Singapore | 12 October 2021 Peril or Opportunity? The Case of Malaysia's First Non-party Leader Prime Minister Ooi Kok Hin
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ISSUE: 2021 No. 133
ISSN 2335-6677
RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE ANALYSE CURRENT EVENTS
Singapore | 12 October 2021
Peril or Opportunity? The Case of Malaysia’s First Non-party
Leader Prime Minister
Ooi Kok Hin*
Ismail Sabri Yaakob was named Malaysia’s new prime minister on 20 August 2021 after
the previous government collapsed. Photo: Arif KARTONO, AFP.
* Ooi Kok Hin is a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at the University
at Albany, State University of New York. The author would like to thank Dr Lee Hwok Aun,
Dr Meredith Weiss, Dr Nicholas Chan, and Daniel Teoh for their thoughtful comments and
feedback.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Ismail Sabri Yaakob, Malaysia’s ninth Prime Minister, is the first who is not a party
leader. He is only the third highest-ranked leader in UMNO. He is Malaysia’s third
premier in 39 months.
• In his first Prime Ministerial address, Ismail Sabri articulated a new vision called
“Keluarga Malaysia” (Malaysian Family), affirming inclusiveness and urging all
parliamentarians to work towards common ground. However, his commitment to
this is uncertain given his track record of stoking ethnic sentiments for political gain.
• Ismail Sabri’s grip over UMNO is tenuous and he faces a party election that must
be held by late 2022. The current top two leaders in UMNO are hostile to Bersatu,
which is part of Ismail Sabri’s coalition. If Ismail Sabri is defeated in the party
election, his position as Prime Minister will become untenable.
• The Islamist party PAS holds significant leverage in the current government. Ismail
Sabri is the first PM to give PAS complete control over the religious affairs ministry.
He walks a tightrope as he needs PAS to offset his weakness in UMNO, but he must
also retain the support of East Malaysian parties wary of PAS’s legislative agenda.
• To circumvent the uncertainties surrounding his fragile coalition and the anticipated
leadership tussle within UMNO, Ismail Sabri has reached out to the Pakatan
Harapan opposition coalition. An imminent test of his government’s ability to forge
multi-party consensus on policies to lift the country out of the health and economic
crises will be seen in whether the opposition’s inputs are incorporated into the annual
budget to be presented in October. Progress in achieving this would augur well for
the evolution of Malaysia’s democracy away from the divisive and “winner takes
all” politics of the past.
• However, the impending state and party elections indicate that Malaysia will
undergo a period of political uncertainty, which is not atypical following the ending
of strongman rule and one-party dominance.
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INTRODUCTION
The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) has retaken the Prime Minister’s office
just 39 months after losing the general election, but not all is well within the party. Although
newly minted Malaysian Prime Minister, Ismail Sabri Yaakob, is from UMNO, he is not
the top party leader and is politically dependent on its coalitional ally-cum-electoral rivals,
the Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu) and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS). Ismail
Sabri’s “weak” position presents opportunities – and potential perils – for Malaysia as he
seeks to foster a new political equilibrium and steer Malaysia toward recovery.
Ismail Sabri announced a bloated cabinet of 70 ministers and deputy ministers, almost a
third of the total Members of Parliament.1 As political scientist Wong Chin Huat observed,
this “payroll vote” is necessary to sustain the prime minister’s slim majority in Malaysia’s
parliamentary democracy.2 He maintained continuity with Muhyiddin Yassin’s cabinet – all
but four ministers are retained in the cabinet. Under Ismail Sabri’s cabinet, UMNO has a
net gain of two ministers and crucially, has wrested the rural development ministry and the
housing and local government ministry – both rich in resources and patronage – back from
Bersatu. UMNO also now completely controls the Communications ministry, whose
messaging channels and personnel hiring will be useful in the general election which has to
be held within two years. Given his position as non-party leader with untested majority in
Parliament (as of the time of writing), his premiership in the coming months will require
him to consolidate his power internally (within UMNO as well as within his coalition) and
externally (through a confidence and supply agreement with the opposition).
