REPORT OF THE 2013 ELECTION REVIEW PANEL
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REPORT OF THE
2013 ELECTION REVIEW
PANEL
CUPE 3787REPORT OF THE 2013 ELECTION
REVIEW PANEL
November 2013
Introduction
Our Party has a laudable record as government in
The May 2013 provincial election results are a BC. We spearheaded major changes to BC’s labour
source of frustration and profound disappointment laws, reformed land use planning and established a
for everyone connected to the BC New Democratic successful system of public auto insurance under
Party. For party members, activists and supporters the Barrett government in the 1970s. In the 1990s,
it represented a lost opportunity, the opportunity during two consecutive terms as government, NDP
to finally put BC back on the right track after 12 governments improved access to post-secondary
years of reckless BC Liberal rule. For NDP MLAs education, placed limits on class size in K-12
the results offset the strong showing over the last education and established a world class system of
four years as they held the government to account protected areas across the province.
for their numerous failures and scandals. For BC Across Canada, New Democrats have shown
NDP campaign staff and volunteers the results similar leadership, forming government in four
undid the months of hard work and organizing other provinces and the Yukon. In Manitoba,
that took place not just during the 28 days of the the provincial NDP has held government for
campaign, but also in the months leading up to almost fifteen years. At the federal level, under
that campaign. Despite those deeply felt reactions, the leadership of the late Jack Layton, the federal
the BC NDP must not let those frustrations New Democrats are now the Official Opposition
and disappointment define our efforts over the in the House of Commons. That legacy of electoral
next four years to build both a strong political success serves as a reminder to Party members
organization capable of winning in 2017 and an here in BC that it is through our shared values as
effective Opposition in the Legislature to hold the New Democrats that we will be able to gain the
new government accountable over the next four confidence and support we need to win in 2017.
years.
1Election Review
It’s with that perspective in mind that the Provincial Cindy Oliver, President of the Federation of Post-
Executive of the BC NDP tasked the Review Panel Secondary Educators and chair; Andy Ross, former
to evaluate the Party’s 2013 campaign and assess President of the Canadian Office and Professional
the changes needed to ensure electoral success in Employees Union, Local 378; Eugene Kostyra,
four years. The review Panel’s Terms of Reference former Manitoba cabinet minister and senior
included: advisor to Premier Gary Doer; and Pam Sihota,
• Evaluating the 2013 campaign with a a law student in Terrace, BC. The Panel members
view to determining the reasons for the loss volunteered their time to undertake this review.
including a review and assessment of the Budget constraints limited the means by which the
strategies and tactics of the BC NDP 2013 Panel was able to gather input, however, that did
campaign. not prevent thousands of activists and members
from completing online surveys and drafting
• Identifying the successes that should be
written submissions. The Panel also received survey
built upon.
information from candidates who ran in the 2013
• Recommending steps to make election; over 25% of those who ran for the BC
improvements and prepare a winning strategy NDP in the election provided us with information
in 2017. from their online survey. As well, several candidates
• Ensuring that the review assessed also provided the Panel with written submissions
constituency preparation, technical and that addressed their concerns about the 2013
logistical preparations, communications, campaign. The labour movement was also a major
fundraising, central campaign decision contributor to the Review Panel’s work, providing
making, selection of campaign leadership, written submissions as well as participating in
advertising and media relations, ethnic a direct interview with Panel members. While
outreach, voter contact, candidate selection, the Provincial Office and Staff were extremely
relationship between the central and local supportive through all of our work, a number
campaigns, platform and policy development, of documents, including the campaign strategy,
role of the leader, stakeholder relations were not available and others, such as polling and
including with community leaders, business, focus group reports arrived late and could not be
social movement, ethnic communities, reviewed. Having access to those documents in a
environmental movement, affiliated unions, timely fashion would have provided the Panel with
and labour movement. additional background data on various aspects of
the campaign as well as information used in the
• Reviewing and assessing the BC NDP’s
development of both the Party’s platform and the
broader relationship with the voters of British
campaign’s key strategic decisions.
Columbia including an examination the
BC NDP’s base of support compared to the The input gathered from Party members and
changing demographics of the population and activists came primarily from an online survey.
the impact of vote splitting with other parties. Over 3,000 party members completed the
survey, providing the Panel with a strong starting
The Review Panel was appointed by the Provincial
point for the drafting of this report. The written
Executive in late July, but began its formal process
submissions from candidates, campaign managers,
of review in late August. The members include
2Election Review
Constituency Associations, Party Committees and lead to the resignation of Mr. Campbell and the
MLAs also contributed invaluably to the drafting potential demise of the province’s right-wing
exercise. As well, through a series of interviews coalition.
with the Leader, key staff, the Provincial Office When it was announced, Mr. Campbell hoped, no
and the Campaign Team, the Panel was able doubt, that whatever controversy it spawned would
to develop further insights into the details of be short-lived. He was wrong. It created enormous
the campaign. We have summarized, as much tensions within his Cabinet and within sectors
as possible, all of the input into this report. Our of the province’s business community. There was
summary has been divided into a number of key a widespread public backlash as well, one that
themes that emerged over the course of our review. undercut BC Liberal support across wide sections
Those themes reflect not only the important of their traditional voter base. More significantly for
chronological narrative of the campaign and its the BC NDP, it created the opportunity to brand
lead-up, but also some of the important strategic the BC Liberals as untrustworthy and dishonest. It
questions that everyone from the Party Leader to took until the Fall of 2010 for the full impact of the
the campaign volunteers struggled with during the HST fiasco to finally force Mr. Campbell to resign.
campaign itself. In the final section of this report
The ensuing leadership contest for the BC Liberals
we outline the major recommendations from our
did little to repair the damage done by the HST.
review. We recognized early on in our process that
Although Christy Clark won the leadership,
some aspects of our review would require follow-on
she faced a divided Caucus. The prospect that a
work by all levels of the Party. Where appropriate,
province-wide referendum on the HST could well
the recommendations flag those areas where this
force her government to withdraw it loomed large.
follow-up work is needed.
