military scientists. 24
cized several actual instances of
US biological warfare research In addition, the Soviets were
early in the Cold War. One extremely sensitive to charges The Campaign Opens
example was the secret Special against them concerning biolog-
Operations Division (SOD) at ical weapons. A US State The opening salvo of the AIDS
the premier US chemical and Department report released on disinformation campaign was
biological warfare research 22 March 1982 accused Mos- fired on 17 July 1983, when an
facility at Fort Detrick, Mary- cow of using chemical toxin obscure newspaper in India, the
land, which had created a num- weapons (“yellow rain”) in Patriot, printed an anonymous
ber of germ weapons for the Southeast Asia. This allegation letter headlined “AIDS may
CIA (codename MKNAOMI). may have provided an impetus invade India: Mystery disease
Later, an SOD report surfaced, for the KGB to respond in caused by US experiments.”
detailing a simulated biological kind. 21 The letter, allegedly written by
warfare attack in New York in a “well-known American scien-
the summer of 1966—Army All Moscow had to do was add tist and anthropologist” in New
personnel had released aerosol a twist to its time-tested biolog- York, claimed that “AIDS…is
clouds of a “harmless simulant ical warfare disinformation believed to be the result of the
agent” into subway stations theme by introducing the idea Pentagon’s experiments to
along the 7th and 8th Avenue that US government scientists develop new and dangerous bio-
lines to assess the vulnerabil- had created the AIDS virus. In logical weapons.” It went on to
ity of subway systems to covert the words of two former Soviet state that the United States
biological attacks and to explore bloc disinformation officers, the was about to transfer these
“methods of delivery that could AIDS disinformation campaign experiments to sites in Paki-
be used offensively.” 19 “virtually conceptualized stan, where they would pose a
itself.” 22 grave threat to neighboring
In this environment, the key India.
event was the emergence in the As in earlier disinformation
early 1980s of the Acquired campaigns, the propagandists • Citing a number of publicly
Immune Deficiency Syndrome, sought to expose what they con- available sources, the article
AIDS, as a national health cri- sidered a greater truth about recounted a series of well-
sis. Scientists had named the the “main enemy”—i.e., that established facts about
disease in 1982, and the follow- the United States was an impe- AIDS—that there was great
ing year a causative virus (HIV) rialistic, reactionary power con- concern about contaminated
was identified. However, the trolled by a war-mongering blood donations; that AIDS
origins of HIV/AIDS were still arms industry. In their conspir- was probably caused by a
obscure. The lack of verifiable acy-driven world view, it was virus; and that AIDS regis-
facts and the strong emotional plausible to assume that AIDS
4 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth
The idea for the AIDS disinformation campaign would have
tered its first major outbreak been approved and polished at KGB headquarters.
in the United States.
• The author then listed ele- charges made in 1982 in the of Army Labs in RDA” and spe-
ments of the US biological Soviet media to the effect that a cifically referred to “the U.S.
warfare program known to research laboratory sponsored Army Medical Research Insti-
the public: government by the University of Maryland tute of Infectious Diseases
records obtained through the in Lahore, Pakistan, was in fact (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick,
Freedom of Information Act a bacteriological warfare Md,” which had—the journal
by the Church of Scientology, facility. 26 AIDS itself was not of asserted—placed particular
which had documented biolog- much concern to the average emphasis “on problems associ-
ical agent experiments in the Indian in 1983, but any men- ated with medical defense
1950s; CIA-sponsored testing tion of schemes involving against potential biological war-
of drugs on humans during India’s arch-foe Pakistan could fare agents, or naturally occur-
the same time period; and the be expected to draw attention ring diseases of particular
development of biological on the subcontinent. military importance and on the
weapons until the late 1960s highly virulent pathogenic
at Fort Detrick. The 17 July letter’s extensive microorganisms which require
quoting of US sources—e.g., special containment facilities.” 28
• Even though President Rich- U.S. News & World Report,
ard Nixon had banned US Associated Press, and Army Once conceived, the idea for
offensive bacteriological weap- Research, Development & the AIDS disinformation cam-
ons research by executive Acquisition magazine—sug- paign would have been
order in 1969, the letter in the gests that US-based KGB offic- approved and polished at KGB
Patriot stated that the Penta- ers initiated the AIDS headquarters (the Center) in
gon had “never abandoned campaign, or at least collected the Moscow suburb of Yasen-
these weapons” and claimed the material that triggered the ovo. (See box on Soviet active
that Fort Detrick had discov- idea. The KGB had large resi- measures process.) The task of
ered AIDS by analyzing sam- dencies in New York City and pulling pertinent material
ples of “highly pathogenic Washington, DC, both of which together and generating the let-
viruses” collected by Ameri- were assigned officers who ter would have fallen to the
can scientists in Africa and worked solely on active KGB’s disinformation special-
Latin America. measures. 27 ists of Service A, under Gen-
eral Ivan Ivanovich Agayants.