Ismail Sabri is the first Malaysian Prime Minister who is not a party leader. In parliamentary
democracies, the positions of Prime Minister or Opposition Leader often belong to the
leader of a political party. But Ismail Sabri is only the third highest-ranked leader in UMNO
(Table 1). He is one of three Vice Presidents of the party (he received the highest votes
among the three winners in the 2018 party election, and hence became the most senior
among them). He was appointed to the premiership out of the force of circumstance: UMNO
president Ahmad Zahid Hamidi faces 47 charges for misuse of funds, 3 and another 33
charges for corruption,4 while UMNO deputy president Mohamad Hasan is not eligible
because he is not a Member of Parliament.5 Being the highest ranked UMNO leader in the
previous cabinet under Muhyiddin, Ismail Sabri was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister
on 7 July 2021. Slightly more than a month later, Muhyiddin resigned, on 16 August, after
a faction of UMNO parliamentarians aligned to the party president withdrew their support
and Muhyiddin failed to reach a confidence-and-supply agreement with the opposition to
remain in power.6 Five days of political uncertainty ensued, and it was Ismail Sabri who
cobbled a sufficient majority to be sworn in as the ninth Prime Minister on 21 August.
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Table 1: Top five UMNO leaders for the term 2018-2021
Name Party post Current position in government
Ahmad Zahid Hamidi President None
Mohamad Hasan Deputy President None
Ismail Sabri Yaakob Vice Presidents Prime Minister
Mahdzir Khalid Minister of Rural Development
Khaled Nordin None
ISMAIL SABRI’S PREMIERSHIP ON ETHNIC RELATIONS: A HISTORY AND
AN OUTLOOK
In his first address to the nation as Prime Minister, Ismail Sabri articulated a new vision
called “Keluarga Malaysia” (Malaysian Family).7 He pleaded for Parliamentarians to put
aside differences and forge consensus, and affirmed the inclusive diversity of “the
Malaysian Family.”
However, is “Keluarga Malaysia” a credible commitment on his part? In the past, Ismail
Sabri had often demonstrated a willingness to stoke ethnic sentiments for political gains.
For example, in 2015, a quick spiral of events turned violent in Kuala Lumpur: a theft
incident in Lowyat Mall was followed by ethnically charged incitements and
misinformation, which led to confrontations between Malay and Chinese groups. Ismail
Sabri, who was then minister in charge of rural development, jumped the gun before police
investigations concluded. He expressed sympathy for one group and called upon Malay
customers to boycott Chinese businesses.8 Not only that, he ended the Facebook post by
lamenting that the Chinese will continue to “oppress the Malays” if they do not change.9 He
later clarified that his intention was to urge consumers to organize against price increases,
but his emphasis on ethnicity was unmistakable.10 He also seized the occasion to launch
MARA Digital Mall, a knee-jerk reaction to the riot, to promote Bumiputra entrepreneurs.11
The initiative proved to be a policy failure12 and cost losses to the ministry.13
On another occasion, a mere three years ago, Ismail Sabri opposed the government’s plan
to ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD). In a public rally, he riled up the predominantly Malay Muslim
crowd by grumbling about the erosion of Malay rights, lamenting the expansion of equal
opportunities for other ethnic groups and falsely claiming that Bibles were being publicly
distributed to Muslims.14 As opposition leader in 2019, he challenged the government to
ban the Chinese educationist group, the United Chinese School Committees’ Association
(Dong Zong).15
Far from revisiting Ismail Sabri’s personal history, these instances point to a reckless
proclivity in jeopardizing ethnic relations. He had no qualms speaking16 and writing17 the
words “Bangsa DAP”, a derogatory term with racist undertones. In a divided society such
as Malaysia, Ismail Sabri’s previous actions in public office do not inspire confidence.