As well, her initial plan to call a snap election in
BC’s Shifting Political Landscape, 2010-2013 mid-2011 faced stiff opposition within her Caucus
It would be a mistake to simply look at the results and Cabinet. Unable to push through on that plan,
of the May election as being the culmination of Clark was forced to launch a legislative session
28 days on the campaign trail. In the months and in the fall of 2011, a session in which she had no
years leading up to the start of the campaign, key substantial agenda to advance.
events, especially those affecting the BC Liberals, During this period the BC NDP MLAs succeeded
had a major impact on the strategies implemented in framing the new Premier and her government
during the 28-day campaign. as lacking both the mandate and an agenda that
Within the first sixty days of winning the 2009 had any measure of support among BC voters.
election, the BC Liberals unveiled one of the most As Clark lurched from one legislative gaffe to
cynical flip-flops in the history of the province: their another, it became increasingly obvious that she
decision to implement the Harmonized Sales Tax lacked the policy depth needed to run the province.
(HST). The announcement made by then-Premier That pattern continued through to the end of the
Gordon Campbell and his Finance Minister Colin legislative session in March 2013 during which
Hansen unleashed a firestorm within the public at time Clark’s approval ratings plummeted, divisions
large as well as within the ranks of their party and within her party became more public and the sense
their supporters, a firestorm that would eventually
3Election Review
that her government had simply “run out of ideas” the campaign was another example of a missed
and was headed for electoral defeat became more opportunity on the part of the BC NDP campaign
widespread in the minds of voters. to define Clark and her track record as Premier.
During this period as well, BC Liberal support ‘Memo to File’ and Attack Ads
trended steadily downward. The shift in public Having won the NDP leadership race Adrian
opinion, while good news for the BC NDP, became Dix faced a very specific challenge: addressing the
something of a two-edged sword. As Clark’s policy “memo to file” issue. Certainly the legislative press
and political failings became more evident and gallery was well versed on the issue and was quick
her prospects in May 2013 looked increasingly to question him on it after he won the leadership
grim, the BC NDP was seen as a “government in in April 2011. His response at the time was direct,
waiting”. That label tended to shift the focus away thoughtful and appeared to satisfy many who
from further scrutiny of the Clark government’s thought that the issue was behind him.
prospects and, instead, intensify the scrutiny of the
However, for BC Liberal supporters, the memo
BC NDP’s prospects as a new government.
issue became the centerpiece of a well-funded series
It’s important to note that during the Spring of attack ads designed to undermine the public’s
2013 legislative session, the Official Opposition perception of Dix. Those ads began to roll out in
landed one of their most stunning blows on the early 2013 at a time when BC Liberal support had
BC Liberals when it tabled material that revealed fallen dramatically. Adrian’s public response, both
a broadly-based government-side partisan plan, in the early days of his leadership bid and during
coordinated by government staff, all designed to the height of these attack ads, stressed that he was
secure “quick wins”—and therefore BC Liberal committed to staying positive and not engaging in
support—within key ethnic communities around personal attacks. In the early part of 2013, during
the province. The revelations led to the dismissal which these ads were pervasive, public support
of senior staff in the Premier’s Office, ridicule by for the NDP continued to remain strong. That
provincial media, open hostility within the BC outcome convinced many that “staying positive”
Liberal Caucus directed at Clark, but most of all, had merit as a strategic approach to the 2013
a humiliating acknowledgement by Clark that campaign.
the plan was a flagrant misuse of public resources.
In talking to communication specialists, it’s
Moreover, the scandal was seen as a calculated and
clear that focus group response to the notion
cynical attempt by her party to win support among
of staying positive can have a certain amount of
ethnic voters.
attraction. However, as one observer put it, “focus
The quick win scandal, which came at the end of groups always like the positive, but the reality is,
the legislative session, was further evidence that negative ads stick”. Complicating the strategy of
Clark’s government had lost the moral authority staying positive was the confusion around what
to govern. However, as many have commented that constituted. In fact, as the Party moved
during this review, the fact that the scandal was closer and closer to the election, the bar on what
largely ignored through most of the run-up to the staying positive meant kept moving up. How that
election and throughout all but the final weeks of happened is still difficult to discern precisely, but
certainly the provincial media found the “staying
positive” proposition a point to which they could
4Election Review
return again and again to assess the Party’s ensured strong support for the platform elements
commitment to this principle. In effect, by making as well as strong buy-in on what would be advanced
the declaration of staying positive a key part of the during the campaign.
campaign strategy (both pre-writ and during the If there were drawbacks to the platform
28 day campaign), the Party found itself faced with development process, they were in areas of
a media that was constantly testing the bounds communication. Many of the submissions and
of what constituted “positive”. Many commented interviews noted that the platform was difficult to
that by the time the writ was dropped in April, summarize into a succinct message that average
the notion of positive was foreclosing many of the voters and party supporters could easily understand
traditional ways in which the NDP has worked to and enthusiastically support. Compared to other
define and frame the governing party during an election campaign platforms, it seemed to reflect
election. the image of a party seeking re-election rather than
Preparing for the Campaign an Opposition seeking to replace an incumbent
As early as 2010, the BC NDP had developed government.