• It concluded by quoting statis- One especially clear indicator By 1985, the service employed
tics and publications on the of the US origins of the effort is roughly 80 officers at Yasenovo
spread and lethality of AIDS, the Patriot letter’s reference to and another 30 to 40 in the
and its particular threat to Army Research, Development & Novosti Press offices at Push-
developing nations. 25 Acquisition,which was not kin Square. 29
widely available and would
make unusual reading for a Although they had no particu-
Indicators of Soviet
“well-known American scien- lar training in psychology, these
Inspiration
tist” who also described himself specialists had honed their
as an “anthropologist.” The skills over several decades and
There can be little doubt
journal would be a typical understood the dynamics of
about the KGB’s authorship of
source for a KGB officer seek- rumor campaigns intuitively.
the letter. The letter’s argu-
ing material for a disinforma- The responsible officer(s) would
ments built on earlier disinfor-
tion campaign, however. In fact, have composed the text first in
mation campaigns involving US
the magazine’s July/August Russian and then commis-
bacteriological warfare and spe-
1982 issue focused on “The Role sioned a translation into
cifically picked up on false
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 5The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth
As an opening salvo, the letter was a dud.
eventually lead to the dissolu-
tion of the USSR, but at the
English by KGB-translators. Indian journalists and politi- time he refrained from interfer-
Some translators were native- cians willing to take money. 31 ing with the KGB active mea-
speakers, but most were Rus- sures program and generally
sian speakers schooled in With respect to the left-wing supported its agenda. 34) Sec-
English for this purpose. Patriot, the KGB had been ond, the spread of AIDS had
involved in setting it up in 1967 become a much greater global
The use of non-native speak- for the very purpose of circulat- concern and made it a poten-
ers who may not have had ing Soviet-inspired articles. tially more powerful disinfor-
much exposure to spoken With a circulation of about mation weapon than two years
English, occasionally resulted 35,000, the Patriot was small by earlier.
in stilted and syntactically Indian standards, but it quickly
incorrect translations, as gained a reputation in intelli- Three events in 1985 might
appeared in the Patriot letter. gence circles as Moscow’s have contributed to a Soviet
The text included several gram- mouthpiece. 32 decision to reactivate the AIDS
matical errors, including a ref- campaign.
erence to the “virus flu,” rather As an opening salvo, the let-
than “flu virus.” Such linguistic ter was a dud. Though care- • A US government report
slip-ups were typical give- fully prepared and planted, no released in February 1985
aways of Soviet bloc disinforma- media outlet picked it up at the claimed that the Soviets had
tion stories. 30 time. Even though the letter broken the Geneva Conven-
mentioned Pakistan, the Indian tion by producing biological
press probably ignored it sim- weapons. 35
Placement ply because AIDS was not then
an issue on the subcontinent. 33 • An article in Lyndon H.
Composed, approved, and That the Soviet media failed to LaRouche Jr.’s Executive Intel-
translated, the letter needed to follow up, on the other hand, ligence Review accused the
be inserted covertly into the may have been because the let- USSR of blocking the battle
media. India, as a large, non- ter had fallen into that second- against AIDS. 36
aligned country with a diverse ary category of disinformation,
English-language press, was an a single, if clever, piece con- • Concern about the spread of
ideal staging ground. The ceived at the bottom of the AIDS within the USSR may
Indian government put few Soviet active measures’ pyra- have prompted the leader-
restrictions on the influx of mid and not reinforced by addi- ship to attempt to redirect
Soviet officials, and in the tional support measures. domestic concerns abroad. 37
1980s more than 150 KGB and
GRU (military intelligence) The campaign reopened with
officers served on the subconti- Reemergence of the an article in the newspaper Lit-
nent. Many of them were busy Campaign. eraturnaya Gazeta, the KGB’s
planting biased or false stories “prime conduit in the Soviet
in Indian papers. According to The Patriot letter lay largely press for propaganda and
KGB archivist and defector unnoticed for nearly three disinformation.” 38 On
Vasili Mitrokhin, the KGB years. By 1985, a lot had 30 October 1985, the paper pub-
planted 5,510 stories in this changed. First, a new, dynamic lished an article by Valentin
way in 1975 alone and con- general secretary of the CPSU, Zapevalov, titled “Panic in the
trolled 10 Indian newspapers Mikhail Gorbachev, had, with West or What Is Hiding behind
and one news agency. KGB KGB support, taken over and the Sensation Surrounding
officers boasted to one another ended the USSR’s period of AIDS.” 39
that there was no shortage of leadership disarray. (Gor-
bachev’s reform agenda would
6 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth
Zapevalov began his lengthy Fort Detrick. As a result of tests
piece by reminding readers that on unsuspecting victims—peo- East Germany’s Ministry for
State Security
AIDS was apparently spread- ple from the US “satellite coun-
ing from the United States to try” Haiti, drug addicts, Modeled on the KGB, East Ger-
the rest of the world (in fact, homosexuals and homeless peo- many’s MfS was a massive secu-
rity and espionage agency that
most early AIDS cases were ple—the virus was then alleg-
included secret police and foreign
reported among US homosex- edly unleashed. Zapevalov intelligence components. The for-
ual men). He went on to accu- concluded by suggesting that eign intelligence branch (HVA, or
rately describe the disease, US military personnel were Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung—
quoting well-known publica- potential carriers of the virus chief reconnaissance division) was
tions such as U.S. News & and expressed the hope that headed for many years by the
World Report for statistical evi- “one of the victims” would sue urbane Markus Wolf. In the early
1960s, the HVA set up its own dis-
dence. He then veered back to the CIA or the Pentagon to
information section, Department
his initial contention about the show the world that “all vic- X (or HVA X). By the 1980s, the
provenance of AIDS, chroni- tims of AIDS are the result of a department had grown to include
cling in some detail the early monstrous experiment.” roughly 60 officers, based at MfS
spread of the disease, and ask- headquarters in the Normannen-
ing rhetorically: “Why [did] The structure of the Literatur- strasse in East Berlin.
