ROMANIA - OUTLOOK ON SECURITY POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL EXPECTATIONS UNTIL 2025 - INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY POLICY (ISP) WORKING PAPER ...

INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY POLICY (ISP)
              WORKING PAPER

       ROMANIA – OUTLOOK ON
             SECURITY POLICY
           DEVELOPMENT AND
      NATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
                   UNTIL 2025

                 by Iulian CHIFU

Founder and President of the Conflict Prevention and

          Early Warning Center Bucharest

                  VIENNA 2020

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.       EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY ........ 2

II.      CRIMEA, THE SECOND KALININGRAD PLUS. RUSSIA’S MULTIPLE THREATS ........ 5

III.     EUROPE AFTER BREXIT. FRANCE SINGULARITY AND EXCEPTIONALISM .............. 7

IV.      FRANCE EXCEPTIONALISM. MACRON’S BRAIN DEATH OF NATO, DEFENSE AND

DETERRENCE STRATEGY AND EUROPEAN ARMY .............................................................11

V.       ROMANIA’S FUNDAMENTALS IN SECURITY POLICIES: STRATEGIC POSTURE,

LEVEL OF AMBITION AND TOOLKIT ....................................................................................15

VI.      FIVE        GENERATIONS               OF        THREATS.            SUPERPOSED,              INTERTWINED,

INTERDEPENDENT, AMPLIFIED ...........................................................................................17

VII.     “I SAW THE ENEMY IN THE FACE AND ITS US” ........................................................21

VIII. EVOLUTION OF THE CONFLICTS OR TOWARDS CONFLICTS ..................................25

IX.      RETURNING TO HARD POWER. NEW-OLD THREATS: HYPERSONIC MISSILES AND

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. ......................................................................................................28

                                           With the friendly support of

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I.       EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND

               GLOBAL SECURITY

Romania is contemplating the evolution of the system of International Relations and global

security from the point of view of a new European state, willing to protect the liberal

democratic system, the multilateralism in the international stage and the rules based world.

On another point, Romania is supportive of the need to build at our direct Eastern border the

same system of values and principles, adding pragmatism and pro-activity to the well

known basic principles from the NATO Strategic Concept1 and NATO final declarations in

Warsaw2 and London3, as well as those found in the European Global Security Strategy4 and

the consecutive reviews and updates until 20195.

1
    Active Engagement, Modern Defense. Strategic Concept for the Security and Defense of the Members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Accepted by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in
Lisbon,                       19-20                        November                 2019,                  at
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-
eng.pdf.
2
    Warsaw Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of
the         North         Atlantic         Council     in       Warsaw      8-9       July    2016,        at
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.
3
    London Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North
Atlantic            Council           in         London           3-4      December          2019,         at
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm.
4
    Shared Vision, Common Action, A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and
Security        Policy,       European          External       Action    Service,     June     2016,       at
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.
5
    From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1, EEAS, 19.06.2017, at
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage_en/37869/Implementing%20the%20EU%20Global%20Strategy%20Year%201;                        EU    Global
Strategy report - Year 2: a year of action to address "predictable unpredictability", 25.06.2018, EEAS, at
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-

                                                                                                           2

But Romania has its own particularities in terms of strategies, interests and approaches.

First, it’s about continuity in strategic and the three pillars of our security –which are

designed in that particular form since 20056:

•     The Strategic Partnership with the US – the most important security and defense pillar

      on hard security.

•     The NATO membership since 2004, with an important profile and participations in all

      possible military operations, with a more important profile and footprint than the

      strategic weight given by its population and GDP.

•     The EU membership since 2007, with complementary security instruments from the

      definition of the Copenhagen School of security studies, soft security, normative power

      and high moral ground.

homepage_en/47277/EU%20Global%20Strategy%20report%20-
%20Year%202:%20a%20year%20of%20action%20to%20address%20"predictable%20unpredictability";
The      European      Union     Global      Strategy.    Three        Years   on,    looking   forward,      EEAS,   at
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_global_strategy_2019.pdf; From Vision to Action, EU Global
Strategy in Practice, Three Years on, looking forward, at https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-
strategy/64034/vision-action-eu-global-strategy-practice-three-years-looking-forward_en, 17 June 2019.
6
    Strategia Națională de Apărare a Țării pentru perioada 2015-2019 - O Românie puternică în Europa şi în
lume             -             Președinția               României,             București,             2015,           at
https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Strategia_Nationala_de_Aparare_a_Tarii_1.pdf; HG nr. 30/2008
privind aprobarea Strategiei nationale de aparare a tarii, Strategia Nationala de aparare a tarii, at
http://www.dreptonline.ro/legislatie/hg_strategie_nationala_aparare_tara_30_2008.php;                    Strategia    de
Securitate Națională a României, România Europeană, România Euro-Atlantică: pentru o viață mai bună, într-
o        țară        democratică,      mai         sigură         și      prosperă,       București        2006,      at
http://old.presidency.ro/static/ordine/CSAT/SSNR.pdf.