and approved a strategic plan that detailed key From presentations made to the Review Panel it’s
elements that would guide the Party’s efforts to apparent that while there was a formal Election
win government in 2013. Those elements included Planning Committee structure that included
building a stronger connection between all levels representatives from all levels of the Party, that
of the Party, making a greater effort to improve Committee was not actively involved in the
fundraising, and creating a concerted effort to development of that campaign strategy or its
diminish the BC Liberals’ support base given the eventual roll-out. This disconnect reflects the
self-inflicted damage that the BC Liberals had prevailing view that the priority during the months
launched with the HST. The plan also included a leading up to the election campaign and the release
renewed emphasis on activating our base within of the platform was more focused on managing
BC’s growing ethnic communities. expectations rather than taking on the BC Liberal
While that strategic plan remained in place track record.
throughout the 2010-2013 period, its interpretation Complicating matters was the fact that the final
and implementation varied. Certainly on the release of the platform was subject to numerous
fundraising front, the Party adopted a more delays and amendments, changes brought on by
aggressive approach, one that produced significant tax changes made by the BC Liberals in 2013 and
increases, especially in the 12 months prior to the an overarching commitment to table a fully-costed
May election. platform. Both the delay and the eventual roll out
The same 12 month period also saw a concerted of the platform in the first week of the campaign
effort at platform development. In fact, many have only served to further emphasize the view that
commented that the 2013 platform was the most our bid to win government lacked a clear, concise
comprehensive and detailed platform document and appealing message to our universe of potential
that the party has ever produced. NDP MLAs voters.
have stressed that the platform development effort All of these complications speak to the strategic
was also a unity building exercise, an outcome that decision to craft a platform document that
was more heavily weighted to the views of “a
5Election Review
government in waiting” rather than a platform that hard to reduce outstanding debts and build capacity
spoke to the aspirations and priorities of voters. By for either an early election call or the fixed date in
comparison, the BC Liberals gave little weight to May 2013.
their election platform; it was released before the The financial strains of the Provincial Office
writ was dropped, spoke about their commitment affected two critical areas: the long overdue
to jobs and the economy and was largely ignored changes to the Party’s voter contact and database
through most of the campaign. Their focus during system and election readiness. Part of that readiness
the campaign was to have their leader appear at included the development of opposition research.
workplaces, talk endlessly about the promise of However, that research appeared to be a difficult
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and have allies and area for the Party because of its limited resources.
Cabinet Ministers attack the NDP. While their As a result, the bulk of that research work was done
promises were paper-thin and their track record by campaign staff. While that effort did produce a
as government was deplorable, their strategic core of useful material, effectively deploying that
approach in the campaign was to downplay all of information was encumbered by the confusion
those weaknesses and emphasize a message that over how the use of this research would square with
played well with voters. In the end, it worked. There the overarching commitment to “stay positive”.
is an important campaign lesson in all of that, one “Failing to prosecute the BC Liberals” took many
that our side failed to recognize. forms and certainly effective opposition research
Party Infrastructure was another example of the collateral impacts that
The financial strains of maintaining a strong and the staying positive directive had on what should
effective Provincial Office are a problem that has have been a basic part of the Party’s infrastructure.
a long history in BC. In between elections the The problems and inadequacies of the Provincial
Provincial Office has had to devote much of its Office’s voter contact data base—NDP Vote—
time and limited resources to either paying down have been a source of frustration for many years.
debts from the previous election or building up To its credit, the Provincial Office recognized this
resources needed for the next election. However, for and took steps to develop a new system starting in
much of the last decade it has struggled with both 2010. The proposed new system was initiated by
simultaneously; that was certainly the situation the federal Party and was designed to incorporate
that the Provincial Office faced after the 2009 new methods of voter identification that merged
election as it contended with a $2 million debt federal and provincial data and provided capacity
while trying to anticipate and prepare for an early for ‘real time updates’ that would help Constituency
election call once the BC Liberals emerged from Associations refine voter support both before
their leadership convention. The financial strains the campaign began and over the course of the
were compounded by the demands of the federal 28 day campaign. Delays in the development of
party as it mobilized for a federal election in 2011. this new system forced the Provincial Office to
In addition, much of the NDP’s traditional donor default to the existing system, NDP Vote, and
base in BC was also being tapped by fundraising work on improvements to that system rather than
efforts at the municipal level, where the three year incorporate a whole new system.
election cycle competed for fundraising support Developing a more robust system of voter contact
at a time when the Provincial Office was working information is a major priority for the Provincial
6Election Review
Office. Although the shared approach to the information has been developed indicates that
development of this new system will help make data quality is just as important as software. That
the transition more affordable, it’s important to means having the capacity to continuously sift
recognize that if the NDP expects to be a viable through data sources and find ways to cross-check
political force provincially, it has to have the information to ensure accuracy and reliability.
modern infrastructure needed to be that force. Putting that capacity in place is an on-going
In an earlier section we described how fundraising investment that needs to be made along with any
efforts improved significantly in the 2011-13 improvements in voter contact systems.