AIDS…appear in the USA and naya Gazeta article bears a
Headed throughout its history by
start spreading above all in striking resemblance to the Col. Rolf Wagenbreth, HVA X
towns along the East Coast?” Patriot letter. While both publi- focused primarily on West Ger-
This leading question was fol- cations claimed that AIDS was many, but it was also active in the
lowed by a laundry list of covert made in the USA, most of the Third World. (By the late 1970s it
US biological warfare pro- information given in the text had expanded its overseas activi-
was accurate—an essential ties to include China and the
grams of the 1950s and 1960s United States.) In the mid-1960s,
already noted in the Patriot let- ingredient of a successful disin-
the KGB introduced structural
ter; CIA-authorized testing of formation campaign. Much of reforms in the Soviet bloc intelli-
drugs for mind-control pur- the data was taken from pub- gence network, permitting indi-
poses; the case of Frank Olson, lished sources. As had the vidual KGB departments to work
a Special Operations Division authors of the Patriot letter, directly with their territorial,
(SOD) bio weapons expert who Zapevalov used verifiable facts counterintelligence and disinfor-
about early Cold War US exper- mation counterparts in Eastern
committed suicide after he was
Europe. Henceforth, HVA X
administered LSD without his iments as circumstantial evi-
informed the KGB directly of
knowledge; and the delivery of dence for his claim that AIDS active measures planned by East
a toxic substance by CIA officer was the result of similar tests. Berlin, and HVA and KGB held
Sidney Gottlieb to the Agency’s annual bilateral meetings, alter-
station chief in Congo for use in nating between Berlin and Mos-
Enter East Germany and cow, to discuss operations against
assassinating President Patrice
Dr. Jakob Segal the United States and other
Lumumba. 40
nations. 44
The Soviets frequently
In the last third of the article,
involved allied intelligence ser-
the author reminded readers of
vices and their disinformation The rest of this story is largely
the biological warfare pro-
departments in their disinfor- about the role played by a dedi-
grams at Fort Detrick and
mation campaigns. In this case, cated East German scientist
stated that these experiments
in turning to East Germany known to the KGB and East
continued notwithstanding
and to a particular East Ger- Germany’s Ministry for State
President Nixon’s 1969 ban.
man, the Soviets injected their Security, the MfS (colloquially
The Patriot letter from 1983
campaign with an energy even known as the Stasi) and the
was referenced as a source for
they may not have expected. Soviet and East German prac-
the alleged creation of AIDS at
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 7The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth
tice of exploiting unwitting ser-
The Segal Arguments in AIDS—its nature and origins
vants of seemingly good causes
for their own ends. Segal and his coauthors mixed truth, to establish professional credentials,
and fiction—the heart of their story. At the outset, the three detailed well
While most of the KGB’s jun- established facts about the illness, including that it was caused by the HIV
ior partner services conducted virus and disabled a body’s immune system.
active measures to some extent,
by the 1980s, East German Rejecting theories about the simian origins of the virus, the three asserted
that Fort Detrick was “for a long time…the central laboratory of the Pentagon
intelligence had emerged as the
for the development of biological agents of war” and operated a “P-4 type” high
KGB’s most valuable partner in security laboratory for gene manipulation in “building 550” since 1977. 49
loyalty, professionalism, and There, voluntary human test subjects were probably infected with the AIDS
technical expertise. Having virus, which they alleged was the product of two natural, artificially synthe-
decided to revive the AIDS cam- sized (“recombined”) viruses, VISNA and HTLV-I. When the test subjects
paign, the KGB informed its showed no symptoms for six to 12 months, due to AIDS’ long incubation
East German counterpart period, the Pentagon concluded its virus was ineffective, and the infected vol-
unambiguously that Moscow unteers were released.