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Table 2: Key events in Ismail Sabri Yaakob’s political career
Year Event
1987-1993 Appointed to party positions at the division level in Pahang
1995 Appointed political secretary to Minister of Culture, Arts and Tourism,
Sabaruddin Chik
2004 Elected UMNO division leader and Member of Parliament of Bera
2008-2009 Appointed Minister of Youth and Sports under the third Abdullah Badawi
cabinet
2009-2013 Appointed Minister of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs under the
first Najib Razak cabinet
2013-2015 Appointed Minister of Agriculture and Agro-Based Industries under the
second Najib Razak cabinet
2015-2018 Appointed Minister of Rural and Regional Development under Najib
Razak’s cabinet reshuffle
May 2018 Retained Bera parliamentary constituency for the fourth consecutive term
June 2018 Elected as UMNO Vice President
May 2019 Appointed as Leader of the Opposition by Barisan Nasional
March 2020 Appointed Senior Minister in charge of security affairs by Muhyiddin
Yassin
July 2021 Appointed Deputy Prime Minister by Muhyiddin Yassin
August 2021 Appointed Prime Minister by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong
That said, historical precedents provide clues that Ismail Sabri will at least tone down his
ethnic appeal when he governs as Prime Minister. Before he became the country’s first
premier, Tunku Abdul Rahman was distrustful of non-Malay loyalty to the polity, stating
that “It is not fair for the Malays to throw in their lot with others when others refused to be
naturalized, refused to study the language, and refused to adopt the customs of the
country.”18 However, he went on to govern liberally as Prime Minister and even appointed
a Chinese as finance minister. Similarly, Mahathir Mohamad was seen as the firebrand
author of “The Malay Dilemma” prior to his premiership but it was he who promoted
Bangsa Malaysia as Prime Minister. Former Prime Minister Najib Razak also started the
1Malaysia campaign immediately after becoming the premier. To an extent, Ismail Sabri
has already moved in this direction with his “Keluarga Malaysia” vision, but a credible
measure of his sincerity would be the extent to which he refrains from the ethnic appeals he
had frequently invoked in the past.
Yet the logical reason underpinning this shift to the centre – to appeal to the broader
electorate beyond one’s own party base – does not always reap the intended rewards. Najib’s
1Malaysia campaign failed to attract Chinese voters in the 2013 general election. Najib
subsequently abandoned the 1Malaysia campaign and pivoted to the right in the run-up to
the 2018 general election. 19 He openly flirted with PAS to enable the Islamist party’s
president, Abdul Hadi Awang, to table a private member’s bill on the empowerment of
Shariah courts.20
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Ismail Sabri is in a unique position because while he is from UMNO, he initially did not
have unanimous support from the party to remain in Muhyiddin’s cabinet.21 He broke ranks
with the top two party chiefs and led a group of UMNO Members of Parliament to side with
the Perikatan Nasional government.22 In doing so, he was rewarded and made Deputy Prime
Minister with support from PAS and Bersatu.
Without full backing from his own party, Ismail Sabri is politically dependent on both PAS
and Bersatu. As a matter of fact, a dark horse in Ismail’s cabinet is PAS. The party has been
quiet since forming the Perikatan Nasional government with Muhyiddin (and now Ismail
Sabri). If they become assertive and press for their ideologically-driven goals – for instance,
a legislation empowering Shariah courts and paving the way for Hudud implementation –
they could reinvigorate ethnic and religious polarization in the country. It is noteworthy that
under Ismail Sabri’s new cabinet, PAS now completely helms the ministry of religious
affairs for the first time. 23 PAS’s increasing leverage can be observed in a recent
announcement of several bills being proposed to strengthen Shariah laws.24 Will Ismail
Sabri’s dependency on PAS’s loyalty lead to concessions in religious conservatism, or will
he contain their ambition out of fear that PAS’s agenda will cost him support from East
Malaysian parties? Already, the Sabah chief minister has publicly objected to the proposed
bills on Control and Restrictions on the Expansion of non-Islam Religions, which is one of
the four new Shariah bills. 25 Regardless, Ismail Sabri would be wise to avoid Shariah-
related issues till at least after the Sarawak state election.26 PAS’s ideological demands may
strike a chord among Malay Muslim voters in the peninsula but they are a liability in
Borneo, which is more diverse and wary of Islamization.
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY AND POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM
As Professor Abdul Rahman Embong concluded in a recent webinar organized by ISEAS –
Yusof Ishak Institute, there may not be a clear winner in GE15.27 If that turns out to be the
case, political fragmentation will remain for a while. What is perceived as instability,
however, is not necessarily a liability for Malaysia’s long-term democratic development. In
Japan and Indonesia,28 for example, there were a series of rapidly changing governments in
the initial period following the fall of a strongman rule or dominant party rule before a new
(and hopefully democratic) equilibrium was found.