period. A major factor behind those increases was Polling
the commitment by all levels of the Party to set One of the most bedeviling, distracting and in
meaningful and aggressive fundraising targets for many ways de-mobilizing factors in the May 2013
fundraising. The result, by 2013, was that most provincial election was polling. The sizeable leads
Constituency Associations were fully funded for that the NDP enjoyed in the year prior to the
the 2013 campaign and that funding carried over election contributed to the growing sense within
to local surpluses following the campaign. There’s the legislative press gallery, media pundits and
no question that the success of those efforts certainly Party activists that support among BC
was also tied to the perception that we would voters for the BC Liberals was in an irreversible
form government after May 14. Had we formed downward spiral that would lead to their certain
government, the prospect of election finance defeat on May 14. However, on election night
reform would have changed the fundraising those provincial polling results proved to be very
efforts for all parties. However, with the loss in wrong, so wrong in fact that many have grave
May comes the reality that the Party will have to doubts about the reliability of polling methods and
rely on broadening its fundraising base, a change accuracy. A working group was formed by the panel
that makes the overhaul of the Provincial Office’s to look specifically at the issue of communications
member and voter identification all the more and polling. Their observations and conclusions
urgent. With a more sophisticated system in place, have been incorporated into the recommendations
the Provincial Office would have the capacity to section of our report, but for the purpose of this
target fundraising in ways that avoid the blanket report, we think it is important to emphasize a few
outreach efforts that some members find either key factors about polling and the role those polls
irritating or redundant. One last point on voter played in the election outcome.
contact information systems: those familiar with
In the post-election analysis done by a number
them stress that whatever changes are made, data
of the prominent pollsters it is now obvious that
quality and training are critical to the effectiveness
sampling methods and voting intentions of those
of any upgrade.
sampled in any of the polls done during the
It is also important to recognize that simply campaign played a critical role in misrepresenting
having the software capability to track supporters real voter support. The polling that was done in
and improve voter contact information does not the domain polls over-weighted the views of those
completely address the technical issues associated 35 years and younger, a group that has a low voter
with this kind of data. The experience in other participation rate. In effect, the pollsters gathered
jurisdictions where more robust voter contact the views of people who were unlikely to cast
7Election Review
a ballot. The polls also underrepresented non- as a vote about the NDP, not about the incumbent
English speaking households in their surveys. In a government’s track record over the last twelve years.
province where ethnic diversity is on the rise and And given the overarching directive that the NDP
ethnic voters represent substantial voting blocks campaign would stay positive, the combination
in many ridings, not having their views reflected of staying positive and having the focus on “us”
in a poll (or only partially reflected because of instead of “them” proved lethal. Christy Clark was
underweighting) will grossly distort the true level able, either through surrogates or through her own
of support recorded in the poll results. campaign, to attack the NDP and raise doubts
While the constant refrain heard in the run-up to in the minds of voters. The NDP, on the other
the election campaign and during the campaign hand, limited itself to talking about the details
period was that the polls would tighten up the in its platform and not taking head on—at least
closer one got to May 14, there didn’t appear to not until the last week of the campaign—the BC
be any substantial effort, either by MLAs prior Liberal track record or the more fundamental ballot
to the election or within the campaign team as it question of whether the BC Liberals deserved
prepared for the election, to more carefully analyze another term as government.
the public domain polling results. Instead, what In terms of Party-generated polling, the major
seemed to develop is a belief that somehow the BC mistake made in this election was that absence of
Liberal vote would either not recover its traditional polling in the target ridings which the Party had
base of support or would not turn out to vote on to win if it hoped to form government. Although
May 14. Both assumptions proved wrong. a comprehensive, large sample size poll was done
The favourable polling numbers also engendered in February-March 2013, target riding specific
a strong sense that the NDP was a government in polling was not done in the period between then
waiting. The impact of that perception was felt in and May 14th. Difficulties in getting sufficient
many ways throughout the twelve months prior to response rates at the riding level were cited as
May 2013. It fed the view that if the NDP was a major problems in this regard. In the next section
government in waiting, it had to sound and behave on the campaign we will talk in more detail about
as though it was government. That, in turn, shifted the target riding strategy, but it is important to
thinking from what would appeal to voters to what note that one of the reality checks that should have
needed to be done to manage expectations. The guided the Party’s overall strategy, both in the pre-
net effect of that effort was that the Party’s base of campaign and campaign periods, should have been
support found itself with fewer and fewer platform a careful assessment of voter sentiments, priorities
options that could generate the excitement or and voting intentions in these target ridings. In the
inspiration needed to mobilize in their respective absence of consistent polling in these targets, the
communities. The strong polling numbers also fed Party and the campaign had no specific sense of
a sense of complacency among Party supporters— just how volatile voter intentions were, who was
the BC Liberals are imploding and our job is to being affected by what arguments in the campaign
stand aside and let them fall. and whether key elements of the platform and
campaign message were resonating with voters in
Both impacts shifted the ground in ways that
those ridings.
would prove very problematic. As BC Liberal
support declined, voters saw the May 14 election
8Election Review
Communications or when key shifts were made in policy. In
From our review of submissions and documents, several instances, the central campaign had
the following communications issues appear to little or no briefing material for local campaigns
have had a major impact on the success of the when significant events or policy changes were
campaign: in play. That gap left local campaigns to fend
for themselves in putting together speaking
• The campaign allowed the media and the notes or background information.
BC NDP’s opponents to define negative in
the broadest possible way, and to extend the • The campaign did not have an effective
prohibition on negative to the NDP’s natural ethnic media strategy, leaving the campaign
supporters. Moreover, it provided no real vulnerable to aggressive and hostile attack ads
room for the campaign to provide contrast in various non-English speaking media.
based arguments against Christy Clark and • The campaign was not competitive in
her record and character at any point in the coverage in print, radio and television in
campaign. For the NDP to do so would have languages other than English.
reinforced the negatives the Liberals were • The campaign failed to conduct sufficient
attaching to the NDP leader on trust and research to determine support for its messages
consistency. and policy decisions amongst first and second
• The campaign allowed the BC Liberals generation British Columbians from Asian
to define the NDP and Adrian Dix rather and South Asian backgrounds.
than prosecute the BC Liberals’ track record • The central campaign did not have readily
as government. The BC Liberals succeeded in available spokespeople and translation capacity
defining the NDP as a tax-and-spend party. in languages other than English.