                                                                                                                      3

For Romania, the biggest fear is not to be presented with the Strategic Choice. We are telling

to all our allies and partners: Don’t ask us to choose! Never let us choose between the EU and

the US, between the two rives of the Atlantic. It’s like choosing between our mother and our

father. Romania is the most pro-American country in Europe, if not in the world – due to

historic reasons: after the World War Two, our grand parents were looking at the skies

waiting for the Americans to come in order not to be invaded by the Russians. At the same

time, it is a pro-European country, with a Euro-conformist behavior, supportive of all the

integrative projects that are unifying Europe – and avoiding if not criticizing and combating

all those that are divisive for the EU.

For Bucharest, the American presence in Europe is mandatory for a credible security and

defense, but also for other historical and strategic reasons of maintaining the regional

ambitions of the major powers in a due balance. It is the same with the very existence of the

EU, which harmonises and avoids a European unhealthy competition of power. In Romania,

the Brexit was considered a big loss due to the fact that Great Britain is the second biggest

investor in our security and defense, after the US, and that we know also the balancing role

of UK in the European affairs and security matters of the continent.

                                                                                            4

II.     CRIMEA, THE SECOND KALININGRAD PLUS. RUSSIA’S

           MULTIPLE THREATS

In concrete terms, the security policies of Romania are dominated by the Russian threat,

perceived as such by the population also due to historic reasons. But now, the real threat

comes from a de facto neighbourhood with Russia in Crimea, after the annexation, a

peninsula situated at some 250 miles away from our shores at the Black Sea, but first and

foremost from the militarization of Crimea and its transformation in the second

Kaliningrad, even a Kaliningrad plus, plus, plus, an enormous land carrier with a huge

capacity of projecting force in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and above, with an A2AD –

Anti Area and Aircraft Denial, but also with huge offensive capabilities.

Being a border state, Romania looks with the highest attention at the evolutions beyond its

border, to the East. First, at its Eastern border lies the Republic of Moldova, the second

Romanian State, as well as Ukraine, the border of Europe, another state with an important

historical Romanian minority and territories that belonged to Romania in modern times,

after the First World War, and which were dragged away after the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact

and occupied by Soviet Union after the World War II.

Romania’s strategy is to have a full respect of the human rights, a common identity

preserved – history, language, traditions, links – and a life as close as that in the EU, including

with an EU perspective for both states. This strategy is already shaken by the evolutions in

the region: the EU does not admit any enlargement towards East, in the Republic of Moldova

we have a pro-Russian Government and President for the first time after the independence,

                                                                                                 5

with policies involving a false Soviet era creation of a so-called Moldovan identity7, and in

Ukraine, the rights of the minorities are altered and are harming the preservation of the

Romanian identity.

On another point, the strategic objective of Romania is to keep Russia as far as possible away

from our borders. That’s why any attempt to create turbulences like those in Donetsk and

Luhansk in Odessa, Chernivtsi or Zakarpatia regions8 of Ukraine are considered threats to

Romanian National Security, as is the attempt to link Crimea with Transnistria9, the land

locked separatist region of the Republic of Moldova, a region with Russian occupation troops

stationed there since the times of the retreat of the Soviet Army from Czechoslovakia.

It is also the reason why there’s a full Romanian reinforced support for Ukraine and its ability

to resist to Russian troops in Easter regions of Donbas, which is considered the border of

Europe. The security sector reform, bilateral military arrangements, military, intelligence

and defense cooperation are included in this package of support for a democratic, pro-

European and pro-NATO Ukraine.

7
    Iulian Chifu, Basarabia sub ocupaţie sovietică, Ed. Politeia-SNSPA, Bucureşti, 2004, 424 p, ISBN 973-86287-
8-4.
8
    Regions neighboring Romania with important Romanian minorities.
9
    The so-call Novorossia project.

                                                                                                             6

III. EUROPE AFTER BREXIT. FRANCE SINGULARITY AND

                EXCEPTIONALISM

Since the EU is one of the three pillars of its security and defense, Romania has spent an

important part of the time of its presidency – first half of 201910 – trying to deal with the

community cohesion, European solidarity, enlargement policies and internal balance of

power. The most challenging was the perspective of Brexit and its strategic importance for

Europe.

The UK has always been a balance and a partner to alternatively both Germany and France.

It has been a rigorous economic partner to Germany, inclined towards a strict respect of the

rules of the game and supporting austerity measures as well as free market rules. And it was

a partner for France in defense and security. After Brexit, a new challenge is on EU’s plate.

First, after Brexit, according to the data of investments in defense and security in Europe,

82% of the defense and security of Europe is going to be paid and fulfill by countries outside

the EU, namely, in order: The US, the UK, Turkey, Canada, Norway and so on. Moreover, the

study of the Korber Foundation and IISS on Europe without US 11 shows very clearly the

impossibility and the costs of a real European autonomy, meaning an investment of at least

10
     The Presidency of the Council of the EU, the first rotational presidency of Romania after acceding in the EU
in 2007.
11
     Korber Foundation, IISS, European security in crisis: what to expect if the US withdraws from NATO, at
https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2019/09/european-security-us-nato; Douglas Barrie, Ben Barry,
Dr Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Henry Boyd, Nick Childs, Dr Bastian Giegerich authors, Defending Europe: Scenario
Based          Capability       Requirements         for       NATO’s        European         members,         at
file:///C:/Users/Iulian/Downloads/Defending%20Europe%20-%20IISS%20Research%20Paper.pdf.