The political order under Ismail Sabri is shaky. Within his party, Ismail Sabri must face the
UMNO party election, which must be held by the end of 2022.29 The timing for this will
depend on the timing of the general election. Will Ismail Sabri contest the presidency? It is
unprecedented enough that a non-party leader was appointed Prime Minister, but it is more
bizarre if he does not consolidate power within his party. Marshalling the incumbency
advantage as Prime Minister, Ismail Sabri could make a bid for the party presidency by
assembling a team with UMNO ministers in his cabinet, such as Defence Minister
Hishammuddin Hussein. 30 The party election will probably take place first before the
general election so that whoever emerges party president will get to pick election candidates
and lead the party into the general election.
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An important detail in Ismail Sabri’s cabinet lies not just in who is in, but who is excluded:
Ahmad Zahid (current UMNO president), Mohamad Hassan (deputy president), and Khaled
Nordin (vice president and former Menteri Besar of Johor). The UMNO president has the
power to sign the candidate nomination form, which means he has the final say in
determining the party’s election candidates. Without becoming party president, Ismail Sabri
cannot pick his slate of candidates (presumably loyal to him) and in fact, cannot unilaterally
settle seat negotiations with other parties in his coalition, such as Bersatu. This could be a
test of two incumbent advantages: does the incumbency advantage of the Prime Minister
outweigh the incumbency advantage of the party president? In the event that Ismail Sabri is
defeated in the party election, however, his position as Prime Minister will become
untenable.
In preparing for UMNO’s party election, Ismail Sabri will have to strike a delicate balance
between campaigning to be a party leader who prioritizes UMNO’s interest, without
antagonizing or yielding to Bersatu. Between UMNO and Bersatu, ties are rocky and Ismail
Sabri’s government is at risk if factions within the two parties fall out again. As it is, they
are unable to even agree on the name of the new government: one faction still calls it the
Perikatan Nasional government, while another faction rejects any association with Perikatan
Nasional.31 For as long as Bersatu exists, UMNO cannot be returned as the sole dominant
party because of their overlapping constituencies. Thus, the current top two UMNO leaders
have rejected cooperation with Muhyiddin’s Bersatu, to which Ismail Sabri’s faction is less
hostile. They will need to wrestle for the UMNO leadership if they wish to form an electoral
agreement and negotiate seats with Bersatu and Perikatan Nasional for the general election.
Though ousted as prime minister, Muhyiddin does not plan to retire from politics. He has
in fact already been appointed chairman of the National Recovery Council,32 and recently
vowed to lead Bersatu and Perikatan Nasional into the general election.33
This could well be the reason PAS sided with Bersatu under Perikatan Nasional and
deprioritized their pre-existing partnership with UMNO under Muafakat Nasional. UMNO
president was so slighted at PAS’s “loyalty” to Bersatu that he virtually claimed that the
Muafakat Nasional partnership is as good as dead.34 With Bersatu’s weak presence on the
east coast, PAS are virtually assured of retaining their rule in their coveted bases, Kelantan,
Terengganu and perhaps Kedah. On the other hand, a partnership with UMNO would entail
a more equal sharing of power. Why would PAS settle for equal partnership when they can
be the Big Brother on the east coast? Since UMNO is the traditional electoral opponent for
PAS prior to the 2018 alignment, a consolidated UMNO would threaten PAS’s political
interests. In addition, PAS has always been the political beneficiary of an UMNO split. This
happened in the 1990, 1999, 2008, and 2018 elections, and it would therefore be in their
interest to draw out the UMNO-Bersatu rivalry for as long as possible.
Given the context of his fragile coalition and uncertainty surrounding UMNO leadership,
Ismail Sabri has sought to forge a temporary stabilizing order by reaching out to the
opposition for support. He met with top opposition leaders prior to the cabinet
announcement35 and in September, leaders from the ruling and the opposition coalitions
signed a Memorandum of Understanding for Transformation and Political Stability.36 This
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could well be a rare opportunity for substantive reforms and democratization, though it is
not clear whether the MoU has any legally binding obligations.37
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Ismail Sabri has been catapulted to Malaysia’s highest office under the most unusual
circumstances. For the first time, the prime minister is not the president, chairman, or de
facto leader of a political party. Compared to his predecessors, Ismail Sabri’s relatively
“weak” position – within his party and the fragile coalition – presents unique challenges to
his premiership.
The MoU signed by the ruling and opposition coalitions helps to set the tone for a new
political culture that is less fixated on a winner-takes-all rationale.