Not surprisingly, mainstream media portrayed
It is also important to emphasize the role that paid
the platform commitments as “spending”,
advertising plays in any campaign. How large a
not memorable, practical changes for people’s
budget the Party has for that advertising is always
lives. As a consequence, undecided voters
subject to the pressures of fundraising. Just as
were susceptible to the BC Liberal assertion
important is the question of placement and target
that the NDP was going to increase spending
audience for that advertising. Overall though,
and taxes. Moreover, those voters were unable
the advertising needs to reinforce the campaign’s
to identify how that spending would benefit
central message. In that regard, the problems cited
them.
earlier with the campaign lacking a clear succinct
• The apparent ballot question developed by message that could inspire voter support also had
the campaign was cautious and uninspiring, an impact on the 2013 paid advertising.
in part a product of being constrained from
Online Survey Input
providing a sufficient negative contrast to the
BC Liberals and their leader. The Review Panel used a web-based approach to
gather input from Party members and activists.
• The central campaign appeared to
The Panel had a website through which we were
lack strong internal communication when
able to provide regular updates to Party members.
important issues emerged during the campaign
With technical help from Provincial Office, we
9Election Review
also drafted an online survey that allowed members • When it came to the strategy of the
the opportunity to reply directly to the Panel on campaign, over two-thirds of respondents did
issues that they believed were critical to our review. not feel that the strategy was well explained to
Although there were over 3,000 responses to the them.
online survey, the useable data from that survey • A similar pattern of response was evident
was closer to 2,500 (duplications and incomplete when asked about support for local campaigns;
surveys accounted for the bulk of the netting two thirds said that their local campaign did
down of the survey results). A summary of some not have what it needed from the central
of the key findings from the survey included the campaign. Many cited problems with outdated
following: list information as a problem in their local
• The surveys were submitted from all campaign.
regions of the province. Approximately one- • Respondents also felt the Party’s ethnic
quarter of those completing the survey were outreach efforts were not effective; over 70%
from Interior and North Coast ridings. of respondents were not convinced that the
Another one-third came from Vancouver ethnic outreach effort was in any way sufficient.
Island ridings. The remaining 42% were from
As well, the Panel received input from many local
ridings located in the greater Lower Mainland
Candidates. Their feedback included the following:
area.
• They expressed a need to have more
• The level of involvement in the campaign
flexibility to include local issues in their local
spanned a broad cross-section of activity. The
campaigns.
majority of those completing the survey were
involved in their local riding campaign in • All found the support and talent of their
some form of voluntary activity that included local Campaign Managers an enormous asset.
canvassing or local campaign support. • Most Candidates expressed concern that
• In terms of key issues that the respondents the attack ads were “sticking” with local voters.
thought needed to be emphasized in the • Several Candidates expressed frustration
campaign and the platform, the economy, the about disconnects between their campaign
environment, jobs, education and health care and the planning of the central campaign.
were the dominant issues cited in the survey.
The Panel also heard from Campaign Man-
• A slight majority—about 54%—also said agers. A separate survey was drafted and sent
that they felt their issues were not reflected in to those managers. Seventy-one surveys were
the Party’s platform document. completed and returned for our review. Their
• A larger majority—close to three-quarters comments were very useful and some of the
of respondents on this question—said that key points raised by those managers includ-
the campaign’s advertising did not reflect the
ed the following:
• The majority of managers were unsure of
issues that they wanted the Party to address in
the value of micro-targeting.
the campaign.
• 40% said they were successful in pulling
their marks.
10Election Review
• Close to 70% of the managers were social media presence was effective; however, it’s
satisfied or very satisfied with the support of not clear that the benefit was proportional to the
the provincial office. resources and time allocated to that effort. The
• A reoccurring theme for many managers rapid response efforts and the daily “reality check”
was the need for a new database, more pieces were deemed a success. While there were
training and preparation and more two way a few examples of gaps in pulling together and
communication with the central campaign. equipping the central campaign office as well as
supporting local campaigns, those gaps did not
The Campaign
appear to be overly problematic. The campaign
At the risk of overstating the obvious, campaigns tour arrangements were also well-resourced
matter. An election is, in many respects, the from a technical perspective. Tour logistics were
culmination of four years of effort, both inside thoroughly mapped out and had the capacity to
and outside the Legislature, for a political party to make changes where and when necessary.
present itself, its leader and its platform to voters.