                                                                                                               7

300 billion Euro to reach the point of capabilities as of today, not the needed ones for facing

the perspectives of the future.

Second, there is a hint and a disposition, at the EU level, to move more and more security

and defense related matters, as well as foreign policy ones, to a decision with a qualified

majority – meaning the double majority with 55% of the states and 65% of the European

citizens 12 . After the retreat of the UK from the EU, the blockage majority shifted

dramatically, considering today's terms. So now, if France and Germany get together and

establish a common policy in this area, there’s a need of the next 13 countries of the row13,

in terms of strategic weight and vote rights, in order to block the project. Try never!

This reality creates, at the same time, a big issue if France and Germany are on opposing

sides in one such policy: it splits Europe, by aligning under one or the other player. The

balancing act that the UK had undertake during its European 47 years as member had also

this value. Now, if such an alignment is transformed into a permanent habit or even

structure, there’s a type of EU inside the EU that is formed, one with France and one with

Germany, with a result in a real split of the community and its decision-making bodies.

12
     According to the Lisbon Treaty, decisions in those matters are consensual ones, but the decision of the
European Council has introduced the will to move to qualified majority in those matters. See European
Council/Council of the European Union, Qualified Majority, at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-
eu/voting-system/qualified-majority/
13
     TREATY OF LISBON AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND THE TREATY ESTABLISHING
THE        EUROPEAN        COMMUNITY         (2007/C      306/01),     at     https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2007.306.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2007:306:TOC;                  see     also
European         Council/Council      of     the       European      Union,     voting      calculator,     at
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/voting-calculator/.

                                                                                                            8

The idea of transforming, even in perception terms, of the EU in a French-German affair –

with a decision between the two big countries and a consecutive proposal for the other

members, obliged more or less to accept the decision - is not a good step forward. It is not

even in the advantage of France and Germany. Instead of multilateralism and consensus

building, the EU will be an image of big power policies, a bilateral Franco-German affair. The

EU will loose a lot of its symbolic and ethic power, as well as its high moral ground and

attractivity. On another point, nor the split of the EU in two opposite blocks, due to repeated

alignments in different votes by the same countries, will not be a good news for the

perspective of the European Community.

Romania is also concerned with any type of applied Power politics and even more by any

type of Big Power politics. Our take is that multilateralism should be the rule of the game at

the international level. Even trying to embrace multipolarism in Russian terms is not

welcomed. It means presuming that big powers are getting together to negotiate the future

of the world, at the expenses of the other countries, and also that each one should have a

sphere of influence or zone of exclusive rights around it. Escaping from the Soviet/Russian

sphere of influence, entering in any German/French or European sphere of interest – except

the rules based and consented European Union format - is not in our very best interest and

our population will react in the same way, if we don’t have our point of view reflected in the

decisions of the bodies and institution we belong to.

This fear is also historical and comes from the former Big bargains of the Big Powers. It

happened in 1939, with the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, where we were traded without our

knowledge and without being asked what do we want. It also happened in Yalta, with the

percentages which threw us in Stalin's hands. It happened several times in other cases, in a

                                                                                             9

far more nuanced way, like those connected with the Transnistrian conflict, or the Minsk

format, or the Normandie 4 Format for Ukraine.

                                                                                     10

IV. FRANCE EXCEPTIONALISM. MACRON’S BRAIN DEATH

               OF NATO, DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE STRATEGY AND

               EUROPEAN ARMY

But maybe the worse impact of Brexit is the birth of a new era of French exceptionalism. It

has been noted after the accession in the presidential office of Emmanuel Macron14. Now,

the impact is worse. It comes from the fact that, after the retreat of the UK from the EU,

France remains the only nuclear state from the EU, the only permanent member in the UN

Security Council and the only state with a global reach due to its former posture as colonial

country, its “territoires d'outre-mer”, and its military presence all around the world.

France manifested already an interest to assume the leadership of the defense and security

pillar, since in economic and social terms it couldn’t compete with Germany. This type of

conundrum could be a form of complementarity if it is maintained in the limits of the

European multilateral bodies. Moreover, the perception in Bucharest and in the whole

Central and Eastern Europe is that France has at least one important strategic aim: solving,

together with the EU and the European Army France’s (and Europe’s), the military industrial

problems and its post-colonial issues in Africa.

The idea of a European Army15 enshrines two components that are unacceptable: ousting

the US from Europe and undermining NATO, as a defense alliance. That’s why this idea has

14
     Emmanuel Macron elected President, with a mandate beginning from May, 14th, 2017.
15
     BBC, Macron pushes for a “true European Army”, 6 November 2018, at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-46108633.

                                                                                                   11

been transformed into a different understanding of the strategic autonomy16, meaning the

capacity of conducting independent operations where NATO is not interested or it doesn’t

fit into its missions. Second, the European Intervention Initiative17, with ten EU member

countries as participants, had to be revised by France in order to respect the requirements

and common interests and not competing with the CSDP.

The interview that President Emmanuel Macron gave to The Economist18, naming NATO a

brain dead Alliance days before the London Summit, proved to add to the perceptions and

concerns of other European Central and Eastern European countries, including Romania.