The spirit of cooperation will be tested in late October when the government tables the
budget. Will the government incorporate the opposition’s inputs into the budget and meet
public expectations? If they do, will the opposition honour their word and pass the budget?
1
“Ismail Sabri’s govt: Who’s in, who’s out and what it means”, Malaysiakini, 27 August 2021.
https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/588927
2
Wong Chin Huat, “Parliament as Prime Minister’s electoral college: the defection game in
Malaysia’s democratic backsliding”, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of
International Affairs, Volume 109, Issue 5, 2020.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358533.2020.1819631
3
“Zahid’s trial over 47 charges involving foundation’s funds to start Monday”, The Star Online,
17 November 2019. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2019/11/17/zahid039s-trial-over-47-
charges-involving-foundation039s-funds-to-start-monday-nov-18
4
“Zahid slapped with 33 more charges for receiving RM42.7m bribes”, The Edge, 27 June 2019.
https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/zahid-slapped-33-more-charges-0
5
Mohamad Hasan, popularly known as Tok Mat, was former Menteri Besar of Negeri Sembilan
from 2004 to 2018 and is now leader of the opposition in the Negeri Sembilan state assembly. In
the 2018 party election, he defeated Annuar Musa, the current Minister of Communications and
Multimedia, to be elected the 11th UMNO deputy president.
6
“Malaysia’s opposition, key ally reject PM’s offer for bipartisan support”, Reuters, 13 August
2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/malaysias-opposition-key-ally-reject-pms-offer-
bipartisan-support-2021-08-14/
7
“In first-ever speech, new PM asks MPs to save ‘Keluarga Malaysia’ together, offers Opposition
leaders a chance to join Covid-19 fight”, Malay Mail, 22 August 2021.
https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2021/08/22/in-first-ever-speech-new-pm-asks-mps-to-
save-keluarga-malaysia-together-off/1999603
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8
“Malaysia minister asks Malays to boycott Chinese businesses to reduce prices”, TODAY Online,
2 February 2015. https://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/malaysia-minister-asks-malays-
boycott-chinese-businesses-reduce-prices
9
“Boycott Chinese businesses to lower price of goods, minister tells Malays”, Malay Mail, 2
February 2015. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2015/02/02/boycott-chinese-
businesses-to-lower-price-of-goods-minister-tells-malays/832557
10
“Ismail Sabri explains Facebook posting”, New Straits Times, 2 February 2015.
https://www.nst.com.my/news/2015/09/ismail-sabri-explains-facebook-posting
11
“Ismail Sabri: Medan Mara digital mall not a racist venture”, the Star Online, 8 December 2015.
https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2015/12/08/ismail-sabri-yaakob-mara-digital-mall-not-
racist-venture
12
“Malaysia’s bumiputera-only digital malls struggle to stay open”, Straits Times, 22 January
2020. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysias-bumiputera-only-digital-malls-struggle-
to-stay-open
13
“Mara digital malls in two states closed due to low sales”, the Star Online, 17 October 2019.
https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2019/10/17/mara-digital-malls-in-two-states-closed-due-
to-low-sales
14
The video clip, shared in a Facebook group called “Penyatuan Ummah” by a user, is titled
“ICERD & Agenda DAP: Luahan Rasa DS Ismail Sabri Yaakob, Naib Presiden UMNO
#Benteng153.” https://www.facebook.com/groups/PenyatuanUmmah/posts/924931844725949
15
“Haramkan Dong Zong, Pertubuhan Rasis Sempit: Ismail Sabri”, UMNO Online, 14 August
2019. https://umno-online.my/2019/08/14/haramkan-dong-zong-pertubuhan-rasis-sempit-ismail-
sabri/
16
“Ismail Sabri: Malaysia currently ruled by ‘bangsa DAP’”, KiniTV, 2019. Video available at:
https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x75351o
17
Ismail Sabri, “Tahap mana lagi kita Bangsa Melayu dan Islam Malaysia harus bersabar apabila
satu demi satu cubaan Bangsa DAP untuk mempersoalkan hak dan keistimewaan Orang Melayu
Islam di Malaysia.,” Twitter.com. 4 August 2019.
https://twitter.com/ismailsabri60/status/1158015391836172288?lang=en
18
The Straits Times, 18 September 1951.