Those operational strengths, however, masked
During the course of 28 days a party works to
a number of critical internal problems. As
capture the interest and ultimately the support
mentioned earlier, the campaign did not have
of voters. At a granular level, the campaign is
a succinct, clearly articulated core message that
how a political party penetrates beyond its base
resonated strongly with voters. That deficiency
of committed voters to convince undecided and
was further compounded by the constraints of
“leaners” to support their candidates.
staying positive, constraints that effectively barred
Winning support beyond a party’s base of both the provincial and local campaigns from
committed voters is no easy task. Modern using Christy Clark’s name in campaign literature.
campaigns have many moving parts that must be That particular constraint added one more barrier
synchronized enough that key objectives are met, to convincing undecided voters and leaners that
often on a daily basis. Modern campaigns also the ballot question was about her track record as
need to be strategically flexible and have the ability Premier and whether the BC Liberals deserved
to understand quickly what’s working and what another term as government.
isn’t. In this regard it seems that the testing of our
The campaign also suffered because of internal
campaign messages and vulnerabilities was either
tensions over whether or when to make shifts in
ignored or discounted by key decision-makers
the campaign. While those kinds of tensions are
within the campaign team. Whether that was done
not new to campaigns, they can have an adverse
because domain polling showed such a large lead
impact, and they certainly did in the 2013
for the NDP is still unclear, but the take-away for
campaign. While opposing views within the
our Panel is that constant testing and re-testing of
campaign team have become more apparent in
our core message needs to be central to the design
the post-election period, it is critical, in terms of
of all future campaigns.
campaign discipline, that the Campaign Manager
At a technical level, many parts of the NDP must take greater responsibility for not only
campaign infrastructure were very strong and well- resolving these counterproductive tensions, but
resourced. The central office staffing was in place also recognizing the vulnerabilities of the overall
well before the campaign began. The campaign’s campaign and have the capacity to direct needed
11Election Review
changes in strategy when and where needed. From message that either the media or undecided voters
reports we received it appears that confusion over could grasp and it became obvious that the longer
the role that the Campaign Manager needed to we spent rolling out the platform, the more we
play in terms of resolving internal tensions had an were making the first week of the campaign about
adverse impact on the overall campaign. the NDP as a “government in waiting” than about
From comments, interviews and submissions the BC Liberals’ twelve year record of government
made to the Panel, it was also clear that the “failure in BC.
to prosecute the BC Liberals” was a major source Many presenters acknowledge that the BC NDP
of frustration for many local constituencies. These will always be framed as a party that advocates
comments go to the heart of a long standing debate for better public services and programs. No one
about how much latitude local constituencies have suggested that we should change that fundamental
during the campaign period. As Panel members, approach. However, many commented that in a
we understand the importance of running a campaign to capture the attention and support of
disciplined campaign, but because of the staying undecided voters, talking up what the incumbent
positive directive and the stifling effect it had has done wrong is a more persuasive force in a
on attacking the BC Liberal track record, party campaign than allowing the incumbent to shift the
activists, especially at the local level, felt stymied debate onto what you would do differently.
by this directive. Invariably, the major challenge for the BC NDP
It is important to remember that one of the is to provide a strong narrative to voters that
traditional strengths of the NDP in this province addresses their concerns about jobs and the
has been our capacity to run strong local campaigns. economy. For all her faults as Premier—and there
The fact that many local campaigns expressed a are many—Christy Clark the campaigner followed
frustration with their inability to highlight their a tightly scripted plan in which her core message
issues within their campaign speaks to the need and daily visuals were all about those issues. In
for the Party to consider ways to provide latitude contrast, our campaign did not follow a similar
to local campaigns and candidates that re-build a path. Daily visuals of the Leader did not show the
strength that has long been key to NDP electoral same connections, a fact that is at odds with the
success. NDP’s long history of support within the labour
Similar frustrations were expressed about the way movement and for working families. The notion of
in which the Party’s platform was rolled out. The a tightly scripted message within each campaign
decision to have an extended roll-out designed event was also a major failing. It remains unclear
to twin elements of the platform with various to our Panel as to how that failure was allowed to
BC Liberal Cabinet Minister’s ridings seemed persist, but certainly competing views within the
confusing to many. It did not have the desired campaign team about how that scripting should
impact of focusing the campaign on the BC Liberal work contributed to this problem.
track record. Instead, it seemed to shift the spotlight The campaign’s target riding strategy had its own
onto the details of our platform, leaving the BC set of problems. While the initial view of the
Liberals the opportunity to portray our platform strategy was pragmatic and guided by a coherent
as “all about spending”. Add to that the fact that analysis of polling results from previous elections
our platform was not easily summarized into a core and an on-the-ground assessment of where NDP
12Election Review
candidates could realistically defeat BC Liberal The experience in 2013 was that we have some
incumbents, several problems emerged. Inevitably, major gaps that need to be closed. Our ability to
those ridings not on the target list were quick to effectively communicate in languages other than
advance their objection. As well, during the course English needs to be improved. Part of that effort
of the campaign there was a push to expand the needs to focus on the distinct media landscape that
list even though the resources needed to support has developed in BC to serve the diverse ethnic
that expansion were not in place. To what extent communities in the province. Having the necessary
that push was a reflection of an over-confident language capacity will make the outreach effort
assessment of voter support is unclear; however, with those media that much more effective.
in hindsight it appears that deviating from the Candidate selection also means candidate support
original target strategy was a campaign misstep. and candidate vetting. From the information
Add to that the failure to do polling and focus received by the Panel, it appears that both areas
group testing linked to the target ridings and the need improvement. To what extent those changes
possibility for error in how the overall campaign will require amendments to the Party constitution
worked increased considerably. and practices is an open question at this point;
Re-Engaging with BC Voters however, if the Party hopes to field a strong list
Our Party has a proud history of defending of candidates in 2017, work needs to begin today
communities across BC. Whether it was the to both identify strong potential candidates from
major changes to labour laws, land use planning, BC’s diverse ethnic communities and to support
the successful launch of public auto insurance those candidates as we move closer to the next
done by the Barrett government in the 1970s or election.