France made few steps backwards and signed without any comment the final declaration of

NATO Summit in London 19 , but that position remains, including two other components

stated in this interview, the need to make business as usual with Russia20 – a clear Russia first

policy that France proposed – and an excessive attention to Africa.

16
     Ulrike Franke, Tara Varma, Independence Play: Europe’s Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy, European Council
of                  Foreign                  Relations,                April               2019,               at
https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/scorecard/independence_play_europes_pursuit_of_strategic_autonomy.
17
     Dick Zandee, Kimberly Krujiver, The European Intervention Initiative. Developing a shared Strategic Culture
for            European           Defense,            Clingandeal,             September       2019,           at
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/The_European_Intervention_2019.pdf.
18
       The   Economist,       Emmanuel    Macron      in   his   own     words,     November   7-th    2019,   at
https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-in-his-own-words-english.
19
     NATO London summit final Declaration, Article 1 noted: “NATO guarantees the security of our territory and
our one billion citizens, our freedom, and the values we share, including democracy, individual liberty, human
rights, and the rule of law. Solidarity, unity, and cohesion are cornerstone principles of our Alliance. As we
work together to prevent conflict and preserve peace, NATO remains the foundation for our collective defence
and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies. We reaffirm the enduring
transatlantic bond between Europe and North America, our adherence to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations Charter, and our solemn commitment as enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty that
an attack against one Ally shall be considered an attack against us all”.
20
     Idem.

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Now the concerns are that France does this game – completely harming NATO and the

Transatlantic link – due to the two motifs underlined bellow: its military industry and its

need for new soldiers and capabilities on the ground in France Africa post-colonial

countries. In the first case, the EU decided to reject the idea of building an Army in order to

have somebody to buy what the EU military industry is producing. The EDF – European

Defense Fund21, proved to be an important incentive to support research and technological

development as well as competitive products in the fields of capabilities that the European

country needs. Able to win the competition with alternative products from the US, Israel,

Great Britain and so on. So money is allocated in order to produce what European countries’

armies need.

In the second case, the policies are designed to limit any individual interests - even France’s

ones, who are important for the EU as well – and respect the EU common interests, fitting to

all EU member states needs. The idea of military adventures in Central Africa or Mali is not

always popular, neither acceptable at the political level in Central-Eastern Europe, that was

considered as a type of Soviet Union colony. As the presence together with a former imperial

country in a former colony.

Another very important point is the new presentation of France (and Europe) Defense and

Deterrence Strategy presented on the 7-th of February in front of the graduates from the War

School by President Emmanuel Macron22. Far more elaborated and with the full range of

21
         European      Commission,       European       Defense     Found,      19      March      2019,      at
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/european-defence-fund-2019-mar-19_en.
22
     Discours du Président Emmanuel Macron sur la stratégie de défense et de dissuasion devant les stagiaires de
la 27ème promotion de l'école de guerre, 7 February, 2019, at https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-
macron/2020/02/07/discours-du-president-emmanuel-macron-sur-la-strategie-de-defense-et-de-
dissuasion-devant-les-stagiaires-de-la-27eme-promotion-de-lecole-de-guerre.

                                                                                                            13

lessons learnt from previous attempts and speeches, this presentation and the document

quoted are of tremendous importance for the hints on how Europe will evolve. It requested

a thorough analysis with pluses and minuses, as well with the policies involved.

This document covers all the fundamental fears of Romania and Central and Eastern

European countries on the evolution of Europe and the World. The result is a national

reflection on the need to introduce in the National Security Strategy of Romania for the next

5 years already, a paragraph linked with the threats, concerns, challenges and risks linked to

the EU or NATO policies opposed to Romania’s interests: big power policies, Big Bargain

approaches, Russia’s first policy of some EU member states and the attempts to project it at

the European level, exclusion from European integrative projects, possibility to face

decisions of the EU and allies from NATO formats where Romania didn’t took part or does

not have a saying.

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V.       ROMANIA’S FUNDAMENTALS IN SECURITY POLICIES:

                STRATEGIC POSTURE, LEVEL OF AMBITION AND

                TOOLKIT

Romania is self defined as a team player with an added value and the objective of its

strategies are to preserve and defend its national interests stated in the National Security

Strategy as well as in its Constitution – sovereignty, territorial integrity, security of the

people and its citizens, liberty, democracy and their way of living. On another point, the level

of ambition is that of being able to project some interests in the post-soviet space – especially

in the Wider Black Sea Region – the Western Balkans and, for the last five years, in the Middle

East-Northern Africa.

Romania has developed a system of strategic partnerships – meaning relations with three

dimensions: security defense and strategic cooperation; economy, trade, energy and

technology; research, education, tourism, people to people. The first and most important

Strategic Partnership is with the US, followed by those with Great Britain, Poland, Turkey, a

shadow Strategic Partnership (not designated by this name) with Israel, a strategic

partnership on energy with Azerbaijan, an economic strategic partnership with South

Korea23.

Moreover, Romania has built up its policies in terms of avoiding strategic surprise and

avoiding to be catch on the wrong foot in any case, in security related matters. That is why,

any strategic planning is made with a plan A – clear, public, undeniable, known to everyone,

23
     Iulian Chifu, Gândire Strategică, Editura Institutului de Ştiinţe politice şi Relaţii Internaţionale al Academiei
Române, Bucureşti, 2013, ISBN: 978-973-7745-85-9, 335 p.