19
A “Made for Television” moment was captured in December 2016 when Najib and Hadi, then
party presidents of UMNO and PAS respectively, jointly appeared in a rally to support Myanmar’s
Rohingya Muslims. The bitter irony was that it was the Perikatan Nasional government, of which
UMNO and PAS were part of, which launched a harsh crackdown on Rohingya refugees in 2020.
20
Helen Ting, “UMNO’s hand in Malaysian Islamic law,” East Asia Forum. 6 June 2017.
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/06/06/umnos-hand-in-malaysian-islamic-law/
21
“Ismail Sabri to face ‘consequences’ for standing with Muhyiddin,” Malaysiakini, 4 August
2021. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/585926
22
“MPs from Umno-led BN break ranks to support Malaysia PM Muhyiddin Yassin”, Straits
Times, 18 August 2021. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/31-mps-from-umno-led-bn-
reiterate-support-for-malaysia-pm-muhyiddin-yassin
23
The Minister of Religious Affairs, Idris Ahmad, and the deputy minister, Ahmad Marzuk
Shaary, are both from PAS. It is the only ministry over which PAS has complete control.
24
“Four new shariah laws in the works, says deputy minister”, Free Malaysia Today, 6 September
2021. https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2021/09/06/four-new-shariah-laws-in-
the-works-says-deputy-minister/
25
“Sabah opposes proposed Shariah Bill to control non-Muslim religions – CM”, Borneo Post, 9
September 2021. https://www.theborneopost.com/2021/09/09/sabah-opposes-proposed-shariah-
bill-to-control-non-muslim-religions-cm/
26
A state of emergency has been extended in Sarawak until February 2022 to suspend the state
election due to the COVID-19 pandemic. An extension is possible after the date.
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27
Abdul Rahman Embong, “Malaysian Political Dynamics: The Making and Remaking of
Political Alignments and Social Cohesion”, ISEAS Malaysia Studies Programme Webinar, 25
August 2021.
28
It was Ross Tapsell from the Australian National University who first drew the parallel between
contemporary Malaysia and Indonesia in the immediate aftermath of the Suharto regime’s
collapse. https://twitter.com/RossTapsell/status/1427418272874438656. Although the context
differs because the Suharto’s regime collapsed while Barisan Nasional lost the election to the
opposition coalition, there is some parallel in the rapid and fluid regrouping of political elites
before a new political equilibrium stabilizes.
29
“Postponement of Umno elections in order - Ahmad Maslan”, New Straits Times, 30 August
2021. https://www.nst.com.my/news/politics/2021/08/722916/postponement-umno-elections-
order-ahmad-maslan
30
“According to UMNO’s party constitution, clause 8.2 states that the annual general assembly
(AGM) must be held annually at a time decided by the Supreme Council so long as it does not
exceed 18 months after the previous AGM. The 2020 AGM was held on March 2021 (It was also
postponed due to the pandemic). The 2021 AGM, the one that is currently being postponed, must
be held within the subsequent 18 months, which is by August 2022.”
31
“Cracks emerge between Umno and Bersatu day after Ismail named PM”, Malaysiakini, 21
August 2021. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/588144
32
“Malaysia appoints former PM to lead coronavirus recovery council,” Reuters, 4 September
2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/malaysia-appoints-former-pm-lead-coronavirus-
recovery-council-2021-09-04/
33
“Bersatu to make comeback at next polls, says Muhyiddin,” The Malaysian Insight, 10
September 2021. https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/s/338562
34
"Zahid hints Muafakat Nasional is dead," The Malaysian Insight, 30 Sept 2021
https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/s/342460
35
“Malaysia’s new PM Ismail Sabri Yaakob and opposition leaders agree to find common
ground”, South China Morning Post, 25 August 2021.
https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3146370/malaysias-new-pm-ismail-sabri-
yaakob-and-opposition
36
“ Malaysian govt, PH opposition sign historic bipartisan deal; polls not expected before Aug
2022”, Straits Times, 14 September 2021. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-
govt-and-opposition-ink-deal-on-historic-bipartisan-cooperation
37
“A legal view of the MOU between the government of Malaysia and Pakatan Harapan — Philip
TN Koh”, Malay Mail, 17 September 2021. https://www.malaymail.com/news/what-you-
think/2021/09/17/a-legal-view-of-the-mou-between-the-government-of-malaysia-and-pakatan-
hara/2006370
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