the improvements to education at both the K-12 The Party’s connection to the BC labour movement
and post-secondary levels during two successive is also critical to any successful rebuilding effort;
terms during the 1990s, the BC NDP has had an BC’s labour movement is a founding partner
enormously positive impact on our province. Over of the NDP. That historic connection reflects a
the next four years we need to position ourselves commitment of shared values. The fight for social
to advance those efforts in 2017. Part of that shift and economic justice that is so central to the
will mean improving the inclusiveness within our principles of the BC NDP is also a key priority
Party. for the labour movement. When unions organize
The BC NDP has made great advances in and bring voice, respect and better conditions to
supporting a nomination process that gives women the lives of the thousands of men and women, they
candidates the opportunity to run for office. In 2013, are also mobilizing a community to ensure those
over 40 percent of the BC NDP candidates were workplace rights are matched with progressive
female. That represents a significant change in how legislative change, a change that is central to all
our Party reflects and respects the communities in New Democrats who want progressive alternatives
which it works to build voter support. from their government. Those shared perspectives
are also critical to how effective the Party is when
For a province like ours, where ethnic diversity
organizing an election campaign. Union activists
continues to gain momentum, the challenge
and union members help mobilize voter support
for 2017 will be to ensure that our candidate
at both the local and provincial level. Unions also
selection process reflects that changing diversity.
13Election Review
provide on-going financial support to the Party as policies, issues and the priorities of those voters is
well as contribute to maintain the Party’s capacity the new standard that drives modern campaigns.
to connect with voters on key issues of economic Unfortunately, right-wing political organizations
and social justice. have seized this approach and are using it to great
The partnership between the labour movement success; witness what the Harper Conservatives
and the NDP is a two-way partnership, one have been able to achieve in their campaigns. Our
that requires both to work collaboratively on a party has to develop capacities in these areas if we
progressive and shared agenda. For the labour hope to win in 2017.
movement it means moving support for the NDP Our Party also has to do a much better job of
beyond the leadership ranks. Too often a disconnect connecting with BC’s increasingly diverse voter
between union leaders and union members population. Our outreach efforts within some of
undermines labour’s ability to mobilize support those communities have a strong history, but we
for NDP candidates or build public support for cannot afford to assume that those connections
progressive change. Similarly, the Party needs to will transition from one generation to the next.
advance policies that connect with working people BC will be a far more diverse province in 2017
in ways that strengthen the principles that brought and if the BC NDP does not have an effective and
labour and the NDP together. coherent ethnic outreach strategy in place by then,
Observations and Conclusions we are at risk of losing again in 2017.
The lessons learned from the 2013 provincial One final observation and that is the extent to which
election are many. We know that not framing election campaigns are about the Leader. The reality
the incumbent government and focusing public of modern campaigning is that a political party has
attention, media scrutiny and ultimately voter to operate a sophisticated campaign at many levels
choice on how their term as government has failed simultaneously. It has to appeal to a party’s base
to meet the needs of voters can have a disastrous for support, fundraising and volunteers. It has to
impact on a campaign and an election outcome. deal with a media that is looking for critical gaps in
Going into the May 2013 campaign the BC NDP whatever position the party is advancing. But most
had the capacity to make a compelling pitch to of all, the campaign has to reach that group of
voters that the BC Liberals did not deserve another voters who don’t pay attention to the details of an
term. Scandal, incompetent public policy decisions, election until well into a campaign. In that respect,
cold-hearted cuts to much needed public services a party’s Leader is a party’s brand. We have to be
and programs—the list of BC Liberal failures is mindful of how we present that brand and never
a long one—but by failing to give these issues make assumptions about how voters, especially the
proper weight in our campaign, we effectively undecided, will ultimately make up their minds
ceded an advantage to the BC Liberals that they and cast their votes. In that context, party Leaders
opportunistically used to win a fourth term. have to be accessible to voters, have to be willing
to engage and have to accept that in creating the
We also know that our campaign machinery,
sense of brand, the Leader’s openness to advice,
although much improved over previous election
input and direction from a campaign team is
campaigns, needs a significant overhaul. Having
critical. Similarly, the campaign team has to work
the technical capacity to not just identify potential
from the assumption that they are always fighting
voter support, but also correlate that support to
14Election Review
an uphill battle in which public support for the • The Party also needs to turn its attention
brand is never a foregone conclusion. Having all to effective member engagement between
those elements firmly in place is the only way to elections, not just during the 28 day campaign.
ensure electoral success in the future. This emphasis will require better training
Recommendations of Local Constituency Associations, more
effective deployment of organizers and
Provincial Office, Provincial Executive and MLAs
ensuring Table Officers and Executive the
• The Party needs to build strong and building of a strong organizing infrastructure
effective connections between all levels of the within the Party beyond the 28-day election
organization including the Table Officers, the campaign cycle.
provincial Executive, the Provincial Council
• The incoming Executive of the Party need
and MLAs. Having that in place will ensure
to undertake regular semi-annual reviews of
that future campaigns enjoy the full support of
the implementation of these recommendations
the Party’s key decision-making bodies.
to ensure the intended goals are achieved.
• The Party needs to have a well-defined
Candidate Selection & Support
structure for the Election Planning Committee.
The EPC must include representation from • While the Party has recorded great success
all levels of the Party and ensure strong and in increasing access for women to represent
effective connections are in place throughout our Party as candidates, similar efforts must
the campaign. also be directed at BC’s increasingly diverse
ethnic communities. The Provincial Executive
• The 2017 campaign must be guided
should consider changes that would ensure
by a strategic plan which reflects the input
that our slate of 2017 candidates fully reflects
and priorities of not just MLAs and the
the ethnic diversity of the province.