                                                                                                                  15

presented by every political figure as unique and without alternative, and at least two

alternative or back up plans, plan B and plan C. That’s why, Romania has built instruments

for this purpose. Since 2011 we have a strong strategic partnership with Turkey and since

2013 the Trilateral Poland-Romania-Turkey24.

The second creative instrument is B9, The Bucharest nine initiative with 9 NATO member

countries, a platform for dialogue and cooperation aimed at preparing common positions

inside the Central and Eastern European countries in order to take the best advantage and

support each other inside NATO 25 , without formalizing or institutionalizing it – never a

NATO inside NATO. The B9 is very present in the works of NATO Atlantic Council and in its

policies towards third states.

The third instrument is The Three Seas Initiative – with reference to the same area in Central

and Eastern Europe, Black Sea, Caspian Sea and Adriatic Sea. This one is an economic,

investment and trade instrument, launched in Poland as a linkage of this “New Europe” with

the US26, then continued in 2018 by Romania including Germany and the EU as observers

and invitees in order to reshape the concept and avoid any EU/US competition for the

region27. The big infrastructure projects, including energy ones, are linked with the 3 Seas

Initiative.

24
     Ministerul Afacerilor Externe (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Reuniune a Trilateralei România-
Polonia-Turcia, 28.10.2013, at https://www.mae.ro/node/22767.
25
     Ministerul Afacerilor Externe (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Declarație comună a miniștrilor de
Externe din statele Formatului Bucurșeti 9(B9), 10.10, 2017, at https://www.mae.ro/node/43571.
26
     Three Seas Initiative (3SI, TSI, I3M), also known as the Baltic, Adriatic, Black Sea (BABS) Initiative, in Polish
Presidency, Minister Szczerski: Three Seas initiative to boost European unity, 4 may 2017, at
https://www.prezydent.pl/en/news/art,425,minister-szczerski-three-seas-initiative-to-boost-european-
unity--.html.
27
     3 Seas Initiative Summit, Bucharest, 17-18.09 2018, at http://three-seas.eu/.

                                                                                                                  16

VI. FIVE GENERATIONS OF THREATS. SUPERPOSED,

              INTERTWINED, INTERDEPENDENT, AMPLIFIED

In all Romanian’s Strategic documents there’s the perception of the fact that the

globalization as a process is accelerating, the turbulences are amplified, we are recording a

high level of techtonicity and what we are living? today is what we will leave for the next

generation, the turning point being 2014 and the annexation of Crimea. The world is

becoming completely uncleared in its rearrangement and with a multiplicity of actors of any

kind and an even more complex relationship between two actors. It’s no more about white

and black, as in the Cold War times, it’s not about friend or foe, but at the same time, two

actors have three layers of relations at the same time: cooperation, competition and

confrontation. It’s important how narrow or large is a layer or another in the three layers

approach to a relationship28.

At the same page, our policies are considering that threats and risks are amplified and

multiplied. So there is not such a thing as removing a threat from the list, but it’s about

completing the list. We are always looking at the most recent and new types of threats, but

the old ones are still there. We need allies from NATO and partners from the EU, specially

the US Strategic Partner, in order to ensure the capacity and capabilities to face all threats.

There are some to which Romania cannot respond on its own, some to which Romania is the

first responder and could face those threats for a (short) period of time, some others where

we are pro-active inside the EU, trying to avoid and face the threats before they are active. In

28
     Iulian Chifu, Contopirea și influențarea reciprocă a lumilor generaționale în relațiile internaționale
contemporane, Revista Infosfera, nr. 1/2015, ISSN 2065 – 3395, pp.28-33.

                                                                                                       17

some other cases, involved is either a Romanian inter-agency, the whole of the Government,

or even the whole of the society approach and reaction is needed.

We are seeing the threats in five generations29:

The first generation of threats are the conventional military threats.

The second generation looks at security according to the Copenhagen School of security

studies (as in the NATO Strategic Concept from Rome, 1991 30 ) with five dimensions –

military, political, social, economic and environment31 – and three objects of securitization

– the state and its institutions, the society and the individual32.

The third generation are the threats comprised in emerging threats, then the emerging

challenges division of NATO 33 : energy security, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure

protection, food security, water security.

29
     Iulian Chifu, O periodizare a amenințărilor globale. Cea de a cincea generație de amenințări, Revista
Infosfera, Anul XII, nr. 1, 2020, ISSN 2065 – 3395, pp. 3-17.
30
     The Alliance's New Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the
Meeting          of        the      North     Atlantic       Council,       7-8         November,      Rome,       at
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm.
31
     The Copenhagen School of security studies is an academic school that employs a critical approach to security
studies. It is part of the post positivist movement in the field of international relations (IR), which became a
salient part of post–Cold War scholarship. See Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, Copenhagen School, în Bruce A.
Arrigo, The SAGE Encyclopedia of Surveillance, Security, and Privacy, SAGE Publications, Inc., Thousand Oaks,
ISBN: 9781483359946; Buzan Barry, Popoarele, Statele și Teama, Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2012.
32
     Buzan Barry, Popoarele, Statele și Frica, Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2014, Iulian Chifu, Gândire Strategică.....
33
     NATO’s new division: A serious look at ‘emerging security challenges’ or an attempt at shoring up relevance
and        credibility?,     ISIS    Europe      Briefing     Note,     No.       51,     September      2010,     at
https://www.natowatch.org/sites/default/files/NATOs_New_Division_0.pdf.