expected it to participate. 41 Since the test subjects were criminals who had spent a long time in jail
deprived of female companionship, the three argued, most of them had
The East Germans were told become homosexuals. Many of the infected volunteers headed for New York,
specifically to employ a “scien- mixing with the local gay population, thus initiating the epidemic whose first
tific approach” 42 and produce victims were registered among homosexuals in that city in 1979—two years
disinformation contending the after the alleged Fort Detrick experiments. Displaying a wobbly grasp of US
AIDS virus had been developed urban reality, they added that it “was logical for the released prisoners to seek
at Fort Detrick, from where it out a major city close by, but not Washington, where the political climate is
rather unsuitable for criminals [in fact, Washington, D.C. had one of the high-
spread to the general popula-
est crime rates of the nation in the 1980s]. New York with its developed
tion through human testing. underworld was more promising.” 50
Beyond those obligatory details,
the East Germans were given a views who were not openly pro- gence probably originated in
free hand in devising their own Soviet. Bloc intelligence those years. After the war, Segal
strategy and spreading the referred to them as “agents of settled in East Berlin, where he
story. The HVA code named the influence,” “subconscious multi- became head of the Institute for
operation INFEKTION and plicators,” or simply as “useful Applied Bacteriology at East
VORWÄRTS II [Forward II] idiots.” 45 Berlin’s Humboldt University in
and henceforth was the KGB’s 1953 46 After his retirement, he
junior partner and main ally The agent of choice in this case and his wife Lilli—also a scien-
regarding AIDS. 43 was the retired East German tist—developed an interest in
biophysicist Professor Jakob AIDS, although neither of them
The KGB was particularly Segal. Born in St. Petersburg in was an expert on the subject. 47
keen on employing another of 1911, Segal grew up in interwar Both Segals were unwavering
its standard active-measure Germany, where he studied biol- believers in international com-
practices, the use of unwitting ogy, but as a Jew and commu- munism and staunch support-
agents who were held in high nist he was forced to flee to ers of the GDR. As an
esteem in their home countries. France when the Nazis assumed established KGB contact and an
Such individuals did Moscow’s power. According to Segal, he MfS informer (Inoffizieller
or East Berlin’s bidding completed his PhD at Sorbonne Mitarbeiter, or IM), 48 Segal was
through their speeches, publica- University in Paris, just before a known quantity, and Soviet
tions, and personal networks. the German invasion in 1940 bloc intelligence had enough
Often, these individuals were and joined the French resis- information to judge him politi-
journalists, scientists, or other tance during the occupation. His cally reliable.
public figures with left-wing connection with Soviet intelli-
8 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth
Segal became genuinely and passionately devoted to his
How Segal was actually cause, and many people found him winsome and convincing.
brought into the process is not
known with certainty, but in all
likelihood “evidence” of the US have met him, the theory’s conceded that the theory was
origins of AIDS would have appeal [about the origins of based on circumstantial evi-
been given to him in personal AIDS] may lie in the man him- dence, they concluded that the
meetings, perhaps with a pro- self. Engaging and well-read, he “assumption that AIDS is a
fessional colleague previously is sympathetic to AIDS suffer- product of the preparation of
briefed by the MfS. In this first ers and wants to help out in the biological warfare can there-
meeting, Segal would not have fight against the disease.” 52 fore be quite plainly expressed.”
been told explicitly that the According to press reports,
material came from Soviet bloc Segal subsequently claimed the
The Segal Contributions project was code-named “MK-
intelligence or that it was part
of a disinformation campaign. Naomi.” 54
Segal’s first major contribu-
Rather, he simply would have tion to the AIDS disinforma-
been encouraged to look into HVA X had provided Segal
tion campaign was a 47-page with much of the material for
the matter. Given Segal’s back- pamphlet titled AIDS—its
ground, he would have been his pamphlet, 55 which began
nature and origin, co-authored circulating in Harare, Zimba-
expected to reach the intended by his wife Lilli and Ronald
conclusion. While Segal may bwe, on the eve of the Eighth
Dehmlow, a fellow retired Hum- Conference of NonAligned
have suspected the real source boldt University professor. 53 In
of the AIDS material, it was Nations (1–6 September 1986).
it, the authors went to great The conference was attended by
common practice in the GDR lengths to refute the more and
for authorities to share “back- representatives of more than
more widely accepted theory 100 Third World countries—as
ground information” quasi-con- about the African origins of
spiratorially in one-on-one well as four HVA and 20 KGB
AIDS, inter alia by pointing to officers, who were busily dis-
conversations. Its validity was the fact that the epidemic’s first
typically not questioned. 51 tributing Segal’s paper to the
cases were reported among the press and delegates. 56 Segal’s
gay populations of New York explicit repudiation of the the-
Segal’s selection as the cam-
and San Francisco, not in sis that AIDS originated in
paign’s frontman was a master-
Africa. Like the Patriot letter Africa was tailor-made for an
stroke. As a German, he could
and Zapevalov’s article in Liter- African audience, and his
speak unfiltered to the popula-
aturnaya Gazeta, Segal’s pam- claims subsequently appeared
tion of a major member of the
phlet tediously detailed several in the press of 25 African coun-
Western alliance, and as an
well-established facts about tries. The East German commu-
established scientist, he pos-
AIDS, and he described accu- nist party leadership was
sessed professional authority. By
rately how Western scientists delighted to see Segal’s theses
concealing their hand, the intel-
had identified HIV. Having included in the conference’s
ligence services ensured that
demonstrated his professional final report and heaped praise
Segal would speak convincingly,
expertise on the subject matter, on the HVA for the operation. 57
with the voice of a true believer
Segal then detailed his theory
not that of a paid informant.