Party Leader, but also the Party’s Executive,
Table Officers and Provincial Council. The • As part of any plan to improve the Party’s
development of that plan is critical to our candidate selection process, the Provincial
success in 2017. Office also needs to strengthen its vetting
procedures to anticipate problems before they
• The development of that plan should begin
arise during the 28 day campaign.
with a thorough de-brief of the 2013 election
results as well as campaign strengths and • The Party should be prepared to make the
weaknesses and utilize an ongoing strategic necessary constitutional changes to support
planning process. the goals of stronger diversity and better
support for local candidates.
• The Provincial Office must invest in a
new system of voter and member contact • Establish a plan for non-incumbent
information that has the capacity to merge candidates nominated well in advance of the
key data bases and provide real-time updates writ period, to allow them to make the most of
to that information. This investment must also their time and resources.
ensure that the data entry is accurate and up to
date. As well, the system change must include
training for local Constituency Associations.
15Election Review
• The Party needs to develop a robust system as government. Not answering that basic
of candidate support that includes extensive question will leave voters wondering why a
training, briefing on platform elements and change in the status quo is needed.
support for their local issues and campaigns • The 2017 campaign needs to include
Fundraising a capacity for local campaigns to highlight
• The Provincial Council should set either the failures of incumbent government
meaningful and measurable fundraising candidates to address important local issues
targets for all levels of the Party and ensure or specific platform commitments designed to
those targets are met. build voter support in key ridings.
• Although there were some complaints • While the platform and the campaign
about the aggressive new approach that the should not inhibit the capacity to govern
Party took to fundraising over the last two in the case of a victory, the election strategy
years, the reality is that neither the Provincial should be, first and foremost, centered on the
Office nor a 2017 election campaign effort first task of winning the election.
can be effective if it isn’t well-resourced. • Campaigns should be inspiring and
Fundraising is key to meeting both objectives. provide a positive vision for voters to grasp, but
For that effort to succeed, all levels of the Party they should also draw appropriate contrasts
need to set meaningful targets for fundraising based on differences in policy, record and
and review how best to achieve those targets. character.
Polling and Communications • Campaigns should center on the NDP’s
• In 2017, the Party needs to have a more perceived strengths and the opponents’
disciplined approach to targeted ridings, one perceived weaknesses.
that includes tracking polling in these ridings • Research must be conducted well in
as well as a very deliberate connection between advance of the election to understand priorities
the platform and local priorities for those of voters from a variety of ethnic backgrounds.
ridings. • Ethnic media should be integral to the
• Comprehensive focus group testing campaign strategy and rollout. Particular effort
must assess campaign messages, campaign should be given to ensuring these media receive
documents and all paid advertising. fair and equal attention from the Leader and
• To ensure that the target strategy has the campaign.
the right level of support, the 2017 campaign • The central campaign should have readily
should have a target committee that works available spokespeople in each of BC’s major
with the target constituencies to ensure they language groups, who are fully integrated in
have quality candidates, resources, training, the central campaign. These spokespeople
volunteers and local advertising. should not necessarily be candidates.
• The 2017 campaign must start with • The Leader and the Leader’s
a strong, clear message about why the communications team should receive media
BC Liberals don’t deserve another term
16Election Review
training for each audience language, and be • In selecting a Campaign Manager for
expected to engage regularly in advance of and the 2017 campaign, experience, skill and a
during the election with ethnic media. thorough understanding of the BC political
• The polling strategy should conform to scene and the Party’s capacity to mobilize at
generally accepted principals of campaign the constituency level are essential attributes
polling and should be sufficiently resourced so for this position. Strong team leadership skills
as to be effective and meaningful. are an essential part of the manager’s skill set.
• The 2017 campaign’s paid advertising • The 2017 campaign should have the
must be properly resourced and support the flexibility to better support local campaigns
campaign’s core messages while being flexible and integrate feedback provided to the central
enough to adapt to emerging issues. campaign by local constituencies.
Platform • It is the responsibility of the Campaign
Manager to keep the team focused and
• While the standard for tabling a fully-
effective. It’s also the job of the Campaign
costed and comprehensive platform document
Manager to ensure that the Leader is
was advanced in 2013, greater emphasis
following the plan developed by the campaign
needs to be placed on how the 2017 platform
team. Where disagreements arise between
document is communicated to voters.
the Campaign Manager and the Leader over
• As well, careful consideration should be details in the plan, it’s the Leader’s job to be
given to how and when the 2017 platform the candidate and the manager’s job to run
document is released. the campaign. Any confusion on those roles
• The 2017 platform must inspire both the and responsibilities undermines the entire
Party’s traditional base and potential swing campaign effort. The 2017 campaign needs to
voters. The input from all levels of the Party have those roles clearly defined and agreed to
needs to reflect those priorities and provide long before the writ is dropped.
clear evidence that the BC NDP has earned • While the Leader’s Tour was well-
the support of voters. resourced, it failed to connect effectively with
• The 2017 platform also needs to be voters, a gap that reflected problems with the
thoroughly tested using polling and focus core campaign message. The 2017 campaign
groups to ensure that our priorities are needs to close this gap.
well understood and easily communicated. • The 2017 campaign needs to resource and
Ultimately the platform is the Party’s pitch to implement an effective ethnic media strategy
voters, especially undecided voters who need that includes more targeted ad buys as well as
to be convinced to vote NDP. more dedicated Party spokespeople capable of
The Campaign handling interviews in languages other than
English.
• The Party should strive to have its 2017
campaign team in place at least a year ahead of • The campaign needs to provide local
the election. campaigns with a capacity to talk about local
issues. The 2017 campaign needs to address
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