                                                                                                                  18

The fourth generation of threats are hybrid threats, lawfare and informational warfare

related threats. Helsinki NATO-EU Center of Excellence for Hybrid Threats is studying

them34.

And the fifth generation are the threats coming from inside our societies and where we

already have an enemy or rival taking advantage of our vulnerability. The biggest part of

them are threats coming from the impact of technology on our society and the lack of

capacity of adaptation to the speed of change.

For all the first four generations, Romania has specific instruments to approach them,

usually an inter-agency integrated effort with a national responsible institution for each

type of threat. In the case of the fifth generation, the research is going on, at this stage, with

a perspective to look into the threats to the political security – populism, nationalism,

adhocracy, leadership failures, lack of trust and confidence in decision makers and

institutions. Research is expected to deliver results and recommendation for new policies in

this field.

Last but not least, Romanian’s security policies are linked to the prospective studies. We did

develop a Romanian methodology for studying prospective evolutions on short (6-12

month), mid(3-5 years) and long term(10-15 years)35. And the good governance has also

this provision, the Government should know the possibilities and the long term evolution

of the country, the alternative futures and the possible scenarios in order to try to avoid the

34
     Greg Simons, Iulian Chifu, The Changing Face of Warfare in the 21st Century, Editura Routledge, London
and New York, 2017, ISBN 978-1-472-48212-9, 278 p.
35
     Iulian Chifu, “Prospective studies: a Romanian Metodology. Ukraine as a case study in Scenarios for a Short-
Mid-Long Term Evolution” în New Approaches in Social and Humanistic Sciences, 11-13 September 2015,
Chișinău, Republic of Moldova, Working Papers, International Conference, 16-19 April 2015, Iași, pp. 75-113,
Lumen Media Publishing UK, 2016, ISBN 978-1-910129-05-0 (ISI Thomson).

                                                                                                             19

worse case scenarios to occur, and to channel the energy on reaching the best scenario for

Romanian interests36.

This line of study has reach an important impetus lately, and the ASA – 2040 – the first

Defense Strategic Analysis, and its consequent Defense Strategic Reviews each 5 years, are a

vivid proof of this concern. The Romanian institutions did participate to both Global Trends

203037 exercise – a prospective study of the NIC-National Intelligence Committee of the US

and of the Global Future Forum, released in 2015, as well as at the future similar exercise.

36
     Ministry of Defence, Strategic Trends Programme Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2050, Sixth edition, UK,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-strategic-trends, 2 October 2018.
37
       National    Intelligence   Council,   GLOBAL     TRENDS      2030:    ALTERNATIVE       WORLDS,      at
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf.

                                                                                                          20

VII. “I SAW THE ENEMY IN THE FACE AND ITS US”

Another line of the strategic thinking in Romania and its consecutive security policies in the

next five years, is the one linked to the evolution of the human being, the society and

political class - including policies – in adapting to the evolution of technology and the speed

of change. The impact of technology to democracy is already a line of research, but the

concern is also about the evolution of the liberal democracy, the International system and

the global security concerns.

Policies should be the result of this research, done by integrating the Romanian research and

international one in common reports and policy papers. And this leads to identifying

shortcomings, lack of adaptation skills, and fragility38 of the liberal democratic system as

well as on the emergence of alternative models in the world today.

So the first threat is coming from the lack of adaptability to the impact of technology on at

least three layers: human being, society, politics. The enemy is inside the gates, and we have

to elaborate policies able to support this adaptability. In the case of Romania, we are still in

the research phase. The second part of the need for adaptability comes from the turbulences

and acceleration of globalization, the impossibility to manage this accelerated trend.

According to Romanian documents, globalization is an objective evolution, coming from

the speed, number and length of travelers, money transfers, communications at the

international level, internet activity. So the challenge is how to manage better the

38
     Taleb Nicholas Nassim, Antifragil, Editura Curtea Veche, 2014, ISBN 978-606-588-702-2, 545 p.

                                                                                                     21

globalization, without winners and loosers, to build resilience 39 , strong solid and robust

institutions or anti-fragile ones40, a liquid society41 able to adapt and resist to high level of

turbulences.

This would be about the enemy within the gates, or the enemy in the mirror. But this is not

the only challenge to the liberal democracy42. Other alternative models are at stake. The first

is China’s authoritarian capitalism, which is presented as far more efficient due to

centralization and capacity of the common action of a controlled society with a complete

rejection of human rights and a new type of social contract: obedience and supporting social

control, giving up liberties versus access to prosperity.

But this model has important shortcomings, namely the lack of capacity to react in times of

crisis, the inertia of such a big and centralized system, as well as the law level of inventivity

and initiative, once the decision is completely centralized and at lower levels everybody

expects for a Beijing decision for each action. Flexibility, adaptability, anti-fragility is less

present and the resilience comes only on the form of robustness.