about US government experi-
In the event, Segal became mentation, specifically among Disappointment at the
genuinely and passionately homosexual prisoners who went Politburo
devoted to his cause, and many on to infect gay populations in
people found him winsome and New York City and San Fran- Meanwhile, Segal began
convincing. A Montreal Gazette cisco. (See text box on facing aggressively pushing his the-
reporter, who interviewed him page: Segal Arguments.) Even ory at home. In late summer of
in 1992, wrote: “For those who though Segal and his coauthors 1986, he asked for a meeting
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 9The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth
for having agreed that the HIV
Segal Memorandums to the Ministry of Health virus had originated in Africa.
After detailing what was wrong
1. If AIDS spread at the current rate, Segal predicted, American hospitals
with the Soviet scientist—the
would soon be overwhelmed, as every AIDS patient “is on average being hos-
pitalized for 82 days until death and costs on average $49,348.” By 1990, the USSR’s top AIDS expert had in
cost of care for patients would “ruin the country economically.” If one could 1986 pinpointed a case of HIV
persuade Americans that AIDS was the result of war preparations, Segal infection in the USSR that pre-
argued, the epidemic could become “an important political factor.” And since ceded the virus’s supposed birth
a majority of AIDS victims were young men eligible for military service, the at Fort Detrick—Segal accused
disease would lead to “a military and economic weakening…. Overall, the him of lying.
United States is facing a decade of gravest economic problems.” Since AIDS
spread exponentially, countries currently less affected—such as the Warsaw It is evident from the second
Pact states—would be much better off for many years. “This optimistic prog-
memorandum that Segal was
nosis, however, has a reverse side,” Segal cautioned. Due to the expected
rapid spread of AIDS in the West, the Americans would lose their capability solely interested in bringing
to wage war against Moscow in the next 10 years. When the American pres- political pressure to bear upon
ident became aware of this decline, “would he not contemplate the idea of a colleagues from bloc countries
preemptive strike in the next years? With [President Ronald] Reagan and with opinions that differed from
[Vice President George H.W.] Bush, such a reaction cannot be ruled out.” 58 his own, rather than engage
2. In the second memo, Segal took swipes at his critics. One of these, Profes- them in a professional dia-
sor Niels Sönnichsen, representing the GDR at an AIDS summit of the World logue. Indeed, as a political
Health Organization in Graz, Austria, in April 1986, had concluded his lec- activist, Segal had reason to be
ture by saying that AIDS originated—“as we know”—in Africa. “This state- upset with Zhdanov. The Soviet
ment is, as a matter of fact, false,” Segal commented and added: scientist’s comments threat-
“[Sönnichsen’s] remarks can only be viewed as a formal kowtow to the US-
ened to pull the rug from
supported thesis.” Then Segal took on Professor Viktor Zhdanov, director of
the Ivanovsky Institute of Virology, the Soviet Union’s top AIDS expert, at
underneath Segal’s own theory.
the second international conference on AIDS in Paris in June 1986. Zhdanov When asked by a reporter
had reported on the case of a 14-year-old girl who had contracted lymphade- whether the United States had
nopathy, an early indicator of infection with HIV. Soviet scientists had traced developed the AIDS virus,
the girl’s infection to a series of blood transfusions in 1974 and concluded the Zhdanov replied bluntly: “That
AIDS virus must already have existed at that time—a blow to Segal’s theory is a ridiculous question. Per-
of its 1979 origins in the United States. Segal indignantly pointed out, “One
haps it was the Martians.” 60
could infer [from Zhdanov’s statement] that AIDS did not spread from New
York to the rest of the world but was imported to America from the Soviet
Axen referred Segal to Karl
Union.” He then accused Zhdanov of lying. 59
Seidel, head of the health
department of the central com-
with Hermann Axen, the East disaster, the US political situa- mittee of the SED (East Ger-
German Politburo member tion would change drastically. many’s ruling communist
responsible for foreign affairs, At the same time, he warned, party), and the two met on
and offered two memorandums the economic consequences 17 September 1986. In this
for consideration. The first would lead US leaders into des- meeting, Segal reiterated his
memorandum demonstrated perate and warlike acts. (See “assumption” (underlined in the
that Segal deemed AIDS to be Segal Memorandums in text minutes of the meeting) that
both a medical problem and a box.) AIDS was the result of biologi-
political weapon. As a medical cal warfare experiments at Fort
problem for the United States, In the other memorandum, Detrick. Segal conceded that
he predicted, AIDS would even- Segal took on East German and this assertion was merely “a
tually overwhelm the nation’s Soviet scientists who contra- hypothesis, albeit a probable
economy, and, if Americans dicted him. Segal charged the one.” Since the Soviet bloc was
could be made to believe their East German with being sub- only minimally affected by
government had caused the servient to the United States AIDS, Segal argued the GDR
10 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth
West German media reported a mysterious visit of two “US dip-
should abandon its “defensive lomats” to Jakob and Lilli Segal in East Berlin.
publishing practice” and begin
denouncing the “true culprit” of
the AIDS epidemic, i.e., the mentioned anti-imperialist construed as an official
United States. goal.” 61 endorsement? In fact, Hager’s
decision to keep Segal at arm’s
Segal solicited guidance from Hager may not have been length was a clever move from a
the SED central committee as aware of the details of the disinformation operation per-
to how he should proceed and AIDS disinformation cam- spective. By keeping Segal at a
expressed interest in working paign, but he probably knew distance, Hager maintained at
with the Ministry of Health about it in general. 62 In any least a semblance of scientific
AIDS task force under Profes- event, he rejected most of independence for the AIDS
sor Sönnichsen—even though Seidel’s recommendations, campaign’s front man and
one of Segal’s memorandums although he authorized the denied Western observers the
disparaged Sönnichsen. Segal Segals’ participation in the opportunity to quickly dismiss
also expressed disappointment AIDS task force. Hager con- Segal’s utterances as state-con-
that officials had not paid suffi- cluded that the GDR should trolled propaganda. Another
cient attention to his own work. maintain its restrictive AIDS reason for Hager’s reluctance to
information policy, and “since endorse Segal was probably
Seidel briefed Kurt Hager, a Comrade Segal himself speaks East German leader Erich
hard-line Politburo member of a hypothesis, reproduction Honecker’s angling for an offi-
and the SED’s chief ideologue, [of his theses] in official GDR cial state visit to Washington,
on the meeting and suggested publications must be avoided. I DC. The last thing Honecker
how to deal with Segal and the do not know to what extent his needed was to have an anti-
AIDS issue. Seidel pointed out assumptions can be published American active measure of his
that Segal’s theses, even if only in relevant foreign journals. Of own secret service blow up and
partially substantiated, would course, he alone would be derail his cherished project. 64
portend the “unmasking of answerable for them.” 63
steps for biological war prepa-
rations of US imperialism, For Segal, support from the A Mysterious Visit
which is politically highly SED leadership would have car-
explosive. Especially the well- ried obvious advantages. His Shortly after Segal’s corre-
founded polemics against the AIDS hypothesis offered him spondence with the SED leader-
long-tailed-monkey theory of the chance of a lifetime— ship, West German media
the origins of AIDS [in Africa], advancing the cause of commu- reported a mysterious visit of
should reinforce anti-imperial- nism while increasing his own two “US diplomats” to Jakob
ist sentiments and activities of name recognition far beyond and Lilli Segal in East Berlin.
numerous political forces in the scientific community and According to a report in the
Africa who must perceive this East Germany. Segal doubt- weekly Der Spiegel—appar-
theory as an insult and dispar- lessly also realized that his ently based on an interview
agement by the schemes of US work would endear him to the with Segal—the two showed up
imperialism.” He recommended SED leadership, which would at his doorstep in mid-October
that Segal be allowed to pursue have supported his research 1986, flashed their credentials,
his work without restrictions efforts and sponsored trips politely asked for permission to
and that he and his wife abroad, a major perk for a GDR enter, and began to “cross-
become consultants to the AIDS citizen. examine” Segal for two hours
task force. He also suggested about his hypothesis. Segal was
that the GDR publish more But why did Hager turn down “certain they were from the
material on AIDS, which “also most of Segal’s proposals and CIA.” 65 He later elaborated that
takes into account the above- avoid anything that could be the two visitors “wanted to
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 11The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth
Heym’s words carried significant moral weight … and his enlist-
ment in the AIDS campaign was a major coup. operation must be rated a suc-
cess.
know where we got our infor- had no incentive to have him
mation. They were interested to “cross-examined,” in Berlin or Another Dupe
know whether the information elsewhere.