The second authoritarian model is the Russian one. It could be described as the maverick in

the system: it could harm any arrangements, predetermined projects or strategies where it

is not involved. The vertical of power43, centralized economy, this authoritarian model has

39
     Iulian Chifu, Războiul hibrid și reziliența societală. Planificarea apărării hibride, Revista Infosfera, February
2018, ISSN 2065-3395, pp. 23-30.
40
     Taleb Nicholas Nassim, Op. cit.
41
     Bauman Zygmunt, Liquid Modernity, Cambridge: Polity, 2000; Umberto Eco, Cronicile unei societăți lichide,
Editura Polirom, Iași, 2016, ISBN 978-973-46-6063-6, 363 p.
42
     Iulian Chifu, China, Rusia şi apusul raţiunii împing lumea spre colapsul sistemului politic contemporan, in
Adevărul, 4 February 2020, at https://adevarul.ro/international/in-lume/china-rusia-apusul-ratiunii-
imping-lumea-colapsulsistemului-politic-contemporan-1_5e382cb25163ec4271b9bd94/index.html.
43
     Greg Simons, Iulian Chifu, Op. cit.

                                                                                                                  22

even no incentive to give in return. The social contract is to regain the status of a proud

citizen of a superpower, able to ignore laws and norms and to quickly do wars of any forms

everywhere in the world, with impunity, versus giving up liberties and a possible

opportunity for some in the society to reach the highest level of the society where prosperity

is conserved.

Vladislav Surkov, the grey eminence of Putin’s regime, and Igor Ashmanov, the head of the

informational warfare, proposed Putin’s regime as an export merchandise for the states that

want to join the authoritarian model of force44, power and strength as incentives and a strict

vertical of power, with a sovereign self-made democracy, where human rights are not a limit

to power politics inside and outside the system.

In order to fight this informational warfare 45 , a war of ideas and alternative models, the

policies of the Romanian state are aimed at combating the informational warfare and

Russian propaganda and also to disclose and to expose in public the Chinese and Russian

society, the shortcomings of each alternative system as well as the studies for improving

liberal democracy as a system but first and foremost fighting corruption – Romania has been

44
     Iulian Chifu, Putinismul ca ideologie globală: ambiţiile Rusiei de a impune prin război informaţional
modelul         său       lumii      întregi,      in      Adevărul,    22         March         2019,     at
https://adevarul.ro/international/rusia/putinismul-ideologie-globala-ambitiile-rusiei-impune-razboi-
informational-modelul-lumii-intregi-1_5c94ac4b445219c57e87aab4/index.html; Vladislav Surkov: Putin's
Long state, Center for Strategic Assessments and Forecast, 11.02.2019, at http://csef.ru/en/politica-i-
geopolitica/223/vladislav-surkov-dolgoe-gosudarstvo-putina-8806; Leonid Bershidsky, Putin Ally’s ‘Deep
State’ Twist Is Deep Russian People, A Kremlin ideologue says the secret of Putin’s resilience is an openly
acknowledged system        that   will   survive    him,   in   Bloomberg,    12     February,     2019,   at
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-12/russia-has-its-own-deep-state-it-s-called-deep-
people.
45
     Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi, Information warfare. The pattern of aggression, The Publishing House of the
Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations “Ion I. C. Brătianu” of the Romanian Academy,
Bucharest, 2016, ISBN 978-606- 8656-37-3, 554 p.

                                                                                                           23

a proud first runner on those matters – giving its general prosecutor as chief of the anti-

corruption European institution, Laura Codruta Kovesi - and come back in the original

posture after 3 years of steps back, with a government and power deposed due to a brave

reaction of the civil society.

                                                                                        24

VIII. EVOLUTION OF THE CONFLICTS OR TOWARDS

                CONFLICTS

Besides the threats of successive generations, Romania has prepared itself to face the

perspectives of an open conflict, even a conventional war. First, in 2015, the political class

signed an agreement for 2% of the GDP during the next 10 years for Defense, including the

respect of more than 20% investments in new capabilities. After the project of Target Force

200746 – for granting Romania the access to NATO – it was the first time when we had a new

target, Romanian Army 2026, with the new capability acquired with the new level of

investments, as well as with a new aim, Romanian Army 2040, the result of the ASA-

Strategic Defense Analysis that is on the way until end July 202047.

According to the documents, there are enough arguments to realize that the world is

heading to a type of conflict, and that Romania could already be a part of a type of hybrid,

informational, economic conflict of any kind right now. The arguments included in the

existing and ongoing documents are48:

46
     Eparu Dorin-Marinel, Importanţa Puterii Militare În Asigurarea Securităţii României (Importance of Military
Power in Securing Romania), September 16, 2015, Impactul transformărilor socio-economice și tehnologice
la      nivel    national,    european      si    mondial;     Nr.    4/2015,      Vol.    4,    available    at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2661331.
47
     ASA-The Strategic Analysis of Defense is suppose to deliver the details of the future Romanian Army 2040 -
Armata 2040.
48
     Iulian Chifu, Contopirea și influențarea reciprocă a lumilor generaționale în relațiile internaționale
contemporane.