was correct or not. They were On 18 February 1987, the
merely looking for the traitor In all likelihood Segal’s visi- major West German daily news-
[who had revealed the secrets tors were HVA officers intent paper tageszeitung published a
to Segal]. In turn, they offered on building up Segal’s resolve lengthy interview by the
us wonderful working condi- by posing as CIA men visiting famous East German author
tions, which we did not accept, in diplomatic guise and raising Stefan Heym with Jakob Segal
though.” 66 questions that allowed Segal to on AIDS. 69 Segal and Heym had
conclude that his theory had much in common. Like Segal,
Segal appears not to have struck a nerve in Washington. Heym was a German of Jewish
questioned the credentials of descent with communist sym-
his visitors. With his conspira- Segal was unlikely to have pathies, and like Segal he left
torial mindset, the incident invented the story. By this time Germany when the Nazis came
must have confirmed his worst he was a sincere believer in the to power in 1933. Heym emi-
suspicions; the appearance of veracity of his theory, and the grated to the United States in
the two “CIA men” showed US invention of such a fairy tale 1935, became a US citizen, and
authorities to be totally uncon- does not correspond with his served in a psychological war-
cerned about the consequences missionary zeal for spreading fare unit of the US Army in
of their “actions” and merely the “truth.” Moreover, a yarn World War II. In 1952, he
interested in tracking and pre- about CIA operations in East returned all his American mili-
sumably punishing those Berlin, published in the West- tary commendations in protest
responsible for leaking the ern media, would have gotten of the Korean War, moved to
secret. him into serious trouble with Prague, and in the following
the GDR security apparatus. year to East Germany, where he
However, the story can hardly Yet there were no repercus- quickly became a literary and
be taken at face value. For one sions for Segal. political icon.
thing, it is virtually inconceiv-
able that CIA officers would Only one organization in East Heym’s words carried signifi-
have “cross-examined” a well- Germany, the MfS, had the cant moral weight in East Ger-
known East German scientist authority and wherewithal to many and beyond, and his
with connections to MfS and carry out a deception opera- enlistment in the AIDS cam-
KGB in one of the best moni- tion—if that is what it was. paign was a major coup for
tored cities of the Soviet bloc. Günter Bohnsack, a former Segal and the HVA. Heym
As one former CIA station chief HVA X officer deeply involved looked favorably on Segal’s the-
in Germany wrote, “East Ger- in the East German AIDS dis- ses, but like his interviewee, he
many’s ubiquitous security ser- information campaign, has lit- was probably unaware of HVA
vice had such an iron grip on its tle doubt that the two visitors involvement. The tageszeitung
people that almost no one dared were from the HVA, and he was an anti-status-quo, left-of-
spy for the Americans.” 67 Had recalls “overhearing comments center newspaper, independent
the CIA really wished to con- from M. Wolf to the effect that of Moscow but critical of the
tact Segal, it could have done so the dear professor needed to be United States. As such, it repre-
easily on one of his trips ‘propped up.’…This ‘CIA visit’ sented the perfect vehicle for
abroad. But why would it? US was certainly staged.” 68 Given Segal and the HVA, and the
intelligence knew Segal’s the- that Segal repeatedly referred interview had the intended
ory was humbug and therefore to the “CIA visit,” the HVA
12 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth
The naive conclusion by a Western academic would have
effect. As a contemporary pleased intelligence headquarters in East Berlin.
reader observed:
Consider the peculiarity tronic surveillance) recorded a case long-term inmates of
of the situation: Two well- phone conversation referencing a prison for men!—back to
known, respected East Simmel’s project and for- their cells. 72
Germans publish a the-
ory propounding the warded a copy to Department The book quickly became a
notion that AIDS is X. The disinformation special- bestseller and spawned a popu-
caused by a man-made ists spotted an opportunity and lar three-part TV program.
virus produced by Ameri- decided to anonymously send
can biological warfare Raving about his agency’s coup,
Simmel material pertaining to Markus Wolf proudly piled 10
researchers—but they do
so in West Berlin. They Segal’s AIDS theory. 71 copies of Simmel’s novel on his
are not permitted to pub- desk. Bohnsack and his col-
lish their theory in The result was, from the East
leagues were both happy and
newspapers in their own German perspective, phenome-
country, which is offi- surprised that Simmel accepted
nal. Released in mid-1987, Sim-
cially anti-American and the HVA material as genuine
mel’s 500-page novel, Doch mit
especially vituperative and made such extensive use of
about the CIA. It is impos- den Clowns kamen die Tränen
it. 73
sible to give a verifiable [Along with the clowns came
explanation for this reti- the tears] revolved around a Simmel’s uncritical accep-
cence, but one may biological arms race between tance of the HVA’s disinforma-
surmise that in the GDR the United States and the
the politics of AIDS has tion package most likely was
Soviet Union. The two super- the product of naivety, moralis-
remained the province of
medical personnel rather powers were portrayed as tic zeal, and eagerness to tell a
than political equally cynical, ruthless, and good story. Shortly after the
propagandists. 70 unethical in their pursuit of a book was released, Simmel said
super germ. In the foreword, about himself more insightfully
This naive conclusion by a Simmel insisted that “The mon-
Western academic would have than he would have realized at
strous experiments I report on the time: “Simmel is in a fatal
pleased intelligence headquar- have already been successfully
ters in East Berlin. way naive and starry-eyed. He
conducted by some scientists.” may come across as cunning
One protagonist cites Heym’s and clever, but he steps into
Still Another Dupe interview with Segal in the ta- every trap that’s out there.” 74
geszeitung as evidence for the
The HVA’s biggest coup was monstrosity of the superpow-
yet to come. In the mid-1980s, ers’ goals: Back to the USSR
the Austrian-born best-selling
author Johannes Mario Sim- He [Segal] is convinced Meanwhile, the Soviets’ own
that genetic scientists at propaganda machine went into
mel mulled over a book project Fort Detrick have experi-
on the perils of genetic manipu- high gear. Moscow understood
mentally generated the
lation and biological warfare. AIDS virus HTLV III that repetition of a particular
By that time, Simmel had [sic]. However, since the theme over an extended period
already authored 20 novels, infection’s initial effect is of time was key to a successful
numerous screenplays, and var- minor and the incubation disinformation campaign, 75 and
period lasts two to five the Soviets promoted the AIDS
ious short stories and chil- years, they didn’t con-
dren’s books. His works had sider the virus viable in story’s worldwide dissemina-
been translated into 25 lan- humans and sent the tion through radio broadcasts,
guages and sold over 65 million infected test persons—yes, rumors, posters, handbills, forg-
copies. By sheer coincidence, yes, yes, they work with eries, and leaflets (some of
test persons there, in this which displayed pornographic
HVA Department III (elec-
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 13The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth
The merger of the ethnic weapons and AIDS campaigns creat-
ed a powerful narrative in Africa. greater extent than the popula-
tion of friendly forces.” 82
caricatures of US soldiers). Turkey, the Soviets sought to In June 1987, Novosti news
Soviet propagandists even lifted stir concern among the local agency editor Valentin Falin
some stories about the US gov- population, create pressure on told a USIA official slyly: “And
ernment’s alleged creation of US allies to send American given the US treatment of
AIDS verbatim from a New troops packing, and generally American Indians, putting
York gay magazine, the New discourage contact with Ameri- smallpox blankets on them, and
York Native, which in Novem- can citizens. 80 the placement of Japanese-
ber 1986 called for a US con- Americans in detention during
gressional investigation into The Soviets also began to the Second World War, the
the origins of AIDS. 76 broaden the campaign’s focus, development of an ethnic
merging it with other disinfor- weapon by the US sounds
Soviet efforts promptly paid mation campaigns. A particu- pretty logical.” 83
off. Third World media reported larly effective twist was the
the AIDS falsehood widely, and claim that the US government
even the established British had designed AIDS as an eth- The Impact in Africa
newspapers Sunday Express nic weapon against black peo-
and Daily Telegraph recounted ple. The “ethnic weapon” theme The merger of the ethnic
Segal’s “findings” uncritically. had first appeared around 1980 weapons and AIDS campaigns
By late 1987, the story had cir- in the Soviet active measures created a powerful narrative
culated in the media of 80 coun- repertoire. In an effort to hitch that threatened to undermine
tries, appearing in over 200 the United States to the widely America’s reputation in Africa.
periodicals in 25 languages. 77 detested South African apart- Allegations that Washington
“If media replay is an indica- heid regime, Moscow spread the was using AIDS as a racial
tion of success,” noted a US offi- rumor that Washington was weapon against Africans began
cial, “then this campaign has aiding Pretoria in the develop- circulating across the continent
been very successful.” 78 ment of weapons to eliminate in the wake of the nonaligned
nonwhites. 81 nations summit in Harare in
The Soviets paid special 1986, where HVA and KGB had
attention to countries with US Since these claims were base- promoted Segal’s paper so
military bases on their soil. In less, the Soviets employed the diligently. 84 On 7 June 1987,
late 1985, North Korea began well-established technique of the Patriot rejoined the fray
its own AIDS propaganda oper- propping up their conspiracy with an article accusing the US
ation, portraying US troops in theories with circumstantial Department of Defense of con-
South Korea as carriers of the evidence. For example, an ducting experiments in Africa
epidemic. Turkish broadcasts American military manual had to determine the “depopulating
emanating from the USSR indeed noted in 1975 that “it is effect” of AIDS in strategically
urged the closure of US bases theoretically possible to develop important areas of the conti-
because they were allegedly so-called ‘ethnic chemical weap- nent like Zaire.
breeding grounds for AIDS. And ons,’ which would be designed
an English-language, Soviet- to exploit naturally occurring In early 1988, a Nigerian
inspired broadcast in Asia differences in vulnerability newspaper varied the theme
alleged that outbreaks of AIDS among specific population somewhat by claiming that the
“are as a rule registered in the groups. Thus, such a weapon spread of AIDS in central and
areas near American war would be capable of incapacitat- western Africa was the result of
bases.” 79 By targeting nations ing or killing a selected enemy rich Americans testing contami-
where American troops were population to a significantly nated polio vaccine on poor
based, such as South Korea and blacks during the 1960s. 85 The
tale was told and retold in a
14 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)You can also read