                                                                                                             25

First, there is a lower level of ambition of the international community now related to

conflicts. We began aiming at peace agreements, but after Dayton, Bosnia Herzegovina and

the Middle East Peace Plan that lead to three Nobel peace prizes, the only good news came

from the Columbia peace plan, that is enforced and applied as we speak – even more

astonishing since we are talking about the resolution of a long war. Now we moved our level

of ambition to cease fire agreements and even lower, to deconflictualisation zones and rules

of engagement, accepting that in those conflicts, people die every day.

Second, the system of confidence building and arms control agreements has fallen. From

ABM Treaty, to the revised CFE Treaty, together with the INF Treaty and even the Open Sky

Treaty, all are at stake. START 2 revised of Start 3, the strategic nuclear balance treaty is due

to expire in 2021, and negotiations are far from any intention to begin.

Third, the leadership of the main players moved more to a military one, with an approach

and influence far more general towards military solutions, once the problems of war and

peace are back even in regions considered safe and peaceful. In the Russian Federation,

decision is influenced more and more by the top brass, Sergey Gerasimov and Sergey Shoigu,

the General Chief of staff and the famous name on the military doctrine of the Russian

Federation and the Minister of Defense. In the US, there’s a new fashion to have as Secretary

of State, chief of the CIA, Secretary of Defense, chief of Presidential Staff, National Security

advisor, generals or military staff. A study in this field proved an acceleration of this military

presence in key decision-making positions after the Cold War, especially after 2016.

Fourth, for the first time after the Cold War, actually since the Cuban Missiles Crisis (1962),

the nuclear powers, Russia and the US, are face to face, eye to eye, one side and the other of

a demarcation line running from the Grand North, via Norway, Sweden, Finland and the

                                                                                              26

Baltics, Poland, Ukraine and the Black Sea, Turkey, Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.

There are current skirmishes, provocations in the air and at the sea, but also direct fights

with killings from one side and the other of the two nuclear powers. This lead to a possibility

of escalation in any point in time, if this relation in common spaces is not properly managed

and if we cannot cope with the perspective of an emerging conflict.

In any case, this leads us to a conclusion: war is far more probable, so we need training,

policies, defense and deterrence, or at least protection, together with diplomacy and

negotiation skills in order to avoid or to prevent war, or at least to stop it before an escalation

towards a full intensity war. The world evolves faster and faster towards more instability and

a possible war of a certain kind.

                                                                                               27

IX. RETURNING TO HARD POWER. NEW-OLD THREATS:

              HYPERSONIC MISSILES AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.

Last but not least, besides the threat coming from the annexation of Crimea and its

consecutive militarization, a Kaliningrad plus type of military land carrier with a possibility

to project force, there are other Romanian concern related to very strict and pure hard power

threats. The need to find ways in order to confront or at least to deter such military threats is

on the table and policy alternatives are to be considered rather sooner than later.

The first is about the entrance of Russia in the hypersonic era. We believe or not in the

technological achievements – presented by Vladimir Putin before his reelection in march

2018 – with all nuances and accidents, including a nuclear explosion, Russia has reported

five batteries of hypersonic missiles 49 , all situated in the European part. No responsible

government will ever ignore this evolution, once again, in spite of a lot of technological

shortcomings related to this project. Until the US presents its version of hypersonic

missiles50 , we still need to move things ahead and find solutions other than protection –

countering or deter those capabilities.

The second area of concern is the cyber defense. Here things are far more elaborated and

closer to a technological solution. At least, there’s a clear political definition of deterrence in

the cyber space: a virus at the entrance in any protected server that allows the access of

designated and welcomed visitors – with a genuine antivirus, and with the possibility to

49
     BBC,    Russia    deploys    Avangard   hypersonic   missile    system,     27    December,      2019,   at
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50927648.
50
     White    House,    Remarks    by   President   Donald   Trump     on      Iran,   8   January,   2020,   at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-iran/.

                                                                                                              28

trace and destroy each system that access without permission a protected server. It solves

both identification of an alien – hacker or attacker - and retaliates by destroying its digital

capabilities.

The third area of concern is the nuclear deterrence. In the case of the INF Treaty, there’s a

possibility – to be established in terms of concrete figure for its probability – to have a nuclear

presence near Romania’s borders (as we have in the case of the hypersonic missiles). In that

case, there’s an urgent need to forge suitable strategy to deter such a perspective or if that’s

not possible, at least the use of such a weapon. Romania already hosts the NATO anti-

ballistic missile system in Deveselu, with 24 interceptors for short and medium range

missiles. The study should cover alternative solutions for this type of threat.

On the conventional side, Romania hosts and participate to the NATO exercises in the

Eastern Flank of NATO and the EU, alternatively, one year in the southern tier, and the other

in the northern part of the Eastern Flank. Training and building capabilities comes also with

training inter-agency and societal resilience.

Far from being an example or assuming a leading role even in the region, Romania tries to

adapt to the evolution of the current turbulent world and to avoid past historical mistakes.

On another note, being the second major player in the Eastern Flank, together with Poland,

Romania assumes its responsibilities as NATO ally in the region as well as those related to

its membership inside the EU, protecting borders and fighting multiple threats in our very

region. With humbleness enough time to learn and adapt, with cleaver prevention and

strategic knowledge, we could rate our country in the first half of prepared countries for an

possible military confrontation, even though there’s a sense that Romania is less interesting

as a target that other European and Euro-Atlantic actors.

                                                                                               29